JUDGMENT NO. 60

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutionality of Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of June 18, 2025 (Provisions regarding the protection of workers in public procurement contracts under regional jurisdiction. Amendments to Regional Law no. 18/2019), brought by the President of the Council of Ministers, by means of an appeal notified on August 13, 2025, filed with the registry on the same date, entered as no. 32 in the 2025 appeal register, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 39, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having considered the statement of appearance of the Tuscany Region;

having heard the Judge Rapporteur Stefano Petitti at the public hearing of March 10, 2026;

having heard State Attorneys Marco Corsini and Emanuele Manzo for the President of the Council of Ministers, and Marcello Cecchetti for the Tuscany Region;

having deliberated in the chambers on March 10, 2026.

Legal Findings of Fact

1.– By an appeal notified on August 13, 2025, and filed on the same date, entered as no. 32 of the 2025 appeal register, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, challenged the constitutionality of Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of June 18, 2025 (Provisions regarding the protection of workers in public procurement contracts under regional jurisdiction. Amendments to Regional Law no. 18/2019), for violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution.

1.1.– The appellant states that Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025, entitled "Protection of workers in public procurement contracts under regional jurisdiction. Insertion of article 6.1 into Regional Law no. 18/2019,” with the intent declared in the preamble to counter the phenomenon of "contractual dumping,” amends Article 6 of the previous Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of April 16, 2019 (Provisions for the quality of work and the valorization of good enterprise in works, supply, and service contracts. Organizational provisions regarding procurement procedures. Amendments to Regional Law no. 38/2007), by introducing the following Article 6.1: "1. Tender notices for public procurement procedures in which the Tuscany Region, its entities, and instrumental bodies, including local health authorities and in-house companies, are contracting authorities or granting entities, with particular regard to labor-intensive contracts based on the most economically advantageous tender award criterion, shall provide as a qualitative award criterion the application of a minimum hourly wage treatment of not less than nine gross euros.”

1.2.– In a single ground of appeal, the appellant alleges the violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution based on multiple profiles.

1.2.1.– Regarding the first profile, the appellant maintains that, although the regulation of public contracts does not relate to a single material domain, according to the consistent orientation of constitutional jurisprudence, both the protection of competition "in the market” and the promotion of competition "for the market,” in compliance with the EU principles of free movement of goods, freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, transparency, and equal treatment, fall within the exclusive legislative competence referred to in Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 4 of 2022 and the precedents indicated therein).

In the opinion of the State Attorney’s Office, the regulation of tender procedures, the qualification and selection of competitors, award procedures, and, as far as relevant here, award criteria (reference is again made to this Court’s judgment no. 4 of 2022 and related precedents), are attributable to the concept of competition "for the market,” aimed at the widest possible opening of the market to all economic operators, due to the need to protect and promote competition uniformly throughout the national territory, also in light of the principle of impartiality under Article 97 of the Constitution.

According to the appellant, the requirements for uniformity underlying the regulation of public contracts are confirmed by the classification of the relevant code, in its entirety, as an economic-social reform implementing the obligations deriving from Italy’s participation in the European Union, and is therefore binding even on the primary competence of regions with special statutes and autonomous provinces (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 45 of 2010, affirmed by subsequent judgments no. 166 of 2019, no. 263 of 2016, no. 36 of 2013, no. 74 of 2012, no. 328, no. 184 and no. 114 of 2011, and no. 221 of 2010).

In this perspective, differing regional regulations and related regulatory disparities would themselves generate territorial barriers distorting competition (reference is made to this Court’s judgments no. 174 of 2024 and no. 283 of 2009), to the extent that the regional legislative competence is precluded from introducing even pro-competitive norms (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 23 of 2022).

1.2.2.– Regarding the second profile, in the appellant’s view, the Tuscan legislature intervened "pending the approval of adequate national legislation in this field,” as stated in the preamble to the regional law. Intervention by way of "inverted ceding” (cedevolezza), however, would only be permitted in matters of concurrent legislative competence (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 1 of 2009). Recently, this Court reiterated, specifically regarding a Tuscany Regional law on maritime state concessions, that the regional legislature cannot intervene in a sphere that does not pertain to it, even in the face of alleged inaction by the state legislature (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 89 of 2025).

In any case, according to the State Attorney’s Office, the state legislature is by no means "absent or distracted,” as Legislative Decree no. 36 of March 31, 2023 (Public Procurement Code implementing Article 1 of Law no. 78 of June 21, 2022), like all codes that preceded it, contains comprehensive regulation of the award criteria for works, services, and supplies contracts, which addresses extensively and "in a closed manner” the protection of minimum wage levels from the design phase onwards. The appellant cites Article 41, paragraph 13, of the Public Procurement Code, on project preparation, Article 102, regarding the competitor’s commitment declarations, and Articles 109 and 110, relating to the evaluation of the tender. Compared to this framework, the award criterion introduced by the Tuscan legislature appears "entirely asystematic.” Furthermore, regarding award criteria, this Court has clarified that the possibility of introducing them, even on a transitional basis, is reserved to the State, which is responsible for defining the point of equilibrium between the protection of competition and other public interests interfering with it, including the pursuit of objectives of social policy, protection of workers, and support for income and enterprises (reference is made again to judgment no. 4 of 2022).

1.2.3.– Regarding the third profile, the appellant criticizes the fact that Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 operates "an ex ante crystallization” of the assessment regarding the adoption of the award criterion, binding on contracting authorities, whereas Article 108, paragraph 7, of the Public Procurement Code leaves to the discretion of contracting authorities the choice of such criteria based on a concrete assessment in light of the subject matter, type of contract, and nature of the award. The guarantee of effective competitive bidding, in fact, requires the autonomy of contracting authorities in evaluating the best tender on a case-by-case basis (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 174 of 2024).

1.2.4.– Regarding the fourth profile, the State Attorney General’s Office complains that the award criterion would prejudice the principle of separation between the technical and economic offers, as it is forbidden to include economic-quantitative elements in the technical-qualitative offer documentation. Even the mere possibility of knowing the amount of the economic offer before the technical one could compromise the impartiality of the evaluation (reference is made to Council of State, fifth section, judgments no. 2005 of March 1, 2024, and no. 612 of January 24, 2019).

1.2.5.– Finally, the appellant notes that the needs to counter contractual dumping and to guarantee an adequate wage level, which the regional legislature intends to address, are already considered by Article 11 of the Public Procurement Code, which introduced the obligation for contracting authorities to indicate in tender documents the "lead” national collective labor agreement (CCNL) for the sector. The provision provides, in paragraph 3, the possibility for the economic operator to opt for a different collective agreement, provided it guarantees employees the same protections as the one indicated by the contracting authority or the granting entity.

Lastly, the state legislature intervened with Legislative Decree no. 209 of December 31, 2024 (Integrative and corrective provisions to the Public Procurement Code), which introduced a new Annex I.01 to the code, aimed at guiding contracting authorities in the selection of the CCNL to be indicated in tender documents and in the evaluation of the equivalence of the different CCNL declared by the bidder. Such evaluation should be based primarily, pursuant to Articles 2 and 4 of the same Annex, on compliance with the minimum "economic value” of the total fixed components of the global remuneration, analytically identified by law, as resulting from the application of the CCNL indicated by the contracting authority. Based on this framework, according to the appellant, the tender discount could never be obtained to the detriment of workers through the application of a CCNL which, being inconsistent with the work, entails lower economic and regulatory protections.

Even more stringent limits are provided for subcontracting, pursuant to Article 119, paragraph 12, of the Public Procurement Code, with the obligation for the subcontractor to grant workers economic and regulatory treatment not inferior to that guaranteed by the main contractor and to apply the same CCNL when the subcontracting activities coincide with those characterizing the object of the contract.

Such "social clauses of minimum treatment” would find their foundation in the objective of ensuring a minimum standard of social protection based on the principle of the best realization of the public interest (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 226 of 1998).

Therefore, in the appellant’s view, the state legislature has already defined "a uniform system of non-negotiable protections” for workers employed in public contracts, striking a balance between the freedom of enterprise and the protection of working conditions with a view to a full and uniform application of pro-competitive rules regarding the choice of the contractor, which fall within the exclusive legislative competence of the State. The introduction of a new award criterion at the regional level, on the other hand, would produce direct effects on the outcome of tenders and would indirectly influence the choice of economic operators to participate, impacting competition "for the market.” This Court should, therefore, according to the Attorney’s Office, confirm the established principle that the possibility of introducing award criteria is reserved to the State, which is responsible for defining the point of equilibrium between competing interests (reference is made to this Court’s judgments no. 4 of 2022, no. 56 of 2020, and no. 30 of 2016).

2.– By a document filed on September 19, 2025, the Tuscany Region entered an appearance in the proceedings, through the President of the Regional Executive, requesting that the challenges be declared unfounded.

2.1.– The regional defense premises that Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 is aimed at promoting the quality and safety of work and at pursuing occupational stability in public procurement and concession contracts executed in the regional territory, placing itself in line with the previous Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of 2019.

2.2.– According to the respondent Region, Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 is an expression of regional legislative powers—both concurrent and residual—in the matter of labor protection (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 219 of 2005) and social services and policies (reference is made to this Court’s judgments no. 91 of 2020, no. 124 of 2009, and no. 50 of 2008).

2.2.1.– The Region maintains, first of all, that it did not intervene in the methods of award, selection of contractors, or award criteria—namely the most economically advantageous tender criterion or the best price criterion—which remain governed by Legislative Decree no. 36 of 2023, in compliance with the requirements of uniformity repeatedly recalled by constitutional jurisprudence.

2.2.2.– Furthermore, the award criterion introduced with Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 would operate only in tenders of the Region and entities dependent on or instrumental to it—i.e., all entities forming part of the consolidated regional budget—and would configure an incremental and enabling protection regarding the wage threshold provided for workers employed in labor-intensive contracts. Thus, the provisions cited by the appellant regarding the non-derogability of minimum wages, as defined by collective agreements and ministerial tables referred to in Article 41, paragraph 13, of the Public Procurement Code, are irrelevant.

2.2.3.– In the Region’s opinion, in any case, the limit deriving from exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection would not exclude regional intervention in areas expressing a related competence; such intervention would be precluded only when it ends up influencing the methods of selecting the contractor (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 161 of 2020). From this perspective, the incremental protection provided for by the challenged provision would not have distortive effects on competition. Unlike the Piedmontese law subject of this Court’s judgment no. 4 of 2022, the challenged criterion would not introduce any requirement of "territoriality” of the employed personnel and would not pose any "barrier to entry” to the micro-market constituted by the single tender, not preventing the economic operator from submitting an application, nor conditioning its participation on burdens that would make it incongruously difficult or even impossible. The criterion provided by the Tuscan legislature, in fact, of a qualitative and non-discriminatory nature, would operate indiscriminately for all companies, ultimately leaving it to the free choice of the economic operator whether or not to adhere to the incremental protection for the purposes of the award, and without prejudice to the possibility of access to the tender.

2.2.4.– Regarding the discretion of contracting authorities, the challenged award criterion would operate only in awards adjudicated according to the most economically advantageous tender criterion where the labor component represents the majority, if not almost exclusive, part of the performance—such as cleaning, security, and surveillance services—and always on condition that the ministerial tables show a wage lower than nine euros per hour. Furthermore, the discretion of the contracting authority in the weighting, to be defined for each single tender in relation to the nature, object, and characteristics of the contract, would remain intact. Therefore, the appellant’s reference to this Court’s judgment no. 174 of 2024, relating to a regional provision that imposed a minimum non-derogable score for the technical tender, in which the autonomy of the contracting authority was harmed precisely by the impossibility of a different weighting, is irrelevant.

2.2.5.– Regarding the feared violation of the principle of separation between the technical and economic tender, the regional defense argues that the criterion of the minimum hourly wage treatment of not less than nine gross euros is qualitative and would not encroach upon the economic tender, configuring itself as a so-called "on/off” criterion, fulfilled solely by the expression of will of the tender participant, without the need for supporting documentation, nor for the disclosure of the economic contents of the offer. According to established principles in administrative jurisprudence, moreover, the indication in the technical tender of some economic elements connected to qualitative data would be admitted, provided that they do not allow for the reconstruction of the overall economic tender (reference is made to Council of State, fifth section, judgments no. 919 of February 6, 2025, and no. 8011 of September 15, 2022; third section, judgment no. 167 of January 9, 2020).

2.2.6.– Finally, according to the regional defense, the so-called inverted ceding (cedevolezza) evoked by the appellant would not be in play, as the regional legislature acted in areas of its own competence. Constitutional jurisprudence, in any case, would have admitted inverted ceding in disciplines where state and regional competences intersect, so that regions could provisionally regulate the matter, awaiting state intervention (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 1 of 2019); similarly, regional laws implementing a directive in environmental matters, not implemented by the state legislature, have not been declared constitutionally illegitimate (reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 398 of 2006).

3.– On October 13, 2025, the General Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL) filed a written opinion as amicus curiae, admitted by presidential decree on January 23, 2026.

The CGIL believes that the controversial regional provision is not constitutionally illegitimate as, according to established EU and administrative jurisprudence, contracting authorities could discretionally introduce award criteria additional to those set by law, provided they do not contravene EU and national principles and are consistent with the object of the contract, proportionate, reasonable, and transparent. The award criterion relating to the wage threshold, moreover, would not introduce any territorial discrimination and would not alter the conditions of access to the tender. Given that the matter of competition would be reserved to the State by Article 117 of the Constitution by reason of the reservation to the Union made by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Tuscan regulation, not being harmful to EU competition, would not conflict even with state legislation (reference is made to the Court of Justice of the European Union, fourth section, judgment of November 17, 2015, case C-115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG and the conclusions of Advocate General Biondi of July 3, 2025, case C-210/24, AESTE).

4.– The Tuscany Region filed a memorandum on February 16, 2026.

The regional defense, in reiterating the arguments already used in support of the non-unfoundedness, insists on the non-territorially discriminatory value of the introduced award criterion, and therefore on its compatibility with EU discipline.

5.– On February 17, 2026, the State Attorney General also filed a memorandum.

In replying to the deductions of the regional defense and the arguments of the amicus curiae, the state defense refers to this Court’s judgment no. 188 of 2025, relating to a law of the Puglia Region, which, despite the difference in object and parameters, would confirm the traceability of the discipline of public awards to the matter of competition protection. Therefore, the non-geographically discriminatory character of the Tuscan award criterion would be irrelevant, being at the root decisive the reservation of such criteria to exclusive state legislative competence.

Regarding EU jurisprudence, the appellant notes that it has expressed itself in a sense sometimes favorable and sometimes unfavorable to national provisions entailing a minimum wage, but always within the framework of a proportionality judgment aimed at verifying the incidence of measures on the freedom to provide services, thereby confirming their traceability to the protection of competition (reference is made to the judgments RegioPost, as well as CJEU, ninth section, September 18, 2014, case C-549/13, Bundesdruckerei GmbH, and second section, April 3, 2008, case C-346/06, Ruffert).

The same jurisprudence, having as its object the respect of EU principles by social clauses, would say nothing regarding the internal distribution of legislative competence, as confirmed by the recent ruling relating to the minimum wage directive, which would have reiterated the prerogatives of the States in the adoption of a legal, negotiated, or mixed model for the guarantee of adequate wages (reference is made to CJEU, grand chamber, judgment of November 11, 2025, case C-19/23, Kingdom of Denmark v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union).

Legal Reasoning

6.– With the appeal entered as no. 32 of the 2025 appeal register, the President of the Council of Ministers challenged, for violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution, Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025, which amends Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of 2019 by introducing Article 6.1, according to which: "1. Tender notices for public procurement procedures in which the Tuscany Region, its entities, and instrumental bodies, including local health authorities and in-house companies, are contracting authorities or granting entities, with particular regard to labor-intensive contracts based on the most economically advantageous tender award criterion, shall provide as a qualitative award criterion the application of a minimum hourly wage treatment of not less than nine gross euros.”

6.1.– The appellant deduces four profiles of constitutional illegitimacy: a) the regional provision, by introducing an award criterion in public tender procedures called by the Region and its instrumental bodies, should be traced back to the concept of competition "for the market,” the discipline of which pertains to the exclusive legislative competence of the State; b) there would be no regulatory vacuum that justifies the challenged provision, given that the current public procurement code provides for numerous institutions for the protection of workers’ wages, with no space remaining for the introduction, at the regional level, of a criterion entirely asystematic compared to the provisions of the code; c) the fixing of a criterion ex lege would prejudice the discretion of contracting authorities in the selection of award criteria, in conflict with what is provided by Article 108, paragraph 7, of the Public Procurement Code; d) the award criterion, being textually qualified as qualitative, would determine a lesion of the principle of separation between technical tender and economic tender for its suitability to reveal the economic value of the tender itself, especially in labor-intensive contracts, in which the cost of labor is a preponderant component.

6.2.– The Tuscany Region, in its defensive documents, maintains that the award criterion should be traced back to regional legislative competences, respectively concurrent and residual, in the matter of labor protection and social services and policies. In the sector of public contracts, in fact, the exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection could not be considered so absorbing as to exclude every regional intervention. The award criterion, in any case, would not conflict with the provisions of the public procurement code relating to the non-derogability of minimum wages, but would introduce an additional, optional, and supplementary protection, which would not preclude access to the tender, but would operate only in the tender evaluation phase. The criterion, furthermore, would not have a discriminatory character, applying in an equal manner to all market operators. There would be no lesion of the autonomy of contracting authorities, applying the criterion only to labor-intensive contracts and not affecting the discretion in weighting. Still, the operation of the criterion would require a mere declaration of the bidder regarding its application, without supporting documentation. The prohibition of commingling between technical tender and economic tender, in any case, should not be understood in an absolute manner, being admitted in some cases the exposure of economic values in the technical tender. Erroneously, finally, the appellant would have made reference to inverted ceding, since the Region would have regulated areas of its own competence; an intervention on a provisional basis would, in any case, be allowed in the case in which, as in the present instance, state and regional competences intersect, pending the intervention of the State.

7.– It is appropriate to premise a framing of the challenged provision.

Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 introduces the obligation to insert into the tenders of the Region and its instrumental entities a qualitative award criterion consisting of the application of a minimum hourly wage treatment of not less than nine gross euros to workers employed in the public contract or concession. Being an award criterion, it does not directly delimit the requirements for access to the tender, but operates in the phase of tender evaluation.

As emerges from the preamble of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025, the provision has the purpose of promoting the quality and safety of work, countering contractual dumping in public procurement or concession contracts executed in the regional territory, and favoring occupational stability. To these ends, the Tuscan legislature intended to adopt measures suitable for ensuring an adequate and current wage level to workers employed by the successful bidder.

Regarding the objective scope of application, from the literal data it is not entirely clear, as the State Attorney’s Office objects in the memorandum filed in view of the public hearing, whether the award criterion finds application in all contracts, and among them also in labor-intensive contracts, or only in the latter, the expression "with particular regard” contained in the challenged provision being able to be understood in both meanings.

7.1.– It is also worth remembering that, as highlighted by the state defense, this Court has recently dealt with the appeals proposed by the President of the Council of Ministers against two laws of the Puglia Region, which configured the recognition of a minimum economic treatment of not less than nine euros an hour as a criterion for the selection of the national collective agreement applicable in tenders started by the Region and its instrumental bodies. In declaring both appeals inadmissible, with which the violation of Articles 36, 39, last paragraph, and 117, second paragraph, letters l) and m), of the Constitution was denounced, this Court had, however, warned that every evaluation of merit remained unprejudiced regarding the profiles relating to the distribution of competences between State and regions in the matter of competition protection as well as to the profiles of state competence in the matter of civil law not deduced in the appeals object of scrutiny (judgment no. 188 of 2025).

8.– Precisely for the violation of the exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection, the first censure raised by the President of the Council of Ministers with reference to Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution is well-founded (supra, point 6.1., sub a).

8.1.– According to the constant jurisprudence of this Court, "the concept of ‘competition’ referred to in the second paragraph, letter e), of Article 117 of the Constitution ‘cannot but reflect that operating in the European sphere’ (judgments no. 83 of 2018, no. 291 and no. 200 of 2012, no. 45 of 2010). It therefore includes both the legislative measures of protection in the proper sense, intended to counter the acts and behaviors of enterprises that negatively affect the competitive structure of markets, and the legislative measures of promotion, aimed at eliminating limits and constraints on the free exercise of entrepreneurial capacity and competition between enterprises (competition ‘in the market’), or to prefigure competitive guarantee procedures that ensure the widest opening of the market to all economic operators (competition ‘for the market’)” (judgments no. 44 of 2023, no. 4 of 2022, and no. 137 of 2018). In this second meaning, through the protection of competition, aims of expanding the area of free choice of citizens and enterprises are pursued, the latter also as users, in turn, of goods and services (again, judgments no. 4 of 2022, no. 137 of 2018, and no. 299 of 2012).

8.2.– On the internal level of the distribution of legislative competence, it also constitutes a consolidated affirmation that the protection of competition has a transversal nature, not presenting certain boundaries (judgments no. 401 of 2007 and no. 14 of 2004). It deserves to clarify, however, that it is not a passe-partout capable of justifying the indiscriminate attraction of every legislative intervention to the exclusive state competence and the aprioristic exclusion of any regional intervention. If it were not so, its very transversal matrix would vanish, ending up consuming regional competences, moreover in an unnamed series of material domains. Since the first jurisprudence following the revision of Title V of the second part of the Constitution, on the other hand, this Court had warned that "a maximum dilation of such competence, which does not present the characters of a matter of certain extension, but those of a function exercisable on the most diverse objects, would risk frustrating the distribution scheme of Article 117 of the Constitution, which sees attributed to the residual and concurrent legislative power of the Regions matters whose discipline undeniably affects economic development” (judgment no. 14 of 2004).

8.2.1.– The exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection, therefore, is not necessarily exclusive of regional legislative competences and must be measured, in its reach and its objectives, in relation to the material sectors in which it manifests itself.

In relation to the discipline of private hire vehicles, for example, this Court recognized that the regional competence in the matter of local public transport can intersect with disciplines aimed at the pursuit of competitive aims, susceptible to being attracted by the exclusive legislative competence of the State, of a purposive and transversal nature, within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality in the pursuit of the aim that delimits its own perimeter (lastly, judgment no. 163 of 2025; among the many, judgment no. 206 of 2024).

According to an analogous scheme, this Court has repeatedly affirmed that the discipline concerning concessions on state-owned assets invests different material domains, some of which pertain to regional legislative competences. The reference to the protection of competition, therefore, cannot be considered so pervasive as to prevent regions from having any space for intervention expressing a related competence, provided that the regional regulation does not influence the methods of choosing the contractor and does not affect the competitive structure of markets in such terms as to restrict the free exercise of entrepreneurial initiatives (lastly, judgment no. 89 of 2025).

8.2.2.– In the specific sector of public contracts, however, the intersection between state and regional legislative competences assumes a peculiar structure. This Court has long affirmed that the discipline of the contractual activity of the public administration does not identify a defined material domain, due to the multiplicity of pursued interests and implicated objects. It is not definable, as regards the distribution of legislative competence, based on the territorial dimension of the interest, not configuring a matter relating to national public contracting, nor a material domain pertaining to contracts of regional or local interest. Not even the subjective profile is relevant, not being able to distinguish tender procedures called by state administrations from those put into being by regional or sub-regional administrations. The perimeterization of the material spheres of competence, in fact, cannot be determined having regard exclusively to the nature of the subject who calls the tender or to whom that particular good or service is referable (judgment no. 401 of 2007).

8.2.3.– The domain of public contracts, in effect, manifests in a more intense manner the need for uniformity of discipline, which this Court has traced back above all to the concept of competition "for the market,” as it is a reflection of that operating at the EU level and aimed at allowing the full opening of the market and the free exercise of entrepreneurial capacity and competition between enterprises.

For these reasons, it constitutes a constant affirmation in constitutional jurisprudence that the discipline of tender procedures, the regulation of the qualification and selection of competitors, of award procedures, and of award criteria are attributable to the matter of the protection of competition of exclusive state legislative competence, as they aim to ensure that they take place in compliance with competitive rules and EU principles of free movement of goods, freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, as well as the constitutional principles of transparency and equal treatment (judgment no. 4 of 2022), which translate and accompany the principles of good performance and impartiality of administrative action presided over by Article 97 of the Constitution (again, judgment no. 401 of 2007).

In the specific domain of public contracting, therefore, uniformity represents, as such, a criterion to be observed, because different regional regulations are susceptible to creating regulatory disparities, productive of territorial barriers (judgments no. 80 of 2025, no. 174 of 2024 and no. 23 of 2022, all with reference to judgment no. 283 of 2009).

8.2.4.– The discipline of public contracts, on the other hand, as said, intersects multiple interests and there is no doubt that it is suitable for pursuing also objectives of social protection, worker protection, environmental sustainability, according to the so-called "strategic” use of public contracts. The same sectoral EU directives foresee it, since 2004 and in a more intense manner since 2014. Also the Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of October 19, 2022, relating to adequate minimum wages in the European Union, recognizes the fundamental role of public contracts for the effective implementation of minimum wage protection, be it provided by law or by collective bargaining (recital no. 31 and Article 9, entitled "Public procurement”).

The "strategic” use of public contracts was reflected in the internal legislation of transposition of sectoral directives (judgments no. 188 of 2025 and no. 4 of 2022). The legislator himself in the current code (Legislative Decree no. 36 of 2023) in Article 1 (Principle of the result) intended to valorize the functional and instrumental nature of competition not as such, but as a means for the attainment of the best result, in compliance with the principles of legality and transparency (Council of State, explanatory report to the definitive draft of the Code, December 7, 2022).

In this regard, this Court has clarified that, in the face of the plurality of interests, also of constitutional rank, implicated in public contracts, it is for the state legislator, in the exercise of its competence ex Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution, to define the point of equilibrium between the protection of competition and the protection of other public interests interfering with it, "as those underlying the achievement of objectives of social policy […], of worker protection, of income support and support for enterprises” (judgments no. 80 of 2025 and no. 4 of 2022; in the same sense, judgments no. 56 of 2020 and no. 30 of 2016, regarding the free exercise of transport activity).

8.3.– Coming to the challenged provision, Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 introduces a qualitative award criterion that pertains to the evaluation of tenders. It is suitable, therefore, to produce direct effects on the outcome of tenders and, indirectly, on the choice of economic operators regarding their participation in them, impacting in this way on competition in the market. From the introduction of said award criteria, in fact, consequences can derive on the lesser or greater possibility of access of enterprises to the regional market of public contracts (judgment no. 4 of 2022; in relation to award criterion, also judgment no. 259 of 2013, regarding the attribution of preferential positions in the awarding of contracts with the region and instrumental entities to enterprises victims of mafia crimes and organized crime).

The introduction of an award criterion such as the one object of scrutiny, therefore, impacts on the competitive structure, determining a potential restriction of the market in territorially identified domains, with consequent violation of the exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection (judgment no. 89 of 2025).

9.– Also with regard to the second profile of violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution deduced in the appeal (supra, point 6.1., sub b), the question is well-founded.

9.1.– As already ascertained, the regional legislator intervened in a domain reserved to exclusive state legislative competence.

Moreover, differently from what the regional defense observes, there does not exist even a regulatory vacuum in state legislation. In the public procurement code of which to Legislative Decree no. 36 of 2023, the protection of workers operates at multiple levels, in part confirming institutions already present in the previous code, in part innovating them with a view to greater worker protection.

9.2.– Regarding the costs of labor, for works, services, and supply contracts since the design phase the average cost of labor is determined annually, in specific tables, by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies on the basis of economic values defined by national collective bargaining between trade union organizations and employer organizations comparatively most representative, taking into account the dimension or legal nature of enterprises, norms in the matter of social security and assistance, the different commodity sectors, and the different territorial areas (Article 41, paragraph 13, Public Procurement Code). For works and services contracts, contracting authorities and granting entities are required to identify in tender documents the costs of labor on the basis of the recalled ministerial tables. The costs of labor are separated from the amount subjected to the discount, firm the possibility for the economic operator to demonstrate that the overall discount derives from a more efficient corporate organization (Article 41, paragraph 14, Public Procurement Code).

The identification of the cost of labor for the purposes of public contracts, therefore, is entrusted to a periodic survey operated by the state administration in a uniform manner for the whole national territory, taking into account the indicated factors (dimensional criterion and legal nature of enterprises, social security and assistance disciplines, commodity sectors, and differences between territorial areas).

Regarding the procedural steps, the declaration obligations of labor costs in the economic tender and the related automatic exclusion (Article 108, paragraph 9, Public Procurement Code) respond "to the requirement pursued by the new public procurement code to strengthen the tools for worker protection, to make economic operators responsible, and to make the tools of surveillance and control more easy and effective, allowing the contracting authority to verify with transparency and ex ante, on the basis of the costs declared in the same tender, how the operators have arrived at formulating the price, avoiding in such way a prejudice to the protection of work” (judgment no. 80 of 2025).

The declared costs constitute one of the specific elements of evaluation of the anomaly of the tender (Article 110, paragraph 1, Public Procurement Code), with the proviso that justifications are not admitted in relation to non-derogable minimum wage treatments established by law or by sources authorized by law (Article 110, paragraph 4, letter a) and that the tender is excluded if the cost of personnel is lower than the minimum wage minima indicated in the ministerial tables (Article 110, paragraph 5, letter d).

9.3.– To the discipline on labor costs, the code joins the new institution of the incorporation of the "leader” CCNL in tender acts, provided among the general principles in Article 11 (Principle of application of national collective labor agreements of the sector. Contribution failures and delay in payments) Public Procurement Code, in implementation of the principle and directive criterion of Article 1, paragraph 2, letter h), of Law no. 78 of June 21, 2022 (Delegation to the Government in the matter of public contracts), which lists it among the so-called social clauses (judgment no. 188 of 2025).

Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, Public Procurement Code provides the obligation for contracting authorities and granting entities to indicate in the initial tender documents and in the decision to contract the national and territorial collective agreement in force for the sector and for the zone in which the work services are executed, stipulated by the employer and worker associations comparatively most representative at the national level and the one whose scope of application is strictly connected with the activity object of the contract or concession performed by the enterprise also in a prevalent manner. The subsequent paragraph 3 provides that the economic operator has the possibility to declare in its tender the different collective agreement applied, "provided it guarantees to employees the same protections of the one indicated by the contracting authority or by the granting entity.” Paragraph 4 of the same Article 11 establishes the connected procedural fulfillments and identifies the control powers of contracting authorities and granting entities, while paragraph 5 extends the same regulatory and economic protections to workers in subcontracting, as foreseen also by Article 119, paragraphs 7 and 12, Public Procurement Code.

Article 11 Public Procurement Code was amended by Article 2, paragraph 1, letters a) to d), of Legislative Decree no. 209 of 2024, whose Article 73 introduced a specific Annex I.01. The Annex resumes and consolidates the criteria for the choice of the applicable CCNL and the regulatory and economic parameters for the judgment of equivalence already elaborated by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) (explanatory report to standard tender no. 1 of 2023, bearing "Open procedure for the award of public service and supply contracts in ordinary sectors of amount higher than European thresholds with the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender on the basis of the best quality/price ratio,” where it is affirmed that the evaluation of equivalence "must necessarily have as its object both economic and regulatory protections as an indivisible complex”).

9.3.1.– Article 11 Public Procurement Code marks a turning point with respect to the previous discipline, in the validity of which administrative jurisprudence had excluded that contracting authorities could impose a determined collective agreement in tender acts, believing such choice included in the power of organization of the economic operator, with eventual control displaced on the level of the verification of the reliability of the tender (Council of State, fifth section, judgment no. 6770 of July 26, 2024, which distinguishes the current discipline from the previous one, dictated by Article 30, paragraph 4, of Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016, bearing "Public Procurement Code”).

9.3.2.– The new institution of the incorporation of the "leader” contract directly into the tender acts, firm the possibility of the bidder to apply a contract with equivalent protections, expresses a clear anti-dumping function (judgments no. 188 and no. 156 of 2025; in this sense, also the already cited explanatory report to the definitive draft of the code of the Council of State). The incorporation of the CCNL does not directly guarantee a minimum wage, but, through the technique of the referral to the qualified collective source, wants to ensure that the competition between enterprises does not happen at the expense of labor protections.

9.3.3.– Article 11, as well as Article 41 Public Procurement Code, has been qualified as an imperative non-derogable norm (Council of State, fifth section, judgment no. 2605 of March 28, 2025) and the correlated commitment declarations, also pursuant to Article 57 Public Procurement Code, are considered a necessary requirement of the tender (Council of State, fifth section, judgment no. 9510 of December 3, 2025, and fourth section, judgment no. 9484 of December 2, 2025). The regulatory and economic protections of the "leader” CCNL constitute in this way a non-derogable minimum limit subtracted from the competitive strategies of enterprises.

9.3.4.– This Court has already pronounced itself on provisions that use the technique of the referral to the qualified collective source for the guarantee of workers (judgment no. 226 of 1998, in the matter of public service concessions and in relation to Article 36 of Law no. 300 of May 20, 1970, bearing "Norms on the protection of the freedom and dignity of workers, of trade union freedom and of trade union activity, in workplaces and norms on placement”; judgment no. 51 of 2015, on the working member of a cooperative, which excluded a violation of Article 39 of the Constitution).

Article 11, paragraphs 1 to 4, Public Procurement Code belongs to the same normative orientation. The state legislator intended to introduce also into the discipline of public contracts an instrument that tends to verify the principles of proportionality and sufficiency of the remuneration of Article 36, first paragraph, of the Constitution, configuring a limit to the freedom of private economic initiative, so that it does not take place in contrast with social utility, as provided by Article 41, second paragraph, of the Constitution (in this sense, already the explanatory report to the definitive draft of the code of the Council of State).

The model of the referral to qualified bargaining, moreover, resumed in the recent Law no. 144 of September 26, 2025 (Delegations to the Government in the matter of worker remuneration and collective bargaining as well as procedures of control and information) also in relation to service contracts, does not certainly exhaust the number of possible solutions for giving implementation to the principles of proportionate and sufficient wage treatment, but represents, under the profile of the distribution of legislative competence, the point of equilibrium currently configured by the state legislator.

9.4.– Coming to the provision object of the present judgment, the award criterion relating to the minimum hourly wage treatment of nine gross euros is additional and distinct with respect to the described institutions of the code.

According to the constant jurisprudence of this Court, for the requirement of uniformity in the specific domain of public contracting, of which it was said, the provisions of the public procurement code that concern the choice of the contractor (award procedures) are attributable to the matter of the protection of competition. It follows that regions cannot dictate a discipline different from them (lastly, judgment no. 80 of 2025; among the many, judgments no. 174 of 2024 and no. 23 of 2022).

The choice of the Tuscan legislator, instead, shifts the point of equilibrium that the legislator of the code has delineated in the search for a balancing between the freedom of private economic initiative, with a view to favoring competition "for the market,” and the pursuit of objectives of social policy, of worker protection, of income support and support for enterprises (lastly, judgments no. 188 and no. 80 of 2025).

Also for this profile, therefore, the question is well-founded.

10.– During the public hearing, the regional defense objected that the regional administration, in the previous normative framework, would have already been legitimized to fix wage levels in the scope of guidelines adopted by the Regional Executive aimed at the guarantee of social requirements. It would be, therefore, illogical that the Region cannot do with law what it could already do with guidelines.

10.1.– The reference of the regional defense is to Article 6-bis (Social requirements) of Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of 2019, introduced by Article 1 of the Law of the Tuscany Region no. 7 of February 28, 2023, bearing "Provisions in the matter of guidelines for the identification of the social requirements referred to in Article 30, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016 (Public Procurement Code). Amendments to Regional Law no. 18/2019.” Article 6-bis was abrogated by Article 3, paragraph 1, letter b), of the same Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025, whose Article 1 is object of the present judgment.

Article 6-bis of Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of 2019 provided that: "1. […] the social requirements referred to in Article 30, paragraph 1, third period, of Legislative Decree no. 50/2016, which inspire the award criteria, to be provided in tenders, are established through guidelines approved with resolution of the Regional Executive. 2. The social requirements of paragraph 1 respond also to the necessity of guaranteeing a wage level, adequate and current, of workers employed by the successful bidder.”

As is made clear by the textual formulation of the provision, the foundation of the power to adopt guidelines was found by the same regional legislator in Article 30, paragraph 1, of the previous code, therefore in the legislation of the State. Article 30, paragraph 1, is no longer in force, given that Article 226 (Abrogations and final provisions), paragraph 1, Public Procurement Code, provided for the abrogation of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016 starting from July 1, 2023, except for ongoing proceedings, as defined by the subsequent paragraph 2.

Nevertheless, Article 6-bis of Tuscany Regional Law no. 18 of 2019, now also itself abrogated, confirms that in the scope of public contracts the space for interventions of modulation between private economic initiative freedom and social utility is delineated, under the profile of competence, by the state legislator. It is for the latter, in fact, the definition of the binding institutions and the margins of choice left to the autonomy of contracting authorities, aimed at measuring social requirements in relation to the nature, the object, and the characteristics of the contract.

The argument spent by the regional defense, therefore, cannot be shared.

11.– In conclusion, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 30 of 2025 must be declared for violation of the exclusive state legislative competence in the matter of competition protection, referred to in Article 117, second paragraph, letter e), of the Constitution.

The further profiles of constitutional illegitimacy deduced in the appeal remain absorbed.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1 of the Law of the Tuscany Region no. 30 of June 18, 2025 (Provisions regarding the protection of workers in public procurement contracts under regional jurisdiction. Amendments to Regional Law no. 18/2019).

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 10, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Stefano PETITTI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancery

Filed in the Chancery on April 30, 2026