JUDGMENT NO. 84

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has issued the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of August 18, 2000 (Consolidated Act on the Statutes of Local Authorities), initiated by the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, through orders dated February 10, 2025, and March 8, 2025, respectively registered as numbers 62 and 72 in the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, special series, numbers 16 and 18 of the year 2025.

Having examined the notices of appearance of D. L.P., M. B. and R. S., F. C., and L. V., as well as the interventions of E. G., M. D.A., V. S., F. I., and the Prosecutor General at the Court of Audit;

having heard the reporting Judge Angelo Buscema at the public hearing on March 10, 2026;

having heard counsel Oreste Morcavallo for M. B. and R. S., Carmelo Salerno for F. C., and State Attorney Fabrizio Fedeli for the President of the Council of Ministers;

having deliberated in the chambers on March 10, 2026.

Legal Findings

1.– By two similarly worded orders dated February 10 and March 8, 2025, registered as numbers 62 and 72 of the 2025 order register, the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of August 18, 2000 (Consolidated Act on the Statutes of Local Authorities), with reference to Articles 3, 51, 54, and 97 of the Constitution. The contested provision stipulates that administrators whom the Court of Audit has found—even at the first instance—to be responsible for having contributed, through intentional or grossly negligent conduct, whether by act or omission, to the financial collapse (dissesto) of the local authority, are barred for a period of ten years from holding the offices of councillor, auditor of local authorities, or representative of local authorities in other public or private bodies and institutions. Furthermore, the provision dictates that mayors and presidents of provinces found responsible—even by a non-final decision—for contributing to the occurrence of a financial collapse through intentional or grossly negligent conduct, whether by act or omission, "are ineligible for a period of ten years for the offices of mayor, president of a province, president of a regional executive, as well as member of municipal councils, provincial councils, regional assemblies and councils, the Parliament, and the European Parliament. They may also not hold the office of municipal, provincial, or regional councillor, nor any position in entities supervised or participated in by public bodies, for a period of ten years.” The referring court, in summary, challenges the impossibility of modulating the duration of the stipulated restrictive measures.

1.1.– Regarding the order registered as no. 62 of 2025, the case originates from an opposition appeal filed before the Jurisdictional Section of the Court of Audit for the Calabria Region, in a collegial composition, in proceedings for sanctioning liability, pursuant to Article 135 of Legislative Decree no. 174 of August 26, 2016 (Code of Accounting Justice). The appeal was filed by several members of the Executive of the Municipality of Castrovillari against a decree issued by a single-judge jurisdictional section, which, having found the appellants liable for having contributed with gross negligence to the Municipality’s financial collapse, imposed pecuniary sanctions proportional to their respective degree of responsibility.

The referring judge reports that following the failure of the control section to approve the rebalancing plan (Court of Audit, Regional Control Section for Calabria, resolution no. 24 of March 6, 2019, and United Sections in Jurisdictional Jurisdiction, judgment no. 18 of July 7, 2019) and the emergence of new liabilities aggravating the deficit, the Municipal Council of Castrovillari declared the financial collapse (resolution no. 42 of June 24, 2019).

The appellants in the underlying proceedings, all municipal administrators, challenged the Court of Audit’s jurisdiction over the restrictive sanctions as well as the inadmissibility of the resolution, furthermore raising doubts regarding the constitutional legitimacy of the automatism provided by Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act, citing unreasonableness (Article 3 of the Constitution) and discriminatory treatment compared to the discipline provided for members of the board of auditors (paragraph 5-bis). On the merits, they alleged evidentiary deficiencies and the absence of a causal link between their actions and the collapse, as well as a lack of criminal intent; furthermore, they claimed that the collapse originated prior to their mandate; that there had been periods of temporary administration (2014-2015); and that the "mechanical” effects leading to the collapse were also a consequence of accounting harmonization (reassessment of residuals, doubtful debt funds, and other provisions).

The referring collegial court, having deemed the constitutional legitimacy issues raised by the parties relevant and not manifestly unfounded, suspended the proceedings.

1.2.– Regarding the order registered as no. 72 of 2025, the case was raised by the Jurisdictional Section of the Court of Audit for the Calabria Region in a single-judge composition, in proceedings for sanctioning liability initiated by the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecutor sought the issuance of a decree for the application of pecuniary sanctions and subsequent restrictive measures against the mayor, several administrators, and certain auditors for having contributed to the collapse of the Municipality of Cosenza, pursuant to the contested provision.

The referring judge reports that, following the Municipal Council's approval of the financial rebalancing plan (Resolution no. 5 of February 9, 2013, later reformulated by Resolution no. 44 of July 11, 2013), the Regional Prosecutor of the Court of Audit brought an action alleging that certain administrators, the mayor pro tempore, and several auditors had aggravated the entity’s situation by failing to adopt the measures necessary to achieve the objectives established by the rebalancing plan. The Regional Control Section for Calabria had already highlighted, in Resolution no. 106 of July 17, 2019, structural critical issues, such as the failure to cover the deficit, current account imbalances, inefficiencies in collection, accounting irregularities, and the failure of auditors to report these issues. The United Sections of the Court of Audit confirmed this situation, and shortly thereafter, the Municipal Council of Cosenza (with resolution no. 51 of November 11, 2019) declared the collapse.

In the sanctioning liability proceedings, the Regional Prosecutor charged the administrators, the mayor pro tempore, and certain auditors with, among other things, the violation of Article 243-bis of the Consolidated Act (recognition of debts and plan conditions), outlining active and omissive conduct marked by gross negligence that supposedly aggravated the deficit.

The defendants in the underlying proceedings raised doubts regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act, arguing that the automatic and uniform ten-year restrictive measure, as well as the ineligibility, violate the principles of reasonableness and proportionality (Article 3 of the Constitution) because no possibility for grading the measures in relation to the gravity of the act and the degree of responsibility (gross negligence or intent) is provided.

They also highlighted a disparity in treatment compared to the auditors, for whom paragraph 5-bis of the same Article 248 provides a modifiable restrictive sanction (prohibition from appointment to the board of auditors of local authorities and related entities) of a duration "up to ten years.”

The single judge suspended the proceedings, deeming the questions of constitutional legitimacy relevant and not manifestly unfounded.

1.3.– The referring judges, in raising the issues, observe that Article 3, paragraph 1, letter s) of Decree-Law no. 174 of October 10, 2012 (Urgent provisions regarding finance and functioning of local entities...), converted with amendments into Law no. 213 of December 7, 2012, in amending Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act, tightened the previously existing discipline in several respects. Beyond introducing a pecuniary sanction (from five to twenty times the monthly gross salary), it eliminated the temporal limitation of responsibility to the five years preceding the collapse and extended its scope to conduct that had merely "contributed” to the occurrence of the collapse, thereby giving weight also to actions or omissions that merely facilitated or aggravated the collapse, whereas the previous version limited liability to conduct that had "determined” it, such that the collapse had to be a direct consequence thereof.

Under this new regime, a conflict arose in the accounting court’s rulings: some expressly imposed the restrictive sanction on the administrators found liable, while others limited themselves to the finding of liability, remitting the imposition of the sanction to another administrative authority.

The United Sections of the Court of Audit intervened in this conflict (judgment no. 4 of April 1, 2022), stating that in sanctioning proceedings, the accounting judge assesses both the application of pecuniary sanctions and the factual prerequisites determining the related restrictive measures; both effects stem from the single finding of liability.

Subsequently, the Joint Civil Sections of the Court of Cassation also addressed the point (order no. 13205 of May 14, 2024), stating that Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act, in the text resulting after the 2012 amendments, intended to confer upon the accounting judge the power to evaluate the existence of prerequisites for the application not only of pecuniary sanctions but also of restrictive sanctions, which, however, follow as an automatic effect of the finding of liability for the collapse; consequently, with regard to these, the decision of the accounting judge has a merely declaratory reach of the voluntas legis, being limited to the verification of the existence of the relevant prerequisites, while their declaration and application remain entrusted to the competent administrative authority.

1.4.– On the point of relevance, the referring Section argues that the finding made by the Court of Audit in identifying the facts that led to the collapse (with intent or negligence) immediately results in the status effect (interdiction or ineligibility), followed by the pecuniary sanction. Thus, in the proceedings before the accounting judge, an impact on the right to passive electorate (in violation of Article 51 of the Constitution) would already be determined.

The accounting proceedings, therefore, represent the only moment in which the doubt of constitutional legitimacy could be raised. In that venue, the assessment of the administrators’ contribution to the collapse produces two effects simultaneously: on one hand, the prohibition from holding public elective office, which operates automatically ex lege as an immediate effect of the judgment; on the other, the pecuniary sanction, which constitutes a further consequence.

Interdiction and ineligibility, therefore, would be the primary effect of the accounting ruling.

The Joint Civil Sections of the Court of Cassation, with the aforementioned order no. 13205 of 2024, confirmed that ineligibility is an automatic legal effect that descends directly from the finding of sanctioning liability. Therefore, the accounting proceedings are the venue where the constitutional legitimacy question can assume actual relevance, as it is here that the causal contribution and the modalities of the administrators’ conduct are evaluated.

1.5.– Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring Section observes that, while the legislature may limit the passive electorate for preventive purposes or the protection of public interest, such limitations should respect the principle of reasonableness and ensure proportionality between the measure and the gravity of the conduct. According to the referring court, the contested provision, by providing for an automatic and non-graduable ten-year fixed term, violates the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and substantive equality (Article 3 of the Constitution), creating tension with the right to passive electorate (Article 51 of the Constitution), the principle of performing public functions with discipline and honor (Article 54 of the Constitution), and the principle of sound administration and impartiality (Article 97 of the Constitution).

This configuration conflicts with the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution, as it treats profoundly different situations in the same manner.

Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act, in fact, equates intentional conduct that determined the collapse—grave and prolonged—with marginal or episodic negligent conduct, perhaps dating back to distant council terms or lacking direct causal impact.

Such uniformity of treatment, devoid of any possibility of modulation based on the gravity of the negligence, duration, or incidence of the conduct, would be unreasonable and disproportionate, especially when the restrictive effect impacts a fundamental constitutional right such as the passive electorate (Article 51 of the Constitution).

In evaluating the provision, the referring court recalls the necessary balance between the right of access to elective offices and the public interests underlying Articles 54 and 97 of the Constitution, related to the duties of fairness and the sound administration of the public sector. However, it observes that Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act deviates from other sanctioning models in a manner that is difficult to justify.

The comparison with Article 143, paragraph 11, of the Consolidated Act, which provides for ineligibility due to mafia infiltration only for two successive electoral cycles and subject to a declaration by final decision, and with Articles 10 and 15, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 235 of December 31, 2012, which provide for ineligibility following criminal convictions but allow for the recovery of the right through rehabilitation, highlights a disparity in treatment between these cases and the one challenged here: paragraph 5 of Article 248, in fact, provides for a fixed ten-year ineligibility even in the face of grossly negligent, but not intentional, conduct, surely not comparable to the gravity of mafia phenomena or crimes against public administration.

In this perspective, the fixed ten-year duration, without margins for adaptation, is unreasonably more rigorous than disciplines sanctioning much graver conduct, thus resulting in disproportion relative to the pursued objective.

A further profile of regulatory incoherence is identified in the fact that the contested provision, while prohibiting administrators who contributed to the collapse from assuming roles as councillors, auditors, or representatives in entities, does not preclude them from running for mayor—the function most incisive and decisive in the management of local entities. This contradiction accentuates the systematic disharmony of the provision, lacking internal coherence and proportionality relative to the stated objectives.

In light of these considerations, the referring Section deems the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act not manifestly unfounded, particularly where it provides for automatic and ten-year ineligibility, even for negligent and merely contributory conduct, without distinguishing between the intensity of intent or negligence, the relevance of the causal contribution, or the timeframe of the facts.

However, the referring judge does not share the arguments on non-manifest unfoundedness proposed by the parties—focusing on unreasonable discrimination compared to other cases, such as that under Article 248, paragraph 5-bis, which provides a graduable restrictive sanction for auditors, or Legislative Decree no. 235 of 2012—because while members of the board of auditors exercise a supervisory role, administrators have greater management power-duty and broader responsibility for the entity’s budget. The referring Section underlines, therefore, that the ten-year fixed duration of the restrictive measure provided against the latter, compared to the graduable nature of that for auditors, could be considered not inherently unreasonable, as it corresponds to two council terms and could be attributed to the legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. This time limit finds justification in the constitutional value of the public budget, the protection of the fiduciary relationship between the elected official and the community, and the principles of sound administration and intergenerational equity, repeatedly cited by this Court (citing judgments no. 246 and no. 235 of 2021, no. 115 of 2020, no. 18 of 2019, and no. 228 of 2017).

The referring Section acknowledges that the ten-year preclusion from holding public office provided by Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act finds its ratio in the protection of the public budget, considered an asset of constitutional importance. The safeguarding of financial equilibrium and sound administration—values relatable to Articles 81, 97, and 119 of the Constitution—could, in principle, justify a limitation on the right to passive electorate when pursuing preventive objectives and the guarantee of the general interest.

2.– By acts filed on May 6 and 20, 2025, the President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the issues be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

2.1.– According to the State Attorney’s Office, the issues are inadmissible due to a lack of relevance, as the referring court is not called upon to directly apply the restrictive measure or the ineligibility provided for by Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act. These measures, in fact, derive automatically and ipso iure from the finding of liability for the collapse, without the need for an express judicial ruling.

In support of this thesis, the state defense cites accounting and legitimacy jurisprudence: in particular, the aforementioned Court of Audit, United Sections, no. 4 of 2022 and Cassation, Joint Civil Sections, no. 13205 of 2024, from which it emerges that the accounting judge ascertains the prerequisites for the application of the measure, but the formal declaration and execution of the interdiction or ineligibility pertain to the competent administrative authority. The latter acts based on the communication of the accounting judgment, in application of Article 16, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 235 of 2012, which extends the regime of non-criminal ineligibility to the hypotheses under Articles 143, paragraph 11, and 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act.

From this, it follows that the Court of Audit is called to impose pecuniary sanctions and verify the prerequisites of the restrictive measures but lacks the power to directly apply the latter; if it were to do so, it would exceed the external limits of its jurisdiction (Article 133 of the Code of Accounting Justice), as stated by the Court of Cassation.

2.2.– On the merits, the State Attorney’s Office maintains that the challenges are unfounded.

Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, as formulated after Decree-Law no. 174 of 2012, as converted, provides for a sanctioning framework aimed at making administrators accountable in financial management, in compliance with the principles of budget balance and sound administration.

The measures provided—pecuniary and restrictive—do not have a punitive nature but rather a functional and preventive one, being aimed at protecting the public treasury and the correct management of public resources, not at punishing the individual.

Accounting jurisprudence has clarified that the subjective element required is at least gross negligence, and that sanctioning liability does not necessarily imply fiscal damage, with causal contribution to the collapse being sufficient, even in terms of omissive or co-causal conduct. Legislative evolution has, in fact, downgraded direct causality to mere co-causality, consistently with the aim of preventing the repetition of disastrous management.

The State Attorney’s Office highlights that the restrictive measure, far from being an accessory penalty, is a status measure aimed at preserving public trust and institutional credibility, in implementation of the principles under Articles 54 and 97 of the Constitution. It does not aim to sanction the person but to protect the administered community from subjects who, through intent or gross negligence, have compromised the entity’s financial stability.

On the constitutional level, the limit imposed on the right to passive electorate (Article 51 of the Constitution) is justified by a reasonable balance with the principles of budget balance (Article 81 of the Constitution) and sound administration (Article 97 of the Constitution). Access to elective office—the state defense observes—can therefore be subordinated to requirements established by law, provided the limitation is necessary and proportionate relative to the public interest objectives.

In this perspective, the State Attorney’s Office highlights how this Court has repeatedly stated that restrictions on inviolable rights are admissible only if indispensable for the protection of constitutionally relevant interests (citing judgments no. 141 of 1996, no. 510 and no. 20 of 1989, no. 235 of 1988).

The ten-year ineligibility under Article 248 of the Consolidated Act responds, according to the state defense, to this requirement: it is based on the gravity of the prerequisite—the intentional or grossly negligent contribution to the collapse—and is configured as an adequate and proportionate measure.

The fixed ten-year duration is not disproportionate, as it is consistent with the need to ensure, for at least two council terms, administrative renewal and trust in the management of public finances.

Nor is there a disparity of treatment compared to auditors, for whom the measure is graduable up to ten years: the diversity of roles justifies the different discipline, as administrators have direct decision-making powers over the entity's economic-financial planning.

Similarly, the absence of a rehabilitation institute does not determine the unreasonableness of the regulatory framework in question, as such an institute is characteristic of criminal sanctions, whereas here it concerns an effect ex lege, functional to requirements of administrative efficiency and integrity.

Regarding the alleged contradiction, whereby the scrutinized provision would allow guilty administrators to run for mayor but not to hold other positions, the state defense believes the provision is justified by the popular will, which directly legitimizes the election of the mayor, unlike positions of fiduciary or technical appointment.

In conclusion, according to the State Attorney’s Office, the contested provision is constitutionally legitimate as the interdiction is not a penalty in the punitive sense, but an effect ex lege consistent with the principles of sound administration and responsibility; the measure is proportionate and reasonable, as it is related to the gravity of the collapse and the role of the administrators; there is no disparity of treatment, nor violation of Article 51 of the Constitution, since the balancing with Articles 81, 54, and 97 of the Constitution is carried out by the legislature in a non-arbitrary manner.

The provision of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act—concludes the state defense—represents a legitimate tool for guaranteeing financial legality and protecting the community, aimed at preventing those who have contributed to the collapse from again impacting the management of the most precious public asset: the balance of public budgets.

3.– By acts filed on May 6 and 15, 2025, the Prosecutor General, representing the public prosecutor’s office at the Court of Audit, intervened in the proceedings, requesting, firstly, that the intervention be declared admissible and, secondly, that the issues be declared inadmissible due to a lack of relevance in the underlying proceedings, or otherwise unfounded.

3.1.– Regarding the admissibility of the intervention, the Prosecutor emphasizes the unity of the prosecuting office, inferable from Articles 12, paragraph 3, and 189 of the Code of Accounting Justice (based on which an appeal can be filed alternatively by the Regional Prosecutor’s Office or the General Prosecutor’s Office, with the "consumption” of the power after the first exercise).

He believes that in sanctioning proceedings (Articles 133 and following of the Code of Accounting Justice), the public prosecutor is a necessary party and the "engine” of the process (as he promotes the action, conducts the investigation, selects the facts, and protects the general interest, including by representing elements favorable to the defendant) and that excluding the intervention of the public prosecutor in the incidental constitutional legitimacy proceedings would violate the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of parties (Article 111 of the Constitution, as modified by Constitutional Law no. 2 of November 23, 1999, providing for the "Inclusion of principles of fair trial in Article 111 of the Constitution”), since the defendant can defend himself directly in the proceedings held before this Court, while the Prosecutor—despite having investigated the file—would remain silent.

The more restrictive approach (citing this Court’s judgment no. 123 of 2023) would not consider the systematic framework and the participatory ratio, and therefore, the Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit requests that the legitimacy to intervene of the General Prosecutor’s Office be recognized, without external representation, when it is a party in the underlying proceedings and holder of a qualified interest.

3.2.– The Prosecutor General nonetheless believes that the issues are inadmissible due to a lack of relevance as the immediate object of the accounting proceedings is the pecuniary sanction; the status-related restrictive measures are, instead, effects ex lege of the finding and would be applied by the administrative authority (citing this Court’s judgments no. 102 of 2016 and no. 100 of 2015).

In conclusion, the issues are inadmissible because they refer to automatic consequences not directly applied by the referring judge.

3.3.– Regarding the merits, the Prosecutor General believes that legislative intervention suitable to act in a restrictive (not punitive) capacity on the right to passive electorate is not in conflict with the Constitution.

Ineligibility is a status of functional unfitness (citing this Court’s judgment no. 97 of 1991) and not a criminal sanction; this non-punitive nature is also confirmed by constitutional jurisprudence (citing this Court’s judgments no. 276 of 2016 and no. 236 of 2015) as well as by administrative jurisprudence (citing Council of State, 3rd Section, judgment no. 730 of February 14, 2014; 5th Section, judgment no. 695 of February 6, 2013; Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, 2nd-bis Section, judgment no. 8696 of October 8, 2013).

The intervener then asserts that the objectives of the provision are both to prevent further damage to public finance by subjects already found responsible for the collapse and to protect the community’s trust in institutions.

Regarding proportionality, the Prosecutor General assumes that the uniform ten-year duration is not unreasonable because the measure is preventive and aimed at the protected asset, namely the integrity of the budget and public trust.

Regarding auditors (Article 248, paragraph 5-bis of the Consolidated Act), the Prosecutor General believes that the graduable nature of the restrictive measure provided for these subjects is justified by the diversity of roles (supervision by auditors and direction/management by administrators).

Regarding the absence of the possibility of achieving rehabilitation, for the Prosecutor General it does not determine the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision, as it is an institute belonging to criminal ineligibility, whereas in the case at hand, an effect ex lege of an administrative-functional nature operates.

Furthermore, the subsequent Decree-Law no. 25 of March 14, 2025 (Urgent provisions regarding recruitment and functionality of public administrations), converted with amendments into Law no. 69 of May 9, 2025, in Article 8, paragraph 7, provided for the exclusion of restrictive measures against those who, despite having contributed to the collapse with grossly negligent conduct, have adopted an approved rebalancing plan: which serves to make the sanctioning mechanism flexible.

The Prosecutor General concludes by stating that Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act contains norms that are proportionate and reasonable, in consistency with Articles 51, 54, and 97 of the Constitution, protecting the sound administration of public administration and citizens’ trust.

4.– In the proceedings registered under no. 62 of the 2025 order register, the Association for Subsidiarity and Modernization of Local Entities (ASMEL), whose members are Italian municipalities and their branches, filed an opinio as amicus curiae on May 6, 2025, admitted by presidential decree of October 27, 2025.

ASMEL highlights how the rigid and automatic discipline of ten-year ineligibility (Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act) can negatively impact the principle of democratic participation (Articles 1, 3, and 51 of the Constitution); local representation and citizens' right to compete in the life of institutions; and the administrative efficiency and stability of entities themselves, as it indiscriminately excludes figures with experience and knowledge of the territory.

The ten-year interdiction measure from holding certain public offices would be counterproductive relative to the goals of recovery, as it would have the effect of discouraging the participation of competent subjects in the post-collapse management, aggravating the administrative crisis of local entities.

Furthermore, the current provision, due to its generality and automatic severity, would not rationally pursue the objective of administrative accountability, but produce opposite effects, disincentivizing transparency and collaboration in local entities.

Ineligibility would be an afflictive and unreasonable measure, lacking an express constitutional basis and disproportionate relative to the objective pursued. Therefore, the challenge of constitutional legitimacy raised by the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, is well-founded in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution for excess of generality and unreasonableness; the provision would also violate Article 51 of the Constitution as it would unduly compress the right to passive electorate and conflict with Article 97 of the Constitution, as it would hinder the sound administration and timely action for the recovery of entities.

ASMEL therefore sees the need for legislative revision or interpretative intervention by this Court aimed at restoring criteria of proportionality, individualization, and coherence of the measure relative to the goals of protecting public finance and local democracy.

5.– By an act filed on May 6, 2025, D. L.P., a party in the underlying proceedings of the order registered as no. 62 of the 2025 order register, appeared in the proceedings, arguing that the issues are well-founded.

The party states that the contested provision, in providing for an automatic and fixed ten-year restrictive sanction for administrators responsible for the collapse, even for negligent or marginal conduct, would violate the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and equality (Article 3 of the Constitution), as well as the right to passive electorate (Article 51 of the Constitution).

Constitutional jurisprudence has repeatedly excluded the constitutional legitimacy of sanctioning automatisms lacking individual graduation (citing this Court’s judgments no. 275 of 2016, no. 236, and no. 113 of 2015).

It would also be irrational for the same provision to prohibit minor positions but allow re-election as mayor, in conflict with the principle of sound administration (Article 97 of the Constitution).

Therefore, it is hoped that the constitutional illegitimacy of the contested provision be declared in the part where it does not allow the measurement of the sanction to the gravity of the conduct, in order to restore a balance coherent with the principles of personal responsibility and proportional justice characteristic of the Rule of Law.

6.– Still regarding the order registered as no. 62 of 2025, by an act filed on April 24, 2025, E. G., M. D.A., V. S., and F. I., respectively mayor and councillors of the Municipality of Belvedere Marittimo, requested to intervene in the proceedings. They claim legitimacy as holders of a qualified interest, directly and immediately inherent to the relationship deduced in the proceedings, being parties to proceedings analogous to those within which the constitutional legitimacy incident was raised. They are, in fact, recipients of decree no. 8 of November 25, 2024, issued by the single judge of the regional jurisdictional section of the Court of Audit for the Calabria Region, whose opposition proceedings were suspended by order no. 19 of February 11, 2025, pending the decision of this Court on the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act.

On the merits, the interveners denounce the violation of Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution, as the provision of a fixed and uniform term of ten years of ineligibility, not modifiable by the judge, would represent an unreasonable sanctioning automatism, infringing upon the principle of proportionality.

Furthermore, the provision would introduce an unjustified disparity of treatment, as the mayor found responsible for the collapse could not hold positions even outside the scope of local entities (deputy, senator, European parliamentarian), while the councillor, even if involved in the same event, could run for such functions. This differentiation would result in being disproportionate and lacking functional coherence with the purpose of the norm.

They conclude, therefore, by requesting that this Court declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 2000, in the part where it provides for a fixed and non-derogable term of ineligibility and an unreasonable differentiation between categories of administrators.

7.– With reference to the proceedings registered under no. 72 of the 2025 order register, by an act filed on May 9, 2025, R. S. appeared in the proceedings, formerly a councillor of the Municipality of Cosenza for the period January 1, 2015 - February 22, 2016 and for the periods January 1, 2015 - February 22, 2016 and August 28, 2016 - April 17, 2018 with responsibility for strategies and tourism, a party in the main proceedings, arguing that the issues are well-founded and relevant in the underlying proceedings.

The contested provision would violate Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution due to incompatibility with the principles of proportionality and the necessary individualization of sanctioning treatment. It would also be discriminatory and unreasonable if measured against the pecuniary sanction which, unlike the status sanction, is individualized based on the function performed and the period in which it was exercised.

The provision would present further profiles of constitutional illegitimacy, still in reference to Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution, in providing for the absolute ineligibility of the mayor for positions and functions entirely unrelated to the local entity system.

The party therefore requests that this Court declare the constitutional illegitimacy, in parte qua, of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act.

8.– By an act filed on May 9, 2025, M. B. appeared in the proceedings related to the order registered as no. 72 of the 2025 order register, formerly a councillor of the Municipality of Cosenza with responsibility for "Quality of life, Health, Public health, Atmospheric pollution, Municipal kennel, Human resources and social capital” in the period December 2, 2014 - February 11, 2016, also a party in the main proceedings, who believes the issues are relevant and well-founded based on arguments analogous to those made by R.S., and therefore requests their acceptance.

9.– By an act filed on May 16, 2025, F. C. appeared in the same proceedings related to the order registered as no. 72 of the 2025 order register, a councillor of the Municipality of Cosenza from June 28, 2016, to December 31, 2019, also a party in the underlying proceedings.

The party challenges the constitutional illegitimacy of the contested provision, even as amended by Article 8, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, as it would provide for an unreasonable and disproportionate status-related sanctioning automatism, in violation of Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution.

The legislative innovation has in fact established that pecuniary and restrictive sanctions do not apply to administrators who, only in cases of gross negligence, have adopted a multi-year financial rebalancing plan (PRFP) approved pursuant to Article 243-bis of the Consolidated Act within two years of taking office, in the presence of a resolution pursuant to Article 148-bis, paragraph 3, of the Consolidated Act.

Paragraph 7-bis of the aforementioned Article 8 has extended the applicability of this exclusion to pending proceedings not passed into final judgment. However, this measure operates only toward those who have approved the PRFP, leaving exposed to sanctions administrators who operated during the plan’s validity without however having formally participated in its adoption. This would result in an unreasonable discrimination between substantially analogous positions relative to the collapse. Such would be precisely the situation in which F. C. finds himself.

The party therefore believes that the sanctioning regime would impact disproportionately on the fitness to hold office, introducing a selective filter based on a merely formal datum (having approved the plan), and not on the concrete causal contribution to the collapse.

The discipline, even as modified, would be characterized by automatisms as the accounting judge would be precluded from individualizing the sanctioning response relative to both the gravity of the act and the intensity of intent or negligence and the causal nexus. This would conflict with the principles affirmed by constitutional jurisprudence (citing judgments no. 52 of 2024, no. 161 of 2018, and no. 97 of 1991) as well as with the functional approach to liability outlined by the Court of Audit, United Sections, no. 4 of 2022.

Furthermore, in providing for an exemption for those who, despite having approved the plan, have contributed decisively to the collapse, and a sanction for administrators devoid of financial responsibilities or with marginal roles, the contested provision would create a wound to the principles of equilibrium and sound administration, as well as to the preventive and restorative function of administrative liability.

The party proposes the possibility of extending the "shield” provided by the new legislation also to administrators who operated during the validity of the PRFP, even without having approved it, limited to cases of gross negligence, while maintaining, in other cases, the necessary judicial scrutiny on the proportionality of the sanction relative to the concrete case.

Such exegesis would harmonize the new discipline with Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution and with constitutional jurisprudence which affirms the principle of the necessary graduality of the sanction.

The party therefore requests to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act (as amended) for violation of Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution; alternatively, to adopt an interpretative/manipulative judgment of acceptance that extends the scope of the "shield” also to administrators who did not approve the PRFP but operated during its validity, only in cases of gross negligence, ensuring the judge the case-by-case assessment of gravity, culpability, and causal nexus.

10.– By an act filed on May 19, 2025, L. V. appeared in the proceedings, a councillor of the Municipality of Cosenza with responsibility for budget from January 1, 2015, to February 22, 2016, and subsequently from June 28, 2016, to April 14, 2018, a party also in the underlying proceedings of the order registered as no. 72 of the 2025 order register.

The party believes the issues in the underlying proceedings are relevant and well-founded, as the contested provision would prevent any graduation of restrictive measures based on the psychological coefficient of the conduct (intent or gross negligence) and the gravity of the act, in violation of Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution regarding the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and individualization of the sanction.

The party therefore requests that the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision be declared in the part where it does not allow any graduation based on the gravity of the conduct and subjective element; alternatively, it requests an interpretative or manipulative ruling that allows the judge to perform a case-by-case assessment, thus realigning the restrictive effect with constitutional principles and the proper function of administrative-accounting liability.

11.– With briefs filed for both proceedings on February 17, 2026, the State Attorney’s Office requested this Court to evaluate the existence of the prerequisites for returning the acts to the referring judges.

The State Attorney’s Office observes that the intervening Article 8, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, added a final period to paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, according to which "[t]he provisions referred to in the first, second, and third periods of this paragraph do not apply to administrators who, only in cases where responsibility is attributed for gross negligence, have adopted a multi-year financial rebalancing plan approved by the Court of Audit, pursuant to Article 243-bis, within two years of taking their first office and following a resolution of the Court of Audit pursuant to Article 148-bis, paragraph 3, ascertaining serious irregularities or criticalities relative to the financial years preceding the election.”

Such regulatory survival, which introduced a cause for the non-applicability of the restrictive measure provided for administrators in the event of local entity collapse for conduct marked by gross negligence, would make a new evaluation necessary by the referring parties on the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the question regarding the first period of paragraph 5, raised in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution for violation of the principle of reasonableness. We would no longer be in the presence, in fact, of an unreasonable automatism, "but of a typical legal consequence downstream of a judicial ascertainment.”

The State Attorney’s Office then insisted on the declaration of inadmissibility of the issues due to lack of relevance, or, alternatively, their lack of foundation, for the same reasons already set out in the appearance act.

Legal Reasoning

12.– With the orders indicated in the heading (order register no. 62 and no. 72 of 2025), the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 2000, with reference to Articles 3, 51, 54, and 97 of the Constitution.

The provision is contested, more precisely, in the part where it provides, in the text in force ratione temporis, that "administrators whom the Court of Audit has found—even at the first instance—responsible for having contributed with conduct, whether intentional or grossly negligent, whether by act or omission, to the occurrence of the financial collapse, may not hold, for a period of ten years, positions as councillor, auditor of local authorities, or representative of local authorities in other public or private bodies and institutions,” as well as in the part where it provides that "[t]he mayors and presidents of provinces found responsible pursuant to the preceding period, furthermore, are ineligible for a period of ten years for the offices of mayor, president of a province, president of a regional executive, as well as member of municipal councils, provincial councils, regional assemblies and councils, the Parliament, and the European Parliament. They may also not hold, for a period of ten years, the office of municipal, provincial, or regional councillor, nor any position in entities supervised or participated in by public entities.”

The referrers complain, in particular, that they cannot modulate the duration of the restrictive measures provided for by the contested paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act.

13.– On the point of relevance, the referring judges argue that the finding made by the Court of Audit, in identifying the facts that led to the collapse (with intent or gross negligence), would immediately determine the status effect (interdiction or ineligibility), to which the pecuniary sanction would be added. The accounting proceedings, therefore, would represent the only moment in which the doubt of constitutional legitimacy of the provision under examination could be raised. In that venue, in fact, the finding of the administrators' contribution to the collapse would simultaneously produce two effects: on one hand, the prohibition from holding elective public office, which operates automatically ex lege as an immediate effect of the accounting judge’s ruling; on the other, the pecuniary sanction, which constitutes a further consequence.

The referrers observe that the Court of Cassation in joint civil sections, with order no. 13205 of 2024, would have confirmed that ineligibility is an automatic legal effect that descends directly from the finding of liability. Therefore, the accounting proceedings would be the only venue in which the question of constitutional legitimacy can assume actual relevance, since it is here that the causal contribution and the modalities of the administrators’ conduct are evaluated.

14.– Regarding the profile of non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring Section observes that, although the legislature can limit the right to passive electorate for preventive purposes or the protection of public interest, such limitations should respect the principle of reasonableness and ensure proportionality between the measure and the gravity of the conduct.

According to the courts a quibus, the contested provision, where it provides for an automatic fixed ten-year duration of the measures in question, would violate the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and substantive equality (Article 3 of the Constitution), furthermore creating tension with the right to passive electorate (Article 51 of the Constitution), the principle of performing public functions with discipline and honor (Article 54 of the Constitution), and the principle of sound administration and impartiality (Article 97 of the Constitution).

Such configuration would conflict with the principle of equality as it would assimilate profoundly different situations. The provision, in fact, would equate intentional and decisive conduct for the determination of the collapse—grave and prolonged in time—to negligent conduct, perhaps even dating back to distant council terms or lacking direct causal impact.

In evaluating the contested provision, the referring judges observe that Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act would deviate from other sanctioning models in a manner difficult to justify. In particular, a comparison is made with Article 143, paragraph 11, of the Consolidated Act, which provides for ineligibility due to mafia infiltration for two successive electoral cycles and subject to its declaration by final provision; as well as with Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 235 of 2012, which provides for ineligibility following criminal convictions but admits, pursuant to subsequent Article 15, paragraph 3, the recovery of the right through rehabilitation. Such comparison would highlight the unreasonable assimilation of the treatment provided for different cases: paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act provides, in fact, for a fixed ineligibility for a period of ten years even in the face of grossly negligent conduct, surely not comparable to those characteristic of mafia phenomena or crimes against public administration.

A further profile of regulatory incoherence is identified in the fact that the provision, while prohibiting administrators who contributed to the collapse from assuming roles as councillors, auditors, or representatives in entities, does not preclude them from running for mayor—the function most incisive and decisive in the management of local entities. The contested provision, therefore, would lack internal coherence and proportionality relative to the stated objectives.

15.– The referring orders raise identical or closely connected issues, making it appropriate to join the related proceedings.

16.– The Prosecutor General, representing the public prosecutor at the Court of Audit, requested to intervene in the proceedings, not only because the prosecuting office would be characterized by unity (citing Articles 12, paragraph 3, and 189 of the Code of Accounting Justice), but above all because, in sanctioning proceedings, he would be a necessary party and the "engine” of the process (as he promotes the action, conducts the investigation, selects the facts, protects the general interest, also by representing elements favorable to the defendant).

16.1.– The intervention must be declared inadmissible.

In this regard, it must be recalled that, based on the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court in force at the time of the intervention, only subjects who are parties to the a quo proceedings are authorized to intervene in incidental constitutional legitimacy proceedings, in addition to the President of the Council of Ministers and, in the case of regional law, the President of the Regional Executive. The intervention of subjects external to the main proceedings (Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Rules, applicable ratione temporis) is admissible only for third parties who are holders of a qualified interest, directly and immediately inherent to the substantive relationship deduced in the proceedings.

With constant orientation, this Court has excluded the admissibility of the intervention of the Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit, observing, "in an absorbing way,” that "he is not a party to the a quo proceedings” (order read at the hearing of November 21, 2023, attached to judgment no. 1 of 2024; in the same sense, judgment no. 150 of 2025, point 2 of Legal Reasoning and precedents cited therein) and cannot be considered "holder of a qualified interest.”

This conclusion must be reiterated even today, since the Prosecutor General is not a party to the a quibus proceedings, nor does the hypothesis occur in relation to which, with judgment no. 39 of 2026, this Court deemed his appearance as a party admissible.

17.– The intervention requests filed in relation to the order registered under no. 62 of the 2025 order register by E. G., M. D.A., V. S., and F. I., respectively mayor and councillors of the Municipality of Belvedere Marittimo, parties to another proceeding, analogous to the a quo proceeding, must also be declared inadmissible.

As already specified, in incidental constitutional legitimacy proceedings, the intervention of subjects external to the a quo proceedings is admissible, based on the text of the Supplementary Rules applicable ratione temporis, only when it concerns third parties holders of a qualified interest, directly and immediately inherent to the substantive relationship deduced in the proceedings (Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Rules) and not simply regulated, like any other, by the norm object of the challenge (ex multis, orders attached to judgments no. 66 of 2025 read at the hearing of March 26, 2025, no. 140, no. 39 and no. 22 of 2024, read, respectively, at the hearings of May 22, January 24, and January 23, 2024, no. 206 of 2019 read at the hearing of June 4, 2019).

Constitutional jurisprudence has also clarified that the circumstance that the subject is a holder of interests analogous to those deduced in the main proceedings, or that he is a party in an analogous but different proceeding from the a quo proceeding, on which the decision of this Court can influence, is not sufficient for the purpose of making the intervention admissible (ex plurimis, order no. 72 of 2024).

Since E. G., M. D.A., V. S., and F. I. are not parties to the a quibus proceedings and, for what is recalled above, cannot be considered holders of a qualified interest directly and immediately inherent to the substantive relationship deduced in the proceedings, their intervention is inadmissible.

18.– The State Attorney’s Office, in the brief filed in proximity to the public hearing, requested to evaluate the existence of the prerequisites for returning the acts to the referring Section. The state defense observes, in fact, that the intervening Article 8, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, added a final period to paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, according to which the interdiction and ineligibility referred to in the first, second, and third periods do not apply to administrators who, although found responsible for having contributed to the collapse with gross negligence, have initiated the multi-year financial rebalancing procedure (so-called pre-collapse) within two years of taking office and following a resolution of the Court of Audit that has ascertained serious irregularities or criticalities relative to the financial years preceding the election.

Such survival would make necessary a new evaluation by the referring judges on the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the question regarding the first period of paragraph 5, raised in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution for unreasonableness. We would no longer be in the presence, in fact, of an unreasonable automatism, "but of a typical legal consequence downstream of a judicial ascertainment.”

18.1.– By constant jurisprudence of this Court, the return of the acts to the a quo judge is imposed when the ius superveniens can "condition the applicability of the contested norms in the a quo proceeding” (ex plurimis, orders no. 55 of 2020 and no. 230 of 2019), or changes substantially "the terms of the question as it was posed by the a quo judge” (judgment no. 28 of 2026) or again when the changes consequent to a ius superveniens "affect […] ‘deeply the logical weave that lies at the base of the proposed challenges’ (orders no. 97 of 2022 and no. 60 of 2021), or affect the mechanism contested by the referrer (order no. 55 of 2020)”, falling in such cases to the latter "both to verify the influence of the surviving regulation on the relevance of the raised issues (order no. 243 of 2021), and to proceed to the revaluation of non-manifest unfoundedness, taking into account the occurred regulatory changes” (order no. 72 of 2023).

Generally, however, "not every new provision that modifies, integrates, or in any case can affect the one object of the incidental constitutionality proceeding requires a new evaluation of the continuing existence of the prerequisites of admissibility of the question and specifically of its relevance and the non-manifest unfoundedness of the doubts of constitutional legitimacy expressed by the referring judge” (order no. 185 of 2020). The ius superveniens does not prevent this Court from pronouncing on the issues, autonomous and moreover logically priority, which the innovations introduced by the legislature do not change in their salient terms, and thus from rendering a timely response to the demand for constitutional justice (judgment no. 101 of 2025).

18.2.– This established, for the purpose of evaluating the existence of the prerequisites for the return of the acts to the a quibus judges, it is necessary to examine the reach of the ius superveniens.

Article 8, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, added a period to the contested paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, which provides for a cause of exclusion from the application of restrictive measures and ineligibility upon the occurrence of two cumulative conditions: a) the administrators and mayors found responsible for having contributed to the entity's collapse for gross negligence must have approved a multi-year financial rebalancing plan in the two years following their election; b) the Court of Audit must have ascertained by resolution "serious irregularities or criticalities relative to the financial years preceding the election.”

In relation to the continuing relevance of the constitutional legitimacy issues object of today’s scrutiny, it must be excluded that the hypothesis introduced by the ius superveniens can render inapplicable in the a quibus proceedings the originally contested provision.

Regarding the proceeding related to the order registered under no. 62 of the 2025 order register, in the Municipality of Castrovillari the rebalancing plan did not obtain approval by the control section of the Court of Audit for the Calabria Region, which rather found that the accounting and management irregularities that led to the declaration of collapse were all referable to the subjects who are parties in the a quo proceeding. Therefore, the cause for exclusion of restrictive measures introduced by the ius superveniens is not applicable to such subjects.

Regarding the proceeding related to the order registered under no. 72 of the 2025 order register, in the Municipality of Cosenza the declaration of collapse (which occurred on November 11, 2019) was preceded, on February 9, 2013, by the approval of a rebalancing plan, within two years of the start of the mandate, by the mayor pro tempore and by some of the administrators accused of having contributed to the collapse for gross negligence, while other administrators who are parties in the a quo proceeding would in any case be excluded from the applicability of the cause for exclusion that has emerged, because their mandates are subsequent to the approval of the multi-year financial rebalancing plan. Moreover, the control section of the Court of Audit for the Calabria Region ascertained, on July 17, 2019 (with the already cited resolution no. 106), the serious and repeated failure to respect the objectives fixed by the multi-year financial rebalancing plan. In that case too, therefore, it must be held that the contested norm remains applicable in the a quo proceeding even in the face of the ius superveniens.

Regarding then the non-manifest unfoundedness, it must be noted that the heart of the challenges of the referring orders is constituted by the fixity of the restrictive measure and of the ineligibility, a structure which is in no way affected by the introduction of a hypothesis of inapplicability of the measures (in an analogous sense, judgments no. 83 and no. 54 of 2024 as well as order no. 185 of 2020).

19.– The State Attorney’s Office asserts that the issues would be inadmissible due to lack of relevance, since the referring section would not be called upon to directly apply the restrictive measure, nor the ineligibility provided for by Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act. These measures, in fact, would derive automatically and ipso iure from the finding of liability for the collapse, without the need for an express judicial ruling.

19.1.– The exception is unfounded.

The referring judge specifies that the proceeding submitted to his examination pursuant to Article 248, paragraph 5, of the Consolidated Act pertains to the finding of liability for "having contributed with conduct, whether intentional or grossly negligent, whether by act or omission, to the occurrence of the financial collapse” and, therefore, is aimed at the finding of factual prerequisites to then be able to impose the pecuniary sanction within the statutory terms (from five to twenty times the gross monthly salary) provided by the provision itself. The further restrictive measure for administrators and the ineligibility for mayors and presidents of provinces would be an automatic effect that follows the finding of liability prerequisites by the Court of Audit, "but which is then materially ordered […] by another competent authority, which […] has however no discretion regarding the an and the quantum temporale of the (personal) sanction to be imposed.”

The referring orders do not err when they observe that the circumstance that the accounting judge’s ruling impacts only indirectly on the imposition of the measure relative to the status does not cause the relevance of the issues to come to naught.

It must be observed, in fact, that the status limitations currently provided for by the legislature with paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act are configured effectively as a two-phase procedure, the first part of which is of a jurisdictional nature, is remitted to the examination of the Court of Audit, and consists in the finding of factual and legal prerequisites; the subsequent one occurs ex lege and consists in the mere application of the restrictive measure and ineligibility in fixed and non-modulable terms.

In reality, therefore, the only proceeding in which the prejudicial effects of the finding can be challenged for constitutional illegitimacy for lack of proportionality is that before the Court of Audit, which is the only organ competent to ascertain whether and, if so, to what extent the individual administrator’s conduct has contributed to the determination of the collapse.

In this regard, this Court has affirmed that "precluding a judge from raising a constitutional legitimacy question on the norm that is at the base of his potestas iudicandi is equivalent, in practice, to sealing the existence—if not exactly of a ‘free zone’—of a ‘shadow zone’ in the constitutional legitimacy control of the law, the result of which is to bind the merit judge to the application of norms in hypotheses contrary to the Constitution, even when the judge has not had the possibility—in a previous moment of the process—to raise such question” (judgment no. 163 of 2024). Such a solution—this Court has clarified—on one hand, appears to conflict with the duty, incumbent on every judge, in force of Article 23 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Norms on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), to oversee the respect of the Constitution by the law, and to invest this Court with every doubt of constitutional legitimacy that it deems not manifestly unfounded, relative to norms destined to find application in a determined proceeding. On the other, it results distonic relative to the requirement of ensuring that the constitutional legitimacy control is such as to "cover in the widest possible measure the legal order” (judgment no. 387 of 1996; in conforming sense, judgment no. 1 of 2014, point 2 of Legal Reasoning).

In light of what has been reconstructed, the issues must be considered, also under this profile, admissible.

20.– Still as a preliminary matter, the thema decidendum must be circumscribed to the first, second, and third periods of paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act.

The referring orders raise indistinct doubts of constitutional legitimacy of paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, in the part where it provides for the legal effect of ineligibility and the prohibition from holding certain positions for a determined and fixed term of ten years, regardless of the grossly negligent or intentional nature of the conduct and, in any case, of the entity of the causal contribution to the collapse event.

The challenged discipline is, moreover, in practice provided by the first three periods of the cited paragraph 5, to which the scrutiny must therefore be limited.

21.– In this regard, it must however be noted that, only the order registered as no. 72 of the 2025 order register (Municipality of Cosenza) originates from a proceeding regarding mayors, administrators, and members of the board of auditors and in which, therefore, the norms of the first, second, and third periods find application.

The proceeding related to the order registered as no. 62 of the 2025 order register, instead, regards exclusively municipal administrators, so that only the provision of the first period is applicable in it. Consequently, the issues raised by such order, having as object the second and third periods, which concern mayors and presidents of provinces—provisions against which the referring judge’s challenges also directed—must be declared inadmissible due to lack of relevance.

22.– Coming to the content of the grievances, the issues are inadmissible, because, even in the face of evident criticalities, the reductio ad legitimitatem to which the referrers aspire can only fall to the legislature, given the plurality of solutions suitable for the purpose, which implies diversified system choices, as testified by the complex evolution that the discipline of restrictive measures for administrators and mayors responsible for the collapse has undergone.

22.1.– Paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act has been the object of numerous modifications over the years.

The original version of the provision provided that administrators whom the Court of Audit had found responsible, even at first instance, for damages produced with intent or gross negligence, in the five years preceding the occurrence of the financial collapse, could not hold, for a period of five years, positions as councillor, auditor of local authorities, or representative of local authorities in other public or private bodies and institutions, where the accounting magistracy, having evaluated the circumstances and causes that had determined the collapse, had ascertained that this was a direct consequence of the actions or omissions for which the administrator had been found responsible.

Subsequently, Article 6, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 149 of September 6, 2011 (Sanctioning and reward mechanisms relative to regions, provinces, and municipalities...) extended the duration of the restrictive measure to ten years and inserted, among the subjects upon whom to let fall the consequences of the collapse, where found responsible, also mayors and presidents of provinces, providing for their ineligibility for ten years, as well as members of the board of auditors, prohibiting their appointment to the board of auditors of local authorities and entities and bodies recognizable to them for a period of up to ten years.

These norms, in summary, limited the ascertainment of the Court of Audit to the five years preceding the declaration of collapse, provided for a restrictive measure of five years duration, later extended to ten, and considered relevant only conduct that could qualify as direct causes of the determination of the collapse.

Thereafter, Article 3, paragraph 1, letter s) of Decree-Law no. 174 of 2012, as converted, in addition to introducing a specific provision for accounting auditors, inserting into Article 248 of the Consolidated Act the new paragraph 5-bis, added to the interdiction and ineligibility also a pecuniary sanction, graduable from a minimum of five times to a maximum of twenty times the gross salary due to the subject responsible at the moment of the violation, eliminated the investigation limit to the five years preceding the collapse, and provided that liability can be referred also to the simple fact of having contributed, with acts or omissions marked by intent or gross negligence, to the determination of the collapse, and no longer, as previously, to the sole fact of having determined in a direct manner the aforementioned event.

Until the introduction of the pecuniary sanction, therefore, the restrictive measure constituted the only consequence of the violation of the precept contained in Article 248 of the Consolidated Act.

It must then be noted that, while for the members of the revision bodies the restrictive measures are graduable in relation to the gravity of the conduct, regarding administrators, mayors, and presidents of provinces they are established in a fixed measure.

The described sanctioning system charged to administrators, mayors, and presidents of provinces provided by the contested paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, moreover, is contemporary with the wider reform design that saw the light with Legislative Decree no. 235 of 2012, issued shortly after the recalled Decree-Law no. 174 of 2012, as converted.

Lastly, the already cited Article 8, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, added a final period to paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, according to which "[t]he provisions referred to in the first, second, and third periods of this paragraph do not apply to administrators who, only in cases where responsibility is attributed for gross negligence, have adopted a multi-year financial rebalancing plan approved by the Court of Audit, pursuant to Article 243-bis, within two years of taking their first office and following a resolution of the Court of Audit pursuant to Article 148-bis, paragraph 3, of ascertainment of serious irregularities or criticalities relative to the financial years preceding the election.”

The first period of the contested paragraph 5 was also modified, with the same Decree-Law no. 25 of 2025, as converted, according to which the measures de quibus now apply also if the responsibility is ascertained "with a non-final provision” and no longer "even at first instance,” as provided previously.

Overall, therefore, the described regulatory interventions have progressively hardened the sanctioning discipline connected to the financial collapse of the local entity: they have expanded the number of recipients of the sanctions, making mention, alongside the administrators, also of mayors and presidents of provinces, for whom the measure of ineligibility was added; the restrictive measures were aggravated, through the doubling of the fixed duration (from five to ten years); to these a pecuniary sanction was added, commensurate to the monthly salary of the subject found responsible and modulable in relation to the degree of responsibility; the application prerequisites of the sanctions were also expanded, with the elimination of the limitation of liability to the conduct placed in being in the five years preceding the collapse, and with the attribution of relevance also to the conduct that contributed to the verification of such event, and no longer only to those that determined it.

22.2.– The referring judges complain about the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the fixed restrictive measure provided by the challenged norm, in the face of the multiplicity and the notable variety of conduct potentially suitable to contribute to the collapse.

With reference to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, this Court, on numerous occasions, has placed such principles—also in relation to measures for which the "punitive” nature was expressly denied (as in the case decided with judgment no. 22 of 2018)—at the foundation of declarations of constitutional illegitimacy of sanctioning automatisms, deemed not in conformity with the principles in question, precisely because they postulate "the adequacy of the sanction to the concrete case; adequacy that ‘cannot be reached if not through the concrete evaluation of the specific behaviors put in act in the commission of the illicit’ (judgment no. 161 of 2018; in the same sense, ex multis, judgments no. 268 of 2016 and no. 170 of 2015)” (judgment no. 112 of 2019).

The principle of proportionality of the sanction, it was specified in the same judgment, possesses "potential applications that exceed the horizon of legislative automatisms,” resulting applicable also to the matter of administrative sanctions, relative to which it finds its constitutional base in the combined provision not—as in criminal matters—of Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution, but of Article 3 of the Constitution and the constitutional norms that protect the rights from time to time affected by the sanction.

The referring judges do not err, therefore, in identifying in the combined provision of Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution the foundation of the principle of proportionality of a measure which, like the restrictive one of which it is spoken, affects, in a limiting sense, the passive electorate right of the author of the illicit as well as the possibility of covering nomination positions at local entities, for ten years.

This Court has already had the opportunity to deem not exceeded the proportionality test in the face of the "combination between a pecuniary sanction of exceptional severity, but graduable in function of the concrete gravity of the illicit and the economic conditions of the author of the infraction, and a further sanction also of ‘punitive’ character” but not graduable (again, judgment no. 112 of 2019).

An analogous event is detectable in the case today under examination.

The fixity of the sanctioning treatment prevents taking account of the different concrete gravity of the individual illicit acts, which is in function of the breadth not only of the distinct degree of responsibility on the psychological level (intent or gross negligence), and the type of violation committed, but also of the duration of the position or the mandate and the effective causal contribution to the collapse.

The disproportion of the measure emerges also from the comparison with the different norm, contained in the fourth period of paragraph 5 of Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, which allows modulating the pecuniary sanction in relation to the concrete gravity of the conduct of the single subject found responsible.

However, the reductio ad legitimitatem, as said, cannot be operated by this Court. The modalities with which this could happen result, in fact, multiple, as well as expressive of different system choices, remitted to the discretion of the legislature.

On the occasion of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the provision of a fixed duration of the accessory penalty of the inhabilitation to the exercise of a commercial enterprise and the incapacity to exercise directive offices at any enterprise (judgment no. 222 of 2018) it was admitted the corrective intervention of this Court regarding the duration of the measure "on condition that the sanctioning treatment […] can be replaced on the basis of ‘precise points of reference, already findable in the legislative system,’ understood as ‘solutions [sanctioning] already existing, suitable to eliminate or reduce the manifest unreasonableness lamented’ (judgment no. 236 of 2016).”

In the case today under examination, it is not possible to find a single point of reference that can be considered constitutionally adequate, albeit not obliged.

Where, in fact, one were to assume as tertium comparationis the norm provided for the members of the board of auditors from the paragraph immediately following the same Article 248 of the Consolidated Act, namely paragraph 5-bis—which provides for the interdiction up to ten years—one would introduce for administrators, mayors, and presidents of provinces a sanctioning treatment equal to that established for auditors, a solution deemed not convincing by the same referring judges, who correctly affirm that the choice of the legislature to provide restrictive measures of different duration for administrators, mayors, and presidents of provinces on one side, and for auditors on the other, cannot be deemed inherently unreasonable, considered the different level of responsibility in the management of the entity.

A further solution could be that of establishing that the restrictive measures have a variable duration from five to ten years, assuming as a point of reference, for the purpose of identifying the minimum duration, what is provided by Article 265 of the Consolidated Act, which establishes in five years the minimum time necessary for the recovery of the local entity, namely for the exit from the collapse procedure, starting from that in which the hypothesis of stably rebalanced budget is drafted.

None of the proposed solutions, however, would escape the risk of the invasion of the sphere of discretion reserved to the legislature, placed that in both cases this Court not only would have to reconsider the fixity of the restrictive measure, but also attribute to the Court of Audit the power, currently limited to the modulation of the pecuniary sanction, to graduate it, once ascertained the material contribution of the subject to the verification of the collapse.

Remaining firm that the concrete determination of the graduality of the measure must be informed by the proportionality criterion, the wide range of possible solutions involves, to the state, the inadmissibility of the raised issues, from the moment that the remedy to the identified vulnus requires, at least in first instance, "a systemic regulatory intervention, implying fundamental choices between options all falling within the discretion of the legislature (judgments no. 71 of 2023, no. 96 and no. 22 of 2022, no. 259, no. 240, no. 146, no. 103, no. 33 and no. 32 of 2021)” (judgment no. 190 of 2023) (judgment no. 183 of 2025).

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

joins the proceedings,

1) declares inadmissible the interventions explained by E. G., M. D.A., V. S., and F. I., in the proceeding related to the order registered under no. 62 of the 2025 order register, indicated in the heading;

2) declares inadmissible the intervention of the Prosecutor General at the Court of Audit in the proceedings indicated in the heading;

3) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, second and third periods, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of August 18, 2000 (Consolidated Act on the Statutes of Local Authorities), raised, in reference to Articles 3, 51, 54, and 97 of the Constitution, by the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, with the order registered under order register no. 62 of 2025 indicated in the heading;

4) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 248, paragraph 5, first, second, and third periods, of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 2000, raised, in reference to Articles 3, 51, 54, and 97 of the Constitution, by the Court of Audit, Jurisdictional Section for the Calabria Region, with the orders indicated in the heading.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 10, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Angelo BUSCEMA, Reporting Judge

Valeria EMMA, Clerk of Court

Deposited in the Clerk's Office on May 19, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms, in text, to the original