JUDGMENT NO. 205

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review proceedings concerning Articles 16, 18, 18-bis, and 19 of Decree-Law of October 11, 2024, No. 145 (Urgent Provisions concerning the entry into Italy of foreign workers, the protection and assistance of victims of labour exploitation, the management of migratory flows and international protection, as well as related judicial proceedings), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 9, 2024, No. 187, initiated by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sitting as a single judge, with eight orders dated May 2, 7, 9, and August 7, 2025, registered under numbers 102, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113, 114, and 177 of the registry of orders for 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, numbers 23, 25, and 39, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having considered the intervention briefs of the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having heard the Reporting Judge Maria Rosaria San Giorgio in the public session of November 17, 2025;

Deliberated in the public session of November 17, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– With orders dated May 2, 2025 (registered under numbers 102 and 103 of the order registry for 2025), May 7, 2025 (registered under numbers 104 and 105 of the order registry for 2025), May 9, 2025 (registered under numbers 112, 113, and 114 of the order registry for 2025), and August 7, 2025 (registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025), the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sitting as a single judge, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Articles 16, 18, 18-bis, and 19 of Decree-Law of October 11, 2024, No. 145 (Urgent Provisions concerning the entry into Italy of foreign workers, the protection and assistance of victims of labour exploitation, the management of migratory flows and international protection, as well as related judicial proceedings), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 9, 2024, No. 187.

1.1.– Article 16, paragraph 1, letter b), amended Decree-Law of February 17, 2017, No. 13 (Urgent Provisions for the acceleration of proceedings concerning international protection, as well as for combating illegal immigration), converted, with amendments, into Law of April 13, 2017, No. 46, by inserting Article 5-bis, according to which "For proceedings concerning the validation of the measure by which the Quaestor orders the detention or extension of the detention of the international protection applicant, adopted pursuant to Articles 6, 6-bis, and 6-ter of Legislative Decree of August 18, 2015, No. 142, and Article 10-ter, paragraph 3, fourth period, of the Consolidated Text of Provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the status of foreigners, referred to in Legislative Decree of July 25, 1998, No. 286, as well as for the validation of measures adopted pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015, the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law of April 22, 2005, No. 69, in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based, shall have jurisdiction.”

Article 16, paragraph 2, stipulated that in said proceedings the Court of Appeal shall rule in a single-judge composition.

Article 18 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), subsequently replicated the substitution of the Court of Appeal for the Tribunal where the specialized section was identified in the instances where the validation judge was designated in said sections.

Article 18-bis, letter a) of paragraph 1, completed the adaptation of the validation proceeding discipline to the innovations introduced by Article 16, while, at letter b), numbers 1) and 2), of the same paragraph, it amended the cassation appeal process against the validation decrees concerning the detention of foreign nationals not seeking international protection, making additions to Article 14, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree of July 25, 1998, No. 286 (Consolidated Text of Provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the status of foreigners), with the effect that the aforementioned paragraph 6 of Article 14 currently reads: "An appeal to the Court of Cassation may be lodged against the validation and extension decrees referred to in paragraph 5, within five days of communication, only for the grounds set forth in letters a), b), and c) of paragraph 1 of Article 606 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The related appeal shall not suspend the execution of the measure. The provisions of Article 22, paragraph 5-bis, second and fourth periods, of Law of April 22, 2005, No. 6 shall be observed, in so far as compatible.”

Article 18, paragraph 1, letter a), number 2), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, extended this discipline to the validation proceedings for the detention of foreign nationals seeking international protection, by inserting into Article 6 of Legislative Decree of August 18, 2015, No. 142 (Implementation of Directive 2013/33/EU laying down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, and Directive 2013/32/EU, laying down common procedures for the recognition and withdrawal of international protection status) paragraph 5-bis, according to which "An appeal to the Court of Cassation shall be admissible against the measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 5, in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree of July 25, 1998, No. 286.”

Finally, Article 19 established that the procedural provisions introduced by the same D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, shall apply thirty days after the date of entry into force of the conversion law of the said Decree-Law.

1.2.– The referring judges deem that the provisions under review, in the part where they attribute jurisdiction to rule on the validation of the extension of detention of the foreign national seeking international protection to the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law of April 22, 2005, No. 69 (Provisions to align domestic law with Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of June 13, 2002, on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States), in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based, which rules in a single-judge composition, "instead of the Specialized Section for immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens, established at the District Tribunal,” conflict with Articles 77, second paragraph, 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

1.2.1.– Articles 18 and 18-bis of the same D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, are also challenged in the part where they provide that the measure issued by the Court of Appeal is appealable by way of a cassation appeal lodged within five days of its communication only for the grounds set forth in Article 606, paragraph 1, letters a), b), and c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that "the provisions of Article 22, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Law No. 69/2005 (as currently provided following the judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 39/2025) shall be observed, in so far as compatible, and not simply by cassation appeal as previously.”

According to the a quo judges, these provisions violate, in addition to Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution, Articles 3, 10, third paragraph, 24, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter two in relation to Article 5, paragraphs 1, letter f), and 4, of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013, laying down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, Article 26 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013, laying down common procedures for the recognition and withdrawal of international protection status, and Articles 6, 18, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

1.3.– In factual terms, in the orders registered under numbers 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the order registry for 2025, the referring judges report that they are seized of as many applications, lodged by the Quaestor of Brindisi pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015, for the validation of the extension of detention of foreign nationals who, already detained under Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998, had applied for international protection with requests deemed pretextual or manifestly unfounded pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 3, of the same Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015, and who had challenged the denial issued by the Territorial Commission of Lecce with appeals still pending.

In the orders registered under numbers 112, 113, and 114 of the order registry for 2025, the referring judges state that they are called upon to rule on as many validation requests – also formulated by the Quaestor of Brindisi pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 – for the extension of the detention of foreign nationals who, already detained under Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998, had filed an application for international protection – which had been denied due to their social dangerousness inferred from criminal and police records pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2, [letter c)], of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 – and had challenged the negative measure of the Territorial Commission in proceedings still pending.

In the order registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025, the referring judge reports that he is seized of the validation application, lodged, once again, by the Quaestor of Brindisi pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015, for the extension of the detention of a foreign national who entered the national territory irregularly and is seeking international protection, ordered pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2, letter d), of the same Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 due to the risk of flight inferred from the applicant being without a stable residence or accommodation where he could be easily located, not rooted in Italy, and without stable employment.

The a quo judge further contends that the validation of the extension was requested due to the persistence of the prerequisites for detention and the pending appeal against the denial of international protection adopted by the Territorial Commission.

1.4.– Regarding relevance, the referring judges first specify that they have not yet ruled on the validation request, also observing that the eventuality that the non-validation of the detention extension within the peremptory term established by law might cause the restriction status of the detained person to cease (referencing, inter alia, Judgment of this Court No. 212 of 2023) does not affect the admissibility of the raised issues.

They add that, in the event of acceptance of the raised issues, the previous system would be restored, which attributed jurisdiction to rule on the validation of the detention measure or its extension for the foreign national seeking asylum to the specialized sections for immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens established at the district tribunals, and identified the means of appeal against the first-instance decisions as a cassation appeal pursuant to Article 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The orders of reference then dwell, with extensive exposition, on the reconstruction of the legal framework to which the challenged provisions belong, also referencing Judgment No. 39 of 2025 of this Court, by which the unconstitutionality was declared, for violation of Articles 3 and 24 of the Constitution, of the new discipline of the cassation judgment regarding the validation of measures ordering or extending the detention of foreigners, introduced by Article 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter b), number 2), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, insofar as it refers to the provisions on the proceedings concerning the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) relating to the special case where the consent of the person requested to be surrendered is found, rather than to the ordinary version of the latter procedure.

1.5.– Subsequently, the a quo judges substantiate, with almost identical arguments, the non-manifest groundlessness of the raised issues, prefacing the reasoning for the individual challenges with critical observations on the procedural reforms under scrutiny, aiming, in particular, to highlight the uncertainty of their scope and the incongruity of their practical implications.

1.6.– The referring judges first find a violation of Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution, observing that the challenged provisions were introduced by means of urgent decree, despite the evident lack of the prerequisites prescribed by the Constitution.

The extraordinary needs and urgency reasons do not emerge – except in an apodictic and tautological form – either from the preamble of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, or from the parliamentary proceedings relating to the conversion law.

It is recalled that in its original formulation, the Decree-Law under examination had reintroduced the appeal against measures issued by the specialized tribunal in matters of international protection, attributing the related jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal and providing, at the same time, for the obligation, for the judges assigned to deal with the appeal, to participate annually in training courses on the subject.

It is then highlighted that the reasons for the amendment by which the aforementioned provisions were replaced with those under scrutiny are not illustrated during the parliamentary conversion process.

1.6.1.– Lastly, the referring judges observe that the provision set forth in Article 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, according to which the procedural provisions introduced in the conversion stage shall apply not immediately, nor within the ordinary period of vacatio legis, but after thirty days from the date of entry into force of the conversion law, "clashes with the alleged necessity and urgency.”

1.7.– The a quo judges then deem that the established shift of jurisdiction in favour of the Court of Appeal conflicts with Articles 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

1.7.1.– The discipline under scrutiny violates, first and foremost, the principle of the judge naturally established by law, as it introduces a derogation from the general rule that attributed the validation of the detention of asylum seekers to a specialized section specifically established for dealing with the subject matter of international protection in general, without a constitutionally relevant justification.

This, despite the case law of this Court affirming that provisions determining a derogation from the general regime of jurisdiction must respond to needs of constitutional relevance (citing Judgment No. 38 of 2025).

In the present case, the legislative amendment is not only devoid of justifying reasons but also shows the legislator’s disinterest in the need for judicial specialization, which serves as a safeguard for the principle of the fair trial enshrined in Article 111, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

Nor, according to the a quo judges, can the reason for the procedural amendment be found in a "presumed affinity” between the proceedings under scrutiny and those concerning the validation of arrests carried out by judicial police in execution of a European arrest warrant, as seems to be suggested by the reference to Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law No. 69 of 2005 contained in the new rule for determining jurisdiction in validation proceedings at first instance, as well as the configuration of the new cassation procedure ad exemplum of the procedures concerning the European arrest warrant.

The referring judges indeed believe that such affinity does not exist, as the European arrest warrant is based either on an enforceable conviction or on a precautionary measure concerning an act qualified as a crime, whereas the validation proceeding for the detention of the foreign national seeking international protection, although concerning a measure restricting personal liberty, has never been considered penal in nature (citing Judgments of this Court No. 39 of 2025 and No. 105 of 2001).

Furthermore, even at the supranational level – the referring judges add – the European Court of Human Rights has affirmed that the detention of foreigners does not fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR, but within that of the guarantee set forth in Article 5, paragraph 1, letter f), ECHR, also highlighting that it is admissible only to allow States to prevent illegal immigration while respecting international obligations (citing, inter alia, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment of December 15, 2016, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy; Judgment of June 25, 1996, Amuur v. France).

The orders of reference also recall the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has affirmed that the detention in question constitutes a serious interference with the right to liberty enshrined in Article 6 ECHR.

In any case, the a quo judges observe, the "alleged affinity” with the EAW procedure does not appear capable of conferring reasonableness upon the amendment under challenge, nor does it represent a need of constitutional relevance.

On the contrary, withdrawing the matter of detention validation from its "natural judge,” that is, the judge specifically established and specialized in dealing with issues of international protection, to entrust it to a judge, "especially if penal,” neither specialized nor obliged to specialize through annual professional updating, would seem to pursue objectives opposite to constitutional needs, such as maintaining concentrated in the specialized sections of the district tribunals – admitted by Article 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution – all matters concerning international protection.

1.8.– According to the referring judges, the challenged discipline also conflicts with the principle of reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution.

It is observed that, although the legislator enjoys broad discretion in configuring procedural instruments, the shift of jurisdiction operated by the provisions under scrutiny is not only devoid of any constitutional justification but also affects the "unitary and indivisible nature of issues relating to the right to asylum and related procedures.”

It is reiterated that this intervention presupposes an assimilation between the detention of international protection applicants and the restriction of personal liberty resulting from the judicial ascertainment of crimes committed by foreign nationals; an assimilation which, however, is not practicable, as the former of these measures constitutes an administrative measure unrelated to criminal acts.

1.8.1.– The orders of reference further complain that the legislator has created a split between the judge competent to rule, on the merits, on measures concerning the right to asylum, i.e., the specialized sections at the district tribunals, and the judge competent to ascertain the legitimacy of detentions ordered within the same proceedings initiated by applications for international protection. This, despite the validation of detention having an incidental effect with respect to the procedure for recognizing the right to asylum, such that it has always been attributed to the same judges called upon to rule, on a precautionary or definitive basis, on the existence or absence of this right.

The unitary nature of the "complex matter of international protection” – the a quo judges further observe – has, moreover, induced the legislator and the Superior Council of the Judiciary itself to "deem it appropriate, rectius necessary, to identify a specialized judge, tabularly pre-defined, equipped with specific competencies and subject to stringent training obligations.”

1.8.2.– The shift in jurisdiction provided for by the provisions in question has frustrated the need for specialization of the judges called upon to rule on the legitimacy of detentions, through a "change of perspective” that is not justified by the previous arrangement "which had not raised critical issues,” but rather had proved capable of meeting the specific speed requirements inherent in the proceedings in question.

1.9.– The referring judges finally denounce the conflict between Articles 18 [paragraph 1, letter a), number 2)] and 18-bis [paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2)] of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, and Articles 3, 10, third paragraph, 24, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter two in relation to Article 5, paragraphs 1, letter f), and 4, ECHR, and Articles 9 of Directive No. 2013/33/EU, and 26 of Directive No. 2013/32/EU, and Articles 6, 18, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFRUE).

1.9.1.– The a quo judges, extensively referencing the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU, assume that the reduction to "barely five days” of the deadline for lodging the cassation appeal – which, under the previous regime, where Articles 325 and 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied, was sixty days or six months, depending on whether the measure had been notified or not – determines an excessive and unreasonable compression of the right to defence, such as to frustrate the effectiveness of the right to appeal.

1.9.2.– The right to defence would also be violated due to the limitation of the grounds for appeal to only those vices indicated by letters a), b), and c) of paragraph 1 of Article 606 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compared to the previous regime, under which the appeal could be lodged for all grounds provided for by Article 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Under the new discipline, the validation measure can instead be challenged only for the violation of substantive and procedural criminal law, whereas the vice of motivation and, in particular, the vice of manifestly illogical, contradictory, perplexing, or objectively incomprehensible motivation, which, under the previous discipline, was instead deductible, cannot be raised.

This, despite the case law of the Court of Cassation recognizing broad cognitive powers to the judge validating the detention (citing, inter alia, Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment of February 15, 2025, No. 3843).

1.9.3.– The referring judges specify that the issues raised with reference to the cassation procedure are relevant within the scope of the a quo proceedings because "the impending measure of extension (or not) of detention is appealable only in this manner, so that, once the decree is issued, the parties are obliged to appeal, adhering to a regulation which, for the reasons described, is exposed to findings of unconstitutionality.”

1.9.4.– Lastly, the a quo judges submit to this Court the assessment of the opportunity to extend any declaration of unconstitutionality of the provisions that have ordered the shift of jurisdiction to decide on the validation of the extension of detention to "all the norms that have amended the validation judgment of the Quaestor’s measure of detention or extension of the international protection applicant in all cases provided for by D.L. No. 145/24, converted, with amendments by Law No. 187/2024.”

1.10.– In the proceedings initiated by the order registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025, the referring judge also represents that other judges of the same Court of Appeal of Lecce have rejected exceptions of constitutional illegitimacy of a content similar to the challenges formulated by him.

The same referring judge illustrates the content of the referred measures, analytically refuting their arguments.

2.‒ In all the constitutional legitimacy review proceedings, the President of the Council of Ministers intervened, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the issues be declared inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

2.1.– With the exception of the proceeding initiated by the order registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025, in which the alleged inadmissibility is not specifically substantiated, the State defence objected, with arguments of the same content, to the lack of relevance of the challenges directed at Article 18-bis [paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2)] – in the part where, amending Article 14, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998, it reduced the deadline for lodging the cassation appeal to five days and limited its admissibility only to the grounds set forth in Article 606, letters a), b), and c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure – and Article 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted.

The challenges relating to the first of these provisions are inadmissible as they concern a discipline whose application does not affect the level of judgment in which the referring judges are called upon to decide, being applicable only after the referring judges have adopted the final measures in their respective proceedings.

As regards Article 19 of the aforementioned Decree-Law, the issues lack any substantiation regarding the specific relevance of this provision in the a quo proceedings.

2.2.– In support of the non-groundlessness of the issues, the State Attorney’s Office develops, overall, the arguments summarized below.

2.2.1.– Regarding the alleged violation of Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution, the intervention briefs note that an element symptomatic of the absence of the necessity and urgency prerequisites established by the invoked constitutional parameter must be found in the heterogeneity or extraneousness of the subject matter of the challenged norm with respect to the content of the Decree-Law.

Such manifest absence is not discernible in the present case, in which the provisions challenged, introduced at the conversion stage, concern the subject matter of immigration and international protection, on which the entire D.L. No. 145 of 2024 intervenes on various aspects.

2.3.– Regarding the challenges alleging the violation of Articles 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution, the State Attorney’s Office observes that the orders of reference merely allege that the shift in jurisdiction must be supported by a justification of constitutional relevance and that, in the present case, a sufficient justification cannot be found in the alleged affinity of the detention validation proceedings with those concerning the EAW, given that the former, unlike the latter, although concerning a measure restricting personal liberty, is not penal in nature.

This conclusion, in the opinion of the intervening party, presupposes an incorrect reconstruction of the legal framework.

Article 25 of the Constitution does not, in fact, prevent the legislator from reordering the structure of judicial jurisdiction relating to a specific matter, subject to the principle of reasonableness which, however, is respected in the regulation under scrutiny, considering the identity of the constitutional principles – and particularly Article 13 of the Constitution – governing restrictions on personal liberty, regardless of the cause of the restriction.

It is no coincidence, the State defence argues, that the Court of Appeal also has jurisdiction in matters of extradition, in addition to EAW.

It is argued that the proceeding concerning extradition and the restrictive measures that can be applied to the person whose surrender is sought constitutes a guarantee mechanism for respecting the principle of non-refoulement and "is analogous to the general matter of asylum.”

This demonstrates the groundlessness of the referring judges' assumption that the matter of the foreigner’s detention is foreign to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal in matters of personal liberty and could only be attributed to the specialized sections of the Tribunal.

2.4.– The State defence further excludes the existence of an incidental relationship between the validation proceeding and the judgment on international protection, highlighting that, in reality, the former is only contingent and is separate from the latter.

The intervening party also notes that the two proceedings do not coincide even chronologically, since the detention measure is adopted irrespective of the stage of the procedure relating to the recognition of the right to asylum, provided there is a relationship of instrumentality between the adoption of the restrictive measure and the examination of the detention applicant's request for protection.

Moreover, the State defence concludes, no provision attributes to the validation judge the power to rule on the request for international protection "or to interfere in the related proceedings,” the examination of which is reserved to the Territorial Commission and, in judicial terms, to the specialized sections.

Considered in Law

1.– With the orders registered under numbers 102, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113, 114, and 177 of the order registry for 2025, the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sitting as a single judge, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Articles 16, 18, 18-bis, and 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted. Specifically, as is clear from the reasoning of the orders, the referring judges primarily challenge Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), and 19 of the indicated Decree-Law, insofar as they attribute jurisdiction to rule on the validation of the extension of the detention of the foreign national seeking international protection to the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law No. 69 of 2005, in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based, which rules in a single-judge composition, "instead of the Specialized Section for immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens, established at the District Tribunal.” The referring judges also challenge Articles 18, paragraph 1, letter a), number 2), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2), of the same Decree-Law, insofar as they provide that the measure issued by the Court of Appeal is appealable by way of a cassation appeal lodged within five days of its communication only for the grounds set forth in Article 606, paragraph 1, letters a), b), and c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that "the provisions of Article 22, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Law No. 69/2005 (as currently provided following the judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 39/2025) shall be observed, in so far as compatible, and not simply by cassation appeal as previously.”

1.1.– The referring judges initially deem that the aforementioned provisions violate Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as they were introduced by means of urgent decree, despite the evident lack of the prerequisites prescribed by the invoked constitutional parameter.

1.2.– Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, also allegedly violate Articles 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution. In particular, the conflict with the indicated constitutional parameters is found in the part where the challenged provisions attribute jurisdiction to rule on the validation of the detention of the asylum-seeking foreigner to the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law No. 69 of 2005, in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based, which rules in a single-judge composition, "instead of the Specialized Section for immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens, established at the District Tribunal.”

1.3.– These provisions establish a shift in jurisdiction that conflicts, primarily, with the guarantee of the naturally established judge, derogating from a general rule of jurisdiction without a "constitutional justification,” as the alleged affinity of the detention validation proceeding with that already attributed to the Courts of Appeal concerning the European arrest warrant cannot be considered such justification, given that the former, unlike the latter, despite concerning a measure restricting personal liberty, is not penal in nature.

1.4.– The same provisions would also be unreasonable, as, by withdrawing the matter of detention from its "natural judge,” i.e., the judge specifically established and specialized in dealing with this subject of international protection, to entrust it to a judge not specialized, nor required to specialize through annual professional updating, they would pursue "needs opposite to those of constitutional relevance,” such as that, derivable from Article 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution, of maintaining concentrated in the specifically established specialized section all matters concerning international protection.

1.4.1.– Furthermore, the provisions under scrutiny affect the unitary and indivisible character of issues relating to the right to asylum, creating a split between the jurisdiction for the judgment concerning the recognition of this right – belonging to the specialized sections of the district tribunals – and the jurisdiction for the validation of detention, despite the latter proceeding having an incidental effect with respect to the former.

Moreover, the provisions in question operate a "change of perspective difficult to understand,” because, on the one hand, the previous system had provided adequate responses to the speed requirements inherent in the proceedings in question and, on the other hand, the shift in jurisdiction has necessitated "rethinking the functioning of the Courts of Appeal,” moreover based on unclear legislative directives.

1.5.– As regards Articles 18, paragraph 1, letter a), number 2) and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, these provisions conflict with Articles 3, 10, third paragraph, 24, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter two in relation to Article 5, paragraphs 1, letter f), and 4, ECHR, Article 9 of Directive No. 2013/33/EU, Article 26 of Directive No. 2013/32/EU, and Articles 6, 18, and 47 of the CFRUE, as, by reducing the deadline for lodging the cassation appeal to "barely five days,” they would determine an "excessive and unreasonable compression” of the right to defence, such as to frustrate the effectiveness of the appeal.

Furthermore, by stipulating that the appeal can be lodged only for the grounds indicated in letters a), b), and c) of paragraph 1 of Article 606 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to excess of judicial power and violation of substantive and procedural criminal law, the challenged norms eliminate the possibility – allowed under the previous regime, in which the cassation appeal could be exercised under the forms of Article 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure – of raising the vice of motivation as "manifestly illogical, contradictory, or even perplexing or objectively incomprehensible,” thus determining an "unreasonable restriction of defence rights.”

2.– Preliminarily, the proceedings must be joined for decision by a single judgment, as they concern the same provisions and are based on coinciding challenges and parameters.

3.– Also preliminarily, the exceptions of inadmissibility raised by the President of the Council of Ministers must be examined.

3.1.– In all proceedings, except for that related to the order registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025, the State defence objected, with arguments of identical content, on the one hand, to the lack of relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 18-bis of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, insofar as – in paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2) – it reformed the cassation judgment on the validation of both forms of detention concerning, respectively, the irregular foreigner subject to expulsion (Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998) and the foreigner seeking international protection (Article 6 of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015); on the other hand, to the absence of reasoning on the relevance of the questions concerning Article 19 of the same Decree-Law, according to which the procedural norms introduced by the latter shall apply thirty days after the date of entry into force of the conversion law of the Decree-Law.

3.2.‒ In support of the first set of exceptions, the intervening party contends that the challenges relating to the new admissibility procedure concern a discipline whose application does not affect the level of judgment in which the a quo judges are called upon to decide, being applicable only after the conclusion of their respective proceedings.

3.2.1.– The exceptions are well-founded.

The discipline of the admissibility proceeding cannot apply to the main proceedings, in which the referring judges, seized of the decision on the request for validation of the extension of detention of foreign nationals seeking international protection, must rule according to the first-instance procedure.

In this procedural stage, it is therefore entirely premature to question the conformity with the Constitution of the norms governing the subsequent level of judgment.

As repeatedly affirmed by this Court, the relevance of the doubt of constitutional legitimacy presupposes, in fact, the need for the challenged provisions to be effectively – and not merely contingently or only subsequently – applicable in the a quo judgment (ex aliis, Judgments No. 140 and No. 20 of 2018; Orders No. 210 of 2020 and No. 184 of 2017).

3.2.2.– The same considerations apply to the issues relating to Article 18 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, insofar as, in paragraph 1, letter a), number 2), it refers to the new cassation judgment.

Although the intervening party has not raised specific exceptions, these challenges must also be declared inadmissible for the reasons set out above.

3.3.– The exceptions of inadmissibility of the issues concerning the intertemporal regime delineated by Article 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, are also well-founded. These issues are, in fact, devoid of any reasoning regarding their relevance.

3.4.– Lastly, it must be highlighted that in the proceeding initiated by the order registered under number 177 of the order registry for 2025, inadmissibility was objected to, but not specifically substantiated, by the State defence.

Nevertheless, in light of the preceding considerations, in this proceeding too, the challenges concerning Articles 18, paragraph 1, letter a), number 2), 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2), and 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, must be declared, ex officio, inadmissible.

4.– It is appropriate to preface the examination on the merits of the remaining issues – concerning the changes in jurisdiction to decide at first instance on the validation of the detention of foreign nationals seeking international protection ordered by Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted – with a concise reconstruction of the relevant legal and jurisprudential framework.

4.1.– The provisions under scrutiny have shifted the jurisdiction to hear the validation request for the measure ordering or extending the detention of the asylum seeker from the Tribunal, where the specialized sections for immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens established by D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, are based, to the Court of Appeal in a single-judge composition.

The reform intervention is centered on Article 16 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, which, in paragraph 1, letter b), added to Chapter I of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, Article 5-bis, according to which, for proceedings concerning the validation of the measure by which the Quaestor orders the detention or extension of the detention of the international protection applicant, the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law No. 69 of 2005, in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based, shall have jurisdiction.

Article 16, paragraph 2, specified that in the aforementioned proceedings the Court of Appeal shall rule in a single-judge composition, while, in paragraph 1, letter a), it adapted Article 3 of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, which defines the jurisdiction of the specialized sections, by eliminating the reference to validation judgments in paragraph 1, letter c).

Article 18, paragraph 1, letters a), number 1), and b), of the same D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, then coordinated the provisions in which the validation judge was previously identified in the specialized section of the district tribunal with Article 16, by substituting the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5-bis of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, for said judicial office.

Article 18-bis, letter a) of paragraph 1, completed the adaptation of the validation proceeding discipline to the innovations introduced by Article 16.

Lastly, Article 19 provided that the procedural provisions introduced by the same D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, shall apply thirty days after the date of entry into force of the conversion law of the said Decree-Law.

4.2.– The discipline just summarized was introduced at the conversion stage, by substituting the original text of Articles 16, 18, and 19, and adding Article 18-bis.

As for Article 16, the original formulation of the legal text had provided for the reintroduction, by amending Articles 2 and 3 of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, of the second-instance judgment in proceedings appealing measures on international protection requests, attributing the related jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeal and imposing on the judges "called to compose the appeal panels” an obligation of specialization identical to that prescribed for the magistrates of the specialized sections.

Article 18, in the version prior to the amendments made by the conversion law, contained provisions on the power of attorney for lodging the appeal in disputes concerning the denial or revocation of temporary residence permits for humanitarian needs.

Finally, the initial text of Article 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024 was formulated as follows: "[t]he provisions of Chapter IV shall apply to appeals lodged pursuant to Article 35 and Article 3, paragraph 3-bis, of Legislative Decree of January 28, 2008, No. 25, thirty days after the date of entry into force of the conversion law of this Decree.”

4.3.– The reform under examination did not, however, modify the procedure for validation, which, therefore, continues to be governed by Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015, which first provides that the measure by which the Quaestor orders the detention or its extension shall be transmitted, without delay and in any case within forty-eight hours of its adoption, to the competent judge – now the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5-bis of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted – and shall be communicated to the international protection applicant.

Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 also refers, "insofar as compatible,” to Article 14, paragraph 4, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998 – concerning the validation of the detention of a foreigner not seeking international protection, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace – according to which the validation hearing shall be held in chambers with the necessary participation of a defence counsel duly notified; the interested party shall likewise be duly informed and brought to the place where the judge holds the hearing; the authority that adopted the measure may appear in court personally, also by availing itself of specially delegated officials; the judge shall rule on the validation, with a reasoned decree, within the forty-eight hours following, verifying compliance with the deadlines, the existence of the requirements provided for by Article 13 of the same Consolidated Text; the measure shall cease to have any effect if the deadline for the decision is not observed.

Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 also provides that the participation of the applicant in the validation hearing shall take place, where possible, remotely through an audiovisual link between the hearing room and the centre where he is detained. The audiovisual link shall be conducted in such a way as to ensure the simultaneous, effective, and reciprocal visibility of the persons present in both locations and the ability to hear what is said there.

Furthermore, the defence counsel, or a substitute thereof, shall always be allowed to be present at the location where the foreigner is held.

In this location, a State Police officer shall also be present to attest to the identity of the detained person, confirming that no impediments or limitations have been placed on the exercise of the rights and powers due to the foreigner, on compliance with the technical conditions of the audiovisual link, and, if the applicant is heard, on the precautions adopted to ensure its regularity with reference to the place where he is located, and shall draw up a record of the operations carried out.

4.4.– Finally, it must be recalled that Article 14, paragraph 4, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998 – which, as mentioned, applies "insofar as compatible,” also to the validation proceedings for international protection applicants – in its original version, in identifying the chamber procedure as the reference procedural model, expressly referred to Article 737 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Although this legislative reference was subsequently eliminated by Article 34, paragraph 19, of Legislative Decree of September 1, 2011, No. 150 (Complementary provisions to the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the reduction and simplification of civil cognitive proceedings, pursuant to Article 54 of Law of June 18, 2009, No. 69), until the reform under scrutiny, the validation proceedings were nevertheless conducted under the forms of the civil chamber procedure.

Although, as just recalled, D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, did not expressly amend the validation procedure, according to the most recent rulings of the Court of Cassation – issued by the First Penal Section of the Court of Cassation, to which, following the reform under scrutiny, by decree of the First President of the Court of Cassation of January 17, 2025, the disputes in question were assigned – the clear change in the legal framework operated by the procedural novelty "unambiguously directs towards the attribution of jurisdiction to the penal judge, both in the merits stages and in the admissibility judgment,” so that the residual application of Articles 737 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure is no longer practicable (Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, October 15-31, 2025, No. 35682).

It has therefore been observed that the attribution of jurisdiction in matters of validation and extension of detentions to the penal judge entails, as a necessary consequence, the application of the rules of the penal procedural code, "it being necessary to exclude that in this matter, save for reference or referral to general principles of procedural law, proceedings can be conducted using models governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, which are entirely foreign to the code under which the merits penal judge is called upon to rule and subsequently [the Court of Cassation] to rule, precisely only in cases of violation of art. 606, lett. a), b), and c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure” (Cass., No. 35682 of 2025).

The admissibility judges have further affirmed that validation or extension measures cannot be challenged by way of cassation appeal for grounds relating to violations of rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the amended Article 14, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998, which refers to the admissibility judgment, expressly refers only to Article 606, paragraph 1, letters a), b), and c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus exerting a "clear retroactive influence” on the procedural rules applicable to the procedure in the previous level of judgment (Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, Judgment of April 28-30, 2025, No. 16441).

5.– Turning to the examination on the merits, the challenges relating to the alleged violation of Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution are unfounded.

5.1.– First, it must be noted that when, as in the present case, the challenges raised with reference to Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution concern provisions introduced by the decree-law conversion law, the violation of this constitutional parameter cannot be derived from the lack of prerequisites of extraordinary necessity and urgency – since the norms added, precisely because they were inserted subsequently, cannot be linked to these preliminary conditions – but from the lack of homogeneity with respect to the original Decree-Law.

This is because, as repeatedly affirmed by this Court, the conversion law assumes "the characteristics of a ‘functionalized and specialized’ source, aimed at stabilizing the decree-law, with the consequence that it cannot open up to subjects heterogeneous with respect to those present therein, but can only contain provisions coherent with the original ones from a material or finalistic point of view (most recently, Judgments No. 113 and No. 6 of 2023, No. 245 of 2022, No. 210 of 2021, and No. 226 of 2019), ‘essentially to prevent the related simplified procedural process, provided for by parliamentary regulations, from being exploited for purposes extraneous to those justifying the decree-law, to the detriment of ordinary parliamentary comparison dynamics’ (Judgments No. 245 of 2022, No. 210 of 2021, No. 226 of 2019: mutatis mutandis, Judgments No. 145 of 2015, No. 251, and No. 32 of 2014)” (Judgment No. 215 of 2023).

This Court has, however, specified that only the patent "extraneousness of the challenged norms to the object and purposes of the decree-law” (Judgment No. 22 of 2012) or the "evident or manifest lack of any link of interrelation between the provisions incorporated into the conversion law and those of the original decree-law” (Judgment No. 154 of 2015) can, in itself, invalidate the constitutional legitimacy of the norm introduced by the conversion law” (Judgments No. 226 and No. 181 of 2019, as well as, mutatis mutandis, Judgment No. 146 of 2024).

Furthermore, where the governmental measure is ab origine of multiple content, the continuity between the conversion law and the decree-law must be measured by verifying the coherence between the provisions added at the conversion stage and those originally adopted as extraordinary necessity and urgency (Judgment No. 6 of 2023), "taking into account the connection with ‘one of the contents already regulated by the decree-law, or its dominant ratio’ (Judgment No. 245 of 2022)” (Judgments No. 44 of 2025 and No. 113 of 2023).

5.2.– In light of the aforementioned criteria, the provisions under scrutiny pass the constitutional legitimacy review, as they cannot be deemed to be devoid of any plausible link with those contained in the original decree-law.

D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, falls among measures that are ab origine of multiple content, as it includes interventions structured in a plurality of lines of action expressly indicated in the Chapters of which it is composed: the first is titled "Amendments to the discipline of entry into Italy of foreign workers,” the second contains "Provisions concerning the protection of foreign workers victims of crimes under Articles 600, 601, 602, 603-bis of the Penal Code and other provisions to combat undeclared work,” the third sets forth "Provisions concerning the management of migratory flows and international protection,” the fourth – into which the provisions under scrutiny have been inserted – contains the "Procedural Provisions,” and the fifth sets forth the "Transitional and Final Provisions.”

The purposes of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, are summarized in the Title ("Urgent Provisions concerning the entry into Italy of foreign workers, the protection and assistance of victims of labour exploitation, the management of migratory flows and international protection, as well as related judicial proceedings”) and replicated in the preamble. The latter, in fact, refers to the "extraordinary necessity and urgency to adopt norms on the entry into Italy of foreign workers,” to the "extraordinary necessity and urgency to provide for measures aimed at protecting foreign workers victims of crimes under Articles 600, 601, 602, 603 and 603-bis of the Penal Code and combating undeclared work,” and to the "extraordinary necessity and urgency to adopt provisions concerning the management of migratory flows.”

5.2.1.– That being established, the point of correlation between the provisions introduced at the conversion stage, which are challenged, and those of the original decree-law must be identified in the matter of the management of migratory flows and international protection.

The new rules on jurisdiction in validation proceedings pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 2015 – which the current constitutional legitimacy review is limited to – regulate, on the procedural side, an institution, such as the detention of foreigners seeking asylum, typically pertaining to the matter of international protection, whose regulation constitutes, as recalled, one of the most relevant contents of the urgent measure.

The amendment that gave rise to the challenged norms is not only objectively continuous with the aforementioned substantive thematic area but also fits into a specific content structure of the decree-law – that of procedural reforms in matters of international protection – to which Chapter IV has been specifically dedicated since the original formulation of the normative act.

6.– The challenges by which the referring judges complain that Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, by ordering the shift of jurisdiction to decide at first instance on the validation of the detention of the asylum seeker, previously attributed to the specialized sections of the district tribunals, violate Articles 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution, are also not worthy of acceptance.

6.1.– First of all, the challenged provisions do not conflict with the guarantee enshrined in Article 25, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

According to the case law of this Court, the expression "judge naturally established by law” contained in this constitutional precept indicates the judge established based on general criteria set in advance and not in view of specific disputes.

This principle protects the citizen's right to prior, unambiguous knowledge of the competent judge to decide, or, even more clearly, the right to certainty that the latter is not a judge created a posteriori in relation to an event that has already occurred (Judgment No. 88 of 1962).

The guarantee of the naturally established judge by law is, therefore, not necessarily violated when a law determines a shift in jurisdiction, also affecting pending proceedings, provided that a series of prerequisites are met to avoid any risk of arbitrariness in the identification of the new competent judge (Judgment No. 56 of 1967; mutatis mutandis, Judgments No. 237 of 2007 and No. 287 of 1987).

This guarantee aims, in fact, "not only to protect the associate against the prospect of a partial judge, but also to ensure the independence of the judge vested with the knowledge of a case, shielding him from the possibility that the legislator or other judges may arbitrarily deprive him of proceedings already initiated before him” (Judgment No. 38 of 2025).

A violation of the right to the naturally established judge occurs, therefore, whenever the judge is designated a posteriori in relation to a specific dispute or directly by the legislator by way of a singular exception to the general rules, or through acts of other subjects to whom the law attributes such power beyond the limits imposed by the reservation.

The guarantee under Article 25 of the Constitution can, conversely, be considered respected when "the judging body has been established by law and its jurisdiction is defined based on general criteria set in advance, in compliance with the law reservation (ex plurimis, Judgments No. 117 of 2012 and No. 30 of 2011)” (Judgments No. 5 of 2025 and No. 159 of 2014; mutatis mutandis, Judgment No. 237 of 2007).

In this situation, the shift in jurisdiction occurs "by effect of a new order – and, therefore, of the designation of a new ‘natural’ judge – which the legislator, in the exercise of his unchallengeable discretionary power, substitutes for the one in force” (Judgment No. 56 of 1967).

In the present case, the violation of Article 25 of the Constitution is to be excluded because Article 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, introduces a modification of jurisdiction relating to a category of disputes – that of the validation of the detention measures of asylum-seeking foreigners – by indicating abstract and predetermined criteria for determination ratione materiae and ratione loci, and moreover, operating pro futuro.

Nor is the fact that the challenged novelty introduced an exception to the general rule that attributes the majority of disputes concerning international protection to specialized sections sufficient to constitute an infringement of the invoked constitutional guarantee, since the natural judge is not crystallized in the legislative determination of a general jurisdiction, "but is also formed by all those provisions that derogate from this jurisdiction based on criteria that rationally assess the disparate interests at stake in the process” (Judgment No. 117 of 1972).

Furthermore, contrary to what is held by the referring judges, it is not necessary to verify whether the challenged derogation is justified, in the present case, by a constitutional-rank requirement, as such a review concerns derogatory modifications of general rules on jurisdiction with effects on pending proceedings (Judgment No. 38 of 2025), whereas, as can be inferred from Article 19 of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, the modification of jurisdiction in question applies to proceedings initiated subsequent to the entry into force of the novelty and, specifically, thirty days after the date of entry into force of conversion Law No. 187 of 2024.

6.2.– The challenges alleging the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, with reference to the principle of reasonableness, and Article 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution are likewise unfounded.

As recalled, the novelty under scrutiny identifies the judge competent to rule on the validation of the detention of the foreign national seeking international protection in the Court of Appeal referred to in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Law No. 69 of 2005 – according to which "[t]he jurisdiction to execute a European arrest warrant belongs, in order, to the Court of Appeal in whose district the accused or convicted person resides, has their domicile or residence at the time the measure is received by the judicial authority” – in whose district the Quaestor who adopted the measure subject to validation is based.

According to the case law of the Court of Cassation, the "legislator’s choice unambiguously expresses the will to concentrate in the penal sections of the Courts of Appeal the jurisdiction over the validation proceedings for the measure by which the Quaestor orders the detention or extension of the detention of the international protection applicant” (Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, Judgment of April 22, 2025, No. 15748, deposited on the same date), as evidenced by the express reference to the judicial authority competent to execute the European arrest warrant, an institution governed by penal provisions, "which therefore requires the intervention of the penal judge and which is shared with the matters of detention of the international protection applicant due to the aspects of judicial protection of personal liberty” (Cass., No. 15748 of 2025).

The reference to the discipline of the EAW procedure integrates, in particular, a criterion for assigning the disputes in question to the judges of the territorially competent Court of Appeal under the new discipline, assigned to the handling of the EAW execution proceedings, judges who are, as a rule, those assigned to the penal sector.

The Court of Cassation, continuing its consolidated orientation, has also clarified that the application of this internal division rule does not affect the legitimate exercise of the judicial function, belonging to the judging office in its unity, nor does it affect the validity of the acts, so that any violation of the related rules is not a cause of nullity of the judgment and its final outcome (Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, Judgment of April 28-30, 2025, No. 15750, deposited on the same date).

The new rules for determining jurisdiction to rule on first-instance validation therefore include both the criteria for identifying the judge ratione materiae (Court of Appeal in single-judge composition) and ratione loci (Court of Appeal in whose district the Quaestor who ordered the detention or its extension is based), as well as a criterion for the internal assignment of disputes to the judges assigned to handling EAW proceedings.

Reconstructed in this way, they appear to possess sufficient precision and intelligibility.

Therefore, the applicative uncertainties denounced by the a quo judges – which are confirmed by the resolution of the Superior Council of the Judiciary of March 19, 2025, concerning the "Analysis of organizational repercussions on the Courts of Appeal following the shift of jurisdiction in matters of validation of detention measures for international protection applicants,” cited in the orders of reference – must be considered mere factual inconveniences that do not entail an intrinsic vice of constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged norms (Judgment No. 143 of 1973).

6.3.– The further profiles of unreasonableness denounced by the a quo judges are also not discernible.

It is undeniable that the challenged discipline introduces a significant exception to the general rule – derivable from the subject matter of the proceedings listed in Article 3, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted – according to which jurisdiction over disputes concerning international protection is devolved to the specialized sections established by Article 1 of the same Decree-Law.

The novelty under scrutiny has, in fact, withdrawn a factual situation – such as the validation of the detention of the asylum seeker – typically pertaining to the matter of international protection, from a jurisdiction structure arranged for the specific purpose of guaranteeing specialization and concentration in a sector characterized by a high degree of specialty as well as the need for the judges assigned to it to engage with the common European asylum system.

Nevertheless, the choice to exclude validation from the number of proceedings falling under the jurisdiction of the district sections is not symptomatic of manifest unreasonableness and, therefore, falling within an area, such as that of the configuration of procedural instruments, in which legislative discretion is broad, cannot be reviewed by this Court (ex aliis, Judgments No. 39 and No. 36 of 2025, No. 189 and No. 96 of 2024 and No. 67 of 2023).

In fact, the novelty sacrificed the requirement of specialization ratione materiae – and consequently also that of concentration – to entrust the examined disputes to judges who, as assignees of the EAW execution and extradition proceedings, are equipped with a different specialization, but are accustomed to handling proceedings involving the personal liberty of foreigners and which must be decided within stringent time limits.

It must be recalled in this regard that the detention of the foreign national, although part of the manifestations of the coercive power of the public administration – and therefore among the instruments with which the latter directly achieves a specific public interest which, in this case, coincides with the need to control migratory flows – consists of a restriction of personal liberty.

This measure, in fact, although not pursuing punitive purposes, shares with detention the practical effect of restricting the person.

The condition of physical subjection of the detained person to the power of others is a "sure indication of the relevance of the measure to the sphere of personal liberty” (Judgment No. 96 of 2025), with the consequence that, pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution, this limitation of habeas corpus, being ordered by the public security authority, must be validated by the judicial authority within forty-eight hours (Judgment No. 127 of 2022; mutatis mutandis Judgments No. 39 of 2025 and No. 105 of 2001).

The case law of the Court of Cassation has also highlighted the distinguishing value of the impact of the detention of a foreigner on personal liberty and, based on this aspect, has considered the shift of the procedural discipline of this measure to the penal area to be consistent (ex aliis, Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, Order of March 7, 2025, No. 9556, deposited on the same date).

Furthermore, it must be excluded that the principle of concentration, although clearly inferable from the institutional discipline of the specialized sections, is constitutionally necessary and therefore unalterable.

Article 3 of D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, in fact, did not establish a single and comprehensive jurisdiction for disputes concerning immigration, international protection, and the free movement of Union citizens, as demonstrated by the fact that some proceedings attributable to these thematic areas remained, respectively, with the Justice of the Peace, the ordinary civil tribunal, and the administrative judge.

The only tendency of the concentration principle derivable from D.L. No. 13 of 2017, as converted, is derived from the very structure, by this normative text, of the specialized sections, not as autonomous judicial bodies equipped with functional and exclusive jurisdiction, as in the case of the juvenile court, nor as subdivisions equipped with a jurisdiction separate from that of the tribunal in which they are based, as in the case of the agrarian sections.

Moreover, the Court of Cassation, with reference to the specialized sections for business matters, whose configuration is almost identical to that of the sections in question, clarified that the relationship between the ordinary section and the specialized section, in the specific case where both are part of the same judicial office, does not pertain to jurisdiction, but falls under the mere internal distribution of matters within the judicial office (Court of Cassation, Civil Joint Sections, Judgment of July 23, 2019, No. 19882).

6.4.– In light of the foregoing considerations, the challenge alleging that the shift in jurisdiction under scrutiny affects the unitary and indivisible character of issues relating to the right to asylum, creating a split between the jurisdiction for the judgment concerning the recognition of this right – belonging to the specialized sections of the district tribunals – and the jurisdiction for the validation of the applicant's detention, despite the latter proceeding having an incidental effect with respect to the former, cannot be considered well-founded.

It must first be noted that even under the regime prior to the reform under scrutiny, the provision of specialized jurisdiction of the district sections regarding both proceedings in question did not imply, by itself, the attribution to the judge seized of the appeal against the denial of international protection of the same jurisdiction to rule on the validation of the asylum seeker's detention.

In fact, for the judgments in question, there was no specific provision attributing functional jurisdiction over the validation of detentions and their extensions to the judge of the international protection proceeding.

Nor can Article 14, paragraph 4, last period, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998 – concerning the validation of the detention of a foreigner subject to an expulsion order, but, as recalled, applicable, insofar as compatible, also to the validation of the detention of an international protection applicant – be valorized in the contrary sense, according to which "[t]he validation may also be ordered on the occasion of the validation of the order for escort to the border, as well as during the examination of the appeal against the expulsion measure.”

As can be inferred from the parliamentary proceedings relating to Law of March 6, 1998, No. 40 (Regulation of immigration and rules on the status of foreigners), whose Article 12 was incorporated into Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998, the legislator, by allowing the possibility that the validation request be lodged before the same judge of the opposition proceeding against the expulsion decree constituting the prerequisite for the restrictive measure, intended only to favour, but certainly not to impose, the joint handling of the two proceedings.

A relationship of technical incidentalness of the validation with respect to the proceeding on the international protection request could not be inferred even from the instrumentality existing between the restrictive measure and the judgment ascertaining the right to international protection.

It is true that the case law of the Court of Cassation recognizes a precautionary nature to detention (Cass., No. 3843 of 2025; Court of Cassation, First Penal Section, Judgment of September 30, 2025, No. 32342, deposited on the same date; First Civil Section, Orders of September 14, 2021, No. 24721 and October 23, 2019, No. 27076); but this classification does not allow for the attribution of an incidental nature to the proceeding aimed at its validation with respect to the judgment ascertaining the right to international protection. This is first of all due to the clear structural difference between the two processes. The validation is a proceeding that must be concluded within forty-eight hours of the transmission of the measure by which the Quaestor orders the detention or its extension, at the conclusion of a hearing held in chambers with the necessary participation of a defence counsel duly notified.

Conversely, in the judgment appealing the denial of international protection – which, although subject to the chamber procedure, is contentious in nature and concluded with a measure capable of becoming res judicata – the hearing is not mandatory, but may be set by the judge if one of the conditions provided for in Article 35-bis, paragraph 10, of Legislative Decree of January 28, 2008, No. 25 (Implementation of Directive 2005/85/EC laying down minimum standards on procedures applied by Member States for the recognition and withdrawal of refugee status) occurs.

Finally, no qualified connection is found between the proceedings in question. Although the validation judgment may be extended to cover the measures that underlie it (Judgments No. 39 of 2025 and No. 105 of 2001), the merely incidental nature of such ascertainment (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Orders of October 31, 2023, No. 30166 and March 20, 2019, No. 7841) and its limitation to manifest illegality exclude that a technical prejudice capable of imposing the joint handling of the causes can be found, nor, considering the summary nature of the cognition in the validation proceeding, could a practical conflict between res judicata occur.

In conclusion, the shift in jurisdiction under examination, while sacrificing to some extent the needs for concentration and interpretive uniformity that had led the legislator to entrust the validation proceeding and the proceeding concerning the international protection application to a single judicial office, constitutes a re-evaluation of that legislative choice which, being characterized by broad discretion and not bordering on manifest unreasonableness, falls outside the review of this Court.

This does not exclude, however, that the legislator himself should verify, over time, the stability of the new structure of jurisdiction and implement corrective interventions should it prove to be a source of applicative difficulties.

7.– The questions of constitutional legitimacy of Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, raised with reference to Articles 77, second paragraph, 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution, must therefore be declared unfounded.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Articles 18, paragraph 1, letter a), number 2), 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 2), and 19 of Decree-Law of October 11, 2024, No. 145 (Urgent Provisions concerning the entry into Italy of foreign workers, the protection and assistance of victims of labour exploitation, the management of migratory flows and international protection, as well as related judicial proceedings), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 9, 2024, No. 187, raised, with reference to Articles 77, second paragraph, 3, 10, third paragraph, 24, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter two in relation to Article 5, paragraphs 1, letter f), and 4, of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013, laying down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, Article 26 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013, laying down common procedures for the recognition and withdrawal of international protection status, and Articles 6, 18, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sitting as a single judge, with the orders indicated in the heading;

2) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Articles 16, paragraphs 1, letter b), and 2, 18, paragraph 1, letters a), numbers 1) and 3), and b), and 18-bis, paragraph 1, letter a), of D.L. No. 145 of 2024, as converted, raised, with reference to Articles 77, second paragraph, 3, 25, and 102, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sitting as a single judge, with the orders indicated in the heading.

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on November 17, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on December 29, 2025