JUDGMENT NO. 23

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of: President:

Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law of December 30, 2023, no. 215 (Urgent provisions on regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law of February 23, 2024, no. 18, on its own and in conjunction with Article 1 of Law of April 29, 2024, no. 56 [recte: with Article 39-bis of Decree-Law of March 2, 2024, no. 19, containing "Further urgent provisions for the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan” (PNRR), converted, with amendments, into Law of April 29, 2024, no. 56], as well as Article 12, paragraph 1, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture), promoted by the Council of State, Sixth Section, in the proceedings concerning the dispute between the CLAAI Association - Provincial Union of Artisans and Small Enterprises of Benevento and others and the Ministry of Enterprises and 'Made in Italy' and others, with order of May 20, 2025, registered under no. 124 of the register of ordinary proceedings 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 26, special first series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the statement of constitution of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of Irpinia Sannio, as well as the statement of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard Judge Rapporteur Giovanni Pitruzzella in the public hearing of January 14, 2026;

having heard counsel Flavio Iacovone for the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of Irpinia Sannio, and State Attorney Giorgio Santini for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in the Chamber of Council on January 14, 2026.

Facts of the Case

1.– With order registered under no. 124 of the register of ordinary proceedings 2025, the Council of State, Sixth Section, raised, with reference to Article 77 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law of December 30, 2023, no. 215 (Urgent provisions on regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law of February 23, 2024, no. 18.

Alternatively, the Council of State raised a question of constitutional legitimacy of the same provision, with reference to Articles 3, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Still alternatively, the referring body subsequently raised, with reference to the principles of reasonableness and non-discrimination under Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy of the aforementioned Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, in conjunction with Article 1 of Law of April 29, 2024, no. 56, concerning the "Conversion into law, with amendments, of Decree-Law of March 2, 2024, no. 19, containing further urgent provisions for the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR)” [recte: with Article 39-bis of Decree-Law of March 2, 2024, no. 19, containing "Further urgent provisions for the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR),” converted, with amendments, into Law of April 29, 2024, no. 56].

Lastly, and in the event of acceptance of one of the above questions, the referring body raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 12 of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture).

1.1.– The Council of State was seized for review of four judgments of the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, which had dismissed the appeals filed by certain business associations against the self-reversal measures excluding other interested parties from the procedure for appointing members of the board of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture (CCIAA) of Irpinia Sannio.

1.1.1.– The original exclusion measures were based on the inter-provincial or regional nature of the associations, which, according to some precautionary precedents of the Council of State, precluded their participation in the procedure, as governed by Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 6, of the Decree of the Minister of Economic Development of August 4, 2011, no. 156 (Regulation concerning the designation and appointment of board members and the election of members of the executive committee of Chambers of Commerce pursuant to Article 12 of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580, as amended by Legislative Decree of February 15, 2010, no. 23), issued in implementation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993.

According to the aforementioned precedents, in particular, Article 12 cited above only provided that board members are designated by business organizations in proportion to the representativeness of each organization within the territorial constituency of the Chamber of Commerce (paragraphs 1 and 2). The aforementioned implementing Ministerial Decree, empowered by the primary norm, would have limited the subjects entitled to take part in the procedure, who are identified, primarily, in business organizations at the provincial level, provided they adhere to national organizations represented in the National Council for Economics and Labor (CNEL), or have been operating in the constituency for at least three years prior to publication (Art. 2, paragraph 2); only in the absence of a provincial level, in business organizations established and structured at the national level and, in the absence of such a national level, in those established and structured at the regional level, always provided they are represented in the CNEL, or have been operating in the constituency for at least three years prior to publication (Art. 2, paragraph 6).

1.1.2.– With the acts challenged in the first instance, those exclusion measures had been subject to self-reversal, in light of the subsequent Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, which – expressly providing an authentic interpretation of the cited Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 – stipulated that the designation of members of the Boards of the CCIAA "is carried out by the representative organizations of businesses and by the trade unions of workers established at the provincial or multi-provincial level or, failing that, by those established at the regional level, where present, or at the national level, with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness of the said organizations within the territorial constituency of competence of the Chamber of Commerce concerned.”

1.1.3.– The first judge therefore dismissed the appeals, deeming the self-reversal measures adopted in light of the challenged Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, in force at the time of their adoption, to be lawful, and the subsequent repeal by the intervening Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted, to be irrelevant in light of the principle *tempus regit actum*.

1.1.4.– The first instance judgments were appealed, before the referring body, on the following grounds: a) for having held the principle *tempus regit actum* to be applicable, despite the norm of purported authentic interpretation subsequently repealed being unable to find application, as it actually had an innovative scope and as such was intended to operate only for the future; b) for not having considered the necessarily retroactive nature of the repealing norm and the consequent lapse of the interpretative constraint imposed by the legislator; c) for not having held the subsequent repealing provision to be applicable due to the unitary nature of the appointment procedure of board members, which was not yet concluded; d) for not having taken into account the regulatory changes that occurred during the procedure, thus "affirming – in relation to the issue of representativeness – a rule that the legislator himself had ‘abjured’ with the repealing norm” and causing, for the electoral procedure relating to the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, the application of a different rule from that affirmed by the Council of State itself in relation to the CCIAA of Naples, in violation of the principle of equality; e) and f) for not having applied the provisions of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011, deemed not to be in conflict with the primary source and not superseded by the authentic interpretation provision (subsequently repealed).

1.2.– The referring body considers the questions relevant because the challenged acts were adopted on the basis of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, which would therefore be "the exclusive regulatory reference parameter in light of which the legitimacy review” of the said acts must be carried out.

Such a conclusion would be required by reason of: a) the nature of authentic interpretation of the provision and its consequent retroactive scope; b) the impossibility of considering the provision repealing the authentic interpretation provision as retroactive in turn; c) the impossibility of adhering to the interpretation of the principle *tempus regit actum* put forward by the appellant party.

1.2.1.– As to the nature of authentic interpretation of the cited Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, the referring body observes that the very "qualification” made by the legislator, according to which Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 "is interpreted to mean that […]”, supports this.

The parliamentary work and, in particular, the studies dossiers of the Senate of the Republic of February 15, 2024 (relating to A.C. no. 1633-A, XIX Legislature) and of April 18, 2024 (A.S. no. 1110, XIX Legislature) would also point in the same direction.

Furthermore, it should be considered that, despite the different opinion of the Council of State, a part of administrative jurisprudence had interpreted Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 in the sense, subsequently adopted by the legislator, that territorial representativeness of the business organization would be the only element assessable in the designation procedure of board members, without its territorial dimension being relevant (citing judgments of the TAR Campania, First Section, January 25, 2024, no. 674, no. 667 and no. 664).

Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, in so far as it has an interpretative nature, was correctly applied by the administration to "a situation preceding its entry into force.”

1.2.2.– As to the non-retroactive nature of the repealing provision under Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted, this Court affirmed that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the repeal of the authentic interpretation norm has no retroactive effect, in line with the general principle under Article 11, first paragraph, of the preliminary provisions to the Civil Code (citing Judgment no. 33 of 2020).

It would follow that Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 should be interpreted according to Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, until the entry into force of the conversion law of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024. From the entry into force of the latter, however, the interpretative constraint ("the so-called unavailability of the text”) would have ceased.

1.2.3.– The thesis put forward by the appellants, according to which the principle *tempus regit actum* should have been applied differently by the first judge, "taking into account the electoral nature of the procedure, which has a complex and overall formation nature,” with the consequence that the repeal of the interpretative provision would be relevant, is not shareable, according to the referring body.

By virtue of the principle *tempus regit actum*, the lawfulness of an administrative act must be assessed with regard to the factual and legal situation existing at the time of its adoption. In the present case, the repeal of the authentic interpretation norm would be an event subsequent to the adoption of the challenged acts and, as such, would be irrelevant. Moreover, the procedure before the referring judge would not be extendable until the conclusion of the electoral operations, with the degradation of the challenged acts to "provisional determinations lacking, in essence, immediate effectiveness.” Rather, these would be sub-procedures confined to verifying the prerequisites for participation in the renewal procedure and governed by the law in force at the time they were concluded.

1.2.4.– The foregoing considerations would lead to the rejection of the first four grounds of appeal. The last two grounds remain for examination, which are based on the applicability in the present case of the provisions of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011, as interpreted by the case law of the Council of State itself, provisions which would not be superseded by Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted.

According to the referring body, this perspective "obliterates the authentic interpretation norm, which clearly affects the identification of the subjects entitled to participate in the procedure.” The last two grounds would also have to be dismissed, due to the necessity of applying the interpretative norm, which would therefore be decisive for the judgment, "determining its outcome.”

Conversely, should this Court declare the constitutional illegitimacy of the "indicated rules,” the interpretative power of the judge would expand again, and the appeal would have to be granted, "deeming the principles set out” by the aforementioned case law of the Section to be shareable, "although with the necessary application of the same to the inter-provincial dimension of the Chamber of Commerce of Irpinia Sannio.”

1.3.– Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring body deems that Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, violates, in the first instance, Article 77 of the Constitution.

1.3.1.– The Council of State observes that the provision was inserted during the conversion of the aforementioned Decree-Law, entitled "Urgent provisions on regulatory deadlines,” i.e., the "so-called 2024 Omnibus Decree.”

The original version of Article 17 was limited to allowing the Mission Structure for the 2009 earthquake and the Government Commissioner for the 2016 earthquake to continue the interventions of the National Complementary Fund to the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), even in derogation of the schedule.

In the conversion stage, paragraph 1-bis was added, pursuant to which, "[f]or the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and to ensure the widest participation of the business sectors of the areas affected by the earthquakes of 2009 and 2016, considering the territorial complexity resulting from the merger of five pre-existing territorial constituencies, the transitional provision referred to in Article 4, paragraph 4, first sentence, of Legislative Decree of November 25, 2016, no. 219, concerning the determination of the number of members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture established following a merger pursuant to Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580, shall apply to the bodies of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of the Marche region for two terms following the one in progress on the date of entry into force of the conversion law of this Decree; for the same duration, the executive committee of the said Chamber of Commerce shall be composed of the president and nine members. The overall expenditure limit referred to in Article 1, paragraph 25-ter, of Decree-Law of December 30, 2021, no. 228, converted, with amendments, by Law of February 25, 2022, no. 15, shall remain unchanged. In the ongoing procedure for the renewal of the bodies of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of the Marche region, the deadline referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1, of Law of December 12, 2002, no. 273, is extended by an additional ninety days. Article 12 of the aforementioned Law no. 580 of 1993 is interpreted to mean that the designation of the members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture is carried out by the representative organizations of businesses and by the trade unions of workers established at the provincial or multi-provincial level or, failing that, by those established at the regional level, where present, or at the national level, with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness of the said organizations within the territorial constituency of competence of the Chamber of Commerce concerned.”

According to the Council of State, the legislator, with Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, introduced several provisions aimed – with the exception of the challenged one – at regulating certain aspects concerning the CCIAA in the territories affected by the 2009 and 2016 earthquakes.

Both the provision in the first sentence, relating to the bodies of the CCIAA of the Marche Region, and the one in the second sentence, "aimed at maintaining the expenditure limit,” and the one in the third sentence, also relating to the renewal procedure of the bodies of the same CCIAA, would be aimed at this purpose.

Conversely, the challenged provision in the last sentence of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, would not contain any element from which to derive its exclusive reference to the CCIAA in the territories affected by the two seismic events and, therefore, should be understood as referring to all CCIAA.

The opposite interpretation, which would have rendered the question of constitutional legitimacy irrelevant, would not be sustainable in the absence of "clear elements of territorial limitation of the precept.”

1.3.2.– Having noted this regarding the interpretation of the challenged provision, the referring body, citing entire excerpts from the judgment of this Court no. 44 of 2025, illustrates the constitutional case law regarding the impact of authentic interpretation laws on ongoing proceedings, which cannot open up to objects heterogeneous from those present in the decree-law, but can only contain provisions consistent with the original ones from a material or finalistic point of view.

In relation to governmental measures with an originally multiple content, the continuity between the conversion law and the decree-law can only be measured by verifying the coherence between the provisions inserted during the conversion and those originally adopted by way of extraordinary necessity and urgency, taking into account the link with one of the contents already regulated by the decree-law, or with its dominant ratio.

This continuity ceases when the added provisions are totally extraneous or even "intrusive” with respect to those contents and those objectives.

With specific reference to the "omnibus” decrees (which are a species of decree-laws with an originally multiple content), the constitutional case law has affirmed that this is a type of decree-law characterized by the unitary ratio of urgently intervening on the expiry of deadlines whose passage would be detrimental to interests deemed relevant by the Government and Parliament, or of acting on existing situations – albeit pertaining to different objects and matters – that require regulatory interventions of a temporal nature.

1.3.3.– Applying these principles to the case at hand, the referring body observes that the challenged provision does not affect any expiring deadline, nor does it put in place "a temporal intervention, but rather an authentic interpretation law of a provision from 1993 that regulates an ordinary situation and is not limited in time.”

Furthermore, it would be extraneous to the object and purposes of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, which consist in the need to "provide for the extension and definition of soon-to-expire deadlines in order to ensure the continuity of administrative action, as well as to adopt essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration action” (according to the preamble), since, in addition to not providing any extension or deferral of deadlines, "it does not even promote essential measures for administrative action, being an interpretative norm aimed at systemically regulating the subjects entitled to participate in the renewal procedures for the chamber bodies.”

The legislator himself was aware of the "criticalities” of the provision, as evidenced by the fact that, just two months after its entry into force, he provided for its repeal by Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, inserted during the conversion, upon proposal of the Government.

1.4.– Alternatively, the Council of State raises a question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, with reference to Articles 3, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR.

For this complaint as well, the referring body cites, in the first instance, extensive excerpts from the judgment of this Court no. 44 of 2025, regarding the constitutional case law on the impact of authentic interpretation laws on ongoing proceedings.

1.4.1.– Applying the principles set out therein to the present case, the Council of State observes, in the first instance, that the challenged provision was introduced pending both the disputes relating to the renewal of the board of the CCIAA of Naples – with respect to which it would only be relevant due to its subsequent repeal – and that initiated by one of the current interested parties who had challenged before the TAR Lazio its exclusion from the renewal procedure (subsequently reversed in self-reversal by the determination appealed in one of the cases before the referring judge). That judgment, moreover, was suspended pending final judgment on the judgment of the same TAR, Fourth Section, December 23, 2024, no. 23270, the subject of one of the appeals before the referring judge.

Furthermore, the legislator would have intervened immediately after the publication, in the proceedings relating to the renewal of the board of the CCIAA of Naples, of the precautionary orders of September 25, 2023, no. 3915 and no. 3914, with which the Sixth Section of the Council of State had reaffirmed that paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 2 of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011 "have, in their clear combined provision, the function of delimiting the field of business organizations entitled to be represented on the Chamber board, identifying them, as a rule, in only the ‘business organizations at the provincial level’ (provided they adhere to national organizations represented in the CNEL or have operated in the constituency for at least three years prior to publication) or, alternatively, in only the ‘business organizations established and structured only at the national or, failing that, regional level’ (always provided they adhere to national organizations represented in the CNEL or have operated in the constituency for at least three years prior to publication).”

1.4.2.– It should also be considered that parts of the indicated proceedings involve public administrations and, in particular, the Ministry of Enterprises and 'Made in Italy' (MIMIT) and a CCIAA.

The Ministry had also expressed a clear "homologous interpretative opinion” to that adopted by the interpretative provision, stating, in the opinion of April 9, 2015, no. 49851, that, when trade associations are structured at both regional and provincial levels, "they may choose whether to participate in the procedure for the establishment of the new board as a Regional Association or as provincial associations.” That position was reaffirmed with the subsequent opinion of November 11, 2021, no. 354943, relating to the renewal procedure of the board of the CCIAA of Salerno and with the note of July 24, 2023, no. 240427, relating to the renewal procedure of the board of the CCIAA of Naples.

1.4.3.– The timing and method followed by the legislator should also be considered, who intervened after the aforementioned precautionary orders of the Council of State and more than thirty years after the entry into force of Law no. 580 of 1993.

Regarding the timing, this suggests that the challenged provision did not pursue the intent "to correct an imperfection of the regulatory text (which, in fact, was not modified, and, indeed, had no obvious imperfections), nor to establish an interpretation more faithful to the original will of the legislator (who, in fact, had not expressed any precise provision regarding the subject matter of the interpretative norm, limiting himself, as explained, to referring, for the criteria” to the regulation to be adopted pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 4, of Law no. 580 of 1993), "but rather to intervene in ongoing judicial proceedings.”

This assumption would be confirmed by the manner in which the legislator intervened, adopting an authentic interpretation norm with retroactive effect, "and, therefore, also affecting previous facts.”

The referring body observes, moreover, how the legislative intervention was carried out by "inserting” the provision "during the conversion of a decree-law of particular relevance (such as the so-called omnibus decree), and therefore, jumping on a moving train, so to speak, and ‘exploiting’ a legislative channel through which the reflection of Parliament is already ordinarily compressed, and even more so in the case of a decree characterized by the unitary ratio ‘to intervene urgently on the expiry of deadlines whose passage would be detrimental to interests deemed relevant by the Government and Parliament’ (Judgment no. 245 of 2022 of this Court).”

Finally, the legislator would not have indicated – and in any case they are not evident – the exceptional circumstances or the reasons of general interest that required the regulatory intervention, given that a precept remained unchanged for over thirty years.

This would also be confirmed by "a comprehensive analysis of the matter.” Indeed, if there were reasons of general interest, it is unclear why the legislator – after repealing the interpretative norm – did not subsequently intervene to regulate the situation with another norm, "maintaining a system that appears, overall, irrational.”

According to this "system,” in fact, until the entry into force of Law no. 18 of 2024 (converting Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023), the interpretation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would have been left, "in a completely physiological way,” to the judicial bodies; after the entry into force of the aforementioned Law no. 18 of 2024 and until the entry into force of Law no. 56 of 2024 (converting Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024), the interpretation intended by the legislator would have been imposed, but with retroactive effect; with the entry into force of the cited Law no. 56 of 2024, the imperative needs underlying the intervention would seem to have ceased, as the legislator did not intervene further and the judge's interpretative power expanded again.

Ultimately, the referring body deems that the legislative intervention was "calibrated and carried out, exclusively, to influence” the events relating to the CCIAA of the Campania Region.

1.5.– With the third question, also raised alternatively to the first, the Council of State doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, and Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, taking into account both "the criterion of logic and reasonableness” and the "principle of equality and equal treatment.”

The already described "overall regulatory operation” carried out by the legislator would be completely irrational, it being unclear "the objective reasons for which to introduce an interpretative constraint on a norm in force for over thirty years for a period limited to just two months, but with necessarily retroactive effects” (given the interpretative nature of the provision).

Nor would it be "rational and logical” to eliminate this constraint only for the future, "thereby dismantling the system and causing different treatment for similar situations, given that the renewal procedures included in the period of application of the interpretative norm will be governed by the precept as interpreted by the legislator,” while other cases (such as those affecting the CCIAA of Naples, "as well as, hypothetically, future situations”) will be left to the judge’s interpretation, "with abstractly different outcomes.”

1.6.– With the last questions, articulated "in the alternative and, in particular, in the event of acceptance of at least one of the three questions of legitimacy raised above,” the Council of State doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution.

The questions – the referring body continues – are formulated by one of the interested opposing parties in the event that the cited Article 12 is "purged” of the interpretative constraint, "thus leading ‘to preclude a representative association of businesses from taking part in the formation process of the Chambers of Commerce simply because it has a subjectivity that is neither national nor provincial, but inter-provincial or regional’.”

The said party, therefore, would have asked the referring body, "in case of adherence to this interpretation,” to raise questions of constitutional legitimacy. The referring body, by adhering to this interpretative option already adopted by the Section in the aforementioned precedents concerning the CCIAA of Naples – "although […] the aforementioned principles must in any case be applied to the inter-provincial dimension” of the Chamber of Commerce of Irpinia Sannio – the questions raised by the association, in case of acceptance of one of the first three questions, "might prove […] relevant.”

Regarding the non-manifest unfoundedness – the referring body continues – the party alleged that this interpretation would be contrary to Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution.

In particular, "the treatment reserved to associations with regional or inter-provincial subjectivity compared to that of associations with national subjectivity would be unreasonable and unjustifiably discriminatory.” Also according to the party in the proceedings before the referring court, its right to participate in the renewal procedure, in order to allow the representation of the businesses associated with it, would be based on Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution.

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the Attorney General’s Office, raising objections of inadmissibility and, on the merits, of non-foundationality of the questions raised.

2.1.– They would be inadmissible, in the first instance, because the interpretation provided by the challenged Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, would coincide with that already provided by the then Ministry of Economic Development (MISE), with circular no. 3727/C of June 14, 2022, and would be confirmed by the subsequent intervention of the legislator.

Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law of March 14, 2025, no. 25 (Urgent provisions on recruitment and functionality of public administrations), converted, with amendments, into Law of May 9, 2025, no. 69, in fact provided that "[t]he designation of members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture is carried out by the organizations referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580, which, in addition to possessing the requirements identified by the methods referred to in paragraph 4 of the same Article 12, are established at the provincial and supra-provincial level or, failing that, at the regional level, where present, or at the national level, with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness of the said organizations within the territorial constituency of competence of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture concerned.”

The questions would therefore be irrelevant, since, even in the absence of the authentic interpretation provision, the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, in light of the interpretation adopted by the ministerial circular, should have adopted the self-reversal acts challenged.

2.2.– On the merits, the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, raised with reference to Article 77 of the Constitution, would be unfounded.

According to the Attorney General’s Office, it should first be considered that the provision in question, in its unitary structure, contains provisions aimed at extending deadlines, even if referred only to the CCIAA of the Marche Region: the extension of the application of the transitional provision referred to in Article 4, paragraph 4, first sentence, of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, as well as the ninety-day extension of the maximum term of six months for the exercise of functions by the expired CCIAA boards, pending the installation of the new ones.

The assumption of extraneousness of the challenged provision to the original content of the decree-law could not be shared.

First of all, it cannot be held that it is eccentric and completely unrelated, by subject matter and purpose, to the decree-law.

The authentic interpretation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, in fact, would be functional to the application of the aforementioned provisions that extend deadlines relating to the CCIAA of the Marche Region, even if, as observed by the Council of State, it does not limit its application to that territorial scope.

The amendment, remaining within the subject matter of the regulation of the CCIAA, would not appear clearly non-homogeneous with the content of the decree-law, with which, on the contrary, it maintains a "clear functional interrelationship link.”

It should also be observed that the extraordinary necessity and urgency of the decree-law, as evidenced by its preamble, would refer not only to the extension and definition of deadlines, but also to the adoption of measures aimed at making administrative action efficient and effective. The challenged provision would be relatable to these latter measures, as it clarifies "the mere applicative meaning” of the interpreted norm and averts the risk of new disputes arising.

2.3.– The second question, raised alternatively, which complains of an illegitimate intrusion into ongoing proceedings, would also be unfounded.

The purpose of the challenged provision, now repealed, would have been to avert disputes, imposing a uniform interpretation for "all legal situations concerning the appointment” of the Boards of the CCIAA.

This purpose would also be "corroborated” by the subsequent introduction of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, which would have re-proposed a norm of substantially coinciding content with that of the repealed authentic interpretation.

In any case, the latter, considered its non-innovative nature and the function of expressing a meaning belonging to those derivable from the interpreted provision, would not have the power to influence the outcome of ongoing proceedings.

2.4.– The intervening party deems the referring body's observations underlying the third question, particularly where it argues that the limited period of validity of the norm determines different treatment for similar situations, also not shareable.

In fact, the challenged provision would be applicable to all cases "under the question submitted to the Court’s judgment, expressing the same meaning as that attributable to the interpreted provision, with the application of the provision under Article 13-bis, paragraph 1,” of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, also remaining unchanged in the case at hand.

In any case, the fact that the authentic interpretation norm intervened at a distance of thirty years from the adoption of the interpreted norm could not be considered a symptom of illogicality, as the legislative intervention would have become necessary only due to the emergence in recent years of the aforementioned jurisprudential conflicts.

2.5.– The last questions concerning Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would also be inadmissible due to lack of reasoning on relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness, as the referring body would limit itself to referring to the positions of one of the parties in the proceedings, without autonomously illustrating the necessary prerequisites for raising them.

3.– The CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, the appealing party in the proceedings before the referring judge, constituted itself in the constitutional legitimacy review, objecting to the inadmissibility of the questions and, on the merits, to their non-foundationality.

3.1.– The questions concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, would be inadmissible, in the first instance.

The referring judge – the party continues – affirms that, if the challenged provision were declared constitutionally illegitimate, it would interpret Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 in a way consistent with its precedents concerning the renewal of the CCIAA of Naples.

The same Council of State, however, in the order of reference states twice that it adheres to this interpretation, "although […] the aforementioned principles must in any case be applied to the inter-provincial dimension” of the Chamber of Commerce of Irpinia Sannio.

In other words, the referring body is aware that – even if one were to consider that the aforementioned Article 12 allows regional organizations to participate in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies only in the absence of a provincial and national level – the same could not apply in exceptional cases (such as the present one) where it concerns "supra-provincial” level CCIAA (the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio was established from the merger of the pre-existing CCIAA of Avellino and Benevento).

If it concerns "supra-provincial” CCIAA, the organizations entitled to participate in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies would be those at the regional level.

Arguing otherwise would illogically lead to allowing the participation of provincial organizations, even though they only represent a portion of the business fabric of the reference constituency, and not that of the regional ones which, instead, have members throughout the territory of competence of the CCIAA.

Since the interested opposing associations could participate in the renewal procedure of the chamber bodies in any case, the relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, would be lacking.

3.2.– Furthermore, it should be noted that, after the case was submitted for decision before the referring judge, the legislator intervened again with the cited Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, reaffirming the contents of the repealed authentic interpretation provision challenged by the referring body.

The new provision, according to the party, would produce "the same interpretative effects” as Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, having substantially the nature of an interpretative provision with retroactive effect.

The subsequent entry into force of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, would therefore render the questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning the repealed Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, irrelevant, even if *ex post*. This should lead to a finding of inadmissibility, or the return of the acts to the referring judge, so that he may re-evaluate the facts "in light of the indicated legislative supervening events.”

3.3.– On the merits, the question of constitutional legitimacy of the cited Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, for violation of Article 77 of the Constitution, would be unfounded.

3.3.1.– The party observes that the challenged provision was introduced during the conversion of the decree-law within Article 17, which, in its original version, provided for some measures aimed at addressing the emergency situations created in central Italy following the earthquakes of 2009 and 2016.

Parliament, during the conversion, by introducing paragraph 1-bis, would have adopted extraordinary and urgent measures relating to the CCIAA of the territories affected by the aforementioned earthquakes.

Specifically, the paragraph in question provided that – due to the merger of the CCIAA of the territories affected by the aforementioned seismic events – the number of representatives of business organizations on the chamber board should be increased and, at the same time, the deadline for calling the procedure for its renewal should be extended by ninety days.

In this context, "as a necessary complement to the aforementioned provisions,” the legislator would have introduced the contested authentic interpretation norm in the last sentence of paragraph 1-bis. Once the *when* of the renewal procedures for the chamber bodies of the earthquake-stricken areas was clarified, the legislator, quite understandably, would have concerned himself with defining the *how*. While the provisions of a temporal nature are limited to the CCIAA of the Marche Region, those relating to the *how*, in order to avoid unjustified disparities of treatment, would have been "conceived with a generalized scope.”

In light of the jurisprudential conflicts illustrated, in fact, it would have appeared essential to intervene urgently, in order to prevent the CCIAA preparing to renew their chamber bodies (among which were those of the earthquake-stricken areas) from operating in an uncertain legal framework, which would prejudice the rights of regional-level trade organizations.

3.3.2.– Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023 – the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio continues – pursued the dual purpose: a) to provide for the extension and definition of soon-to-expire deadlines in order to ensure the continuity of administrative action; b) to adopt essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration action.

The challenged provision would encompass both purposes pursued by the decree-law. In fact, on the one hand, it would extend the deadlines for the renewal of the bodies of the CCIAA of the Marche Region and, on the other hand, it would indicate the correct interpretation of the norms governing their procedural aspects, thereby ensuring in time the correct reconstitution of these bodies and, consequently, the effectiveness of the related administrative action.

The challenged provision, therefore, would be simultaneously consistent with the object of the article in which it is inserted and, more generally, with the object of the converted decree-law.

3.4.– The second question raised by the Council of State with reference to Articles 3, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, would also be unfounded.

The challenged provision, in fact, would have intervened in the context of the aforementioned objectively uncertain interpretative framework. Furthermore, it would have been adopted in order to correct an imperfection of the regulatory text. Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would "assume” that there are no preclusions to the participation of regional-level organizations in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies, provided that they demonstrate the relevant representativeness in the provincial constituency of reference, but it would not expressly state this, "thus giving rise to instrumental interpretations of the regulatory sources that implemented it.”

The referring judge, in order to support the constitutional illegitimacy of the authentic interpretation provision, would have highlighted that: a) it intervened immediately after the aforementioned precautionary rulings of the Council of State no. 3914 and no. 3915 of 2023 (in which an interpretation opposite to that contained in the authentic interpretation norm was adopted); b) parts of the proceedings are public administrations and, among these, is MIMIT which, in its circulars, had adopted an interpretation similar to that contained in the interpretative provision (thus hypothesizing that the legislative intervention violated the principle of equality of the parties); c) the challenged provision intervened thirty years after the approval of the interpreted one and remained in force for only a short period of time.

To the first consideration, the party replies that the two precautionary orders of the Council of State (which are, moreover, different from those of the first instance and subsequently dismissed by the TAR Campania in the merits phase) are not indicative of a consolidated jurisprudential orientation, with the consequent exclusion of an infringement of legitimate expectations and interference with judicial function.

Regarding the second consideration, the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio observes that the position of MIMIT in the proceedings before the referring judge is completely "neutral,” since they do not concern acts adopted by the Ministry.

The administrations directly involved (the CCIAA of Naples in the cases decided by the TAR Campania and Irpinia Sannio in those decided by the TAR Lazio), moreover, would have no interest in the adoption of the authentic interpretation norm.

Finally, the time elapsed between the entry into force of the latter and that of the interpreted norm would be explained by the fact that before the adoption of the aforementioned precautionary orders of the Council of State, there would never have been any doubt about the possibility for regional organizations to participate in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies, even if they belonged to national-level organizations.

3.5.– The third question, with which the Council of State complains of the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution due to the irrationality and inequality of treatment originating from the overall regulatory system, i.e., from the succession of the interpreted norm, the interpretative norm, and the repeal of the latter, would also be unfounded. According to the referring body, the irrationality of the system lies in having introduced an interpretative constraint on a norm in force for over thirty years for a period of just two months, "but with necessarily retroactive effects” (given the interpretative nature of the authentic interpretation provision).

The party deems that the Council of State, with this question, criticizes not so much the authentic interpretation provision, as rather the decision to repeal it two months after its approval.

If, moreover, the doubt of the referring body derives solely from the choice to introduce an authentic interpretation norm for a limited period, this perplexity should necessarily be considered overcome by the introduction of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, which clarifies, again and definitively, the correct scope of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993.

In any case, the fact that the authentic interpretation norm intervened thirty years after the approval of the interpreted norm could not be considered a symptom of illogicality, since the legislative intervention would have become necessary only due to the emergence in recent years of the aforementioned jurisprudential conflicts.

3.6.– Finally, the last questions concerning Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would also be unfounded, raised in the event of acceptance of one of the first three questions concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted (on its own and in conjunction with Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted).

The referring body incurs a "logical contradiction”: the questions would have been raised in the event that Article 12 is interpreted to mean that it precludes regional-level organizations from participating in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies, if they belong to national-level organizations.

The referring body itself, however, deems this to be the preferable interpretation of the provision. In other words, the referring judge would adhere to an interpretation that it itself deems "potentially unconstitutional,” while simultaneously excluding those that would allow overcoming such doubts of constitutional legitimacy.

According to the party, this would not necessarily lead to the inadmissibility of the question, as the feasibility of alternative interpretative solutions must be investigated.

The correct interpretation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would always have been that of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, even following its repeal, an interpretation also re-proposed by the legislator with Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted.

Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 would merely provide that the designations by business organizations "take place in proportion to their representativeness within the territorial constituency of the Chamber of Commerce concerned.”

The primary norm, therefore, would not impose any limit on the type, or territorial structure (provincial, regional, or national) of the business organizations that may participate in the renewal procedure of the chamber board.

The "crystal clarity of this regulatory precept” would have been the subject of discussion only due to the ambiguous wording of the regulatory discipline that implemented it.

The combined provisions of the primary source and the regulatory norm, however, could also be interpreted, "in line with the practice of the last thirty years,” to mean that the prerequisite for participation in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies is the representativeness of an organization in the chamber constituency, regardless of its structure at the provincial, regional, or national level.

It is not understood, in fact, why, in a situation where a business organization is structured at both regional and national levels, the only organizational level entitled to participate in the renewal of the chamber boards (typically provincial or "supra-provincial”) should be the national one. This would be a "logical absurdity,” which would end up favoring the organizations most distant from the business fabric of reference, to the detriment of those that, conversely, have a direct relationship with the territory.

Such an interpretation, besides violating the principle of reasonableness, would also be in conflict with Articles 2, 18, and 97 of the Constitution.

With regard to Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution, it would suffice to observe that, in this way, regional-level business organizations would be prevented from fully exercising their representational functions.

As for Article 97 of the Constitution, it would appear contrary to the principle of good administration to allow business organizations lacking a direct link with the territory to participate in the renewal procedure of the chamber boards, while preventing those that have a higher degree of proximity to it from participating.

In conclusion, this Court could well adopt a judgment of rejection of the interpretation, clarifying that Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, in the sense that regional-level business organizations may participate in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies even if they belong to national-level organizations.

If such a solution were deemed not practicable, a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the cited Article 12 for violation of Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution would be necessary.

Considerations in Law

4.− With the order indicated in the heading, the Council of State, Sixth Section – seized for the review of four judgments of the TAR Lazio, which had dismissed the appeals filed by certain business associations against the self-reversal measures excluding other interested parties from the appointment procedure for members of the board of the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio – raised several questions of constitutional legitimacy.

The original exclusion measures were based on the inter-provincial or regional nature of the business associations, which, according to some precautionary precedents of the Council of State, in the presence of a national level, would have precluded participation in the aforementioned procedure, as governed by Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 6, of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011, issued in implementation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993.

4.1.− The questions concern three different provisions: Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, containing a norm of purported authentic interpretation, Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted, which repeals the aforementioned interpretative norm, and Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, containing the interpreted norm.

4.1.1.− More specifically, with the first question, the referring body doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, pursuant to which "[t]he interpretation of Article 12 of the aforementioned Law no. 580 of 1993 is that the designation of the members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture is carried out by the representative organizations of businesses and by the trade unions of workers established at the provincial or multi-provincial level or, failing that, by those established at the regional level, where present, or at the national level, with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness of the said organizations within the territorial constituency of competence of the Chamber of Commerce concerned.”

According to the referring body, this provision violates Article 77 of the Constitution, due to a lack of homogeneity with the content and purpose of the "omnibus” decree-law in which it was inserted by the conversion law.

4.1.2.− With the second question, raised alternatively to the first, the Council of State doubts the constitutional legitimacy of the same Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, for violation of Articles 3, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, because the legislator would have intervened to interpret Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, after more than thirty years from its entry into force, solely for the purpose of influencing ongoing judicial proceedings – of which public administrations are parties – imposing a reconstruction of the interpreted provision contrary to that already expressed by the referring body in previous precautionary rulings (concerning the election of the board of another CCIAA).

4.1.3.− With the third question, also raised alternatively to the first, the referring body challenges the cited Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, together with Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted, which provided for its repeal.

According to the Council of State, the combined provisions of the two cited provisions violate Article 3 of the Constitution, with regard to both "the criterion of logic and reasonableness” and the "principle of equality and equal treatment,” it being irrational to "introduce an interpretative constraint on a norm in force for over thirty years for a period limited to just two months, but with necessarily retroactive effects” (given the interpretative nature of the authentic interpretation provision), thus "determining different treatment for similar situations, given that the renewal procedures included in the period of application of the interpretative norm will be governed by the precept as interpreted by the legislator,” while "other cases” will be left to the judge’s interpretation, "with abstractly different outcomes.”

4.1.4.− Lastly, the referring body, in the event of acceptance of one of the first three questions, challenges Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, which – by providing that inter-provincial and regional business organizations are admitted to participate in the procedures for the election of chamber bodies only if they are not also structured at a national level – would conflict with Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution, because: a) "the treatment reserved to associations with regional or inter-provincial subjectivity compared to that of associations with national subjectivity would be unreasonable and unjustifiably discriminatory”; b) it would violate their right to participate in the renewal procedure, "in order to allow the representation of the businesses associated with them.”

5.− Both the intervening party and the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, constituted in the constitutional legitimacy review, raised several exceptions of inadmissibility concerning the first three questions concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted (together with, as regards the third question, Article 39-bis of Decree-Law no. 19 of 2024, as converted).

5.1.− More specifically, according to the President of the Council of Ministers, these questions would be inadmissible due to lack of relevance, since the administration should in any case have adopted the challenged self-reversal act on the basis of the correct interpretation of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 offered by the then MISE with its circulars, as well as on the basis of the subsequent Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted.

5.2.− Also according to the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, the same questions would be inadmissible due to lack of relevance on two different grounds.

The party observes, in the first instance, that – according to the referring judge – if the interpretative provision were declared constitutionally illegitimate, Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 should be interpreted in a manner consistent with its precedents, and yet the referring body specifies, as many as two times, that the principles set out in these precedents should in any case be "applied” "to the inter-provincial dimension” of the Chamber of Commerce of Irpinia Sannio. This would mean that – according to the referring body itself – for "supra-provincial” CCIAA, such as the present one, regional-level organizations would be entitled to participate in the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies, with consequent irrelevance of the challenged interpretative provision.

In the second place, the subsequent Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, would dictate an authentic interpretation norm with substantially identical retroactive effects to the challenged one, which the referring body should therefore not apply. Alternatively, this fact should require the return of the acts to the referring judge, so that he may assess the intervening legal situation.

5.3.– The aforementioned preliminary exceptions call into question the relevance of the questions, which requires verification of the reasoning on this point provided by the referring body within the well-known limits of merely "external” review, aimed at ascertaining the existence of reasoning that is not implausible, not manifestly erroneous or contradictory (among many, judgments no. 50 of 2024, no. 164 of 2023, no. 192 of 2022 and no. 32 of 2021), without delving into an autonomous examination of the elements that led the referring judge to certain conclusions, being able to interfere with this assessment only if it appears, at first glance, absolutely unfounded (among many, judgments no. 164 of 2023 and no. 218 of 2020).

5.4.– The referring body's reasoning cannot be considered implausible.

5.4.1.– In the order of reference, it is stated that the relevance of the questions concerning Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, is based on the circumstance that this provision, having an interpretative and therefore retroactive nature, must be applied, as the challenged self-reversal act is expressly based on it, being its exclusive reference regulatory parameter.

According to the Council of State, by virtue of the principle *tempus regit actum*, the lawfulness of an administrative act must be assessed with regard to the factual and legal situation existing at the time of its adoption. The repeal of the authentic interpretation norm would be a subsequent event to the challenged acts and, as such, would be irrelevant.

Moreover, the procedure before the referring judge would not be extendable until the conclusion of the electoral operations, with the degradation of the challenged acts to "provisional determinations lacking, in essence, immediate effectiveness.” Rather, these would be sub-procedures confined to verifying the prerequisites for participation in the renewal procedure and governed by the law in force at the time they were concluded.

For these reasons, the appellant’s thesis, according to which the principle *tempus regit actum* should be applied differently for the electoral procedure in question, having a "complex and overall formation nature,” thus requiring consideration of all the supervening regulations up to the proclamation of the elected members and therefore also the subsequent repeal of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, would not be founded.

5.4.2.– The aforementioned reasoning is based on the following logical steps: a) at the time of adoption of the challenged self-reversal act, the contested Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, was in force, which justified the annulment, as it had an interpretative nature; b) its subsequent repeal is irrelevant, because it is not retroactive; c) it cannot even be considered that the subsequent repealing provision finds application due to the complex nature of the electoral procedure, because it is a matter of a phase or sub-procedure closed with the issuance of the exclusion act.

The first assumption is not implausible, since the provision under Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, whether it is considered genuinely interpretative or not, still legitimized the self-reversal intervention on previous exclusions, given that in the first case the provision is "intended to operate with the same temporal scope as that interpreted” (Judgment no. 44 of 2025) and in the second case it has a retroactive innovative effect (among many, judgments no. 169, no. 77 and no. 4 of 2024, no. 18 of 2023).

The second assumption is also not implausible, since the subsequent repeal of the interpretative provision, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, has effect *ex nunc* (Judgment no. 33 of 2020).

Furthermore, the assertion that the "complex” nature of the electoral procedure does not allow, in derogation of the principle *tempus regit actum*, to consider subsequent regulatory changes (always subject to express provision to the contrary) and therefore, in the present case, the subsequent repeal of the interpretative provision, is also not implausible, since the admission assessment phase had already concluded with the relevant acts of the procedure manager.

According to administrative jurisprudence, in fact, "the procedure is subject to the regulations in force at the time of its conclusion, with the important exception of procedures that can be fragmented into sub-procedural segments or a plurality of connected procedures: each of them is governed by the law in force at the time the sub-procedure is carried out and only that will be the applicable law” (Council of State, Second Section, Judgment of December 16, 2019, no. 8508; in the same terms, among many, Fifth Section, Judgment of July 27, 2017, no. 3705, and Fourth Section, Judgment of July 7, 2016, no. 3013).

5.4.3.– The plausibility of the referred reasoning is not undermined by the arguments put forward by the Attorney General’s Office and the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio in support of their respective exceptions.

5.4.3.1.– First, it must be excluded that there are grounds for returning the acts to the referring judge for a new assessment of relevance due to the subsequent Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted.

The provision in question does not constitute *ius superveniens*, since it entered into force on May 14, 2025, i.e., (after the hearing in which the case was submitted for decision, but) before the publication of the order of reference, which occurred on May 20, 2025.

5.4.3.2.– Furthermore, it does not affect the relevance of the question, since "the review of the lawfulness of administrative acts is subject to the principle *tempus regit actum* and must therefore be conducted on the basis of the norms in force at the time of their adoption” (Order no. 30 of 2024; in the same sense, among many, judgments no. 172 of 2024, no. 180 of 2022 and no. 227 of 2021; no. 170, no. 109 and no. 7 of 2019; no. 240 of 2018, no. 281, n. 245, n. 203, n. 49 and n. 30 of 2016; Order no. 76 of 2018).

Nor can the provision in question be assigned an interpretative or in any case retroactive significance: it does not contain an interpretative norm, because it does not state that it interprets another, nor a retroactive norm, because it does not expressly deal with facts preceding its entry into force.

5.4.3.3.– Nor is the argument of the Attorney General’s Office, according to which the challenged self-reversal measure should have been adopted regardless of the interpretative provision, based on one of the possible interpretations of the interpreted provision (and the implementing regulatory norms) already adopted by MIMIT in its circulars, relevant.

The scenario outlined by the intervening party is merely hypothetical: the fact remains that the challenged act was adopted precisely and exclusively on the basis of the interpretation contained in the contested Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, which the judge is called upon to apply.

5.4.3.4.– The same applies to the observation, made by the constituted CCIAA, according to which, essentially, regardless of the outcome of the constitutional legitimacy review concerning the interpretative provision, the appeals against the challenged acts should in any case be dismissed, given that regional-level organizations should be admitted to the procedure even by following the interpretation adopted by the Council of State, an interpretation that, as stated by the referring body itself, should be "applied” differently in the case of "supra-provincial” organizations.

Even disregarding the correctness of this observation, on the one hand, the fact remains that the challenged act is based exclusively on Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, and on the reading of Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993 imposed by it on the interpreter; on the other hand, it is known that the judgment on relevance is independent of the influence of the constitutional legitimacy question on the outcome of the proceedings before the referring judge, as it is sufficient that the referring body must apply the challenged provision in its logical-argumentative path (among many, judgments no. 44 of 2025, no. 25 of 2024, no. 88 and no. 19 of 2022 and no. 202 of 2021).

6.– On the merits, the first question with which the Council of State raises the doubt of constitutional legitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, for violation of Article 77 of the Constitution, is founded.

6.1.– In Judgment no. 44 of 2025, not coincidentally widely cited by the referring body, this Court reiterated its case law on the necessary homogeneity of amendments inserted during the conversion of a decree-law compared to the original decree-law.

According to this case law, "amendments to the decree-law conversion law must concern the same object as the latter, under penalty of constitutional illegitimacy (most recently, judgments no. 215 and no. 113 of 2023). In this way, a concurrence of sources is realized, the first governmental and the second parliamentary, in the regulation of the same object” (Judgment no. 146 of 2024).

The conversion law, in fact, "bears the characteristics of a ‘functionalized and specialized’ source, aimed at stabilizing the decree-law, with the consequence that it cannot open up to objects heterogeneous from those present therein, but can only contain provisions consistent with the original ones from a material or finalistic point of view (most recently, judgments no. 113 and no. 6 of 2023, no. 245 of 2022, no. 210 of 2021 and no. 226 of 2019), ‘essentially to prevent the simplified procedural process, provided for by parliamentary regulations, from being exploited for purposes extraneous to those justifying the decree-law, to the detriment of ordinary parliamentary confrontation dynamics’ (judgments no. 245 of 2022, no. 210 of 2021, no. 226 of 2019: in the same sense, judgments no. 145 of 2015, no. 251 and no. 32 of 2014)” (Judgment no. 215 of 2023).

As for "governmental measures with an originally multiple content […], the continuity between the conversion law and the decree-law can only be measured by verifying the coherence between the provisions inserted during the conversion and those originally adopted by way of extraordinary necessity and urgency (most recently, Judgment no. 6 of 2023), taking into account the link with "one of the contents already regulated by the decree-law, or with its dominant ratio” (Judgment no. 245 of 2022). This continuity ceases when the added provisions are totally extraneous or even "intrusive” with respect to those contents and objectives, since "[o]nly the manifest ‘extraneousness of the challenged norms to the object and purposes of the decree-law’ (Judgment no. 22 of 2012) or the ‘evident or manifest lack of any link of interrelation between the provisions incorporated into the conversion law and those of the original decree-law’ (Judgment no. 154 of 2015) can per se invalidate the constitutional legitimacy of the norm introduced by the conversion law” (Judgment no. 181 of 2019, as well as, in the same sense, judgments no. 247 and no. 226 of 2019)” (Judgment no. 113 of 2023).

With specific reference to the "omnibus” decrees (which are a species of decree-laws with an originally multiple content), it has been repeatedly affirmed that this is a "type of decree-law characterized by the ‘unitary ratio of urgently intervening on the expiry of deadlines whose passage would be detrimental to interests deemed relevant by the Government and Parliament, or of acting on existing situations – albeit pertaining to different objects and matters – that require regulatory interventions of a temporal nature” (Judgment no. 22 of 2012)” (Judgment no. 245 of 2022; in terms, Judgment no. 154 of 2015). With respect to such decrees, only the insertion, during the conversion, of a norm "totally extraneous” to the unitary ratio and purpose "determines the commingling and superimposition, in the same regulatory act, of heterogeneous objects and purposes, due to heterogeneous presuppositions in turn (Judgment no. 22 of 2012)” (Judgment no. 154 of 2015).

6.2.– Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, entitled "Urgent provisions on regulatory deadlines,” is precisely an "omnibus” decree-law, adopted due to the "extraordinary necessity and urgency of providing for the extension and definition of soon-to-expire deadlines in order to ensure the continuity of administrative action, as well as adopting essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration action” (according to the preamble).

The challenged provision was inserted during the conversion in Article 17 – titled "Interventions of the Complementary Fund to the PNRR reserved for Areas Affected by the Earthquakes of 2009 and 2016” – which, in its sole paragraph, authorized the Mission Structure for the 2009 earthquake and the Extraordinary Commissioner for the 2016 earthquake to continue the interventions of the Complementary Fund to the PNRR even in derogation of the deadlines established by the schedule (consequently allowing the assumption of multi-year obligations).

Paragraph 1-bis inserted by the conversion law, for its part, consists, primarily, of three sentences intended to regulate the renewal procedures of the CCIAA of the Marche Region, "[f]or the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and to ensure the widest participation of the business sectors of the areas affected by the earthquakes of 2009 and 2016.”

The aforementioned sentences, in particular, provide that, "considering the territorial complexity resulting from the merger of five pre-existing territorial constituencies, the transitional provision referred to in Article 4, paragraph 4, first sentence, of Legislative Decree of November 25, 2016, no. 219, concerning the determination of the number of members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture established following a merger pursuant to Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580, shall apply to the bodies of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of the Marche region for two terms following the one in progress on the date of entry into force of the conversion law of this Decree; for the same duration, the executive committee of the said Chamber of Commerce shall be composed of the president and nine members. The overall expenditure limit referred to in Article 1, paragraph 25-ter, of Decree-Law of December 30, 2021, no. 228, converted, with amendments, by Law of February 25, 2022, no. 15, shall remain unchanged. In the ongoing procedure for the renewal of the bodies of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture of the Marche region, the deadline referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1, of Law of December 12, 2002, no. 273, is extended by an additional ninety days.”

In these parts, therefore, paragraph 1-bis inserted during the conversion: a) extended a transitional norm, deferring by two terms the deadline for the transition from thirty-three to twenty-two members of the CCIAA of the Marche Region provided for following the 2016 reform, and set, for the same period, the number of executive committee members at ten (while keeping the expressly indicated expenditure limit unchanged); b) extended by an additional ninety days the deadline for the extension of the expiring bodies of the same CCIAA.

The last sentence of paragraph 1-bis, on the other hand, contains the challenged norm, according to which "[t]he interpretation of Article 12 of the aforementioned Law no. 580 of 1993 is that the designation of the members of the boards of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture is carried out by the representative organizations of businesses and by the trade unions of workers established at the provincial or multi-provincial level or, failing that, by those established at the regional level, where present, or at the national level, with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness of the said organizations within the territorial constituency of competence of the Chamber of Commerce concerned.”

This provision, therefore, on the one hand, does not exclusively concern the (or one or some of the) CCIAA of the areas affected by the earthquakes of 2009 and 2016, areas dealt with by the original Article 17 of the decree-law; on the other hand, it does not contain an extension of a deadline, nor does it regulate a temporal aspect.

The last sentence of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, on the contrary, contains a purported authentic interpretation norm aimed at identifying, on a permanent basis (i.e., with a "regulatory purpose”: Judgment no. 215 of 2023), the subjects entitled to participate in the appointment procedure for members of the boards of the CCIAA.

For this reason, the challenged provision is heterogeneous with respect to the decree-law, as it is not supported by the same "unitary ratio of urgently intervening on the expiry of deadlines whose passage would be detrimental to interests deemed relevant by the Government and Parliament, or of acting on existing situations – albeit pertaining to different objects and matters – that require regulatory interventions of a temporal nature” (Judgment no. 22 of 2012, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of a provision inserted during the conversion of an "omnibus” decree-law having the character of "a ‘permanent’ regulation, entirely disconnected from particular contingencies”).

In other words, "the insertion, during the conversion, as is the case here, of an interpretative norm completely extraneous to the unitary ratio and purpose of an ‘omnibus’ decree-law, determines the commingling and superimposition, in the same regulatory act, of heterogeneous objects and purposes, due to heterogeneous presuppositions in turn (Judgment no. 22 of 2012)” (Judgment no. 154 of 2015, regarding an authentic interpretation provision inserted in an "omnibus” decree-law and having the purpose of "overcoming a jurisprudential conflict that arose on the identification of the subjects entitled to draft and sign certain cadastral deeds”; in terms, Judgment no. 245 of 2022, regarding a provision inserted in an "omnibus” decree-law that introduced "a mechanism of a regulatory nature concerning the operation, on a permanent basis, of the civil protection service, that is, on an object not even broadly considered, originally, by the decree-law essentially relating to the extension of deadlines”).

6.3.– The thesis of the intervening party and the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, according to which the challenged provision would be homogeneous to the decree-law because it was introduced in order to ensure the correct conduct of the renewal procedures of the chamber bodies, which would allow finding a link with the purpose of the decree-law itself to "adopt essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration action,” is not shareable.

The provisions of the decree-law in question, in accordance with what was declared in the preamble, are aimed at "providing for the extension and definition of soon-to-expire deadlines.”

That of "ensuring the continuity of administrative action, as well as adopting essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration action” is not an autonomous *ratio* of the decree-law, but constitutes a further teleological limitation of the interventions of extension and definition of soon-to-expire deadlines.

6.4.– Nor, as argued by the intervening party and the CCIAA of Irpinia Sannio, can the challenged provision be considered homogeneous by virtue of its link with the others contained in paragraph 1-bis relating only to the CCIAA of the Marche Region and similarly inserted by the conversion law.

This Court, in fact, has already excluded that there can be a "sort of ‘supervening’ or ‘transitional’ homogeneity” (Judgment no. 154 of 2015) by virtue of the material link of the challenged provision with another similarly inserted during the conversion of an "omnibus” decree-law and providing, in fact, for the extension of a deadline.

In fact, "[a]ccording to the case law of this Court, every provision introduced during the conversion must be linked to one of the contents already regulated by the decree-law, or to the dominant *ratio* of the original measure considered as a whole, while the indiscriminate recognition of a ‘transitional’ homogeneity, of the type just described, would allow for easy circumvention of the stated principle” (still, Judgment no. 154 of 2015).

7.– The constitutional illegitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law no. 215 of 2023, as converted, is therefore declared.

8.– The second and third questions, raised by the referring body alternatively to the first, remain absorbed.

9.– We can therefore proceed to examine the last questions raised in the event of acceptance of one of the first three questions and concerning Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, i.e., the interpreted provision.

9.1.– The questions are inadmissible.

Although the referring body apparently raises questions of constitutional legitimacy of a norm of primary nature, the precept challenged is, in fact, contained in the regulatory provisions of Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 6, of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011.

Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993, as far as relevant here, in paragraph 1, merely establishes that "[t]he members of the board are designated by the representative organizations of businesses belonging to the sectors referred to in Article 10, paragraph 2, as well as by the trade unions of workers and the associations for the protection of the interests of consumers and users and by the Consultation referred to in Article 10, paragraph 6.”

Paragraph 2, on the other hand, provides that the members of the board are designated (also) by the representative organizations of businesses "in proportion to their representativeness within the territorial constituency of the Chamber of Commerce concerned,” representativeness to be identified based on criteria provided for by Article 10, paragraph 3, of the same law for the sectoral allocation of the Council, i.e.: number of businesses, employment index and value added, as well as the amount of the annual fee paid (these criteria, specified, as regards sectoral allocation, by the Decree of the Minister of Economic Development of August 4, 2011, no. 155, containing "Regulation on the composition of the boards of Chambers of Commerce in implementation of Article 10, paragraph 3, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580, as amended by Legislative Decree of February 15, 2010, no. 23,” were taken into consideration, for intra-sectoral allocation, by Article 9 of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011).

Paragraph 4, in turn, delegates the regulatory discipline for the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 (as well as Article 14, paragraph 1, of the same law) regarding "the timing, criteria and procedures relating to the procedure for designating the members of the board, as well as the election of the members of the executive committee.”

In implementation of the cited paragraphs of Article 12, Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011 was therefore adopted, which in Article 2, paragraph 2, provided that, "[w]ithin and no later than forty days from the publication of the notice, under penalty of exclusion from the procedure, provincial-level business organizations adhering to national organizations represented in the CNEL, or operating in the constituency for at least three years prior to publication, shall send to the chamber of commerce, for the purpose of allocating the seats referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the law and according to the criteria defined by the decree referred to in Article 10 of the law, a single self-declaration of notoriety […] , signed by the legal representative” and containing a series of data expressly indicated therein.

Paragraph 6 of the same article, on the other hand, provides that, "[l]imitedly to business organizations established and structured only at the national level or, failing that, regional, represented in the CNEL or operating for at least three years in the constituency of the chamber of commerce, the declaration referred to in paragraph 2 and the designations referred to in Article 10, paragraph 1, are submitted by the legal representative of such organization with exclusive reference, in any case, to the representativeness within the provincial scope.”

As admitted by the referring body itself, therefore, the primary source merely sets out the general principle of representativeness in the constituency concerned, saying nothing about the territorial structure of the organizations, rather evoking as indices of representativeness, to be specified by the regulatory source, the different criteria of Article 10, paragraph 3 (i.e., the number of businesses, the employment index, the value added, and the amount of the annual fee paid).

It is, however, from the combined provisions of the regulatory provisions of paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 2 of Ministerial Decree no. 156 of 2011 that the Council of State derived the norm by virtue of which business organizations of an inter-provincial or regional nature can participate in the renewal procedure of the chamber board only in the absence of a national level thereof.

It is known, however, that regulatory norms cannot be the subject of a constitutional legitimacy review, limited to the cognizance of laws and acts having the force of law (among many, judgments no. 174 of 2023 and no. 427 of 2000; orders no. 254 of 2016, no. 156 of 2013, no. 37 of 2007, no. 401 and n. 125 of 2006 and no. 389 of 2004).

Nor can it be said that the regulatory norms challenged by the referring body specify the primary norm, in which case the review of constitutional legitimacy carried out by this Court can extend to them as well (judgments no. 263 of 2022 and no. 1104 of 1988; in the same sense, judgments no. 92 of 2021, no. 241 and no. 3 of 2019, no. 224 and no. 200 of 2018, no. 16 of 2017 and no. 178 of 2015).

This exception, in fact, exclusively concerns hypotheses in which the primary norm already contains the precept deemed harmful, which the secondary norm limits itself to detailing, i.e., hypotheses in which "the specifications expressed by the secondary legislation are strictly linked to the content” (Judgment no. 224 of 2018) of the primary norm, or between them there is a "strict link of qualified specification” (Judgment no. 200 of 2018).

This is not the case in question, where the primary norm is silent on the territorial structure of business organizations, which is considered exclusively by secondary norms.

Since the latter cannot be the subject of the constitutional legitimacy review, it is up to the referring judge to interpret them in a manner consistent with the law and, even before that, with the Constitution, resorting, in case of insurmountable conflict, to their caducation, if they have been challenged, or, otherwise, to their disapplication (judgments no. 174 of 2023, no. 133 of 1992 and no. 102 of 1972).

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 17, paragraph 1-bis, last sentence, of Decree-Law of December 30, 2023, no. 215 (Urgent provisions on regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law of February 23, 2024, no. 18;

2) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 12 of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Agriculture), raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 18, and 97 of the Constitution, by the Council of State, Sixth Section, with the order indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on January 14, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Chancellor Director

Filed with the Chancellery on March 5, 2026