JUDGMENT NO. 85

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 2946 of the Civil Code and Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of April 13, 1999 (Reorganization of the national tax collection service, in implementation of the delegation provided for by Law no. 337 of September 28, 1998), initiated by the Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, in the proceedings pending between the Revenue Agency - Collection and M. P., by order dated September 19, 2025, registered under no. 221 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 47, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the act of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having heard, in chambers on March 23, 2026, the Reporting Judge Roberto Nicola Cassinelli;

Having deliberated in chambers on March 23, 2026.

Statement of Facts

1.– The Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, has raised, with reference to Articles 3 (first paragraph), 97, and 111 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 2946 of the Civil Code (Ordinary prescription), according to which, save for cases where the law provides otherwise, rights are extinguished by prescription upon the expiry of ten years, in the part in which it applies – according to the consolidated orientation of the legitimacy jurisprudence, to the extent of constituting "living law" – also to the collection of erarial taxes, as well as Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of April 13, 1999 (Reorganization of the national tax collection service, in implementation of the delegation provided for by Law no. 337 of September 28, 1998), which allows creditor entities to reactivate collection even after discharge, provided that the limitation period for the claim has not expired.

2.– The referring court premises that it was seized by the appeal proposed by the Revenue Agency - Collection against a judgment of the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Rome, Section 13, which had upheld the challenge, proposed by the taxpayer M. P., of a payment notice for the collection of erarial taxes served on August 4, 2022, holding that the ordinary limitation period provided for by Article 2946 of the Civil Code, applicable to the case at hand, had expired, as the previous act of the collection procedure had been served on April 7, 2011.

The appellant administration, in particular, had highlighted that the prescription had not yet matured, since the calculation of the relative period had to take into account the suspension ordered by Article 68, paragraph 4-bis, of Decree-Law no. 18 of March 17, 2020 (Measures for the strengthening of the National Health Service and economic support for families, workers, and businesses connected to the COVID-19 epidemiological emergency), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 27 of April 24, 2020, and subsequently extended by Article 4 of Decree-Law no. 41 of March 22, 2021 (Urgent measures regarding support for businesses and economic operators, work, health, and territorial services, connected to the COVID-19 emergency), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 69 of May 21, 2021.

On this basis, the judge a quo observes that, due to the referenced provisions, the limitation period had undergone an overall extension of twenty-four months, which allowed for the consideration that the payment notice had been served in a timely manner.

3.– Having stated the above, the referring court doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 2946 of the Civil Code in the part where, according to the living law, it applies to the collection of erarial taxes, assuming that the five-year period established for the collection of the municipal property tax (IMU), ancillary penalties for tax violations, and social security credits would be more appropriate for the case.

The same doubt of constitutional legitimacy is presented, "if and to the extent necessary," also with regard to Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of 1999, in the part providing that the creditor entity may "re-entrust sums for collection," after their discharge, on the condition that the ten-year limitation period has not expired.

4.– As regards relevance, the Tax Justice Court observes that the upholding of the questions of constitutional legitimacy would be decisive for the ruling on the tax appeal, because the application of the five-year period would lead to considering the challenged interruptive act as untimely, even if the suspension ordered during the pandemic emergency were applied.

5.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness, the order premises a reference to the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, which has long and consistently subjected the collection of erarial taxes to the ordinary limitation period, in the terms clearly represented, in particular, by the judgment of the Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 23397 of November 17, 2016.

Having briefly reconstructed the living law, the referring court assumes its constitutional illegitimacy in relation to various parameters.

5.1.– In a first question, the referring court assumes that Article 3 (first paragraph) of the Constitution is violated under the profile of the principle of equality, due to the different treatment that the same jurisprudence would have reserved for the collection of IMU, in relation to which it held the five-year period under Article 2948, number 4, of the Civil Code to be applicable.

Such disparity of treatment, in the opinion of the referring court, would result in "an unjustified privilege for the state administration."

5.2.– Three questions are then raised with reference to Article 97 of the Constitution, under different profiles.

Firstly, the referring court, with the second censure, observes that, as a matter of common experience, "participation in an [administrative] proceeding (in the broadest notion), governed by rules of any rank, requires the use of an electronic tool (computer, tablet, smartphone) capable of producing an electronic document and sending it, via airwaves, to its recipient"; it follows that when, as in this case, the notification of procedural acts is carried out by means of certified electronic mail, "waiting times for the requested operation would be eliminated."

On this basis, it states that the reduction of the times necessary for the completion of interruptive acts would no longer make it justifiable to maintain in force "a provision [...] that entered into force when the first commercial computer had not even been imagined."

5.3.– With the third censure, the referring court then assumes that the ten-year limitation period for collection would be "anomalous" with respect to a system in which the provision of a five-year period "expresses a general trend of the legal system."

Since, in fact, this latter term is established for the assessment of direct taxes, for the collection of municipal taxes and ancillary penalties for tax violations, for the "effectiveness of the application for setting a hearing in the administrative process," and for the automatic discharge of uncollected tax bills, it would by now be "perceived as the ultimate deadline within which certain activities must be performed or as the term that (if exceeded) determines the ineffectiveness of the act."

Hence a further profile of violation of the evoked parameter.

5.4.– With the fourth censure, a further profile of contrast with Article 97 of the Constitution is highlighted, as well as with the "principles of reasonableness and proportionality," which would derive from the comparison between the discipline provided by the challenged civil code provision and that of the judgment for challenging tax acts.

The referring court observes, in particular, that the taxpayer must challenge the tax act, under penalty of forfeiture, within sixty days from the relevant notification, and then has the burden of filing the appeal at the registry of the seized court within the subsequent thirty days, so that "the time recognized for the drafting of the appeal [...] is always double the time assigned for its filing," as "the activity of drafting the appeal requires an effort of intellectual creativity that filing (a mere material activity) does not require."

It notes, therefore, that for the assessment of the tax violation, the administration has at its disposal, under penalty of forfeiture, a term of five years, which starts from the last day of the fifth year following the tax year to which the examined or omitted tax return refers, while the subsequent right to collection, due to the provision in question, is prescribed in the term of ten years.

It deems, therefore, that it can "establish a parallelism" between the two pairs of tasks, as both are composed of a first moment dedicated to the drafting of the act – which requires a particular "effort of intellectual creativity" – and its filing, which can be accomplished in much shorter times; from which it deduces the unreasonableness of a prescription period double that provided for the forfeiture of the Treasury's taxing power.

5.5.– The fifth censure denounces the "[v]iolation of the principle of coherence of the legal system."

The referring court assumes that, dating from 2009, the legislature would have manifested its own "tendency [...] to shorten the times for the completion of certain activities."

To this end, it cites, as an example, a series of regulatory interventions referring to the most varied systems (from the civil procedural order to that of administrative justice), highlighting that, even in this perspective, the maintenance of the ten-year term would be constitutionally illegitimate.

5.6.– Lastly, with the sixth censure, the referring court assumes that Article 2946 of the Civil Code would be in conflict with Article 111 of the Constitution; this is because, even if "process and proceeding are ontologically distinct entities," the tax proceeding must also "have a reasonable duration."

6.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General.

The state defense first excepted the inadmissibility of the questions due to the manipulative scope of the query, observing that the identification of the limitation period in tax matters constitutes a political and technical choice of balancing between the State's need to place adequate time margins for the exercise of erarial credits and the taxpayer's right to have certainty and stability in legal relations, a choice that, as such, can only be reserved for the legislature.

The remedy to the prospect vulnus, therefore, would impose a systemic intervention, which could not be asked of this Court.

In the alternative, it excepted the groundlessness of the questions under all the highlighted profiles.

In particular, and as regards the denounced disparity of treatment with respect to the discipline of the collection of municipal taxes, it observed that the different limitation period applicable is the direct consequence of the different nature of the relative obligations – autonomous and unitary for erarial taxes, periodic and of duration for municipal ones – expressive of the so-called fiscal polysystemicity, evaluated on the basis of the general provisions dictated in the legal system.

As for the relationship between the limitation period and the tasks necessary to carry out the relative interruptive acts, it noted that the numerical dimensions of the creditor lots relating to state taxes entail, for their collection, the adoption of enforcement or precautionary procedures that are particularly expensive, also by virtue of the regulatory limits to which the Treasury is subjected in the subject matter.

Furthermore, and with reference to the alleged violation of Article 97 of the Constitution, it highlighted the irrelevance of the parameter with respect to the content of the criticisms, which are unsuitable for supporting any profile of constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provision.

Finally, it observed that the numerous legislative interventions reducing terms, reported in the referral order, cannot be compared with the discipline of the prescription of tax credits, which has a substantive nature, and that, for this latter reason, the reference to the principle of reasonable duration of the process is not at all pertinent.

Legal Considerations

7.– The Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, has raised, with reference to Articles 3 (first paragraph), 97, and 111 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 2946 of the Civil Code (Ordinary prescription), in the part in which – according to the consolidated orientation of the legitimacy jurisprudence, to the extent of constituting "living law" – it applies to the collection of erarial taxes, resulting in the prescription of the relative credit in the ordinary ten-year term rather than the five-year term applicable to the collection of IMU, penalties for tax violations, and social security credits, as well as Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of 1999, which allows creditor entities to reactivate collection even after discharge, provided that the limitation period for the credit has not expired.

8.– With a first question, the referring court denounces a conflict of the challenged provisions with Article 3 (first paragraph) of the Constitution, deducing a disparity of treatment with respect to the collection of IMU, which is subject to a five-year prescription.

The second, third, and fourth questions refer to Article 97 of the Constitution.

The judge a quo assumes that the provision of a ten-year period for the prescription of collection would no longer be justified in light of the fact that, with the introduction of electronic notifications, the interruptive act requires a bureaucratically reduced time commitment.

The ten-year term, moreover, would be anomalous with respect to a system in which the provision of a five-year term "expresses a general trend of the legal system."

Finally, it would be unreasonable, with the consequent violation also of Article 3 of the Constitution, to provide for a term double that within which the financial administration, under penalty of forfeiture, is required to ascertain tax violations, since this latter act "requires an effort of intellectual creativity" that the interruption of prescription does not require, so as not to justify a double term for its adoption, as, moreover, would be confirmed by the provision – of which the referrer "believes it can establish a parallelism" with the first case – of a term for the challenge of the tax act by the taxpayer equal to double the term for filing the relative appeal in the registry of the competent court.

With a fifth question, the referrer then denounces the violation of the "principle of coherence of the legal system," assuming that the maintenance of the ordinary limitation period would be contrary to the numerous interventions of the legislature, relating to various sectors of procedural and substantive law, which have provided for a reduction of terms.

Lastly, and with the sixth question, it is assumed that the application of the ordinary limitation period would also cause a vulnus to Article 111 of the Constitution, as the tax proceeding must be considered subject, like the process, to the principle of reasonable duration.

9.– It must first be premised, as regards the questions concerning Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of 1999, that the referral order does not contain any consideration regarding the reasons for which said provision would be applicable to the main proceedings.

These questions, therefore, must be declared inadmissible for lack of motivation on relevance.

If, in fact, the control that this Court carries out in this regard must stop at the threshold of the non-implausibility of the motivation, "both regarding the applicability of the rule in the main process, and with respect to the possibility, or not, of defining 'the latter independently of the solution of the question raised' (ex plurimis, judgment no. 192 of 2022)" (judgment no. 137 of 2025 and order no. 22 of 2026), this imposes, in any case, that a non-implausible motivation be provided; it follows that, in the absolute lack of arguments, the questions cannot pass the admissibility threshold.

10.– Still as a preliminary matter, the exception of inadmissibility raised by the state defense must be rejected, according to which an excessively manipulative petitum would underlie the questions and, consequently, that this Court would be asked to replace the discretion of the legislature in the adoption of the measures necessary to repair the denounced vulnus.

On one hand, in fact, it must be observed that the referral order does not aim at a modification of the system of erarial credit collection – with respect to which, in effect, different remedial solutions could be envisaged, all attributable to options falling within legislative discretion – but at the substitution, in such context, of the ordinary limitation period established by living law with the five-year term that applies to the collection of other credits, which are also of a tax nature.

On the other hand, and in any case, it must be recalled that the petitum of the referral order can clarify the content of the censures, but does not entail the adoption of a bound solution; this Court, in fact, "where it deems the questions founded, remains free to identify the judgment most suitable for the reductio ad legitimitatem of the challenged provision" (judgments no. 146 and no. 53 of 2025 and no. 46 of 2024).

11.– Moving to the scrutiny of the censures on their merits, it is convenient to premise that the application of the ordinary limitation period to the collection of erarial credits is the result of a consolidated line of legitimacy jurisprudence, of which judgment of the Court of Cassation no. 23397 of 2016, which the referrer indicated as living law, is the primary expression.

In that decision, largely recognizing the variegated framework of precedents concerning the prescription of different tax credits, it was affirmed, in particular, that Article 2935 of the Civil Code "applies [...] in cases where a judicial title has become final" regarding the payment notice that legitimizes the forced collection of the erarial credit.

Said term, in fact, is destined to be applied "[s]ave for cases where the law provides otherwise"; and there are no specific provisions dictated for the collection of erarial taxes.

Nor can reference be made to the five-year limitation period, provided for by Article 2948, number 4, of the Civil Code for "everything that must be paid periodically annually or in shorter terms."

It is, in fact, a term referred exclusively to periodic obligations or obligations of duration, characterized by the fact that the performance is susceptible to fulfillment only with the passage of time and the interest of the creditor is satisfied through repeated execution.

In this latter ambit, therefore, fall local taxes, in which the credit relationship is characterized by "a causa debendi of a continuous type susceptible to fulfillment" only by effect of the prolongation in time of the performance provided by the imposing entity or by the benefit that the latter grants (see, among others, Court of Cassation, Tax Section, judgments of December 10, 2014, no. 26013 and of February 23, 2010, no. 4283 and, in the same sense, of November 6, 2025, no. 29391); for erarial taxes, however, the autonomy of individual tax periods and the relative obligations prevents the periodic nature of the performance from being affirmed, since the credit derives, year by year, from a new assessment on the existence of the taxing conditions.

11.1.– Given these considerations, the first question, raised with reference to Article 3 (first paragraph) of the Constitution, is not founded.

The censure prospects a violation of the principle of equality due to the disparity of treatment that would be configured, as regards the limitation period, between the discipline of the collection of erarial taxes and that of IMU, to which, as observed, the five-year term applies.

In this sense, the referrer proceeds to a mere numerical comparison between the terms, but omits to confront the reasons that ground their diversity; it has been said, in fact, that the application to local taxes of the five-year period of Article 2948, number 4, of the Civil Code follows from the fact that it is a periodic obligation, and that erarial taxes do not have such nature.

The two types of credit placed in comparison by the referrer are therefore attributable, for the purposes of identifying the limitation period, to two quite different normative paradigms.

Therefore, the challenged provision and that assumed as tertium comparationis regulate non-homogeneous situations, so as to exclude the denounced violation of the principle of equality, which "exists when substantially identical situations are regulated in an unjustifiably different way and not when to the diversity of discipline correspond non-assimilable situations" (ex plurimis, judgments no. 155 of 2014, no. 108 of 2006 and no. 340 of 2004 and order no. 46 of 2020).

In the comparison between the two provisions, there is, in particular, a lack of the relationship of pertinence that must characterize the norms placed in comparison for the purposes of the judgment of equality.

On this point, this Court has recently specified that such a model of judgment "has at its center the concept of pertinence, since it is only possible to consider that the normative treatment of a case is discriminatory in relation to that of another case in so far as the comparison with such second case is indeed pertinent"; and pertinence must be determined also taking into consideration "the needs of systemic coherence and the purposes pursued by the norm subject to constitutional legitimacy control and by that assumed as tertium, which must be coherent and at least not undeserving of constitutional protection" (judgment no. 54 of 2026).

11.2.– The questions formulated with reference to Article 97 of the Constitution are, likewise, all to be rejected.

The second question is not founded, with which the referrer assumes that the ten-year prescription period would be "unjustified," having regard to the fact that, to interrupt it, the administration employs a very short time, which is that required for the sending of an interruptive act by means of certified electronic mail.

This argument, in fact, does not appear convincing.

As this Court has affirmed, "[i]n the discipline of prescription the legislature enjoys wide discretion which allows it to pursue publicistic purposes and, at the same time, to balance the private interests of the opposing parties" (judgment no. 32 of 2024) and which meets the only limit of not being able to be exercised "in such a way as not to make effective the possibility of exercising the right to which it refers" (ex plurimis, judgment no. 234 of 2008 and orders no. 166 of 2006 and no. 153 of 2000).

In the identification of the term to apply to the case at hand, in particular, the nature of the erarial tax credit comes into play, in relation to which it is necessary to balance the interest of the financial administration in collecting it with the reliance that taxpayers can develop as a consequence of the tax authority's inertia.

These are, therefore, the parameters by which the reasonableness of the legislature's choice on the duration of the prescription period could be challenged, which, instead, cannot be determined on the basis of the time necessary to interrupt it.

Moreover, the interruption of prescription can consist of any act signifying the exercise of the relative right by its holder and, in this sense, assume the most varied conformations, so as not to allow the elaboration of a temporal unit of measurement suitable to act as a model, as the referrer would claim to affirm.

11.3.– The third question, which denounces an "anomaly" of the ten-year term with respect to other terms, variously provided for by different provisions in the legal system, is manifestly unfounded.

Also in this case, the referrer's arguments resolve themselves in the noting of a substantial disparity of treatment between the discipline of the prescription in question and other provisions.

These, in particular, concern the assessment of direct taxes, for which Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Decree of the President of the Republic no. 600 of September 29, 1973 (Common provisions regarding the assessment of income taxes) sets, under penalty of forfeiture, for the notification of the relative notices, the deadline of December 31 of the fifth year following that in which the return was presented; the collection of IMU, of which mention was made in point 11.1.; the expiration of appeals of more than five years before the regional administrative tribunal, governed by Article 82, paragraph 1, of Annex 1 (Code of Administrative Process) to Legislative Decree no. 104 of July 2, 2010 (Implementation of Article 44 of Law no. 69 of June 18, 2009, containing delegation to the government for the reorganization of the administrative process); finally, the term for the automatic discharge of roles for quotas entrusted to the collection agent, set at five years by Article 3, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 110 of July 29, 2024 (Provisions regarding the reorganization of the national tax collection system).

These are, obviously, cases that are completely heterogeneous, concerning different systems and, within them, institutions supported by a distinct ratio, in relation to which, moreover, the term is established by the legislature with the different effect of forfeiture of the possibility of enforcing the right.

All the indicated cases, therefore, are unsuitable for performing the function of tertia comparationis, which radically excludes the existence of the denounced violation.

11.4.– For the same reason, the fourth question also appears manifestly unfounded, formulated with reference to Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution.

It, in fact, has its logical support in a comparison – which the referrer qualifies in terms of "parallelism" – between, on one side, the challenge of tax acts by the taxpayer and the subsequent registration of the case on the docket and, on the other side, the assessment action of the tax authority and the subsequent collection of the credit.

These are, obviously, cases not even remotely assimilable; it is no coincidence that the same judge a quo juxtaposes them exclusively on a descriptive level, through purely subjective considerations and devoid of legal substratum, where it assumes that both pairs of tasks would be composed of a first moment dedicated to the "drafting" of the act, which "requires an effort of intellectual creativity," and a second moment dedicated to its "filing," which can be accomplished in much shorter times.

11.5.– The fifth question, formulated with reference to the "principle of coherence of the legal system," with which the referrer, denouncing the unreasonableness of the challenged norm, represents the existence of an antinomy between the ordinary limitation period and the "tendency [of the legislature] to shorten the times for the completion of certain activities," which it assumes was expressed starting from the year 2009, in correspondence with a greater diffusion of computer tools, is not founded.

The simple observation of a conflict "with the tendency of the legal system" does not, in fact, in any way validate the existence of an unreasonable legislative choice.

On the other hand, even wanting to trace the question to the parameter of Article 3 of the Constitution under the profile of equality, interpreting it as a denunciation of a possible violation of the "principle of equality of treatment" (in the terms affirmed by this Court with judgment no. 215 of 2014), the absolute heterogeneity of the situations placed in comparison highlights its lack of foundation, since the norms indicated as tertia comparationis are completely unsuitable for performing such a function (judgment no. 276 of 2016).

11.6.– Finally, the sixth question is also manifestly unfounded, formulated with reference to the principle of reasonable duration of the process referred to in Article 111 of the Constitution, as it is an irrelevant parameter.

The jurisprudence of this Court is, in fact, constant in affirming that the "constitutional asset of the reasonable duration of the process, [...] already implicit in Article 24 of the Constitution, is [...] object of specific statement in the new text of Article 111 of the Constitution, in the wake of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (judgment no. 30 of 2014 and order no. 305 of 2001), so as to inevitably anchor its protection to provisions of a procedural nature, among which the discipline of prescription, which is an institution of substantive law, does not fall.

12.– In conclusion, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 2946 of the Civil Code must be declared manifestly unfounded, with reference to Articles 3, 97, and 111 of the Constitution, and not founded with reference to Articles 3 (first paragraph) and 97 of the Constitution.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 20, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree no. 112 of April 13, 1999 (Reorganization of the national tax collection service, in implementation of the delegation provided for by Law no. 337 of September 28, 1998), raised, with reference to Articles 3 (first paragraph), 97, and 111 of the Constitution, by the Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, with the order indicated in the epigraph;

2) declares the manifest unfoundedness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 2946 of the Civil Code, raised, with reference to Articles 3, 97, and 111 of the Constitution, by the Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, with the order indicated in the epigraph;

3) declares not founded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 2946 of the Civil Code, raised, with reference to Articles 3 (first paragraph) and 97 of the Constitution, the latter under the profile of the unjustified term, as well as to the "principle of coherence of the legal system," by the Tax Justice Court of Second Instance of Lazio, Section 11, with the order indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 23, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Rapporteur

Valeria EMMA, Chancellor

Filed in the Registry on May 19, 2026

 

The anonymized version is consistent, in its text, with the original