JUDGMENT NO. 83

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 10, 13(1), 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 26 May 2025 (Organic revision of regional regulations concerning the associated exercise of municipal functions and services and local government secretaries. Amendments to Regional Laws no. 6 of 5 August 2014 and no. 1 of 12 March 2002), initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers with an appeal notified on 6 August 2025, filed in the Registry on 7 August 2025, registered as no. 28 of the 2025 appeal registry, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 37, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearance of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste;

having heard the reporting judge Massimo Luciani at the public hearing on 11 March 2026;

having heard State Attorney Edoardo Morena for the President of the Council of Ministers and Attorney Marcello Cecchetti for the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste;

having deliberated in the chambers on 11 March 2026.

Legal Reasoning (Factual Context)

1.– By way of an appeal registered as no. 28 of the 2025 appeal registry, notified on 6 August 2025 and filed on 7 August 2025, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, raised questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 10, 13(1), 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 26 May 2025 (Organic revision of regional regulations concerning the associated exercise of municipal functions and services and local government secretaries. Amendments to Regional Laws no. 6 of 5 August 2014 and no. 1 of 12 March 2002).

2.− The President of the Council of Ministers asserts four grounds for the appeal.

2.1.− The first ground challenges, in part, the following provisions of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025: i) Article 3(1), "in the part where, in replacing Article 2 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, letters b) and c) of paragraph 1 of the aforementioned Article 2 [recte: Art. 2], provides that municipalities shall exercise municipal functions and services in an associated form within the territorial ambit of the Unités des Communes valdôtaines, rather than that they may exercise them; and in the part where it refers the regulation of the subsequent paragraph 2 of the same Article 2 exclusively to the aforementioned cases of mandatory exercise”; ii) Article 5(1), "in the part where, in replacing Article 4 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, it provides that municipalities shall exercise municipal functions and services in an associated form through the CELVA, rather than that they may exercise them; and in the part where it refers the regulation of the subsequent paragraph 2 of the same Article 4 exclusively to the aforementioned cases of mandatory exercise”; iii) Article 6(1), "in the part where, in replacing Article 6 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, it provides that municipalities shall exercise municipal functions and services in an associated form through the Regional Administration, rather than that they may exercise them”; iv) Article 13(1), "in the part where, in replacing Article 16 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, it provides that the mandatory exercise of municipal functions and services is entrusted to the Unités des Communes valdôtaines, rather than that such exercise may be entrusted to them optionally”; v) Article 15, "in the part where, in replacing Article 18 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, it provides that municipalities shall exercise as provided therein all functions and services not reserved to the subjects identified therein, rather than referring to the services that said municipalities have not deemed to reserve to the subjects identified therein”; and, finally, vi) Article 16 "in the part where, in introducing Article 20-bis, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as paragraph 7, into Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, it also refers to mandatory agreements”.

All the aforementioned regulatory provisions—within the limits and for the profiles indicated—are alleged to violate "Article 3 of the Constitution, in relation to the combined provisions of Articles 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution, which embody principles, such as the autonomist principle and the principle of sound administration, that fall, including for the purposes of the legislation of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, among the ‘principles of the legal order of the Republic’, and in any case among the constitutional values with which Valdostan legislation must be ‘in harmony’, and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the Statute of the Region of Valle d’Aosta, regarding limits to its primary legislative power”.

The President of the Council of Ministers premises that the aforementioned norms of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 mandated the obligation to exercise various categories of municipal functions and services in an associated form, and that management in an associated form was regulated according to different modalities, consisting, in certain hypotheses, of access to a Unité des Communes valdôtaines, pursuant to Article 8 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, and, for others, of the execution of agreements between municipalities and the subjects referred to in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the same regional law.

According to the State defense, the provision for an associative form with a mandatory character—already introduced by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 5 August 2014 (New regulation of the associated exercise of functions and services of Municipalities and other local entities, as well as provisions relating to the office of local government secretary), then eliminated by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 21 December 2020 (Urgent provisions to allow the revision of the supra-municipal territorial ambits referred to in Article 19 of Regional Law no. 6 of 5 August 2014, as well as the related conferral of new assignments to local government secretaries. Amendments to Regional Law no. 14 of 24 September 2019)—would be in clear contrast with the principles enunciated by this Court in judgment no. 33 of 2019.

Specifically, according to the aforementioned judgment no. 33 of 2019, a regulation that provides for the mandatory associated management of all fundamental functions on a generalized basis would be affected by "excessive rigidity, to the point that it does not allow consideration of all those situations where, due to geographical location and demographic and socio-environmental characteristics, the agreement or union of Municipalities is not suitable to achieve, while maintaining an adequate level of services to the population, those cost savings that the norm cites as the purpose of the entire regulation”.

In the opinion of the State defense, the principles enunciated in judgment no. 33 of 2019 apply to the regional legislator and bind it.

The appeal highlights that the special statute, while assigning the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste primary legislative competence in the matter of the organization of local entities (Article 2(1), letter b), establishes that it must be exercised within the customary limits of "harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic and with respect for international obligations and national interests, as well as the fundamental norms of the economic-social reforms of the Republic” (Article 2(1), alinea, of Constitutional Law no. 4 of 26 February 1948, containing the "Special Statute for the Valle d’Aosta”).

Consequently, in providing for the mandatory nature of the exercise in an associated form of certain municipal services and functions on a generalized basis, Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 was adopted in violation not only of Article 117 of the Constitution (which corresponds to the special statutory provision referred to in Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), but also of Articles 3, 5, and 97 of the Constitution, thus of provisions bearing "principles of the legal order of the Republic” and, in any case, "constitutional values” with which Valdostan legislation must be "in harmony”.

The appellant argues that, even with reference to Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, the generalized provision for the obligation to exercise the municipal functions and services indicated therein ends up constituting a disproportionate solution, and in any case not in line with "functional geography”, imposing a strong sacrifice on municipal autonomy without finding justification in the objective pursued by the regional legislator. This is because, in the perspective adopted by the latter, the revision of the regulation on the associated exercise of municipal functions and services has the explicit "objective of increasing the quality and homogeneity of the services provided to citizens” (reference is made to Article 2 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025).

However, in the opinion of the State defense, the abstract and generalized provision of such an obligation, without the identification of specific exemptions that take into account the differentiated situations that (inevitably) characterize the regional territory, would not guarantee—even in the abstract—the pursuit of this objective, which, on the contrary, to be concretely satisfied, should necessarily be adapted to—and coordinated with—the concrete peculiarities of the individual municipal and geographical realities of the Region, with a view to the maximum efficiency and accessibility of the administrative system.

In summary, the President of the Council of Ministers asserts that, in light of this Court’s judgment no. 33 of 2019 and the principles established therein, no law—not even that of the Region of Valle d’Aosta—could impose upon municipalities the obligation to manage functions and services in an associated form. In fact, the constitutional autonomy of municipalities and the sound management of public administration must always be safeguarded, according to the principle of the optional nature of the common exercise of functions sanctioned by the Court.

2.2.− The second ground of the appeal challenges Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, "in the part where it inserts Article 20-quater into Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with specific reference to paragraph 2, which provides that "[a]ll secretary appointments terminate automatically, regardless of the originally foreseen duration, on the date of the general municipal elections. Secretaries in service shall continue to exercise their functions until the end of the month in which the last secretary appointment is conferred according to the procedure referred to in this article.”

According to the State defense, such a provision would violate "Article 99(2) of the Consolidated Law on the Organization of Local Entities (Legislative Decree 267/2000), a provision interposed to the thus violated parameters referred to in Article 3 of the Constitution, in relation to the combined provisions of Articles 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution, which embody principles, such as the autonomist principle and the principle of sound administration, that fall, including for the purposes of the legislation of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, among the ‘principles of the legal order of the Republic’ and in any case among the constitutional values with which Valdostan legislation must be ‘in harmony’, and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the Statute of the Region of Valle d’Aosta, regarding limits to its primary legislative power.”

More specifically, according to the appellant, Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 would end up dictating a regulation on the rotation of municipal secretaries that is not in accordance with that fixed by the relevant State provisions, among which, in particular, Article 99(2) and (3) of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000 (Consolidated Law on the Organization of Local Entities).

The State defense maintains that the new regional regulation would significantly reduce the institution of the prorogatio of the secretary’s functions, which would be permitted limited only to the month of the general elections, compared to, instead, the four months from the inauguration provided for by the Local Entities Consolidated Law; furthermore, the institution of automatic confirmation in the assignment would not be provided for, which, on the contrary, for the same Consolidated Law, occurs after the aforementioned maximum term of four months from the inauguration of the new mayor (reference is again made to Article 99(3) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law).

The appeal then cites this Court’s judgment no. 23 of 2019 and Article 97(2) and (4) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law.

In light of the specificity that characterizes the figure of the municipal secretary, the challenged regional regulation would end up violating the constitutional parameters referred to in Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution and, in particular, the principle of sound administration referred to in Article 97 of the Constitution, as declined by the national legislator, providing for both a maximum period of prorogatio and "automatic” confirmation in the assignment.

The violation of the aforementioned constitutional parameters would be further accentuated considering that the termination of the "union” secretary assignment is regulated by the challenged provision in such a way as to impose itself on the entity regardless, without exceptions, and, therefore, not only in relation to the Unités affected by the entry into force of the new order introduced by the regional law in question.

Having said this, the President of the Council of Ministers argues that the described violation of the aforementioned parameters would determine the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision in question, since the principle of sound administration referred to in Article 97 of the Constitution binds (also) the regional legislator.

The appeal highlights that Article 15 [recte: Article 105] of the Local Entities Consolidated Law establishes that "[s]pecial statute regions [...] shall regulate the matters referred to in this chapter [Chapter II of Title IV, titled ‘Municipal and Provincial Secretaries’] with their own legislation.”

On this point, the State defense cites this Court’s judgment no. 100 of 2023, according to which the regulations of special autonomy regions that regulate access to the register of municipal secretaries and those relating to the attribution of related deputy functions must be traced back to the statutory competence in the matter of the organization of local entities and related districts: "[s]uch competence includes the regulation of the related personnel (judgment no. 132 of 2006), and must be exercised ‘in harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic’, whether one wishes to regulate the methods of establishing employment relationships or whether one intends to dictate rules on the status of subordinate personnel” (judgment no. 95 of 2021).”

It is added that, with specific regard to the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, this Court expressly held that: "regional norms on the subject of access to the Valdostan register are an expression, both of the statutory legislative competence in the matter of local entities and related districts—given that the municipal secretary depends functionally on the mayor (Article 3(1) of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 46 of 1998) and provides its service activity in favor of the municipality—and of that in the matter of the organization of offices and entities dependent on the Region and legal and economic status of the personnel” (reference is made to judgment no. 100 of 2023, point 2.2 of the Legal Reasoning).

It is also argued that, as specified by this Court again in judgment no. 100 of 2023, both of the legislative competencies in question—expressly identified in Article 2(1), letters a) and b), of the autonomy statute—meet the same limits outlined in the aforementioned Article 2(1), alinea, having to be exercised in harmony with the Constitution, with the principles of the legal order of the Republic, in compliance with international obligations and national interests, as well as the fundamental norms of the economic-social reforms of the Republic. Among such limits, Article 97 of the Constitution would necessarily also be included, which, on the contrary, according to the State defense, would be violated by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025.

2.3.− The third ground of the appeal challenges Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, "in the part where it inserts Article 20-sexies into Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with specific reference to its paragraph 1, which regulates the conferral of the assignment of municipal secretary of the Municipality of Aosta, arguing that the provision in question would violate the "principles referred to in Article 35 of Legislative Decree no. 165 of 30 March 2001, containing ‘Norms on the organization of work in the employ of public administrations’, and Articles 98 and 99 of the Consolidated Law on the Organization of Local Entities, a regulation interposed to the thus violated parameters referred to in Article 3 of the Constitution, in relation to the combined provisions of Articles 5 and 97 of the Constitution, which embody principles, such as the autonomist principle and the principle of sound administration, that fall, including for the purposes of the legislation of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, among the ‘principles of the legal order of the Republic’ and in any case among the constitutional values with which Valdostan legislation must be ‘in harmony’, and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the Statute of the Region of Valle d’Aosta, regarding limits to its primary legislative power.”

In particular, according to what is argued by the appellant, the provision in question would allow the attribution of the assignment of municipal secretary "to subjects significantly different on a professional level from those identified by the same regional regulation, inspired by the principles of the general legal order”, in this way disregarding "both the conduct of the public competition and the participation in the professional training course”, thereby incurring a violation of the constitutional parameters evoked and, especially, of the principles "of impartiality and sound administration of administrative action, underlying the necessary conduct of the competition procedure for the purposes of access to functions and career levels superior to those belonging to the personnel that the challenged provision indicates.” The violation of Article 97 of the Constitution would then be "further aggravated by the circumstance that such a possibility is provided for in an ordinary way, and not in an exceptional or temporary form, without even introducing explicit limits to any new future attributions.”

2.4.− With the fourth and final ground of the appeal, finally, Article 10 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 is challenged, "in the part where it replaces Article 12 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with particular reference to paragraph 1 of this amended article, which regulates the substitution of the mayor, in case of absence, temporary impediment, or incompatibility, as a member of the Executive of the Unités des Communes valdôtaines, arguing that the provision in question would violate "Articles 32 and 53 of the Consolidated Law on Local Entities, as modified by Article 1(105) of Law no. 56 of 2014, constituting a regulation interposed to the thus violated parameters referred to in Article 3 of the Constitution, in relation to the combined provisions of Articles 5 and 97 of the Constitution, as a vehicle, including for the purposes of the legislation of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, of ‘principles of the legal order of the Republic’ and in any case among the constitutional values with which Valdostan legislation must be ‘in harmony’, and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the Statute of the Region of Valle d’Aosta, regarding limits to its primary legislative power.”

In particular, in the opinion of the President of the Council of Ministers, the hypotheses of substitution and delegation of the mayor introduced with the challenged provision would exceed the ambits of regional legislative competence, "because they introduce hypotheses of ‘re-dislocation’, albeit temporary, of mayoral powers beyond those strictly fixed by the relevant provisions of the aforementioned Consolidated Law on Local Entities, and precisely by Article 53 of the same Consolidated Law”, whose contents would integrate "organizational principles inherent to the overall structure of local autonomy” and would prove binding also in the Valdostan local order by virtue of Article 32(4) of the same Local Entities Consolidated Law, modified by Article 1(105) of Law no. 56 of 7 April 2014 (Provisions on metropolitan cities, provinces, unions, and mergers of municipalities) and made applicable in the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste by the subsequent paragraph 145 of the same article.

2.5.– On the basis of these premises, the President of the Council of Ministers asks this Court to declare constitutionally illegitimate Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 13(1), 10, 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, for the reasons and in the terms illustrated in the grounds of the appeal.

3.– With an act filed on 15 September 2025, the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste entered an appearance in the proceedings, asking that the raised questions be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

3.1.– To the illustration of the inadmissibility of some questions, the respondent Region places certain reconstructive premises of the regulatory framework and of the position expressed in the appeal by the President of the Council of Ministers.

3.2.− As a preliminary matter, the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste has excepted the inadmissibility of the questions raised with the first ground of the appeal, in the part where they also refer to letter c) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, as replaced by Regional Law no. 15 of 2025.

In the opinion of the respondent, there would be no need, in fact, for particular interpretative expertise to notice that such a provision, establishing that "[m]unicipal functions and services are exercised: [...] c) at the municipal territorial level, for all other functions and other services, without prejudice to the possibility of associated exercise through agreements between local entities”, would not contemplate any hypothesis of mandatory exercise in an associated form of municipal functions, but rather a case of general and residual scope in which the exercise of the aforementioned functions remains entrusted to the individual municipalities, with the simple "possibility/faculty” for the latter to exercise them in an associated form on the basis of specific agreements stipulated with other entities.

According to the respondent, considered the actual content of the challenged norm, the appeal proposed against Article 3(1) of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 would prove manifestly inadmissible in part—that is, in relation to the replaced Article 2(1), letter c), of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014—at least for an absolute lack of motivation.

3.3.− On the merits, the regional defense deduces the unfoundedness of the questions raised with the first ground of the appeal.

In particular, the respondent Region highlights that towards the norms subject to this first ground, the President of the Council of Ministers proposes a single profile of censure, referred to their common regulatory connotation, consisting of "providing for the mandatory nature of the exercise in an associated form of certain municipal services or functions on a generalized basis”, arguing the alleged violation of the evoked constitutional parameters exclusively with the "clear contradiction with the principles of law” affirmed by this Court in judgment no. 33 of 2019, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 14(28) of Decree-Law no. 78 of 31 May 2010 (Urgent measures on financial stabilization and economic competitiveness), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 122 of 30 July 2010, as modified by Article 19(1) of Decree-Law no. 95 of 6 July 2012 (Urgent provisions for the revision of public spending with invariance of services to citizens as well as measures for the patrimonial strengthening of companies in the banking sector), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 135 of 7 August 2012, "in the part where it does not provide for the possibility, in a context of obliged and non-obliged Municipalities, to demonstrate, for the purpose of obtaining exemption from the obligation, that due to the particular geographical location and demographic and socio-environmental characteristics of the obliged Municipality, economies of scale and/or improvements, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, in the provision of public goods to the reference populations are not achievable with the imposed associative forms.”

The respondent maintains in primis that the national regulation contained in Article 14(28) of Decree-Law no. 78 of 2010, as converted, would not find application in the Valdostan regional order and that neither would the appellant, on the other hand, pretend to claim the opposite, considered that it is not invoked as an interposed parameter.

Regardless of such considerations, it is underlined, it would suffice to read this Court’s judgment no. 33 of 2019 in its entirety to ascertain the erroneousness of the thesis of the "clear contradiction [of the regional regulation submitted to censure] with the principles of law” affirmed by this Court in that pronouncement.

In fact, besides the incidental clause present in the dispositive part of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 14(28) of Decree-Law no. 78 of 2010, as converted, where explicit reference is made to "a context of obliged and non-obliged Municipalities”, judgment no. 33 of 2019—after having argued the reasons for the detected constitutional illegitimacy of the scrutinized legislative regulation—in the same point 7.5 of the Legal Reasoning takes it upon itself to specify with extreme punctuality that "the scope of the decision does not involve all those different situations in which regulations impose obligations of associated management of functions and/or services on the generality of Municipalities, and therefore are referable to all local entities belonging to a specific territorial ambit, without distinguishing between obliged and non-obliged Municipalities.”

In the opinion of the respondent, the "excessive rigidity” of the legislative regulation of the mandatory exercise in an associated form of municipal functions stigmatized in that circumstance regarding national legislation would not reside at all in the "mandatory nature” in and of itself, but only and exclusively in the "mandatory nature” that imposes the associated exercise of functions only to some municipalities and not to others. Therefore, that "excessive rigidity” would not be detectable in any way—precisely based on what was affirmed expressis verbis by this Court—in situations in which the mandatory exercise in an associated form is imposed, without distinctions of any kind, on the generality of municipal entities belonging to a specific territorial context. Such would be the "regulatory situation” designed by the regional norms challenged with the first ground of the appeal.

All, in fact, would contemplate forms and modalities of mandatory exercise in an associated form of municipal functions and services without distinguishing between obliged municipalities and non-obliged municipalities, unequivocally assuming as addressees, therefore, the generality of the municipalities belonging to the territorial ambit of the entire Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste.

According to the respondent, this would confirm the full and undeniable "conformity” of such norms with the principles affirmed by this Court in judgment no. 33 of 2019 and, for the effect, the manifest unfoundedness of the questions raised by the President of the Council of Ministers with the first ground of the appeal.

3.3.1.− This having been said, the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste states that it deems it appropriate, out of mere defensive caution and for the sake of completeness, to highlight further elements that should have been taken into consideration in the evaluation of the constitutional legitimacy of the legislative intervention in question, but which, instead, were completely neglected or even misinterpreted by the President of the Council of Ministers: i) the institutional-territorial context of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta in relation to the entire national territory, characterized by the absence of the provincial level of government; ii) a territory expressly qualified as entirely "mountainous” (Article 2(7-bis) of the Law of the Region of Valle d’Aosta of 7 December 1998, no. 54, containing "System of autonomies in Valle d’Aosta”) and characterized by the presence of seventy-four municipalities, united, from a dimensional point of view, by being all—except for the capital Aosta—qualifiable as "small municipalities” and, on a geomorphological level, by being located along lateral valleys, often not of easy access and in many cases with considerable altimetric development; iii) on the level of normative power, the provision of primary legislative competence attributed to the Region in the matter of "organization of local entities and related districts” (Article 2(1), letter b), of the special statute) and "of integration and implementation of the laws of the Republic” in the matter of "regional and municipal finances” (Article 3(1), letter f), of the special statute); iv) on the level of administrative power, then, the special statute would attribute in a general way to the Region all administrative functions in the matters in which it has legislative competence, without prejudice to the specific functions that the laws of the Republic attribute directly to municipalities and other local entities (Article 4(1), of the special statute). This is in compliance with the principle of the so-called "parallelism of functions” (on the point, reference is made to this Court’s judgment no. 236 of 2004).

Consequently, based on the regime of special autonomy established by the special statute, Valdostan municipalities would not enjoy constitutional prerogatives as "natural holders” of administrative functions in application of the principles referred to in Article 118 of the Constitution, but only of the specific functions that regional law, or State law, determines to confer upon them.

On these bases rests the intervention of the regional legislator referred to in Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, subsequently modified by the Law of the Region of Valle d’Aosta of 25 May 2017, no. 7 (Urgent provisions for the financing of the corporate restructuring plan of Casino de la Vallée S.p.A., in implementation of Regional Law no. 2 of 10 February 2017) and, lastly, by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025. A regional law (no. 6 of 2014) which, in its original layout, suppressed mountain communities and established the Unités des Communes valdôtaines, expressly aimed at the "associated exercise of municipal functions and services” (Article 8(1)), bearing at the same time a general and organic regulation of the "modalities of organization of the mandatory exercise in an associated form of municipal functions and services, with the objective of increasing the quality of the services provided to citizens, reducing overall the organizational and financial burdens and guaranteeing uniform essential levels of services on the entire regional territory” (thus Article 1(1)).

The memorandum describes the system originally built by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014.

In light of the layout and regulatory contents of this law in the text preceding the modifications introduced with Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, an element would emerge that the appellant neglected in relation to the effective innovative scope and the ratio of the legislative intervention operated with the challenged norms.

Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025—deduces the respondent—reformed the arrangement of associated management between municipalities, reducing its mandatory character and expanding the autonomy of local entities. The obligation of supra-municipal management through agreement was in fact transformed into a faculty, save for specific exceptions (as for the municipal secretary in small municipalities and for functions already attributed to other entities). The reform, while confirming some existing associative forms, would eliminate the obligation of association between municipalities for all other functions originally subjected to constraints of associated exercise, strengthening the principles of autonomy, subsidiarity, and administrative efficiency. It would also prove shared with the local entities system, as would emerge from the preparatory work.

3.4.− As for the second ground of the appeal, the Region contests its unfoundedness: the duration of the prorogatio of the municipal secretary would not be reduced to one month, but would derive from a complex procedure that would guarantee a minimum period of about ninety days. Furthermore, the automatic confirmation of the outgoing secretary would not be provided for because the system would ensure continuity without gaps, making the end of the prorogatio coincide with the start of the new assignment.

3.5.− As for the third ground, the respondent Region excepts its inadmissibility in the part where it evokes, as interposed norms, the principles referred to in Article 35 of Legislative Decree no. 165 of 30 March 2001 (General norms on the organization of work in the employ of public administrations) and Article 98 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law, which would be irrelevant in relation to the challenged norm.

On the merits, it defends the legitimacy of the norm that allows the Mayor of Aosta to appoint as secretary a qualified internal executive, who has matured a length of service of at least three years in such a qualification, even if not registered in the register. Such a choice would be justified by the organizational peculiarities of the Municipality of Aosta and would in any case guarantee adequate professionalism, efficiency, and containment of spending.

3.6.− Finally, the fourth ground is deemed inadmissible for generality and, in any case, unfounded: the regional regulation on substitutions and delegations of the mayor would be consistent with the Valdostan order and functional to ensuring continuity and sound administrative management.

4.− On 18 February 2026, the President of the Council of Ministers deposited a memorandum, insisting on the unfoundedness of the censures, contesting in particular the thesis of the respondent regarding the interpretation of the regulation of the prorogatio period and reiterating that the invoked State norms (Articles 35 of the Public Employment Consolidated Law and 98 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law) express general principles binding on the Region.

Considerations of Law

5.– With the appeal indicated in the heading (app. reg. no. 28 of 2025), the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, raised questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 10, 13(1), 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, with reference to Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution (everywhere evoked without indication of the relative paragraphs) and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the autonomy statute.

6.− Four grounds are deduced.

6.1.− With the first ground, Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 13(1), 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 are challenged, all inherent to the exercise deemed mandatorily associative of municipal functions.

In summary, it is argued that the imposition of a mandatory associative form would contrast with the principles of law affirmed by this Court in judgment no. 33 of 2019. Even with reference to Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, the generalized obligation to exercise the municipal functions and services provided therein in an associated form would determine a disproportionate legislative choice not consistent with the so-called "functional geography”, impacting excessively on the autonomy of municipalities, without such sacrifice resulting justified by the objective pursued by the regional legislator, thus placing itself in violation of Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the autonomy statute.

6.2.− With the second ground, Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 is challenged, "in the part where it inserts Article 20-quater into Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with specific reference to paragraph 2, which provides that "[a]ll secretary appointments terminate automatically, regardless of the originally foreseen duration, on the date of the general municipal elections. Secretaries in service shall continue to exercise their functions until the end of the month in which the last secretary appointment is conferred according to the procedure referred to in this article.”

The new regional regulation would sensibly reduce the scope of application of the prorogatio of the secretary’s functions, limiting it to only the month of the general elections, in place of the one hundred and twenty days from the inauguration provided for by the Local Entities Consolidated Law. It, furthermore, would not contemplate the automatic confirmation of the assignment, which the State regulation, instead, provides for upon the expiry of the same four-month term, thus placing itself in violation of Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution, Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the autonomy statute (in relation to Article 99(2) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law).

6.3.− With the third ground, Article 16 of the same law is challenged, "in the part where it inserts Article 20-sexies into Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with specific reference to paragraph 1 of the latter, which regulates the conferral of the assignment of secretary of the Municipality of Aosta, arguing that the provision in question would violate the "principles” referred to in Article 35 of the Public Employment Consolidated Law and Articles 98 and 99 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law, as interposed norms with respect to the parameters referred to in Articles 3, 5, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the autonomy statute.

The challenged norm would allow the conferral of the assignment of municipal secretary also to subjects professionally different from those contemplated by the norms of principle, disregarding both the public competition and the training course. This would determine the violation of the invoked constitutional parameters, in particular of the principles of impartiality and sound administration.

6.4.− With the fourth and final ground, Article 10 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 is challenged, "in the part where it replaces Article 12 of Regional Law no. 6 of 2014”, with particular reference to paragraph 1 of the latter, which, in case of absence, temporary impediment, or incompatibility, regulates the substitution of the mayor as a member of the Executive of the Unités des Communes valdôtaines. This, arguing that the provision in question would violate "Articles 32 and 53 of the Consolidated Law on Local Entities, as modified by Article 1(105) of Law no. 56 of 2014”, as an interposed regulation with respect to the parameters referred to in Articles 3, 5, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the special statute.

The hypotheses of substitution of the mayor and of delegation of his powers provided for by the challenged provision would exceed the ambits of regional legislative competence "because they introduce hypotheses of ‘re-dislocation’, albeit temporary, of mayoral powers” beyond those strictly fixed by Article 53 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law.

7.− With a memorandum filed on 15 September 2025, the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste entered an appearance in the proceedings, asking that the above-described questions be declared inadmissible or unfounded, in the terms that will be described below.

8.− As a preliminary matter, the exceptions of inadmissibility raised by the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta must be examined.

8.1.− The regional defense excepted the inadmissibility of the questions raised with the first ground of the appeal in the part where they also refer to letter c) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, as replaced by Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 and, in particular, with reference to the obligation to exercise municipal functions and services in an associated form.

It is known that, on the subject of principal appeals, this Court has always required reinforced motivation. Recently, for example, in judgment no. 28 of 2025 it was reiterated that "[a]ccording to the constant orientation of this Court, the appellant has the burden of identifying the challenged provisions and the constitutional parameters of which it denounces the violation, proposing a motivation that is not merely assertive but contains a specific and congruous indication of the reasons for which there would be a contrast with the evoked parameters, with the support of a brief argument on the merits (ex plurimis, judgment no. 201 of 2021).”

Well: in formulating the first censure, the current appellant did not reconstruct the regulatory framework in a complete way.

The model originally built by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 identified, in Article 2, four "[o]ptimal territorial ambits for the exercise of municipal functions and services.”

The first three—corresponding to letters a), b), and c) of paragraph 1—were all aimed at the mandatory exercise in an associated form, respectively, "in the regional territorial ambit, through agreements between Municipalities and the subjects referred to in Articles 4, 5, and 6” (that is, with the Consortium of local entities of the Valle d’Aosta – CELVA, with the Municipality of Aosta and with the regional administration), "in the supra-municipal territorial ambit, through the Unités des Communes valdôtaines referred to in Article 8” (for the exercise of functions and services concerning the ambits of activity listed in Article 16), as well as "in the supra-municipal territorial ambit, through agreements between local entities” (for the exercise of functions and services inherent to the ambits of activity listed in Article 19). The fourth and final optimal ambit—corresponding to letter d) of the same paragraph 1—was instead aimed at contemplating the exercise of municipal functions and services "in the municipal territorial ambit, for residual functions.”

With the challenged norms, concerning the associated exercise of municipal functions and services, the Valdostan legislator, while confirming in large part the original model referred to in Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, suppressed the obligation of exercise in an associated form "in the supra-municipal territorial ambit, through agreements between local entities”—now transformed into a mere faculty, left to the free decision of the individual entity (with the only specific exception of the obligation of agreement for the secretary office, imposed, moreover with derogations, on municipalities with resident population up to 1,000 inhabitants by the new Article 20-bis, paragraphs 3 and 4)—and maintained the general obligation of associated exercise only for those functions and only for those services (those punctually identified by the respective provisions of law) already allocated to other entities, according to what was already provided for by Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014.

From a comprehensive reading of the norms having as object the associated exercise of functions and services, therefore, it is deduced that the regional legislator reformed Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 by conferring on municipal entities greater autonomy and responsibility.

The fact is easily supported by a simple textual comparison of the legislative provisions of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 before and after the intervention of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, where it is found that the old letter c) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 was replaced by a new formulation which, taking up the tenor of the previous letter d), today establishes that municipal functions and services are exercised "c) at the municipal territorial level, for all other functions and other services, without prejudice to the possibility of associated exercise through agreements between local entities.” Furthermore, the new Article 18 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, significantly accompanied by a new heading (corresponding to the new title of Chapter IV: "Municipal functions and services”), establishes, in paragraph 1, that "[m]unicipalities exercise all functions and services not included among those reserved to the Unités and to the subjects referred to in Articles 4, 5, and 6, also in an associated form through agreement”, making evident the mere optional nature of the associated exercise of municipal functions which, in fact, can be activated through the conventional instrument. Finally, the entire Chapter V—including Article 19—which regulated municipal functions and services to be carried out mandatorily in the supra-municipal territorial ambit through agreements between municipalities, was expressly repealed by Article 19(1), letter e), of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025.

The appeal did not take such aspects into adequate consideration.

It must be added, then, that the reference to this Court’s judgment no. 33 of 2019, as a precedent deemed favorable, is not entirely pertinent.

Such pronouncement declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 14(28) of Decree-Law no. 78 of 2010, as converted, and modified by Article 19(1) of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, "in the part where it does not provide for the possibility, in a context of obliged and non-obliged Municipalities, to demonstrate, for the purpose of obtaining exemption from the obligation, that due to the particular geographical location and demographic and socio-environmental characteristics, of the obliged Municipality, economies of scale and/or improvements, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, in the provision of public goods to the reference populations are not achievable with the imposed associative forms.”

It, therefore, concerns a State norm that had imposed in an "excessively rigid” way on smaller municipalities the associated exercise of functions. Such municipalities could have bordered on non-obliged municipalities ("in a context of obliged and non-obliged Municipalities”), making such associated exercise effectively complex and, in any case, preventing the achievement of the purpose of the norm, that is, the obtainment of economies of scale and/or improvements, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, in the provision of public services to the reference populations. It is highlighted, in fact, that the norm in question was held by this Court to be an expression of the "State concurrent power in the matter of coordination of public finance” (judgment no. 33 of 2019, which cites judgments no. 44 and no. 22 of 2014).

Such a situation is not configurable in the case at hand, since Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 imposes on all municipalities the associated exercise of the functions indicated therein, while the judgment invoked by the appellant clarifies that the principles expressed therein do not apply where the associated exercise is imposed, precisely, on all local entities belonging to a specific territorial ambit.

More specifically, in said judgment it is read: "[m]oreover, it must be specified that the scope of the decision does not involve all those different situations in which regulations impose obligations of associated management of functions and/or services on the generality of Municipalities, and therefore are referable to all local entities belonging to a specific territorial ambit, without distinguishing between obliged and non-obliged Municipalities.” Well: even in Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 the obligation of associated management of functions and services is imposed on the generality of municipalities.

Finally, it is not given to understand how the challenged norms would violate in concrete the evoked parameters. In particular, apart from the generic affirmation that the provision of the obligation of exercise in an associated form of the municipal functions and services indicated therein would end up "[...] realizing a disproportionate solution and, in any case, not in line with ‘functional geography’, imposing a strong sacrifice on municipal autonomy without this finding reason in the objective pursued by the regional legislator”, the appellant does not indicate what this "functional geography” is and does not clarify why such a provision would contrast in concrete with the principle of sound administration. This also considered that, in the perspective of the regional legislator, the revision of the regulation of the associated exercise of municipal functions and services has instead the explicit "objective of increasing the quality and homogeneity of the services provided to citizens” (Article 2 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025). Not to mention that the appellant does not even confront the new provision referred to in Article 2(1), letter c), of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, as modified by Article 3(1) of Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, which—as already noted—expands the discretionary space of choice of municipalities regarding decisions on the associated exercise of functions and services.

The reconstruction of the regulatory framework results, therefore, insufficient and such as to prevent the scrutiny of the merits of the appeal. Nor could a different conclusion be reached by observing that some of the municipal functions are—in fact—subject to mandatory associated exercise, since it is the overall logic of the challenge that is prejudiced by the not fully defined definition of the relevant regulatory data.

In light of the considerations exposed above, and taking into account the jurisprudence of this Court on the subject of motivation of appeals in principal proceedings, the questions raised with the first ground of the appeal must be declared inadmissible in toto, with absorption of the exception of inadmissibility only partial raised by the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste.

8.2.− The respondent, lamenting the "manifest erroneousness of the interpretative presupposition”, (and adding that the interpretation provided by the appellant would be "even lacking in the very consideration of the textual data”), excepted the inadmissibility also of the second ground of the appeal. It is, in reality, an exception of inadmissibility for lack of motivation connected to a defective reconstruction of the regulatory framework.

In these terms, the exception is founded. Even in such a case, in fact, the reconstruction of the regulatory framework provided by the appellant is not complete.

Truly, the appeal limits itself to invoking Article 20-quater(2) of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, as introduced by Article 16 of Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, without, however, taking into consideration the complex procedural regulation provided for by the regional legislator for the conferral of new municipal secretary assignments.

Specifically, Article 20-quater(2) of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, introduced by the challenged regional law, provides that: "[a]ll secretary appointments terminate automatically, regardless of the originally foreseen duration, on the date of the general municipal elections. Secretaries in service shall continue to exercise their functions until the end of the month in which the last secretary appointment is conferred according to the procedure referred to in this article.”

As can be seen, it refers to the "procedure referred to in this article.” Of such "procedure”, however, no mention is made in the appeal, even to affirm its unsuitability to guarantee compliance with Article 99(2) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law, invoked by the appellant as an interposed parameter, and, in the final analysis, to ensure the continuity of administrative action (purpose to whose pursuit the institutions of prorogatio and automatic confirmation are pre-ordered).

Well, as regards the aforementioned procedural itinerary, paragraphs 3 to 6 of Article 20-quater of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 establish as follows: "3. In the case of general municipal elections, within five days from the expiry of the term referred to in Article 20-bis(7), the Agency, with the timing and modalities established by the same with a specific regulation in compliance with the provisions concerning union relations, initiates the iter for the assignment of secretaries with the publication on its institutional website of the list of vacant secretary offices, resulting from the agreements referred to in Article 20-bis and with the invitation to those registered in the Regional Register of secretaries to communicate, within the subsequent ten days, their expression of interest for a maximum of three offices. 4. Within thirty days from the expiry of the term for the communication of the expression of interest referred to in paragraph 3, the Agency, on the basis of the identifications of the secretaries made by the administrators, provides for the assignment of the secretaries which must occur, also taking into account the expressions of interest received, with priority of choice for the entities associated for the secretary office with the minor overall number of inhabitants, and, subsequently, for other local entities not associated with the minor number of inhabitants. 5. Towards local entities failing in the identification of the secretaries to be assigned, the President of the Agency, after notice to comply within a congruous term, provides in substitution, with his own act, for the identification of the secretary, through random extraction from among the subjects still available, for the assignment of the same to the entity as well as for the consequent conferral of the assignment. 6. All new secretary assignments run from the first day of the month following the conclusion of the procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5.”

By virtue of the reference made by the above-reported paragraph 3, the procedural regulation in question is completed by Article 20-bis(7), likewise introduced by the challenged Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, which thus provides: "7. In the case of municipal elections, for the purposes of the assignment of secretaries by the Agency pursuant to Article 20-quater, the entities approve and sign the agreements, mandatory or optional, for the secretary office, within forty-five days from the date of the proclamation of those elected and, in the case of general municipal elections, from the date of the last proclamation.”

The final term of the prorogatio of the outgoing secretary, which the challenged norm makes coincide with the "end of the month in which the last secretary assignment is conferred according to the procedure referred to in this article”, therefore, is only the last of a sequence of procedural terms rigorously punctuated by the regional legislator, of which the appeal does not take into account.

The appellant, truly, limits itself to evoking what was statuted by this Court’s judgment no. 23 of 2019, which—it asserts—would connect the institution of prorogatio and automatic confirmation to the necessary "guarantee of the same continuity of administrative action”, without, however, explaining why the challenged norm (also taking into account the complex procedure described above) would not guarantee the continuity of said administrative action.

In light of the considerations exposed above, and taking into account the recalled jurisprudence on the subject of motivation of appeals in principal proceedings, the exception of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste results founded, such that also the question raised with the second ground of the appeal must be declared inadmissible for defect of motivation.

8.3.− Again as a preliminary matter, the further exception of inadmissibility for generality, defective reconstruction of the regulatory framework and, consequently, absolute defect of motivation, raised by the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste with reference to the fourth ground of the appeal, must be examined, an exception which for expository coherence must be examined before that concerning the third ground.

Also this exception is founded.

The appellant identifies the object of the censure in a generic way, limiting itself to invoking a "re-dislocation” of mayoral powers without indicating in what terms Article 53 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law would be violated. Even considering only paragraph 2 of the invoked norm, however, similarities and differences emerge between the challenged regional regulation and the State one that are not examined in the appeal. It follows that the grievance results imprecise and generic.

The inadmissibility of the question results even more evident in relation to the reconstruction of the relevant regulatory framework, with particular reference to the norms invoked as a parameter. In fact: i) the reasons that would lead to affirming the qualification of the regulatory contents of Article 53 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law as "organizational principles inherent to the overall structure of local autonomy”, suitable to impose themselves in binding terms on the legislative power of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste in the matter of the "organization of local entities and related districts”, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the special statute, are not argued; ii) the scope of Article 32(4) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law is not specified nor are the reasons indicated for which such a provision should render the invoked Article 53 of the same consolidated law applicable to the Valdostan local order and, in particular, to the Unités des Communes valdôtaines; iii) the scope of paragraph 145 of Article 1 of Law no. 56 of 2014 is not specified nor are the reasons indicated for which such a norm would render applicable in the Region of Valle d’Aosta Article 32(4) of the Local Entities Consolidated Law.

The appeal suffers, therefore, from a lacunose and uncertain reconstruction of the regulatory framework, which, involving directly the identification of the interposed parameter of constitutional legitimacy on which the appellant built its own censures, renders these last for that very reason inadmissible for defect of motivation.

9.− As for the third ground of the appeal, the regional defense excepts its inadmissibility, in the part where it prospects the violation of the principles referred to in Article 35 of the Public Employment Consolidated Law and Article 98 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law, as interposed norms with respect to the violation of Articles 3, 5, and 97 of the Constitution, in that they would be irrelevant in relation to the norm subject to censure.

The exception is not founded.

Truly, Article 35 of the Public Employment Consolidated Law and Article 98 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law bear the regulation of the public competition, thus implementing Article 97 of the Constitution. As such, the provisions in question are an expression of general principles of the legal order of the Republic, which guarantee the impartiality of administrative action, equality, and parity of treatment in access to public employment, and which therefore constitute a limit also to the primary competencies of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste.

On the merits, the question is founded.

The special statute assigns to the respondent Region the primary legislative competence in the matter of "organization of local entities and related districts” (Article 2(1), letter b), a competence capable of extending, as already recognized by constitutional jurisprudence (judgment no. 132 of 2006), to the regulation of the relative personnel.

More specifically, this Court’s judgments no. 60 of 2023, no. 167 and no. 95 of 2021 have traced the norms of special autonomy regions that regulate access to the register of municipal secretaries (and those relating to the attribution of related deputy functions) back to the statutory competence in the matter of the organization of local entities and related districts (on the point, also judgment no. 100 of 2023).

The special statute for Valle d’Aosta, however, establishes that such primary legislative competence must be exercised within the customary limits of "harmony with the Constitution and the principles of the legal order of the Republic and with respect for international obligations and national interests, as well as the fundamental norms of the economic-social reforms of the Republic” (Article 2(1), alinea), "whether one wishes to regulate the methods of establishing employment relationships or whether one intends to dictate rules on the status of subordinate personnel” (judgment no. 100 of 2023, which cites judgment no. 95 of 2021).

The recalled statutory limit entails, therefore, the obligation to respect the principles deducible from Article 97 of the Constitution, with particular reference to those of sound administration and impartiality of administration, as well as to that of access through competition "to employments in public administrations” (judgment no. 95 of 2021).

In the case here in discussion, the regional legislator, with Article 20-sexies of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 (introduced by Article 16 of the challenged law), regulates the conferral of the assignment of secretary of the Municipality of Aosta, establishing, in paragraph 1, that "[t]he assignment of secretary of the Municipality of Aosta can be attributed pursuant to Article 20-quater of this law or, for the purpose of containing public spending and in derogation of what is foreseen by Article 1(1) of Regional Law of 19 August 1998, no. 46 (Norms on the subject of secretaries of local entities of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta), be conferred, without new or greater burdens on the municipal budget, to one’s own employee, hired on a permanent basis, belonging to the unique executive qualification who has matured a length of service of at least three years in the aforementioned qualification and who has performed the functions of secretary for at least a three-year period in the last ten years.”

The comprehensive analysis of the regulation in question returns a figure of municipal secretary (of the Municipality of Aosta) that does not conform to the principles of sound administration and impartiality of administration, nor to that of access through competition "to employments in public administrations.”

Article 20-sexies of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014 (introduced by Regional Law no. 15 of 2025) violates, in the first place, the principle of public competition, expressly and punctually evoked by the appellant. The challenged provision, in fact, allows the attribution of the assignment of municipal secretary to subjects professionally different from those identified by the same regional regulation, inspired by the principles of the general legal order.

It must indeed be observed that, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Law of the Region of Valle d’Aosta of 19 August 1998, no. 46 (Norms on the subject of secretaries of local entities of the Autonomous Region of Valle d’Aosta), "[s]ecretaries of local entities are executives belonging to the unique executive qualification, registered in the Regional Register of secretaries, established and managed by the Regional Agency of secretaries of local entities of the Valle d’Aosta, hereafter denominated Agency. The Agency, on which depend the secretaries who access the aforementioned Register with the modalities referred to in paragraph 5, is an entity endowed with legal personality of public law, subjected to the supervision of the Presidency of the Region” and the subsequent paragraph 5 provides that "[a]ccess to the Regional Register of secretaries is by competition-course, pursuant to what is foreseen by Regional Law of 14 November 2023, no. 22 (New provisions on the subject of recruitment of secretaries of local entities of the Valle d’Aosta).”

The norm under scrutiny, truly, disregards the conduct of the specific competition-course provided for by the same Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 46 of 1998, incurring the violation of the constitutional parameters indicated by the appellant and, in particular, of Article 97 of the Constitution. The specific competition procedure in question, in fact, is the instrument necessary to guarantee impartiality, the sound administration of public administration (judgments no. 227 and no. 195 of 2021, no. 199 and no. 36 of 2020, and no. 225 of 2010) and access in conditions of equality to public offices (judgments no. 250 and no. 227 of 2021, and no. 293 of 2009).

This Court has already held insufficient the simple passing of any selection, even if public, when it—as indeed happens here—does not guarantee that the choice has a competitive nature and is referred to the typology and the level of the functions that one is called to perform (judgments no. 95 of 2021, no. 277 of 2013, no. 127 of 2011 and no. 225 of 2010).

Moreover, in the face of other regional provisions aimed at allowing registration in the Register of municipal secretaries and, therefore, the exercise of the relative functions, to subjects other than the winners of the appropriate competition procedure and the relative professional training course, this Court, with judgment no. 100 of 2023, deemed it necessary to address to the regional legislator a specific warning, urging it "to a reforming intervention consistent with the principles affirmed here.”

In particular, in such a pronouncement it was affirmed that "[f]rom the last—not concerning the present judgment those provisions of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 46 of 1998 that allow registration in the regional register of secretaries of local entities to subjects who have not passed the pertinent public competition—this Court cannot exempt itself from urging the regional legislator to a reforming intervention consistent with the principles affirmed here, also in light of the announced organic revision of the current regional regulation on the subject.”

The challenged norm ends up transforming deeply the physiognomy of the municipal secretary—of the Municipality of Aosta—through the grafting of regulatory elements that end up undermining that indispensable balance between the reasons of the autonomy of local entities and the needs of an independent control over their activity (judgment no. 23 of 2019) which is configured precisely in the general regulation of the figure of the municipal secretary (judgment no. 95 of 2021).

In light of the considerations that precede, the third ground of the appeal is founded and must be welcomed. Therefore, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025 must be declared, in the part in which it inserts Article 20-sexies into Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 16 of the Law of the Region of Valle d’Aosta of 26 May 2025, no. 15 (Organic revision of the regional regulation on the subject of associated exercise of municipal functions and services and local government secretaries. Amendments to regional laws no. 6 of 5 August 2014, and no. 1 of 12 March 2002), in the part in which it inserts Article 20-sexies into the Law of the Region of Valle d’Aosta of 5 August 2014, no. 6 (New regulation of the associated exercise of functions and services of Municipalities and other local entities, as well as provisions relating to the office of local government secretary);

2) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3(1), 5(1), 6(1), 13(1), 15, and 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, in the parts in which, modifying Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, they replace Articles 2(1), letters b) and c), and paragraph 2, 4, 6, 16, and 18, and introduce Article 20-bis, paragraphs 3, 4, and 7, raised, in reference to Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of Constitutional Law no. 4 of 26 February 1948 (Special Statute for the Valle d’Aosta), by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

3) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 16 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, in the part in which it inserts Article 20-quater(2) into Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, raised, in reference to Articles 3, 5, 114, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the special statute for the Valle d’Aosta, in relation to Article 99(2) of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000 (Consolidated Law on the Organization of Local Entities), by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

4) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 10 of Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 15 of 2025, in the part in which it replaces Article 12(1) in Valle d’Aosta Regional Law no. 6 of 2014, raised, in reference to Articles 3, 5, and 97 of the Constitution and Article 2(1), alinea and letter b), of the special statute for the Valle d’Aosta, in relation to Article 35 of Legislative Decree no. 165 of 30 March 2001 (General norms on the organization of work in the employ of public administrations) and Articles 98 and 99 of the Local Entities Consolidated Law, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 11 March 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Massimo LUCIANI, Reporting Judge

Valeria EMMA, Chancellor

Filed in the Registry on 19 May 2026