Sentenza n. 64 del 2025

Judgment No. 64 of 2025 - AI translated judgement

JUDGMENT NO. 64

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has rendered the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concerning Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Campania Region of November 11, 2024, No. 16, entitled "Provisions concerning ineligibility for the office of President of the Regional Council, in implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f) of Law No. 165 of July 2, 2004,” brought by the President of the Council of Ministers, with an appeal served on January 10, 2025, filed with the Registry on the same date, registered under No. 1 of the appeals register for the year 2025, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 4, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearance of the Campania Region;

Having heard in the public hearing of April 9, 2025, the Reporting Judge Giovanni Pitruzzella;

Having heard the State Attorneys Ruggero Di Martino and Eugenio De Bonis for the President of the Council of Ministers and the attorneys Giandomenico Falcon and Marcello Cecchetti for the Campania Region;

Deliberated in the council chamber on April 9, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– With an appeal filed on January 10, 2025, and registered under No. 1 of the 2025 appeals register, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the Office of the State Attorney General, brought a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Campania Region of November 11, 2024, No. 16, entitled "Provisions concerning ineligibility for the office of President of the Regional Council, in implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f) of Law No. 165 of July 2, 2004,” in reference to Articles 3, 51, and 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of July 2, 2004 (Implementing provisions of Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution).

1.1.− The appellant contends that the challenged provision – after establishing, in the first sentence, that "[t]he person who, at the expiry of the second term, has already held such office continuously for two consecutive terms is not immediately re-eligible to the office of President of the Regional Council” – stipulates, in the second sentence, that, "[f]or the purposes of applying this provision, the counting of terms shall commence from the term currently being served on the date of entry into force of this Law.”

In this manner, the regional legislator allegedly only seemingly implemented the principle of the prohibition of a third consecutive term established by the invoked intermediate parameter, while, in reality, deferring its application.

1.2.− The Office of the State Attorney General observes that, pursuant to Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as amended by Constitutional Law No. 1 of November 22, 1999 (Provisions concerning the direct election of the President of the Regional Council and the statutory autonomy of the Regions), "[t]he election system and the cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of the President and the other members of the Regional Council and of the regional councilors shall be governed by Regional Law within the limits of the fundamental principles established by State Law, which shall also determine the term of office of the elected bodies.”

The regulation of the electoral system and the cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of the President and the other members of the Regional Council is therefore a matter of concurrent legislation.

In implementation of the constitutional mandate – the appellant continues – Law No. 165 of 2004 established the fundamental principles that Regions must incorporate into their legislation.

Specifically, Article 2, paragraph 1, establishes that, "[e]xcept for State legislative provisions concerning non-candidacy for those who have been convicted or against whom preventive measures have been applied, Regions shall regulate by law the specifically identified cases of ineligibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution,” within the limits of the fundamental principles expressed by the same paragraph 1, including, in letter f), that of "the non-immediate re-eligibility upon expiry of the second consecutive term of the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage, based on the regional legislation adopted in the matter.”

The respondent, for its part, adopted its own electoral regulation with the Law of the Campania Region of March 27, 2009, No. 4 (Electoral Law), which entered into force on April 15, 2009, whose Article 1, paragraph 1, provides that "[t]he President of the Regional Council and the Regional Council shall be elected by universal and direct suffrage.” Similarly, the Law of the Campania Region of May 28, 2009, No. 6 (Statute of the Campania Region), Article 46, paragraph 1, provides that "[t]he President of the Regional Council is elected by universal and direct suffrage concurrently with the election of the Regional Council, of which he or she is a member.”

Having thus adopted an electoral law and a statute providing for the election of the President of the Regional Council by universal and direct suffrage, the Campania Region has no reason to exclude the application of the prohibition of a third consecutive term for those who have already served two terms under the aforementioned regional electoral legislation.

As highlighted by administrative jurisprudence and the Court of Cassation, this prohibition is functional to the need to prevent the risk of concentration and personalization of power.

This was confirmed by this Court in Judgment No. 60 of 2023, where it was clarified, regarding mayors, that "[t]he provision for the maximum number of consecutive terms – in strict connection with the direct election of the head of the local body, to which it serves as a considered counterweight – reflects […] a legislative choice capable of realizing and guaranteeing other fundamental constitutional rights and principles: the effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of vote of individual electors, and the overall genuineness of the electoral competition, the physiological turnover of political representation, and, ultimately, the very democratic nature of local authorities.”

These assertions – reiterated in this Court’s Judgment No. 196 of 2024 – are also applicable to the limit on consecutive terms for the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage.

Furthermore, the State principle prohibiting a third consecutive term does not require any specific implementation or reception by the Regions in order to apply, "as it is already perfectly defined” and "immediately operational.”

This principle is intended to impose uniform and binding regulations throughout the national territory, allowing "different detailed arrangements at the regional level, without, however, sacrificing the unitary requirement brought by the State provision.”

The challenged regional provision, insofar as it excludes terms served before its entry into force from the counting of terms, conflicts with the aforementioned fundamental principle, resulting in a violation of Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as well as the principles of reasonableness and equality under Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution.

The appellant further adds that, assuming that Regions are free to postpone the effectiveness of the ineligibility ban after the second consecutive term and "if it were even granted that the principle must be necessarily and formally received by regional legislation to be operative, without setting any deadline for reception,” it would follow that the Regions would remain free to reduce its mandatory scope and even postpone its implementation sine die.

Nor can it be argued that so-called framework laws are not subject to direct application, as the national legislator can certainly establish detailed rules that meet a prevailing need for uniform regulation at the national level.

In the present case, the interests deserving uniform protection are the effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of vote of individual electors, and the overall genuineness of the electoral competition, as well as the "physiological turnover of political representation pursuant to Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, strictly connected to the democratic principle that permeates the entire legal order.”

In "addition” to this, it should be noted that Regional Law No. 4 of 2009 of Campania, by providing that the President of the Regional Council and the Regional Council are elected by universal and direct suffrage (Article 1, paragraph 1), stipulates, inter alia, that the other State or regional provisions, including regulatory ones, in force in the matter shall apply, "insofar as compatible with this Law” (Article 1, paragraph 3).

This latter reference to existing State provisions constitutes a "further reason for the mandatory application of the principle” set forth in Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

The appellant thus reiterates that the challenged provision violates the constitutional parameters invoked and the interposed State norm, which is allegedly: a) directly operative, as an "self-executing” fundamental principle of the matter; b) in any case, applicable to the respondent Region by virtue of the reference contained in Article 1, paragraph 3, of the aforementioned Regional Law of Campania No. 4 of 2009.

2.− With a document filed on February 14, 2025, the Campania Region appeared in the proceedings, challenging the inadmissibility and the lack of merit of the opposing appeal.

2.1.− The issues are inadmissible, in the first instance, due to the "omitted reconstruction” or "incompleteness of the factual and legal framework.”

The appeal, in fact, apodictically asserts the "self-executing” nature of the principle prohibiting a third consecutive term, without dwelling on: a) Article 5 of Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1999, which, in introducing the discipline of the new regional form of government, expressly maintained the effectiveness of State legislation in the matter (among others) of ineligibility until it was replaced by regional legislation; b) the "historical, textual, logical, and systematic interpretation” of the provisions of Law No. 165 of 2004; c) the "living law” formed "through consolidated and convergent rulings of the Court of Cassation, as well as, on the specific point relevant to this dispute, by the Tribunals and Courts of Appeal seized of the issue”; d) the prior enactment by other Regions (Veneto, Marche, and Piedmont) of laws that, on the assumption of the non-"self-executing” nature of the principle, introduced it "to apply from the current or subsequent presidential term”; e) the "corresponding assessments” of the Council of Ministers itself, which in all such cases decided not to challenge the relevant regional laws.

2.2.− Secondly, the issue is inadmissible due to generality and "lack of argumentation” with reference to Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, as the appellant has not explained how and why they would be violated.

2.3.− On the merits, the Campania Region first addresses the supposed self-executing nature of the principle established by Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

According to the respondent, there are few doubts that Law No. 165 of 2004, in setting the fundamental principles regarding ineligibility and incompatibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, including the limit of two consecutive terms, expressly reserves its implementation to regional law.

Article 2, paragraph 1, of the aforementioned framework law, in fact, not only reiterates that "Regions shall regulate by law the specifically identified cases of ineligibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution,” but, in letter f), emphasizes that the "provision for the non-immediate re-eligibility upon expiry of the second consecutive term of the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage” must be established "based on the regional legislation adopted in the matter.”

Thus, the intent of the State legislator to make the principle operational only "by effect and within the context of the implementing regional legislation” is "doubly clear,” rendering the appellant’s "discourse” on the abstract possibility that State principles may operate directly, or that the State legislator may also enact detailed rules, or whether the principle in question is sufficiently defined, unnecessary.”

This plain textual interpretation corresponds to "the history of the provision,” as evidenced by the preparatory works, "which from the outset highlighted […] the need to respect regional autonomy” regarding the limit on the number of terms for the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage, this being an issue concerning the form of government.

For this reason, the provision establishing the limit of two consecutive terms was formulated in the original text as a mere faculty left to the individual Regions, and for the same reason, that provision was suppressed by the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

The position taken by the Government is also worth noting. In particular, in the session of the Chamber of October 7, 2003, the Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers expressed perplexity regarding the constitutional conformity of an amendment aimed at reintroducing the term limit suppressed in Committee, stating that it concerns the form of government directly, regardless of its classification as a case of ineligibility or non-candidacy.

In the session of the Senate of the Republic of April 20, 2004, the same Government representative, however, observed that the provision reintroduced by the Chamber of Deputies is also amenable to a constitutionally oriented interpretation, given that the term limitation in question is not immediately applicable but is provided for "based on the regional legislation adopted in the matter.”

2.4.− The respondent then illustrates the "living law” "in the concurring interpretation of the civil judges,” with specific reference to the "cases” of the Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna Regions.

The non-direct applicability of the fundamental principles dictated by Article 2 of Law No. 165 of 2004 is considered "an undisputed point” in civil jurisprudence.

Firstly, the Court of Cassation (First Civil Section, Judgment of March 1, 2005, No. 4327, and later the United Civil Sections, Judgment of July 25, 2006, No. 16898) clarified that "the ‘fundamental principles’ established by Law No. 165 of 2004 can have efficacy and be applicable in the legal system only if the regional legislator has exercised the new legislative power attributed to it: thus, the existence of both the regional law and the State law on ‘fundamental principles’ is necessary for the applicability of the new regulation.”

Equally significant and even more relevant are the decisions of the civil judges who dealt with the specific issue of the prohibition of a third consecutive term. These concern the well-known disputes aimed at establishing the forfeiture of the Presidents elected in March 2010 in the Regions of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, concluded with judgments of the ordinary Tribunals of Milan and Bologna, both confirmed on appeal.

2.5.− The Campania Region then proceeds to analyze the law "lived, and experienced, in the stable interpretation of the Government,” in relation to the cases of the Veneto, Marche, and Piedmont Regions.

The Law of the Veneto Region of January 16, 2012, No. 5 (Rules for the election of the President of the Regional Council and the Regional Council), introduced the limit of the double consecutive term, while specifying, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that it applies "with reference to the terms subsequent to the elections held after the date of entry into force of this Law.”

The Council of Ministers allegedly considered the aforementioned Veneto law in its session of February 3, 2012, resolving to challenge Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 27, paragraph 1, before this Court, but not the provisions on the term limit for the President of the Regional Council, thus implicitly deeming their constitutional legitimacy "undisputed.”

Based on these provisions – the Campania Region adds – the current President of the Regional Council of the Veneto Region (who served as President from 2010 to 2015 and from 2015 to 2020) was able to run for and be elected for the subsequent term from 2020 to 2025.

Similarly – the respondent continues – Article 2 of the Law of the Marche Region of February 20, 2015, No. 5 (Amendments to the Regional Law of December 16, 2004, No. 27 "Rules for the election of the Regional Council and the President of the Regional Council”), inserted Article 3-bis into the Law of the Marche Region of December 16, 2004, No. 27 (Rules for the election of the Regional Council and the President of the Regional Council), establishing, in paragraph 2, the prohibition of the third consecutive term. Simultaneously, Article 11 of the same Regional Law of Marche No. 5 of 2015 specified that "[t]he provision referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 3-bis of R.L. 27/2004, as amended by Article 2 of this Law, shall apply with reference to the legislatures subsequent to the one in which this Law entered into force.”

The Government allegedly considered the aforementioned Regional Law of Marche No. 5 of 2015 in the Council of Ministers session of April 21, 2015, resolving not to challenge it "in consideration of the wide margins of technical-legal uncertainty.”

Based on those provisions, the then President of the Regional Council of Marche ran in the subsequent 2015 elections, "obviously influencing – although not being elected – the electoral campaign and the overall outcome of the elections.”

Finally, the respondent adds that, during the current legislature, the Law of the Piedmont Region of July 19, 2023, No. 12 (Rules for the election of the Regional Council and the President of the Regional Council), likewise provided, in Article 5, paragraph 2, for the prohibition of the third consecutive term, establishing, simultaneously, in Article 34, paragraph 1, that "[t]he provisions of Article 5, paragraph 2, and Article 8 shall apply starting from the XII legislature.”

This regional law, too, was allegedly considered by the Government in the Council of Ministers session of September 18, 2023, which in this case also decided not to challenge it.

2.6.− The Campania Region then argues concerning the irrelevance, for the purpose of the direct application of the two-consecutive-term limit, of the electoral procedure regulation contained in the Regional Law of Campania No. 4 of 2009.

The appeal seems to "allude” to the possibility that the mere promulgation of the cited regional law made the limit in question operative.

This contention is unfounded, as Regional Law No. 4 of 2009 limits itself to regulating the electoral procedure, without "touching upon” the areas of ineligibility and incompatibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

2.7.− That being established, the respondent proceeds to refute the further arguments put forward in the appeal to support the "self-executing” nature of the State principle.

The reference is, firstly, to the thesis that if it were admitted that Regions can postpone the effectiveness of the ban until its reception, moreover without a deadline, it would follow that they remain "free to reduce its mandatory scope and even postpone its implementation sine die.”

This is a suggestive but substantially unfounded consideration.

On the one hand, in fact, the interpretation of the law cannot "be conducted ‘in reverse,’ starting not from its wording and manifest intention, but from the deemed undesirable consequence.”

On the other hand, the alleged freedom of ordinary Regions to disregard State law is not absolute, given the existence of the Government’s extraordinary substitution power, pursuant to Article 120, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as attested by the formal notice and subsequent substitution of the Puglia Region effected by Decree-Law No. 86 of July 31, 2020 (Urgent provisions concerning gender parity in the electoral consultations of ordinary statute Regions), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 98 of August 7, 2020, precisely in relation to a case of failure to adapt regional legislation to the fundamental principles of Law No. 165 of 2004 concerning regional elections.

Furthermore, the alleged rationale of imposing a uniform and binding regulation throughout the national territory identifies "an inspiring criterion of the principle,” but has never translated into the imposition of its automatic and immediate operation.

Moreover, challenging today the interpretation of Law No. 165 of 2004, "as intended by the legislator, consolidated in the interpretation of civil judges at all levels, and confirmed by the twenty-year practice of regional legislation and the exercise of governmental prerogatives, would lead not to a condition of equality, but rather to an inequality that would undermine institutional coherence itself.”

On the one hand, in fact, it would necessarily have to be recognized, based on the final judgment formed in those cases, the full legitimacy of the third terms served by the then Presidents of the Councils of the Regions of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna; on the other hand, it would contradict the legitimacy of the term currently being served by the President of the Council of the Veneto Region.

Finally, the rulings of this Court, No. 60 of 2023 and No. 196 of 2024, cited in the appeal and relating to term limits for mayors, are irrelevant, as municipalities do not possess constitutionally guaranteed legislative autonomy nor a statutory reservation for the regulation of the form of government.

2.8.− The contention that the principle set forth in Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004 was received by Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Regional Law of Campania No. 4 of 2009, which provides for the application, "insofar as compatible with this Law, of the other State or regional provisions, including regulatory ones, in force in the matter,” would also be unfounded.

With the aforementioned reference, the legislator of Campania allegedly intended to refer only to the regulation of the electoral procedure (and not to that of ineligibilities and incompatibilities).

Even if one were to assume otherwise, it would still be a reference to a provision that, in turn, expressly refers, for its application, to a specific provision of regional law.

2.9.− Alternatively, the Campania Region claims the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004, for violation of Article 122, first paragraph, and Article 123, first paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it is deemed that it directly and mandatorily establishes the limit of two consecutive terms for the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage.

Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in referring fundamental principles in the matter of ineligibility to State law, did not intend to "give the expression a meaning different from the traditional one incorporated in State legislation itself,” i.e., an institution intended to prevent the freedom of vote from being influenced by holding offices during the election period that allow for influencing the outcome—that is, offices from which the interested party can timely resign, as confirmed by Article 2, paragraph 1, letter b), of Law No. 165 of 2004 itself.

The provision set forth by the intermediate parameter, however, is allegedly not a cause of ineligibility, since in the case of the outgoing President, the risk of undue influence during the electoral period is adequately mitigated by the reduction of powers characteristic of the prorogatio institution; in any case, the logic of ineligibility presupposes that the President of the Regional Council can resign and abandon office to stand as a free citizen in the electoral competition, whereas this could not happen in the case of the prohibition of the third term, which is intended to operate according to the logic typical of causes of non-candidacy, i.e., personal conditions that render the subject devoid of passive electoral capacity.

Furthermore, the limit of two consecutive terms allegedly finds its justification "in broader system considerations,” "peculiarly linked to the form of government characterized by direct universal suffrage election.”

The prohibition of a third consecutive term, in other words, does not concern the relationship between the candidate and the electorate, as is characteristic of causes of ineligibility, but rather the relationships between the regional political bodies, which is precisely the "heart” of the form of government in the strict sense.”

It is conceivable, in fact, how the effects of a limit on the re-eligibility of the President of the Regional Council inevitably rebound on the concrete functioning of the principle aut simul stabunt aut simul cadent (they stand or fall together), because they are inevitably destined to influence the use of the "weapons” of no-confidence by the Council and the resignation of the President, acting, from time to time, "sometimes as a brake, sometimes as an engine” for the two fundamental institutions of the system imposed in an unalterable manner” by Article 126, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

Given the statutory reservation under Article 123, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the State legislator could not have intervened, except through a constitutional law.

3.− With a document filed on January 30, 2025, the Association "Passione civile con Valerio Onida” filed a written opinion, as amicus curiae, pursuant to Article 6 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, arguing in support of the appellant’s claims.

The opinion was admitted by Presidential Decree of March 4, 2025.

4.− On March 19, 2025, the Campania Region filed a defensive brief, further illustrating the arguments supporting the lack of merit of the issue already set out in the document of appearance.

In addition to these, the respondent asserted that the constitutional illegitimacy of the interposed parameter, if interpreted as imposing the immediate application of the third consecutive term prohibition on ordinary Regions, is also supported by Article 41-bis of Royal Legislative Decree No. 455 of May 15, 1946 (Approval of the Statute of the Sicilian Region), converted into Constitutional Law No. 2 of February 26, 1948, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter m), of Constitutional Law No. 2 of January 31, 2001 (Provisions concerning the direct election of presidents of special statute regions and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano), which article, in its first paragraph, includes among the "provisions relating to the form of government” that can be amended "by the Regional Assembly by an absolute majority of its members,” also Article 9, fourth paragraph, of the special statute, which contains the prohibition of the third consecutive term.

Considered in Law

l.− The President of the Council of Ministers brought a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 1, of Regional Law No. 16 of 2024 of Campania, in reference to Articles 3, 51, and 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

The challenged provision, in the first sentence, establishes that "[t]he person who, at the expiry of the second term, has already held such office continuously for two consecutive terms is not immediately re-eligible to the office of President of the Regional Council.”

The second sentence, which is the subject of the appellant’s claims, adds that, "[f]or the purposes of applying this provision, the counting of terms shall commence from the term currently being served on the date of entry into force of this Law.”

According to the Office of the State Attorney General, with this latter clause, the legislator of Campania, by excluding from the counting of terms relevant for the operation of the prohibition of a third consecutive term those served before the introduction of Regional Law No. 16 of 2024, allegedly evaded the principle established by the invoked intermediate parameter, thereby violating Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, according to which "[t]he election system and the cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of the President and the other members of the Regional Council and of the regional councilors shall be governed by Regional Law within the limits of the fundamental principles established by State Law, which shall also determine the term of office of the elected bodies.”

Article 2, paragraph 1, of Law No. 165 of 2004, in fact – by establishing that, among the fundamental principles that ordinary Regions must observe in regulating "the specifically identified cases of ineligibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution,” there is that "of the non-immediate re-eligibility upon expiry of the second consecutive term of the President of the Regional Council elected by universal and direct suffrage, based on the regional legislation adopted in the matter” (letter f) – allegedly established a "self-executing” and "immediately operational” principle, which requires no specification by the regional legislator.

The prohibition is stated to be functional to the need to uniformly regulate throughout the national territory the interests and constitutional principles of effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of vote of individual electors, and the genuineness of the electoral competition, as well as the "physiological turnover of political representation pursuant to Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, strictly connected to the democratic principle that permeates the entire legal order.”

According to the appellant, the constitutional parameters invoked are violated also because the principle of the prohibition of a third consecutive term would already be operative in the Campania Region, by virtue of the reference made by Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Regional Law of Campania No. 4 of 2009 to the "other State or regional provisions, including regulatory ones, in force in the matter,” which must include, precisely, Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

2.− The examination of the objections of inadmissibility raised by the respondent Region is preliminary.

2.1.− According to the latter, the issue is inadmissible, firstly, due to "omitted reconstruction” or "incompleteness of the factual and legal framework.”

2.2.− The objection is unfounded.

The appeal is supported by a sufficient and adequate reasoning, which takes into account both the challenged provision and the interposed and constitutional parameters invoked.

The provisions of other Regions that have regulated the prohibition of the third consecutive term, as well as the practice followed by the Council of Ministers regarding the challenge of regional laws, do not form part of the "relevant regulatory framework.”

In the main proceedings, moreover, as there is no lower court proceeding for which to assess relevance, the description of the "factual framework” is irrelevant.

Nor, finally, is the omission to consider Article 5 of Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1999 relevant, given that it concerns a transitional period that ended in Campania in 2009, when the latter adopted both the statute and the electoral law.

2.3.− According to the respondent, the issue is inadmissible, secondly, due to generality and "lack of argumentation” with reference to Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, as the President of the Council of Ministers has not explained how and why they would be violated.

2.4.− This objection is also unfounded.

The reason for invoking these parameters is clear.

According to the appellant, ordinary Regions cannot disregard or suspend the operation of the prohibition of the third consecutive term not only because they would violate the interposed parameter and with it Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, but also because the balance between the resulting limit on the right to be elected and the other constitutional principles at play (par condicio among candidates, freedom of vote of electors, genuineness of the electoral competition, and the democratic principle) could only be determined, uniformly throughout the national territory, by the State legislator.

3.− On the merits, the issue is founded with reference to Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

4.− It is necessary, first of all, to reconstruct the historical and normative context in which the principle of the prohibition of the third consecutive term for the President of the Regional Council was introduced, and then to illustrate its rationale, also in light of the jurisprudence of this Court (point 5), and to resolve the issue of its relevance to the form of government or to ineligibilities (point 6).

4.1.− It is well known that the original constitutional architecture provided for a parliamentary form of government with assembly pre-eminence for ordinary statute Regions, which, over time, had generated high levels of instability in regional executives.

4.2.− To remedy this, the legislator first reformed the electoral system, introducing, with Law No. 43 of March 25, 1995 (New rules for the election of the councils of ordinary statute regions), a majority bonus.

4.3.− A few years later, Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1999 intervened. This law, on the one hand, granted greater statutory autonomy to the Regions. In fact, the amended Article 123, first paragraph, of the Constitution entrusts the statute with determining the form of government, as well as the fundamental principles of organization and functioning of the Region, with the sole limit of "harmony with the Constitution” (the previous limit from "Laws of the Republic” having been removed). The statute also regulates "the exercise of the right of initiative and referendum on Regional laws and administrative measures and the publication of Regional laws and regulations.”

On the other hand, the Constitutional Law of 1999, precisely to remedy the "instability in the political management of the Regions” (Judgment No. 2 of 2004) and thus guarantee their governability, outlined a specific form of government.

The latter was imposed on ordinary Regions on a transitional basis by Article 5, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1999, "[u]ntil the date of entry into force of the new regional statutes and new electoral laws,” and substantially "proposed” as the "normal” form (Judgment No. 372 of 2004; mutatis mutandis, Judgment No. 203 of 2023), while the Regions remained free to choose it or not in their statutes.

It is equally known that the form of government in question – confirmed by the statutes of all ordinary Regions – provides for the direct universal suffrage election of the President of the Regional Council and the attribution of extensive powers to the same.

The model introduced by the constitutional legislator of 1999 is characterized, in fact:

a) by the President's power to appoint or dismiss the members of the Council (Article 122, fifth paragraph, of the Constitution), choosing them also from outside the Regional Council; b) by the principle aut simul stabunt aut simul cadent, i.e., by a mechanism that links the fate of the Regional Council to that of the President of the Council and vice versa, and which is articulated, on the one hand, in the rule that the loss of office by the latter (due to voluntary resignation, removal, permanent impediment, or death) entails the dissolution of the former and a return to the polls (Article 126, third paragraph, of the Constitution) and, on the other hand, in the rule that the Council, to remove the President of the Council (and the latter), can only approve a motion of no confidence by an absolute majority, or proceed through the simultaneous resignation of the majority of its elected members (Article 126, second and third paragraphs, of the Constitution), necessarily leading, even in these cases, to the dissolution of the Council and a return to the polls; c) correspondingly, by the absence of a direct relationship of confidence between the two bodies, replaced by a relationship of "non-distrust.”

As clarified by this Court, however, once the form of government provided for by the Constitution has been chosen, ordinary Regions cannot modify the aforementioned fundamental features (Judgments No. 203 of 2023, No. 12 of 2006, No. 2 of 2004 and No. 304 of 2002).

Concurrently, the reformed Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution provided for concurrent legislative competence in the matters of "election system” and "cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of the President and other members of the Regional Council as well as regional councilors.” These matters, in fact, are governed "by Regional Law within the limits of the fundamental principles established by State Law,” which also determines the "term of office of the elected bodies.”

4.4.− At the time of the 1999 constitutional reform, the prohibition of a third consecutive term had already entered our legal system for mayors and presidents of provinces elected by universal and direct suffrage (Article 2 of Law No. 81 of March 25, 1993, concerning the "Direct election of the mayor, the president of the province, the municipal council, and the provincial council”).

However, the constitutional legislator, in providing for the direct election of the President of the Regional Council (like mayors and provincial presidents), did not couple it with the aforementioned prohibition, despite one of the six bills (A.C. 5500 – Rebuffa et al.) merged into the discussed and subsequently approved text aiming at this.

A new attempt to introduce the prohibition of a third consecutive term into the Constitution was made by the "Text of the constitutional law approved in the second vote by an absolute majority, but less than two-thirds of the members of each Chamber, concerning: ‘Amendments to Part II of the Constitution,’” which, however, did not pass the constitutional referendum of 2006.

4.5.− As illustrated in point 1, the prohibition in question was instead introduced by Law No. 165 of 2004, that is, the law enacted in implementation of Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, and therefore intended to establish "exclusively, […] the fundamental principles concerning the election system and the cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of the President and other members of the Regional Council, as well as regional councilors” (Article 1), in addition to regulating the term of office of regional elected bodies (Article 5).

5.− This Court has addressed limitations on the number of consecutive terms in holding elected offices with reference to: a) the councils of local bar associations (Judgment No. 173 of 2019); b) the president and governing bodies of national sports federations (Judgment No. 184 of 2023); c) and, most relevantly here, mayors (Judgments No. 196 of 2024 and No. 60 of 2023).

5.1.− In Judgment No. 173 of 2019, some questions regarding the prohibition of a third consecutive term for councilors of local bar associations were declared unfounded, based on considerations that, despite the undeniable difference in scope, are also relevant to the examination of the present issue.

In excluding the violation of Articles 3, 48, and 51 of the Constitution, it was indeed observed therein that "the provision for a limit on the terms that may be served consecutively is a principle of wide application for public offices,” whose "peculiar and essential purpose […] is […] to enhance the conditions of equality that Article 51 of the Constitution places at the foundation of access ‘to elected offices.’ Equality, in its substantive sense, would evidently be compromised by a competition that could be influenced by those who have held the office for which they are running for two (or more consecutive terms) and who have thus been able to consolidate a strong link with a part of the electorate.”

It was further added that "[t]he prohibition of a third consecutive term favors the physiological turnover within the body, introducing ‘fresh forces’ into the representative mechanism (with a view to ensuring the expansion and greater fluidity of passive electorate) and – on the other hand – blocks the emergence of forms of crystallization of representation.”

5.2.− In Judgment No. 60 of 2023 cited by the appellant, the unconstitutionality, for violation of Article 3, letter b), of Constitutional Law No. 3 of February 26, 1948 (Special Statute for Sardinia), and Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution, was declared for a provision of the Autonomous Region of Sardinia that regulated the limit on consecutive terms for mayors, departing from Article 51 of Legislative Decree No. 267 of August 18, 2000 (Consolidated Text of Laws on the organization of local authorities), which provides for the prohibition of a third term.

On that occasion, this Court affirmed that "[t]he provision for the maximum number of consecutive terms – in strict connection with the direct election of the head of the local body, to which it serves as a considered counterweight – reflects […] a legislative choice capable of realizing and guaranteeing other fundamental constitutional rights and principles: the effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of vote of individual electors, and the overall genuineness of the electoral competition, the physiological turnover of political representation, and, ultimately, the very democratic nature of local authorities. These further constitutional interests are intended to operate in harmony with the principle upheld by Article 51 of the Constitution, based on a specific equilibrium whose identification must be left to the State legislator.”

5.3.− In Judgment No. 184 of 2023, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of a provision that introduced a prohibition on a fourth term for national sports federations were declared founded, for violation of Articles 2, 3, and 18 of the Constitution, as being "disproportionate,” since it was not a temporary limitation but a "definitive and irreversible prohibition” from holding the office again, even after a long period from previous terms.

In that context, to the extent relevant here, it was observed that: a) "[t]he objective pursued by intervening in the regime of candidacies is […] to favor the access of all members in conditions of equality to directive offices […] overcoming internal crystallizations resulting from positional advantages held by those who have already held those same offices for a long time”; b) the prohibition, as previously clarified with reference to the order councils in Judgment No. 173 of 2019, aims to "stimulate and support a […] directive turnover at the top of national sports federations,” to shield "national sports federations from the risk of crystallizations in the management structure,” to "guarantee efficiency and credibility to the sports institutions of our country,” and to "avoid positional advantages for ‘long-serving’ directors, ensuring par condicio among candidates and greater participation in associative life”; c) the challenged provision also protects the efficiency and impartiality of the federation, and its very "internal democratic nature,” "which this Court has valued, albeit in the different context of municipal elections for the candidacy for mayor, as a further product of the effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of voters, the genuineness of the competition, and the physiological turnover of representation (Judgment No. 60 of 2023).”

5.4.− Lastly, Judgment No. 196 of 2024 – in rejecting the questions of constitutional legitimacy brought by the Liguria Region against the provision that amended Article 51 of the TUEL (easing the regime of limitations on the number of consecutive terms for mayors of municipalities with a population of less than 15,000 inhabitants) – reiterated the principles expressed in Judgment No. 60 of 2023.

5.5.− The prohibition of the third consecutive term for the President of the Regional Council also represents a balancing act between opposing principles, which is left to the discretion of the State legislator, who, with the present intermediate parameter, considered it a "systemic temper” in relation to the direct election of the monarchical head, to which it serves as a "considered counterweight” (Judgment No. 60 of 2023).

What this Court affirmed with reference to mayors applies, a fortiori, to Presidents of Regional Councils elected by universal and direct suffrage, given that they, as recalled in point 4.3, combine extensive powers, to the point that in doctrine the relevant form of government has even been defined as "hyper-presidential.”

Moreover, during the parliamentary work on Law No. 165 of 2004 (A.C. 3599), the prohibition of the third term, openly borrowed from the identical institution previously introduced for mayors, was considered by some as a tool aimed at preventing a "drift towards an absolute form of governorship, without time limits,” or as a "general principle, which limits what could become absolute and uncontrollable powers by anyone” (XIV Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, session of October 7, 2003, No. 369).

6.− According to the Campania Region, the prohibition of the third consecutive term, to be classified as a cause of non-candidacy, pertains to the form of government, which is reserved to statutory autonomy under Article 123, first paragraph, of the Constitution, and not to the matter of concurrent legislative competence of ineligibility under Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

It would follow that the interposed parameter is constitutionally illegitimate, and this Court should refer the relevant question back to itself if it deems that this principle operates "directly” towards ordinary Regions, even without their implementing and specifying intervention.

6.1.– Setting aside the aspect of the immediate operability of the prohibition and the scope for regional legislative intervention, which will be discussed later (point 7.2), the respondent’s thesis cannot be accepted.

In a theoretical context where the form of government and electoral law are notoriously matters with very blurred conceptual boundaries (Judgment No. 2 of 2004) and intimately connected, what matters is the reconstruction of their actual perimeter delineated in the Constitution by the 1999 reform.

It is therefore necessary to ascertain, in the present case, whether the notion of ineligibility of the President of the Regional Council used in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution is capable of encompassing also the situation of those directly elected Presidents who have served two consecutive terms, thus incurring the prohibition established by Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004.

6.2.– The answer is affirmative.

It must first be considered that the prohibition of the third consecutive term, since its introduction for mayors (with Article 2, paragraph 2, of Law No. 81 of 1993), has been formulated in terms of "ineligibility.” Only following the recent amendments made by Article 3, paragraph 1, letter b), of Law No. 35 of April 12, 2022 (Amendments to the Consolidated Text pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 267 of August 18, 2000, concerning the limitation of the term of mayors and management control in smaller municipalities, as well as Legislative Decree No. 39 of April 8, 2013, concerning the non-conferrability of positions in private entities under public control), to Article 51 of the TUEL has the latter referred to "non-candidacy” (as noted by this Court in the cited Judgment No. 60 of 2023).

Consistent with the aforementioned textual fact, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation has always defined the one relating to mayors as a cause of "original” ineligibility (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment of May 20, 2006, No. 11895; in similar terms, First Civil Section, Judgments of March 26, 2015, No. 6128, December 4, 2012, No. 21685, February 12, 2008, No. 3383; United Civil Sections, Judgment of October 29, 2007, No. 22640; First Civil Section, Judgment of May 20, 2006, No. 11895; Order of February 24, 2021, No. 5060).

Furthermore, there is an identity of rationale between the "classic” causes of ineligibility and the one at issue here.

According to constitutional jurisprudence, in fact, the former are functional to guaranteeing equal access to public offices and the fullness of the freedom to vote, being aimed, in particular, at preventing the latter from being conditioned by captatio benevolentiae or metus publicae potestatis (among many others, Judgments No. 283 and No. 257 of 2010, No. 217 and No. 84 of 2006).

The causes of ineligibility arise, to use the very words of Article 2, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law No. 165 of 2004, "where the activities or functions performed by the candidate, also in relation to peculiar situations of the Regions, may directly disturb or condition the free decision of the electors’ vote or may violate the equality of access to elected offices with respect to other candidates.”

This rationale also supports the prohibition of the third consecutive term for the President of the Regional Council, which (as recalled in point 5.5) serves as a system temper for direct election and is capable of balancing the right to be elected with the principles of effective par condicio among candidates, the freedom of vote of individual electors, and the overall genuineness of the electoral competition.

In light of the above observations, it must be held that the term "cases of ineligibility” of the President of the Regional Council used by Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution also includes the prohibition of the third consecutive term.

6.3.– It is true that the institution in question operates like causes of non-candidacy and not like causes of ineligibility.

As with the former, in fact, the condition barring the election of the President of the Regional Council who has already served two consecutive terms cannot be removed by the interested party, whereas it is known that causes of ineligibility are removable "if the interested parties cease from the activities or functions” that determine them, "no later than the day set for the submission of candidacies or another term otherwise established” (Article 2, paragraph 1, letter b, of Law No. 165 of 2014).

This operational aspect, highlighted by the Campania Region, appears subordinate to the finalistic element recalled above and to the "historical” notion of ineligibility due to the holding of prior terms, as it emerged legislatively and consolidated jurisprudentially.

6.4.– Once the prohibition of the third consecutive term is traced back to the causes of ineligibility provided for in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, it becomes superfluous to inquire into its abstract and theoretical connection to the regional form of government. Still less are the prerequisites met to accede to the suggestions of the Region’s defense for this Court to self-refer the relevant constitutional legitimacy question.

As this Court stated in Judgment No. 188 of 2011, "[t]he letters 122 and 123 of the Constitution provide for a ‘complex division of the electoral matter among the different sources of State and regional law’ (Judgment No. 2 of 2004). In particular, ‘Article 122, fifth paragraph, stipulates that the President of the Regional Council is elected by universal and direct suffrage, unless the statute provides otherwise; Article 123, first paragraph, provides that the regional form of government falls within the statutory competence; Article 122, first paragraph, stipulates that the election system is the competence of the regional legislator "within the limits of the fundamental principles established by State Law”’ (Judgment No. 45 of 2011).”

Given this framework, "one cannot claim, in the name of statutory competence on the ‘form of government,’ to regulate the electoral matter through statutory provisions, since the first paragraph of Article 123 and the first paragraph of Article 122 are provisions of equal rank: even if conceptually it can be argued that the determination of the form of government can (or even should) include electoral legislation, it must be acknowledged that, instead, under the current Constitution, legislative power over elections has been assigned to bodies and procedures different from those responsible for adopting the regional statute, and therefore the regional statute cannot directly regulate the electoral matter or even contradict the constitutional provision that provides for this special legislative competence” (Judgment No. 2 of 2004).

It has also been stated that "the expression ‘election system’ used in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution must be understood as comprehensively including all aspects of the electoral phenomenon. It therefore refers not only to the regulation of the mechanisms that allow the preferences expressed by the electorate through the vote to be translated into seats, within elected bodies (electoral system in the strict sense, concerning the type of vote and electoral formula and the type and size of constituencies), but also to the regulation of the electoral procedure (Judgment No. 196 of 2003), as well as to that which relates, more generally, to the conduct of elections (electoral system in the broad sense)” (Judgment No. 151 of 2012).

The same hermeneutic approach has been followed with specific reference to limitations on the right to be elected, i.e., the "cases of ineligibility and incompatibility” considered by Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

In Judgments No. 379 and No. 378 of 2004, it was indeed ruled out that the incompatibility between the office of regional councilor and that of assessor falls under the form of government: although it is "true that choices regarding incompatibility between the office of member of the Regional Council and that of regional councilor may originate from statutory options regarding the form of government of the Region, […] it must be noted that the recognition in Article 123 of the Constitution of the power of the statute regarding the form of regional government is accompanied by the provision of Article 122 of the Constitution, and therefore the regulation of the specific subjects expressly referred to by Article 122 escapes the determinations left to statutory autonomy” (Judgment No. 379 of 2004).

6.5.– The aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence confirms, therefore, that the notion of the form of government adopted by Article 123 of the Constitution is a notion restricted to the immediate definition of the relationships between the political bodies of the Region, from which the electoral matter in the broad sense, including the regime of limitations on the right to be elected, is excluded.

This choice by the constitutional legislator, moreover, is easily understandable if one considers that these, too, as they are to be traced according to a delicate balance with the right to vote and the interests connected to the genuineness of the electoral competition and the general democratic nature of institutions, require regulation inspired by unitary principles.

6.6.– A different solution cannot be based, as the Campania Region would have it, on the circumstance that the special statute of the Sicilian Region, as amended by Constitutional Law No. 2 of 2001, includes the prohibition of the third consecutive term among the provisions relating to the President of the Region elected by universal and direct suffrage.

The structure of special autonomies, defined by statutes with constitutional rank, is different from that of ordinary Regions, and the link between the form of government and electoral law is much tighter, as the State’s concurrent legislative competence delineated in the Constitution for ordinary Regions does not exist for the former.

6.7.– The above considerations are not undermined even by the reference made by the respondent to this Court’s Judgment No. 2 of 2004.

This judgment, as acknowledged by the Campania Region itself, did not take a position on whether the prohibition of the third consecutive term falls under the matter of ineligibility referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, or under the scope of the form of government, which is subject to statutory reservation.

The consequential constitutional illegitimacy of the provision of the Calabrian statute that established this prohibition was pronounced due to the close link found between it and the peculiar form of direct election of the President and Vice-President established therein, which, while confirming the connection between these aspects, does not prove, more generally, that the former also pertains to the form of government.

7.– With the present intermediate parameter, therefore, the State legislator, exercising the concurrent competence attributed to it by Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, has established a principle, that of the prohibition of the third consecutive term, which, like all fundamental principles in concurrent matters, obliges ordinary Regions to comply with it in exercising their legislative function.

7.1.– The mandatory nature of a fundamental principle and its application, with the clarifications that will follow, cannot be conditioned on its express reception by regional laws, because in this way Regional Councils would be empowered to prevent its operation, even for long periods of time. This consequence would conflict with the function of fundamental principles, which is to ensure an adequate level of homogeneity of regional regulations due to underlying unitary demands, and which, in the present case, would be even more intolerable because the prohibition of the third consecutive term is configured by law as the "counterpart” of direct election.

7.2.– Even norms that have a specific and precise content can be recognized as having the nature of fundamental principles (among others, Judgments No. 195 of 2024, No. 166 of 2021, No. 84 of 2017, and No. 67 of 2016 and No. 44 of 2014), when the specificity of the prescriptions is in a relationship of "co-essentiality and necessary integration” with the nature of the principles themselves (among others, Judgments No. 189 of 2022 and No. 192 of 2017); this is due to their "finalistic” vocation (among others, Judgments No. 195 of 2024, No. 112 of 2023 and No. 38 of 2016) to ensure a requirement (not of homogeneity but) of normative uniformity throughout the national territory (among others, Judgments No. 112 of 2023, No. 106 of 2022 and No. 145 of 2021), as can happen in the presence of a "fundamental choice” (Judgment No. 44 of 2021) made by the State legislator.

Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004 – by providing for the prohibition of the third consecutive term for the President of the Regional Council, in the event of direct election – lays down a rule attributable to this latter category, because, as is generally true of all prohibitions, it expresses a precept that in itself is specific and does not require integration by the regional legislator to be applicable (although the latter retains "interstitial” areas of regulation).

This is justified, on a finalistic level, by the rationale for the prohibition in question, which, as illustrated above, is considered by the State legislator an appropriate counterpart to the direct election of the President of the Regional Council.

7.3.– However, it could not have been considered immediately operational since its introduction with Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), of Law No. 165 of 2004, given that the latter expressly intended to tie the application of the principle to the direct election of the President of the Regional Council "based on the regional legislation adopted in the matter.”

This reference broadly and generally relates to the regional legislation that in some way connects to the direct election of the President of the Regional Council and therefore extends from the electoral system in the strict sense, "concerning the type of vote and electoral formula and the type and size of constituencies” (Judgment No. 151 of 2012) to the regulation of the electoral procedure, up to including the regulation of ineligibilities and incompatibilities.

In this way, the State legislator achieved a compromise between two opposing needs equally felt during the preparatory works for Law No. 165 of 2004: that of ensuring a certain degree of regional autonomy and that of requiring ordinary Regions to apply the principle in question.

The first need, in particular, as argued by the Campania Region, was repeatedly expressed by the representative of the Government, in the XIV Legislature, most recently in the session of the Senate of the Republic of April 20, 2004, No. 584, during which the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers affirmed that "the reference to regional legislation ensures […] the non-immediate applicability of the State provision, which requires direct regional regulation.”

Testimony to the second need, however, is the position expressed in the report of the 1st Standing Committee of the Senate of the Republic (Constitutional Affairs) No. 1094-C, in which – after recalling that a previous provision merely facultative regarding the introduction of the prohibition had been suppressed during the preparatory works – it is stated: "the free choice of the Regions to make use of this possibility, or not, ceases with the new text, and the Region must provide that the President, elected by universal and direct suffrage, cannot be immediately elected for a third time. The provision is clear and any other different interpretation does not correspond to the will of the legislator and would reintroduce the rule, which was instead intended to be suppressed, concerning the faculty of the Regions to legislate or not on the matter.”

Precisely because, however, ordinary Regions have the obligation, not the faculty, to comply with the aforementioned fundamental principle, the respondent’s assertion that the reference to "regional legislation” in the cited Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f), should be understood as relating to regional legislation that expressly incorporates the prohibition of the third consecutive term cannot be shared.

The reference must instead be understood as relating to all regional legislation in electoral matters (and not necessarily to legislation that also regulates cases of ineligibility), to which Law No. 165 of 2004 is addressed, establishing, in implementation of Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the fundamental principles that it must follow.

Therefore, with the adoption of the first laws of the ordinary Regions enacted in electoral matters after the entry into force of Law No. 165 of 2004, on the one hand, the Regions could specify the principle of the prohibition of the third consecutive term by regulating the "interstitial” spaces, for example by identifying the duration of the terms relevant for the count, in the event of early termination.

On the other hand, even in the absence of regulation of the aforementioned "interstitial” spaces permitted by Law No. 165 of 2004, once the ordinary Regions – in which, after the 1999 constitutional reform, the direct election system for the President of the Council has always operated – have adopted, even in a fragmented manner, legislative regulation concerning one of the multiple aspects of electoral matters, the prohibition of the third consecutive term, not necessarily requiring further specification, became applicable.

This conclusion is consistent with the function assigned to the prohibition in question.

It constitutes, by choice of the State legislator, a necessary component of the system of direct election of the President of the Regional Council, in order to balance the risk inherent in direct popular investiture, of plebiscitary impulses and a personalistic concentration of power. Consequently, even from this perspective, the application of the principle cannot be postponed and must instead be linked to the first exercise of the legislative function in electoral matters following the entry into force of Law No. 165 of 2004.

From the foregoing, it follows that the aforesaid regional laws and subsequent ones cannot, under penalty of constitutional illegitimacy, violate the principle in question, which is now an integral part of their respective legal systems.

8.– In the case of the Campania Region, the prohibition of the third consecutive term became operational with the entry into force of Regional Law No. 4 of 2009, that is, the electoral law, which not only contains no provision derogating from it (nor could it have provided for one, as it would have been constitutionally illegitimate for violating the repeatedly cited fundamental principle), but also includes in Article 1, paragraph 3, a reference, "insofar as compatible with this Law, [to] other State or regional provisions, including regulatory ones, in force in the matter.”

The provision challenged today, which after several years introduced a specific derogation substantially excluding the counting of previous terms relative to the current one, thereby allowing the outgoing President of the Regional Council who has already served two consecutive terms to be re-elected in the next regional elections, is all the more in conflict with the aforementioned fundamental principle, in violation of Article 122, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

9.– It must also be added that no relevance can be attributed to the fact, alleged by the respondent Region, that analogous regional laws aimed at preventing the operation of the principle of the third consecutive term prohibition were not challenged by the President of the Council of Ministers.

This Court has repeatedly clarified not only that "[t]he admissibility of the challenge, in terms of timeliness and existence of the interest to appeal, must be assessed in relation to the individual laws adopted,” but also that "acquiescence regarding other regional laws does not argue in favor of the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged provisions” (Judgment No. 128 of 2023; mutatis mutandis, among the most recent, Judgments No. 118 and No. 114 of 2023). This applies also to laws of other Regions (Judgments No. 19 of 2023, No. 24 of 2022, No. 107 of 2016 and No. 59 of 2006), whose eventual constitutional illegitimacy, moreover, may well be asserted, in the manner provided for by the legal system, incidentally.

10.– The claims referring to Articles 3 and 51 of the Constitution remain absorbed.

11.– In light of the foregoing considerations, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 1, of Regional Law No. 16 of 2024 of Campania must be declared, limited to the words "[f]or the purposes of applying this provision, the counting of terms shall commence from the term currently being served on the date of entry into force of this Law.”

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Law of the Campania Region of November 11, 2024, No. 16, entitled "Provisions concerning ineligibility for the office of President of the Regional Council, in implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1, letter f) of Law No. 165 of July 2, 2004,” limited to the words "[f]or the purposes of applying this provision, the counting of terms shall commence from the term currently being served on the date of entry into force of this Law.”

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on April 9, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Registrar Director

Filed with the Registry on May 15, 2025