JUDGMENT NO. 41

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concerning Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree of November 25, 2016, no. 219 (Implementation of the delegation referred to in Article 10 of Law of August 7, 2015, no. 124, for the reorganization of the functions and financing of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), promoted by the Ordinary Court of Turin, Third Civil Section, in a single-judge composition, in the proceedings between V. I. and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture of Turin, with an order of June 27, 2025, registered under no. 184 of the register of ordinary proceedings of 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 41, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having reviewed the filings of constitution of V. I. and of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture of Turin, as well as the intervention filing of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard Judge Rapporteur Emanuela Navarretta in the public hearing of February 11, 2026;

having heard the lawyers Mario Bertolissi for V. I., Alfonso Celotto for the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture of Turin, as well as the State Attorney Fabrizio Urbani Neri for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in the chamber of council of February 11, 2026.

Facts Considered

1.– With an order of June 27, 2025, registered under no. 184 of the register of ordinary proceedings of 2025, the Ordinary Court of Turin, Third Civil Section, in a single-judge composition, raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree of November 25, 2016, no. 219 (Implementation of the delegation referred to in Article 10 of Law of August 7, 2015, no. 124, for the reorganization of the functions and financing of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, letter f), of the delegation law of August 7, 2015, no. 124 (Delegations to the Government regarding the reorganization of public administrations), in the part in which it provided for the gratuitous nature of all positions in the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce other than the boards of auditors.

2.– The dispute arises from the action brought by V. I. against the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture of Turin (hereinafter: Turin Chamber of Commerce), of which the plaintiff served as president from September 15, 2014, to February 19, 2020, in order to obtain payment of a sum as consideration for the activity performed in the period following December 10, 2016, during which he served without remuneration, due to the intervening challenged provision, which occurred during his term of office. The plaintiff challenged the constitutional legitimacy of the latter provision.

The referring judge specifies that the plaintiff received, until December 10, 2016, the annual compensation, paid monthly, of Euro 54,383.00, the payment of which was subsequently interrupted due to the intervening legislation, according to which, for Chambers of Commerce, their regional unions, as well as their special agencies, "all positions in bodies other than the boards of auditors shall be held free of charge.”

Subsequently, the Court adds, this provision was superseded by the entry into force of Decree-Law of December 30, 2021, no. 228 (Urgent provisions regarding legislative deadlines), converted, with modifications, into Law of February 25, 2022, no. 15, whose Article 1, paragraph 25-bis, among other things, repealed the first period of paragraph 2-bis of Article 4-bis of Law no. 580 of 1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016. In this way, a situation analogous to that originally regulated by Law no. 580 of 1993 was restored, under which the compensation of the President, as well as that of the other members of the governing body, is determined based on the size of each Chamber of Commerce, applying the criteria identified by a decree of the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy.

According to the information provided by the Court, the Turin Chamber of Commerce, in its filing in the main proceedings, contested, as a preliminary matter, the standing of the plaintiff to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged rule, which, if anything, could only be deemed to infringe upon the organizational and functional autonomy of the entity. In any case, it pleaded the statute of limitations for any claimed entitlements.

3.– In raising the questions of constitutional legitimacy and in motivating their relevance, the referring judge argues on this preliminary point, highlighting how the challenged provision affects the asserted right of the members of the governing bodies of a Chamber of Commerce "to receive compensation/indemnity for the function performed by them.” In particular, it notes that the plaintiff was denied the compensation previously resolved by the Turin Chamber of Commerce, exclusively by applying the challenged paragraph 2-bis of Article 4-bis of Law no. 580 of 1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, so that any declaration of constitutional illegitimacy would have an immediate effect on his legal position.

Conversely, it observes that the Chambers of Commerce would have very little incentive to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of a rule that is entirely favorable to them economically.

3.1.– Regarding the plea of the statute of limitations, the Court of Turin observes that, even assuming the applicability of the five-year term and not the ten-year term put forward by the plaintiff, as well as the accrual of the statute of limitations on a monthly basis throughout the relationship, some monthly payments would still remain, due to the timing of the commencement of the proceedings and the consequential effects of the statute of limitations interruption.

Therefore, maintaining the provision in force would inevitably lead to the rejection of the entire claim, whereas a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy would open the way for the total or partial acceptance of the claim asserted.

3.2.– In addition, the referring judge specifies that the subsequent repeal of the rule does not preclude its continued applicability to past events "not fully exhausted.” It refers, in this regard, to the judgments of this Court no. 78 of 2013 and no. 177 of 2012, as well as the judgment of the Council of State, Sixth Section, October 3, 2014, no. 4946.

3.3.– Finally, the referring judge considers that a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the challenged provision is not possible, as its literal text is unequivocal in establishing the gratuitous nature of the position during the period the provision was in force.

4.– The Court of Turin therefore proceeds to substantiate the non-manifest groundlessness.

4.1.– First, it identifies a conflict between the challenged provision and Article 3 of the Constitution "due to inherent irrationality and unreasonableness […] with a correlated and disproportionate disparity of treatment [compared to] identical or similar situations, as inferred from the fact that, without apparent justification, the legislator between 2016 and 2021 first provided for the remunerated nature of the positions of the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce pursuant to Law no. 580/1993, then for their gratuitous nature pursuant to paragraph 2-bis of Article 4-bis of Law no. 580/1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 219/2016, and then returned again to remunerated status with Decree-Law no. 228/2021, thus treating the same substantial position in a diametrically opposite way from an economic point of view within less than 5 years, given that in the meantime the tasks and responsibilities of the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce have not substantially changed.”

4.2.– From another perspective, the referring judge contests the disparity of treatment that would emerge from the comparison between the foreseen gratuity of compensation for the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce and the maintenance of compensation for the auditors of the same entities, which reveals an unreasonable different regime established for the various bodies of the chamber system.

4.3.– Still in terms of unreasonable disparity of treatment, the referring judge highlights the comparison with professional orders – entities equally endowed with broad autonomy, as expressions of a specific membership base, deemed comparable to the Chambers of Commerce – in relation to which the legislator has never intervened by imposing gratuity for the positions of the corresponding governing bodies.

Such disparity of treatment would not be justifiable by spending review requirements, given that the Chambers of Commerce do not receive direct funding from the State, but derive their resources, as provided for by Article 18 of Law no. 580 of 1993, from contributions of registered members and revenues from the activities they carry out, including compensation for the functions that the State itself has delegated to these entities, starting with the maintenance of the business register.

4.4.– The Court of Turin argues, in addition, that the challenged provision conflicts with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, for having unreasonably and disproportionately infringed upon the autonomy of the Chambers of Commerce. These, being formations of the business world, would not be free to pay an indemnity to the members of their governing bodies, even though such potential disbursements would not be borne by the state budget, and thus the State would derive no benefit from the provision of gratuity.

4.5.– Finally, according to the Court of Turin, the challenged provision violates Articles 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, by disproportionately and excessively sacrificing the economic rights resulting from the work performed by the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, in the absence of valid justifying reasons, so much so that the provision itself remained in force "for less than 4 years.”

The referring judge emphasizes that Article 36 of the Constitution guarantees the worker remuneration proportionate to the quantity and quality of their work, while Article 35, first paragraph, of the Constitution establishes that work (including self-employment, as held by, among others, the judgment of this Court no. 112 of 2021) is protected in all its forms and applications. Consequently, while Article 36 of the Constitution is habitually applied by current law only to dependent workers, it appears entirely unreasonable and disproportionate, in light of Articles 3 and 35 of the Constitution, to exclude any compensation for performing an activity of significant public relevance, with correlated heavy responsibilities and which implies continuous and not episodic work, given that the plaintiff in the main proceedings had taken out a specific professional liability insurance policy.

This unreasonable violation of Article 35 of the Constitution is also confirmed, according to the referring order, by the comparison with the compensation that the legal system grants to similar figures, starting from the accountants of the same Chambers of Commerce, as well as by considering the indemnities due to those holding political offices in local authorities involving continuous activity, such as mayors, regional presidents, municipal and regional councilors.

5.– The plaintiff in the main proceedings duly constituted himself in the constitutional proceedings with a memorandum of submissions.

5.1.– The party expresses full agreement with the arguments developed in the referring order and highlights that, even if one were to hypothesize the existence of an abstract justification for the gratuity provided for in 2016, the subsequent reintroduction of compensation in 2021 would fuel the suspicion of a substantial unreasonableness having occurred. Recalling the link between the issue of so-called measure-laws and the principle of equality, it stresses that legislative choices must retain a minimum degree of generality-abstractness, which is lacking when, as in this case, the incumbent presidents upon whom gratuity is imposed can be identified through a well-defined list of names.

5.2.– The defense therefore considers it unacceptable that the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce, under the same conditions, received an indemnity, which was then eliminated and finally re-attributed, and that, during the period when the gratuity regime was in force, the boards of auditors, conversely, maintained compensation.

It similarly contests that the gratuity for performing governing positions only concerned the Chambers of Commerce, unlike what was established for professional orders, which, like the former, are public associative entities. This would be even more unjustified, as this regime would not have brought about reductions in public spending, resulting merely in an advantage for the entity, which is legally benefited by what is considered unjust enrichment.

5.3.– Finally, in the memorandum of submissions, the defense asserts the violation of Articles 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, as the protection of work (Article 35) and the worker (Article 36) are at stake.

As for the first aspect, the defense emphasizes the close continuity between Article 1 of the Constitution, which founds the Republic on work as a guarantee of its very democratic nature, and Article 3, second paragraph, and Article 4 of the Constitution, which consider work as the main instrument for activating and promoting the project of social transformation envisaged by our Constitution.

Furthermore, regarding the protection of the worker, it is argued that it must be understood in a very broad sense, highlighting that the due compensation finds its specific cause, regardless of the legal qualification of the emolument, in the services rendered. The latter, which, according to the Constitution, must be considered from the dual perspective of their quantity and quality, serve to ensure a free and dignified existence for those who work and their families, all to be assessed in the current context where "being part of the middle class can also mean belonging not to a strong middle class, but to a weak middle class.”

6.– The Chamber of Commerce of Turin also constituted itself in the proceedings, arguing, as a preliminary matter, the inadmissibility of the questions due to lack of relevance, based on the non-existence of a constitutionally guaranteed right to receive compensation for the position of president.

In particular, according to the entity's defense, the organic identification relationship of the president of a Chamber of Commerce, similar to that of company directors, does not constitute a relationship of subordinate or quasi-subordinate employment, professional work performance, or a mandate, and is therefore not capable of legitimizing a subjective right to compensation. Moreover, the referring judge failed to address current law, which qualifies the president's position in the terms illustrated, nor did it indicate the source of the alleged subjective right to compensation.

The Chamber of Commerce of Turin further adds the observation that, faced with the introduction of a free-of-charge regime, the plaintiff in the main proceedings could well have renounced the position.

6.1.– On the merits, the entity's defense asserts the unfoundedness of the challenge under Article 3 of the Constitution, due to inherent unreasonableness and disparity of treatment.

In particular, the diversity of the social and economic context in which the regulatory measures of 2016 and 2021 were adopted is highlighted, as well as the circumstance that the legislation subject to constitutional scrutiny was introduced in a phase of so-called spending review, under a delegation conferred to the Government by Law no. 124 of 2015, as part of a reorganization program for public administrations.

It observes, in particular, that the delegation law, Article 10, required the adoption—subsequently implemented by Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016—of rules for the reform of the organization, functions, and financing of Chambers of Commerce, including the provision for the gratuity of positions other than those of auditors.

The Turin Chamber of Commerce emphasizes, in this regard, that this Court’s judgment no. 261 of 2017, called upon to rule on the possible constitutional illegitimacy of the entire text of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, deemed the legislator's intervention capable of implementing "the ‘goal of rationalization, efficiency, and effectiveness of the activity’ carried out by the Chambers of Commerce.”

It is therefore underlined – also based on the order of this Court no. 174 of 2001 – that the legislator may modify its choices, even in the opposite direction, when the economic, social, or political conditions that justified them change, provided that the intervention is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

6.2.– As for the contested disparity of treatment with respect to the auditors, the entity's defense notes the non-homogeneity between the role of the president, linked by an organic identification relationship with the entity, and the auditors, who perform a freelance professional assignment exercisable only by those who have obtained the corresponding qualification. The requirement of remuneration for the latter would be justified in relation to the need to ensure the seriousness, independence, and objectivity of their function, which serves as a guarantee for third parties.

6.3.– The identification of professional orders as the *tertium comparationis* is likewise deemed improper. While Chambers of Commerce, despite being associative-based entities with financial autonomy, are qualified as public administrations included in the consolidated economic account of the public administration, the same cannot be said for professional orders, which could not "be the recipients of so-called spending review measures and, therefore, are not comparable – at least under the specific aspect of interest – to the Chamber Entities.”

6.4.– Furthermore, on the premise that for self-governing public bodies, such as Chambers of Commerce, "cost containment rules” are fully legitimate, provided in a context of "serious economic crisis,” in order to realize the "institutional mission of the Chambers of Commerce, for the support of businesses,” the entity's defense considers the issue raised in reference to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution manifestly unfounded as well.

The gratuity of the positions in the governing bodies that have an organic identification position with the Chambers of Commerce would, in fact, guarantee savings which, transferred to the benefit of the users of the institutional mission of these entities, would implement a form of fulfillment of the non-derogable duties of political, economic, and social solidarity.

Moreover, the entity's defense notes that the referring order itself acknowledges that the challenged provision "has exclusively positive economic effects on the Chambers of Commerce,” which contradicts the alleged infringement of the Chamber autonomy.

6.5.– Finally, regarding the challenges concerning Articles 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, according to the Turin Chamber of Commerce, the referring judge failed to follow the direction of current law which, with respect to a relationship of organic identification, such as that between the Chamber of Commerce and those holding governing positions therein, excludes a possible qualification as subordinate employment, quasi-subordinate employment, professional work performance, or mandate.

This does not prevent – as observed by the Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, judgment of January 20, 2017, no. 1545 – the possibility that "an autonomous, parallel, and different relationship may be established between the company and the natural person who represents and manages it, assuming, according to the exclusive assessment of the merits judge, the characteristics of a subordinate, quasi-subordinate, or work relationship,” in the absence of which, however, an attraction within the operational scope of Article 35 of the Constitution would not be conceivable.

With regard to Article 36 of the Constitution, the entity's defense notes that the referring judge himself admits that the provision is attributable only to dependent work.

7.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General, filed an intervention filing in which he referred, as a preliminary matter, to the opinion of the Council of State issued with reference to Article 10 of Law no. 124 of 2015. From this provision it would emerge that the legislative delegation was undertaken, "in the European and international context of crisis and recession,” for the dual purpose of "reducing the burdens of the annual fee” and reforming the chamber system, in order to ensure more efficient services and simplified access to business compliance, consistent with the globalization processes favored by technological innovation. The delegated legislative decree would therefore have had – still according to the fiscal defense, which cites the Council of State's opinion – the objective of initiating a process of reorganization and rationalization of the chamber system, with "immediate savings resulting from the corresponding reduction in the number of top administrative positions in the entities and the related remuneration expense, as well as [from] the overall and specific reduction in the number of body members and, except for the auditors, their compensation,” together with the freeze on hiring pending the implementation of mobility processes aimed at "stabilizing and rationalizing the reduction of personnel expenditure.” All this in view of the objective "to achieve an enhancement of the role of the chamber system” and "greater confidence from the businesses themselves, as a consequence of the reduction in general tax burdens and the recovery of efficiency connected to the rationalization of organizational structures” (meeting of the Special Commission September 14, 2016).

7.1.– With reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, the intervention filing highlights that the challenged provision is justified, in the already mentioned context of international crisis and recession, by a requirement for cost containment, pursued through the reduction in the number of Chambers of Commerce (mergers), the hiring freeze, the mobility provided for personnel, as well as the gratuity of all positions in the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce other than the boards of auditors. It is not by chance that, with the passing of the contingency of the period of international crisis and recession, the legislator proceeded to repeal the provision in question and to restore the remunerated nature of the position.

7.2.– Regarding the comparison with the auditors, the President of the Council of Ministers points out that the latter are characterized by specific technical competence, attested by holding academic qualifications in economic-legal matters, as well as registration in the dedicated register, which is obtained by passing a professional qualification exam, whereas no specialization is required for the members of the board of directors of the Chambers of Commerce. Their appointment occurs through designation by the representative organizations of businesses, trade union organizations of workers, associations for the protection of the interests of consumers and users, as well as professionals.

By this, the intervention filing specifies, it is not intended to affirm in absolute terms that the activity performed by the members of the boards of directors of the Chambers of Commerce should not be remunerated, but only to highlight that, in certain cases, where particular needs arise, such as those indicated above (reasons instrumental to achieving the objectives of immediate cost containment of the system and immediate commencement of reorganization), it would not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or even manifestly discriminatory for the legislator to provide for the gratuity of such positions.

7.3.– With reference to the alleged violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, due to the alleged infringement of the independence and financial and economic-management autonomy of the Chamber of Commerce, the State Attorney General emphasizes that the annual fee, which registered businesses are required to pay, is a tax, is subject to the so-called *ravvedimento* (voluntary disclosure) regime, as well as compulsory collection, following direct enrollment in the register, and the related disputes are devolved to the jurisdiction of the tax commissions.

This tax revenue, therefore, serves to finance public expenditure, and for this reason the Chambers of Commerce, qualified as non-economic public entities carrying out functions of general interest for the business system, are included in the list of public administrations included in the consolidated economic account, pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 3, of Law of December 31, 2009, no. 196 (Public Accounting and Finance Law).

In this regard, the State Attorney General specifies that the Chambers of Commerce, no differently from other entities listed by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), are subject to public finance rules, especially those aimed at cost containment. The balance of the extended public finance could not be achieved in the presence of an "imbalance” in the accounts of the Chambers of Commerce, so that the latter are not alien to the objective of achieving this balance.

The alleged infringement of the entity's autonomy would thus be refuted, as the premise of the referring judge, according to which the compensation of the governing bodies would not be borne by the state budget, proves to be unfounded.

7.4.– Finally, regarding the alleged violation of Articles 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, the President of the Council of Ministers notes that these constitutional norms would be "habitually applied only to dependent workers,” a figure that is not at issue in the case of the challenged provision.

He argues, conversely, that the referring judge should have referred to Article 97 of the Constitution, while noting in this regard that the challenged provision is in line with the principle of good administration of public administrations, since the choice made by the legislator, through the regulation adopted by Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law no. 580 of 1993, would have balanced the need to reduce the costs of the Chambers of Commerce with the necessity to continue to carry out the institutional objectives of general interest entrusted to these entities.

8.– In the proximity of the hearing, V. I. and the Turin Chamber of Commerce filed illustrative memoranda.

8.1.– The defense of the former insists on the unreasonableness and disproportionateness of the challenged regulatory intervention, referring in particular to the judgment of this Court no. 173 of 2016 and pointing out that, in the present case, the issue is not a mere reduction of compensation, but its total elimination.

After reiterating the well-founded nature of the issues centered on disparities of treatment, the party invokes the decree of the Minister of Enterprises and Made in Italy, in agreement with the Minister of Economy and Finance, of March 13, 2023 (Implementation of Article 4-bis, paragraphs 2-bis and 2-bis.1, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 and subsequent amendments and integrations, laying down the criteria and maximum limits for emoluments due to the administrative bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, within the limits of available resources based on current legislation), containing the determination of minimum and maximum compensation values for the chamber bodies, in order to emphasize how Article 5, paragraph 8, of the aforementioned interministerial decree, places these charges entirely on the entities' budgets, which demonstrates that the gratuity regime, provided for by the challenged provision, would have brought no benefit to the State.

8.2.– The Turin Chamber of Commerce, for its part, reiterates that the challenge focused on the sequence of remunerated status-gratuity-remunerated status for chamber positions focuses on the succession of regulatory regimes that differ from each other, which in itself would not be illegitimate, unless there is an arbitrariness in the choice. This latter characteristic, which would not exist in this case, where the measures found justification in the economic context present at the time of their adoption.

Subsequently, the entity's defense reaffirms the impossibility of comparing the position of the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, for which gratuity was provided, with that of the auditors, just as it reiterates the impossibility of equating, with regard to the *ratio* of the challenged provision, the Chambers of Commerce with professional orders.

Finally, it contests the thesis that the provision of gratuity limits the autonomy of the entities, which, in its opinion, would instead be expanded by the release of resources resulting from the established savings, and insists on the radical unfoundedness of the reference to the protections under Articles 35 and 36 of the Constitution with regard to subjects not classifiable as workers.

Considered in Law

9.– The Ordinary Court of Turin, Third Civil Section, in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 184 of 2025), raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law no. 580 of 1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, letter f), of the delegation law no. 124 of 2015, in the part in which it provided for the gratuity of all positions in the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture (hereinafter: Chambers of Commerce) other than the boards of auditors.

The constitutional reference was made in the context of a civil proceeding initiated by the former president of the Turin Chamber of Commerce (in office from 2014 to 2020), who requested payment of a sum as consideration for the activity performed in the period following the entry into force of the challenged provision.

10.– The referring judge considers that Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law no. 580 of 1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, is detrimental to Article 3 of the Constitution due to "inherent irrationality and unreasonableness […] with a correlated and disproportionate disparity of treatment [compared to] identical or similar situations” governed by antecedent and subsequent provisions. According to the referring judge, the legislator—by providing, with Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, for the gratuity of positions that were previously remunerated and then returning, with Decree-Law no. 228 of 2021, as converted, to a remunerated regime—would have treated the same substantial position in a diametrically opposite way from an economic point of view within less than five years, without any change in the tasks and responsibilities of the governing bodies.

Still in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, the referring judge censures the disparity of treatment that would emerge from the comparison between the provision for gratuity for the governing positions of the Chambers of Commerce and the maintenance of compensation for the auditors, who are also bodies of the chamber system.

Furthermore, the referring judge asserts the constitutional illegitimacy of the introduced gratuity regime only concerning the Chambers of Commerce, which would be treated in an unreasonably different manner compared to professional orders, equally endowed with broad autonomy and based on a similar associative structure.

Moreover, the Court of Turin finds, pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, an infringement of the autonomy of the Chambers of Commerce, social formations of the business world, which would be deprived of the faculty to pay compensation to their governing bodies, without any benefit for public accounts deriving from such provision, as these charges are not borne by the state budget.

Finally, the Court of Turin denounces the conflict between the challenged provision and Articles 3, 35, and 36 of the Constitution. The referring judge observes that, while it is true that Article 36 of the Constitution is habitually applied only to dependent workers, it must nevertheless be deemed unreasonable and disproportionate, in light of Articles 3 and 35 of the Constitution, to exclude any compensation for activities, such as those of the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, characterized by significant public relevance, heavy responsibilities, and continuous, non-episodic commitment.

11.– The Turin Chamber of Commerce raised an objection of inadmissibility due to lack of relevance, motivated on the premise of the non-existence of a constitutionally guaranteed right to receive compensation by the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce, a right whose source the referring judge failed to identify.

11.1.– The objection is unfounded.

The challenges are directed precisely at the existence of a right to compensation for holding governing positions in the Chambers of Commerce and, specifically, for performing tasks related to the office of president; a right that the referring judge grounds in Articles 35 and 36 of the Constitution.

Whether such a right is founded (and its source is identifiable) and whether its exclusion by the challenged provision is unreasonable and infringes on equal treatment are questions that relate to the merits, not the procedure.

12.– Before proceeding with this judgment, however, the inadmissibility of the challenge raised with reference to Article 36 of the Constitution must be noted ex officio due to lack of motivation.

The referring judge expressly acknowledges that this constitutional provision "is habitually applied only to dependent workers by the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation,” so he argues for the unreasonableness and disproportionateness of the challenged provision by relying only on Articles 3 and 35 of the Constitution.

This is sufficient to highlight the lack of motivation regarding the first issue.

13.– Coming to the merits, this Court deems it necessary to examine first the challenge raised with reference to Articles 3 and 35 of the Constitution, as it considers it logically a priority to ascertain whether the provision of gratuity for the governing positions of the Chambers of Commerce is inherently unreasonable and infringes upon the protection of work in all its forms.

14.– The question is unfounded.

14.1.– As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to characterize the nature of the bodies of the Chambers of Commerce for which the gratuity of the position has been provided, namely the council, the board, and the president (Article 9 of Law no. 580 of 1993).

The councilors are designated by the representative organizations of businesses, trade union organizations of workers, associations for the protection of the interests of consumers and users, and the presidents of professional orders, with the further possibility for the entities' statutes to provide for the renewal of the councils through the direct election of the component concerning the registered businesses (Article 12 of Law no. 580 of 1993).

The council elects from among its members, by separate votes, the board and the president (Article 11, paragraph 1, letter b, of Law no. 580 of 1993), the latter within thirty days of the council's appointment and with the majorities indicated in Article 16, paragraph 1, of the aforementioned Law no. 580 of 1993.

The figure of the president, as well as the position of the other governing bodies, does not exhibit the characteristics of a subordinate, quasi-subordinate, or self-employed employment relationship, but rather presents the features typical of honorary offices.

The attribution of the aforementioned positions is inspired by "criteria of a political-discretionary rather than technical-administrative nature, the integration into the public administration apparatus is functional rather than structural, the regulation of the relationship derives, almost exclusively, from the act of conferring the position [...], the compensation received is of an indemnity rather than remuneration nature, and finally the duration [...] is normally temporary and not tending towards indeterminacy” (judgment no. 319 of 1994).

These indications, which can be inferred from constitutional jurisprudence, are also reflected in that of legitimacy, according to which "the figure of the honorary official occurs whenever there is a service relationship with the attribution of public functions, but the elements characterizing public employment are lacking, namely: the choice of the employee of a purely technical-administrative nature made through competitive procedures, which is contrasted, in the case of the honorary official, by the political-discretionary choice; the structural integration of the employee into the organizational apparatus of the public administration, which is distinct from the merely functional integration of the honorary official; the performance of the relationship according to the specific statute of public employment, inapplicable to the honorary official for whom the regulation is drawn almost exclusively from the act of conferring the position as well as from the special provisions that regulate the same; the remunerative nature of the compensation received by the public employee, which is justified by the contractual reciprocal exchange, compared to the indemnity and reimbursement of the compensation received by the honorary official; the tendentially indeterminate duration of the public employment relationship, as opposed to the normal temporariness of the honorary position” (Court of Cassation, Labour Section, order of December 30, 2021, no. 41999; on the same topic, also United Civil Sections, judgment of April 10, 1997, no. 3129).

14.2.– Since the figures at issue in the present proceedings are classified as honorary positions, it must be excluded—as the referring judge himself acknowledges—the possibility of referring to the specific guarantees provided by "Article 36 of the Constitution [and the connected issue concerning the overall evaluation of economic treatment” (judgment no. 319 of 1994; in the same sense, judgment no. 70 of 1971).

The honorary nature of the position, conversely, evokes *sui iuris* relationships (Court of Cassation, Labour Section, order of February 26, 2020, no. 5239), increasingly widespread in the legal system, characterized sometimes by the nature of representation or representativeness, and at other times by the need to support the performance of public functions; functions that must be fulfilled in conformity with the constraint of discipline and honor contemplated by Article 54, second paragraph, of the Constitution (Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, order of November 4, 2015, no. 22569).

This set of relationships, which encompasses heterogeneous figures, lies at the boundaries of the galaxy of Article 35 of the Constitution, which protects "work in all its forms and applications” (judgment no. 148 of 2024 and, in the same sense, judgment no. 112 of 2021).

Therefore, the legislator has a wide margin of discretion (again, judgment no. 70 of 1971 and, in the context of elected offices, judgment no. 52 of 1997) in defining the features of individual cases, and it is precisely these features that attract, from time to time, the reference to specific constitutional principles—such as Article 51, third paragraph, of the Constitution in the case of elected public functions—and constitute the term of comparison against which to measure any manifest unreasonableness or disproportionateness of the choices made by the legislator himself.

This primarily concerns the aspect relating to the remuneration or the potential gratuity of the position, associated or not with reimbursement of expenses.

In particular, considering that the honorary position is voluntary, always renunciable, and, to a greater or lesser extent, a source of social prestige, various are the indicators that can guide the assessment of any manifest unreasonableness of providing for the gratuity of its performance.

A first indication is drawn from the nature of the position and, specifically, from its being classifiable among those elected public offices, referred to in Article 51 of the Constitution, which, "in a democratic system with a broad popular base and within which power is not reserved for classes in economically advantageous conditions[, must be accessible] also to the poor” and, therefore, normally require the payment of an indemnity (judgments no. 182 of 2022; in the same sense, judgments no. 454 of 1997 and no. 24 of 1968).

Likewise, the fact that the honorary position is aimed at supporting public functions that require guarantees of independence, as in the case of honorary jurisdiction (on its requirements for independence, see judgment no. 41 of 2021, point 13 of the Considered in Law, and judgment no. 108 of 1962), must be considered indicative of manifest unreasonableness of the gratuity of the position.

Furthermore, further indicators supporting the same conclusion can be found in the legal incompatibility between the honorary position and other remunerated occupations or activities or sources of income (judgment no. 188 of 2022), as well as in the factual incompatibility between the type of institutional position, particularly demanding and burdensome, and activities capable of ensuring income.

However, none of the indicators just mentioned are found with regard to the positions that are the subject of the current challenge.

The councilors of the Chambers of Commerce are designated by private law associations and entities representing categories.

Subject to the prohibition for those who are employees of the Chamber of Commerce, the Region, and local authorities within the territory to hold the office of councilor, and without prejudice to any authorization from the entity of belonging for other public employees (Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 165 of March 30, 2001, concerning "General rules on the organization of employment in the public administrations”), there is no prohibition on carrying out remunerated activities or income-generating activities. At the same time, only limited incompatibilities are established with respect to holding other public offices or positions in entities or companies in various ways connected to the Chambers of Commerce (Article 13, paragraph 2, letters a, b, and c, of Law no. 580 of 1993).

Lastly, it cannot be considered that the commitment required of the councilors and the president himself is factually incompatible with the performance of other remunerated or income-generating activities.

The absence of reasons that make the unreasonableness of a gratuity regime immediately evident does not, however, equate to automatically legitimizing treatments lacking compensation for honorary positions, which still involve a commitment *lato sensu* of work.

Rather, it confirms the possibility of giving weight to specific justifying reasons for the provision of gratuity, such as, for example, the economic difficulties of the entity conferring the position, systematic reorganization needs, necessary reduction of state funding, especially in conjunction with periods of socio-economic crisis.

14.3.– It is therefore necessary to note that only the reimbursement of expenses for governing positions in the Chambers of Commerce was introduced, replacing the previous remunerated regime, in the context of a systematic reorganization (Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016) aimed at ensuring wider autonomy and greater efficiency for these entities, with lower costs for the businesses that finance them and with the abolition, also, of "generic and indeterminate funding” (judgment no. 261 of 2017) arising from state and regional laws (as inferred from the repeal, by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter r, number 1, letter a, of the aforementioned Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, of Article 18, paragraph 1, letter c, of Law no. 580 of 1993).

This overall reorganization represented a piece of the broader reorganization of public administrations, envisaged by the delegation law no. 124 of 2015, and intended to provide remedies, especially to protect businesses that contribute to the financing of the Chambers of Commerce, to address the critical issues that emerged "in the European and international context of the crisis and recession years that have also affected our country,” as stated in the preliminary report on the regulatory impact assessment attached to the draft delegated legislative decree (XVII Legislature, Government Act subject to parliamentary opinion no. 327-bis, of November 11, 2016, laying down "Draft legislative decree regarding the reorganization of the functions and financing of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture”).

In this perspective are the main regulatory measures adopted by the delegated legislator (Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016), in implementation of the delegation referred to in Article 10 of Law no. 124 of 2015.

In particular, this intervention intended, among other things: i) to reduce the number of Chambers of Commerce, through mergers (Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016); ii) to reduce the number of councilors (Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 580 of 1993, as amended by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter i, of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016); iii) to eliminate the residual form of generic funding through "revenues and contributions derived from state laws, regional laws, agreements, or provided for in relation to the attributions of the Chambers of Commerce” (according to the aforementioned Article 1, paragraph 1, letter r, number 1, letter a, of Law no. 219 of 2016, repealing, as anticipated, Article 18, paragraph 1, letter c, of Law no. 580 of 1993); iv) to contain the annual contribution of registered businesses, which is halved compared to 2014 (Article 4, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, in relation to Article 28, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law of June 24, 2014, no. 90, laying down "Urgent measures for simplification and administrative transparency and for the efficiency of judicial offices,” converted, with modifications, into Law of August 11, 2014, no. 114); v) to provide new rules for identifying needs (Article 18, paragraph 4, of Law no. 580 of 1993, as amended by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter r, number 1, letter e, of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016).

The introduction of the gratuity regime for "honorary” services by the holders of governing positions, while still allowing for the reimbursement of expenses incurred for the performance of their duties (Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, second period, as introduced by Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016), is thus squarely part of this organizational and financial restructuring, consistent with the relevant socio-economic context.

This excludes the manifest arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the challenged regulatory intervention.

15.– Having clarified that the provision of gratuity, except for expense reimbursement, for the honorary positions of the chamber bodies other than the auditors, does not in itself conflict with Articles 3 and 35 of the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the harm that the referring judge believes is caused to Article 3 of the Constitution "due to inherent irrationality and unreasonableness [of the challenged provision], with a correlated and disproportionate disparity of treatment [compared to] identical or similar situations” governed by antecedent and subsequent provisions.

In particular, the referring judge complains that, in a timeframe of "less than 5 years,” the legislator alternated a remunerated regime with a gratuitous one, only to return again to a remunerated regime, without the tasks and responsibilities of the chamber bodies having substantially changed.

16.– This question is also unfounded.

16.1.– As a preliminary matter, it must be specified that the challenge of inherent unreasonableness, as presented by the referring judge, boils down to the complained-of unreasonable disparity of treatment between regulatory regimes that follow one another over time, to the extent that the referring judge himself considers the questions strictly correlated.

Nor is the mere mention of the limited time frame in which the dual change of the economic regime was established sufficient to support the hypothesis of a discriminatory intent against the bodies in office at the time of the regulatory intervention, to which the party’s defense alludes, when it claims that the legislator "was able to know *ex ante* the names of the Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce affected by the gratuity-remuneration pairing.”

Such intent is contradicted by the fact that the regime introduced by the challenged provision involved both subjects who already held the position and individuals who assumed the commitment when the challenged regulatory regime was in force, and it concerned all the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce and not only the presidents.

In any case, it is decisive to note that the challenge makes no distinction between those who were in office and those who were not at the time the challenged provision entered into force, nor does it put forward the hypothesis that these categories of subjects may claim different interests.

16.2.– Coming, therefore, to examine the alleged disparity of treatment, it must be recalled that, according to constant constitutional jurisprudence, "a differentiated treatment applied to the same circumstances, but at different moments in time, is not in itself in conflict with the principle of equality, as the flow of time can constitute a valid element of diversification of legal situations (orders no. 25 of 2012, no. 224 of 2011, no. 61 of 2010, no. 170 of 2009, no. 212 and no. 77 of 2008)” (judgment no. 254 of 2014). "It is up to the legislator’s discretion, in compliance with the standard of reasonableness, to delineate the temporal scope of application of the rules, and from this angle, the flow of time can represent an appreciable distinguishing criterion in the regulation of legal situations (judgments no. 273 of 2011, point 4.2 of the Considered in Law, and no. 94 of 2009, point 7.2 of the Considered in Law)” (judgment no. 104 of 2018; in the same sense, judgments no. 7 of 2024 and no. 194 of 2018).

On the basis of these premises, the alleged disparity of treatment between the recipients of the challenged provision and those who, before its introduction, held the same position for remuneration is unfounded, as it is not unreasonable for the legislator to have changed the economic regime of the specific honorary function, in conjunction with a reform intervention, inspired by systematic reorganization and spending review.

Likewise, a disparity of treatment cannot be found with respect to those who benefited from the reintroduction of the remunerated regime, by Decree-Law no. 228 of 2021, as converted.

In fact, no unreasonableness can be found in the choice to limit particularly cost containment policies over time, reintroducing the remunerated regime in a different socio-economic context, after the reorganization operations envisaged by the reform of the chamber system have been carried out over the five-year period.

17.– Coming to the other challenges that denounce the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution for disparity of treatment, these are also unfounded.

17.1.– Regarding the comparison with the auditors, for whom the remunerated regime was maintained, even with the 2016 reform, it must be noted that they, although bodies of the Chambers of Commerce (Article 9 of Law no. 580 of 1993), perform functions clearly distinct from those of the governing bodies.

The latter hold active administration tasks, while the auditors are responsible for the control of the entity, and this is sufficient to distinguish them from the former, given that remuneration is a guarantee of independence for them.

To this differential aspect is then added the further distinction linked to the requirement of professional specificity required only for the auditors, who must either be registered in a specific professional register or be public executives or officials (Article 17, paragraph 1, of Law no. 580 of 1993).

Thus, the homogeneity of the *tertium comparationis* is lacking.

17.2.– Furthermore, the imposition of gratuity for the governing bodies of the Chambers of Commerce, when compared with what is provided for corresponding positions in professional orders, does not constitute an undue disparity of treatment.

The comparison with the latter entities is, in fact, based on overly generic similarities, such as the analogous representative structure—in one case of businesses, in the other of reference professionals—and similar disciplinary tasks in the sectors in which they are respectively competent.

Conversely, to show the lack of homogeneity, it is sufficient to recall that professional orders are not included in the list, drawn up by ISTAT, of public administrations included in the consolidated economic account pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 3, of Law no. 196 of 2009, which means they are not subject to public finance rules, especially those aimed at cost containment.

In any case, it is within the full discretion of the legislator to decide to organize differently entities that operate in distinct and heterogeneous sectors, such as business activities and the exercise of professions.

18.– Lastly, the challenge raised with reference to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, on the assumption that, by providing for the gratuity of governing positions, the legislator infringed upon the autonomy of the Chambers of Commerce, which cannot freely decide to recognize remuneration for these functions, is also without merit.

In particular, the autonomy of public entities does not prevent the State from reorganizing on the basis of uniform regulations.

This Court, even after the introduction of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, has reiterated that "the Chambers of Commerce perform tasks that require uniform regulation at the national level and, as has been observed, do not constitute an archipelago of isolated entities, but are the terminals of a single national system that justifies the intervention of the State” (judgment no. 261 of 2017; in the same sense, also judgment no. 374 of 2007).

This challenge must therefore also be considered unfounded.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law of December 29, 1993, no. 580 (Reorganization of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree of November 25, 2016, no. 219 (Implementation of the delegation referred to in Article 10 of Law of August 7, 2015, no. 124, for the reorganization of the functions and financing of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture), raised, with reference to Article 36 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Turin, Third Civil Section, in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the heading;

2) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Law no. 580 of 1993, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter d), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 219 of 2016, raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, and 35 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Turin, Third Civil Section, in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 11, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Chancellor

Filed in the Chancellery on March 27, 2026

 

The anonymized version is textually consistent with the original