JUDGMENT NO. 62

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has handed down the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of December 27, 2024 (Urgent provisions regarding regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 15 of February 21, 2025, initiated by the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, twenty-ninth and first sections, sitting in a single-judge composition, by way of orders dated June 18 and June 13, 2025, registered as numbers 191 and 192 of the 2025 register of orders, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, no. 42, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the notices of appearance of Municipia spa and F. L., as well as the interventions of the Municipality of Naples;

having heard Judge-Rapporteur Luca Antonini at the public hearing of February 24, 2026;

having heard legal counsel Fabrizio Rimetti for F. L., Fabio Cintioli and Massimo Basilavecchia for Municipia spa, and Antonio Andreottola for the Municipality of Naples;

having deliberated in the chambers on February 24, 2026.

Legal Findings

1.– By order of June 18, 2025, registered as no. 191 of the 2025 register of orders, the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, twenty-ninth section, sitting in a single-judge composition, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of December 27, 2024 (Urgent provisions regarding regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 15 of February 21, 2025, with reference to Articles 3, 41, 77, 101, 102, 111, and 117 (first paragraph, in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution.

1.1.– The subject matter of the a quo proceedings concerns four tax assessment notices regarding the omitted or partial payment of the municipal property tax (IMU) for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, which the appellant challenged primarily on the grounds of nullity, as they were issued by the company Napoli Obiettivo Valore srl (NOV), an entity allegedly lacking the power of assessment and collection for not possessing the required ministerial authorization.

The sole shareholder of NOV srl is Municipia spa, the company awarded the contract for the management of tax and non-tax revenues of the Municipality of Naples, which established NOV srl as a project company pursuant to both Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016 (Public Procurement Code), applicable ratione temporis to the procedure initiated by the local authority, and the specific provisions of the tender specifications.

In resisting the taxpayer’s appeal, Municipia spa invoked the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, which states: "[f]or the year 2025, the deadline of March 31, referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), of the regulation of the Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 101 of April 13, 2022, is extended to September 30, 2025. In order to adapt the regulations concerning the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of December 15, 1997, also to directly applicable European Union law, the regulation of the Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 101 of April 13, 2022, shall be revised by a regulation to be issued within one hundred and eighty days from the date of entry into force of the law converting this decree. To this end, the provisions of Articles 52, paragraph 5, letter b), number 1), and 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, in compliance with the rules set out by directly applicable European Union law, shall be interpreted as meaning that special purpose vehicles, referred to in Article 194 of the Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree no. 36 of March 31, 2023), or project companies, referred to in the former Article 184 of the Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016), established to perform assessment and collection activities or activities preparatory thereto, are not required to be registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, provided that the company awarded the tender for the management of tax assessment and collection for local authorities, being a shareholder of the same special purpose vehicle, is already registered in the aforementioned register. Assessment and collection acts issued by the special purpose vehicles referred to in the preceding period shall be considered legitimate as they are issued in place of the awardee, who remains jointly and severally liable for the fulfillment of all services provided directly by said companies.”

1.2.– Regarding the relevance of the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, the a quo court observes that, "without prejudice to any decision” regarding the discrepancies between the copies of the tax documents filed by the parties—appearing, from those produced by the respondent, that such documents were issued not only by NOV srl but also by Municipia spa, a company registered in the register—in any event, the latter would have been issued in execution of a contract concluded with an entity not registered in said register.

The referring court adds that the provisions involved in the examination of the dispute—Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016, Articles 52 and 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of December 15, 1997 (Establishment of the regional tax on productive activities, revision of tax brackets, rates, and deductions for personal income tax and establishment of a regional surcharge, as well as reorganization of local tax regulations), and the Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 101 of April 13, 2022 (Regulation regarding the definition of criteria for mandatory registration in a separate section of the register of entities authorized to perform assessment and collection activities)—cannot be interpreted to mean that the possession of the subjective requirement of register entry by the awardee of the tender "may then be attributed to the condition of the project company established by the awardee, legitimizing its activities carried out in execution of the concession itself regardless of its personal and direct registration in the Register.”

Therefore, the resolution of the case "requires the application” of the challenged Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, the constitutional illegitimacy of which would render the acts issued by NOV srl invalid.

1.3.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness, the order observes first that the challenged provision, despite the terminology adopted by the legislature, appears not to be one of authentic interpretation, but rather an innovative provision with retroactive effect. Through it, the legislature intended to dictate new rules for the project or special purpose companies provided for by the Procurement Code, in order to authorize them to perform assessment and collection activities.

In this regard, the order notes that in the past it was settled, on an interpretive level and with reference to the provisions of Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, that the powers of assessment and collection of taxes could be entrusted exclusively to entities directly registered in the register contemplated by said provision.

Citing constitutional jurisprudence (in particular, judgments no. 77 and no. 4 of 2024), the a quo court considers Articles 3 and 117 (first paragraph, in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR) of the Constitution to be violated, based on the following symptomatic indices of the distorted use of legislative function: a) the self-qualification of the challenged provision as one of authentic interpretation is incorrect and artificial; b) the public administration, through the concessionaire of tax assessment powers, is a party in numerous proceedings before the tax jurisdiction; c) the legislature intervened "more than 27 years after the entry into force of the norms object of the alleged authentic interpretation”; d) the provided interpretation attributes a meaning not deducible from the literal wording of the interpreted provisions; e) the challenged provision aims to overcome a consolidated jurisprudential orientation (referencing the Court of Cassation, tax section, order no. 35338 of November 30, 2022), according to which the requirement of registration in the register was "always considered indispensable for the purposes of the Concessionaire’s legitimacy.”

Nor could this intervention be considered justified by the need to protect constitutional principles, rights, and assets, because, in essence, "imperative reasons of general interest” are lacking, which would allow for legislative interference in ongoing proceedings (citing judgment no. 4 of 2024 of this Court).

1.4.– Furthermore, the challenged provision, by providing a "‘dual regime’ […] for participation in the tender, for entities ‘participated in’ by companies registered in the Register, and [for] non-participated companies,” would also violate Article 117 (second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, where it refers to the principle of protection of competition, and as an expression of the principle of equal treatment inherent in Article 3 of the Constitution and the freedom of economic initiative of Article 41 of the Constitution.

Project companies participated in by another company registered in the register could, in fact, "prove to be awardees of the tender for the entrustment of the public service regardless of their direct and personal registration,” "while those not participated in [would be] precluded from participating in the tender unless autonomously registered in the Register.”

Moreover, companies already registered in the register could benefit from that subjective requirement to participate in other tenders, "while then transferring the effects of the award to another project company,” a possibility that would remain "definitively precluded to companies lacking that subjective requirement, with inevitable negative consequences on the free market and evident alteration of the principle of equality and free competition.”

1.5.– With specific regard to the last period of the challenged provision, which provides that the assessment and collection acts issued by the project companies referred to in the previous period "are to be considered legitimate,” the violation of Articles 3, 101, 102, and 111 of the Constitution is alleged, on the assumption that it constitutes a legge-provvedimento (ad-hoc legislation).

The legislature would have, in fact, "dictated a final provision, not having a general and abstract nature,” but a "concrete character, with which, in substitution of the judicial power, [it would have] substantially validated the assessment acts issued by the company in question,” thus interfering in the resolution of the case in question, as well as the one pending before the Court of Cassation, pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced by another section of the same Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples and defined by the court of legitimacy with the judgment of the fifth section, no. 7495 of March 20, 2025.

1.6.– Lastly, the challenged paragraph 14-septies, introduced during the conversion into law of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, would violate Article 77 of the Constitution, constituting "an amending intervention absolutely heterogeneous compared to the rest of the discipline contained” in said decree-law.

In the opinion of the referring court, no provision of the original content of the decree-law could be considered linked to the regulation referred to in Ministerial Decree no. 101 of 2022, and even less to the provisions of Articles 52 and 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, both of which are the object of the amendment subsequently approved by Parliament. Furthermore, this intervention would be "aimed not only at the mere extension of a deadline, but at substantially modifying the regime of public procurement tenders, and that of managing the Registers of entities legitimized to participate therein.”

2.– By order of June 13, 2025, issued by the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, first section, sitting in a single-judge composition, and registered as no. 192 of the 2025 register of orders, questions of constitutional legitimacy were raised regarding the same legislative provision of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted.

2.1.– In the a quo proceedings, a payment reminder is challenged, issued by both NOV srl and Municipia spa, referring to an executive assessment notice for the omitted or partial payment of the waste tax (TARI) for the year 2020, issued and notified exclusively by NOV srl, which the appellant asked to be declared null or otherwise illegitimate because it was adopted by an entity not registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, nor in the separate section of the register introduced by Article 1, paragraph 805, of Law no. 160 of December 27, 2019 (State Budget for the 2020 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2020-2022 period), relating to entities that perform exclusively support activities for those of assessment and collection.

The order observes that it would in any case be necessary to decide on the validity of the underlying act, underlying the challenged reminder, since the appellant proposed a "specific reason for appeal” on the "failed issuance and notification of a valid assessment notice.” Moreover, faced with the respondent’s exception that said notice, although notified, "was not challenged” by the taxpayer, the order adds that "the assessment notice underlying the challenged reminder […] appears to have been issued and notified exclusively” by NOV srl and that, "even after the filing of such act,” the appellant insisted on the acceptance of the appeal reiterating "the nullity/illegitimacy of the assessment and collection activity carried out” by NOV srl.

The "question concerning the validity or otherwise” of the activity carried out by the latter would therefore be "certainly relevant in the case at hand, given that the outcome of the dispute depends on the relative interpretation”; therefore, the challenged Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, would find application in the proceedings.

2.2.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness, the order identifies first of all the violation of Article 76 of the Constitution for "[e]xcess of delegation sub specie of eccentricity of the subject matter of the norm with respect to the ‘milleproroghe’ decree.”

Citing both the judgments of this Court no. 22 and no. 7 of 2024 (both relating to questions of constitutional legitimacy raised in reference to Article 76 of the Constitution for excess of delegation), and judgment no. 2 [recte: no. 22] of 2012 (relating to a question raised in reference to Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution), the referring court notes that the challenged provision was inserted during the conversion of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024 and that, not operating any extension of the deadlines for registration in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, and, on the contrary, establishing the cessation of such obligation for some companies, it would present "no relevance to the assumption itself, and therefore to the object of the enabling law, as well as to the purposes pursued by the latter.”

2.3.– The challenged Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, in the second and third periods, would also violate Articles 3, 25, and 97 of the Constitution, being, under several aspects, obscure and indeterminate.

In particular, it would highlight "a clear contradiction in terms,” referring, on the one hand, to a future regulation for the purposes of revising the discipline concerning the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 and providing, on the other hand, an interpretive provision which, as such, would not require regulatory sources to have effectiveness.

Moreover, it would contribute to regulatory uncertainty the fact that nothing was established with reference to the hypothesis in which the partner registered in the register transfers its shareholding to others.

Furthermore, the provision relating to the guarantee that the registered partner is required to provide, as well as the reference "to directly applicable European Union law,” would remain equally generic.

2.4.– The provision in question would also violate Article 41 of the Constitution, together with Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, favoring the possibility of giving rise to a privileged condition for companies awarded the tax collection services, registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 and partners of a project company, which participate in new tender procedures for such services.

2.5.– Finally, the order raises two further questions, in terms substantially analogous to those of the order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025, believing that: a) Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution, as well as the principle of protection of competition, referred to in Article 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, are violated, insofar as the challenged provision would introduce, in fact, a differentiated regime of requirements provided for collection companies, unreasonable and unjustified; b) Article 111 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR, is violated, presenting symptomatic elements of a distorted use of the instrument of the law of authentic interpretation, so as to violate constitutional limits to the issuance of retroactive laws.

3.– In the proceedings registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025, F. L., appellant in the a quo proceedings, appeared, asking to declare the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy well-founded, in particular because the challenged provision would affect the exercise of judicial function where, "by means of the cogent formula: ‘are to be considered legitimate’,” it would provide the judge with a rule that would lead to the dismissal of pending appeals against acts issued by the project company.

4.– Municipia spa, a party to the a quibus proceedings, appeared in both proceedings, stating that it is the awardee of the tender called by the Municipality of Naples, pursuant to Article 183 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016, for the creation of the technological infrastructure for the management of the municipal entity's revenues, as well as for the management under concession of the tax and non-tax revenues of the same entity.

In such capacity, and to execute the activities covered by the concession, it established the company NOV srl, which, pursuant to Article 184 of said legislative decree, became "concessionaire in the original sense,” replacing Municipia spa "in all relations with the granting administration,” and signed the concession contract with the Municipality of Naples, without being "registered in the Register of concessionaires for collection, given that such registration is already possessed by the parent company Municipia.”

The party also points out that, on the issue of the lack of registration of NOV srl in the aforementioned register, two rulings of the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples and one of the Ordinary Court of Naples stated that the only one to have to possess such requirement would be Municipia spa, awardee of the tender. A section of the aforementioned tax judicial body believed, instead, to arrange the preliminary referral of the question of law to the Court of Cassation, pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure, declared admissible by the First President with a decree of July 23, 2024, and assigned to the tax section. The latter, with judgment no. 7495 of 2025, noting that "the legislature intervened with a declaredly interpretive norm to clarify the meaning and scope of the provision subject to preliminary referral,” declared the aforementioned preliminary referral inadmissible, by then devoid of the requirement of "serious interpretive difficulties.”

4.1.– In the opinion of the party, the raised questions would be inadmissible, as irrelevant, first of all because in both main proceedings the challenged acts were adopted, on behalf of NOV srl, by Municipia spa, by virtue of the service contract signed on August 7, 2024, pursuant to Article 184, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016; therefore, the dubious legitimacy of the former would not be relevant, since the latter is peacefully registered in the register.

Furthermore, in the proceedings registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025, the a quo court would not have taken a position on the second ground of appeal, relating to the correct notification of the assessment notices; the relevance of the doubt of constitutional legitimacy would have required the declaration of groundlessness of such ground, which in reality had a "preliminary scope.”

In the proceedings registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025, instead, the referring court would not have adequately evaluated the relevance of the questions, considering that the act underlying the challenged reminder would be an assessment notice issued and notified by NOV srl, but not challenged; the taxpayer’s appeal would therefore be inadmissible in part, it being possible to challenge tax acts only for their own defects, without it being allowed to "remedy the unchallengeability of the underlying acts.”

4.2.– On the merits, the questions of constitutional legitimacy lamenting the violation of the limits placed on the issuance of retroactive provisions, on the assumption that the challenged one has in reality an innovative and not interpretive content, would not be well-founded.

In this case, in fact, all the prerequisites for the issuance of a law of authentic interpretation would exist, there being: a) an objective interpretive uncertainty "deriving from the lack of coordination between, on the one hand, the provisions dictated by the Public Procurement Code for the execution of project financing through project companies and, on the other hand, the discipline regarding tax collection on behalf of local authorities which does not contemplate, nor expressly exclude, project companies among the entities required to register in the register”; b) jurisprudential conflicts on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016 and Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, "as demonstrated by the conflicting orientations between different sections” of the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, "which the Order tends to underestimate”; c) the need for "uniform application, linked to the general interest in legal certainty in a sector strategic for public finance, such as that of tax collection of local authorities.”

In particular, in the system of the Public Procurement Code, the project company would constitute "nothing but an emanation of the company awarded the concession, established for the exclusive purpose of executing the obligations provided for by the approved project put to tender.” Decisive, in this sense, would be the "normative specification that, despite the sub-entry to the awardee of the project company, a transfer of the contract does not take place,” having therefore to be believed that, "in the absence of a special discipline of different content regarding tax assessment and collection by project companies,” this principle could only apply "in the same way also to this specific sector of the legal system.”

The challenged provision would therefore have favored one of the meanings reasonably attributable to those interpreted and, contrary to what was stated by the referrers, it would not appear at all that the intention of the legislature, before the intervention carried out with the challenged provision, was that "of providing for the obligation of registration in the Register for project companies,” for the simple reason that "there was no rule that provided for such an obligation.”

It should therefore be believed that Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, would not have innovative scope nor would it alter the meaning of previous norms, which did not exist, nor would it have served "to heal an illegitimate situation,” in the absence of an express regulatory reference for the particular case of the tax collection service by means of a project company, it being possible to state that "the borrowing of the requirements of the awardee by the project company was reasonably detectable from the legislation and jurisprudence.”

On the other hand, the "existence of the interpretive conflict” on the issue of the legitimacy to carry out the collection activity by the project company not registered in the register would be confirmed by the decree of July 23, 2024, of the First President of the Court of Cassation, of admissibility of the preliminary referral on the same issue, devolved pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4.3.– The censures of violation of the principle of protection of competition, on the assumption that the challenged provision has created a dual regime favoring project companies, would also not be well-founded, for the decisive reason that it would not be the latter to participate in the tender, but the parent company.

The challenged provision could therefore not cause any alteration to competition with respect to participation in the tender, concerning exclusively the "phase following the conclusion” of the same, intending to resolve "the problem of registration in the Register of the special purpose or project company that the economic operator already registered in the Register (and who participated in the tender by virtue of the possession of such requirement and obtained the award) is required to establish.”

4.4.– In the opinion of the party, the censures having as their object the last period of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, centered on the character of legge-provvedimento of the provision, would be first of all inadmissible, the order not having illustrated the reasons for which it should fall "within this peculiar typology of regulatory interventions.”

In any case, they would be not well-founded, "precisely because such part of the norm does not have the characteristics of a legge-provvedimento”; it, in fact, would address recipients not at all determined or of limited number, would have an abstract content and, in any case, would not take over a determination normally entrusted to the administrative authority, moving "exclusively on the level of sources.”

Even if one wanted to recognize the nature of legge-provvedimento in the provision in question, the censures would be without foundation, essentially because it would not have interfered with jurisdictional decisions that have passed into a final judgment, nor would it represent an intervention intentionally directed to affect pending proceedings or a form of contrast to a consolidated jurisprudential orientation in the opposite sense.

4.5.– Finally, having excepted the inadmissibility of the evocation of Article 76 of the Constitution by the order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025, because Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, "was not introduced on the basis of an enabling law,” the question raised by the other order in reference to Article 77 of the Constitution would be not well-founded, since the challenged provision, inserted during the conversion of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, would appear fully consistent with the purposes, expressed in the preamble of the same, "not only of ‘providing for the extension, revision or repeal of deadlines of imminent expiration in order to guarantee the continuity of administrative action,’ but also ‘of adopting essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of the action of public administrations.’”

In continuity with the aforementioned rationale, the provision referred to in the mentioned paragraph 14-septies, on the one hand, would extend the deadline established by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), of Ministerial Decree no. 101 of 2022, for the declaration to be made by those registered in the register for the purposes of the annual verification of the permanence of the possession of the requirements, arranging for the revision of the same decree so as to adapt to European legislation the discipline of Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, relating to the register itself. On the other hand, it would interpret Articles 52, paragraph 5, letter b), number 1), and 53 of the latter decree in light of European legislation on public procurement, specifying, consequently, that the acts issued by the project or special purpose company are considered legitimate, as they are issued in place of the awardee, obliged jointly and severally to fulfill all the services provided by the company.

5.– With a single act of October 16, 2025, the Municipality of Naples intervened in both proceedings, deducing that it is the entity holding the tax claims object of the a quibus proceedings and that it had entrusted the assessment and collection activities of local taxes to Municipia spa and, for it, to the project company NOV srl.

After arguing the admissibility of its intervention, the entity notes first of all the inadmissibility of the question of constitutional legitimacy in reference to Article 76 of the Constitution raised with the order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025, the exercise of a legislative delegation not being at issue in the case.

The one raised in the same proceeding, which concerns the second and third periods of the challenged Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, in reference to Articles 3, 25, and 97 of the Constitution, would also be inadmissible, not presenting "any relationship of ‘functional dependence’” with the object of the tax dispute, since it would concern aspects of the provision concerning the relations between the legislative source and the regulatory one referred to by it as well as some contents that the provision would have omitted to regulate.

In any case, such question would still be not well-founded: on one side, the legislative provision would set a cornerstone principle for future secondary regulation; on the other, the alleged gaps would in reality be non-existent, in light of the general discipline of the project company and the correctness of the reference to European Union legislation, capable of realizing a dynamic referral.

The question in reference to Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution would also not be well-founded, being based on an erroneous legal reconstruction of the nature of special purpose vehicles within the scope of project finance. Likewise, not well-founded is considered the one in reference to Article 41 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 102 TFEU, on the assumption that the challenged provision can legitimize a form of abuse of dominant position; also in this case, the exegesis of the notion of abuse and the competitive context of reference would be erroneous.

The question, raised by both orders, of violation of Article 117 (first paragraph) of the Constitution, or of Article 111 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR, for the alleged innovative content with retroactive effect, would also be not well-founded, since the challenged provision would possess the typical characters of the law of authentic interpretation, having the purpose of clarifying the meaning of pre-existing provisions in a context of objective uncertainty of the regulatory data.

Proof of such uncertainty would be not only the vast litigation arisen on the issue of the necessity of registration in the register for project companies, but above all the initiative of the same Tax Justice Court of Naples, in other proceedings, to raise a preliminary referral before the Court of Cassation pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, moreover, with judgment no. 7495 of 2025 would have recognized the authentically interpretive and clarifying function of the challenged provision.

Having to exclude that the challenged provision has the typical characters of a legge-provvedimento, the question raised in reference to Articles 3, 101, 102, and 111 of the Constitution would also be not well-founded.

Lastly, devoid of foundation would also be the denounced violation of Article 77 of the Constitution: the provision in question would fully respond to the logic of the so-called milleproroghe decree, being composed of three parts forming "a unified and functionally interconnected regulatory package.” It would open in compliance with the typical content of such a category of decree-laws, then following with a second part that would explain the reason for the extension, constituted by the updating of the regulatory discipline of the register. The third part, or the provision of authentic interpretation, would not be a foreign body to the regulatory framework, but an essential instrument for the correct exercise of the power of regulatory revision.

5.1.– With order no. 8 of 2026, this Court declared admissible the interventions explained by the Municipality of Naples and authorized the intervenor to view and take copies of the procedural acts of these proceedings.

6.– In proximity to the public hearing, F. L. filed a brief, arguing that, contrary to what was excepted by Municipia spa, the raised questions would be relevant in the a quo proceedings, given that the challenged acts would not originate from such company, but only from NOV srl, as would emerge from the inconsistencies between the copies filed in that proceeding by the respondent company and those actually sent for notification to the party.

Municipia spa also filed a brief, in both proceedings, reiterating its defenses.

Considered in Law

7.– With the orders registered as numbers 191 and 192 reg. ord. of 2025, the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, twenty-ninth and first sections, both sitting in a single-judge composition, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, which the referrers believe they must apply to decide the disputes under their examination, having as their object, directly or as a prerequisite, the validity of the tax acts issued by the company NOV srl, concessionaire of the Municipality of Naples for the management of tax and non-tax revenues of the local entity, but not registered in the register referred to in Article 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, which authorizes private entities to carry out liquidation and assessment activities of taxes and those of tax collection and other revenues of provinces and municipalities, when the latter have deliberated their entrustment to third parties pursuant to the previous Article 52, paragraph 5, letter b).

According to the referrers, the requirement of registration in the register should be possessed directly by the entity entrusted with the service, thus precluding the possibility for NOV srl to borrow it from its sole partner Municipia spa, which is in possession of it and which established it as a "project company,” pursuant to Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016, as awardee of the tender called by the Municipality of Naples for the entrustment under concession, through the instrument of project finance, of the management services of municipal revenues.

8.– In such context, the referral orders recognize multiple doubts of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, which establishes: "[f]or the year 2025, the deadline of March 31, referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), of the regulation of the Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 101 of April 13, 2022, is extended to September 30, 2025. In order to adapt the regulations concerning the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of December 15, 1997, also to directly applicable European Union law, the regulation of the Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance no. 101 of April 13, 2022, shall be revised by a regulation to be issued within one hundred and eighty days from the date of entry into force of the law converting this decree. To this end, the provisions of Articles 52, paragraph 5, letter b), number 1), and 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, in compliance with the rules set out by directly applicable European Union law, shall be interpreted as meaning that special purpose vehicles, referred to in Article 194 of the Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree no. 36 of March 31, 2023), or project companies, referred to in the former Article 184 of the Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree no. 50 of April 18, 2016), established to perform assessment and collection activities or activities preparatory thereto, are not required to be registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, provided that the company awarded the tender for the management of tax assessment and collection for local authorities, being a shareholder of the same special purpose vehicle, is already registered in the aforementioned register. Assessment and collection acts issued by the special purpose vehicles referred to in the preceding period shall be considered legitimate as they are issued in place of the awardee, who remains jointly and severally liable for the fulfillment of all services provided directly by said companies.”

8.1.– First of all, the part that interprets Articles 52, paragraph 5, letter b), and 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 is challenged, in the sense of allowing project companies referred to in Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016 and special purpose vehicles referred to in Article 194 of Legislative Decree no. 36 of March 31, 2023 (Public Procurement Code in implementation of Article 1 of Law no. 78 of June 21, 2022, containing delegation to the Government in matters of public contracts), established to perform assessment and collection activities or activities preparatory thereto, not to be registered in the register referred to in the cited Article 53 "provided that the company awarded the tender for the management of tax assessment and collection for local authorities, being a shareholder of the same special purpose vehicle, is already registered in the aforementioned register.”

8.1.1.– The qualification as a merely interpretive provision would be incorrect, in the face of content with an innovative and retroactive character, with the consequent violation of Articles 3 and 117 (first paragraph) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR (order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025), or of Article 111 of the Constitution, in relation to the cited Article 6 of the ECHR (order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025).

8.1.2.– The same provision, introducing in fact a differentiated, unreasonable, and unjustified regime of requirements provided for collection companies, would also contrast with Articles 3 and 41 of the Constitution (order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025), or with Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution (order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025), as well as, for both referral orders, with the principle of protection of competition, referred to in Article 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution.

8.1.3.– Article 41 of the Constitution would also be violated, together with Article 102 TFEU, because a privileged condition would be created for companies awarded the tax collection services, registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 and which are partners of a project company (order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025).

8.2.– The last period of the challenged provision, providing that the assessment and collection acts issued by the project companies referred to in the previous period "are to be considered legitimate,” would have the character of a legge-provvedimento, such as to interfere with pending proceedings in violation of Articles 3, 101, 102, and 111 of the Constitution (order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025).

8.3.– A further censure is then addressed to the provisions of the second and third periods of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, which would present profiles of obscurity and indeterminacy, in contrast with Articles 3, 25, 76, and 97 of the Constitution (order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025).

8.4.– Lastly, the mentioned paragraph 14-septies would violate Article 77 of the Constitution, having a content absolutely heterogeneous compared to the rest of the discipline contained in Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, in which it was inserted during the conversion into law (order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025), or would violate Article 76 of the Constitution, for "[e]xcess of delegation sub specie of eccentricity of the object of the norm with respect to the ‘milleproroghe’ decree” (order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025).

9.– Preliminarily, the joinder of the proceedings must be ordered so that they are decided with a single judgment, the relative questions of constitutional legitimacy having as their object the same provision and prospectively overlapping censures in part and for another part connected anyway.

10.– In ritual terms, it is necessary to start from the exceptions proposed by Municipia spa and the Municipality of Naples.

10.1.– As regards the order registered as no. 192 reg. ord. of 2025, the exception of inadmissibility formulated by Municipia spa for the inadequate motivation of the relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy is well-founded, with the consequent absorption of the exceptions raised by the Municipality of Naples.

In fact, despite having considered "the question concerning the validity or otherwise of the underlying assessment notice” decisive to the payment reminder challenged, in the presence of the reason for appeal on the "failed issuance and notification” of such underlying act, the a quo court did not, however, ascertain that the latter had not been notified to the taxpayer, a circumstance decisive for the purposes of the relevance of the raised questions, given that in the tax trial only "[t]he lack of notification of independently challengeable acts, adopted previously to the notified act, allows its challenge together with the latter” (Article 19, paragraph 3, third period, of Legislative Decree no. 546 of December 31, 1992, containing "Dispositions on the tax process in implementation of the delegation to the Government contained in Article 30 of Law no. 413 of December 30, 1991”).

Moreover, giving an account of the filing in the proceedings of the assessment notice underlying the challenged one and the fact that the same "appears to have been issued and notified exclusively” by NOV srl, the order ends up stating that the notification to the taxpayer had taken place, so that, besides the very admissibility of the taxpayer’s grievance directed at striking its defects appearing to be lacking, the inadequacy of the motivation on the relevance of all the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by it, which, therefore, must be declared inadmissible, is even more accentuated.

10.2.– On the other hand, the exceptions of inadmissibility of the questions introduced by the order registered as no. 191 reg. ord. of 2025 are devoid of foundation.

Municipia spa argues that, as the challenged acts are also attributable to itself, an entity peacefully registered in the ministerial register, the necessity of applying the challenged provision would be lacking; in any case, the referrer would have said nothing on the second reason for appeal of the taxpayer, concerning the alleged formal irregularity of the notification of the challenged acts, to be considered instead of preliminary scope.

As regards the first profile, contrary to what the party presupposes, the order acknowledges that the copies of the challenged acts filed in the proceedings by the parties differ from each other, specifying, moreover, that "without prejudice to any decision” on the point, in any case, the acts would have been issued in execution of the concession entrusted by the Municipality of Naples to an entity not registered in the register.

It is a not implausible and sufficient motivation to integrate the relevance of the raised questions.

As regards the second profile, emerging from the order that the same appellant filed the copies of the challenged measures, collected at the place of storage, it can be inferred that the a quo court implicitly believed to dismiss the censure on the form of notification, this having reached its purpose.

Also devoid of foundation is the exception, proposed by Municipia spa, of inadmissibility of the question of constitutional legitimacy of the last period of the challenged paragraph 14-septies, which the order raises for its character of legge-provvedimento, without however illustrating the reasons for which the provision should fall "within this peculiar typology of regulatory interventions.”

The referrer, in fact, charges the provision in question with a "concrete character, with which, in substitution of the judicial power, [it would have] substantially validated the assessment acts issued” by NOV srl, "in place of the awardee Municipia s.p.a.,” thus interfering in the resolution of the case in question. Being a fully intelligible censure, the verification of the actual qualification of the provision as "legge-provvedimento” pertains to the merits.

11.– It is appropriate to preface a brief regulatory and jurisprudential framing of the cases that come into the field in the examination on the merits of the individual questions.

First of all, it must be specified that Article 52 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, governing the general regulatory power of provinces and municipalities in tax matters, establishes, in paragraph 5, the criteria to which the regulations of the entities must be informed: in particular, where the entity does not provide directly, the assessment of taxes can also be carried out in the associated forms provided for by the legislation on local entities (agreements, consortia, unions of municipalities, mountain communities, methods referred to by letter a of the cited paragraph 5).

Above all, it must be considered that, pursuant to letter b) of the same paragraph 5, where instead the entity decides "to entrust to third parties, even disjointedly, the assessment and collection of taxes and all revenues, the relative activities are entrusted, in compliance with European Union legislation and the procedures in force regarding the entrustment of the management of local public services,” to the entities indicated in a list that contemplates, at number 1), those "registered in the register referred to in Article 53, paragraph 1,” of the same legislative decree, established at the Ministry of Finance, today the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to authorize private entities to carry out liquidation, assessment, and collection activities of taxes and other revenues of provinces and municipalities.

The cited Article 53, in paragraph 2, demands to a specific commission, composed also of representatives of local entities, "[t]he examination of applications for registration, periodic revision, cancellation, and suspension from the register, revocation, and lapse of management.”

The subsequent paragraph 3 then provides that with ministerial decrees, "taking into account the needs of transparency and protection of public interest, having heard the State-City conference, conditions and requirements for registration in the register are defined, in order to ensure the possession of adequate technical and financial requirements, the existence of sufficient moral requirements and the absence of causes of incompatibility on the part of those registered, and provisions are issued regarding the composition, functioning, and duration in office of the members of the commission referred to in paragraph 2, the keeping of the register, the methods for registration and verification of the prerequisites for suspension and cancellation from the register as well as the cases of revocation and lapse of management.”

The regulation currently in force is carried by Ministerial Decree no. 101 of 2022, which has given implementation, among other things, to Article 1, paragraph 805, of Law no. 160 of 2019, which delegated the regulatory source to establish "general provisions regarding the definition of criteria for mandatory registration in a separate section of the register referred to in the same Article 53 for entities that perform exclusively the functions and activities of support preparatory to the assessment and collection of revenues of local entities and companies participated in by them.”

For registration in the register and in the separate section, it is necessary to prove the possession of the prescribed technical, financial, honorability, and professional requirements, as well as the absence of causes of incompatibility provided for legal representatives, administrators, mayors, employees provided with representation, general or special attorneys, and partners of companies registered in the register.

These are requirements that have a very significant character in view of the performance of the delicate activity in question, to the point that "[f]or the purposes of the annual revision for the verification of the existence of the requirements to which registration in the register is subordinated,” Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), of Ministerial Decree no. 101 of 2022 provides that "those registered are required to send” to the competent office of the MEF "by March 31 of each year a specific declaration” containing, among others, the attestation of the "permanence of the requirements provided for by this regulation for registration.”

11.1.– As regards specifically the methods of entrustment to third parties of the assessment and collection activities of local entities’ revenues, administrative jurisprudence has for some time noted that the regulation contained in the sector legislation dedicated to them by Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 provides for "forms of entrustment and management analogous to those of local public services” (Council of State, decision of July 1, 2005, no. 3672), i.e., "through a public tender procedure” (TAR Puglia, detached section of Lecce, judgment of May 24, 2001, no. 2408).

Among the aforementioned forms of entrustment, it is possible to resort to the instrument of project finance.

Initially introduced by the legislature for works concessions only, the relative discipline was extended to services, in whose genus fall the activities of assessment and collection of revenues, by virtue of Article 152, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 163 of April 12, 2006 (Public Procurement Code implementing directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC), becoming in concrete applicable with the entry into force of the methods specifically fixed by Article 278 of Presidential Decree no. 207 of October 5, 2010 (Regulation of execution and implementation of Legislative Decree no. 163 of April 12, 2006, containing "Public Procurement Code implementing directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC”).

Only recently, however, local entities have started to use the provisions on project finance for the entrustment of assessment and collection services of their revenues.

Therefore, in the jurisdictional litigation that originated the questions of constitutional legitimacy, the topic of the necessity of registration in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 of the project company specifically established by the tender awardee, carried out with the project finance instrument, for the entrustment under concession of assessment and collection activities of the local entity’s revenues, arose for the first time.

In fact, if, on the one hand, registration in the register is a necessary requirement for carrying out the aforementioned activities, on the other hand, the discipline of project finance from the beginning recognized to the awardee the faculty to establish, after the award, a project company in the form of a joint-stock company or a limited liability company, also consortium-like.

The public procurement code currently in force then transformed said faculty into an obligation, for concessions of value higher than the European relevance threshold, and modified the denomination into "special purpose vehicle,” thus underlining the functional profile of the same, strictly instrumental to the realization of a specific project, to which the corporate purpose is exclusively addressed.

The positive discipline recognizes therefore the subjective otherness between awardee and executor of the concession, where, both Article 184 of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016, and Article 194 of the current Legislative Decree no. 36 of 2023, in paragraphs 1 and 3, establish that the company established by the awardee sub-enters into the concession relationship "without the need for approval or authorization” by the administration and "replaces the awardee in all relations” with the granting entity.

On the other hand, both cited Articles 184 and 194 expressly exclude that such sub-entry constitutes "transfer of contract” and provide—it is important to note—that the concession contract establishes the methods for the eventual transfer of the project or special purpose vehicle shares, however "without prejudice to the fact that the partners who have competed to form the requirements for qualification are required to participate in the company” until the relations with the granting entity are defined with the issuance of the testing certificate.

11.2.– In such regulatory context, a jurisprudential orientation believed, in essence, that the requirement of registration in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 was not required in capo to the project company, having to be possessed only by the tender awardee, its partner (Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, judgments of April 18, 2024, no. 6112 and April 22, 2024, no. 6325; Court of Naples, fifth civil section, order of November 21, 2024).

However, within the same Tax Justice Court of Naples, an interpretive doubt also emerged in order to the possibility that the project company "borrows from the awardee company (registered in the aforementioned register and sole partner of the project company) the requirements prescribed by law.”

Doubt that led to raising a preliminary referral, pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure (Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, twenty-seventh section, order of May 23, 2024, no. 3737), which the First President of the Court of Cassation, with decree of July 23, 2024, believed to be admissible, subsisting, among other conditions, the "serious interpretive difficulties” required by the code provision.

The tax section of the Court of Cassation, to which the preliminary referral had been assigned, however, pronounced itself after the entry into force of the challenged provision and, noting that "[t]he legislature therefore intervened directly, with a declaredly interpretive norm, to clarify the meaning and scope of the provision object of preliminary referral,” believed that the requirement of the presence, in the question deduced to its examination, of "serious interpretive difficulties” had ceased and declared, therefore, the inadmissibility of the referral itself.

12.– Having premised so much, one can now pass to the examination of the questions of constitutional legitimacy, starting from that which believes Article 77 of the Constitution violated.

The question is not well-founded.

The jurisprudence of this Court is constant in requiring the necessary homogeneity of amendments, inserted during conversion, with respect to the original decree-law, "since Article 77, second paragraph, of the Constitution establishes a link of functional interrelation between the decree-law, which is adopted by the Government in cases of extraordinary necessity and urgency, and the law of conversion, which is characterized by a peculiar procedure of approval with respect to the ordinary one” (judgment no. 245 of 2022).

Assuming "the characters of a ‘functionalized and specialized’ source, aimed at the stabilization of the decree-law,” the law of conversion "cannot open itself to heterogeneous objects with respect to those present in it, but can only contain provisions consistent with the original ones from the material or finalistic point of view […], ‘essentially to avoid that the relative simplified procedural iter, provided for by parliamentary regulations, can be exploited for purposes extraneous to those that justify the decree-law, to the detriment of ordinary parliamentary confrontation dynamics’ (judgments no. 245 of 2022, no. 210 of 2021, no. 226 of 2019; in the same sense, judgments no. 145 of 2015, no. 251 and no. 32 of 2014)” (lastly, judgment no. 23 of 2026).

The same jurisprudence has also specified that for government measures with multiple content ab origine, it is necessary to verify the coherence between the provisions inserted during conversion and those originally adopted in a way of extraordinary necessity and urgency, having regard to the link with "one of the contents already regulated by the decree-law, or to its dominant rationale” (judgment no. 245 of 2022).

Moreover, as recently reiterated, "[w]ith specific reference to ‘milleproroghe’ decrees (which are a species of decree-laws with multiple content ab origine), it has been affirmed several times that it is a ‘typology of decree-law marked by the ‘unitary rationale of intervening with urgency on the expiration of deadlines whose passing would be harmful to interests considered relevant by the Government and Parliament, or to affect existing situations—even if pertaining to different objects and matters—that require regulatory interventions of a temporal nature’ (judgment no. 22 of 2012)” (judgment no. 245 of 2022; in terms, judgment no. 154 of 2015). With respect to such decrees, only the insertion, during conversion, of a norm "completely extraneous” to the unitary rationale and purpose "determines the mixing and overlapping, in the same regulatory act, of objects and purposes that are heterogeneous, by reason of assumptions, in turn, heterogeneous (judgment no. 22 of 2012)” (judgment no. 154 of 2015)” (again, judgment no. 23 of 2026).

12.1.– In light of such coordinates, the statement of the referrer, according to which there would be no link with the original content of the decree-law, is without foundation.

Paragraph 14-septies inserts itself in fact with coherence into Article 3 of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, which from the beginning carried "[p]rorogation of deadlines in economic and financial matters,” providing precisely, in the first period, the extension of a deadline of imminent expiration, i.e., that established against entities registered in the register referred to in Article 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, required to render, by March 31, 2025, the declaration for the purposes of the annual revision for the verification of the existence of the requirements for the maintenance of the registration itself in the year 2025. The extension of such deadline to September 30, 2025, is, therefore, fully consistent with the unitary rationale of the "milleproroghe” decree, of intervening with urgency on the expiration of deadlines whose passing would be harmful to interests considered relevant by the Government and Parliament.

To the content of the first period results then strictly connected that of the subsequent periods, in a concatenation that reflects the further purposes of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, expressed in the preamble, of "guaranteeing the continuity of administrative action, as well as adopting essential measures for the efficiency and effectiveness of the action of public administrations.”

Such purposes are found in the provision in question, concerning the assessment and collection activities of revenues of local entities, certainly marked by the character of continuity and the need for efficient and effective action.

From the connection between the contents of the various periods of the challenged paragraph 14-septies emerges that the legislature intended, on the one hand, to extend the deadline of imminent expiration for the time necessary to allow the revision of the discipline of the criteria for registration in the register and the consequent fulfillments, entrusted to the regulatory source. On the other hand, with a provision of authentic interpretation, immediately effective, it allowed the entities required to present the annual declaration for 2025, and apart from the issuance of the revision regulation, to attest facts and situations relating, among other things, to project or special purpose vehicles established by virtue of the legislation on public contracts.

13.– Now the questions raised in reference to Articles 3 and 117 (first paragraph) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR, which the referrer believes violated for effect of the distorted use of legislative function, which would result from the symptomatic indices represented: by the erroneous and artificial self-qualification of the challenged provision as one of authentic interpretation; by the presence of a public administration as a party in numerous proceedings before the tax jurisdiction; by the lapse of time elapsed from the entry into force of the norms object of the alleged authentic interpretation; by the attribution of a meaning not deducible from the literal wording of the interpreted provisions; by the purpose of overcoming a consolidated jurisprudential orientation.

On the other hand, always according to the a quo court, the intervention in question could not be considered justified by the need to protect constitutional principles, rights, and assets, in the absence of "imperative reasons of general interest” such as to allow a legislative interference in pending proceedings, financial ones not falling within the aforementioned reasons.

13.1.– According to constant constitutional jurisprudence "an essential requirement for a provision to be considered as one of authentic interpretation is that it expresses one of the meanings already deducible from the interpreted provision.”

Therefore, to this Court "it competes ‘to verify that the provision has an interpretive nature on a substantial level, ascertaining that its end is that ‘of clarifying the sense of pre-existing norms or of excluding or of enucleating one of the senses among those believed reasonably attributable to the interpreted norm, for the purpose of imposing on those who are required to apply the considered provision a determined normative meaning’ […]’” (lastly, judgment no. 72 of 2025, as well as, in the same sense, judgments no. 184 and no. 77 of 2024).

From the positive result of this examination derives a triple consequence.

First of all, that the norm resulting from the welding between the two provisions "assumes such a meaning from the origin, giving rise to a retroactivity which, in the logic of the unitary syntagm, is only apparent” (judgment no. 44 of 2025).

Secondly, that, in any case, the same temporal effectiveness of interpretive norms with the interpreted ones means that "they too must respect some general limits connected to their nature” (again, judgment no. 44 of 2025), among which "are included ‘respect for the general principle of reasonableness, which is reflected in the prohibition of introducing unjustified disparities in treatment; the protection of the reliance legitimately arisen in subjects as a principle connate to the State of law; the coherence and certainty of the legal system; respect for the functions constitutionally reserved to the judicial power’ (judgment no. 170 of 2013, as well as judgments no. 78 of 2012 and no. 209 of 2010)” (judgment no. 73 of 2017; in the same sense, judgments no. 184 and no. 77 of 2024).

Finally, that the verification of the genuinely interpretive nature of the norm is not, however, indifferent in the assessment of the respect for the aforementioned principles (again, judgment no. 44 of 2025).

13.2.– Passing therefore to the assessment of the challenged provision, it must be noted, first of all, that it explicates one of the meanings already deducible in a systematic way from the regulatory complex resulting from Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 and from that on public contracts.

In the sector in question, in fact, Article 52, paragraph 5, letter b), of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997, requiring that the entrustment to third parties of assessment and collection activities of revenues happens "in compliance with European Union legislation and the procedures in force regarding the entrustment of the management of local public services,” operates in essence a referral to the procedures allowed by the legislation in force at the moment in which the local entity adopts the deliberation.

And this referral, from the introduction of the project finance instrument, has seen the project company, today special purpose, as a direct emanation of the subject awarded the public tender procedure.

It is precisely on the basis of this systematic connection, as has been seen (supra, point 11.2.), that a jurisprudential orientation believed that the requirement of registration in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 was not required in capo to the project company, having to be possessed only by the tender awardee, its partner.

This clarified, the suggestive argument based on the distance of time elapsed between the month of February 2025, the date in which the challenged norm was introduced, and January 1, 1998, to which the entry into force of those interpreted dates back, must be considered not conducive.

Such symptomatic profile, which the referrer identifies in the sense of the distorted use of legislative function, is fallacious.

In fact, it has been seen (supra, point 11.1.) that the extension to service concessions of the provisions regarding project finance became operational only at the end of the year 2010, while the effective use of such instrument by local entities dates back to the beginning of the current decade.

It was therefore the need to apply the relevant provisions to a case never verified before to induce the intervention of authentic interpretation, which therefore is not only genuinely such, but neither does it discount the distance in time indicated by the referrer.

13.3.– The referral mechanism recalled above, together with the discipline of the project and special purpose company, previously summarized (supra, point 11.1.), account for the origin of the effective situation of hermeneutic uncertainty, on which the challenged provision then intervened by extracting one of the possible variants of meaning of the interpreted provisions.

Significant in this perspective are both the activation by the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples of the instrument of preliminary referral to the Court of Cassation pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, above all, the assessment of admissibility of the referral itself, by the First President, in the presence of the "serious interpretive difficulties” required by the procedural norm.

In a similar context, in which the interpretation of the provisions on registration in the register presented itself in problematic terms with reference to project companies, the legislature therefore intended to clarify its meaning with the challenged provision, identifying one corresponding to that already emerged in the, albeit quantitatively limited, jurisprudence.

To further confirmation of the character of authentic interpretation of the challenged provision militates, finally, the already recalled judgment no. 7495 of 2025 of the Court of Cassation, which in these terms qualified the intervention of the legislature, such as "to clarify the meaning and scope of the provision object of preliminary referral.”

13.4.– It must also be excluded that the effect of improper retroactivity, which accompanies the challenged norm, contrasts with the general limits to whose respect even authentically interpretive norms are held.

First of all, the meaning provided by it, which, in essence, does not require the project company a "duplication” of the registration in the register, does not collide with the principle of reasonableness.

Such meaning expresses, in fact, an interpretation of system whereby the partner registered in the register, which therefore holds those technical, professional, and honorability requirements that are particularly important in the activity in question, must maintain its presence in the project company.

The provision of Article 184, paragraph 3, fifth period, of Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016—today replicated in Article 194, paragraph 3, sixth period, of the current public procurement code of Legislative Decree no. 36 of 2023—binds, in fact, the partner that has provided the subjective requirements necessary for the purposes of participating in the tender to maintain its participation in the company until the verification of the correct execution of the concession.

In other words, where the requirement of registration in the register referred to in Article 53, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 comes into play, the subject that, in possession of such requirement, participated in the tender and, resulted awardee, established the project company, will not be able to dismiss the quality of partner, having to ensure its contribution, qualitatively necessary for the correct execution of the service entrusted in concession.

At the same time, should the qualified partner transfer its participation, violating the obligation of maintenance, or lose for any reason the subjective requirement, even the project company would suffer, not being able to continue the entrustment received from the local entity.

As administrative jurisprudence has had the opportunity to specify, the discipline of the project company gives "evidence of the natural subjective coincidence between the awardee—which has also lent the qualification requirements—and the partner” of the company, so that one cannot admit a substantial "re-modulation of the entrustment in favor of subjects […] different from the awardees who have lent the qualification requirements” (Council of State, fifth section, judgment of April 18, 2023, no. 3886). By virtue of this orientation, also in the peculiar matter of assessment and collection of local entities’ revenues, the recourse to project finance as a form of entrustment of the concession requires the enduring presence in the project company of the tender awardee partner, as registered in the register, so as to guarantee to the granting entity the professional suitability of the subject, partner of the project company, to which the service was entrusted.

Moreover, also in the case, different from that of the main judgment, in which the awardee is composed of multiple subjects who have presented a joint offer, all the subjects that will execute the "reserved” services, of assessment and collection, as well as of support and preparatory, will have to be in possession of the registration in the register of concessionaires.

Finally, it must be specified that the granting administration, in the contract that it stipulates with the project or special purpose vehicle, establishes the methods for the eventual transfer of the shares of the same, which however remains not allowed to the partners indicated by Articles 184, paragraph 3, fifth period, Procurement Code 2016 and 194, paragraph 3, sixth period, Procurement Code 2023, or to those who, in the case, are registered in the register of concessionaires.

13.5.– Devoid of foundation is then the profile of the lamented interference on pending judgments in which a public administration is a party.

In the case, although the legislative intervention was occasioned by the start of the litigation relating to the Municipality of Naples, however, from it does not transpire the "clear purpose of affecting the outcome of pending judgments” (judgment no. 77 of 2024), having to consider in this regard rather the pursuit of the needs of legal certainty, promptly realized precisely by means of the adoption of the interpretive provision.

It is not, in fact, devoid of relevance the observation that, before the adoption of the challenged provision, no judgments resulted issued that had already declared invalid the tax acts adopted by the subject not registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997.

The legislature has thus intervened at a time when it could not be considered formed, let alone consolidated, any reliance on the interpretation put forward by the appellant parties of the pending judgments.

On the contrary, the consideration contained in the recalled decree of July 23, 2024, of admissibility of the preliminary referral pursuant to Article 363-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the interpretive question, "being a matter of assessment and collection of taxes of very widespread diffusion also with reference to geographical areas different from that of competence of the referring judge,” could have re-proposed itself "in numerous analogous judgments,” not linked to the Municipality of Naples, is significant.

Therefore, those reasons of general interest are recognizable which, even by the standard of Article 6 of the ECHR, can justify "in exceptional circumstances, a retrospective legislation […], especially for the purpose of interpreting or clarifying a previous legislative provision” (ECHR, grand chamber, November 3, 2022, Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium, paragraph 107; pronouncement which, having examined an interpretive provision with retroactive effects in tax matters, considered "relevant the objective reported by the Government of not creating an arbitrary discrimination between taxpayers who had spontaneously renounced the already elapsed limitation period, paying their tax debt, and those who had not,” paragraph 105).

Moreover, for what is relevant here, among the cases in which the ECHR recognizes compatibility with Article 6 of the ECHR of retroactive legislative interventions affecting ongoing proceedings, there are those in which "the appellant subjects had attempted to profit from the technical defects of the legislation” (judgment of October 23, 1997, National & Provincial Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. United Kingdom, paragraph 112), just as it recognized justified by imperative reasons of general interest a retroactive legislative provision having "the objective of clarifying, by specifying the literal content, the meaning” of a previous provision, even in the presence of pending judgments of which the State was a party, where, before the questions were decided by the Court of Cassation, only in a few cases was the right of the appellants recognized (judgment of November 8, 2018, Hôpital local Saint‑Pierre d’Oléron and Others v. France, paragraphs 69, 70 and 72).

13.6.– Finally, the evocation, in support of the argument according to which the challenged provision would be "functional to overcome a consolidated jurisprudential orientation,” of the order of the Court of Cassation no. 35338 of 2022, from which the referrer draws that the requirement of registration in the register would have been "always considered indispensable for the purposes of the Concessionaire’s legitimacy,” is not convincing.

It, in fact, regarding a case in which the service of assessment and collection of local taxes had been entrusted to a temporary grouping of enterprises (RTI), has indeed confirmed the constant principle that requires registration in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 in capo to subjects who perform activities for which this is required, without however stating that it had to be the RTI to demonstrate the possession of such requirement. This latter profile was then explicitly clarified by the same Court of Cassation in another pronouncement relating to the same case, stating that "The obligation of registration in the Register does not go referred to the R.T.I., subject not provided for by Article 2, Ministerial Decree no. 289 of 2000,” carrying the regulation relating to the register itself, applicable ratione temporis, "but exactly to the individual enterprises called to perform the service of assessment, liquidation and collection of taxes” (Court of Cassation, fifth civil section, order of June 8, 2023, no. 16261).

Therefore, the pronouncement recalled by the referrer, besides not resulting clearly expressive of an orientation that the legislature intended to overcome, inserts itself into a jurisprudential interpretation which, in case of entrustment of the service in associated form, requires the possession of the requirement of registration in the register in capo to the individual operators of the team; principle, this, not incoherent with that deducible from the discipline of the project company.

For the reasons exposed until here, the questions in question go therefore declared not well-founded.

14.– Devoid of foundation are also the censures with which it is lamented that the provision, in favor of project or special purpose companies, of a differentiated regime is unreasonable and unjustified, as well as harbinger of anti-competitive advantages, in contrast with Article 3 of the Constitution and with the principle of protection of competition of Articles 41 and 117, second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution.

According to the referrer, benefiting from the requirement in possession of their partner, these could perform, in essence, activities reserved to those registered in the register referred to in Article 53 of Legislative Decree no. 446 of 1997 regardless of their direct and personal registration, "while to those not participated [would be] precluded from participating in the tender unless autonomously registered in the Register.”

It would have moreover that companies already registered in the register could "continue to benefit from that subjective requirement to participate and be awarded other tenders, save then transferring the effects of the award to another project company,” a possibility that would remain instead "definitively precluded to companies lacking that subjective requirement, with inevitable negative consequences on the free market and evident alteration of the principle of equality and free competition.”

14.1.– The prospect of the referrer is erroneous where it does not consider that project or special purpose companies are established after the award of the tender by the subject that, having resulted awardee, must necessarily be in possession of the subjective requirements required to participate.

From this descends that one cannot preach the disparity of treatment between the project company, emanation of the awardee, only formally lacking the requirements, which borrows however from its partner, and the subject that, not being ab origine in possession of such requirements, cannot even aspire to achieve the award, being precluded to it the access itself to the procedure ad evidenza pubblica.

The absolute non-homogeneity of the situations taken as reference demonstrates moreover the inconsistency of the alleged lesion to the principle of protection of competition.

15.– Not well-founded, finally, is the question of constitutional legitimacy of the last period of the challenged paragraph 14-septies, which, as legge-provvedimento, would violate Articles 3, 101, 102, and 111 of the Constitution.

The provision in question, in fact, having abstract character, on one hand does not present indices revealing of the "punctual and concrete content” (order no. 30 of 2024) and of the incidence "on a limited number of recipients or even on a single legal position” (judgment no. 186 of 2022), in the presence of which the jurisprudence of this Court recognizes the character of legge-provvedimento. On the other hand, it neither produces the effect, proper to this category of provisions, of attracting to the legislative sphere what is normally entrusted to the administrative authority, i.e., in the case, the adoption of assessment or collection acts.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of December 27, 2024 (Urgent provisions regarding regulatory deadlines), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 15 of February 21, 2025, raised, in reference overall to Articles 3, 25, 41, 76, 97, 117 (second paragraph, letter e), and 111 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, first section, sitting in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph;

2) declares not well-founded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 14-septies, of Decree-Law no. 202 of 2024, as converted, raised, in reference overall to Articles 3, 41, 77, 101, 102, 111 and 117 (first paragraph, in relation to Article 6 of the ECHR, and second paragraph, letter e) of the Constitution, by the Tax Justice Court of First Instance of Naples, twenty-ninth section, sitting in a single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 24, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Luca ANTONINI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery

Deposited in the Chancellery on April 30, 2026

 

The anonymized version is consistent, in the text, with the original.