Sentenza n. 116 del 2026

Judgment no. 116 of 2026 - AI translated

JUDGMENT NO. 116

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Tuscany Region Law of 20 August 2025, no. 50 (Provisions concerning regional protected areas and Natura 2000 Network sites regarding sanctions, incidence assessment, investigative costs, and natural reserve regulations. Amendments to Regional Law 30/2015), initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers, by appeal notified on 24 October 2025, filed in the Registry on the following 27 October, registered under no. 40 of the 2025 register of appeals, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 47, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearance of the Tuscany Region;

having heard in the public hearing of 15 April 2026 the Reporting Judge Marco D’Alberti;

having heard State Attorney Generoso Di Leo for the President of the Council of Ministers, and attorney Marcello Cecchetti for the Tuscany Region;

having deliberated in the chambers on 15 April 2026.

Statement of Facts

1.– By appeal notified on 24 October 2025, filed on the following 27 October, and registered under no. 40 of the 2025 register of appeals, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, challenged the constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Tuscany Region Law of 20 August 2025, no. 50 (Provisions concerning regional protected areas and Natura 2000 Network sites regarding sanctions, incidence assessment, investigative costs, and natural reserve regulations. Amendments to Regional Law 30/2015), with reference to Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

The challenged provision replaced paragraph 2 of Article 93 of the Tuscany Region Law of 19 March 2015, no. 30 (Norms for the conservation and enhancement of the regional naturalistic-environmental heritage. Amendments to Regional Law 24/1994, Regional Law 65/1997, Regional Law 24/2000, and Regional Law 10/2010) with the following:

«2. In the case of interventions, projects, and activities, realized or in the course of realization, without prior submission to the incidence assessment procedures or in substantial discrepancy with the provisions of the final incidence assessment measures, the competent authority, following a possible suspension of works or activities and upon assessment of the extent of the environmental prejudice caused and that resulting from the application of the sanction, may order the demolition and restoration of the state of the places and of the environmental situation at the expense and care of the responsible party, defining the terms and methods thereof».

1.1.– According to the appellant, the challenged provision, insofar as it amends paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015 by providing for the merely optional nature of the suspension of works relating to projects initiated without a prior environmental incidence assessment (VINCA) in sites belonging to the "Natura 2000” network, would alter the previous regulatory framework, which instead configured suspension as a mandatory act in the event of a violation of the obligation for prior incidence assessment.

The previous paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015 provided, in fact, that: «2. In the case of works and interventions realized without prior submission to the incidence assessment procedures or in violation of the same provisions and in the case of substantial discrepancies with the provisions of the final measures of the proceedings conducted under this law, the competent authority, having assessed the extent of the environmental prejudice caused and that resulting from the application of the sanction, shall order the suspension of works and may order the demolition and restoration of the state of the places and the environmental situation at the expense and care of the responsible party, defining the terms and methods thereof».

Before the modification introduced by the challenged norm, therefore, the Administration was not granted any margin of assessment regarding the suspension of works.

The challenged provision would therefore cause, according to the appellant, a lowering of the level of environmental protection guaranteed by state and European Union legislation, in violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

The failure to suspend works for projects initiated without prior incidence assessment could, in fact, lead to alterations of the state of the places with consequent prejudice to environmental values.

1.2.– The appellant recalled, in this regard, the constitutional case law which has affirmed that in environmental matters, given the cross-cutting and teleological nature of state legislative competence, regions may adopt improvement measures, but may not introduce derogatio in peius compared to state standards.

The regional provision subject to challenge, by contrast, by granting the administration discretionary power in place of an obligation, would reduce the effectiveness of prevention tools, compromising the uniformity of protection across the national territory.

This provision would conflict with the minimum levels of environmental protection provided for by Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 152 of 3 April 2006 (Environmental Regulations), titled "Coordination of the procedures of SEA, EIA, Verification of subjection to EIA, Incidence Assessment, and Integrated Environmental Authorization,” and by Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the so-called Habitats Directive), as implemented by Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 357 of 8 September 1997 (Regulation implementing Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora).

Article 6 of said Directive provides, in paragraphs 2 and 3: "2. Member States shall take appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated, in so far as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objectives of this Directive. 3. Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general public.”

1.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers recalled the constant orientation of administrative case law according to which environmental incidence assessment constitutes a requirement for the validity of the authorization title, so much so that, in its absence, the suspension of works must necessarily be ordered and cannot be left to the discretion of the administrative authority.

The appellant cited the judgment of the Council of State, Second Section, 28 May 2021, no. 4135, which stated that the incidence assessment constitutes a procedural requirement that must necessarily precede the commencement of any plan or project, and that the aforementioned supranational norm does not contemplate the possibility that, despite the lack of anteriority of the incidence assessment, a building consent act adopted in the absence of such prior requirement may nonetheless receive post-hoc validation.

According to this approach, the lack of a prior VINCA would constitute an obstacle to the realization of any intervention, which should therefore be immediately and mandatorily prohibited or, if commenced, suspended.

In the same vein, reference was made to the case law of legitimacy which highlighted how the VINCA constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the validity of the building permit issued in areas subject to environmental protection and how, conversely, its absence entails the invalidity of the building title and justifies the preventive seizure of works carried out in a "Natura 2000” area (Court of Cassation, Third Criminal Section, judgment 6 March-10 April 2025, no. 14127).

Article 7 of the regional law in question would, therefore, be unconstitutional because, in amending Article 93, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015, it would have introduced a less rigorous regime than that provided by the interposed state norms (Article 10 of Leg. Decree no. 152 of 2006 and Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 357 of 1997), in violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, thereby infringing upon fundamental principles regarding the uniform protection of the environment.

2.– The Tuscany Region entered an appearance in the proceedings with a document filed on 3 December 2025, concluding for the non-foundedness of the challenges.

2.1.– The regional defense argued that with Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025, the Tuscany Region intended to regulate in greater detail the sanctioning procedure in the event of interventions carried out in Natura 2000 Network areas, in the absence of or in discrepancy with the VINCA.

The regional legislator, however, would in no way have derogated from the obligation of prior acquisition of the VINCA, which is not remediable ex post, with the consequence that the challenged provision would not entail any infringement of the exclusive state legislative competences regarding the subject of "environmental protection” pursuant to Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

Directive 92/43/EEC, cited in the appeal, in fact demands that national implementation provisions provide for sanctions and other safeguards for compliance with VINCA regulations, such as the identification of inhibitory and conservative measures.

Such implementation occurred with Presidential Decree no. 357 of 1997, which constitutes the framework for the VINCA, together with Leg. Decree no. 152 of 2006, which provides for the integration of incidence assessment into environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment procedures.

2.2.– Within the national legislative framework described above, regions are called upon to contribute to the protection of particularly relevant and sensitive environmental assets, such as Sites of Community Importance (SCI), in order to ensure the protection of species for which such zones have been identified (Council of State, Second Section, judgment 28 May 2021, no. 4135 is cited).

The regional defense cites the consolidated orientation of this Court, according to which the subject of environmental protection has a cross-cutting character and legitimizes regions to intervene in relation to topics that have repercussions on the environmental sphere (judgments no. 246 and no. 32 of 2006, no. 336, no. 232, no. 214 and no. 62 of 2005, no. 259 of 2004, no. 507 and no. 54 of 2000, no. 382 of 1999, no. 273 of 1998).

The challenged provision would have the precise purpose of strengthening the safeguarding and protection of biodiversity, providing the competent authority with powers analogous to those attributed to the managing bodies of protected areas pursuant to Article 29 of Law no. 394 of 6 December 1991 (Framework Law on Protected Areas), allowing for suspension and restoration even in cases where there are no prerequisites for the activation of measures in application of specific sector regulations.

In the same direction are the modifications made by the challenged provision to paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015, which were necessary to align its terminology with the "National guidelines for incidence assessment (VIncA) - Directive 92/43/EEC 'HABITATS' Article 6, paragraphs 3 and 4,” published in the Official Gazette no. 303 of 28 December 2019, and to overcome some application criticalities determined by a partial overlap of the cases regulated by the original norm.

2.3.– The new wording of paragraph 2 of the cited Article 93, in confirming the sanctioning measures of an inhibitory or conservative nature (suspension of works) and of a restorative or demolition character (demolition, restoration of the state of the places and of the environmental situation) – already contemplated by the original norm and additional to the pecuniary sanctions pursuant to the subsequent Article 94 – would specify their scope of application (completed interventions/projects/activities and/or those in progress) and sequence; so that the suspension of works would now be prioritized before the assessment of environmental prejudice, in a more precautionary function.

With the challenged provision, therefore, the Tuscany Region reaffirmed the obligation of prior acquisition of the VINCA also with reference to works carried out in areas interfering, even if only indirectly, with the areas included in the "Natura 2000” network, as well as the obligation for the competent authority to verify and sanction prejudice to the ecosystem in the event of illegal interventions.

The term "possible” (eventuale), therefore, far from foreshadowing discretion in the exercise of the inhibitory power, is to be understood in the sense of "where necessary,” as clearly explained also in the explanatory report to Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025; the suspension of works is provided for in the event that the interventions are still in the course of realization, while, if the works are already completed, the restoration of the status quo would operate directly, following an assessment of the environmental prejudice.

The new norm could not be interpreted, according to the Region, in a sense detrimental to environmental protection, as argued by the state defense; the sanctioning measure provided for by Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015, in fact, would in any case always be intended for the demolition of illegal structures and/or the restoration of the state of the places and such restoration would be incompatible with the possibility of allowing the continuation of illegal works in progress.

3.– The President of the Council of Ministers filed a memorandum on 23 March 2026.

In replying to the arguments of the regional defense, the State Attorney's Office highlighted that the challenged provision could not be interpreted in the restrictive sense proposed by the regional defense.

The use of the adjective "possible” (eventuale) would indicate not a mere factual condition, but a power left to the evaluation of the competent authority, with the consequence that the norm would abstractly allow the administration not to order the suspension of works even when the illegal intervention is still in progress, characterizing the inhibitory power as a discretionary power. The result would be a weakening of "the level of preventive protection of the environment, which in state discipline is, instead, characterized by bound and immediately injunctive powers.”

The interpretation proposed by the Tuscany Region, by replacing the "preceptive” content with a merely "descriptive” content (limited to the mere acknowledgment of the fact that, where works are finished, suspension would no longer have any effect), would conflict with the hermeneutic canon that requires interpreting a provision in such a way that it maintains a "useful” effect of innovation of the legal system.

In this perspective, the provision would also jeopardize the need for legal certainty. Indeed, if interpreted as a duty in its objective normative meaning, in the sense of configuring the suspension of works as optional, it would be capable of affecting the minimum level of environmental protection established by state legislation.

On the other hand, an adequacy-oriented interpretation would be permitted only where compatible with the literal data of the provision, as it cannot result "in a 'manipulation' of the normative text” (reference is made to the judgments of this Court no. 94 of 2023 and no. 240 of 2019).

4.– Approaching the public hearing, the regional defense filed a memorandum in which it reiterated the arguments already illustrated in support of the non-discretionary nature of the suspension of works provided for by Article 93, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015, as amended by the challenged provision.

The Tuscany Region further specified that Article 7, paragraph 3, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025 confirmed the sanctioning measures of an "inhibitory/conservative” nature (suspension of works) and of a "restorative/demolition” character (demolition, restoration of the state of the places and of the environmental situation), already contemplated by the original norm, clarifying their scope of application (completed interventions/projects/activities and/or those in progress) and redefining their sequence; in particular, according to the new paragraph 2 of Article 93, the suspension of works is positioned before the assessment of environmental prejudice and its precautionary function is therefore enhanced.

This interpretation would find confirmation in the preamble to Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025.

There would, therefore, be no conflict with the Habitats Directive, nor with the state discipline that implements it.

Legal Reasoning

5.– With the appeal indicated in the header, registered under no. 40 of the 2025 register of appeals, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, challenged the constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 3, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025, with reference to Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

The challenged provision replaced paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015 with the following:

The previous paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015 provided that: «2. In the case of works and interventions realized without prior submission to the incidence assessment procedures or in violation of the same provisions and in the case of substantial discrepancies with the provisions of the final measures of the proceedings conducted under this law, the competent authority, having assessed the extent of the environmental prejudice caused and that resulting from the application of the sanction, shall order the suspension of works and may order the demolition and restoration of the state of the places and the environmental situation at the expense and care of the responsible party, defining the terms and methods thereof».

5.1.– According to the appellant, the challenged provision, in the part in which it amends paragraph 2 of Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015, by providing for the merely optional nature of the suspension of works relating to projects initiated without a prior incidence assessment, or in discrepancy with its outcomes, would alter the previous regulatory framework, which instead configured suspension as a mandatory act.

The amendment would therefore cause a lowering of the level of environmental protection guaranteed by state and Union legislation, in violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

5.2.– The Tuscany Region entered an appearance in the proceedings, concluding for the non-foundedness of the challenges.

The regional defense argued that Tuscany Regional Law no. 50 of 2025 would in no way have derogated from the obligation of prior acquisition of the VINCA, provided for by the mentioned interposed norms, with the consequence that the challenged provision would not entail any infringement of the exclusive state legislative competences regarding the subject of environmental protection ex Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution.

6.– During the oral argument, the defense of the Region raised an objection of inadmissibility of the question due to the irrelevance of the interposed parameters invoked, as the provisions referred to in the appeal make no mention of the suspension of works initiated in the absence of the VINCA, such that no conflict could be identified between the challenged regional provision and the discipline referred to as interposed (Habitats Directive, Article 10 of Leg. Decree no. 152 of 2006, Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 357 of 1997).

6.1.– The objection is not founded.

In arguing that the regional provision would cause a lowering of the level of environmental protection guaranteed by state and Union legislation, in violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, the appellant deduced that, according to the constant orientation of administrative case law, environmental incidence assessment constitutes a requirement for the validity of the authorization title, so much so that, in its absence, the suspension of works must necessarily be ordered and could not be left to the discretion of the administrative authority. Consequently, the challenged regional provision, by attributing a discretionary power to the administration instead of a duty, would reduce the effectiveness of prevention tools, compromising the uniformity of environmental protection across the national territory.

As set forth, the violation of state legislative competence was thus adequately argued, and the merits of this assumption must be examined.

7.– On the merits, the question is not founded.

7.1.– With the Habitats Directive, an environmental protection system aimed at the conservation of biodiversity, called "Natura 2000,” was outlined, which identifies the sites of community interest subject to protection.

The purpose of the Directive is "to contribute towards ensuring bio-diversity through the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the European territory of the Member States to which the Treaty applies” (Article 2, paragraph 1). To achieve this objective, the Directive establishes measures aimed at ensuring the maintenance or restoration, in a satisfactory state of conservation, of habitats and species of union interest listed in its annexes.

The Directive is built on two pillars: the "Natura 2000” ecological network, consisting of sites aimed at the conservation of habitats and species listed in Annexes I and II respectively; and the protection regime for species listed in Annexes IV and V.

To reach the objectives of protecting habitats and animal and plant species, the Directive established Special Areas of Conservation (SAC), areas in which to apply measures necessary for the maintenance and restoration of habitats and populations of the species present. These zones, together with the Special Protection Areas (SPA), established by Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 July 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (the so-called Birds Directive), form the "Natura 2000” network.

The Directive also contains norms that regulate the management of "Natura 2000” sites and environmental incidence assessment, the monitoring of sites, and the drafting of national reports on the implementation of supranational provisions.

7.2.– Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, as far as relevant here, provides in paragraph 3 that, for special areas of conservation, Member States shall establish the measures necessary to avoid the deterioration of natural habitats and that "[a]ny plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the assessment of the implications for the site [...] the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general public.”

7.3.– The provisions of the Directive were implemented by Presidential Decree no. 357 of 1997, where, in Article 5, paragraph 8, it is provided that, in the case of interventions that may have significant impacts on sites of community importance, "[t]he authority competent for the final approval of the plan or intervention shall acquire the incidence assessment beforehand, possibly identifying methods for consulting the public affected by the realization of the same.”

With reference to the prerequisites for the application of the VINCA, the Community norm and the internal implementation norm therefore subordinate the necessity of an assessment of the environmental implications of a plan or project to the condition that there is a probability or risk that the latter will significantly affect the site concerned.

7.4.– Administrative case law observed, in this regard, that the objective of the legislator, both European and national, is that of maximum conservation of sites, with attention to both the single impact of the project specifically subject to assessment, and the cumulative impact that could occur in connection with another and different plan or project (Council of State, Sixth Section, judgment 14 October 2014, no. 5092).

Therefore, interventions that do not cause a significant impact on protected areas remain excluded from incidence assessment.

7.5.– The "National guidelines for incidence assessment (V.Inc.A.)” have regulated the "Incidence Assessment process,” which starts with a phase of acquiring basic information data relating to the proposed intervention (possibly through the preparation of an incidence study by the proponent) and can conclude with a positive opinion from the authority competent in matters of VINCA, if the collected data show with certainty that it will not jeopardize the integrity of the site.

8.– With the regulatory framework thus delineated, it must be observed that neither the Habitats Directive nor the national implementing provisions deal with the regulation of interventions initiated in the absence of incidence assessment or in discrepancy with its outcomes.

It is true that from the examination of community and internal norms it is clearly inferred that the VINCA procedure is intrinsically preventive, because it has the function of safeguarding environmental matrices, fauna, and flora of the protected area from the negative effects of anthropogenic intervention and can only be conducted before the intervention has begun, since only the ex ante assessment of the state of ecosystems allows for establishing if the programmed intervention can have prejudicial effects on them (Administrative Court for Abruzzo, 10 July 2025, no. 350; Administrative Court for Sicily, Palermo, 19 July 2024, no. 2283; Council of State, no. 4135 of 2021); however, the provisions on the matter do not regulate in any way the measures to be adopted in the face of works realized or in the course of realization in the absence of VINCA or in discrepancy with it.

The state legislator, therefore, exercised its competence in the matter by limiting itself to establishing the necessity of prior incidence assessment which, in line with the principles affirmed by this Court, constitutes a mandatory constraint for the regions in the exercise of their competence in the matter of "territorial governance.”

8.1.– According to the constant case law of this Court, "environmental and landscape conservation pertains, on the basis of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, to the exclusive care of the State” (judgments no. 82 of 2024, no. 160 of 2021, no. 178 and no. 172 of 2018 and no. 103 of 2017).

The subject of environmental protection identifies a cross-cutting legislative competence, governed by the teleological element, the unfolding of which leaves room for possible interference with the exercise of legislative competences belonging to the regions, such as territorial governance and health protection (judgments no. 16 of 2024, no. 160 of 2023, no. 191, no. 144 and no. 21 of 2022, no. 189, no. 158, no. 86 and no. 21 of 2021 and no. 88 of 2020).

Constitutional case law has clarified the terms in which the exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of environmental and ecosystem protection operates as a limit to the exercise of regional legislative competences and to what extent the latter can instead unfold.

8.2.– In particular, this Court has affirmed that state legislative provisions act as a limit to the discipline that the regions, even those with special statutes, dictate in matters of their competence, if and when the state norm has set the point of balance between opposing needs (judgments no. 16 of 2024, no. 88 of 2020, no. 197 of 2014, no. 300, no. 145 and no. 58 of 2013, no. 66 of 2012 and no. 225 of 2009).

Therefore, where the state legislator has outlined a unitary design in guaranteeing environmental and ecosystem protection, possibly through solutions modulated between the various territorial areas, such choice does not admit regional legislative interventions capable of determining interference, even if in melius, regarding environmental protection (judgments no. 258 and no. 88 of 2020); this occurs, for example, if there is state discipline regarding the placement of power lines (judgment no. 331 of 2003), or identification of electromagnetic emission thresholds by state law (judgment no. 307 of 2003).

Furthermore, interference deriving from regional legislation was excluded in the face of state legislative interventions aimed at regulating in a uniform manner the administrative procedure applicable for the purposes of environmental protection (judgment no. 82 of 2024, relating to a regional provision that excluded some areas intended for parking from environmental and landscape assessment procedures; judgment no. 93 of 2013, relating to the provision of the unitary discipline of EIA, as a procedure that evaluates in concrete and preventive terms environmental sustainability).

Again, this Court considered the definition of the organizational structure and the allocation of administrative functions in environmental matters reserved to the state legislator: only the state legislator can define the attribution of administrative functions, "also through the allocation of competences to entities other than Municipalities – to which they must be considered generally attributed according to the criterion expressed by Article 118, first paragraph, of the Constitution – whenever the need for unitary exercise of the function transcends such territorial area of government. [...] This leads logically to exclude that the administrative functions attributable to the matters referred to in Article 117, second paragraph, of the Constitution – which, on the basis of an assessment oriented by the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation, and adequacy, have been conferred by the State to the Region – can be reallocated by the latter to another infra-regional entity, as such an initiative entails an amendment, through a regional legislative act, of the structure of competences mandatorily established by national law” (judgment no. 189 of 2021).

8.3.– Outside of such hypotheses, where the ratio of the state legislative intervention in the matter of environmental protection is attributable to the provision of a minimum level of protection, the exercise of regional legislative competences that indirectly act to raise that standard can instead unfold. The limit that the State's legislative competence then places on the balancing of interests identified by the regional legislator is that it does not violate the minimum parameter set by the state provision (judgments no. 148 of 2023, no. 69 of 2022, no. 44 and no. 7 of 2019, no. 218, no. 174, no. 139 and no. 74 of 2017, no. 303 of 2013 and no. 278 of 2012).

In such a case, regions and autonomous provinces can, therefore, "adopt higher environmental protection norms,” still "in the exercise of [their] competences, provided for by the Constitution, which compete with that of the environment” (judgment no. 16 of 2024; in the same sense, furthermore, judgments no. 198 and no. 66 of 2018, no. 199 of 2014, no. 246 and no. 145 of 2013, no. 67 of 2010, no. 104 of 2008 and no. 378 of 2007).

9.– With reference to the matter under examination, the European and national reference provisions do not contain any discipline regulating the suspension of interventions initiated in the absence of environmental incidence assessment or in discrepancy with it.

Article 5 of Presidential Decree no. 357 of 1997 provides in fact, in paragraph 8, that "[t]he authority competent for the final approval of the plan or intervention shall acquire the incidence assessment beforehand, possibly identifying methods for consulting the public affected by the realization of the same,” without however regulating the consequences of the omission of this phase.

In this regard, administrative case law, in analyzing the possible measures to be adopted in case of prejudice caused to protected sites, referring to Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, noted that "[t]he presence, in the norm, of expressions such as 'avoid the degradation of habitats' and 'such disturbance could have significant consequences' highlights not only the preventive and anticipatory nature of the measures to be adopted but also, in the event of degradation already in progress, the need for 'active', 'anti-cyclical' measures capable of reversing the process which, in the absence of initiatives, would continue irreversibly,” since, if the degradation is already in progress, it is no longer enough to just prevent it, but it is necessary to counter it, to restore the state encountered at the moment of the site's identification. Consequently, "[t]he elimination of the negative impact may require, depending on the case, the suspension of the activity and/or the adoption of mitigation or restoration measures, also by performing an ex post assessment.” The measures, in any case, "must be 'effective', 'efficient', and 'adequate',” and therefore not only conservative, but of positive intervention, with measurable and, if necessary, "anti-cyclical” effects (Council of State, Fourth Section, judgment 30 April 2024, no. 3945).

In the European and internal discipline of the matter, there is no regulation of the measures to be taken in the face of interventions not submitted to prior incidence assessment, a regulation that can be qualified as a minimum standard of protection implemented by the state legislator, it being possible only to identify, as a cornerstone state principle, that of the necessarily preventive nature of the assessment.

In the specific case, the regional legislator has in no way called into question the principle of prior acquisition of the VINCA, which is, indeed, confirmed by the Tuscan regional law, where it expressly provides for the necessity of "prior submission to incidence assessment procedures.”

The regional legislator, therefore, does not cast doubt on the procedural choice of the state legislator, regarding the necessity of prior incidence assessment, but regulates the suspension of works, the demolition of works, and the restoration of the state of the places and of the environmental situation in the case of interventions carried out in the absence of or in discrepancy with it (Article 93 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2015).

In the absence of an express state regulation of the power to suspend interventions, it must, therefore, be considered that the regional legislator can legislate on the point, in full respect of the constitutional distribution of competences in the matter, as delineated by this Court.

Furthermore, in the present case, the challenged provision can well be interpreted in the sense that the provided possibility of suspension does not mean its discretion, but that the suspension is ordered in the case in which the interventions are still in the course of realization. Should the works already be completed, the restoration of the status quo would operate directly, following an assessment of the environmental prejudice.

The question must therefore be declared not founded.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares not founded the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Tuscany Region Law of 20 August 2025, no. 50 (Provisions concerning regional protected areas and Natura 2000 Network sites regarding sanctions, incidence assessment, investigative costs, and natural reserve regulations. Amendments to Regional Law 30/2015), promoted, in reference to Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the appeal indicated in the header.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 15 April 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Marco D’ALBERTI, Author of the opinion

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on 30 June 2026