JUDGMENT NO. 167

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law of December 29, 2022, no. 197 (State budget forecast for the fiscal year 2023 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2023-2025), initiated by the Court of Audit, jurisdictional section for the Emilia-Romagna Region, in a single-judge composition, in the proceedings between M.O. B. and others versus the National Institute for Social Security (INPS), by order of March 25, 2025, registered under no. 76 of the register of orders for 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 19, first special series, of 2025.

Having examined the appearance of INPS, as well as the interventions of the President of the Council of Ministers and the Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit;

having heard Judge Rapporteur Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi at the public hearing of October 21, 2025;

having heard Deputy Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit Adelisa Corsetti for the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Court of Audit, lawyer Antonella Patteri for INPS, and State Attorney Fabrizio Urbani Neri for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in the council chamber on October 21, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– By order of March 25, 2025 (reg. ord. no. 76 of 2025), the Court of Audit, jurisdictional section for the Emilia-Romagna Region, in a single-judge composition, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law of December 29, 2022, no. 197 (State budget forecast for the fiscal year 2023 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2023-2025), in reference to Article 53 of the Constitution as well as «the principle of reasonableness and temporariness of exceptional measures».

2.– In the main proceedings, M.O. B. and twenty-three other claimants – all «former members of the defense and security sector» – requested the «adjustment of their pensions to inflation dynamics, mitigated by Article 1, paragraph 309 of Law no. 197 of 2022».

3.– The referring judge, firstly, states awareness that «this Court has already ruled on the matter in Judgment no. 19 of 2025», «which rejected the challenges brought by other regional jurisdictional Sections».

However, it considers that «other aspects of constitutional illegitimacy not examined by the Court» exist.

4.– In particular, the referring judge finds a violation of Article 53 of the Constitution.

Citing constitutional jurisprudence (Judgment no. 223 of 2012 is cited), it recalls that, «for legislation to be deemed fiscal in nature», it is necessary to ascertain that: (a) it is directed, primarily, to procuring a (definitive) reduction in assets for the liable party; (b) the reduction does not constitute a modification of a reciprocal relationship; (c) the resources derived from the said reduction, linked to an economically relevant prerequisite, are allocated «to cover public expenses».

Given the above, for the referring judge, all these requirements are «met in the statutory provision» being challenged, which introduces a «compulsory levy», made to recover resources intended «for general financial purposes», without modifying the «employment relationship attributable to a 'non-contractualized' state public employee», but merely affecting «a salary item».

Such a tax levy would be «limited, however, only to a portion of the taxpayers», that is, those who «fall within the scope of Article 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 488 of 1998», thus excluding self-employed workers «who are not liberal professionals», whose pension benefits «are managed by the separate management body at INPS».

Even if this were not the case, for the referring judge the contradiction with the invoked parameter would persist, because «the tax» would affect «a particular item» of «deferred employment income», already subjected to taxation «on equal terms» with all other recipients of dependent employment income. In this manner, «a discrimination solely to the detriment of the specific category of subjects, the former employees, compared to current employees» would have been introduced, as the salaries of the latter were not subject, in the same tax periods, «to any additional tax levy», in violation of the principle of tax equality.

5.– Secondly, the referring judge, alleging a conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, complains of the «illegitimate repetition of exceptional measures», drawing attention to the last in a series of legislative interventions – detailed in point 7 of the Grounds for Decision of Judgment no. 19 of 2025 – «aimed at the same recipients, thus transforming a remedy from exceptional to ordinary».

For the referring judge, the challenged provision «potentially covers a time span exceeding budgetary needs, given that it is destined to carry over over time». In this way, the principle expressed by this Court in Judgment no. 316 of 2010 would be violated, according to which «the indefinite suspension of the equalization mechanism, or the frequent repetition of measures intended to paralyze it», exposes «the system to evident tensions with the insurmountable principles of reasonableness and proportionality», also with reference to pensions «of greater consistency», which might not be «sufficiently protected in relation to changes in the purchasing power of the currency».

6.– This would also highlight the relevance of the issues raised, given «the direct effect of the cut on pensions starting from 1.1.2023, as well as the carrying over of the reduction in the years to come without the possibility of recovery», since subsequent revaluations will always be calculated «not on the original accrued right value, but on the last nominal amount eroded by the lack of adjustment».

7.– The National Institute for Social Security (INPS) appeared in the proceedings, requesting that the issues be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

The social security body contests the interpretative premise from which the referring judge proceeds, according to which the reduction of the revaluation percentage of pension benefits constitutes a «compulsory levy of a fiscal nature». In fact, there is no incision «on the concrete and current assets of the person subject to it».

INPS contends, in particular, that the provisions regarding the so-called "cooling" of the revaluation dynamics in no way affect «the amount already received with the last pension instalment», which «is, on the contrary, increased, albeit by a lower percentage than the general rule».

Thus, the first of the indispensable elements of the fiscal situation outlined by Judgment no. 223 of 2012, cited by the referring judge, which is the asset reduction to the detriment of the liable party, is missing.

Citing extensive passages of the aforementioned Judgment no. 19 of 2025, INPS adds that the resulting expenditure saving is also intended to finance measures in the social security sector.

In this regard, and citing jurisprudence of the Court of Audit in support, it is pointed out that the social security body's budget is autonomous, that «there is no permeability with that of the State», and that the latter could not «draw from any of the chapters of the Institute's budget», so that the expenditure saving «on the current payment for pensions translates immediately into an improvement of the accounts of every insurance management of INPS», freeing up resources for other pension interventions, «always charged to the managements from which the saving originated».

This would exclude any «discriminatory effect to the detriment of pensioners compared to other citizens receiving incomes of equal amount but of a non-pension nature»: pensioners and current workers could not, moreover, be usefully compared – based on the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution – as pensions and salaries are subject to «completely different adjustment mechanisms», not to mention that even for «the vast majority of workers, including non-contractualized public employees», the adjustment of salaries to inflation «has not been at all fully compensatory».

Furthermore, INPS highlights the error made by the referring judge in considering that the pensions charged to the separate management body referred to in Article 2, paragraphs 26 et seq., of Law no. 335 of August 8, 1995 [Reform of the mandatory and supplementary pension system], are excluded from the scope of application of the challenged provision: Article 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 448 of December 23, 1998 (Public finance measures for stabilization and development), referred to by the challenged provision, applies to «all pensions under the general mandatory insurance scheme for dependent and self-employed private workers of all categories», with the sole «exception of private funds», thus including benefits subject to the separate management regime, in which «subjects carrying out particular forms of self-employment are insured».

As for the aspect of the challenge relating to the unreasonableness of measures allegedly exceptional and lacking the necessary requirement of temporariness, INPS believes that the issue has already been examined and declared unfounded by this Court in Judgment no. 19 of 2025, excerpts of the reasoning of which are recalled.

8.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the raised issues be declared unfounded.

For the State defense, the mechanism established by the challenged provision does not result in «a surreptitiously introduced tax», because there is no issue of a levy on the pension. Rather, it is an intervention – justified «by a precise public interest, aimed at guaranteeing a sustainable and balanced social security system» – which nonetheless increases the pension treatment, albeit temporarily reduced compared to the standard regulation.

The State Attorney’s Office also reproduces extensive excerpts from Judgment no. 19 of 2025, retracing the steps of previous constitutional jurisprudence which, in examining legislative measures for "cooling" the equalization dynamics of pension benefits—even more severe than the one challenged here—excluded their incompatibility with the principles of adequacy and proportionality.

The same jurisprudence, the intervener emphasizes, has foreshadowed the unreasonableness of only legislative mechanisms that intervene «in the form of a total block of indexation for long periods».

9.– The Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit also intervened in the proceedings, first explaining the reasons for the admissibility of his initiative within the present constitutional legitimacy review.

The intervener highlights, in particular, that, although the provisions establishing and governing the conclusions and the intervention of the Prosecutor General in proceedings concerning civil, military, and war pensions have been repealed, the power of the same office to bring an appeal in the principal interest of the law remains, «a faculty now governed by Article 171» of Legislative Decree of August 26, 2016, no. 174 (Code of Audit Justice, adopted pursuant to Article 20 of Law no. 124 of August 7, 2015), as well as the necessity of the presence of the Prosecutor General in the proceedings before the Joint Sections in their jurisdictional capacity, «through the provisions of Article 115» of the same Code of Audit Justice. Furthermore, even in pension matters, the procedural system has «safeguarded the guarantee role of the Prosecutor General», as demonstrated by the expression contained in Article 73 of Royal Decree no. 12 of January 30, 1941 (Judicial Organization), according to which «[t]he Public Prosecutor ensures compliance with the laws» and therefore, the intervener adds, «obviously, first and foremost, the Constitution».

From all this, the «qualified interest, directly and immediately inherent in the relationship subject to the proceedings», which, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Provisions for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, founds the standing to intervene, would be inferred to be vested in the Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit.

On the merits, the intervener considers the issues raised by the referring judge to be unfounded.

10.– The Association Comma2 - Lavoro è dignità and the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL) filed opinions as amici curiae pursuant to Article 6 of the Supplementary Provisions.

These opinions were admitted by Presidential Decree of September 19, 2025.

Grounds for Decision

1.– The Court of Audit, jurisdictional section for the Emilia-Romagna Region, in a single-judge composition, raises questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022, in reference to Article 53 of the Constitution, as well as «the principle of reasonableness and temporariness of exceptional measures».

2.– In the main proceedings, twenty-four «former members of the defense and security sector» requested the revaluation of their pension benefits according to the ordinary mechanism, currently set out in Article 1, paragraph 478, of Law of December 27, 2019, no. 160 (State budget forecast for the fiscal year 2020 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2020-2022), derogated by Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022.

The latter, in fact, provides, for the year 2023, a mechanism for "cooling" the revaluation dynamics of pension benefits, granting full automatic equalization only for pensions cumulatively equal to or less than four times the INPS minimum; for those exceeding this amount, the revaluation is granted in progressively decreasing percentages – between 85 and 32 percent – inversely proportional to the amount of the benefit.

3.– The referring judge is aware that this Court has already ruled on the challenged provision in Judgment no. 19 of 2025, which declared unfounded questions of constitutional legitimacy – raised by other regional jurisdictional sections of the Court of Audit – in reference essentially to the principles of proportionality and adequacy of pension benefits protected by Articles 3, 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

However, it believes that «other aspects of constitutional illegitimacy not examined» by this Court exist.

3.1.– In particular, the referring judge first notes a violation of Article 53 of the Constitution.

The challenged provision allegedly introduced a «compulsory levy», made to recover resources intended «for general financial purposes», without modifying the reciprocal relationships underlying the claimants' pensions, but merely affecting a particular «salary item».

Therefore, the requirements identified by constitutional jurisprudence for a fiscal nature to be configured would be met.

Such a levy would, however, have impacted «only a portion of the pensioners», excluding self-employed workers «who are not liberal professionals», whose pension benefits «are managed by the separate management body at INPS»: for the referring judge, the latter management body is not included in the scope of application of the provision under review.

In any case, «a discrimination» would have been introduced to the detriment of only «former employees, compared to current employees», given that the salaries of the latter were not subject, in the same tax periods, «to any additional tax levy», resulting in a violation of the principle of tax equality.

3.2.– With a second set of challenges, the referring judge complains of the violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Article 3 of the Constitution, due to the «illegitimate repetition» of measures that should instead be considered «exceptional».

The challenged provision, due to the "carrying over" of the effects it produces, would violate the principle expressed by this Court in Judgment no. 316 of 2010, which excluded the constitutional legitimacy of measures that cool the equalization dynamics when repeated over time.

4.– The inadmissibility of the intervention filed in these proceedings by the Prosecutor General of the Court of Audit must be reaffirmed here, for the reasons indicated in the order read at the hearing of October 21, 2025, attached to this judgment.

5.– INPS objects to the inadmissibility of the «second aspect of the challenge» – the one proposed «in reference to the principle of reasonableness and temporariness of exceptional measures» – because the issue was «already scrutinized and rejected by the Constitutional Court with Judgment no. 19 of 2025».

The objection is not worthy of acceptance.

According to constant constitutional jurisprudence, even «the re-submission of issues identical to those already declared unfounded on the merits does not lead to inadmissibility, but at most may result in their being declared unfounded, possibly manifestly so» (Judgment no. 168 of 2023; analogously, judgments no. 143 of 2023 and no. 186 of 2020).

6.– Before addressing the merits of the raised issues, it is necessary to precisely define the *thema decidendum*.

The referring judge, in articulating the first set of challenges, expressly invokes only Article 53 of the Constitution, but actually also raises the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, having denounced a «discrimination» among pensioners – by considering self-employed workers enrolled in the INPS separate management body excluded from the scope of application of the challenged provision – and between the latter and current workers.

The constitutional legitimacy question, in fact, must be scrutinized also with reference to constitutional parameters not formally invoked but unequivocally derivable from the referring order, if such act makes clear reference to them, even implicitly, by invoking the principles enunciated therein (Judgments no. 35 of 2021, no. 227 of 2010, and no. 170 of 2008).

Moreover, this Court has consistently held that Article 53 of the Constitution constitutes «a specific expression in fiscal matters of the more general principle of equality and reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution (ex plurimis, Judgments no. 149 of 2021, no. 142 of 2014, no. 116 of 2013, and no. 111 of 1997; Order no. 341 of 2000)» (Judgment no. 108 of 2023).

7.– Still as a preliminary matter, it is useful to recall that this Court has already ruled on Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022 in Judgment no. 19 of 2025, declaring unfounded questions of constitutional legitimacy raised in reference to Articles 1, first paragraph, 3, 4, second paragraph, 23, 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

On that occasion, the legislative interventions that have, over time, modified the annual revaluation mechanism for pensions were detailed (point 7 of the Grounds for Decision of the latter ruling).

It is appropriate, rather, to summarize the essential points of the reasoning articulated at that time, and therefore reiterate that:

a) automatic equalization is a technical instrument aimed at ensuring the adequacy of pension benefits over time in the face of inflationary pressures, while respecting the principles of sufficiency and proportionality of remuneration, which, however, do not imply a rigid parallelism between the guarantee under Article 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, and that under Article 36, first paragraph, of the Constitution;

b) the guarantee of equalization does not negate the discretion of the legislature in the concrete determination of the level of protection necessary from time to time, in light of the resources effectively available;

c) there is no constitutional imperative requiring the annual adjustment of all pension benefits, provided that the contrary choice passes a review of "non-unreasonableness," to be carried out in light of the economic and financial framework which the legislature must punctually account for;

d) the main indicator of the "non-unreasonableness" of legislative interventions in this area is the differentiated consideration of pension benefits based on their amount, given that higher pensions have broader margins of resistance to inflationary erosion.

Based on the above statements, the measure introduced by Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022 was considered not incompatible with the principles protected by the constitutional parameters invoked at the time. In fact, it «safeguards the full revaluation of lower pensions, the scope of which it even enlarges, including those with an amount equal to four times (and no longer three) the INPS minimum benefit. Furthermore, in ordering a "slowing" of the equalization dynamics for higher-amount benefits, it follows the technique of inverse progression relative to the amount of the benefits, without excluding any from revaluation», based on economic and financial justifications clearly emerging from the explanatory and technical reports that accompanied the 2023 budget bill, highlighting, in particular, the expenditure saving objectives pursued, projected even beyond the three-year horizon of the maneuver.

8.– That being stated, the issues are unfounded.

9.– Regarding the alleged violation of Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, constitutional jurisprudence has delineated specific indices for qualifying a situation as fiscal in nature: «a situation must be deemed fiscal in nature, regardless of the qualification offered by the legislator, when the following indispensable requirements are met: the legal provision must be directed, primarily, to procuring a definitive reduction in assets for the liable party, the reduction must not constitute a modification of a reciprocal relationship, and the resources, connected to an economically relevant prerequisite and derived from the said reduction, must be allocated to cover public expenses (ex plurimis, Judgments no. 182, no. 128, and no. 27 of 2022, no. 149 of 2021, no. 263 of 2020, no. 167 and no. 89 of 2018, no. 269 and no. 236 of 2017)» (most recently, Judgment no. 80 of 2024).

Indeed, precisely when scrutinizing legislative mechanisms for slowing down – compared to the ordinary regime – the equalization dynamics of pension benefits, often even more severe than the one under review, this Court has already declared unfounded issues analogous to the present ones, raised in reference to Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, excluding the fiscal nature of the examined situations.

This occurred, for example, with Judgment no. 250 of 2017, in reference to the mechanism provided for by paragraphs 25, letter e), and 25-bis, of Article 24 of Decree-Law of December 6, 2011, no. 201 (Urgent provisions on growth, equity, and consolidation of public accounts), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 22, 2011, no. 214, in the text resulting from the amendments made by Article 1, paragraph 1, numbers 1) and 2), of Decree-Law of May 21, 2015, no. 65 (Urgent provisions on pensions, social safety nets, and TFR guarantees), converted, with amendments, into Law of July 17, 2015, no. 109.

As can be inferred from point 6.4. of the Grounds for Decision of the latter ruling, in that instance, in response to the provision for the complete cancellation of the automatic revaluation of pension benefits exceeding six times the INPS minimum benefit, one of the referring judges had argued that the legislative measures (then suspected of constitutional illegitimacy in reference to, among others, the same current parameters), in addition to being «intended to cover public expenses» and «not to modify a reciprocal relationship», procured «a definitive reduction in assets for the liable party, given the "carrying over" effect» that characterized them.

This Court, recalling how Judgments no. 173 of 2016 and no. 70 of 2015 had already excluded the fiscal nature of the «measures blocking the automatic revaluation of pension benefits», held that the referring judge's arguments were not such as to induce it «to modify the orientation expressed in the two judgments mentioned».

It was sufficient to observe that «the "carrying over" effect inherent in the challenged blocking measures of equalization does not change their nature as mere expenditure-saving measures and not as a reduction of the liable party's assets».

The «non-fiscal nature of the equalization blocking measures» was thus reaffirmed, declaring unfounded the raised issues, which conversely presupposed such a nature.

Indeed, Judgment no. 70 of 2015, with respect to a measure of «cancellation of automatic revaluation for the years 2012 and 2013, relating to pension benefits exceeding three times the INPS minimum benefit», had already rejected similar challenges to those currently under review, denying that the legislative intervention constituted «a patrimonial measure of a fiscal nature, violating the principle of universality of taxation for equal contributory capacity, as it is imposed on only one category of taxpayers», and thus also excluding the violation of the principle of equality again raised by the present referring judge.

In recalling the indispensable elements of the fiscal situation, this Court, on that occasion, stated that «the cancellation of automatic equalization [...] escapes the canons of an imposed patrimonial measure, since it does not give rise to an imposed patrimonial measure realized through an authoritative act of an ablative nature, intended to raise resources for the treasury», if only because «the blocking of the revaluation mechanism [...] does not provide for a reduction or levy on the holder of a pension benefit». Consequently, it considered the «prerequisite for asserting the fiscal nature of the provision» to be entirely absent.

It then added that the legislative intervention determined exclusively «an expenditure saving», and not an increase in resources directly intended to finance public expenses.

Therefore, INPS and the State Attorney’s Office are not mistaken in emphasizing the two essential aspects characterizing the legal mechanism again subject to review today.

Firstly, it in no way affects the amount of pension already received, which is still increased, albeit by a lower percentage than the ordinary regime. Even more clearly than in the cited precedents, the first of the indispensable elements of the fiscal situation, namely the asset reduction to the detriment of the liable party, is therefore lacking.

Furthermore, Judgment no. 19 of 2025 already noted that the purpose of the challenged provision, based on the documents accompanying the parliamentary work for the approval of the 2023 budget law, is essentially to achieve «"economies in terms of lower pension expenditure” foreseen up to the year 2032 and amounting, gross of tax effects, to approximately 54 billion euros» and not to raise resources to directly finance other public expenses.

The exclusion, which must be reiterated here, of the fiscal nature of the situation reflects on the challenge concerning the violation of the principle of tax equality, leading to its being declared unfounded as well, regardless of the arguments used by the referring judge to support the contrary.

First of all, there is no unjustified disparity of treatment between categories of self-employed workers. It is sufficient to observe that Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022 refers to Article 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 448 of 1998, and the latter provides that the mechanism for revaluing pensions applies «for each individual beneficiary based on the total amount of benefits paid charged to the general mandatory insurance and the related management bodies for self-employed workers», a wording which is also capable of including self-employed workers enrolled in the so-called "separate management body".

Furthermore, still under the criterion of Article 3 of the Constitution, the situations of pensioners and active workers – the latter allegedly "spared" by the legislator – would in any case not be comparable, as completely different systems for adjusting the emoluments received to inflation dynamics are provided for.

In conclusion, the issues raised in reference to Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution must be declared unfounded, due to the erroneous premise – the fiscal nature of the scrutinized situation – upon which they rest.

10.– Turning to the second set of challenges, Judgment no. 19 of 2025 certainly recognized (point 12.3. of the Grounds for Decision) that «[t]he measure in question [...] constitutes the last link in a chain of analogous interventions that has seen little continuity over time», but also specified that it, «as conceived, complies with the parameters [then] invoked», including the one that safeguards the principles of reasonableness and necessary proportionality which form the basis of the present questions.

It further added that the statement found in Judgment no. 316 of 2010, according to which «the indefinite suspension of the equalization mechanism, or the frequent repetition of measures intended to paralyze it, would expose the system to evident tensions with the insurmountable principles of reasonableness and proportionality», does not preclude this conclusion.

10.1.– Judgment no. 19 of 2025 has already clarified, in response to a challenge similar to the present one, that it misses the mark, because «it collides with the factual data that the mechanism scrutinized herein does not involve "the effect of paralyzing, or indefinitely suspending, the revaluation of pension benefits, not even for the highest-value ones, but rather results in a mere cooling of the equalization dynamics, implemented with gradual and proportional indices”, as already noted by Judgment no. 234 of 2020, in relation to legislative provisions of a similar nature».

Also Judgment no. 19 of 2025, with specific regard to the "carrying over" effect – normally resulting from any limitation of indexation – recalled that constitutional jurisprudence has repeatedly «affirmed that "the principle of adequacy enunciated in Article 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution does not entail the constitutional necessity of the annual adjustment of all pension benefits, nor does the lack of equalization for a single year, in itself, affect the adequacy of the pension (Judgments no. 250 of 2017 and no. 316 of 2010)” (Judgment no. 234 of 2020)», so that «[a] fortiori the parameters invoked are respected when even the highest benefits benefit from a, albeit reduced, equalization».

10.2.– From another perspective, for the referring judge, the measures for "cooling" the equalization dynamics, being "exceptional" as they should be considered, have been transformed into "ordinary," again in conflict with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality which, precisely because of the "extraordinary" nature of the derogations from the ordinary discipline of automatic equalization, require the temporariness and transience of these measures and, ultimately, their non-repeatability over time.

However, the considerations expressed by Judgment no. 19 of 2025 do not in any way authorize the belief, held by the referring judge, that measures limiting equalization dynamics must be considered of an "exceptional" nature, with the corollary of "non-repeatability" that one would wish to derive from this premise.

As seen, on the contrary, only total paralysis – if repeated over time – or even indefinite suspension of the equalization mechanism could create friction with Articles 3 and 38 of the Constitution.

The principle of necessary temporariness of the invoked measures, moreover, was established in constitutional jurisprudence with reference to the very different institution of the so-called "solidarity contribution" imposed on higher pension benefits.

In particular, it is with respect to the "solidarity levy" on higher-amount benefits (points 16 to 18 of the Grounds for Decision concerning paragraphs 261 to 268 of Article 1 of Law no. 145 of December 30, 2018, establishing the "State budget forecast for the fiscal year 2019 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2019-2021") that Judgment no. 234 of 2020, in clarifying the scope of the preceding Judgment no. 173 of 2016, affirmed the aforementioned principle, observing that the temporal dimension of the reduction – at the time set by the legislature at five years – appeared «obstructive to an evaluation of constitutional legitimacy», betraying «a logic of stability of the contribution, even outside a project of organic reform», whereas only a comprehensive rethinking of the pension system could justify «measures tending to be permanent, or in any case of long duration».

Instead, in the part of the reasoning of the same judgment where a mechanism for "cooling" the equalization dynamics analogous to the one currently challenged was scrutinized (point 15.4.2 of the Grounds for Decision, concerning Article 1, paragraph 260, of the same Law no. 145 of 2018), this Court held that «[o]ne cannot assume, in itself, a sort of "consumption" of legislative power due to the execution of one or more interventions reducing equalization, but the new further intervention is legitimate where it proves compliant with the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and adequacy, based on a judgment not limited only to the aspect of repetition, but inclusive of all relevant elements».

And this Court, with Judgment no. 19 of 2025, has already carried out the aforementioned conformity judgment with positive results in relation to Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022.

11.– It is appropriate, however, to reiterate here the invitation previously addressed by this Court to the legislature, to ensure in the future that: (a) account is taken of the effects produced by the provision under review when regulating «the scope of any subsequent measures affecting the indexation of pension benefits» and (b) the ordinary regime currently set out in Article 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of 2019 is affected «with extreme caution by sudden changes, negatively impacting household spending behaviors» (Judgment no. 19 of 2025), as well as (c) a differently calibrated approach is adopted with respect to pensioners subject to the contributory system, the latter characterized by the «tendential correspondence between financial provision (the so-called *montant*) and the amount of the pension benefit paid» (Judgment no. 94 of 2025).

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 309, of Law of December 29, 2022, no. 197 (State budget forecast for the fiscal year 2023 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2023-2025), raised, in reference to Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, by the Court of Audit, jurisdictional section for the Emilia-Romagna Region, in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the heading.

Decided thus in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 21, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on November 13, 2025

 

Attachment:

Order read at the hearing of October 21, 2025