JUDGMENT NO. 46

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of October 10, 1990 (Rules for the protection of competition and the market), as added by Article 5-bis, paragraph 1, of Law Decree no. 1 of January 24, 2012 (Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development, and competitiveness), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 27 of March 24, 2012, initiated by the First Instance Tax Court of Udine, Section 2, in the proceedings between Acciaierie di Verona S.p.A. and others and the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) and the Revenue Agency - Collection Office of Udine, pursuant to the referral order of June 3, 2025, registered as no. 171 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, no. 39, First Special Series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearance of Acciaierie di Verona S.p.A., Ferriere Nord S.p.A., Siderpotenza S.p.A., and Società Italiana Acciai Trafilati (SIAT) S.p.A., as well as the intervening brief of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the Judge Rapporteur Angelo Buscema at the public hearing of February 10, 2026;

having heard counsel Gabriele Donà and Wilma Viscardini for Acciaierie di Verona S.p.A. and the other appearing parties, as well as State Attorneys Agnese Soldani and Sergio Fiorentino for the President of the Council of Ministers;

having deliberated in the chambers on February 10, 2026.

Legal Findings of Fact

1.– By order of June 3, 2025, registered as no. 171 of the 2025 register of orders, the First Instance Tax Court of Udine, Section 2, raised questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of October 10, 1990 (Rules for the protection of competition and the market), as introduced by Article 5-bis, paragraph 1, of Law Decree no. 1 of January 24, 2012 (Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development, and competitiveness), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 27 of March 24, 2012, with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to European Union law, specifically regarding: the principle of non-discrimination; Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 11, 2018, which empowers the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and ensures the proper functioning of the internal market; Articles 101, 102, and 103 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); Council Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003 of December 16, 2002, on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty; Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); and Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

1.1.– The referring court states that it is seized of an appeal by Acciaierie di Verona S.p.A. against a payment notice issued by the Revenue Agency - Collection Office of Udine and the underlying tax roll, relating to the payment, for the year 2023, of the contribution provided for in Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990.

The referring court decided to consolidate the aforementioned proceedings with other appeals filed against payment notices from the Revenue Agency and the underlying tax rolls submitted by the companies Ferriere Nord S.p.A., Siderpotenza S.p.A., and Società Italiana Acciai Trafilati - SIAT S.p.A., in which similar grounds of challenge had been raised.

The lower court reports that the appellant companies do not challenge the legal compliance of the tax claim by the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) and the conduct of the Revenue Agency, but rather contest the legitimacy of the provisions of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990, alleging a conflict with constitutional and EU law principles.

1.2.– The referring court is aware that doubts concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the same provisions challenged in these proceedings have already been declared unfounded by this Court in Judgment no. 269 of 2017; however, it believes that the issues could be re-examined on the basis of objective data not considered in that ruling.

It assumes in this regard that, as would be evidenced by statistics relating to the decision-making practice of the AGCM, the supervisory activity of the Authority is divided, in a substantially equivalent manner, between matters concerning "below-threshold" companies and those concerning "above-threshold" companies. Furthermore, it holds that no empirical elements or experiential data can be found from which to infer, as a general rule, that companies exceeding a certain turnover threshold require, merely due to their size, greater effort in the oversight activity concerning them, both in quantitative terms (number of audits) and qualitative terms (number of inspectors engaged in individual checks, their complexity, and the time required to complete them).

The referring court also highlights that the activity of the AGCM does not consist solely in the protection of competition among companies, but also concerns other sectors and applies to the generality of economic actors operating in the Italian territory, without any distinction between joint-stock companies with a turnover above or below 50 million euros and regardless of their corporate structure. In light of the wide spectrum of action of the AGCM, the structure of the contribution in question would therefore be unreasonable and discriminatory.

1.3.– Regarding relevance, according to the referring court, the rules under Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990 must necessarily be applied in the main proceedings, since the legitimacy of the tax claim initiated on the basis of such rules is in dispute, and—given the unequivocal literal provision—it would not be possible to provide an interpretation compatible with the Constitution and the indicated EU parameters.

Likewise, it would not be possible to disapply the aforementioned provisions on the basis of European Union law, since there is no specific European provision that can be applied directly to the case at hand, as the matter pertains to the distinct situation of the alleged discrepancy of domestic rules with principles of EU origin not directly applicable by the national court.

1.4.– As to the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring court doubts the constitutional legitimacy of paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater of Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990, insofar as, in order to ensure the operation of the AGCM, contributions are applied solely to companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros.

1.4.1.– According to the referring court, a conflict with the principle of ability to pay under Article 53 of the Constitution is primarily discernible, as the challenged provisions mandate that only joint-stock companies—and not citizens or public administrations, which also carry out their activities with direct or indirect effect on the market by creating or eliminating distortions to competition—are called upon to finance the AGCM.

Beyond the limitation of the taxpayer base to joint-stock companies only, the challenged rules would result in further discrimination deriving from the subjection to the aforementioned contribution of only those companies with a business volume exceeding 50 million euros.

The lower court observes that the criterion adopted to identify the taxpayer base is not a reliable indicator of corporate income, as equal turnover may yield different profits, especially when considering companies operating in different sectors; furthermore, it cannot be excluded that, even in the presence of high turnover, a negative balance on the income statement may occur.

The challenged provisions, therefore, depart from the aforementioned principle of ability to pay, which should correlate the fiscal costs an enterprise is required to bear with the parameter of profitability.

Furthermore, the challenged provisions would violate the principle of progressive taxation, as, based on the provision that the maximum amount of the contribution cannot exceed one hundred times 0.08 per thousand of the turnover resulting from the latest financial statement (paragraph 7-ter), subjects with greater ability to pay could result in being liable for proportionally smaller contribution obligations compared to those borne by taxpayers with lesser ability to pay.

1.4.2.– Article 3 of the Constitution would also be violated in terms of reasonableness, proportionality, and equality of fiscal treatment.

The referring court, while admitting that the legislature may discretionarily modulate taxation among different economic areas or different types of taxpayers, believes that any diversification of the tax regime should be supported by adequate justifications, in the absence of which the differentiation could degenerate into arbitrary discrimination (citing Judgment no. 10 of 2015 of this Court). Moreover, in its opinion, tax differentiations should be anchored in adequate objective justifications (citing Judgment no. 142 of 2014 of this Court).

The referring court observes that, while the discretion of the legislature in relation to the purposes of taxation and methods of imposition is very broad, in this specific case it is characterized by profiles of irrationality because the tax would burden, unreasonably and exclusively, only a portion of the parties effectively involved in the activity of the AGCM, and among such parties, the tax burden would be distributed regardless of the criterion of proportionality, due to the mechanism of the maximum cap on the contribution amount, which would induce, beyond a certain threshold, effects that are not progressive but rather regressive, thereby undermining the independence of the administrative action performed by the AGCM.

According to the lower court, it could not even be held that the challenged rules are oriented towards charging the operating expenses of the AGCM to companies characterized by a significant presence in the relevant markets and endowed with a considerable capacity to influence the movements of the related economic activities, based on the assumption that the reference to a specific turnover threshold is a valid criterion to select the subjects towards whom, id quod plerumque accidit, the greatest oversight effort of the Competition Authority is exercised.

The referring court assumes that a market situation could arise where the relevant product (or service) has such low production costs or sales prices that the companies concerned might never achieve "above-threshold" turnover, despite having a significant presence in the relevant market with a capacity to influence it; just as it could happen that, in a given year, a company temporarily falls "below threshold" without thereby losing its market position.

Furthermore, the challenged rules would present further doubts of constitutional legitimacy as they would create discrimination between Italian companies with revenues exceeding 50 million euros and foreign companies that, while lacking a permanent establishment in Italy, exercise business activities in our country, benefiting from the oversight and regulatory services provided by the AGCM. Given the homogeneity of the factual situation considered by the law for tax purposes, limiting the base of taxpayers required to pay the contribution only to joint-stock companies resident in Italy for tax purposes and whose revenues exceed the 50 million euro threshold would cause an unjustified disparity of treatment based solely on the nationality or corporate organization of the taxpayer. Such a structure for the contribution would be devoid of any reasonable justification and, for these reasons, would be in conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution in terms of reasonableness, proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination.

1.4.3.– Paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater of Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990 would also violate Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution in relation to European Union law, specifically regarding: the principle of non-discrimination; Directive 2019/1/EU (Recital no. 8 and Article 2, paragraph 1, number 10); Articles 101, 102, and 103 TFEU; Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003; Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU; and Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU).

The challenged provisions would, first of all, conflict with the principle of non-discrimination which, in the hierarchy of EU sources, carries the weight of a general principle of law requiring that similar situations not be treated differently.

The conflict would be caused by the fact that the contribution in question is imposed only on some from a broader base of subjects towards whom the activity of the Authority is directed, thereby violating the aforementioned principle of non-discrimination and the EU provisions that contain its explicit recognition (Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, CFREU).

The challenged rules would also be in conflict with Directive 2019/1/EU—transposed into Italian law by Legislative Decree no. 185 of November 8, 2021, titled "Implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018, which empowers the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and ensures the proper functioning of the internal market"—which establishes that: "[t]o ensure that national administrative competition authorities have the necessary resources to perform their tasks, various means of financing could be taken into consideration, such as financing from alternative sources other than the State budget" (Recital no. 26) and that: "[m]ember States shall at least ensure that national competition authorities have sufficient qualified personnel and sufficient financial, technical, and technological resources for the effective performance of their tasks and the exercise of their powers, for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU" (Article 5, paragraph 1).

The referring court assumes that, while leaving ample discretion to the national legislature in determining the source of the contribution itself, and thus it being lawful for States to require a contribution from companies for the operation of the Authority, nevertheless, in doing so, States could not adopt discriminatory criteria among companies based on turnover or other criteria.

Furthermore, the lower court observes that, regarding the compliance of the domestic rules with the principle of non-discrimination, the CJEU would have affirmed a series of principles that could find application in the case at hand (citing the judgment of September 7, 2023, Case C-226/22, Nexive Commerce S.r.l. and others, in which the case of private postal service providers subjected to a uniform "contribution" to support the activity of the Italian Communications Authority - AGCOM was addressed). The Court of Justice deemed it legitimate that the financing of AGCOM be borne by all operators in the postal sector, given that all benefited from the regulatory activity of the aforementioned Authority (and thus were in a comparable and not different situation), further stating that the intensity of the activity carried out by a regulatory and monitoring body is not relevant for the purposes of the principle of non-discrimination.

The principles set out by the Court of Justice in the aforementioned ruling would apply to the rules of the contribution at issue because, on one hand, there is a homogeneity of the situation of the subjects subjected to the activity of the Competition Authority, and on the other hand, the intensity of the oversight would not constitute an element to clearly distinguish between subjects liable or not liable for the contribution.

Therefore, the challenged domestic rules, revolving around a distinction based on turnover and justified by the presumption of a greater impact of the activity of the funded body on the companies subject to the contribution, would be unmotivatedly discriminatory.

The challenged rules would, furthermore, conflict with the principle of sincere cooperation integrated into Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU, where it is established that Member States "shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from acts of the institutions of the Union" and must refrain "from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Union."

In consideration of the activity performed—of safeguarding competition to counter anti-competitive practices and of monitoring to ensure that companies do not conclude agreements or implement practices "which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market" (Article 101 TFEU) and do not exploit their potential dominant position (Article 102 TFEU)—the AGCM would provide a public service for the benefit of the entire community and not a specific service for the benefit of individual companies; therefore, it would benefit the generality of citizens as consumers interested in free market competition.

In this context, the challenged domestic rules would be detrimental to the independence of the AGCM and the effectiveness of its activity since the structuring of its financing would be based essentially on the contribution provided by the subjects primarily subjected to the oversight activity.

Ultimately, the rules submitted for constitutional legitimacy scrutiny would be detrimental to the independence of the AGCM, in violation of the principle of sincere cooperation imposed on Member States by Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU, which would imply the prohibition of adopting measures that risk jeopardizing the realization of the Union's objectives.

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, requesting that the questions be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

2.1.– According to the State Attorney's Office, the referring court, while demonstrating awareness of Judgment no. 269 of 2017 of this Court, raised issues against Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990 similar to those already scrutinized and regarding which this Court has already ruled, recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the aforementioned provisions in reference to the principles of equal treatment, ability to pay, progressivity, and legal reservation, pursuant to Articles 3, 23, and 53 of the Constitution.

2.2.– In the opinion of the State's defense, the constitutional legitimacy questions would therefore be inadmissible for insufficient motivation on non-manifest groundlessness, to the extent that they would re-propose the same challenges already scrutinized by this Court in reference to Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution.

On this specific aspect, the State Attorney's Office cites the consistent constitutional case law according to which the failure to engage with previous decisions of this Court does not, per se, invalidate the issues raised, as the latter can take on the weight of its own jurisprudence during the examination of the merits of the issues (citing judgments of this Court no. 4 and no. 21 of 2024) where they are proposed regarding profiles and on the basis of new arguments; it observes, however, that in the case under examination, there would be no elements of substantial novelty compared to the issues already examined and judged unfounded by this Court.

It believes that the statistical data valorized by the referring court would not provide the real number and the effective dimensional relevance of the subjects investigated by the Authority because it would limit itself to considering cases resolved by the application of sanctions, without taking into account the wide range of cases that did not give rise to sanctioning measures because they were archived or closed with so-called commitments. Since, therefore, the statistical data presented by the referring court would offer only a partial picture of the number and nature of the companies subjected to the Authority's investigative activity, the questions raised would be manifestly unsuitable to change the judgment of constitutional legitimacy on the Authority's financing system already rendered with the cited judgment of this Court, which would make the defect of insufficient motivation on non-manifest groundlessness manifest.

2.3.– The same defect would characterize the questions raised in reference to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, because the referring court would have failed to engage with the order of the Court of Justice of the European Union of April 17, 2023, Case C-560/22, Ferriere Nord S.p.A. and others, which would identify principles clearly precluding the acceptance of today's challenges.

In that ruling, which moreover involved three of the parties currently appearing here, the Court of Justice declared the request based on parameters coinciding with those evoked in today's proceedings manifestly inadmissible, as "neither Regulation no. 1/2003 nor any other provision of Union law prescribes a specific method of financing for the competition authorities of the Member States" (point 18 of the order of the Court of Justice of the EU) and therefore "when, as in the present case, in order to finance its national competition authority, a Member State imposes a contribution that burdens only companies having their seat or a secondary establishment in the territory of that Member State whose revenues exceed a certain threshold, that Member State acts in the exercise of its competence in fiscal matters" (point 19).

In the same ruling, the Court of Justice also affirmed that "the imposition of a contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings falls within the exercise, by a Member State, of its competence in fiscal matters and does not constitute implementation of Union law" (point 29).

The State Attorney's Office doubts that from Recital no. 8 of Directive 2019/1/EU—according to which "[i]n order to ensure a truly common area of application of competition rules in the Union that offers greater equality of conditions to companies operating in the internal market and reduces disparities in conditions for consumers, it is necessary to introduce fundamental guarantees of independence and adequate financial, human, technical, and technological resources as well as minimum investigative and sanctioning powers when applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and national competition law in parallel to those articles, so that national administrative competition authorities can be fully effective"—the meaning attributed to it by the referring court can be derived, believing, rather, that it indicates, in the equality of conditions among companies operating in the market, the result to which the activity of national competition authorities must tend and not that which the legislature must guarantee through the mechanism of financing the authorities themselves.

The State Attorney's Office observes that, although this directive requires States to equip competition authorities with sufficient resources in terms of qualified personnel, financial means, and technical and technological equipment to guarantee their independence, it does not refer to the means through which to pursue such a result, limiting itself to stating that "[t]o ensure that national administrative competition authorities have the necessary resources to perform their tasks, various means of financing could be taken into consideration, such as financing from alternative sources other than the State budget" (Recital no. 26).

From this, it follows that the identification of the source of financing for the authorities would be the responsibility of the national legislature and this would serve to refute the hypothesis formulated by the referring court or, at the very least, to exclude that the "communally" obligated alternative must consist in placing the financing of the AGCM on the entire community.

Furthermore, the State Attorney's Office believes that the referring court's assertion according to which financing the AGCM through a tax imposed on companies would make the Authority "depend" on the companies themselves would be completely apodictic. On the contrary, according to the State defense, the rate of independence of the Authority would be more limited if its operation depended on sub-legislative measures susceptible to being modified by the government authority or on the collection of sanctions imposed by the AGCM.

This aspect would have been grasped by the repeatedly cited Judgment no. 269 of 2017, in which it is stated that the new financing system was introduced precisely "[i]n order to strengthen the independence of the Authority from conditioning that could derive from the previous mixed financing system - conditioning that could come from subjects of various natures (political, economic, financial)."

The preceding considerations would not be refuted by the cited judgment of the CJEU C-226/22, concerning the financing of the Communications Authority (AGCOM), due to the diversity of the context in which that decision intervened, which would relate to a matter governed by secondary Union law, namely that of administrative fees imposed on companies in the sector in the face of authorizations for electronic communications networks and services, regulated by Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002, on the authorization of electronic communications networks and services and by Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 11, 2018, establishing the European Electronic Communications Code.

In the present case, the exclusion of the subjects indicated by the referral order from the financing duties of the AGCM would be explained by the objective diversity of the positions that such subjects occupy, as the objective of the system of contribution to the financing of the Authority would be to place the related burden on the subjects towards whom the oversight activity of national markets can be considered directed, as only larger companies, because they are endowed with appreciable market power and substantial bargaining strength, would have the capacity to effectively influence the competitive balances of the markets and the quality of the commercial relations existing therein, conditioning them through conduct capable of appreciably restricting competition or significantly orienting commercial practices towards logics of unfairness and aggression.

What has been observed so far would find confirmation in the provisions governing anti-competitive conduct over which the AGCM is called upon to perform its function of overseeing national markets.

Clear indications on the necessity of a minimum size of the enterprise to be able to arouse the interest of the Authority would also come from the regulations in the matter of concentrations, which exclude ex ante from any control smaller operations, requiring, as an indispensable condition for the arising of the obligation to notify, not only that the complex of the companies concerned exceeds a certain threshold, but also that each of them reaches a minimum level of size, corresponding to 50 million euros of turnover.

Therefore, the 50 million euro turnover threshold provided by the legislature as a parameter for the identification of the subjects obliged to pay the contribution for the operation of the AGCM would be that which, more than any other, would harmonize with the current regulatory and oversight framework, as it would express a dimension that antitrust law has already identified as "relevant."

A similar argument, the State Attorney's Office believes, could be made for the repression of unfair commercial practices, since the relevance of the practice and its severity would depend mainly on the size of the subject that implements it.

As regards the denounced discrimination between national companies and companies resident abroad without a permanent establishment in Italy, the State defense believes that their exclusion from the contribution would be in accordance with the principles of European Union law and consistent with the principles of domestic law and international treaty law regulating transnational taxation.

With regard to the alleged violation of the principle of progressivity under Article 53 of the Constitution, according to the State Attorney's Office, the absence of progression and the presence of a maximum cap on contribution are consistent with the purpose of the tax and respectful of the needs not to determine an excessive economic burden for the individual entrepreneur as well as to avoid that individual operators can rise to the rank of hegemonic contributors of the AGCM.

Finally, as regards the contribution cap, the State defense observes that constitutional case law has considered it an appropriate measure, clarifying that "[t]he distribution of the Authority's financing according to criteria that, by imposing the contribution burden starting from certain minimum turnover limits, determine the amount according to a fixed percentage, up to a maximum non-exceedable amount, prevents the creation of a restricted circle of hegemonic financiers" (citing Judgment no. 269 of 2017).

3.– By deed of October 13, 2025, the companies Acciaierie di Verona S.p.A., Ferriere Nord S.p.A., Siderpotenza S.p.A., and Società Italiana Acciai Trafilati - SIAT S.p.A.—all belonging to the same industrial group and all with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros—entered an appearance in the proceedings, stating that they adhere to the reasons provided by the referring court both as regards the admissibility of the questions and the merits of the challenges.

In particular, the parties believe that the obligation to pay the contribution, burdening only companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros, would not be reasonable. In support of this thesis, the companies state that, for the purposes of the applicability of the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements under Article 101, paragraph 1, TFEU, or the generalized exemption from the application of such rule granted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 101, paragraph 3, TFEU, the turnover of the company would not be relevant but its market share; turnover would be relevant only to determine the potential prejudice to intra-community trade. Furthermore, the contribution in question would distinguish in a discriminatory and selective manner between economic operators in the same legal and factual situation.

The companies also observe that the cited Judgment no. 269 of 2017 had not examined the compatibility of the contribution at issue with European Union law and, in particular, with the principle of non-discrimination and Directive 2019/1/EU. They therefore ask that the challenged provisions be evaluated with reference to the EU legislation evoked by the referring court.

They further assert that Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990 would conflict with the principle of non-discrimination—considered by the CJEU as a general principle of law having direct effect in the legal systems of the Member States—which requires not to treat similar situations in a different manner, unless a difference in treatment is objectively justified. They argue that the cited directive would contain a series of provisions and principles in the matter of financing national antitrust Authorities, including Article 1, paragraph 1; a rule according to which adequate financial resources would be essential so that national Authorities, such as the AGCM, can effectively apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

Although the directive does not mandate that the financing of the Competition Authority be borne by the State, they believe that it should burden all subjects operating in the market, given that the Authority would perform a service of a public nature for the benefit of the entire community and not a specific service for the benefit of individual companies.

Entrusting the financing of oversight activity to the subjects to be overseen would also risk compromising the neutrality and independence of the same Authority appointed to oversee.

Considerations of Law

4.– By order of June 3, 2025, registered as no. 171 of the 2025 register of orders, the First Instance Tax Court of Udine, Section 2, raised questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990, introduced by Article 5-bis, paragraph 1, of Law Decree no. 1 of 2012, as converted, with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to European Union law with regard, in particular: to the principle of non-discrimination; Directive 2019/1/EU; Articles 101, 102, and 103 TFEU; Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003; Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU; and Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, CFREU.

4.1.– The referral order clarifies that these questions, proposed in the part where the challenged provisions, to ensure the operation of the AGCM, apply contributions to only companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros (so-called above-threshold), raised with reference to Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, were declared unfounded by Judgment no. 269 of 2017, which, however, would not have considered that the oversight activity of the Authority would be carried out, in a substantially equivalent manner, towards "below-threshold" and "above-threshold" companies.

It also highlights that the activity of the AGCM does not consist solely in the protection of competition among companies, but also concerns other areas, affecting the generality of economic actors operating in the Italian territory, without any distinction between joint-stock companies with a turnover above or below 50 million euros and regardless of their corporate structure.

From this would derive the unreasonableness and discriminatory nature of the contribution at issue.

4.2.– Regarding relevance, the referring court believes that, since the duty to pay the contribution for the financing of the AGCM is contested, the regulations provided for by the challenged paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater of Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990 would come into play.

5.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, requesting that the questions of constitutional legitimacy be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

5.1.– According to the State defense, the challenges would be inadmissible for insufficient motivation on non-manifest groundlessness, as they would limit themselves to re-proposing the same questions, raised in reference to the same constitutional parameters, already declared unfounded by Judgment no. 269 of 2017.

5.2.– The State Attorney's Office also excepted the inadmissibility of the challenges, as the referral order would have omitted to engage with the order of the CJEU, Case C-560/22.

5.3.– The aforementioned preliminary objections are unfounded.

The articulated motivations of the referring court are sufficient to identify the ratio of the challenges, the correctness of the arguments brought in their support pertaining, if anything, to the merits of the issues (in this sense, ex multis, judgments no. 4 of 2026, no. 80 of 2025, and no. 32 of 2023).

In effect, the order of the lower court, far from limiting itself to uncritically re-proposing the challenges already the subject of Judgment no. 269 of 2017, has taken into account this latter ruling, contesting the validity of its arguments.

As regards, instead, the order of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-560/22, this is not cited by the referring court; however, the lower court reconstructs in a sufficiently complete manner the relevant normative and jurisprudential context.

Moreover, the motivation of the referral order has not prevented the State defense from developing a completed and exhaustive defensive argument on the merits with reference to all the parameters and aspects touched upon by the lower court (in this sense, ex multis, judgments no. 4 of 2026, no. 80 of 2025, and no. 53 of 2020).

6.– It is necessary to provide a brief normative and jurisprudential reconstruction of the context in which the issues at hand are inserted.

6.1.– Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990 (the so-called antitrust law), within which the challenged provisions are contained, established, in paragraph 1, the Italian Competition Authority; in paragraph 2, it established that the aforementioned Authority operates in full autonomy and with independence of judgment and assessment and that it is a collegial body, whose members are appointed following an agreement between the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic from among persons of notorious independence who, in the case of the President, have held institutional positions of great responsibility and prominence and, in the case of the other members, are magistrates of the higher courts, full professors, or personalities endowed with high and recognized professional competence.

The Italian Competition Authority is considered an independent administrative Authority called upon to carry out oversight tasks to protect competition in national markets (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, order of January 3, 2025, no. 64), in order to counter classic antitrust conduct (agreements, abuse of dominant position, concentrations, provided for respectively by Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the aforementioned law), sanctioned also by the TFEU (Articles 101 and 102) and by Regulation (EC) no. 139/2004 of January 20, 2004, regarding the control of concentrations between undertakings.

The regulatory framework has undergone subsequent modifications, substantially aimed at expanding the tasks and powers of the AGCM, which remain focused on the protection of the market and which, therefore, do not assume a determining weight for the purposes of this decision.

The activity of the AGCM has progressively extended also to the protection of the consumer, which is found in Italian legal language precisely within the antitrust law (Articles 3, 4, 5, and 12 of Law no. 287 of 1990): consider the tasks of the Authority in the matter of unfair commercial practices under the Consumer Code (Articles 18 and following of Legislative Decree no. 206 of September 6, 2005, containing the "Consumer Code, in accordance with Article 7 of Law no. 229 of July 29, 2003").

Directive 2019/1/EU (the so-called ECN+ Directive) also intervened, aimed at strengthening the powers and independence of the competition authorities of the individual countries; this directive was implemented in Italy with Legislative Decree no. 185 of 2021, which, among other things, modified some rules contained within Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990 (the same one challenged by the referring court, but with reference to different paragraphs), establishing in particular that "[t]he Authority is independent in using its financial endowment" (paragraph 7, second sentence).

Subsequently, the powers of the AGCM were expanded and strengthened through various and significant additions to the same Law no. 287 of 1990, introducing, in particular, the possibility of detecting concentrations harmful to the market (Articles 5 and 6); increasing investigative powers in order to verify the existence of anti-competitive conduct (Article 14); providing for the power to adopt precautionary measures (Article 14-bis); attributing powers on the subject of commitments—for companies to which the initiation of an investigation has been notified—such as to eliminate the anti-competitive profiles subject of the investigation itself (Article 14-ter); settlement powers (Article 14-quater); powers in the matter of warnings and sanctions (Article 15); powers in the matter of non-applicability (Article 15-bis) or reduction (Article 15-ter) of sanctions by virtue of the cooperation provided by companies in the verification of infringements; powers in the matter of investigative cooperation within the European Competition Network (Article 15-octies); powers in the matter of requests for information in the matter of concentrations between undertakings (Article 16-bis).

If before the task of overseeing the antitrust law was the only and exclusive one of the Authority, others have been added to it, among which are the protection of the consumer, the resolution of conflicts of interest (Law no. 215 of July 20, 2004, containing "Rules in the matter of resolution of conflicts of interest"), the assignment of the legality rating to companies (Article 5-ter of Law Decree no. 1 of 2012, as converted), the repression of conduct of abuse of economic dependence relevant for the protection of competition and the market (Article 9, paragraph 3-bis of Law no. 192 of June 18, 1998, containing "Discipline of subcontracting in production activities," introduced by Law no. 57 of March 5, 2001, containing "Provisions in the matter of opening and regulation of markets").

6.2.– As regards the challenged provisions, in 2012 a new and unitary system for the financing of the AGCM was provided for, notably through Article 5-bis of Law Decree no. 1 of 2012, as converted, which introduced paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater to Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990, which provide that: "7-ter. The burden deriving from the operation of the Competition Authority shall be met by a contribution equal to 0.08 per thousand of the turnover resulting from the last approved financial statement of joint-stock companies, with total revenues exceeding 50 million euros [...]. The maximum threshold of contribution borne by each company cannot exceed one hundred times the minimum amount. 7-quater. Without prejudice, for the year 2012, to all current forms of financing [...], for the year 2013, the contribution referred to in paragraph 7-ter shall be paid directly to the Authority with the methods determined by the Authority itself with its own resolution, by October 30, 2012. For subsequent years, starting from the year 2014, the contribution shall be paid, by July 31 of each year, directly to the Authority with the methods determined by the Authority itself with its own resolution. Possible variations in the measure and methods of contribution may be adopted by the Authority itself with its own resolution, within the maximum limit of 0.5 per thousand of the turnover resulting from the financial statement approved prior to the adoption of the resolution, without prejudice to the maximum contribution threshold referred to in paragraph 7-ter."

Such regulation constitutes the point of arrival of a significant regulatory evolution.

The original paragraph 7 of Article 10 established, in fact, that "[t]he Authority provides for the autonomous management of expenses for its operation within the limits of the fund allocated for this purpose in the State budget and registered, with a single chapter, in the estimate of expenditure of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts." Such a financing system, entirely borne by the State, was gradually abandoned.

As already observed in Judgment no. 269 of 2017, "[t]he rules subject to the doubts of constitutional legitimacy have significantly innovated the financing system of the AGCM which, previously, was based on four different sources, consisting of transfers from the State (with burdens for general taxation and, therefore, for all citizens); from a 'solidarity fund' fed by the other independent authorities; from contributions borne by companies subject to the obligation to communicate concentration operations; from a portion of the sanctions imposed pursuant to the regulations in the matter of consumer protection."

As also already recalled in the aforementioned judgment, "[t]his arrangement was the result of a stratification of regulatory interventions that had succeeded one another over time, aimed at adding other resources to State transfers. In particular, starting from Law no. 266 of December 23, 2005 (Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget - 2006 Budget Law) a system of contribution by companies subject to the obligation to notify concentrations was added to the fund specifically allocated in the State budget [...]. In subsequent years, with Law Decree no. 207 of December 30, 2008 (Extension of terms provided for by legislative provisions and urgent financial provisions), converted, with amendments, by Law no. 14 of February 27, 2009, the possibility was provided to finance the non-continuing and non-mandatory expenses of the Authority with a portion of the revenues deriving from the sanctions imposed in the matter of unfair commercial practices. In the same year, with Article 2, paragraph 241, of Law no. 191 of December 23, 2009 (Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget - 2010 Budget Law), a temporary mechanism of transfer of resources between independent authorities was established for the three-year period 2010-2012 in favor, among other things, of the AGCM."

7.– This Court, with the already cited Judgment no. 269 of 2017, in declaring the groundlessness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of 1990, raised in reference to Articles 3, 23, and 53 of the Constitution, stated that "[t]he taxation at issue here constitutes an atypical form of contribution. It, in fact, is not traceable to the category of 'taxes' [tasse], as it concerns pecuniary obligations due regardless of whether the activity of the entity has specifically concerned the individual obliged subject, and from the circumstance that such activity is configured as a divisible service, but is correlated to the activity of the administration in terms of advantage enjoyed or cost caused by the taxpayer: so that the tax [tributo] at issue differs from 'taxes' [imposte] in the strict sense."

Well, in raising these present questions, it has not been called into question, by the referring court, that the financing of the AGCM must take place through the payment of a tax [tributo], nor is it contested that it must consist in a contribution. On the point, it must be reiterated that it is not "justified by any contractual relationship with the independent Authority, but configures a pecuniary obligation imposed by the law in favor of the same Authority, which has coercive powers to impose payment. It has, therefore, a mandatory character and completely ignores any synallagmatic relationship with the Authority, to which it is due regardless of whether the taxpayer has been the recipient of the powers of the entity or has benefited from its activity" (again Judgment no. 269 of 2017).

In the same judgment, it was affirmed that "[t]he contribution is connected to an economic premise, being commensurate with the volume of turnover which is assumed as an index of ability to pay" and is destined to "finance the operating expenses of the AGCM in relation to the services that it is institutionally called upon to perform, in the delicate and essential function of safeguarding the rules of the market to protect competition, rooted in public interests of constitutional value pursuant to Articles 3 and 41 of the Constitution," so that "[a]ll the requirements essential and necessary for the constitutional recognition of the fiscal nature of the contribution in question must [...] be considered integrated."

8.– This having been premised, it is necessary to verify the validity of the grievances moved by the referring court, which can be distinguished into two groups of challenges.

8.1.– The first group, founded on the alleged violation of Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, contests the conclusions reached by this Court in Judgment no. 269 of 2017 in declaring similar questions unfounded, raised in reference to the same constitutional parameters.

8.2.– The second group of challenges, instead, in evoking Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, laments the conflict with a series of EU principles and rules.

It complains, in particular, that the referring court, that Directive 2019/1/EU, while leaving ample discretion to the national legislature in the determination of the source of financing of the AGCM, would not allow for distinguishing the subjects required to pay the contribution based on the amount of their turnover; furthermore, the challenged rules would conflict with EU legislation as they are detrimental to the independence of the AGCM, which should be endowed with adequate means to carry out its functions without having to depend financially on the companies towards whom it exercises inspection and sanctioning powers.

9.– The challenges falling into the first group are unfounded.

9.1.– With reference to the choice of a high turnover as an index of ability to pay and to the alleged violation of the principles referred to in Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, this Court has affirmed that by ability to pay "[o]ne must understand the aptitude of the subject to the tax obligation, deducible from the economic premise to which the taxation is connected, a premise that consists in any index revealing wealth, according to evaluations reserved to the legislature, except for the control of constitutional legitimacy from the perspective of their arbitrariness or irrationality" (judgments no. 34 of 2025, no. 108 of 2023, and, in the same sense, Judgment no. 201 of 2014).

In Judgment no. 108 of 2023, it was also specified that "[i]n a complex context like the contemporary one, where new and multiform creations of value develop, the concept of ability to pay does not necessarily have to remain linked only to traditional indices such as assets and income, being able to be relevant also other and more evolved forms of capacity, which well can denote an economic force or potentiality."

It is necessary to highlight, furthermore, that this Court on other occasions has "[d]eemed unfounded challenges referred to taxes established only for some taxpayers within a certain category [...] with reference to companies operating in the financial market. In Judgment no. 201 of 2014, it highlighted, in fact, that the limitation to only the 'financial sector' of the base of taxpayers subject to the 'additional' levy on remuneration in the form of bonuses and stock options was not unjustified" (Judgment no. 34 of 2025).

It was also highlighted, in Judgment no. 269 of 2017, that "[t]o the legislature falls an ample discretion in relation to the various purposes to which the activity of fiscal imposition is inspired" (Judgment no. 240 of 2017), with only the limit of non-arbitrariness and non-manifest unreasonableness and disproportion. In this perspective [...] the choice of the legislature to impose the contribution at issue exclusively on companies that are distinguished by a significant presence on the markets, because they are endowed with a particular structure and because they are characterized by a relevant economic dimension, cannot be considered constitutionally illegitimate: such companies, in fact, based on the id quod plerumque accidit, are the prevalent recipients of the activity of the Authority itself and, therefore, the greatest responsible for the relative expense. In light of this ratio, the legislative selection of the subjects required to contribute does not appear either arbitrary or unreasonable. Neither does the fact that the activity of the AGCM can sometimes be directed also towards subjects not required to contribute, such as so-called below-threshold entrepreneurs, public administrations, companies without a permanent establishment in Italy, or consumers themselves, invalidate the legislative option. On the level of effectiveness, the antitrust Authority is predominantly engaged by the economic activities of medium and large entrepreneurs."

The cited judgment continues by stating that "[n]either is the choice to refer to a specific turnover dimension (50 million euros) to delimit the base of entrepreneurs subject to the contribution unreasonable [...]. [T]he tax at issue, in fact, does not have as its causa impositionis an income, but intends to distribute the economic burdens related to the provision of a public service (the protection of competition and the functioning of the market) among the subjects that justify the existence of a competition authority and that in fact most engage its activity."

More recently, this Court has also reiterated that "[i]t is not unreasonable that the operating expenses of the authority responsible for the proper functioning of the market burden companies characterized by a significant presence in the relevant markets and endowed with considerable capacity to influence the movements of the related economic activities" (Judgment no. 34 of 2025).

With particular reference to the concept of turnover, it was affirmed that, regarding the identification of this magnitude "[a]s a taxable base for the determination of the contribution by the obliged subjects [...] one can observe that the notion at issue, used also in other places of the legal system, well lends itself to being specified, with regard to the specific sector of reference, based on technical criteria of an economic and accounting nature" (Judgment no. 69 of 2017).

9.2.– Therefore, in light of the aforementioned precedents of this Court, with respect to the contribution in question, a high turnover can well be considered a valid index revealing wealth and therefore ability to pay as it denotes the conclusion of a considerable number of contracts and a notable volume of business and, therefore, a relevant presence on the market, indicative of the holding of a significant share of that market.

In this regard, the Court of Cassation affirmed that "[t]he 'definition of the relevant market' represents a tool to identify and define the scope in which companies are in competition with each other, so that '[t]he market must be defined both from the product profile and from the geographical profile to identify the effective competitors of the interested companies that are able to condition the behavior of the latter and to prevent them from operating independently of effective competitive pressures. It is from this perspective that the definition of the market allows, among other things, to calculate market shares that provide significant information on market power, and therefore useful for the purposes of establishing whether a dominant position exists or is foreseen or for the purposes of the application of Article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community' [now Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]" (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, judgment of November 12, 2019, no. 29238).

9.3.– It is in this perspective that the aforementioned assertion, contested by the referring court, according to which companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros "[based] on the id quod plerumque accidit, are the prevalent recipients of the activity of the Authority itself and, therefore, the greatest responsible for the relative expense," must be read.

The argumentation of the lower court according to which statistics would show that the Authority does not deal predominantly with "above-threshold" turnover companies is not shared. This is because the activity of the AGCM must not be evaluated in a merely statistical sense, i.e., in terms of measures issued, but with regard to the work cumulatively performed in all the multiform sectors of competence and which, moreover, does not always translate into specific measures.

The Authority, in fact, ensures the proper functioning of the market, sanctioning anti-competitive practices and those contrary to consumer rights. To this end, the Authority must be completely independent from political power. Hence the choice of a financing system that is completely detached from the decisions of the Government and the State budget and that, instead, is based on the contribution of the companies themselves which, thanks to the activity of the Authority, benefit from the functioning of a competitive market.

The financial contribution from companies is, however, conditional on the reaching of a certain turnover threshold equal to at least 50 million euros. The provision of the aforementioned threshold reasonably balances the following needs: a) to avoid imposing a financial burden on smaller companies, which could result in being excessively burdensome; b) to have companies that for their greater size can better bear the relative financial burden contribute to the expenses for the operation of the Authority, in fulfillment of a constitutionally founded duty of solidarity (Article 2 of the Constitution); c) to have the financial burden burden companies of larger size that draw the greatest advantages from the existence of an efficient market; d) to impose the contribution for the operation of the Authority on companies that, due to their market power, fall within the base of subjects that most likely can exercise it to the detriment of other companies and consumers.

9.4.– As regards the exclusion from the payment of the contribution of public administrations, it is undoubted that, also in light of the provision of Article 1, paragraph 1, of Law no. 287 of 1990, according to which "[t]he provisions of this law [...] apply to agreements, abuses of dominant position, and concentrations between undertakings," towards public administrations the Authority can only render opinions (in terms of collaboration) or challenge secondary administrative acts of regulation that are capable of restricting competitive dynamics (in this sense Article 21-bis of Law no. 287 of 1990).

The diversity of the situations compared (public administrations and large private companies) seems, therefore, to preclude any violation of Article 3 of the Constitution.

A different case is that of public subjects that exercise business activity, also through subsidiaries, because they too are subject to the tax in question by virtue of the relative EU notion, according to which any "entity that exercises an economic activity" consisting "in offering goods or services on a given market" must be considered an undertaking (Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section-T, order of May 2, 2018, no. 10450).

9.5.– Coming then to the challenge according to which it would be unreasonable that the contribution in question is limited only to joint-stock companies and is not instead extended to all types of companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros (that is, also including partnerships and individual enterprises), it is necessary to recall that joint-stock companies benefit from the limitation of liability to the assets only.

Given such diversity, a regulation that, with equal turnover, distinguishes the tax regime of joint-stock companies from other economic subjects is not, therefore, unreasonable.

9.6.– Regarding then the choice of the amount of 50 million euros as a value starting from which the contribution is due, the existence of "value thresholds," exceeded which legal consequences—positive or negative that they may be for the addressees of the rules—are triggered, are often provided for by the law to establish obligations, tax impositions or, conversely, exemptions and facilities.

The legislative choice in the identification of a "threshold" of value starting from which legal consequences arise has already been declared constitutionally legitimate by this Court because "[t]he legislature enjoys [...] an ample discretion in the identification of the threshold that guarantees adequate means to the needs of life, being called to perform a complex balancing of interests, which is affected, obviously, by the type of interests implied. Such discretion encounters only the limit of manifest unreasonableness and disproportion" (Judgment no. 216 of 2025).

Regarding the non-manifest unreasonableness of the business volume established by the challenged provisions in relation to which the obligation to pay the contribution in question is triggered, it has already been said that it responds to the very essence of the antitrust law which, by definition, deals with anti-competitive conduct put in place by subjects able to reach a dominant position in a certain commodity sector in the national market or in a relevant part of it.

9.7.– Finally, the question that laments discrimination between Italian companies with revenues exceeding 50 million euros registered in the business register held by the Italian Chambers of Commerce and foreign companies that do not have a stable representation in Italy, but exercise business activities in our country, benefiting from the oversight and regulatory services provided by the AGCM, is also unfounded.

It must first of all be noted that the challenged regulation does not expressly provide for such a distinction.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has, moreover, affirmed that "when [...] in order to finance its national competition authority, a Member State imposes a contribution that burdens only companies having their seat or a secondary establishment in the territory of that Member State whose revenues exceed a certain threshold, that Member State acts in the exercise of its competence in fiscal matters" (Case C-560/22, repeatedly cited).

In the exercise of such competence, the stability of the organization in Italy can be considered a reasonable criterion of differentiation in relation to the lesser effort that non-resident companies and without a stable organization in our country tend to entail for the AGCM.

In the national tax arrangement, it is provided, in fact, as a general line, that the subjection to the taxing power of the Italian State must occur—should the adoption of decisions regarding the direction and management of the business activity take place in our country (Articles 73 and 162 of Presidential Decree no. 917 of December 22, 1986, containing the "Approval of the consolidated text of income taxes" and, in this sense, Court of Cassation, Fifth Civil Section, judgments of June 24, 2024, no. 17289 and March 9, 2021, no. 6476)—in coherence with the principle of the prohibition of double taxation (Article 67 of Presidential Decree no. 600 of September 29, 1973, containing "Common provisions in the matter of assessment of income taxes"; judgments no. 171 of 2024 and no. 262 of 2020) and in consideration of the foreign-vesting of companies as conduct evading the principle of the effectiveness of the seat of the company in Italy referred to in Article 73, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree no. 917 of 1986 (Court of Cassation, Fifth Civil Section, judgment of August 25, 2025, no. 23842).

10.– As regards the second group of challenges, they, while united by the circumstance of concerning European Union norms through the reference to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, can in turn be distinguished into two subgroups.

10.1.– The first subgroup concerns grievances which, by recalling some norms placed to protect competition and the market in the EU field (Articles 101, 102, and 103 TFEU, Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003) and the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, CFREU), constitute a substantial repetition of the challenges already addressed regarding the first group of questions raised in reference to the parameters of Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution.

They are unfounded for the same motivations already expressed in points 9.1., 9.2., and 9.3.

In any case, as affirmed by the CJEU in the order adopted in Case C-560/22, "neither Regulation no. 1/2003 nor any other provision of Union law prescribes a specific method of financing for the competition authorities of the Member States. It follows that, when, as in the present case, in order to finance its national competition authority, a Member State imposes a contribution that burdens only companies having their seat or a secondary establishment in the territory of that Member State whose revenues exceed a certain threshold, that Member State acts in the exercise of its competence in fiscal matters [...]. In the present case [concerning the liability or lack thereof for the contribution to the Competition Authority by some of the companies involved in the proceedings in the main proceedings], it must be noted, on one hand, that the dispute in the main proceedings has as its object the annulment of payment notices for a contribution imposed by Italian law, intended for companies of Italian law and, on the other hand, that such contribution burdens both joint-stock companies having their seat in the Italian territory, and joint-stock companies having their seat in another Member State and which have a secondary seat in Italy provided that, in both cases, their annual revenues exceed the threshold of EUR 50 million. [...] [T]he imposition of a contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings falls within the exercise, by a Member State, of its competence in fiscal matters and does not constitute implementation of Union law, in particular of the provisions referred to in the preliminary question."

In this perspective, the regulation subject to challenge, not constituting implementation of specific obligations placed by Union law, does not conflict with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

10.2.– The second subgroup of questions laments a violation of the principles in the matter of the independence of the Authority since the challenged provisions, by placing the entire weight of the financing of the AGCM on joint-stock companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros, would damage the independence and—therefore—the effectiveness of the action of the Authority in carrying out its task of pursuing anti-competitive conduct, thus violating the principle of sincere cooperation imposed on Member States by Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU, which implies the prohibition of adopting measures that can compromise the realization of the objectives of the Union.

Such questions, although already addressed in Judgment no. 269 of 2017, must take into account the subsequent Directive 2019/1/EU, adopted on the basis of Article 103 TFEU.

Also the questions of the second subgroup are unfounded.

The CJEU affirmed, regarding the financing of the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM), that "Member States are granted a wide margin of discretion as regards the determination of the sources of the financing system of the national regulatory authorities responsible for the postal sector [...]" (point 38). "Article 9(2), second subparagraph, fourth indent, and paragraph 3, of Directive 97/67/EC [...], in conjunction with Article 22 [of that directive], as amended, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a Member State from opting for a financing mechanism for the national regulatory authority responsible for the postal sector fed exclusively through contributions imposed on operators in that sector pursuant to Article 9(2), second subparagraph, fourth indent, of that directive, as amended, to the exclusion of any financing from the State budget, provided that such a system guarantees that the national regulatory authority concerned effectively has the resources indispensable to ensure its proper functioning and the fulfillment, in full independence, of its regulatory tasks in the postal sector or legal means that allow it to acquire such resources [...]. Therefore, in light of the margin of discretion mentioned at point 38 of this judgment, the principle of proportionality as well as Article 9(2), second subparagraph, fourth indent, and paragraph 3, of Directive 97/67 cannot be interpreted as meaning that there must exist a precise correlation between the amount of the contribution imposed on an operator and the costs effectively incurred by the NRA concerned for its regulatory activity towards such operator" (CJEU, Case C-226/22).

Similarly, the CJEU, regarding the financing of the Italian Transport Regulation Authority, affirmed that "[m]ember States may establish a financing mechanism for the independent supervisory authority, which may include the imposition of charges on airport users and airport operators. [W]hen Member States decide, pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2009/12, to establish a financing mechanism for their supervisory authorities, they are not required to establish a correlation between, on one hand, the amount of the contribution they impose on airport users and airport operators and, on the other hand, the cost of the services provided by that authority [...]. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, national legislation establishing a financing mechanism for the supervisory authority, pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2009/12, must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued by that provision [...], that is [...] that of equipping that authority with resources in terms of personnel, technical skills, and financial means capable of allowing it to exercise its functions in an impartial, transparent manner and in full independence" (CJEU, Eighth Section, judgment of April 25, 2024, Case C-204/23, Transport Regulation Authority).

Furthermore, according to Recital no. 26 of the cited Directive 2019/1/EU, "[t]o ensure that national administrative competition authorities have the necessary resources to perform their tasks, various means of financing could be taken into consideration, such as financing from alternative sources other than the State budget."

Finally, according to Article 4 of the same directive, "[i]n order to ensure the independence of national administrative competition authorities [...] Member States shall ensure [...] that [...] the persons who adopt the decisions [...] are able to perform their tasks and exercise their powers [...] in a manner independent from political interference and other external influences [...] do not seek or accept instructions from the government or other public or private entities in the performance of their tasks or in the exercise of their powers," while Article 5 establishes that "[m]ember States shall ensure [...] that national competition authorities have [...] sufficient financial resources [...] for the effective performance of their tasks and the exercise of their powers."

The orientation of this Court is consistent with such an approach, according to which, regarding the Communications Authority, "it must be recognized that Community regulation tends towards a strengthening of the independence also of national regulatory authorities. To this end, however, it is considered sufficient that it is guaranteed through an explicit provision that the national authority responsible for the ex ante regulation of the market or for the resolution of disputes between companies is protected, in the exercise of its functions, from any external intervention or political pressure that could compromise its impartiality of judgment in the matters it is called to settle" (Judgment no. 7 of 2014).

The aforementioned normative and jurisprudential references lead to the belief that the national legislature disposes of an ample discretion regarding the choice of the financing system of the AGCM that it deems most appropriate, provided that the latter is independent from external influences and provided that it disposes of sufficient means to carry out its tasks in the best way possible.

Well, the challenged regulation, also in light of the regulatory framework in which it is inserted, fully guarantees the independence of the Authority as delineated by the European Union and is consistent with the jurisprudence of this Court.

It is necessary, in fact, to highlight that the aforementioned Directive 2019/1/EU was implemented in Italy with Legislative Decree no. 185 of 2021, which modified some rules contained within Article 10 of Law no. 287 of 1990, in particular providing that the Authority is independent in using its financial endowment.

According to this provision, the Authority operates in full autonomy and with independence of judgment and assessment and is a collegial body whose members are appointed from among persons of "notorious independence" (paragraph 2): it must be added in this specific place that, pursuant to the subsequent paragraph 3, "[t]he members of the Authority [...] cannot be reappointed" and "[t]hey cannot exercise, under penalty of forfeiture, any professional or consulting activity, nor can they be administrators or employees of public or private entities, nor hold other public offices of any nature [...] they cannot be removed or dismissed for reasons connected to the correct performance of their tasks or the correct exercise of their powers." Again, according to the subsequent paragraph 3-bis, the aforementioned members "[d]o not seek or accept instructions from the Government or other public or private subjects in the performance of their tasks or in the exercise of their powers" and "[a]bstain from undertaking any action incompatible with the performance of their tasks or with the exercise of their powers."

It is also useful to emphasize that Judgment no. 269 of 2017 had already highlighted that the challenged regulation constitutes an evolution of the previous one in the sense of greater independence of the Authority in question: "[i]n order to strengthen the independence of the Authority from conditioning that could derive from the previous mixed financing system – conditioning that could come from subjects of various natures (political, economic, financial) – [... the] Article 5-bis of Law Decree no. 1 of 2012, converted, with amendments, by Law no. 27 of 2012, has introduced a new financing system, based on mandatory contributions due from medium-large companies [...]. The absence of progression and the presence of a maximum cap on the contribution are consistent with the ultimate purpose of the tax in question [...] that of having the subjects to whom the guarantee activity of the Authority itself is mainly addressed contribute to its financing."

Such a system corresponds to the need "[t]o avoid that some operators can transform into 'super-financiers' of the Authority, ending up by compromising its independence in fact. In particular, the affixing of a maximum cap to the contribution intends to correct a criticality that manifested itself with reference to the previous system, which provided for a contribution borne by the subjects subject to the obligation of communication of concentration operations, for whom no maximum limit of contribution was established. The new system has introduced such a limit for the purpose of placing the Authority protected from any risk of 'capture' of the controller by the controlled. In the absence of such a limit, the largest companies [...] could become the main financiers of the Authority, determining a link of financial subordination susceptible to conditioning the guarantee activity even if only through the delayed payment of the sums due. The distribution of the authority's financing according to criteria that, by imposing the contribution burden starting from certain minimum turnover limits, determine its amount according to a fixed percentage, up to a maximum non-exceedable amount, prevents the creation of a restricted circle of hegemonic financiers: from this profile the system designed by the legislature results, therefore, not only compatible with the constitutional principles referred to in Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, but even responding to needs of reasonableness" (again Judgment no. 269 of 2017).

There is, therefore, no evidence regarding interferences that can condition, even if only indirectly, its activity or any circumstance that can even only cast doubt that the Authority does not dispose of adequate means to carry out its tasks with effectiveness.

With reference to the profile of the financial independence of the AGCM, it is necessary to highlight that the quantum of the contribution due from joint-stock companies with a turnover exceeding 50 million euros is established by law precisely by the challenged regulation, with the Competition Authority being able to only vary the rate within a certain range pre-established always by law: the last sentence of paragraph 7-quater of Article 10 establishes in fact that "[p]ossible variations in the measure and methods of contribution may be adopted by the Authority itself with its own resolution, within the maximum limit of 0.5 per thousand of the turnover resulting from the financial statement approved prior to the adoption of the resolution, without prejudice to the maximum contribution threshold referred to in paragraph 7-ter."

Such a provision, in ensuring the Authority a wide margin of discretion in varying the measure of the contribution, responds perfectly to the need, reasonably placed by Directive 2019/1/EU, that the financing of the Authority be of such an amount as to guarantee the effective and adequate performance of its tasks.

11.– In conclusion, the enduring validity of the affirmations contained in Judgment no. 269 of 2017 must be reiterated, namely that it is not unreasonable to have the operating expenses of the Authority responsible for the proper functioning of the competitive mechanism burden joint-stock companies characterized by a significant presence in the relevant markets.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraphs 7-ter and 7-quater, of Law no. 287 of October 10, 1990 (Rules for the protection of competition and the market), introduced by Article 5-bis, paragraph 1, of Law Decree no. 1 of January 24, 2012 (Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development, and competitiveness), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 27 of March 24, 2012, raised with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution—the latter in relation to the European Union law principle of non-discrimination; Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 11, 2018, which empowers the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and ensures the proper functioning of the internal market; Articles 101, 102, and 103 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Council Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003 of December 16, 2002, on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty; Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on European Union; and Articles 20 and 21, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—by the First Instance Tax Court of Udine, Section 2, with the order indicated in the epigraph, to be unfounded.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 10, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Angelo BUSCEMA, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Clerk of the Court

Filed in the Clerk's Office on April 3, 2026