Sentenza n. 16 del 2026

Judgment No. 16 of 2026 - AI translated

JUDGMENT NO. 16

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the legitimacy challenge regarding Articles 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, and 22, paragraphs 1, 6, and 7, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of December 7, 1998, No. 54 (System of Autonomies in the Aosta Valley), as amended, respectively, by Article 3, paragraphs 4 and 1, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of March 3, 2025, No. 4 (Urgent provisions for the simultaneous conduct, in the year 2025, of regional and general municipal elections. Amendments to regional laws concerning local authorities), promoted by the President of the Council of Ministers with a claim filed on May 19, 2025, lodged with the Registry on the following May 21, registered under No. 22 of the claims register for 2025, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 23, special first series, of 2025.

Having seen the appearance of the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste;

having heard at the public hearing of December 2, 2025, the Reporting Judge Massimo Luciani;

having heard the State Attorney Paolo Gentili for the President of the Council of Ministers, as well as the lawyer Marcello Cecchetti for the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste;

deliberated in the private hearing of December 2, 2025.

Facts of the Case

1.– With a claim registered under No. 22 of the claims register for 2025, served on May 19, 2025, and lodged on the following May 21, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General, initiated proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, and 22, paragraphs 1, 6, and 7, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of December 7, 1998, No. 54 (System of Autonomies in the Aosta Valley), as amended, respectively, by Article 3, paragraphs 4 and 1, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of March 3, 2025, No. 4 (Urgent provisions for the simultaneous conduct, in the year 2025, of regional and general municipal elections. Amendments to regional laws concerning local authorities), as well as, "in any case,” of Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it amended Articles 30-bis and 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998.

The challenged provisions stipulated: a) the non-immediate re-candidacy for the office of Mayor and Deputy Mayor in municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants for those who have held the same office for four consecutive terms (unless one of the preceding terms was less than two years, six months, and one day due to a cause other than voluntary resignation); b) the prohibition of selecting municipal councilors from outside the body of municipal councilors; c) the prohibition for the spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor to be members of the Council.

More specifically, Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025 provided as follows: "[a]fter paragraph 2-bis of Article 30-bis of Regional Law 54/1998, as inserted by paragraph 3, the following is inserted: ‘2-ter. Any person who has held the office of Mayor or Deputy Mayor for four consecutive terms in Municipalities with a population up to 5,000 inhabitants shall not be immediately eligible for re-election to the same office upon the expiry of the fourth term. A fifth consecutive term shall be permitted if one of the four preceding terms was less than two years, six months, and one day, for a cause other than voluntary resignation.’”

Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, in turn, substituted Article 22 of Regional Law No. 54 of 1998 with the following: "1. The Council shall be composed of the Mayor, who chairs it, the Deputy Mayor, and a number of councilors, chosen from among the municipal councilors, established based on the percentage values defined by the Regional Council for the determination of financial transfers to be attributed to the Municipalities, pursuant to Article 11 of the Regional Law of November 20, 1995, No. 48 (Regional interventions regarding local finance), for the year in which the bodies are elected, equal to: a) two, in Municipalities with a percentage value up to 2; b) three, in Municipalities with a percentage value from 2.001 to 3; c) four, in Municipalities with a percentage value from 3.001 to 5; d) five, in Municipalities with a percentage value from 5.001 to 10; e) six, in the Municipality of Aosta. 2. With the act appointing the Council, the number of councilors established under paragraph 1 may be increased by one unit. With the same appointment act, the number of councilors may be increased by a further unit, without new or increased burdens on the municipal budget, as attested by the economic-financial review body. To ensure cost invariance, the allowances of all members of the Council may be readjusted, excluding the burdens deriving from paid leave, as well as social security, welfare, and insurance burdens referred to in the provisions contained in Part I, Title III, Chapter IV of Legislative Decree of August 18, 2000, No. 267 (Consolidated Text of Laws on the Organization of Local Authorities). 3. During the term of office of the Municipal Council, the number of councilors may be varied within the limits, minimum and maximum, referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 4. In all Municipalities, the presence of both genders is guaranteed within the Council if, among the councilors elected from the winning list, the less represented gender has been elected for at least 30 percent of those elected, unless at least one member of the less represented gender has been elected to the office of Mayor or Deputy Mayor. 5. The procedures for appointing and revoking members of the Council shall be established by the statute. 6. The spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor may not be members of the Council. 7. In any case, the appointment of citizens who are not members of the Municipal Council to the office of councilor is not permitted.”

In the opinion of the claimant, the aforementioned provisions conflict with the teachings of constitutional jurisprudence (citing Judgment No. 60 of 2023) concerning the "relationship between the State’s legislative competence in matters of organization and government bodies of local authorities and the primary legislative competence vested in the same matter by special statute regions.”

1.1.– Specifically, the introduction of a term limit for consecutive mandates of Mayors of municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants, as established by Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, allegedly violates Articles 1 and 2, letter b), of the Constitutional Law of February 26, 1948, No. 4 (Special Statute for the Aosta Valley), as well as Articles 1, 3, 51, 114, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, in relation to Article 51, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree of August 18, 2000, No. 267 (Consolidated Text of Laws on the Organization of Local Authorities): the latter, in fact, does not provide for any term limit for consecutive mandates of the Mayor of municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants, and this provision allegedly constitutes an unalterable principle for the primary legislative competence of the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste, which – pursuant to Article 2, letter b), of the special statute – must legislate "[i]n harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic,” thereby violating the principle of equality in matters of passive suffrage and the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of electoral law, government bodies, and fundamental functions of municipalities, provinces, and metropolitan cities (citing this Court's judgments No. 50 of 2015, No. 143 of 2010, No. 84 of 1994, No. 463 of 1992, No. 539 of 1990, No. 235 of 1988, No. 130 and No. 127 of 1987, No. 171 of 1984, No. 82 of 1982 and No. 108 of 1969, as well as Order No. 571 of 1990).

Nor, in the opinion of the claimant, can any special nature of the Aosta Valley situation compared to the rest of the national territory be invoked, as it cannot be argued "that lesser difficulties in electoral competition exist here for Municipalities up to 5,000 inhabitants, compared to the rest of the national territory, or, more generally, that the principle of democratic governance of the Republic and its local authorities must be applied in the Aosta Valley by limiting passive suffrage in small Municipalities.”

1.2.– Similarly flawed is the provision of Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, according to which councilors can only be chosen from among the municipal councilors (citing again this Court's Judgment No. 60 of 2023). The prohibition on choosing municipal councilors from outside the body of municipal councilors radically departs, in fact, from the provisions of Article 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, which stipulate that "[i]n municipalities with a population exceeding 15,000 inhabitants and in provinces, councilors are appointed by the mayor or the president of the province, even from outside the members of the council, from among citizens possessing the requirements for candidacy, eligibility, and compatibility for the office of councilor” and that "[i]n municipalities with a population below 15,000 inhabitants, the statute may provide for the appointment as councilor of citizens not members of the council and in possession of the requirements for candidacy, eligibility, and compatibility for the office of councilor.” These latter provisions equally constitute principles of the legal order, which the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste must adhere to even when exercising its primary legislative power, so that not only Articles 1 and 2, letter b), of the special autonomy statute are violated, but also Articles 3, 51, 97, 114, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, as the autonomous region cannot legislate differently from a provision to which only municipal statutes (limited to municipalities with a population below fifteen thousand inhabitants) may derogate.

1.3.– Furthermore, the provision of Article 22, paragraph 6, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, according to which "[t]he spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor may not be members of the Council,” would be no less objectionable. Here, in fact, the conflict is with the provision (also constituting an unalterable principle) of Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, according to which "[t]he spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, and in-laws within the third degree, of the mayor or the president of the provincial council, may not be members of their respective council nor be appointed as representatives of the municipality and the province.” Since the regional provision under examination excludes ascendants and descendants from the incompatibility to be members of the council, reducing the range of incompatible relatives and in-laws to those within the first degree, and extends to the deputy mayor reasons for incompatibility that state law provides only against the mayor, the same norms invoked to prove the unconstitutionality of Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998 would be violated, as the Region cannot differently balance on its territory "the political right of every citizen to participate in public affairs, including as a municipal councilor (Art. 51 of the Constitution), with the necessity […] to prevent commingling and conflicts of interest based on family ties (Art. 97 of the Constitution),” nor extend to other subjects a regulation that "expresses the balance between equally relevant constitutional values attested, on the one hand, by Art. 51 of the Constitution, and on the other, by Art. 97 of the Constitution.”

2.– By a document lodged on June 30, 2025, the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste appeared in the proceedings, requesting that the claim be declared inadmissible or, in any case, unfounded.

2.1.– In limine, the Region objected to the inadmissibility of the appeal due to the tardiness of the Council of Ministers' resolution authorizing the challenge: according to the respondent, in fact, although the timeliness of lodging the claim cannot be doubted, based on the established case law of the Constitutional Court which extended the sixty-day deadline for challenging laws to the principle that, if – as in this case – the deadline falls on a Saturday, it is automatically extended to the following Monday (citing this Court's Judgment No. 248 of 2022), the appeal would still be inadmissible, as the Council of Ministers' resolution, which is not a procedural act and which, pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of Law of March 11, 1953, No. 87 (Provisions on the Constitution and Functioning of the Constitutional Court), must necessarily precede the initiation of the constitutional legitimacy challenge, was adopted on the same day, May 19, 2025, which is when the sixty-day deadline for the challenge, which under Article 127 of the Constitution runs from the publication of the regional law, had already expired.

The objection does not merit acceptance.

Actions for judicial review are governed, first and foremost, by Article 127 of the Constitution, which regulates state claims against regional laws in the first paragraph and regional claims against state laws in the second paragraph. In both cases, one and only one deadline is provided for by law: sixty days (from the publication of the law) for initiating the action (the norm states: "[...] may initiate [...]”). The complex procedure established by the original text of this article was thus clearly simplified by Article 8, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law of October 18, 2001, No. 3 (Amendments to Title V of Part Two of the Constitution).

The form for initiating proceedings in the principal form is the claim, as established by Articles 31, paragraph 3 (for state claims) and 32, second paragraph (for regional claims), of Law No. 87 of 1953. It is therefore the claim that must be lodged within the sixty-day period, with "lodging” being understood as its service (as per the unequivocal wording of the two normative provisions cited above), while preparatory activities, starting from the drafting of the claim itself by the technical defender, remain irrelevant (see this Court's Judgment No. 24 of 2022). The claim must be preceded by the "resolution of the Council of Ministers” or the "resolution of the regional council,” but as regards these resolutions, the law only requires that they precede the lodging of the claim (i.e., its service), without providing for a specific further deadline (contrary to what happens for the lodging of the claim itself, set at ten days – respectively – by Articles 31, paragraph 4, and 32, third paragraph, of Law No. 87 of 1953).

This procedural framework is confirmed by Article 22 of the Supplementary Provisions for Proceedings before the Constitutional Court, which reiterates that the act that "initiates a constitutional legitimacy challenge” is the "claim” (paragraph 1) and that said claim must be lodged (now) "by electronic means” (paragraph 2). In this case too, no specific deadline is provided for the adoption of the resolution of the Council of Ministers or the regional council.

From the normative framework thus synthesized, it emerges clearly that the deadline for adopting the aforementioned resolutions is established only by relation: since they must be "prior” to the service of the claim, they must comply, as regards the deadline, with the same regulation provided for the introductory act. The respondent’s exception postulates, instead, a separation between the deadline for serving the claim and the deadline for adopting the resolution of the political body competent to rule on the appeal, which has no constitutional basis and is not found even in sub-constitutional sources.

The inseparable link between the deadline for serving the claim and the deadline for adopting the resolution of the political body does not cease even when service occurs beyond the sixtieth day. This may happen in cases where the statutory deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday and is extended to the next working day (as occurred in this case: the claim was served on the sixty-second day because the deadline fell on a Saturday, and the Council of Ministers' resolution was also adopted on the sixty-second day).

The extension of the deadline to the first working day is a general principle of our legal system (Judgment No. 85 of 2012), and the constitutional case law is firm in holding that this principle is also applicable to constitutional proceedings, based on the provisions of Article 52, paragraphs 3 and 5, of Annex 1 (Code of Administrative Procedure) to Legislative Decree of July 2, 2010, No. 104 (Implementation of Article 44 of Law of June 18, 2009, No. 69, containing delegation to the government for the reorganization of administrative procedure), which apply to constitutional proceedings by virtue of the reference in Article 22, first paragraph, of Law No. 87 of 1953 (Judgment No. 248 of 2022). Nor could it be otherwise: the extension serves to satisfy the need to ensure the full exercise of the right to defense, and the very possibility of electronic service of documents, permitted by technological progress today, does not eliminate this need, considering the constitutional right to rest (Art. 36, third paragraph, of the Constitution) and – specifically concerning proceedings in the principal form, as well as inter-subject and inter-organ conflicts – the organizational difficulties of the administrations on Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays. When, therefore, the deadline for serving the claim is moved forward due to the application of the general principle mentioned, the inseparable connection between the deadline for service and the deadline for adopting the resolution of the competent political body means that the shift also applies to the latter. This is without any derogation from the deadline established in Article 127 of the Constitution, as the extension only affects the methods of its computation (Judgment No. 248 of 2022). Hence the lack of foundation for the first of the inadmissibility objections raised by the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste.

5.– In the alternative, but still preliminarily, the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste objected that, regarding the challenged objects and the constitutional parameters invoked, the claim diverged from the Council of Ministers' resolution authorizing the challenge. That resolution, in fact, allegedly authorized the initiation of the constitutional legitimacy challenge only with reference to Article 22, paragraphs 6 and 7, and Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as respectively introduced by Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, and restricted the challenges to the violation of Article 2, letter b), of the special statute, "for failure to respect the principles of the legal order of the Republic as expressed by Articles 64, paragraph 4, 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, of Legislative Decree No. 267/2000 (TUEL) and Article 51, paragraph 2,” specifying that only for the provision referred to in the aforementioned paragraph 2-ter of Article 30-bis of the regional law was there "a violation of Articles 2, 3, 48, and 51 of the Constitution, protecting fundamental political rights in matters of passive and active suffrage for election to local elective offices.”

Consequently, the challenges concerning Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, are allegedly inadmissible as they pertain to norms not covered by the authorized challenge, as well as the challenges concerning the same paragraph 1 of Article 3, insofar as it introduces the new paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22, already mentioned, and Article 3, paragraph 4, insofar as it adds paragraph 2-ter to Article 30-bis of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, argued – respectively – by invoking the violation of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 3, 51, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, and the violation of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 1, 114, first paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, these being constitutional parameters of which the authorizing resolution makes no mention.

5.1.– On the merits, the respondent requested that all issues be declared unfounded.

Given that it is undisputed that the challenged norms were approved in the exercise of the primary legislative competence in the matter of "organization of local authorities and their divisions,” under Article 2, letter b), of the autonomy statute, the respondent initially noted that the constitutional case law has consistently attributed to this area the regulation of local authority elections and related ineligibility and incompatibility issues (for electoral regulation, citing Judgments No. 168 of 2018, No. 48 of 2003, No. 230 of 2001, No. 84 of 1997, No. 96 of 1968 and No. 105 of 1957; regarding ineligibility and incompatibility regulations, Judgments No. 283 of 2010, No. 288 of 2007, No. 189 of 1971 and No. 108 of 1969), pointing out that Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities itself contains an express safeguard clause, stating that "[t]he provisions of this consolidated text shall not apply to special statute regions and to the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano if incompatible with the powers provided for by the statutes and related implementing provisions.”

Once the parameter for constitutional legitimacy was identified solely as Article 2, letter b), of the special statute, which requires that primary legislative power be exercised "[i]n harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic,” the respondent contested that all norms of Legislative Decree No. 267 of 2000 could or must be qualified as principles or socio-economic reforms, as this would render meaningless the constitutional recognition of particular autonomies itself (Art. 116 of the Constitution), and recalled that constitutional case law, while affirming that regulations enacted by special statute regions in electoral matters and matters of ineligibility and incompatibility must respect the principle of equality under Article 51 of the Constitution, has allowed that particular environmental situations or peculiar local circumstances may justify a derogation (citing Judgments No. 283 and No. 143 of 2010, No. 276 of 1997 and No. 539 of 1990).

According to the respondent, there could be no doubt about the existence of such peculiarities "in a context such as the Aosta Valley, where the entire Region, except for the capital, is composed of Municipalities with a size well below 5,000 inhabitants,” representing "truly a unique case in the national panorama,” so that the provision of a term limit for consecutive mandates of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor would serve the function of guaranteeing some periodic turnover of the highest local authority figures and preventing phenomena of crystallization of local power, preserving democratic dynamism.

2.4.– In a substantially analogous manner, the respondent argued for the lack of foundation of the challenges directed against Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998.

Reaffirming that the opposing view is based on the—contested—premise that the primary legislative competence of the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste should yield to any provision contained in the consolidated text on local authorities, the respondent first highlighted that the limits set by constitutional case law on ineligibility and incompatibility do not apply to the composition of the municipal council, as it is a body appointed by the mayor (citing Judgments No. 277 of 2011 and No. 48 of 2003), and then emphasized that the peculiarities of its territory, characterized by a strong community dimension, would certainly justify the choice to exclude the possibility that councilors who are not also municipal councilors are part of the council, given the "need to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the executive body, ensuring that all its components are directly invested with popular consent.” The described territorial peculiarities of the region would also justify both the choice to limit the incompatibility of the appointment as councilor to relatives and in-laws within the first degree (rather than the third) of the mayor, and the choice to extend this incompatibility to relatives and in-laws within the same degree of the deputy mayor; it being understood that, contrary to what is assumed in the claim, incompatibility would also cover ascendants and descendants, as both are included within the scope of kinship as defined by Article 74 of the Civil Code. This would be, on the one hand, to preserve the regular and effective functioning of local bodies, especially in municipalities with such a small population as to make the identification of persons not linked by ties of kinship or affinity to the mayor problematic, and on the other hand, to preserve the impartiality of the functioning of the administrative machinery, by extending the reasons for incompatibility also to the relatives and in-laws of the deputy mayor, who, unlike in the rest of the national territory, is elected by universal and direct suffrage and, in the event of the mayor’s cessation from office due to resignation, permanent impediment, removal, forfeiture, suspension, or death, assumes the office of mayor until the renewal of the municipal council.

The reasonableness of this legislative solution would also be supported, according to the regional defense, by the existence of a further guarantee provision, contained in Article 31, paragraph 1, of the same Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, which states that "[t]he members of the collegiate bodies of local authorities must refrain from participating in the discussion and voting on resolutions concerning their own interests, those of their spouse, or those of their relatives or in-laws up to the fourth degree,” and that "[t]he prohibition also entails the obligation to leave the chamber during the discussion of the resolutions in question.” The obligation to leave the chamber would, in fact, constitute a reinforcement of the constitutional principle of impartiality and good administration of the public administration even more pervasive than that provided for by Article 78 of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, which is limited to ordering the prohibition of taking part in the discussion and voting on resolutions concerning one's own interests or those of relatives or in-laws up to the fourth degree.

Considered in Law

3.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General, initiated proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, and 22, paragraphs 1, 6, and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended, respectively, by Article 3, paragraphs 4 and 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, as well as, "in any case,” of Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it amended Articles 30-bis and 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998.

The challenged norms stipulated: a) the non-immediate re-candidacy for the office of Mayor and Deputy Mayor in municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants for those who have held the same office for four consecutive terms (unless one of the preceding terms was less than two years, six months, and one day due to a cause other than voluntary resignation); b) the prohibition of selecting municipal councilors from outside the body of municipal councilors; c) the prohibition for the spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor to be members of the Council.

All norms were challenged for violating Articles 1 and 2, letter b), of the special statute, as well as Articles 1, 3, 51, 114, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, in relation to the intervening norms constituted by Articles 51, paragraph 2, 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, and 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities. As for the norms establishing the prohibition of selecting municipal councilors from outside the body of municipal councilors and the prohibition for the spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor to be members of the Council, Article 97 of the Constitution was also invoked as a parameter.

4.– In appearing in the proceedings, the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste preliminarily objected, first, to the inadmissibility of the claim due to the tardiness of the governmental resolution authorizing the challenge. According to the respondent, in fact, since the law subject to the challenge was published in the Official Bulletin of the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley on March 18, 2025, the resolution in question should have been adopted definitively by Saturday, May 17, 2025, in compliance with the sixty-day period established by Article 127 of the Constitution, "since the procedural rule which provides for the automatic extension to the following Monday concerns [...] exclusively the procedural act of the claim, and not the preparatory political-administrative activity, in which the Government's will to contest the unconstitutionality of the regional law is expressed.”

The objection does not merit acceptance.

5.– In the alternative, but still preliminarily, the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste objected that, regarding the challenged objects and the constitutional parameters invoked, the claim diverged from the Council of Ministers' resolution authorizing the challenge. That resolution, in fact, allegedly authorized the initiation of the constitutional legitimacy challenge only with reference to Article 22, paragraphs 6 and 7, and Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as respectively introduced by Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, and restricted the challenges to the violation of Article 2, letter b), of the special autonomy statute, "for failure to respect the principles of the legal order of the Republic as expressed by Articles 64, paragraph 4, 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, of Legislative Decree No. 267/2000 (TUEL) and Article 51, paragraph 2,” specifying that only for the provision referred to in the aforementioned paragraph 2-ter of Article 30-bis of the regional law was there "a violation of Articles 2, 3, 48, and 51 of the Constitution, protecting fundamental political rights in matters of passive and active suffrage for election to local elective offices.”

Consequently, the challenges concerning Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, are allegedly inadmissible as they pertain to norms not covered by the authorized challenge, as well as the challenges concerning Article 3, paragraph 1, cited, insofar as it introduces the new paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22, already mentioned, and Article 3, paragraph 4, insofar as it adds paragraph 2-ter to Article 30-bis of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, challenges which respectively lament the violation of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 3, 51, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, and the violation of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 1, 114, first paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, these being constitutional parameters of which the authorizing resolution makes no mention.

5.1.– The objection is only partially founded.

It should be recalled that, due to the political nature of the choices concerning the appeal, the case law of this Court is firm in requiring, in proceedings in the principal form, the necessary correspondence between the resolution by which the authorized body decides to lodge the challenge and the content of the claim, resulting in the inadmissibility of challenges relating to normative provisions and/or constitutional parameters not mentioned in the resolution itself (among many others, Judgments No. 161 of 2025, No. 126 of 2024, No. 223 of 2023 and No. 199 of 2020).

That being said, the resolution of the Council of Ministers authorizing the present challenge appears to have been adopted "according to the terms and reasons” of the attached report of the Department for Regional Affairs and Autonomies, which, after reviewing the normative content of Article 22, paragraphs 6 and 7, and Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as resulting from the amendments made by Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, highlighted its conflict "with the provisions of Articles 64, paragraph 4, 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, and 51, paragraph 2, of the TUEL.” These provisions are allegedly binding also on the present respondent in relation to the statutory provision that primary legislative competence in matters of organization of local authorities must be exercised "[i]n harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic […] as well as the fundamental norms of the socio-economic reforms of the Republic,” attributing to the (sole) provision of Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, cited, also "the violation of Articles 2, 3, 48, and 51 of the Constitution, protecting fundamental political rights in matters of passive and active suffrage for election to local elective offices.”

Consequently, the following are indeed absent from the text of the resolution: a) the challenge of Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998; b) the reference to the constitutional parameters of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 3, 51, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, which the State Attorney General based the challenges on regarding Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998; c) the reference to the constitutional parameters of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 1, 114, first paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, which the State Attorney General based the challenges on regarding Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it added paragraph 2-ter to Article 30-bis of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998.

However, the established case law of this Court has clarified that, with the obvious limit of substantial fidelity to the Council of Ministers' resolution, the State Attorney must be recognized the technical discretion necessary to supplement the wording of the received authorization (among others, Judgment No. 75 of 2023 and prior judgments cited therein). And while there can be no doubt that in no part of the resolution are arguments found that could translate into challenges of the type mentioned under letters b) and c), the same cannot be said for that under letter a), since Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, in introducing the new paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, establishes that "[t]he Council shall be composed of the Mayor, who chairs it, the Deputy Mayor, and [...] councilors, chosen from among the municipal councilors [...]”, thus substantially reproducing, albeit in affirmative form, the same norm as in the subsequent paragraph 7, according to which "[i]n any case, the appointment of citizens who are not members of the Municipal Council to the office of councilor is not permitted.”

In other words, the constitutional legitimacy challenge promoted with reference to the provision of Article 22, paragraph 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended, can logically extend also to the provision of paragraph 1 of the same article, insofar as it establishes that the Council is composed of councilors "chosen from among the municipal councilors.” Evidence of this is that, irrespective of the claim’s *petitum*, the latter norm, if the challenge were upheld, could be subject to a consequential declaration of unconstitutionality pursuant to Article 27 of Law No. 87 of 1953, having an almost identical content to that of the norm hypothetically declared unconstitutional.

5.2.– On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the following are therefore deemed admissible: a) the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, promoted for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the autonomy statute, and Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, in relation to the failure to respect the provision contained in Article 51 of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, constituting a principle of the legal order of the Republic; b) the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, promoted for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the special statute, in relation to the principle of the legal order of the Republic expressed by Article 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities; c) the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 22, paragraph 6, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, promoted for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the special statute, in relation to the principle of the legal order of the Republic expressed by Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities.

5.3.– The challenges concerning: a) Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it introduced the new paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, promoted for violation of Article 1 of Constitutional Law No. 4 of February 26, 1948 (Special Statute for the Aosta Valley) and Articles 3, 51, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the claim indicated in the preamble; b) Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it inserted paragraph 2-ter into Article 30-bis of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, promoted for violation of Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 1, 114, first paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the claim indicated in the preamble, must, however, be declared inadmissible.

6.– Turning now to the merits of the challenges, it must first be noted that the most recent constitutional case law has precisely defined the relationships between state and regional legislation in the matter of regulating passive suffrage and the hypotheses of ineligibility, ineligibility, and incompatibility, finding in Legislative Decree No. 267 of 2000 the intervening source conditioning the legitimacy of regional laws in relation to the constitutional source that primarily comes into consideration in this matter (Article 51 of the Constitution).

Thus, Judgment No. 60 of 2023 affirmed that the constitutional principles applicable in the matter must be harmonized "based on a specific point of equilibrium whose determination must be left to the state legislator.” The identification of this point of equilibrium can vary depending on the changing characteristics and needs of the process of democratic will formation, to the extent that "it is the state legislator who is in the best position to establish the outlines of this regulation, and to assess, always in a unitary manner, any needs suggesting a modification of the achieved point of equilibrium, as it has also recently done, increasing, for municipalities with a population below five thousand inhabitants, the number of consecutive terms permitted” (both citations are found in point 8 of the Facts of the Case). This – it should be noted – applies to all regions, including those with special autonomy, to the extent that the stipulations mentioned were made in proceedings concerning a law of the Autonomous Region of Sardinia.

Judgment No. 196 of 2024 explicitly referred to the ruling in Judgment No. 60 of 2023, adding that, since the "determination of the point of equilibrium between them, as the result of a balance between different constitutional interests, is an expression of the legislator's discretion, which can be reviewed by this Court only if manifestly unreasonable.” In the same ruling, then (and this is a statement that acquires specific relevance in this dispute, as will be seen infra, point 6.1.), the guiding logic of the state legislation in the matter was reconstructed after the amendment of paragraph 2 of Article 51 of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities by Article 4, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law of January 29, 2024, No. 7 (Urgent provisions for the electoral consultations of 2024 and on the revision of resident population registries and determination of the legal population), converted, with amendments, into Law of March 25, 2024, No. 38. This Court, in fact, noted that "[t]he amended Article 51, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities is inspired [...] by a gradual logic: no term limit in the demographically smallest municipalities, a limit of three consecutive terms for intermediate municipalities, a limit of two consecutive terms for the most populous municipalities. This is a choice that is not manifestly unreasonable, which, while following a different logic and structure from the previous ones, intends to achieve a fair balancing between the constitutional rights and principles under consideration” (point 3.2 of the Facts of the Case). The ruling now recalled was rendered following the claim of an ordinary autonomy region (the Liguria Region), but its statements, concerning state legislation, are also relevant in a dispute such as the one before us, in which the dispute is between the State and a special autonomy region.

With Judgment No. 64 of 2025 (concerning a law of the Campania Region), this Court further specified that "[e]ven norms that have a specific and detailed content can be recognized as fundamental principles (among many others, Judgments No. 195 of 2024, No. 166 of 2021, No. 84 of 2017, No. 67 of 2016 and No. 44 of 2014), when the specificity of the prescriptions is in a relationship of "co-essentiality and necessary integration” with the nature of the principles themselves (among many others, Judgments No. 189 of 2022 and No. 192 of 2017); this by reason of their "finalistic” vocation (among many others, Judgments No. 195 of 2024, No. 112 of 2023 and No. 38 of 2016) to ensure a requirement (not of homogeneity but) of normative uniformity throughout the national territory (among many others, Judgments No. 112 of 2023, No. 106 of 2022 and No. 145 of 2021), as may occur in the presence of a "fundamental choice” (Judgment No. 44 of 2021) made by the state legislator” (point 7.2 of the Facts of the Case). In this way, on the one hand, the normative scope of entrusting the state legislator with the task of identifying the point of equilibrium between the various constitutional principles has fully emerged; on the other, it has been confirmed that the requirement of "normative uniformity” concerns "the entire national territory,” with no exclusion of that of the special autonomy regions.

With the subsequent Judgment No. 148 of 2025, this Court, again, resumed the link between Article 51 and Article 3 of the Constitution already made by Judgment No. 143 of 2010, in which it was affirmed that "the exercise of legislative power by the Regions in areas, although assigned to them primarily, concerning ineligibility and incompatibility for elective offices, necessarily encounters the limit of respecting the principle of equality specifically enshrined in this matter by Article 51 of the Constitution,” and reiterated that the requirement of uniformity concerns the entire national territory, since passive suffrage is a fundamental political right that can only be regulated by general laws and without creating discrimination among citizens (point 6.2.2 of the Facts of the Case).

Lastly, with Judgment No. 211 of 2025, this Court found that a law of the Autonomous Province of Trento conflicted with the prohibition of the third consecutive term provided for by state legislation and affirmed that "the aforementioned prohibition is not imposed by the Constitution [...] and nevertheless applies also to special autonomies, both because – in the current state of legislation – it must be considered a general principle of the legal order [...], and due to the necessary respect for the principle of equality in access to elective offices [...]” (thus, in summary, point 3 of the Facts of the Case). In particular, in this same ruling, the Court affirmed that "the special autonomies, in regulating the causes of ineligibility and incompatibility, as far as they are remitted to their primary legislative competence, are nevertheless required to respect the principles enunciated by Law No. 165 of 2004 that are "expressive of the indispensable requirement of uniformity imposed by Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution” (Judgment No. 143 of 2010; in the same sense, Judgments No. 148 of 2025, No. 134 of 2018 and No. 294 of 2011)” (point 7 of the Facts of the Case).

From this consistent trend of constitutional case law, to which continuity is intended here, it is clear that the current state legislation in matters of passive suffrage, ineligibility, and incompatibility is a direct implementation of Article 51 of the Constitution, in its intimate connection with Article 3 of the Constitution. From these constitutional paradigms, a general requirement for uniformity of regulation concerning the political right of suffrage is derived, which may find distinct declinations in the various regional regulations, but always in respect of the principles of state legislation, which – as stated – may also include more specific and detailed norms, provided they express general requirements.

It is in light of this approach that the challenges proposed in the initial claim of these proceedings must be scrutinized.

6.1.– Examining first the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended (supra, point 5.2, sub a), there is no doubt that the provision for non-immediate re-candidacy of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor (both, in the Aosta Valley, "elected by universal and direct suffrage”: Art. 25 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998) in municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants, concerning those who have held the same office for four consecutive terms (unless one of the preceding terms was less than two years, six months, and one day due to a cause other than voluntary resignation) is inconsistent with what is established by Article 51, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, which – as stated – has suppressed any limit to re-candidacy for the office of Mayor in municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants.

Nor is the argument of the respondent Region based on the peculiar structure of the Aosta Valley context decisive on this point, whose municipalities – with the exception of the capital – all have a population under five thousand inhabitants: as Judgment No. 60 of 2023 recalls, "municipalities ‘with inhabitants up to 5,000 are almost 6,000 in Italy – about 70 percent of municipalities – and govern more than half of the national territory’,” so that it is ruled out that any regional specificity can be argued solely on the basis of the size of the municipalities in the region in terms of resident population.

Even less decisive is the further argument of the regional defense aimed at justifying the choice to provide for the non-immediate re-candidacy of the so-called "top” single-member bodies of local authorities with the alleged greater adherence to the framework of constitutional principles outlined by Judgment No. 60 of 2023: as also stated, what is not at issue here is the correctness of the balance struck by the regional law between the right to passive suffrage, access to electoral competition under conditions of equality, and the good functioning of public administration, but solely the faculty for special autonomy regions, in exercising their primary legislative power, to derogate from the specific balance struck from time to time by the state legislator. Once this faculty is denied, expressly stating – as Judgment No. 60 of 2023 does – that the identification of the specific point of equilibrium "must be left to the state legislator,” and judging – as the subsequent Judgment No. 196 of 2024 does – the "gradual logic” inspiring the new text of Article 51, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, which outlines a system contemplating "no term limit in the demographically smallest municipalities, a limit of three consecutive terms for intermediate municipalities, a limit of two consecutive terms for the most populous municipalities,” as "not manifestly unreasonable,” the challenge proposed with the initial claim in these proceedings is founded.

Therefore, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as inserted by Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, must be declared, for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the Special Statute of the Aosta Valley Region, in relation to the principle of the legal order of the Republic expressed by Article 51, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, and Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution.

6.2.– Similar arguments support the foundation of the constitutional legitimacy challenges concerning the prohibition that municipal councilors be chosen from outside the body of municipal councilors (supra, point 5.2, sub b) and the prohibition that the spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor be members of the Council (supra, point 5.2, sub c). In this case too, there is no doubt that these are provisions inconsistent with those of Article 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, which respectively provide that councilors in municipalities with a population up to fifteen thousand inhabitants may also be chosen from outside the body of municipal councilors (unless the municipal statute provides otherwise) and that the spouse, ascendants, descendants, and relatives and in-laws up to the third degree of the Mayor may not be members of the Council, while no appointment prohibition is placed on the spouse and relatives and in-laws of the Deputy Mayor.

In this regard, the assertion of the respondent Region that the limits to the primary legislative competence of special autonomy regions, which this Court has found in matters of ineligibility and incompatibility for elective offices, should not apply with regard to the composition of the council, as it is a body not elected but appointed by the mayor, is not shareable. Setting aside the fact that in doctrine it is undisputed that the principle of equality presides over access to all elective offices and cannot be restricted to those invested by popular vote, the case law of this Court has already attributed the membership of the municipal council to the notion of "access to a political public office,” deeming it protected by the same principle of equality that inspires Article 51 of the Constitution (Judgment No. 107 of 2024).

Given this, it must be concluded that, in this case too, the specific point of equilibrium identified by the state legislator operates as an insurmountable limit for the primary normative power that special autonomy regions possess in matters of organization of local authorities. Nor can contrary arguments be drawn from Judgment No. 48 of 2003, which the regional defense also cites to support its assertions. It is true, in fact, that in that judgment, in rejecting the "contention that electoral legislation is inherently extraneous to the subject of the organization of local authorities,” this Court expressly affirmed that "[t]he configuration of the governing bodies of local authorities, the relationships between them, the methods of forming the bodies, and therefore also the methods of electing the representative bodies, their term of office, the cases of early dissolution, are aspects of this matter,” but it is equally true that, immediately thereafter, it did not fail to refer to "the constraints for the regional legislator arising from the need to respect the constitutional and legal order principles, when legislative intervention touches upon the delicate mechanisms of local democracy.” Constraints that, precisely, the consistent constitutional case law has identified in the need to subject the matter of ineligibility and incompatibility for elective offices (in the sense specified above) to the not unreasonable balance struck by the state legislator.

6.2.1.– Turning, more specifically, to the challenge of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998 (supra, point 5.2, sub b), the respondent Region doubts that the possibility of choosing councilors even from outside the body of municipal councilors has the value of an unalterable principle, given that Article 47, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities textually provides that "[i]n municipalities with a population below 15,000 inhabitants, the statute may provide for the appointment as councilor of citizens not members of the council and in possession of the requirements for candidacy, eligibility, and compatibility for the office of councilor.”

However, it is easy to reply that the challenged regional norm, by providing the prohibition that, in municipalities with a population up to five thousand inhabitants, citizens not belonging to the municipal council be appointed councilors, completely deprives the municipalities of the possibility of providing otherwise through their statutes, thus resulting in an indirect compromise of the citizens' right to access the office of councilor, a right that – as a general principle – must be equal for all throughout the national territory, except for the existence of local specificities which, however, as already seen, cannot be reduced to the mere numerical size of the resident population in the region’s municipalities.

Therefore, the unconstitutionality of Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, must be declared for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the Special Statute of the Aosta Valley Region, in relation to the principle of the legal order of the Republic expressed by Article 47, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities.

6.2.2.– As for the challenge of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 22, paragraph 6, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998 (supra, point 5.2, sub c), it must first be agreed with the regional defense that the incompatibility established by the challenged norm also applies to ascendants and descendants, albeit within the first degree (and not up to the third, as Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities provides instead): pursuant to Article 74 of the Civil Code, kinship "is the bond between persons descending from the same ancestor” and it is therefore evident that (also) ascendants and descendants are included among the "relatives [...] within the first degree” of the Mayor (and the Deputy Mayor) for whom the challenged norm provides the prohibition of being members of the municipal council.

This clarified, the regional defense cannot, however, be further agreed with when it argues that the choice to limit the relevant kinship bond for incompatibility with the office of councilor to the first degree would be justified "by the peculiar geographical and territorial dimension of the Aosta Valley,” characterized not only by the exclusive presence of municipalities with a population below five thousand inhabitants (apart from the capital), but also "by communities linked by widespread kinship ties and a restricted relational dimension, especially in the many smaller centers.” In fact, it has already been recalled that the entire national territory is characterized by the dominant presence of municipalities with a population equal to or less than five thousand inhabitants and that, consequently, the small resident population size of the region’s municipalities (and the consequential presence of widespread kinship ties typical of any restricted community dimension) cannot be adduced to justify any local specificity.

Nor can the provision of Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, according to which "[t]he members of the collegiate bodies of local authorities must refrain from participating in the discussion and voting on resolutions concerning their own interests, those of their spouse, or those of their relatives or in-laws up to the fourth degree,” with an "obligation to leave the chamber during the discussion of the resolutions in question,” be recalled to the contrary to diminish the conflict between the state norm and the regional norm. In fact, it is not doubtful that the incompatibility for the office of councilor of relatives and in-laws up to the third degree of the mayor, by constituting a limit to the *ius ad officium*, has a scope far broader than the limit to the *ius in officio* provided for by the aforementioned regional norm.

For symmetrical reasons, the constitutional legitimacy challenge of the norm under examination is also founded in the part where, unlike what is provided for by Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, it prohibits the spouse, relatives, and in-laws within the first degree of the Deputy Mayor from being members of the municipal council. It is true that, in the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste, the Deputy Mayor is elected by universal and direct suffrage (Article 25 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998), but it is equally true that the functions assigned to the Deputy Mayor by Article 30 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998 do not substantially differ from those provided for by Article 53 of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities, as in both cases the Mayor is substituted in case of absence or temporary impediment. And faced with a substantial affinity of functions, the provision of a prohibition, for the relatives and in-laws of the Deputy Mayor, to be members of the municipal council results in a compromise of their right to access the office of councilor, a right that – in the absence of local specificities that may justify differentiated treatment – must be, as a general principle, equal for all throughout the national territory.

Therefore, the unconstitutionality of Article 22, paragraph 6, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as amended by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, must be declared, for violation of Article 2, letter b), of the Special Statute of the Aosta Valley Region, in relation to the principle of the legal order of the Republic expressed by Article 64, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Text on Local Authorities.

7.– It is, however, worth noting, finally, that the case law of this Court, summarized above (point 6), has highlighted that the state regulation in the matter at issue has changed over time, as is logical given the natural evolution of political-social dynamics and – consequently – of the needs to protect the constitutional rights involved. This very observation requires a concluding consideration.

Profiles of disharmony may indeed arise between the requirement of uniformity throughout the national territory of the regulation concerning passive suffrage and the requirement (which the state legislator himself has perceived) to adequately take into account the evolution of the political-social reality. In fact, it cannot be excluded that (in addition to the methods and contents) the times for change may differ in the various regional realities and that – therefore – the dynamic adaptation of state legislation may not be adequately timely everywhere. It is therefore for the state legislator to identify mechanisms of *nomopoiesis* that allow for the most coherent combination of the requirement of uniformity and that of adaptation. This Court, in fact, has not intended uniformity as synonymous with identity, so that, while always respecting the combined provisions of Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, room for regional regulation in the matter can always be identified by State law.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 30-bis, paragraph 2-ter, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of December 7, 1998, No. 54 (System of Autonomies in the Aosta Valley), inserted by Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of March 3, 2025, No. 4 (Urgent provisions for the simultaneous conduct, in the year 2025, of regional and general municipal elections. Amendments to regional laws concerning local authorities);

2) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 22, paragraphs 1, 6, and 7, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, as substituted by Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Aosta Valley Region of March 3, 2025, No. 4;

3) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it substituted paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, promoted, in reference to Article 1 of Constitutional Law No. 4 of February 26, 1948 (Special Statute for the Aosta Valley) and Articles 3, 51, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the claim indicated in the preamble;

4) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy challenge of Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 4 of 2025, insofar as it inserted paragraph 2-ter into Article 30-bis of the Regional Law of the Aosta Valley No. 54 of 1998, promoted, in reference to Article 1 of the special statute and Articles 1, 114, first paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letter p), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the claim indicated in the preamble.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on December 2, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Massimo LUCIANI, Rapporteur

Valeria EMMA, Chancellor

Lodged at the Registry on February 19, 2026