JUDGMENT NO. 29

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review proceedings concerning Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law of 27 December 2013, no. 147, containing "Provisions for the annual and multi-year budget of the State (Stability Law 2014)," initiated by the Court of Appeal of Rome, First Civil Section, in the proceedings between the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors, by order of 2 April 2025, registered under no. 106 of the register of ordinary rulings 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 24, special first series, of the year 2025.

Having reviewed the statement of constitution of the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors, as well as the statement of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having heard the Reporting Judge Filippo Patroni Griffi in the public hearing of 27 January 2026;

Having heard Ms. Barbara Randazzo, counsel for the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors, and State Attorney Amedeo Elefante, counsel for the President of the Council of Ministers;

Deliberated in the Chamber of Council on 27 January 2026.

Facts Considered

1.− By order of 2 April 2025, registered under no. 106 of the register of ordinary rulings 2025, the Court of Appeal of Rome, First Civil Section, raised, with reference to Articles 3, 38, and 97 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law of 27 December 2013, no. 147, containing "Provisions for the annual and multi-year budget of the State (Stability Law 2014)," "insofar as it prescribes that the sums resulting from the expenditure reductions provided for by this provision must be paid annually by the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors to a specific revenue item of the State budget."

1.1.− This provision states: "Starting from 2014, in order to achieve the public finance objectives agreed upon at the European level and to comply with structural public finance balances, the entities referred to in Legislative Decree of 30 June 1994, no. 509, and Legislative Decree of 10 February 1996, no. 103, may comply with the provisions in force regarding the containment of administrative expenditure by making a transfer to the revenue of the State budget by 30 June of each year, equal to 15 percent of the expenditure incurred for intermediate consumption in the year 2010. For said entities, this provision substitutes all legislation in force concerning public expenditure containment that provides, for the purpose of achieving public finance savings, for the contribution of the administrations referred to in Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law of 31 December 2009, no. 196, without prejudice, in any case, to the provisions in force concerning personnel expenditure constraints."

This provision correlates to the imposition of public expenditure containment measures on private law social security institutions (originating from the privatization of pre-existing public bodies pursuant to Legislative Decree of 30 June 1994, no. 509, concerning "Implementation of the delegation conferred by Article 1, paragraph 32, of Law of 24 December 1993, no. 537, regarding the transformation into private legal entities of bodies managing mandatory social security and assistance schemes," or newly established for self-employed professionals registered in appropriate rolls or lists pursuant to Legislative Decree of 10 February 1996, no. 103, concerning "Implementation of the delegation conferred by Article 2, paragraph 25, of Law of 8 August 1995, no. 335, regarding mandatory social security protection for self-employed professionals") due to their inclusion in the consolidated financial statements of public administrations, according to the list prepared annually by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) pursuant to Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law of 31 December 2009, no. 196 (Public Accounting and Finance Law).

In particular, among these measures, it was provided for entities that, like the social security funds for self-employed professionals, possess financial autonomy and do not receive transfers from the State budget, the duty to "reduce expenditure on intermediate consumption" according to different percentages established for different years, and correlatively, the obligation to annually transfer the resulting savings to the State budget (Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law of 6 July 2012, no. 95, concerning "Urgent provisions for the revision of public expenditure with no change in services to citizens, as well as measures to strengthen the equity of banking sector companies," converted, with amendments, into Law of 7 August 2012, no. 135, and Article 50, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law of 24 April 2014, no. 66, concerning "Urgent measures for competitiveness and social justice," converted, with amendments, into Law of 23 June 2014, no. 89).

In this normative context, the challenged provision allowed only category social security funds, starting from 2014, to opt, instead of analytically complying with specific public expenditure containment requirements, to effect the aforementioned lump-sum transfer to the State budget equal to 15 percent of the expenditure incurred for intermediate consumption in 2010.

1.2.− The referring court is called upon to decide – to the extent relevant – on the appeal filed by the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors (CIPAG, or also: Cassa dei geometri), against the judgment of the Court of Rome, Second Civil Section, single-judge panel, of 9 June 2020, no. 8314, which had rejected its claim for the repayment of sums transferred to the State in the years 2014-2016, in compliance with the provisions of the challenged Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013.

The claim for restitution by CIPAG was based on the alleged constitutional illegitimacy of the latter provision, as deemed to impose a transfer to the State of the expenditure savings achieved by the privatized social security entities, contrary to Articles 3, 38, and 97 of the Constitution. This conflict, in particular, was argued "in application of the principle of law" established by the judgment no. 7 of 2017 of this Court which, concerning the National Social Security and Assistance Fund for Chartered Accountants (CNPADC), declared the constitutional illegitimacy of the aforementioned Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, insofar as it required the Fund to pay to the Treasury the sums obtained from the reduction of intermediate consumption expenditure concurrently imposed.

The referring judge states that the first instance judge had rejected the claim under Article 2033 of the Civil Code, deeming the questions of constitutional legitimacy, raised by the plaintiff, regarding Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, manifestly unfounded, having outlined the differences between it and Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, which was the subject of the cited judgment no. 7 of 2017.

Not sharing the Tribunal's assessment, the Court of Appeal provided reasoning for raising the questions of constitutional legitimacy.

1.2.1.– Regarding relevance, the referring court assumes that the decision on the claim for repayment of undue payments filed by the Social Security Fund requires the necessary application of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013.

Furthermore, a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the challenged discipline is precluded due to its unequivocal literal meaning, its *ratio*, and its effects.

1.2.2.– Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring judge asserts that Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 presents the same grounds for constitutional illegitimacy identified by the aforementioned judgment no. 7 of 2017 against Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted.

Indeed, the doubted provision and the one already declared constitutionally illegitimate share the same *ratio* and result in the same diversionary effect in favor of the State of the expenditure savings achieved by a privatized social security entity.

To support this assertion, the order quotes the arguments put forward by CIPAG.

In particular, the two provisions give rise to a similar mechanism – imposing both an obligation to reduce expenditure and an obligation to transfer the resulting savings to the Treasury – with the only difference in the second provision from the first being the greater amount of sums to be transferred and the transferability of the transfer as an alternative to complying with other spending review obligations. Rather, the option granted to entities by Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 concerns only the "modalities through which the expenditure reductions and the resulting transfers are to be carried out, whether lump-sum [...] or analytical according to the general legislation for non-territorial public bodies." Both disciplines, therefore, are detrimental to the financial autonomy of privatized social security entities.

In light of the perceived correspondence in the scope of the two provisions, the referring court sustains the current doubts of constitutional legitimacy, reproducing almost entirely the reasoning of the cited judgment no. 7 of 2017.

In particular, the following tenets of that ruling are reported:

a) Article 8 of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, insofar as it establishes the duty to reduce expenditure on intermediate consumption, is justified by the necessary compliance with public finance objectives agreed upon at the European level and is a suitable tool to make pension management more efficient, as it reduces the Fund's current expenses and generates resources for pension benefits;

b) conversely, insofar as it imposes the obligation to allocate the savings achieved to the Treasury, it is constitutionally illegitimate on three grounds:

– Firstly, contrary to the principle of reasonableness, the norm (which operates as an exception to the ordinary regime of autonomy of that Fund) incongruously sacrifices its interest in retaining the saved sums to fulfill its mission of managing and securing pension benefits for its members over time, compared to a generic interest of the State to acquire them to marginally increase its revenue;

– Secondly, in violation of the proper functioning of the social security entity's administrative management, the obligation to transfer to the Treasury acts contrary to the spending review rules – which limit current expenses for the benefit of funds available for benefit payments – as it reduces the savings obtained from the resources naturally intended for such purposes;

– Finally, the provision compromises the guarantee of the members' pension entitlements (Article 38 of the Constitution), to which the Fund's financial balances are functional. Indeed, the State levy (structural and continuous) risks undermining, in the long term, the balances of a social security system based on economic self-sufficiency (with an express legal prohibition of State balancing interventions) and on the dedication constraint between contributions from members and pension benefits.

2.− CIPAG constituted itself in the proceedings, requesting a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 in the same terms supported by the referring party.

The social security entity shared and supported the arguments set forth in the act of referral.

In particular, to reinforce the referring court's arguments regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the party devoted itself to reconstructing the entire normative framework and emphasized the findings of this Court's judgment no. 7 of 2017, deeming them extensible to the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 by virtue of the alleged analogy of the challenged mechanism to that provided by Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted: both provisions, in fact, impose expenditure reductions and transfers of the resulting savings to the State, differing only in the modalities (analytical or lump-sum) for proceeding.

Furthermore, the defense document dwells on the nature of the transfer, classifying it as a structural and continuous levy.

The transfer of the amounts in question was, in fact, introduced as a non-temporary, but permanent, measure, as revealed by the literal wording of the provision which refers only to the initial term of the provision ("Starting from 2014"). Conversely, its exceptional nature cannot be asserted, even in light of the subsequent limitation of its provision to the year 2019, following the removal of privatized social security entities from the public expenditure containment legislation starting from 2020 by virtue of Article 1, paragraph 183, of Law of 27 December 2017, no. 205 (State Budget for the fiscal year 2018 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2018-2020). Indeed, the latter provision would represent a subsequent legislative decision to terminate the levy, after six years of its effectiveness.

3.− The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, requesting that the raised questions be declared inadmissible or, in the alternative, unfounded.

3.1.− The intervening party precedes any procedural and substantive consideration with a description of the economic scope of the questions, due to the significant financial repercussions that a decision accepting the claims would entail.

In this regard, the State Attorney's Office notes that all "privatized" (or rather: private law) social security entities referred to in Legislative Decrees no. 509 of 1994 and no. 103 of 1996 exercised the option provided for by the challenged provision, with the consequence that a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, not limited solely to CIPAG, would result in the obligation for the Treasury to reimburse the social security funds for the payments they made to the State budget from 2014 to 2019, for an amount of approximately 68.5 million euros, plus interest.

3.2.− Preliminarily, the intervening party objected to the inadmissibility of the questions for different reasons.

3.2.1.− Firstly, the questions would be inadmissible due to inadequate and/or deficient reasoning on relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness, having largely utilized the technique of reasoning by reference (*per relationem*).

In particular, as regards relevance and the impossibility of a constitutionally oriented interpretation, the referring Court of Appeal allegedly referred to what was stated by the Court of Rome in the judgment under appeal and, as regards non-manifest unfoundedness, allegedly limited itself to: 1) adopting some considerations of CIPAG; 2) agreeing with the arguments used by the Council of State, Fourth Section, in raising, with order registered under no. 208 reg. ord. 2015, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted (subsequently decided with the frequently cited judgment no. 7 of 2017); 3) above all, making mere references to the grounds for constitutional illegitimacy set out in the frequently cited judgment no. 7 of 2017 regarding this different legislation, moreover reproducing almost entirely the reasoning.

Thus, the referring court allegedly failed to present autonomous considerations to support the constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged norm, and the alleged defects were derived, automatically, from those found in the aforementioned ruling concerning other and different legislation whose identity of *ratio* and effects with that under scrutiny was asserted in an apodictic manner.

3.2.2.− Secondly, the President of the Council of Ministers denies the existence of the prerequisite for relevance under two aspects.

On the one hand, the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy would not be necessary to decide the dispute which, rather, would be "founded on the undisputed existence of the legal source of the obligation, which CIPAG challenged for the recognition of the right protected by Article 2033 of the Civil Code."

On the other hand, the invoked declaration of constitutional illegitimacy would be irrelevant to the referring judgment.

This is because "an irreversible factual situation has arisen in terms of corrections to the expenditures already made in the years from 2017 to 2019." Indeed, the lump-sum transfer, made as an alternative to complying with all the rules on expenditure reduction, would have "allowed CIPAG not to implement the analytical expenditure reductions required by the substituted norms, which would have had to be applied in the absence of [the option exercised]."

3.2.3.− Thirdly, the referring court allegedly attempted only apparently to undertake a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the challenged provision, proceeding to request this Court's endorsement for a specific exegesis and not for the resolution of a doubt regarding constitutional legitimacy.

3.3.− On the merits, the State defense opposed the various questions raised.

The State Attorney's Office first refuted the similarity between the challenged norm and that contained in Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, supported by the order of the referring court and the defense of the party.

To this end, the differing characteristics and the different *rationes* of the two disciplines are highlighted: Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 – enacted to grant privatized social security funds greater management flexibility in expenditure – contrary to the second, allegedly has an optional scope (since its application is left to the free adherence of each social security entity) and a special nature (as it does not intervene on intermediate consumption expenditure reductions, but allows only private law social security entities an exemption from spending review provisions provided they ensure, through the chosen predetermined and lump-sum transfer, contribution to the balance and sustainability of public debt). Due to these peculiarities, the mechanism in question would not be classifiable as a structural and continuous levy, and moreover, the aforementioned abolition measure by Article 1, paragraph 183, of Law no. 205 of 2017 would have confirmed its transitory nature.

Therefore, due to the substantial divergences between the two norms, the grounds for constitutional illegitimacy found by judgment no. 7 of 2017 regarding Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, would not be transposable to Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013.

In particular, the alleged violations of Articles 3, 38, and 97 of the Constitution would not exist because the described optional nature of the lump-sum transfer, dependent on a choice by the Fund made in the exercise of its management, organizational, and accounting autonomy, would not alter the financial balances between contributions paid by members and benefits provided, functional to guaranteeing the pension entitlements of the members, nor would it compromise the self-sufficiency of the related social security system.

Rather, the lump-sum transfer would constitute an alternative system to the precise compliance with the legislation on expenditure containment, resulting from the legislator's balancing act between the autonomy of social security entities and public finance needs.

3.3.1.− The intervention statement also emphasizes that the dictum of the aforementioned ruling no. 7 of 2017, which concerned only the National Social Security Fund for Chartered Accountants, was never extended by the financial administration to the other category funds for self-employed professionals.

3.4.− Finally, the intervening party asserts the non-unfoundedness of the questions by stressing the unreasonableness of the request to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 only insofar as it provides for the transfer – in terms analogous to the provision in judgment no. 7 of 2017 – and not also in the remaining part which establishes its alternative to compliance with public expenditure containment: rather, the repeal of the former norm would render the latter devoid of its "raison d'être." The President of the Council of Ministers further notes that the specific legislation on spending review would remain in the legal system.

4.− In view of the public hearing, CIPAG filed a memorandum in which it replied to the defenses put forward by the State Attorney's Office, both with reference to the raised exceptions of inadmissibility of the questions and concerning the substantive arguments made for their non-unfoundedness.

In particular, while opposing the intervening party's thesis of the diversity of the scope of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 compared to Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, it further developed its defense argument according to which the lump-sum transfer provided for in the first provision also has the implicit prerequisite of the obligation to proceed with expenditure savings: it would, in fact, be unreasonable and inconsistent with the European spending review discipline to impose a payment of sums to the State by social security entities not accompanied by their duty to contain expenditure.

Legal Considerations

5.− The Court of Appeal of Rome, First Civil Section, doubts, with reference to Article 3, first paragraph, Article 38, second paragraph, and Article 97, second paragraph, of the Constitution, the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013 "insofar as it prescribes that the sums resulting from the expenditure reductions provided for by this provision must be paid annually by the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors to a specific revenue item of the State budget."

The first sentence of the aforementioned provision allowed, starting from 2014, only private law social security entities to "comply with the provisions in force regarding the containment of administrative expenditure" – which they are obliged to do as subjects included in the list of public administrations drawn up by ISTAT pursuant to Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law no. 196 of 2009 – "by making a transfer [annual to the State budget] equal to 15 percent of the expenditure incurred for intermediate consumption in the year 2010." The second sentence specifies that for "said entities, this provision substitutes all legislation in force concerning public expenditure containment," without prejudice to the provisions concerning personnel expenditure constraints.

The challenges are supported with extensive reference to the reasoning of the judgment of this Court no. 7 of 2017, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, "insofar as it provides that the sums resulting from the reductions [of concurrently imposed intermediate consumption] must be paid annually by the National Social Security and Assistance Fund for Chartered Accountants to a specific revenue item of the State budget."

5.1.− Prior to any other consideration is the delimitation of the *thema decidendum*.

The referring court – called upon to rule on the appeal by CIPAG for the restitution of amounts paid to the State under this heading in the years 2014-2016 – focuses its challenges on the resource transfer mechanism provided for by Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, first sentence, with specific reference to this Social Security Fund.

The object of the constitutional legitimacy questions must be delimited in these terms to guarantee "adherence to the subjective case of the referring judgment" (judgment no. 267 of 2020), taking into account the heterogeneity of the category of social security funds for self-employed professionals.

6.− Having clarified the foregoing, it is necessary to preliminarily address the objections of inadmissibility raised by the President of the Council of Ministers.

6.1.− Firstly, the State Attorney's Office alleges a deficiency in the order's reasoning on both prerequisites for raising questions of constitutional legitimacy, as it was carried out only *per relationem* to the cited judgment of this Court no. 7 of 2017 and the defense submissions of CIPAG, without self-sufficient argumentation.

The objection is unfounded.

As for relevance, the Court of Appeal reasons autonomously, albeit concisely.

As for non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring court does not make mere references; rather, it reproduces extensive excerpts from the reasoning of this Court's ruling, affirming that it adopts its tenets and considers the defects found in that ruling with regard to Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, to be applicable to the challenged Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, due to the similarities in *ratio* and effects between the transfers respectively provided for. This conclusion is further strengthened by the adoption of certain additional arguments advanced by the social security entity.

6.2.− The intervening party then objects to the inadmissibility of the questions due to the lack of relevance under two different aspects.

6.2.1.− Firstly, the constitutional referral would not be necessary to settle the referring judgment.

The objection in this regard is without merit.

From a comprehensive reading of the order, the reasons set forth by the referring judge, in a manner that is anything but implausible, supporting the prejudice of the question raised concerning the definition of the main process (among many others, judgments no. 88 of 2025, no. 125 of 2024, no. 151 of 2023 and no. 192 of 2022): it is, in fact, explained that the claim, filed pursuant to Article 2033 of the Civil Code, for the repayment of payments made by CIPAG to the State, in implementation of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, is based on the alleged constitutional illegitimacy of this normative provision, which constitutes the title of the respective pecuniary obligations.

6.2.2.− Secondly, the effect of the invoked ablative intervention on the referring judgment is claimed to be nonexistent.

Specifically, the event of an acceptance judgment would not be capable of correcting the expenditures already incurred by the social security entity in past years, to the analytical reduction of which it would have been subject in the absence of the option for the lump-sum transfer permitted by the challenged norm.

This objection must also be dismissed on this point.

What has been stated concerns, in fact, an effect entirely extraneous to the *thema decidendum* of the main judgment, which pertains only to the repayment of the sums transferred on a lump-sum basis.

6.3.− Finally, the residual objection regarding the failure to attempt a constitutionally oriented interpretation must be rejected.

The referring judge has ruled out the practicability of a conforming exegesis of the challenged Article 1, paragraph 417, due to its unequivocal literal meaning, an assumption that cannot be refuted given the clarity of the provision for an annual transfer of sums by the social security funds for self-employed professionals in favor of the State.

Therefore, the referring judge has correctly applied the principle of constitutional jurisprudence according to which the unequivocal wording of a provision marks the boundary beyond which the attempt at conforming interpretation must yield to the review of constitutional legitimacy (among many others, judgments no. 142 and no. 88 of 2025, no. 44 of 2024, no. 193 of 2022 and no. 221 of 2019).

7.− The examination of the merits requires a brief reconstruction of the normative and jurisprudential framework in which the raised questions are situated, limited to the essential aspects for the decision.

7.1.− The Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors is one of the private law social security entities for the categories of self-employed professionals and, in particular, an association derived from the transformation of a pre-existing public body, pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994.

As already stated by this Court, this privatization left the publicistic nature of the institutional activity of social security and assistance carried out by the entities unchanged, having instead affected the legal form and organizational methods of the functions on different levels (judgments no. 7 of 2017 and no. 248 of 1997; order no. 214 of 1999).

The combination of private law legal personality with the publicistic relevance of the service rendered is of specific relevance in the case at hand.

7.1.1.− On the one hand, linked to the change in the legal qualification of the entity and management tools is the legislative configuration of their "management, organizational, and accounting autonomy," which, however, finds "the limits set [by Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994 itself] in relation to the public nature of the activity performed" (Article 2, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994).

The social security system entrusted to the privatized funds is consequently characterized by: 1) the mandatory nature of registration and contribution for members of the relevant professional category (Article 1, paragraph 3, first sentence); 2) the express prohibition of "direct or indirect public funding" (Article 1, paragraph 3, second sentence); 3) the duty of the same to adhere to rigorous economic-financial management such as to ensure budget balance (Article 2, paragraph 2), which, if altered by a temporary economic-financial deficit, leads to the appointment of a special commissioner or, if altered by a persistent deficit, to the opening of forced administrative liquidation (Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 5); 4) the provision for a legal reserve, to ensure the continuity of benefit payments, in an amount not less than five years of the amount of existing pensions (Article 1, paragraph 4, letter c). To this, the legislator subsequently added the provision for the stability of long-term social security schemes, increased over time from the original fifteen to the current fifty years (Article 3, paragraph 12, of Law of 8 August 1995, no. 335, concerning "Reform of the mandatory and complementary pension system"; Article 1, paragraph 763, of Law of 27 December 2006, no. 296, concerning "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year budget of the State - Finance Law 2007"; Article 24, paragraph 24, of Decree-Law of 6 December 2011, no. 201, concerning "Urgent provisions for growth, equity, and consolidation of public accounts," converted, with amendments, into Law of 22 December 2011, no. 214).

7.1.2.− On the other hand, the public nature of the social security and assistance activity performed – along with the provision for its support through mandatory contributions, subjection to ministerial supervision, and audit by the Court of Auditors on management (Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994) – has hitherto justified the inclusion by ISTAT of CIPAG among the "institutional units" whose budgets contribute to the formation of the consolidated financial statements of public administrations, as provided by Regulation (EU) 2013/549 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 21 May 2013, concerning the European System of Accounts in the European Union, which replaced Council Regulation (EC) no. 2223/1996, of 25 June 1996, concerning the European System of Accounts in the Community (see, Council of State, Sixth Section, judgment of 28 November 2012, no. 6014). For the purposes of this case, at the supranational level, the accounting statement that constitutes the consolidated financial statement is relevant for verifying the achievement of public finance objectives agreed upon by each Member State at the European level and compliance with the obligation to avoid actual public deficits, established by Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. At the national level, instead, from the inclusion of an entity in the list drawn up by ISTAT, the legislator has derived – as established for independent authorities and administrations referred to in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree of 30 March 2001, no. 165 (General rules on the organization of employment in the public administration) – the application of provisions on public accounting and finance (Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law no. 196 of 2009), the contribution to budget balance and public debt sustainability, pursuant to Article 97, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as well as the limit on the annual growth rate of expenditures (Articles 2, paragraph 1, letter a, 3, 4 and 5 of Law of 24 December 2012, no. 243, concerning "Provisions for the implementation of the principle of budget balance pursuant to Article 81, sixth paragraph, of the Constitution") and, in general terms, subjection to public expenditure containment regulations through its rationalization and reduction of some of its items.

7.2.− Regarding these latter public expenditure containment regulations, which are the subject of the raised questions, two considerations necessary for their decision must be made.

Firstly, on the level of effects, it should be noted that regulations providing for specific expenditure reductions, applied to entities possessing financial autonomy that do not receive transfers from the State budget, such as CIPAG, can affect their assets in different ways.

Indeed, ordinarily, expenditure constraints lead to savings in the resources available to the obligated party and, therefore, consequently result in an investable resource in its institutional mission.

Conversely, this is not the case with regard to the obligation to reduce disbursements to which the legislator has linked the entity's obligation to transfer the saved sums to the State (see: Article 61, paragraph 17, of Decree-Law of 25 June 2008, no. 112, concerning "Urgent provisions for economic development, simplification, competitiveness, stabilization of public finance and tax equalization," converted, with amendments, into Law of 6 August 2008, no. 133; Article 6, paragraph 21, of Decree-Law of 31 May 2010, no. 78, concerning "Urgent measures regarding financial stabilization and economic competitiveness," converted, with amendments, into Law of 30 July 2010, no. 122; Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted; Article 1, paragraphs 141-148, of Law of 24 December 2012, no. 228, concerning "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year budget of the State – Stability Law 2013"). In this case – with the overall balance of the public consolidated remaining unchanged (given by the measure of savings achieved by one of its units) – a revenue is generated for the State budget supported by a depreciation of the assets of the obligated party.

Furthermore, on the subjective level, account must be taken of a limited application of spending review regulations to privatized social security entities such as the Cassa dei geometri, despite their constant inclusion in the list of subjects of the so-called enlarged public finance: indeed, in recognition of their autonomy, they: 1) have sometimes been excluded from the imposition of certain expenditure constraints (Article 61, paragraph 15, of Decree-Law no. 112 of 2008, as converted, and Articles 6, paragraph 21-bis, and 8, paragraph 15-bis, of Decree-Law no. 78 of 2010, as converted); 2) have sometimes benefited from favorable provisions and 3) finally, starting from 2020, have been definitively excluded from the scope of application by Article 1, paragraph 183, of Law no. 205 of 2017.

7.3.− Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, which granted only private law social security entities, starting from 2014, the option to "comply with the provisions on the containment of administrative expenditure" – with the exception of personnel expenditure constraints – "by making a transfer to the revenue of the State budget by 30 June of each year" in the amount initially set at 12 percent "of the expenditure incurred for intermediate consumption in the year 2010," subsequently increased to 15 percent by Article 50, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 66 of 2014, as converted, falls within these favorable provisions.

Thus, with this provision, prior to 2020, the funds were given a choice between being subject to "all legislation in force concerning public expenditure containment" – and therefore to provisions for analytical cuts and any corresponding transfers in favor of the State budget – or being exempted from those specific obligations by making the annual lump-sum transfer.

Although Article 1, paragraph 417, does not link the provision for the lump-sum payment to the duty to contain expenditure – unlike the aforementioned provisions which provide for specific obligations to reduce consumption and equivalent transfers – it is evident that the general obligation to cut consumption is derivable from the system and is its prerequisite.

This is clear from a threefold observation: 1) on the literal level, the provision explicitly states in its opening the justification for the levy as the "achievement of public finance objectives agreed upon at the European level and compliance with structural public finance balances"; 2) on the systematic level, the general imposition of expenditure reduction is derived from the subjection of the social security entities to the aforementioned duties of contributing to the sustainability of public debt and the containment of the annual growth rate of public expenditure (Articles 4 and 5 of Law no. 243 of 2012) and to the principle of budget balance (Article 3 of Law no. 243 of 2012 and Article 2, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994); and 3) on the level of *intentio legis*, the technical report accompanying the bill explains, on the one hand, that the annual contribution from the lump-sum transfer is set at an amount such as to ensure the State receives amounts at least equal to the "annual contribution imposed on the entities in question pursuant to current legislation" – given by the sum of the annual transfer due for savings achieved on intermediate consumption under Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, and that for the restriction on the purchase of furniture and furnishings under Article 1, paragraphs 141 and 142, of Law no. 228 of 2012 – and, on the other hand, that the provided substitute payment "respects [their] organizational autonomy, with positive effects on [their] efficiency."

7.3.1.− Regarding the provisions "substituted" by the optional and lump-sum transfer, this Court has already addressed Article 8, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law no. 95 of 2012, as converted, twice, declaring the constitutional illegitimacy of the annual transfer provided for specifically with regard to the National Social Security and Assistance Fund for Chartered Accountants (judgment no. 7 of 2017) and to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Crafts and Agriculture (judgment no. 210 of 2022). The rulings are based on the common premise that the transfer of savings achieved by the aforementioned entities to the State budget entails the subtraction of resources from use for the realization of their institutional aims and prejudice to the proper functioning of their administrative management.

8.− Having established the foregoing, the questions raised are well-founded due to the violation of all parameters evoked.

The referring judge, with extensive reference to judgment no. 7 of 2017, rightly complains that the mechanism for transferring the amounts resulting from CIPAG's savings determines, firstly, the violation of Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, due to the incongruous sacrifice of the Fund's interest in retaining them and allocating them to use in pension activities, to the advantage of a generic interest of the State in marginally increasing its revenues, and correlatively, the violation of the pension entitlements of the members protected by Article 38 of the Constitution and the proper functioning of the entity in administrative management.

It is the structural characteristics of the transfer that lead to this conclusion, without the option granted to the Fund to choose the lump-sum payment instead of complying with the analytical expenditure containment obligations and the corresponding transfers of realized savings, where imposed, being relevant.

8.1.− Contrary to what is argued by the State Attorney's Office, firstly, the transfer provided for by the challenged provision was designed as a periodic payment obligation ("by 30 June of each year"), with a lasting character ("Starting from 2014" and without the provision of an end date), which ceased only due to Article 1, paragraph 183, of Law no. 205 of 2017, which excluded private category funds from the application of regulations on public expenditure containment starting from 2020, and therefore from the set of norms that the lump-sum transfer "substitutes."

Thus, far from being configured as an extraordinary contribution charged to the privatized social security funds to cope with a contingent economic crisis, it was an imposition introduced stably, remaining in force for six years, until its repeal by subsequent legislative choice, which did not alter its original nature (judgments no. 262 of 2020 and no. 125 of 2018).

Secondly, the optional nature of making the lump-sum payment, while preserving the management, organizational, and accounting autonomy of the Social Security Fund for Surveyors regarding the modalities for containing its expenditures, does not alleviate the critical issue of the provision concerning financial autonomy "which precludes the possibility of obtaining adequate funding from the State and balancing interventions for any deficits generated by administrative management" (judgment no. 210 of 2022).

In particular, the transfer appears clearly inconsistent with the provisions established for privatized social security entities, which this Court's jurisprudence has already had occasion to emphasize, consisting of self-financing (judgments no. 88 and no. 78 of 1995; orders no. 340 of 2000 and no. 214 of 1999) – based essentially on contributions from members and accompanied by the prohibition of public funding (judgments no. 67 of 2018, no. 7 of 2017 and no. 248 of 1997) – and the principle of the entity's financial balance (judgments no. 404 of 2000 and no. 390 of 1995; order no. 340 of 2000); the "levy" is, furthermore, inconsistent with the established stability of pension provision in the long term and the exclusion of economic balancing measures in case of temporary or persistent economic-financial deficit.

8.1.1.− In the framework thus outlined, the balancing carried out between the interests at stake, through the provision for a lump-sum transfer instead of analytical ones which – like these – still establishes the sacrifice of the Fund's interest in retaining the savings for use in the "institutional mission of managing and securing pension benefits for members over time" compared to a "generic interest of the State in marginally increasing its revenue endowments" (judgment no. 7 of 2017, point 4.1.), is, firstly, contrary to the principle of reasonableness.

In particular, the envisaged financial obligation finds no justification in funding other specific constitutionally protected interests entrusted to the State or in the principles of Article 97, first paragraph, of the Constitution, for the achievement of objectives agreed upon at the European level, given the aforementioned invariance of the balance of overall consolidated expenditure.

8.1.2.− The described "savings levy" infringes upon both the interests of the members guaranteed by Article 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, and the interest of the Fund itself in carrying out its duties within a system based on proper functioning (Article 97 of the Constitution).

Firstly, the lump-sum transfer reduces the entity's revenues, fed predominantly through members' contributions, which constitute the provision for pension and welfare benefits.

Secondly, the payment in question conflicts with the principle of proper functioning to which the social security entity is subject, as, although endowed with private law legal personality, it carries out public activities (Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 1-ter, of Law of 7 August 1990, no. 241, concerning "New provisions on administrative procedure and the right of access to administrative documents").

In particular, the system chosen by Legislative Decree no. 509 of 1994 implies that management expenses are "inspired by the logic of maximum containment and maximum efficiency" (again, judgment no. 7 of 2017), so as not to negatively affect the means necessary for provisions to members: indeed, the implementation of this financial rule, left to the entity's autonomy in organizational choices, is supported by state legislation that imposes rigor in expenses for the subjects of the enlarged public finance, while it is nullified by the "subtraction... of the achieved expenditure savings" through "correct and effective management of administrative tasks," leading to an "imbalance" of accounts" (again, judgment no. 210 of 2022).

9.− In conclusion, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, first sentence, of Law no. 147 of 2013, insofar as it provides, starting from 2014, for an annual lump-sum transfer in favor of the State budget by CIPAG, as an alternative means of complying with the legislation on public expenditure containment, is declared, with reference to Article 3, first paragraph, Article 38, second paragraph, and Article 97, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

The declaration of constitutional illegitimacy implies that, for the same Social Security Fund, the second sentence of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law no. 147 of 2013, which reiterates the substitution effect of the lump-sum transfer for the entire legislation on public expenditure containment applicable to that entity (without prejudice to the provisions in force concerning personnel expenditure constraints), lacks autonomous normative relevance.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 417, of Law of 27 December 2013, no. 147, containing "Provisions for the annual and multi-year budget of the State (Stability Law 2014)," insofar as it provides, starting from the year 2014, for an annual lump-sum transfer in favor of the State budget by the Italian Social Security Fund for Freelance Surveyors, as an alternative means of complying with the legislation on public expenditure containment, without prejudice to the provisions in force concerning personnel expenditure constraints.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 27 January 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Rapporteur

Valeria EMMA, Chancellor

Filed in the Registry on 13 March 2026