JUDGMENT NO. 196

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review proceedings of articles 76, paragraph 4, 95 to 118, 123 to 127, 130, 131, 134, 136, paragraph 1, and 137 of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism), promoted by the President of the Council of Ministers, with an appeal notified on March 10, 2025, and filed in the registry on the same date, registered under no. 14 of the appeals registry for 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 14, first special series, of 2025.

Having seen the statement of appearance of the Tuscany Region;

having heard in the public hearing of October 8, 2025, the Reporting Judge Maria Alessandra Sandulli;

having heard the State Attorneys Maria Gabriella Mangia and Giorgio Santini for the President of the Council of Ministers and the Attorney Andrea Pertici for the Tuscany Region;

having deliberated in the council chamber of November 4, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– With an appeal notified and filed on March 10, 2025, and registered under no. 14 of the appeals registry for 2025, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, has promoted, inter alia, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning articles 76, paragraph 4; 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, paragraph 2, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, paragraph 1, 112, paragraph 3, 113, paragraph 1, 114, paragraph 3, 115, paragraphs 1 and 3, 116, paragraphs 2, 7 and 8, 117, 118, 123, paragraph 1, 124, 125, 126, 127, paragraph 1, 130, 131, 134, 136, paragraph 1, and 137 of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism), alleging the violation of several constitutional and interposed parameters.

1.1.– Firstly, the appellant maintains that the various provisions challenged present numerous aspects of constitutional illegitimacy, because – contrary to the case law of this Court (citing, in particular, Judgment no. 271 of 2009) – they are merely repetitive of norms contained in State laws; they introduce a discipline that is discordant or otherwise not fully consistent with that established by State laws, or they introduce new professional figures. This results in the alleged violation of the State's exclusive legislative power concerning the protection of competition, pursuant to art. 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution, as well as the intrusion into the State's concurrent legislative power under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, regarding professions. With regard to the latter, the State Attorney General's Office – citing this Court's Judgment no. 127 of 2023 – recalls that in matters of professions, regional legislative power "must respect the principle that the identification of professional figures, with related profiles and enabling qualifications, is reserved, due to its necessarily unitary nature, to the State," while "the regulation of aspects that have a specific link with the regional reality falls within the competence of the Regions," and Regions cannot "create new professional figures."

Still preliminarily, the President of the Council of Ministers notes that the circumstance that the Tuscan legislator, in establishing new professional figures, has used the phrase "pending the definition by the State of the relative professional profile" does not overcome the deemed reasons for constitutional illegitimacy. In other words, the regional intervention cannot be justified by the "principle of the so-called inverted subsidiarity." The latter, in fact, is only operative in relation to situations where there is, at least, an interplay of State and regional legislative powers, allowing Regions to intervene and provisionally and exceptionally regulate the matter, in case of State inertia and until the adoption of the relevant discipline by the State (citing this Court's judgments no. 1 of 2019 and no. 222 of 2020).

On these premises, the State Attorney General's Office deems that the aforementioned principle of so-called inverted subsidiarity is in no way applicable "as it is ontologically incompatible with the need to ensure, in the case of the establishment of new professional figures, a unitary discipline functional" to the protection of competition throughout the national territory, avoiding discriminations linked to infra-state territorial areas, as well as the "full exercise of the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment under articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as [the] achievement of the objectives of Directive 2006/123/EC of December 12 (concerning services in the internal market) and Directive 2005/36/EC of September 7 (concerning the recognition of professional qualifications)."

State counsel further notes that, reasoning otherwise, the establishment of new professional figures, along with the identification of their profiles and enabling qualifications, would be left to regional initiative, rather than the State. It adds that the absence of State discipline aimed at regulating a specific activity, such as a profession, cannot be attributed to mere inertia, which would (hypothetically) legitimize regional legislative initiatives, but may well be characterized as a clear will not to intervene, resulting in the impossibility for the regional legislator to override or substitute itself for it.

1.2.– Given the foregoing, the President of the Council of Ministers first challenges article 76, paragraph 4, of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which provides that "[t]he technical director must perform their work with continuity and exclusivity in only one agency."

The appellant first observes that the profession of technical director for travel and tourism agencies is contemplated by article 20, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 79 of May 23, 2011 (Consolidated Act on State Legislation concerning the organization and market of tourism, pursuant to article 14 of Law no. 246 of November 28, 2005, as well as implementation of Directive 2008/122/EC on timeshare contracts, long-term holiday products, resale and exchange contracts), which delegates to a decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, or the delegated Minister, the identification of "professional requirements at the national level for technical directors of travel and tourism agencies, following an agreement with the Permanent Conference on Relations between the State, Regions, and Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano"; this provision was subsequently implemented by the Decree of the Minister of Tourism of August 5, 2021, no. 1432 (National professional requirements for technical directors of travel and tourism agencies), without establishing any exclusivity requirement for the directors.

In light of the aforementioned national legislation, the challenged article 76, paragraph 4, first and foremost, exceeds the limits of the concurrent legislative power attributed to the regional legislator, pursuant to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions. In this matter, in fact, it is for the State to determine, by legislation, the fundamental principles, while Regions are entrusted with determining the detailed discipline, as clarified by this Court in the already cited Judgment no. 127 of 2023 (citing also Judgment no. 178 of 2014).

Secondly, the contested provision, by introducing limitations valid only within the regional territory, would determine a disparity of treatment between operators in the sector who practice their activity in that area and those who, instead, operate in other Regions, where no exclusivity requirement is provided, with the risk of fragmentation, at the regional level, of the discipline of that profession. In other words, the "principles on competition, the protection of which is reserved to the State's exclusive legislative power pursuant to article 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution," were violated.

1.3.– With a second set of issues, the President of the Council of Ministers challenges a wide series of provisions of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which have introduced and regulated the professional figures of the tourist escort (articles 95-101) and the environmental guide (articles 102-110).

1.3.1.– Firstly, articles 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 are challenged, through which the Region would have unlawfully established the professional figure of the tourist escort (art. 95); dictated the related discipline, and, specifically, identified the requirements for exercising the profession (art. 96); provided for and regulated qualification courses recognized by the Region (articles 97 and 98); and, finally, established the regime for price advertising of professional services indicated in advertising and informational material (art. 99).

1.3.2.– Secondly, the State challenges articles 102, 103, 104, paragraph 2, 105, 106, 107, and 108, alleging the illegitimacy of establishing the professional figure of the environmental guide (art. 102, paragraph 1) and the related discipline, namely: the identification of the requirements for exercising the profession (art. 103); the provision for qualification and specialization courses recognized by the Region (articles 105 and 106); the provision for professional obligations aimed at ensuring customer safety in relation to their abilities and the difficulty of the routes (art. 107); and the regime for price advertising of professional services indicated in advertising and informational material (art. 108).

In the opinion of the President of the Council of Ministers, the Region, in introducing and regulating the new professional figures of the tourist escort and the environmental guide, would have exceeded the limits of the concurrent legislative power attributed to it by art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, since Regions are precluded from introducing new professional figures in the absence of their prior identification by the State legislator. According to the appellant, in fact, regional legislative power – as expressly provided by art. 1, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 30 of February 2, 2006 (Recognition of fundamental principles in matters of professions, pursuant to article 1 of Law no. 131 of June 5, 2003) – can only be exercised on professions identified and defined by State legislation.

This, moreover, is confirmed by the case law of this Court, as evidenced by judgments no. 271 of 2009 and no. 230 of 2011, cited in the appeal.

The appellant observes, in fact, that the State legislator has limited itself to setting forth the general definition of tourism professions, typifying, pursuant to art. 6 of Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011 (hereinafter, also: Tourism Code), only "those activities, concerning the provision of services for the promotion of tourism activities, as well as hospitality, assistance, escorting, and guiding services, aimed at allowing tourists the best enjoyment of their trip and vacation, including from the perspective of knowledge of the visited places."

The regional legislator would have also determined a fragmentation, at the regional level, of the discipline of these professions, with consequent violation of the principles on competition, the protection of which is reserved in any case to the State's exclusive legislative power pursuant to art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution.

1.3.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers therefore challenges articles 100, 101, 109, and 110, which provide for the imposition of pecuniary administrative sanctions and the prohibition of continuing the activity, respectively, for the tourist escort (articles 100 and 101) and for the environmental guide (articles 109 and 110).

On the premise – already clarified by this Court – that the provision of administrative sanctions, although not attributable to an autonomous basis of competence, "accrues to the substantive matters" (Judgment no. 12 of 2004; citing also judgments no. 148 and no. 121 of 2018), to which the sanctions refer and which, therefore, should fall under the competence of the body that has competence over the latter, the appellant deems that the challenged provisions incur the constitutional illegitimacy defects already alleged in the previous complaints. In fact, since the power to introduce and regulate tourism professions falls outside the competence of the Regions, the Tuscan legislator could not even introduce the related sanctioning circumstances.

Moreover, for these provisions as well, the appellant alleges the risk of fragmentation of the discipline at the regional level and the consequent violation of the "exclusive legislative power of the State pursuant to article 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution."

1.3.4.– The challenge also concerns article 103, and specifically its paragraph 3, which provides that the exercise of the profession of environmental guide by self-employed workers is subject to a certified notification of commencement of activity (SCIA), to be submitted to the single desk for productive activities (SUAP) competent for the territory where they intend to operate; article 96, paragraph 3, which sets forth analogous discipline with reference to the tourist escort, and article 104, paragraph 2, which provides that "[t]he park or nature reserve guides already enabled pursuant to article 21, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of April 11, 1995, no. 49 (Rules on parks, nature reserves, and protected natural areas of local interest) may continue to exercise the activity exclusively within the park or nature reserve of their pertinence."

In the opinion of the appellant, the cited provisions limit the possibility for guides to operate outside the Region, thereby determining, also from this perspective, a fragmentation of tourism professions on a regional basis, with distorting effects on the need for unitary coordination and protection of market uniformity and, therefore, of the public interest. In other words, the challenged provisions negatively affect "a regulatory framework [...] aimed, among other things, at guaranteeing both the full right to the freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment under articles 49 and 56 of the TFEU and the achievement of the objectives of Directive 2006/123/EC of December 12 (concerning services in the internal market) and Directive 2005/36/EC of September 7 (on the recognition of professional qualifications)."

Ultimately, the challenged discipline outlines a regulation applicable exclusively to the Tuscan regional area, moreover not justified by a connection with the peculiar needs of the territorial reality (citing supporting judgments of this Court no. 153 of 2006 and no. 230 of 2011), and is susceptible of impeding and/or hindering the exercise of the same activity by operators residing in the territory of other Regions, with consequent violation of the principles on competition, the protection of which is reserved to the State's exclusive legislative power pursuant to art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution.

1.4.– With a third set of issues, the President of the Council of Ministers challenges articles 111, paragraph 1, 112, paragraph 3, 113, 114, paragraph 3, 115, paragraphs 1 and 3, 116, paragraphs 2, 7 and 8, 117, 118, 123, paragraph 1, and 124, which regulate the professional figure of the ski instructor.

Except for the challenge to art. 117 (below, point 1.4.6.), the appellant deems that some of these provisions exceed the limits of the concurrent legislative power attributed to the regional legislator pursuant to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, as they conflict with some fundamental principles of the matter, introduced by Law no. 81 of March 8, 1991 (Framework Law for the profession of ski instructor and further provisions on the organization of the profession of mountain guide).

Articles 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution are also invoked, but are mentioned only in the heading of the ground of appeal (and only article 117, first paragraph, in the conclusions).

1.4.1.– Having stated this, article 111, paragraph 1, is deemed constitutionally illegitimate because, by providing a definition of the professional profile based on that already provided by art. 2, paragraph 1, of Law no. 81 of 1991, it violates the principle, affirmed by this Court (citing Judgment no. 271 of 2009), according to which the regional law is not permitted to repeat what has already been established by State law.

1.4.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of article 112, paragraph 3, is also alleged, as it provides that the register of ski instructors is "divided, by specialty, into the following sections: a) alpine ski instructors; b) cross-country ski instructors; c) snowboard instructors."

Since, as clarified by this Court in Judgment no. 127 of 2023, regional registers can only perform "merely recognizing, communication, and updating functions," the Tuscan legislator, by parceling out the professional figure defined uniformly by the State legislator, would have exceeded its powers in the matter.

The constitutional illegitimacy defect would consequently affect articles 114, paragraph 3, and 115, which "provide that the qualification courses prerequisite for registration in the regional register concern the 'single specialty'."

1.4.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers also denounces the constitutional illegitimacy of article 113, paragraph 1, which establishes the requirements for registration in the register.

The appellant first contends that – according to the case law of this Court (citing Judgment no. 271 of 2009 again) – the regional legislator cannot indicate specific requirements for exercising professions, even if partially coincident with those expressed by State legislation, because the discipline of the necessary qualifications qualifies as a fundamental principle of the matter, falling under State competence.

It further complains that, by so acting, the Tuscan legislator would hinder, contrary to the provisions of art. 5 of Law no. 81 of 1991, the transfer of ski instructors from one regional register to another.

1.4.3.1.– The constitutional illegitimacy of article 116, paragraphs 2 and 7, is then alleged, insofar as, for the purpose of registration in the regional register of ski instructors by professionals already registered in the registers of other Regions or for the purpose of stable exercise of the profession by instructors coming from non-EU countries, they refer to the requirements under the challenged article 113.

1.4.4.– The appellant further specifically challenges article 115, paragraph 1, which prescribes that "[b]y resolution of the Regional Executive Board, the subject matter of the courses referred to in article 114, the number of hours, and the access methods shall be determined. The subject matter and topics of the courses shall be determined in compliance with the criteria and levels of skiing techniques," unlawfully delegates the definition of the hourly duration and subject matter of the courses to a resolution of the Regional Executive Board.

The provision cited is, in its opinion, in contrast with the fundamental principles of the matter set forth in art. 7 of Law no. 81 of 1991, which provides that "[t]he courses shall have a minimum duration of 90 effective days of teaching and shall include the following fundamental subjects: skiing techniques; teaching methodology; mountain hazards; topographic orientation, mountain environment, and knowledge of the competent regional territory; notions of medicine and first aid; rights, duties, and responsibilities of the instructor; professional laws and regulations."

1.4.5.– The constitutional illegitimacy of article 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the regional law in question is also alleged, with reference to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, insofar as, by making the stable and occasional exercise of the profession by ski instructors from non-EU countries subject to the condition of reciprocity of treatment, it attributes the power to recognize the equivalence of the professional qualification to the Italian Winter Sports Federation, whereas State legislation identifies the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as the competent body.

The State Attorney General's Office refers in this regard to art. 12, paragraph 3, of Law no. 81 of 1991, which provides that, for citizens from non-EU countries, holding professional qualifications for the exercise of the profession of ski instructor issued by those States, "authorization to exercise the profession is subject to the application of the provisions of the consolidated act on the discipline of immigration and rules on the status of aliens, under Legislative Decree no. 286 of July 25, 1998."

It then recalls that Legislative Decree no. 206 of November 9, 2007 (Implementation of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, as well as Directive 2006/100/EC adapting certain directives on the free movement of persons following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania) intervened in the matter, which, in art. 5, paragraph 1, establishes that "[f]or the purposes of recognition under Title II and Title III, Chapters II and IV, the competent authorities to receive applications, receive declarations, and make decisions are: a) The Presidency of the Council of Ministers - Office for Sport, for all activities concerning the sports sector and those exercised with the qualification of sports professional, with the exception of those referred to in letter l-septies), as well as for the professions referred to in Law no. 6 of January 2, 1989."

The identification of the State office (now Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers) as the authority competent to receive applications for the recognition of professional qualifications for those coming from non-EU countries would therefore determine the alleged constitutional illegitimacy of the aforementioned article 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, in partibus.

1.4.6.– Article 117 of the challenged regional law is also censured, according to which "[t]he abusive exercise of the profession of ski instructor is punished pursuant to article 348 of the Penal Code."

In light of the aforementioned principle which prevents the regional legislator from repeating what has already been established by the State legislator, the challenged provision, although limited to referring to art. 348 of the Penal Code, would have unlawfully encroached upon the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of criminal law, under art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

The State Attorney General's Office observes, in fact, that the challenged article 117 of the Tuscan law could create confusion in the sources intended to regulate the matter, especially if the State legislator were to amend the criminal provision in the future or identify a different sedes materiae for it.

1.4.7.– The appellant also requests that the constitutional illegitimacy of article 118 of the challenged regional law, which regulates the Regional College of Ski Instructors, be declared.

This provision, although with some discrepancies, would be, according to the State, mostly repetitive of what is already provided for in art. 13, paragraph 1, of Law no. 81 of 1991, thus unlawfully intervening in an area already regulated by the State framework law.

1.4.8.– Article 123, paragraph 1, of the same regional law is also censured, limited to the words "[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of criminal law," for violation of the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of criminal law, under art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution, because, by derogating from art. 9, second paragraph, of Law no. 689 of November 24, 1981 (Amendments to the criminal system), it would have introduced administrative sanctions for the abusive exercise of the profession of ski instructor intended to accumulate with the criminal sanction.

1.4.9.– Finally (with regard to the regional discipline of the ski instructor), the appellant alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of article 124 of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which prescribes that "[t]he continuation of the professional activity of ski instructor is prohibited by the municipality if the interested party loses one of the requirements for exercising the activity. In this case, the recognition card shall be withdrawn."

In the opinion of State counsel, the norm conflicts with the provisions of art. 13, paragraph 1, of Law no. 81 of 1991, which, instead, attributes to the Regional College of Ski Instructors, and specifically to its governing board, "all functions" concerning, among others, "the keeping of professional registers, the supervision of the exercise of the profession, the application of disciplinary sanctions."

1.5.– With the last set of issues, the President of the Council of Ministers challenges articles 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 134, 136, paragraph 1, and 137, of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which regulate the professional figure of the alpine guide, alleging the violation of a series of constitutional and interposed parameters, similarly to what was argued for the other professional figures.

Except for the challenged art. 136, paragraph 1 (below, point 1.5.5.), the appellant alleges that the regional discipline in question, similarly to the provisions on the ski instructor, violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

1.5.1.– Firstly, article 125 of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 is censured, which, in defining the activity of the alpine guide in a way "almost repetitive" of that provided for by articles 2 and 3 of Law no. 6 of January 2, 1989 (Organization of the profession of alpine guide), violates, for the reasons set out in the preceding grounds of appeal, the State legislative competence in matters of professions, under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

1.5.2.– The President of the Council of Ministers then alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of articles 126 and 127, paragraph 1, concerning respectively the regional register of alpine guides and the requirements for registration therein, in that, by adopting, albeit "with some differences," the contents of Law no. 6 of 1989, they overlap with what is provided for by the same. In particular, the provisions of art. 5 of the said State Law and those of art. 127 of the Regional Law do not appear to be entirely "coincident."

Therefore, "articles 126 and 127 [...] appear constitutionally illegitimate, as does art. 130, paragraph 2, which refers to art. 127 for the purpose of registration in the regional register of alpine guides from other Regions."

Paragraph 3 of the cited art. 126 is also challenged, which defines "stable exercise of the profession" as the activity carried out "by the alpine guide having a residence, even seasonal, in Tuscany for the purpose of offering their services," in conjunction with art. 130, paragraph 1, of the said regional law, which establishes that "Alpine guides already registered in the registers of other Regions who intend to exercise the profession stably also in Tuscany must apply for registration in the regional professional register of alpine guides of Tuscany."

State counsel observes that the challenged regional legislation does not allow, in divergence from what is established by art. 4, paragraph 5, of Law no. 6 of 1989, registration in the regional register for those who, despite not having a residence, even seasonal, in the Region, offer their services in its territory. In this way, the principle expressed by paragraph 3 of the cited art. 4, according to which the authorization to exercise the profession of alpine guide is valid throughout the national territory, would also be violated.

1.5.2.1.– The appellant also alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 130, paragraph 3, of the challenged regional law, which, by establishing that the exercise "of the profession by alpine guides coming from abroad or from other Italian Regions and who accompany their clients, is not subject to registration in the register," would conflict with art. 6 of Law no. 6 of 1989, which, instead, allows the guide registered in a regional register to practice the profession throughout the national territory.

1.5.3.– Article 130, paragraph 4, which regulates the registration of alpine guides coming from non-EU countries, is also censured. The appellant deems, in fact, that, similarly to the discipline of the ski instructor, the challenged regional provision, in addition to conflicting with art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, conflicts with art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution, in relation to art. 5 of Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007, which identifies the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as the competent body for the recognition of the relative professional qualifications.

The Region, in fact, unlawfully subjects the registration in the register of alpine guides to the National College of Alpine Guides, identified as the body responsible for recognizing the equivalence of the qualification issued by the State of origin.

1.5.4.– The President of the Council of Ministers also challenges articles 131 and 134 of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which regulate the Regional College of Alpine Guides and disciplinary sanctions, respectively, alleging that the relative provisions would be "almost repetitive of articles 13, 14, and 17 of Law no. 6/1989 and, therefore, [...] constitutionally illegitimate."

1.5.5.– Referring integrally to the reasons put forward regarding the challenged art. 123, the State Attorney General's Office also requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of art. 136, paragraph 1, as it introduces a "double sanctioning track regarding sanctions for alpine guides," in violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

1.5.6.– Finally, article 137 is challenged, which establishes that the municipality may prohibit the continuation of activities in the event that the interested party loses the requirements for exercising the activity of alpine guide. For this discipline as well, which diverges from art. 14, paragraph 2, of Law no. 6 of 1989, the same constitutional illegitimacy profiles already noted in relation to art. 124 of the cited regional law, which sets forth analogous discipline for ski instructors, would exist.

2.– With an act filed on April 17, 2025, the Tuscany Region appeared in the proceedings, requesting that the issues raised be declared manifestly unfounded or in any case unfounded.

2.1.– The respondent first states that the alleged constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged norms would be based on manifestly erroneous assumptions and arguments, as well as on an unacceptable reading of constitutional case law.

In particular, it is noted that the Tuscan legislator had already introduced specific discipline concerning the professional figures of tourist escort, environmental guide, ski instructor, and alpine guide, with the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 20, 2016, no. 86 (Consolidated Act on the Regional Tourism System), which was not challenged by the President of the Council of Ministers nor the subject of declarations of constitutional illegitimacy, as the outcome of an incidental constitutional review proceeding.

Still preliminarily, regional counsel outlines the normative and jurisprudential context in which the challenged discipline is situated, first citing "the absolutely prevalent jurisprudential orientation, recently reaffirmed by the Council of State" (citing Council of State, V Section, Judgment of August 13, 2024, no. 7124), according to which Regions may intervene and provisionally and exceptionally regulate a matter (so-called "inverted subsidiarity") that is not attributable to the exclusive legislative competence of the State, when regional legislative competences are also in question.

The Region also states that, with regard to art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution, concerning the protection of competition, European Union law has strongly impacted the legal systems of Member States, requiring an ever-increasing liberalization of professional activities; this has also resulted in a general prohibition for regional legislation to introduce unjustified obstacles to the free movement within the European Union of persons exercising professional activities.

The respondent further observes that constitutional case law, although it has led to "a notable compression of the regional legislator's room for maneuver" over the years, has recently curbed the State legislator's tendency to monopolize the production of norms concerning professions.

In fact, it recalls that, on the one hand, since Judgment no. 355 of 2005, this Court has recognized the competence of Regions to regulate aspects that have a specific connection with the regional reality, and, on the other hand, with Judgment no. 192 of 2024, it identified "territorial specificity" as a criterion supporting the entire system of differentiation of legislative powers.

Finally, starting from the traditional tripartite division "between so-called statutory professions, recognized professions, and non-recognized professions," it observes that defining the boundaries between State and regional legislative competence in matters of professions cannot fail to take into account the professional category in question. From this consideration, based on the assumption that "hypotheses in which a profession other than (because, for example, characterized by predominantly manual or mechanical activities) intellectual ones (taken as a reference by art. 33 of the Constitution) can be relevant for the protection of constitutional interests are very rare," it follows, according to regional counsel, also considering the constitutional interests at stake, that the need for a more penetrating and uniform regulation should be highest only in the scope of statutory professions.

2.2.– With regard to the challenge to art. 76, paragraph 4, the respondent deems that "from a first and summary reading of the ground of appeal" it is clearly evident that the cited constitutional case law is manifestly irrelevant.

The crucial point of a discipline such as the one under consideration would be the eventual disparity of treatment that it could generate with the connected risk of altering competitive mechanisms; but, in the opinion of regional counsel, the President of the Council of Ministers reaches this conclusion in a way that is both unsubstantiated and apodictic.

This is also due to the fact that the challenged provision finds its justification in the regional context of Tuscany, where tourism represents an economic sector of particular relevance and requires "increasingly specialized and locally present personnel," and its purpose is to strengthen the regional tourism chain, within which the technical director assumes a central role in the activities carried out by travel and tourism agencies, as also clarified by art. 1 of Ministerial Decree no. 1432 of 2021.

For the reasons set out above, the Region requests that the issues be declared manifestly unfounded.

2.3.– The respondent requests that the constitutional legitimacy issues concerning the challenged provisions that established and regulated the professional figures of the tourist escort and the environmental guide also be declared manifestly unfounded.

Firstly, it is argued that they essentially constitute a specification of the tourism professions, provided for by State legislation and in particular by art. 6 of Annex 1 to Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011.

Secondly, it is highlighted that the introduction of these figures and the related discipline would only take effect until the State legislator intervenes, who has, however, shown culpable inertia regarding the regulation of these professions, contrary to what has been done with other figures similarly attributable to tourism professions. This inertia, which created difficulties for the Tuscany Region, given its particular tourism vocation, and which represents the justification for the legislative intervention in question, which has become unavoidable especially in consideration of the disorder that characterizes the guides sector, often lacking adequate training and unable to offer tourists a service of a high quality standard, in a territorial context that has seen a notable increase in tourist presence in recent years. On these bases, the respondent argues that, contrary to what the State has apodictically affirmed, that particular and specific link exists which – even according to the case law of this Court (citing judgments no. 153 of 2006 and no. 230 of 2011) – legitimizes the Regions to adopt legislative provisions "of detail in the matter of professions."

With particular regard to the challenge to art. 104, paragraph 2, regional counsel observes that the appellant, alleging the violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, has not taken into consideration the second part of that paragraph, according to which park or nature reserve guides, if possessing adequate training, may exercise the profession of environmental guide throughout the regional territory. The Region adds that it is not clear how the provisions of art. 104, paragraph 2, could impede or hinder the exercise of the same activity by operators residing in the territory of other Regions, "consequently rendering the complaints advanced by the State defense entirely irrelevant."

2.4.– Regarding the challenge to the various provisions regulating the figure of the ski instructor, the regional counsel argues, firstly, that that of art. 111, paragraph 1, is unfounded. The President of the Council of Ministers has, in fact, omitted to consider that this provision implements an improper and merely declarative reference, i.e., it represents a case of a regional law that refers to the State law only to facilitate the identification of the rules governing the relationships. As this Court has clarified (citing Judgment no. 192 of 2024 on this point), this type of reference is not constitutionally illegitimate.

2.4.1.– In relation to the challenged art. 112, paragraph 3, the respondent observes that the three professional profiles, provided for in the sections into which the regional professional register of ski instructors is divided, do not represent autonomous professional figures, but mere internal articulations of the single figure constituted by the ski instructor. In essence, an articulation of the register has been introduced, aimed at making it easier to identify the scope of teaching for the ski instructor, always under the logic of rationalization and better organization of tourism activities.

2.4.2.– The Region requests that the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 113 also be declared unfounded.

Regarding psychophysical fitness – not contemplated by State discipline – it is argued that the Tuscan legislator introduced a necessary requirement, the omission of which in the State law would raise serious doubts about the constitutionality of the latter. It is, in fact, considered manifestly unreasonable not to contemplate such a requirement in relation to the exercise of a profession that also involves taking on considerable responsibility for the health and safety of clients.

Regional counsel further affirms that the provision, in the aforementioned art. 113, of requirements partially different from those contemplated by the State legislator would not hinder – as alleged in the appeal – the transfer from one regional professional register to another or the authorization for the temporary exercise of the profession in another Region. This – it is stated – especially considering that the (two) additional requirements provided for by the challenged article are psychophysical fitness and the passage of five years in the case of a criminal conviction, the latter, in fact, being more favorable to the applicant.

It adds that it is neither understood how the provision of these two requirements, only partially different from those contemplated by the State legislator, can hinder registration in the regional register of ski instructors coming from non-EU countries.

2.4.3.– The challenge to art. 115, which delegates the definition of the hourly duration and subject matter of the courses to a resolution of the Regional Executive Board, would also be manifestly unfounded, as it is "obvious" that this definition must take place in compliance with the fundamental principles set forth in art. 7 of Law no. 81 of 1991.

2.4.4.– The censure of art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, would also be unfounded, as it was "alleged on the basis of a genuine error, not considering the difference between ski instructors who are EU citizens [...] and those from non-EU States." For the latter professionals, in fact, the regional legislator could not refer – as it did for the former – to the discipline contained in Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007. This would explain the introduction of "a regional discipline, obviously 'subsidiarity' with respect to any national discipline that may intervene" on the point. Moreover, the regional discipline has the merit of entrusting the verification of requirements to the most qualified bodies, such as the Italian Winter Sports Federation and the National College of Ski Instructors.

2.4.5.– The respondent deems the challenge to art. 117 of the same regional law also manifestly unfounded, as it does not reproduce the text of art. 348 of the Penal Code, but merely makes a formal reference to it, which fundamentally excludes the emergence of any possible confusion in the system of sources and consequently the alleged violation of art. 117, first paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

2.4.6.– With regard to the challenged art. 118, which regulates the Regional College of Ski Instructors, the regional defense refers to what was stated in relation to the challenged art. 111 (above, point 2.4.) and merely "points out that in the case of art. 118 of the challenged regional law, the normative text is only partially coincident with that included in the State law, so that the former cannot be classified as purely and simply reproductive of the latter."

2.4.7.– The challenge to art. 123, which regulates the administrative sanctions applicable to ski instructors, would also be unfounded, as it is based on an interpretation of the textual data that is clearly contra legem. The phrase, which opens paragraph 1 of the aforementioned article ("Without prejudice to the provisions of criminal law"), "can only be interpreted to mean that the administrative sanction can actually be imposed only when the act does not simultaneously constitute a crime."

The formula used would operate a general reference to the entire criminal system and, consequently, also to art. 9, paragraph 2, of Law no. 689 of 1981, which requires the prevalence of State criminal law over regional discipline.

2.4.8.– As for the challenge to art. 124, because it violates art. 13 of Law no. 81 of 1991, the regional defense notes that there is "in no way a relationship of antinomy between the two normative provisions, such that it is perfectly possible that – without this determining the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision produced by the regional legislator" – both the Regional College of Ski Instructors (as provided for by the cited art. 13), and the municipalities (as stipulated by the challenged art. 124) "are entitled to prohibit the continuation of the professional activity of ski instructor."

2.5.– With regard to the challenge to the various provisions of Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 regulating the figure of the alpine guide, the regional defense argues, first of all, the unfoundedness of the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 125, referring to the arguments already made regarding the challenged art. 111 (above, point 2.4.).

2.5.1.– On the challenge to articles 126 and 127, the respondent essentially advances its defense arguments only in relation to the specific challenge to paragraph 3 of the cited art. 126.

The issue raised is deemed unfounded, as the provision referred to aims "to simplify and, at the same time, to make the criterion [of stable exercise of the profession] more certain, by offering a simple and concrete reference, such as the residence, i.e., an address to refer to." This is also in consideration of the fact that – notes regional counsel – the mere residence, which could easily be indicated also at the workplace, is not an element that makes the stability of professional practice more burdensome.

The respondent further observes that there is no alleged antinomy between the challenged art. 126, paragraph 3, and art. 4, paragraph 5, of Law no. 6 of 1989, because the former merely omits to provide for one of the two conditions required to qualify the exercise of the profession as "stable," and therefore it would be perfectly possible to integrate the two circumstances, thus saving the challenged provision from a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy.

2.5.2.– The constitutional legitimacy issues concerning art. 130, paragraphs 1 (in conjunction with the challenged art. 126, paragraph 3), 3, and 4, would also be unfounded. For the arguments on the unfoundedness, regional counsel refers to what was already stated in relation to art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8 (point 2.4.4.).

2.5.3.– Regarding the issues relating to articles 131 and 134, which regulate the Regional College of Alpine Guides and disciplinary sanctions, respectively, and art. 136, paragraph 1, on administrative sanctions for the abusive exercise of the profession, regional counsel refers to what was already argued in relation to articles 111 (point 2.4.) and 123 (point 2.4.7.), respectively.

2.5.4.– Finally, on the challenge to art. 137, regional counsel refers to what was already argued in relation to that of art. 124 (above, point 2.4.8).

3.– On September 17, 2025, the President of the Council of Ministers filed a brief, in which he replied to the respondent's submissions, insisting on the acceptance of the appeal. In particular, State counsel observed that the justifications provided to support the challenged norms – revolving around the peculiar needs of the regional territorial reality – would not constitute an official element usable in the constitutional proceedings, as the peculiarities of the regional reality were not illustrated.

4.– On the same date, the Tuscany Region also filed a brief in which, replying to the appellant's submissions, it insisted on the conclusions already drawn in the statement of appearance, emphasizing, among other things, the reasons justifying its intervention, namely the specific link between this and the regional territory. It was particularly highlighted that the challenged norms regulate professional profiles connected to the tourism sector, which is certainly within regional competence, and that "according to Istat-Irpet data in 2023, Tuscany ranked as the third Region in Italy for tourist presences and tourist consumption represents 23% of Tuscany's internal consumption." These data would substantiate the specific link between the regional reality and the challenged discipline.

Considered in Law

1.– With the appeal indicated in the heading (app. reg. no. 14 of 2025), the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, has promoted, inter alia, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning articles 76, paragraph 4; 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, paragraph 2, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, paragraph 1, 112, paragraph 3, 113, paragraph 1, 114, paragraph 3, 115, paragraphs 1 and 3, 116, paragraphs 2, 7 and 8, 117, 118, 123, paragraph 1, 124, 125, 126, 127, paragraph 1, 130, 131, 134, 136, paragraph 1, and 137 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, alleging the violation of various constitutional parameters, as well as several interposed parameters.

In assessing the individual challenges, the parameters invoked from time to time will be specifically indicated, but preliminarily it is noted that the appeal is largely based on the alleged violation of the State legislative competence in matters of professions, under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

2.– The other questions of constitutional legitimacy promoted with the appeal indicated in the heading were settled by Judgment no. 186 of 2025.

3.– The State first censures art. 76, paragraph 4, according to which the technical director of the travel agency must perform their work with continuity and exclusivity for only one agency.

In the appellant's opinion, the challenged regional provision exceeds the limits of concurrent legislative power in matters of professions, regarding which it is for the State to determine, by legislation, the fundamental principles, while Regions are entrusted with the detailed discipline, as clarified by this Court in Judgment no. 127 of 2023 (citing also Judgment no. 178 of 2014).

Article 76, paragraph 4, also violates the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of competition protection, under art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, as, by introducing limitations valid only within the regional territory, it would determine a disparity of treatment between operators in the sector who practice their activity in the Tuscany Region and those who, instead, carry it out in other Regions, where no exclusivity requirement is provided, with the risk of fragmentation, at the regional level, of the discipline of that profession.

Although art. 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution is also mentioned in the introductory act, this parameter, appearing only in the heading of the ground of appeal and in the conclusions, which however focus only on the violation of the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of competition protection, cannot be considered duly invoked and therefore validly involved in the challenge.

3.1.– It is preliminarily appropriate to recall that – as highlighted by both parties – art. 20, paragraph 1, of the Tourism Code, delegates to a decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, or the delegated minister, the identification of "professional requirements at the national level for technical directors of travel and tourism agencies, following an agreement with the Permanent Conference on Relations between the State, Regions, and Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano." The Ministerial Decree no. 1432 of 2021 provided implementation of the cited provision (after several years), which, however, makes no reference to the continuity and exclusivity of the work performed by the technical director of the travel agency.

Also preliminarily, it must be highlighted that the Guarantor Authority for Competition and the Market also expressed an opinion on these requirements, with the communication of February 2, 2017, no. AS1350 (Distorting profiles of competition in the discipline of travel agencies and the technical directors operating therein), which, acknowledging their presence in almost all regional disciplines, considered them a factor of "criticality in terms of competition protection," highlighting that "the prohibition of exercising an economic activity in multiple offices or in multiple geographical areas has been expressly qualified as an inadmissible restriction under the liberalization decrees of the 2011 reform (article 34 of Legislative Decree no. 201 of December 6, 2011, converted into Law no. 214 of December 22, 2011)."

3.2.– That being said, the issue relating to the violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, is well-founded.

As this Court clarified immediately after the reform of Title V of Part Two of the Constitution, the notion of competition, which "cannot fail to reflect that operating at the European level" (a constant assertion, also recently reiterated in Judgment no. 183 of 2024, point 8.2. of the Facts Considered), "includes regulatory interventions, antitrust discipline, and measures intended to promote an open and freely competitive market" (Judgment no. 14 of 2004, point 4 of the Facts Considered).

Constitutional case law has also affirmed that the protection of competition "is not only expressed as opposition to acts and conduct of undertakings that negatively affect the competitive structure of the markets, but also involves the promotion of competition among undertakings"; promotion which "is primarily achieved by eliminating limits and constraints on the free exercise of entrepreneurial capacity" (Judgment no. 36 of 2024, point 8 of the Facts Considered).

Therefore, when Regions adopt laws that limit or hinder the free entry of workers and undertakings into the market and competition among them, they directly affect the scope of the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of competition protection.

This is also the case for the challenged art. 76, paragraph 4, which, by imposing on the technical director the obligation to perform their work with continuity and exclusivity for only one agency, introduces a limit on professional activity.

This limit also has repercussions on the competition between economic operators in the sector, i.e., not only on the individual technical directors but also on the agencies, which see their possibility (or rather, freedom) to turn to a larger number of professionals in the sector limited.

The provision for the continuous and exclusive nature of the work of the travel agency's technical director, therefore, concerns a "aspect" falling "within the broad notion of competition under the second paragraph, letter e), of art. 117 of the Constitution," translates into "a choice that imposes a limit on the freedom of individual economic initiative and affects competition among economic operators in the relevant market" (Judgment no. 265 of 2016, point 4.3. of the Facts Considered) and is detrimental to the State's legislative competence in matters of competition protection.

3.3.– In conclusion, the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 76, paragraph 4, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must be declared, for violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, with absorption of the remaining challenges.

4.– The appellant next alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of the provisions of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 aimed at introducing and regulating the professional figures of the tourist escort and the environmental guide.

Specifically, regarding the former, the following provisions are challenged:

– art. 95, which established the professional figure of the tourist escort;

– art. 96, which provided the requirements for exercising the aforementioned profession;

– articles 97 and 98, which regulate the qualification courses recognized by the Region;

– art. 99, which regulates the regime for advertising the prices of professional services indicated in advertising and informational material;

– articles 100 and 101, which respectively regulate administrative sanctions and the prohibition of continuing the activity.

As for the environmental guide, the following are challenged:

– art. 102, which established the professional figure of the environmental guide;

– art. 103, which provided the requirements for exercising the aforementioned profession;

– articles 105 and 106, which regulate the qualification courses recognized by the Region;

– art. 107, which prescribes professional obligations aimed at ensuring customer safety in relation to their abilities and the difficulty of the routes;

– art. 108, which regulates the regime for advertising the prices of professional services indicated in advertising and informational material;

– articles 109 and 110, which respectively regulate administrative sanctions and the prohibition of continuing the activity.

The State Attorney General's Office alleges that the regional legislator, through the cited provisions, has introduced and fully regulated professional figures not provided for by State legislation, exceeding the limits of the concurrent legislative power attributed to it by art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions. In fact, Regions are precluded from introducing professional figures.

The regional legislator would also have determined a fragmentation, at the regional level, of the discipline of these professions, with consequent violation of the principles on competition, "the protection of which is in any case reserved to the exclusive legislative power of the State pursuant to art. 117, [paragraph] first and second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution."

The State Attorney General's Office further argues that the circumstance that articles 95, paragraph 1, and 102, paragraph 1, of the challenged regional law, establishing the professions in question, both contain the phrase "pending the definition by the State of the relative professional profile" would not overcome the deemed reasons for constitutional illegitimacy.

In other words, according to the appellant, the cited provisions, and the discipline of the professional figures introduced by them, would illegitimately apply the (implicit) principle of the so-called "inverted subsidiarity"; a principle on which the defenses of the Tuscany Region are based.

4.1.– Logically preceding the constitutional review is the assessment of the actual existence, and of the possible scope, of the cited principle of inverted subsidiarity in the constitutional system of division of legislative powers.

This assessment yields a negative result.

In fact, both parties proceed from an incorrect reading of constitutional case law, specifically Judgment no. 1 of 2019.

It is true that in that Judgment it is stated that "in the perspective of the so-called 'inverted subsidiarity,' [...] the intervention that the regional legislator can anticipate due to State legislator inertia still pertains (and only) to matters of concurrent competence of the Region" (point 4.1.3. of the Facts Considered). This statement, however, must be read in the light of the more general normative context in which it is placed, which is that of the implementation of EU law, and specifically of Union directives. In the case brought to the attention of this Court on that occasion, in fact, a regional law of Liguria was challenged for alleged invasion of the State's exclusive legislative power in matters of competition protection, aimed at temporarily implementing European regulations, pending an organic restructuring intervention by the State legislator. The mere consideration of the context in which the statements of the cited Judgment no. 1 of 2019 are to be placed, and, more generally, of the rulings in which this Court has referred to "inverted subsidiarity" (in addition to the judgments already recalled, see judgments no. 89 of 2025, point 5.4. of the Facts Considered; and no. 398 of 2006, point 3.1. of the Facts Considered), makes it clear that the reference to the latter cannot, and must not, be understood as a reference to – nor as an affirmation of the existence of – an implicit constitutional principle providing for a derogation from the division of legislative powers outlined in art. 117 of the Constitution.

The reference is, instead, to a specific mechanism provided for by State legislation on the implementation of European directives, namely Law no. 234 of December 24, 2012 (General rules on Italy's participation in the formation and implementation of European Union legislation and policies), which, by establishing that Regions promptly adopt, in matters of their competence, the transposition of the aforementioned directives (under art. 29, paragraph 1, and 40, paragraph 1, of the same law), while recognizing the Regions' power to intervene in matters of concurrent competence without waiting for the State framework legislation, does not introduce a general derogation from the constitutional division of legislative powers. In matters of concurrent competence, the identification of the fundamental principles of the matter remains reserved to the State legislator (thus art. 30, paragraph 2, letter g of the cited law), and the constitutional obligation of the Regions – directly stemming from art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution – to conform to the provisions of principle, even subsequent ones, set forth by State law, remains equally firm.

In conclusion, the reference to "inverted subsidiarity," understood, as assumed by the respondent, as a general power of the Regions, in matters of concurrent legislative power, to establish framework legislation in place of State legislation, has no constitutional foundation.

4.2.– In light of the foregoing considerations, the specific challenges can be examined, starting with the preliminary assessment of the constitutional legitimacy of articles 95, paragraph 1, and 102, paragraph 1, which establish the definition, and therefore the establishment, of the professional figures of the tourist escort and the environmental guide. This review is, in fact, logically antecedent (and therefore conditioning) to that of the other challenged provisions, concerning the discipline of the professional figures in question.

The constitutional legitimacy issues concerning articles 95, paragraph 1, and 102, paragraph 1, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, which can be examined jointly, are well-founded.

This Court has, in fact, repeatedly affirmed that, pursuant to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, "the identification of professional figures, with related profiles and enabling qualifications, is reserved, due to its necessarily unitary nature, to the State, the regulation of aspects that have a specific link with the regional reality falling within the competence of the Regions; and that this principle, beyond the particular implementation by individual normative precepts, constitutes [...] a general limit, which cannot be overridden by regional law, from which it follows that it is not within the powers of the Regions to create new professional figures" (Judgment no. 98 of 2013, as recalled by Judgment no. 209 of 2020)" (thus Judgment no. 127 of 2023, point 4.1. of the Facts Considered; similarly, among many others, judgments no. 161 of 2025, point 2.1. of the Facts Considered; no. 6 of 2022, point 4.4. of the Facts Considered; no. 241 of 2021, point 5.1. of the Facts Considered; no. 228 of 2018, point 3 of the Facts Considered; no. 217 of 2015, point 2.2. of the Facts Considered).

It follows that "the delineation of specific professional figures, starting from a genus indicated by State law," in this case art. 6 of the Tourism Code, which contains a general definition of tourism profession, "is precluded to regional law (Judgment no. 328 of 2009)" (Judgment no. 117 of 2015, point 2.2. of the Facts Considered).

The content of the challenged provisions is in clear contrast with the aforementioned constitutional case law, as the Tuscany Region, through them, has introduced two additional professional figures to those provided for by State legislation.

The argument put forward by regional counsel, according to which the issues under examination should result in a finding of no foundation because the challenged discipline reproduces what was already contained in the repealed Regional Law no. 86 of 2016, which was not previously challenged, is not well-founded.

According to the consolidated orientation of constitutional case law, in fact, "the institution of acquiescence does not apply in primary proceedings, given that the challenged provision, even if it reproduces, in whole or in part, a previous, unchallenged norm, nevertheless has the effect of reiterating the violation that gives rise to the interest to appeal" (Judgment no. 76 of 2024, point 2.1. of the Facts Considered; similarly, among many others, judgments no. 22 of 2025, point 2 of the Facts Considered; and no. 151 of 2024, point 2 of the Facts Considered).

The further argument put forward by regional counsel, according to which the challenged regulation would be justified by the tourism vocation of the Region, cannot be accepted either.

As this Court has repeatedly clarified (and as recalled here as well), the identification of professional figures is a general limit that can never be exceeded by the Regions, i.e., it is an area always and in any case precluded to the exercise of regional legislative autonomy, which, instead, can be exercised in the regulation of "aspects" – i.e., specific subjects – inherent in professions already established by State legislation, when such an operation is justified by (or shows a connection with) the specific regional reality.

Finally, the distinction between statutory and non-statutory professions, argued by the region to justify the adoption of the challenged discipline and therefore the introduction and regulation of the two professional figures in question, is also unfounded. This is for the overriding reason that it is not the type of profession, but the need for unitary regulation, and therefore for uniformity of discipline, that prevents Regions from establishing new professions.

4.3.– In light of the foregoing considerations, the constitutional illegitimacy of articles 95, paragraph 1, and 102, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must be declared, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, with absorption of the remaining challenges.

4.4.– For the same reasons, the constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged articles 95, paragraph 2, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, paragraphs 2 and 3, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, and 110 of the same law must be declared.

5.– The State also censures art. 104, paragraph 2, first sentence, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, which establishes that "[p]ark or nature reserve guides already enabled pursuant to article 21, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of April 11, 1995, no. 49 (Rules on parks, nature reserves, and protected natural areas of local interest) may continue to exercise the activity exclusively within the park or nature reserve of their pertinence."

In the appellant's opinion, this provision limits the possibility for these same guides to operate outside the Region and, "by outlining a regulation applicable exclusively to its reference territorial area, is susceptible of impeding and/or hindering the exercise of the same activity by operators residing in the territory of other Regions, with consequent violation of the principles on competition, the protection of which is reserved to the State's exclusive legislative power pursuant to article 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution."

5.1.– The issue is unfounded.

The appeal is based on an erroneous premise resulting from inadequate consideration of the normative framework in which the challenged provision is situated.

First of all, the State fails to notice that art. 104, paragraph 2, first sentence, constitutes a compliant implementation of art. 14, paragraph 5, of Law no. 394 of December 6, 1991 (Framework Law on protected areas), according to which "[t]he park authority organizes, in agreement with the region or regions concerned, special training courses at the end of which it issues the official and exclusive title of park guide."

The State legislation just recalled is one of the methods for enhancing and promoting parks and protected areas outlined by art. 14 itself and constitutes the implementation of the purposes of guaranteeing and promoting the conservation and enhancement of these natural areas.

The challenged provision sets out a discipline that, within the scope of the regional legislative competence in matters of tourism and in full compliance with the provisions of Law no. 394 of 1991, is a tool for enhancing and promoting protected natural areas, with their own environmental, natural, and even historical-cultural characteristics, which require the park guide to be linked to a specific protected natural area. This is based on the not unreasonable assumption of the need for specific training – and therefore the acquisition of specific knowledge – for the enhancement of that particular area.

5.2.– The question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 104, paragraph 2, first sentence, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, must, therefore, be declared unfounded.

6.– The State has also challenged several provisions relating to the professional figure of the ski instructor, alleging, except for art. 117 (below, point 6.6.), the invasion of the State legislative competence under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

Although the introductory act also mentions art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution, these parameters, appearing only in the heading of the ground of appeal (and only art. 117, first paragraph, also in the conclusions), cannot, in fact, be considered duly invoked and therefore validly involved in the challenge.

6.1.– The challenges first concern art. 111, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, which defines the professional figure of the ski instructor and literally reproduces the content of art. 2, paragraph 1, of Law no. 81 of 1991, to which the challenged provision expressly refers.

In the appellant's opinion, the regional discipline, although not conflicting with the State framework legislation, would nevertheless be detrimental to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, as the regional law is not permitted to repeat what has already been established by State law (citing this Court's Judgment no. 271 of 2009).

6.1.1.– The respondent counsel observes, in support of the Tuscan legislator's choice, that the challenged art. 111, paragraph 1, merely operates an improper and merely declarative reference, i.e., it represents a case of a regional law that refers to the State law only to facilitate the identification of the applicable rules. The provision could not therefore be deemed constitutionally illegitimate (as confirmed by what was stated, for an analogous case, by this Court in Judgment no. 192 of 2024).

6.1.2.– The reply is not shared, as the norm reproduces, and adopts, the prescriptive content of art. 2 of Law no. 81 of 1991.

It is therefore necessary to assess whether the repetition of the content of the State law, and in this case of that of the aforementioned art. 2, conforms to the constitutional division of legislative powers.

This assessment yields a negative result.

According to the constant orientation of this Court, it is "precluded to intrude into matters of exclusive competence of a non-transversal nature, even for the sole purpose of reproducing (or referring to) State provisions" (Judgment no. 50 of 2024, point 4 of the Facts Considered; among many others, see also judgments no. 158 of 2025, point 3 of the Facts Considered; no. 239 of 2022, point 4.2. of the Facts Considered; and no. 4 of 2022, point 4.1. of the Facts Considered).

As State counsel further recalls, precisely in matters of professions, this Court has clarified that the reproduction of State framework legislation, in this case the provisions indicating the requirements for registration in the registers, is precluded to regional legislators (Judgment no. 271 of 2009, point 2.2. of the Facts Considered).

That being said, it must be noted that, generally speaking, in matters of concurrent legislative power – although the regional provision that refers to "the fundamental principles of the matter deducible from the existing State legislation, specifying the details of the reference State legislation to which it must conform" (Judgment no. 66 of 2017, point 3.3. of the Facts Considered) or that "merely reiterates and specifies the content of an obligation" provided for by State framework legislation (Judgment no. 108 of 2025, point 7 of the Facts Considered) – is not, in itself, an element capable of passing the "constitutional test" (Judgment no. 290 of 2019, point 7.2. of the Facts Considered).

The undue interference in the State's sphere of competence must, in fact, be excluded only when the regional intervention refers, more or less analytically, to the content of the State framework legislation, as a direct implementation thereof, i.e., when the repetition of the (State) principle is functional to the provision of detailed (regional) legislation; when, instead, this functional link is lacking, i.e., when the reproduction of the framework legislation is not directly and specifically aimed at introducing regional detailed legislation, the regional intervention constitutes an undue invasion of an area reserved for State legislative competence.

6.1.3.– In light of the foregoing considerations, the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 111, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must therefore be declared well-founded.

Firstly, what this Court affirmed in a remote precedent applies to the challenged provision, i.e., that "although it is true that by exactly reproducing the content of State norms" the regional law "has not innovated regarding the concrete discipline of the matter, in the sense that it has not established norms different in content from those in force, it must nevertheless be considered that, since the provision is not limited to a mere reference to State norms, but autonomously reproduces their content, even in textual form, the Region has adopted the related rules, exercising its legislative power over them and thus giving them a force of their own as an additional and different law from the original one, namely the force of regional law" (Judgment no. 128 of 1963, point 1 of the Facts Considered).

Therefore, article 111, paragraph 1, by reproducing the State legislation setting out the definition of the ski instructor and with an operation unnecessary for the introduction of regional detailed legislation, has duplicated this definition and imparted to it the force of regional law, thus violating art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, which reserves the identification of the profession to the State.

In fact, the normative definition of the professional figure cannot be considered indifferent, in terms of effects, to the identification of that figure, but is, rather, a logical prerequisite (due to the implication that exists between the definition and the identification of the object to be defined), even before being a legal one, for its establishment.

Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that, although the legal system provides specific remedies for the occurrence of a subsequent conflict between binding State law and regional law, i.e., repeal, under art. 10 of Law no. 62 of February 10, 1953 (Constitution and functioning of regional bodies), or subsequent illegitimacy following the eventual referral of the related issue to this Court by the ordinary judge, operations such as the one carried out by the Tuscan legislator undeniably strain the principle of legal certainty.

6.1.4.– Based on the foregoing considerations, the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 111, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must therefore be declared, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

6.2.– The State also censures art. 112, paragraph 3, of the same regional law as, by providing that the register is "divided, by specialty, into the following sections: a) alpine ski instructors; b) cross-country ski instructors; c) snowboard instructors," it violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, because it has parceled out the professional figure defined uniformly by the State legislator.

6.2.1.– The issue is well-founded.

Contrary to what is argued by regional counsel, it cannot be considered that the challenged provision is limited to providing for an articulation of the regional professional register of ski instructors, aimed at making it easier to identify the relevant scope of teaching and that the "specialties," coinciding with the sections into which the register is divided, represent mere internal articulations of the single figure of the ski instructor.

The cited art. 112, paragraph 3, in fact, by providing for the division of the regional register into sections corresponding to specific specialties, does not attribute "merely recognizing, communication, and updating functions" to these sections, as permitted to the regional legislator (thus, most recently, Judgment no. 127 of 2023, point 4.1. of the Facts Considered), but causes the related professional activity to assume a qualified position within the regional legal system, in relation to which registration in the register assumes a genuine constitutive function (similarly Judgment no. 230 of 2011, point 2 of the Facts Considered).

The regional intervention is thus unlawfully placed in the genetic phase of normative identification of the profession, to the point of determining, through a substantial redefinition of the activity of the ski instructor, a diversification not permitted within the single professional figure regulated by State law (thus Judgment no. 230 of 2011, point 2 of the Facts Considered).

This is confirmed, firstly, by art. 114, paragraph 3, of the challenged regional law, which subjects registration to the outcome of a training path that, by express normative provision, must be calibrated and carried out in relation to the specialties identified by the challenged art. 112, paragraph 3. To the extent that these specialties assume a qualifying and differentiating element of the ski instructor profession. And, secondly, by art. 112, paragraph 4, of the same regional law, where it limits registration, valid for three years, to the (only) section in which the instructor is registered.

6.2.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 112, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must therefore be declared, and this determines (as requested by the appellant) also the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of its articles 114, paragraph 3, limited to the words "in the single specialty," and 115, paragraph 3. The latter provision, stating that "[s]ki instructors already qualified in a specialty who have passed the aptitude test for admission to the qualification courses of another specialty are exempt from the training course and the examination limited to the subjects already covered by the training course for which the qualification has been obtained," in fact, sets forth a discipline built on the illegitimate provision of the individual specialties.

The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 112, paragraph 4, must also be declared, consequently, pursuant to art. 27 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), limited to the words ", is limited to the section in which the instructor is registered."

6.3.– The State has also challenged art. 113, paragraph 1, in that, by indicating the requirements for registration in the register, it violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

In addition to alleging, ex se, the invasion of a competence reserved to the State, the appellant argues that these requirements are not even perfectly coincident with those provided for by art. 4 of Law no. 81 of 1991. In fact, the Tuscan legislator, on the one hand, introduces the requirement of psychophysical fitness, not contemplated by State legislation; and, on the other hand, provides for the possibility, also not contemplated by State legislation, of registration in the register for those who have been convicted by a final judgment involving the interdiction, even temporary, from exercising the profession, if "five years have passed since the day the sentence was served or if, with a final judgment, conditional suspension of the sentence has been granted." In this way, moreover, the same legislator would hinder, contrary to what is provided for by art. 5 of Law no. 81 of 1991, the transfer of ski instructors from one regional register to another.

6.3.1.– The challenge is well-founded.

As correctly argued by State counsel, constitutional case law has consistently affirmed the validity of the fundamental principle that "reserves to the State not only the identification of professional figures, but also the definition and regulation of the requirements and qualifications necessary for the exercise of the professions themselves" (Judgment no. 271 of 2009, point 2.2. of the Facts Considered and, similarly, most recently, judgments no. 161 of 2025, point 2.1. of the Facts Considered; and no. 127 of 2023, point 4.1. of the Facts Considered). It follows that "the indication of specific requirements for the exercise of professions, even if partially coincident with those already established by State legislation, violates State competence, resulting in an undue interference in a sector (that of the regulation of qualifications necessary for the exercise of a profession) constituting a fundamental principle of the matter and, therefore, of State competence, pursuant to art. 4, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2006 as well" (judgments no. 153 of 2006 and no. 57 of 2007)" (Judgment no. 271 of 2009, point 2.2. of the Facts Considered).

6.3.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of the cited art. 113, paragraph 1, must therefore be declared for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution in matters of professions, and this declaration determines (as requested by the appellant) also the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 116, paragraph 2, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "referred to in article 113."

6.4.– The President of the Council of Ministers then censures art. 115, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, which, by regulating the qualification courses, conflicts with the fundamental principles of the matter, set forth in art. 7 of Law no. 81 of 1991, and therefore invaded the State legislative competence in matters of professions, under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

In particular, according to the appellant, the challenged provision is constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it delegates the definition of the hourly duration and subject matter of the courses to a resolution of the Regional Executive Board.

6.4.1.– The issue is unfounded within the limits and terms specified below.

First of all, it should be recalled that art. 6, paragraph 2, of Law no. 81 of 1991 provides that authorization to exercise the profession of ski instructor is obtained by attending the relevant courses, organized by the Region, with the collaboration of the College of Ski Instructors and the technical bodies of the Italian Winter Sports Federation, "according to methods established by regional laws."

It is the State law itself, therefore, that recognizes the regional competence to organize the courses to obtain authorization, in line, moreover, with the recognition of residual regional legislative competence in matters of professional training.

On the basis of this premise – and as correctly pointed out by the respondent – the alleged conflict with the State framework legislation proves to be non-existent, since the challenged provision can be interpreted in a way that prevents the emergence of the alleged antinomy, as the challenged art. 115, paragraph 1, in recognizing the Regional Executive Board's power to define the duration and subject matter of the courses (by virtue of the provisions of the cited art. 6), does not preclude the application of what is provided for by State legislation.

Firstly, in fact, art. 7 of Law no. 81 of 1991, by prescribing the minimum duration of the courses, does not at all exclude that Regions may establish a different duration, provided it is not less than the minimum provided for by State legislation. Therefore, the cited art. 115, paragraph 1, must be interpreted to mean that the Regional Executive Board may determine the duration of the courses, provided that the minimum limit of 90 hours is respected.

Secondly, even with regard to the teaching of the subjects to be covered in the courses, the challenged provision must be interpreted to mean that, while maintaining the provision of the fundamental teachings indicated by the cited art. 7, the Regional Executive Board may provide for further teachings or – as emphasized by the respondent – the identification of profiles, also operational and technical, and in any case specifically professionalizing with respect to the characteristics of Tuscan winter tourism.

Consequently, the related constitutional legitimacy issue must be declared unfounded within the limits specified here.

6.5.– The State also censures art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the challenged regional law, as, by making the stable and occasional exercise of the profession by ski instructors from non-EU countries subject to the condition of reciprocity of treatment, it attributes the power to recognize the equivalence of the professional qualification to the Italian Winter Sports Federation, whereas State legislation identifies the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as the competent body.

The State Attorney General's Office argues that the exercise of the profession for citizens coming from non-EU countries is regulated by art. 12, paragraph 3, of Law no. 81 of 1991, which provides that for these subjects, holding professional qualifications for the exercise of the profession of ski instructor issued by those States, "authorization to exercise the profession is subject to the application of the provisions of the consolidated act on the discipline of immigration and rules on the status of aliens, under Legislative Decree no. 286 of July 25, 1998."

The appellant recalls, then, that Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007 intervened in the matter, which, in art. 5, paragraph 1, establishes that "[f]or the purposes of recognition under Title II and Title III, Chapters II and IV, the competent authorities to receive applications, receive declarations, and make decisions are: a) The Presidency of the Council of Ministers - Office for Sport [now Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers], for all activities concerning the sports sector and those exercised with the qualification of sports professional, with the exception of those referred to in letter l-septies), as well as for the professions referred to in Law no. 6 of January 2, 1989."

According to the State, the challenged art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, would therefore be constitutionally illegitimate, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, insofar as it attributes this power to the Italian Winter Sports Federation, in agreement with the National College of Ski Instructors, following a request for authorization from the Regional College of Ski Instructors of the Tuscany Region.

6.5.1.– The respondent raises the inadmissibility of the issue, as it is "alleged on the basis of a genuine error, not considering the difference between ski instructors who are EU citizens [...] and those from non-EU States." For the latter professionals, in its view, the regional legislator could not refer – as it did for the former – to the discipline contained in Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007.

The exception must be rejected.

Contrary to what is argued by the Region, art. 5, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007, which, as seen, also regulates the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in a non-EU country, is relevant in this case, as it also regulates the recognition of the equivalence of professional qualifications of citizens of non-EU countries.

Art. 12, paragraph 3, of Law no. 81 of 1991, invoked as another interposed parameter, in fact, refers to Legislative Decree no. 286 of July 25, 1998 (Consolidated Act on the discipline of immigration and rules on the status of aliens), according to which (and in this case to what is provided in its art. 1, paragraph 6) Presidential Decree no. 394 of August 31, 1999 (Regulation containing implementation rules for the consolidated act on the discipline of immigration and rules on the status of aliens, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 286 of July 25, 1998) was adopted. By virtue of art. 60, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007, art. 49, paragraph 2, of Presidential Decree no. 349 of 1999, regulating the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in a non-EU country, must be read as a reference to the cited legislative decree, the discipline of which therefore also applies to the circumstance considered by the provision in question.

In conclusion, although in a synthetic manner, the appeal correctly identifies the relevant State discipline in the case in question.

6.5.2.– That being clarified, the issue is well-founded, as the challenged art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

It is preliminarily appropriate to highlight that the challenged provisions reproduce the discipline of art. 12, paragraph 1, of Law no. 81 of 1991, in the version preceding the amendment made by art. 17, paragraph 1, of Law no. 39 of March 1, 2002 (Provisions for the fulfillment of obligations arising from Italy's membership in the European Communities. Community Law 2001). The cited art. 12, paragraph 1, in its original version, provided, in fact, that "[t]he Regions shall regulate the non-occasional exercise in their territory of the activity of foreign ski instructors not registered in Italian regional registers. Authorization to exercise the profession is subject to the recognition, delegated to the Italian Winter Sports Federation, in agreement with the national college referred to in article 15, of the equivalence of qualifications and reciprocity."

That being established, art. 5, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 206 of 2007, which, as seen, also regulates the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in a non-EU country, must be considered a fundamental principle of the matter, as the discipline of recognizing the equivalence of professional qualifications obtained in other States is strictly linked to the identification of the requirements and qualifications for exercising the profession.

With the challenged art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, the regional legislator, by entrusting the Italian Winter Sports Federation with the competence to recognize the equivalence of the ski instructor professional qualification for non-EU citizens, has therefore violated the fundamental principle of the matter, expressed by the cited art. 5, which, as seen, today identifies the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as the competent authority in the matter.

6.5.3.– The constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged art. 116, paragraph 7, second sentence, must therefore be declared, insofar as it provides that registration is effected following recognition, "by the Italian Winter Sports Federation, in agreement with the National College of Ski Instructors, of the equivalence of the professional qualification acquired in the State of origin, of verification of the reciprocity of treatment and of the existence of the subjective requirements referred to in article 113," instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, of the equivalence of the professional qualification acquired in the State of origin."

The constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged art. 116, paragraph 8, must also be declared, insofar as it provides that authorization is issued following recognition, "by the Italian Winter Sports Federation in agreement with the National College of Ski Instructors," instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers."

6.6.– The President of the Council of Ministers also challenged art. 117 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, according to which "[t]he abusive exercise of the profession of ski instructor is punished pursuant to article 348 of the Penal Code," alleging its conflict with art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

According to the State Attorney General's Office, in light of the aforementioned principle which prevents the regional legislator from repeating what has already been established by the State legislator, the challenged regional provision, although limited to referring to art. 348 of the Penal Code, would exceed the scope of regional legislative competencies, legislating in the matter of "criminal law," delegated to the exclusive legislative competence of the State under art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

6.6.1.– The issue is well-founded.

According to the case law of this Court, a regional norm that – like the one challenged today – penalizes certain facts is constitutionally illegitimate, as this is a task reserved exclusively to State legislation (Judgment no. 167 of 2010, point 6.1. of the Facts Considered).

Nor does the reference, contained in the regional law, to the State law (and, in any case, the conformity of the former with the latter) serve to amend the alleged defect, since it is not relevant "to establish whether regional legislation is or is not in conformity with State legislation, but, even before that, whether it is competent to legislate" on the criminal classification of a fact "independently of conformity or non-conformity with State law" (Judgment no. 313 of 2003; similarly, Judgment no. 167 of 2010) (Judgment no. 35 of 2011, point 2 of the Facts Considered).

6.6.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 117 must therefore be declared for violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

6.7.– The appellant has also requested that the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 118 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, which regulates the Regional College of Ski Instructors, be declared.

Regarding this, however, it merely notes that the provision largely reproduces what is already provided for in art. 13 of Law no. 81 of 1991, albeit with some discrepancies regarding the composition of the Regional College, which is not entirely coincident with the analogous provision of art. 13, paragraph 1, of the cited State law. The challenged regional provision would therefore be constitutionally illegitimate, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, as it would intervene, even in this area, on subjects already regulated by the State framework law.

6.7.1.– The issue must be declared inadmissible, as the reasoning supporting the challenge is deficient and merely assertive.

Constitutional case law is constant in affirming that "the requirement of adequate reasoning to support the challenge is set out rigorously in proceedings initiated as primary challenges, in which the appellant has the burden not only to identify the challenged provisions and the constitutional parameters whose violation they allege, but also to support the reasons for the alleged conflict with clear, complete, and sufficiently articulated arguments (ex multis, judgments no. 125 of 2023, no. 265, no. 259 and no. 135 of 2022, no. 170 of 2021 and no. 279 of 2020)" (Judgment no. 169 of 2024)" (judgments no. 126 of 2025, point 4.1. of the Facts Considered and no. 106 of 2025, point 2.1. of the Facts Considered).

The appellant has not adequately fulfilled this obligation. In fact, the normative scope of the challenged provision is not accurately considered, since it is an implementing provision for the State provision requiring the establishment of ski instructor colleges in every Region and is not, moreover, attributable to the category of norms establishing the professional figure and setting its profiles and enabling qualifications. Since the appeal did not present any "even synthetic merits-based argument in support of the challenges" (Judgment no. 175 of 2024, point 4.4. of the Facts Considered), the reasons why the challenged art. 118 would conflict with the invoked constitutional and interposed parameters are not clear.

6.7.2.– The question of constitutional legitimacy of the cited art. 118, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, must therefore be declared inadmissible.

6.8.– The State next censures art. 123, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the phrase "[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of criminal law," because the literal wording would be capable of introducing a double sanctioning track for ski instructors.

In the appellant's opinion, the regional legislator would have introduced an administrative sanction for the abusive exercise of the related profession, intended to accumulate with the criminal sanction, thus invading the State legislative competence in matters of criminal law, under art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

6.8.1.– The issue must be declared inadmissible, as the challenged provision is not indicated either in the authorization act for the appeal of the Council of Ministers, or in the annexed report, to which it refers. And, according to the constant case law of this Court, "[t]he verified omission entails the exclusion of the appellant's will to promote the related issues and, therefore, their inadmissibility. In fact, [...] in primary proceedings there must be a full and necessary correspondence between the resolution by which the authorized body determines to appeal and the content of the appeal, given the political nature of the act of appeal (among many, judgments no. 134 and no. 58 of 2023 and no. 179 of 2022)" (Judgment no. 142 of 2024, point 6.3.1. of the Facts Considered).

6.9.– Finally (in this group of issues concerning the figure of the ski instructor), the appellant challenges art. 124 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, as, by providing that "[t]he continuation of the professional activity of ski instructor is prohibited by the municipality if the interested party loses one of the requirements for exercising the activity. In this case, the recognition card shall be withdrawn," it violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, in relation to art. 13 of Law no. 81 of 1991.

In this case, the appellant notes that the challenged art. 124 conflicts with art. 13, which, in paragraph 4, attributes to the Regional College of Ski Instructors all the functions concerning, among others, "the keeping of professional registers, the supervision of the exercise of the profession, the application of disciplinary sanctions."

The argument put forward by regional counsel, to support the legitimacy of the challenged provision, according to which there would be "in no way a relationship of antinomy between the two normative provisions, such that it is perfectly possible that – without this determining the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision produced by the regional legislator" – both the Regional College of Ski Instructors (as provided for by the cited art. 13), and the municipalities (as stipulated by the challenged art. 124) "are entitled to prohibit the continuation of the professional activity of ski instructor" – is not valid.

The aforementioned art. 124, in fact, erodes or, in any case, calls into question the attributions of the Regional College of Ski Instructors, thus invading the State competence to establish the fundamental principles of the matter.

Moreover, it is not even clear how an entity (the municipality) that has no competence whatsoever over the keeping of the register, the verification of the requirements for registration therein, or the related issuance of the recognition card, can effectively exercise a power of control over the existence of the same, with the correlated power to withdraw the recognition card in question.

6.9.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of the cited art. 124 must therefore be declared for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution in matters of professions.

7.– With the last set of issues, the State has challenged a series of provisions of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 relating to the profession of alpine guide.

Preliminarily, it is appropriate to recall that, in the opinion of State counsel, the regional discipline in question, similarly to that subject to the issues previously analyzed on the ski instructor, violates art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions (except for the challenge to art. 130, paragraph 4, with reference to art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e) of the Constitution, and 136, paragraph 1, with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution, below, points 7.6. and 7.8., respectively).

7.1.– Firstly, art. 125 is censured, which, in defining the activity of the alpine guide in a way "almost repetitive" of that provided for by articles 2 and 3 of Law no. 6 of 1989, violates the State legislative competence in matters of professions, under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

The issue is well-founded.

Like art. 111, paragraph 1, of the cited regional law, the challenged art. 125, by reproducing the contents of the State legislative act, has, in fact, brought about an illegitimate novation of the source, appropriating the principles established by State law and reserved for the competence of the latter.

7.1.1.– Therefore, for reasons analogous to those more extensively set out for the cited art. 111, paragraph 1 (above, point 6.1.), the unconstitutionality of the challenged art. 125 must be declared, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

7.2.– The President of the Council of Ministers then jointly alleges the illegitimacy of articles 126 and 127, paragraph 1, concerning respectively the regional register of alpine guides and the requirements for registration therein.

In the appellant's opinion, the discipline introduced by the cited articles would overlap, by reproducing, albeit "with some differences," the contents of Law no. 6 of 1989. In particular, the provisions of art. 5 of the State Law and those of art. 127 of the Regional Law do not appear to be entirely "coincident."

Therefore, articles 126 and 127, paragraph 1, would be constitutionally illegitimate, "as would art. 130, paragraph 2, which refers to art. 127 for the purpose of registration in the regional register of alpine guides from other Regions."

7.3.– With regard to art. 126, although the appellant, in the first part of the relevant ground of appeal, alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of the article in its entirety, in developing the challenges, the State specifically directs its complaints only at paragraph 3, challenged, in conjunction with art. 130, paragraph 1, of the cited regional law, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, in relation to art. 4, paragraphs 3 and 5, of Law no. 6 of 1989.

As the State Attorney General recalls, the cited art. 130 provides, in paragraph 1, that "[a]lpine guides already registered in the registers of other Regions who intend to exercise the profession stably also in Tuscany must apply for registration in the regional professional register of alpine guides of Tuscany"; while the cited art. 126, paragraph 3, defines as "stable exercise of the profession" the activity carried out "by the alpine guide having a residence, even seasonal, in Tuscany for the purpose of offering their services."

State counsel complains that this latter provision does not allow, in divergence from what is established by art. 4, paragraph 5, of Law no. 6 of 1989, registration in the regional register for those who, despite not having a residence, even seasonal, in the Tuscany Region, offer their services in its territory, thus also violating the principle expressed by paragraph 3 of the cited art. 4, according to which the authorization to exercise the profession of alpine guide is valid throughout the national territory.

As can be deduced from the summary of the grounds for the challenge above, the constitutional legitimacy issue does not concern the conjunction of articles 130, paragraph 1, and 126, paragraph 3, of the challenged regional law, but only the latter provision, which sets forth the definition of stable exercise of the profession.

Moreover, the cited art. 130, paragraph 1, constitutes a compliant implementation of the principle contained in art. 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 6 of 1989, which provides that alpine guides who intend to exercise the profession stably in the territory of multiple Regions may register in multiple registers.

7.3.1.– The challenge, limited to art. 126, paragraph 3, is well-founded.

As State counsel correctly recalls, art. 4, paragraph 5, of Law no. 6 of 1989 considers as stable exercise of the profession "the activity carried out by the alpine guide-mountaineering instructor or by the aspirant guide who has a residence, even seasonal, in the territory of the interested region, or who effectively offers their services to clients in it." It is therefore provided that the exercise of the profession can be considered stable in a specific regional territory, not only if the alpine guide has a residence there, but also if they actually carry out their activity there.

In this way, the discipline concerning the requirements for exercising the profession must be considered an expression of the fundamental principle, repeatedly invoked by constitutional case law (and in this ruling), which reserves to the State not only the identification of professional figures but also the definition and regulation of the requirements and qualifications necessary for the exercise of the related professions.

With the challenged provision, which in turn sets forth a notion of stable exercise of the profession, moreover narrower than that set forth by the cited State provision, the regional legislator has therefore appropriated an area reserved for State legislative competence, namely that of identifying the requirements for registration in the register. This, moreover, with evident repercussions on the freedom to exercise the profession of alpine guide for those who, despite being registered in other regional registers, offer their services in the Tuscany Region, who, contrary to what is provided for by art. 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 6 of 1989, will not be able to register in the related regional register.

7.3.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 126, paragraph 3, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, must therefore be declared, and this declaration determines (as requested by the appellant) also the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of art. 127, paragraph 1, of the Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "referred to in article 127."

7.4.– The appellant has also challenged art. 127, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, launching challenges analogous to those addressed to art. 113, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, alleging that the Tuscany Region, through the illegitimate reproduction of the content of art. 5 of Law no. 6 of 1989, has regulated the requirements for registration in the register of alpine guides, in a manner that is moreover not perfectly coincident with State discipline.

Preliminarily, it should be noted that the challenge, although summarily argued, is admissible, as it is motivated by internal reference to the complaints addressed against the cited art. 113.

As this Court has clarified, this argumentative technique is not, in itself, a reason for inadmissibility, as the appellant has precisely referred to arguments already set out in the preceding pages of the appeal, to motivate challenges of a similar nature and concerning a provision of similar content (thus Judgment no. 68 of 2011, point 3.2. of the Facts Considered; similarly and more recently: Judgment no. 90 of 2023, point 13.1.1. of the Facts Considered), thus making the challenge brought against the challenged art. 127, paragraph 1, perfectly intelligible.

7.4.1.– On the merits, the issue is well-founded.

As already stated in relation to art. 113 (above, point 6.3.), in fact, the indication of specific requirements for the exercise of professions is an area reserved for State competence and, consequently, precluded to regional intervention.

7.4.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 127, paragraph 1, must therefore be concluded for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution in matters of professions, and this declaration determines (as requested by the appellant) also the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 130, paragraph 2, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "referred to in article 127."

7.5.– The appellant has also challenged art. 130, paragraph 3, of the same regional law, which establishes that the exercise "of the profession by alpine guides coming from abroad or from other Italian Regions and who accompany their clients, is not subject to registration in the register," for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, in relation to art. 6, paragraph 1, of Law no. 6 of 1989.

The latter article, which regulates the "transfer" and "temporary aggregation" of alpine guides, provides, among other things, for the possibility for the guide registered "in the register of a Region [to transfer] to the register of another Region" (art. 6, paragraph 1), "on condition that the interested party has their residence or domicile or stable dwelling in a municipality of the same Region" (art. 6, paragraph 2).

7.5.1.– The challenge, moreover not very clear, must be declared inadmissible.

In the resolution authorizing the challenge – in which, moreover, there is a generic reference to the (entire) art. 130, but nothing is said about its paragraph 3 – the necessary indication of the parameter is missing. Therefore, that necessary correspondence between the appeal and the authorization resolution, which is a necessary condition in primary proceedings, is lacking (among many others, judgments no. 142 of 2024, point 6.3.1. of the Facts Considered; and no. 134 of 2023, point 2.1. of the Facts Considered).

7.6.– Article 130, paragraph 4, is also challenged, which establishes that "[r]egistration, for citizens of non-EU countries, is subject to the recognition by the National College of Alpine Guides of the equivalence of the qualification issued in the State of origin," violating art. 117, first and second paragraphs, letter e), and third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

Even in light of the overall sense of the appeal, aimed primarily at alleging the violation of State competences under art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, this Court – availing itself of the power to decide the order of the issues to be addressed (among many, judgments no. 192 of 2024, point 13.2. of the Facts Considered, no. 92 of 2023, point 6.4. of the Facts Considered, no. 120 of 2022, point 5 of the Facts Considered) – deems it appropriate to primarily examine the latter challenge.

7.6.1.– The issue is admissible.

Although summarily motivated, in fact, the challenged provision and the cited constitutional parameter are clearly identified, as the State has alleged the violation of the latter by all the challenged provisions on alpine guides at the beginning of the ground of appeal; and the reason for the challenges also emerges, which is the invasion of an area reserved for the State legislator, with a discipline that is moreover antinomic to that set forth by the latter.

7.6.2.– On the merits, the issue is well-founded.

With the cited art. 130, paragraph 4, as well as with art. 116, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the challenged regional law, the Tuscan legislator has, in fact, appropriated an area reserved for State legislation, namely the recognition of the equivalence of professional qualifications obtained abroad, setting forth a discipline that violates the State framework discipline, which attributes this competence to the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (above, point 6.5.2.).

7.6.3.– The constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged art. 130, paragraph 4, must therefore be declared for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions, insofar as it provides that registration is subject to recognition "by the National College of Alpine Guides" instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers," with absorption of the remaining challenges.

7.7.– The President of the Council of Ministers also jointly challenges the constitutional legitimacy of articles 131 and 134, which regulate the Regional College of Alpine Guides and disciplinary sanctions, respectively. The provisions, in fact, would be "almost repetitive of articles 13, 14, and 17 of Law no. 6/1989 and, therefore, [...] constitutionally illegitimate."

The passage quoted above essentially exhausts what was argued in the introductory appeal, so the issues relating to the challenged articles 131 and 134 must be declared inadmissible.

7.7.1.– In fact, the appellant has not adequately fulfilled the obligation of reasoning required in primary proceedings, having limited himself to generically indicating the aforementioned articles, which are, moreover, markedly heterogeneous among themselves, regulating, the first, the Regional College of Alpine Guides and, the second, disciplinary sanctions. Even assuming that the defect represented by the lack of indication, even merely formal, of the constitutional parameters allegedly violated (a defect that could be remedied by the general invocation of the violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, made at the beginning of the relevant ground of appeal) could be overcome, the extremely synthetic and clearly assertive reasoning (it is simply alleged that the challenged provisions are repetitive of articles 13, 14, and 17 of Law no. 6 of 1989); defects that are further amplified precisely by the noted heterogeneity of the prescriptive content of the challenged provisions, which would have required a precise and separate, albeit synthetic, exposition of the reasons for the conflict with the constitutional and interposed parameters, prevents the examination of the merits.

7.7.2.– In conclusion, on this point, the appeal has not fulfilled the obligation of reasoning required by constitutional case law, and the questions of constitutional legitimacy of articles 131 and 134 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must consequently be declared inadmissible.

7.8.– The appellant then challenged art. 136, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, which introduces a "double sanctioning track regarding sanctions for alpine guides." Referring integrally to the reasons advanced in relation to the challenged art. 123, it requests the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of art. 136 of the cited regional law also for violation of the State's exclusive legislative competence in matters of criminal law, under art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution.

7.8.1.– The issue must also, in this case, be declared inadmissible, due to the lack of correspondence between the appeal and the resolution authorizing the challenge.

The resolution includes the indication of art. 136, but, since the reasons for the challenge are expressed by reference, i.e., by referring to what was argued for the non-existent challenge of art. 123 of the same regional law, the reference results in an empty reference, as neither the parameters nor the reasons for the challenge are indicated in relation to art. 136.

As this Court has repeatedly affirmed, most recently in Judgment no. 179 of 2022 (point 8.1. of the Facts Considered), "[...] 'the omission of any mention of a constitutional parameter in the resolution authorizing the challenge by the political body, entails the exclusion of the appellant's will to promote the issue in that regard, with the consequent inadmissibility of the issue which, on the same parameter, was raised by the defense in the appeal' (Judgment no. 239 of 2016)" (Judgment no. 128 of 2018, cited in Judgment no. 166 of 2021; in the same terms, among the most recent, also Judgment no. 129 of 2021)."

7.9.– Finally, art. 137 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 is challenged, which establishes that the municipality may prohibit the continuation of activities in the event that the interested party loses the requirements for exercising the activity of alpine guide, for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

This discipline would also be affected by the same constitutional illegitimacy defects alleged for art. 124 of the cited regional law, which sets forth analogous discipline for ski instructors.

In this case, the appellant notes that the challenged art. 137 diverges from art. 14, paragraph 2, of Law no. 6 of 1989, in that, among the prerogatives that the State norm attributes to the Regional College of Alpine Guides, the power to supervise the persistence of the requirements for carrying out the activity of alpine guide and, consequently, the power to inhibit the continuation of the profession when the lack thereof is found, is also included.

7.9.1.– The issue is well-founded.

The challenged art. 137 – similarly to what was already noted regarding art. 124 (above, point 6.9.) – in fact, conflicts with the fundamental principle of the matter expressed by the cited art. 14, paragraph 2, of Law no. 6 of 1989, which – as State counsel notes – attributes to the Regional College of Alpine Guides the aforementioned powers of supervision and injunction.

7.9.2.– The constitutional illegitimacy of art. 137 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024 must therefore be declared for violation of art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in matters of professions.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 76, paragraph 4, of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism);

2) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of articles 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

3) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of articles 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109 and 110 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

4) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 111, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

5) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 112, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

6) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 114, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "in the single specialty";

7) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 115, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

8) declares, consequently, pursuant to art. 27 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 112, paragraph 4, limited to the words ", is limited to the section in which the instructor is registered";

9) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 113, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

10) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 116, paragraph 2, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "referred to in article 113";

11) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 116, paragraph 7, second sentence, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, insofar as it provides that registration is effected following recognition, "by the Italian Winter Sports Federation, in agreement with the National College of Ski Instructors, of the equivalence of the professional qualification acquired in the State of origin, of verification of the reciprocity of treatment and of the existence of the subjective requirements referred to in article 113," instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, of the equivalence of the professional qualification acquired in the State of origin";

12) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 116, paragraph 8, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, insofar as it provides that authorization is issued following recognition, "by the Italian Winter Sports Federation in agreement with the National College of Ski Instructors," instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers";

13) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 117 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

14) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 124 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

15) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 125 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

16) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 126, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

17) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 127, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

18) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 130, paragraph 2, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, limited to the words "referred to in article 127";

19) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 130, paragraph 4, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, insofar as it provides that registration is subject to recognition "by the National College of Alpine Guides" instead of "by the Department for Sport of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers";

20) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 137 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024;

21) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 118 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the appeal indicated in the heading;

22) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 123, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the appeal indicated in the heading;

23) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 130, paragraph 3, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the appeal indicated in the heading;

24) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy issues concerning articles 131 and 134 of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers with the appeal indicated in the heading;

25) declares inadmissible the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 136, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter l) of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

26) declares unfounded the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 104, paragraph 2, first sentence, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

27) declares unfounded, within the terms set forth in the reasoning, the constitutional legitimacy issue concerning art. 115, paragraph 1, of Regional Law of Tuscany no. 61 of 2024, promoted, with reference to art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on November 4, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on December 23, 2025