JUDGMENT NO. 20
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, of Decree-Law of February 20, 2017, no. 14 (Urgent provisions on city security), converted, with amendments, into Law of April 18, 2017, no. 48, initiated by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, in the criminal proceedings against H. P., with order of June 3, 2025, registered under no. 142 of the register of orders 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 34, first special series, of 2025.
Having seen the statement of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;
having heard in the chamber of council of January 12, 2026, the Reporting Judge Francesco Saverio Marini;
deliberated in the chamber of council of January 12, 2026.
Facts Considered
1.– With order of June 3, 2025 (reg. ord. no. 142 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, of Decree-Law of February 20, 2017, no. 14 (Urgent provisions on city security), converted, with amendments, into Law of April 18, 2017, no. 48, with reference, collectively, to Articles 2, 3, 13, 16, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The contested provision, in the text applicable ratione temporis in the proceedings a quo, regulates the personal preventive measure known as "anti-brawl DASPO” (Stadium Ban) and punishes with imprisonment from six months to two years and a fine from 8,000 to 20,000 euros anyone who has violated the prohibitions and prescriptions imposed pursuant to the same Article 13-bis of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted.
These specifically concern provisions establishing, for security reasons, the prohibition of accessing public establishments or venues for public entertainment for those who have been, depending on the case, reported, arrested, or placed under validated custody, or convicted even with a non-final judgment for certain crimes, including those committed on the occasion of serious disturbances occurring in such places, or in the immediate vicinity.
The referring judge reports that they are to adjudicate an accused person for the crime provided for by paragraph 6 of the contested provision, for having breached, on December 22, 2022, such a provision, notified to him on the preceding September 4.
The Police Commissioner of Florence, specifically, prohibited the accused, pursuant to the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, from accessing establishments "comprised within a certain area, analytically described, of the Municipality of [C.]” for two years.
The measure was adopted based on two reports, for crimes indicated by the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, allegedly committed, respectively, in 2021 and 2022, and based on a "first instance" conviction of October 19, 2020, for a similar crime, thus preceding the entry into force of the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, which dates to October 22, 2020.
The judge a quo deems the Police Commissioner’s measure to be compliant with the law, and specifically, well-reasoned with regard to every prerequisite on which its validity is conditioned. However, they doubt the constitutional legitimacy of Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, as the legal basis for such a measure.
Regarding relevance, the Court of Florence specifies that, should the constitutional illegitimacy of the contested provisions be declared, the Police Commissioner’s measure, which is based upon them, would be "nullified."
Consequently, the referring judge would have to acquit the accused due to the non-existence of the fact, consisting in the violation of the prohibition imposed by that measure.
That being stated, the judge a quo raises three distinct questions of constitutional legitimacy, ranked as follows.
2.– Primarily, they doubt the conformity of the contested Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, with Article 13 of the Constitution, in that it attributes to the Police Commissioner, rather than the judicial authority, the competence to adopt the DASPO measure, when it applies to a person already subject to another preventive measure.
The referring judge is aware that with Judgment no. 203 of 2024 this Court excluded the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 2 of Legislative Decree of September 6, 2011, no. 159 (Code of anti-mafia laws and preventive measures, as well as new provisions regarding anti-mafia documentation, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of Law of August 13, 2010, no. 136), which regulates the mandatory expulsion order, with reference to Article 13 of the Constitution, asserting that this preventive measure pertains to the constitutional regime of freedom of movement and residence under Article 16 of the Constitution.
Revisiting the motivational passages of the ruling, the Court of Florence then observes that the preventive measures provided for by Article 13-bis do not involve physical coercion but entail an encroachment on freedom of movement with an "effect of legal degradation" of the person.
In the referring judge's view, this results from a "discretionary negative assessment of the moral qualities and sociality of the individual" which carries with it a "moral stigma" and a "mortification of their equal social dignity," as it is based on the "possibility of committing further crimes in the future."
Furthermore, the measure would be particularly punitive, because, by prohibiting the person subject to the measure from accessing or even lingering in the immediate vicinity of public establishments identified by the Police Commissioner, it would "appreciably affect the recipient’s ability to easily and quickly procure readily available food items," as well as "their social life."
That being established, the referring judge deems Article 13 of the Constitution applicable where the person intended to be subjected to the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO" is already subject, by another or other measures, "to multiple preventive measures (of the same type or even of a different type)," as occurred with the accused in the main proceedings.
The Court of Florence specifies that the latter, at the time the Police Commissioner adopted the measure for whose violation criminal proceedings are being pursued, was already subject to an oral notice of 2018 and a mandatory expulsion order of 2020, with a three-year duration. Subsequently, the referring judge adds, a further mandatory expulsion order was issued in 2023.
In these cases, the judge a quo doubts that "it is still possible to speak simply of a limitation of freedom of movement," as the preventive measures "as a whole determine a considerable series of restrictions on the fundamental rights of the person [...] to the extent of overturning their life."
In the presence of these elements, the referring judge, excluding the path of constitutionally conforming interpretation due to the clear literal wording of the contested provision, doubts the constitutional legitimacy of this provision insofar as it provides that it is the Police Commissioner, rather than the judicial authority, who adopts the "anti-brawl DASPO" measure, "even when the subject is already subject to other preventive measures," assuming that in such a case the restrictive act encroaches upon the personal liberty protected by Article 13 of the Constitution.
The Court of Florence specifies that this would not create any application uncertainty, because the fact of the contemporaneity of another and previous preventive measure would be "objective and easily verifiable."
3.– Alternatively, the referring judge doubts the constitutional legitimacy of the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, insofar as it applies even when the recipient has been convicted (or arrested, detained, or subjected to custodial precautionary measures) for crimes committed before the entry into force of the provision itself, with reference to Articles 16 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR.
It is noted that the contested paragraph 1-bis was introduced by Article 11, paragraph 1, letter b), number 1), of Decree-Law of October 21, 2020, no. 130 (Urgent provisions on immigration, international protection and complementary protection, amendments to Articles 131-bis, 391-bis, 391-ter and 588 of the Penal Code, as well as measures regarding the prohibition of access to public establishments and venues for public entertainment, contrast to the distorted use of the web and regulation of the National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of Personal Liberty), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 18, 2020, no. 173, with effect from October 22, 2020.
With this legal novelty, the legislator established that the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO" may be ordered with reference to public establishments or venues for public entertainment "present in the territory of the entire Province," instead of with regard to the "specifically identified" establishments referred to in paragraph 1 of the contested Article 13-bis.
The referring judge is aware that, based on established case law of legitimacy, preventive measures, like security measures, escape the prohibition of retroactivity established for penalties by Article 25, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as they lack a punitive-sanctioning character.
The judge a quo believes that the settled law formed in this direction can only extend to Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, thus making it the subject of the constitutional legitimacy doubt.
The contested provision, by allowing its application also in relation to conduct prior to its entry into force, would lack a "legal basis" of "adequate quality," as it would prevent the person from "foreseeing the future possible application" of the measure.
4.– As a final alternative, the judge a quo doubts, with reference to Articles 2, 3, second paragraph, and 16 of the Constitution, the constitutional legitimacy of the contested provisions themselves, insofar as they do not provide that the Police Commissioner, when adopting the measure, "sends a report to the competent socio-health services, where the conditions so require."
Regarding non-manifest groundlessness, it is observed that Article 10 of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, concerning the so-called "urban DASPO," provides for such a report.
In the absence of the latter, and thus of the involvement of socio-health services, the preventive measure indicated by the contested Article 13-bis would be destined to fail and would result in a "useless limitation of (at least) freedom of movement," with a consequent violation of the principle of reasonableness (Article 3 of the Constitution), of Article 16 of the Constitution, and of Articles 2 and 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as obstacles to the full development of the person would not be removed.
5.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the questions be declared manifestly unfounded.
The Attorney’s Office observes that the measure provided for by the contested Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, has a preventive character, and serves not to repress a crime, with a punitive purpose, but to avert the commission of other similar acts. It is also subject to rigorous judicial review before the administrative judge, who assesses its legitimacy, proportionality, and reasonableness.
In light of the criteria identified by this Court, most recently in judgments no. 127 of 2022 and no. 203 of 2024, to distinguish the scope of application of Articles 13 and 16 of the Constitution, in the face of measures limiting freedom of movement, the State defense notes that the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO" does not involve either physical coercion or a legal degradation such as to be equivalent "from a 'quantitative' point of view" to restrictions implemented through the use of physical compulsion.
The "invasiveness criterion," which distinguishes prohibitions on accessing certain places from the more burdensome obligations to go to or remain in them, allows the measure to be classified under the field of freedom of movement protected by Article 16 of the Constitution, excluding the relevance of Article 13 of the Constitution invoked by the referring judge.
Moreover, the Attorney’s Office continues, the limitation imposed by the contested Article 13-bis concerns only specifically identified establishments, "guaranteeing the subject full freedom to move and go to commercial establishments" not indicated.
The measure "is based on the assessment of the social dangerousness of the individual," nor does its application depend on the existence of other preventive measures.
Given that the impact on personal liberty of the measures should be assessed not with regard to their number, but to the "particular burden of the personal restrictions imposed by the legislator relating to the specific preventive measure," the Attorney’s Office concludes for the rejection of the question raised primarily, the acceptance of which would be "highly dysfunctional regarding the protection of public safety."
6.– Regarding the alternative questions, the State defense notes that, according to constant case law of legitimacy, preventive measures are assimilated to security measures with regard to the applicability of only the principle of legality expressed by Article 25, third paragraph, of the Constitution, and not the prohibition of retroactivity under Article 25, second paragraph, of the Constitution. Therefore, Article 200 of the Penal Code applies to them, according to which they are governed by the law in force at the time of their application.
Consequently, in the absence of any punitive element, the measure under the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, encounters no limit to its application for facts committed before its entry into force.
Concerning the further alternative question, the State Attorney’s Office observes that Article 10 of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, regarding the so-called "urban DASPO," would in no way be comparable to the contested Article 13-bis, regarding the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO," as to the obligation to report to socio-health services, because the former concerns persons who "show evidence of living situations of personal and social precariousness," while the latter concerns violent and dangerous persons, lacking traits of "social fragility."
The legislator would therefore have not unreasonably established that in the first case the report is made, moreover, not by the Police Commissioner but by the "authority verifying the expulsion order," and not in the second case.
These questions would also therefore be manifestly unfounded.
Considered in Law
7.– With the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 142 of 2025), the Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 13-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 13, 16, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR.
The referring judge is adjudicating an accused person for the crime provided for by Article 13-bis, paragraph 6, of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, for having violated the prohibition of accessing public establishments, imposed upon him, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 1-bis of the same provision, by the Police Commissioner (so-called "anti-brawl DASPO," an expression that has entered common parlance, although DASPO is the acronym for "prohibition of access to sports events," while the measure in question does not refer to these).
The judge a quo, after acknowledging that in the present case the DASPO measure was adopted in compliance with the law regulating it, doubts the constitutional legitimacy of the latter for three aspects, which they submit to the scrutiny of this Court in ranked order.
7.1.– Primarily, they suspect that the "anti-brawl DASPO," when added to a previous preventive measure still effective against the same person, assumes such serious traits as to fall within the scope of Article 13 of the Constitution, and consequently to be subject to the competence of the judicial authority, rather than that of the public security authority.
The contested provisions would therefore violate the aforementioned constitutional parameter insofar as they provide that DASPO measures are adopted by the Police Commissioner, rather than the court, "even when the recipient is already subject to another preventive measure."
7.2.– Alternatively, and in the event that this Court deems Article 13 of the Constitution inapplicable, Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, would violate, in the opinion of the judge a quo, Articles 16 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR, insofar as it allows the DASPO measure to be based on a conviction (or arrest, detention, or application of house arrest or pre-trial detention in prison) for crimes committed before the entry into force of the contested provision, which provides for a more severe form of the preventive measure in question.
In that case, in fact, the referring judge deems that the measure, although assigned to the scope of application of Article 16 of the Constitution, lacks a "legal basis" of "adequate quality" that permits foreseeing its "future possible application."
7.3.– As a final alternative, the referring judge doubts, with reference to Articles 2, 3, and 16 of the Constitution, the constitutional legitimacy of the contested provisions themselves, insofar as they do not provide that the Police Commissioner, when applying the measures, concurrently "sends a report to the competent socio-health services, where the conditions so require."
In the view of the Court of Florence, in the absence of this requirement (provided for by Article 10, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, with regard to the preventive measure provided for by the preceding Article 9), the measure, by "failing" to support the person in their recovery process, would end up being "useless because incapable of achieving the purpose for which it is ordered," with a consequent manifest unreasonableness of the norm governing it and a disproportionate encroachment on the constitutional rights protected by Articles 2 and 16 of the Constitution.
8.– The questions are relevant, since the referring judge has not implausibly observed that the Court, should they be accepted, would have to exclude the legitimacy of the DASPO measure for whose violation the accused was brought to trial and conclude for acquittal (Judgment no. 203 of 2024).
9.– The question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, with reference to Article 13 of the Constitution, is unfounded, while the one concerning paragraph 1-bis of the same Article 13-bis, always with reference to Article 13 of the Constitution, is well-founded, in the following terms.
10.– First, it is necessary to reconstruct the regulatory evolution that has involved the introduction and expansion of the preventive measures subject to the present questions of constitutional legitimacy.
The contested Article 13-bis was introduced into Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017 (whose Chapter II contains "Urgent provisions for the protection of city security and urban decorum") by Article 21, paragraph 1-ter, of Decree-Law of October 4, 2018, no. 113 (Urgent provisions on international protection and immigration, public security, as well as measures for the functionality of the Ministry of the Interior and the organization and functioning of the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organized Crime), converted, with amendments, into Law of December 1, 2018, no. 132. Paragraph 1 of this article provides, in particular, for a personal preventive measure by which the Police Commissioner has the power to preclude access to specifically identified public establishments or venues for public entertainment to individuals convicted of crimes committed on the occasion of serious disturbances occurring in such places or for certain additional types of crimes (initially coinciding with non-negligent felonies against the person and property, as well as felonies under Article 73 of Presidential Decree no. 309 of October 9, 1990, containing the "Consolidated Text of Laws on the Discipline of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addiction"), where the conduct may pose a danger to security. In the original framework, the prohibition had a duration between six months and two years, and was enforced in case of transgression by the criminal penalty of imprisonment from six months to one year and a fine from 5,000 to 20,000 euros.
With Article 11, paragraph 1, letter b), numbers 1) and 5), of Decree-Law no. 130 of 2020, as converted, the "anti-brawl DASPO" undergoes a severe tightening. The measure becomes, in fact, adoptable also against those who have been reported, and not necessarily convicted; the catalog of indicator crimes, which allow the use of the measure, is expanded to any felony aggravated pursuant to Article 604-ter of the Penal Code and includes cases where the felony was committed not only in the public establishment but also in the immediate vicinity; the prohibited venues can be specifically identified also with reference to the persons with whom the interested party associates; the measure extends automatically to lingering in the immediate vicinity of the venues to which access is prohibited; the penalty for non-compliance with the prohibition is increased, being set at imprisonment from six months to two years and a fine from 8,000 to 20,000 euros.
Above all, paragraph 1-bis is added to Article 13-bis of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, which configures the so-called "aggravated anti-brawl DASPO" (or provincial). It allows prohibiting access to those who have been convicted, even with a non-final judgment, or placed under arrest or validated detention by the judicial authority for the crimes under paragraph 1, to establishments present in the territory of the entire Province. Thus, the object of the prohibition ceases to be specifically identified and potentially coincides with the entire spectrum of public establishments and venues for public entertainment located within the provincial area.
Finally, Article 3 of Decree-Law of September 15, 2023, no. 123 (Urgent measures to combat youth hardship, educational poverty, and juvenile crime, as well as for the safety of minors in the digital sphere), converted, with amendments, into Law of November 13, 2023, no. 159, further expands the range of indicator crimes, including that under Article 4 of Law of April 18, 1975, no. 110 (Integrating provisions on the discipline of weapons, ammunition, and explosives control) and those provided for by Articles 336 and 337 of the Penal Code; it extends the group of recipients of the measure indicated by the contested paragraph 1-bis to those subjected to one of the precautionary measures under Articles 284 and 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; it significantly increases the duration of the measure, now between one and three years; it further increases the penalty in case of violation of the provision, which now ranges from one to three years of imprisonment and a fine from 10,000 to 24,000 euros.
11.– With the question raised primarily, this Court is called again to decide under what conditions a measure, although not having a coercive nature and affecting the faculty of movement in space of the person, must be considered restrictive of personal liberty, rather than only of freedom of movement and freedom from the imposition of personal services, and is consequently subject to the jurisdiction reservation of Article 13 of the Constitution and not only to the reservation of law under Article 16 of the Constitution or Article 23 of the Constitution.
The problem arises because, as noted on several occasions, "[i]t is evident that the faculty to self-determine regarding the mobility of one's person in space, in principle, constitutes an essential component of both personal liberty and freedom of movement" (Judgment no. 127 of 2022).
For the purpose of distinction, this Court, since earlier times, has taken care to ensure the widest protection offered by the constitutional statute of personal liberty to its constituents, in cases where the contact with the public authority, generated by the restrictive measure, was, in the abstract configuration predetermined by law, so invasive as to involve unacceptable physical coercion, thus requiring the immediate and ex officio intervention of the judicial authority, in the application of the measure, or, in permitted cases, its validation.
Thus, it was quickly clarified that, "[i]n constitutional jurisprudence, the irreducible core of habeas corpus, protected by Article 13 of the Constitution and deducible by induction from the list of acts expressly mentioned by the same article (detention, inspection, personal search), implies that the legislator cannot subject a person to physical coercion, except by virtue of a reasoned act of the judicial authority, or validated by the latter within forty-eight hours, if the public authority has instead provided for coercion" (Judgment no. 127 of 2022; in application of this criterion, judgments no. 203 of 2024, no. 22 of 2022, no. 275 of 2017, no. 222 of 2004, no. 105 of 2001, no. 238, no. 194, no. 193 and no. 143 of 1996, no. 23 of 1975, no. 45 of 1960 and no. 2 of 1956).
This Court, however, has brought within the scope of application of Article 13 of the Constitution not only acts of physical coercion but also non-coercive acts that produce "a total subjection of the person to the power of others," with effects substantially analogous to physical coercion (Judgment no. 30 of 1962).
In this perspective, constitutional jurisprudence has, since earlier times, also considered measures restrictive of personal liberty those that, although not characterized by forms of coercion, introduce "a sort of legal degradation" (Judgment no. 11 of 1956), determined by the isolation of the subject affected by the measure from all other constituents. That is, through a systematic interpretation of Article 13 of the Constitution in light of Article 3 of the Constitution, this Court has noted that "degrading restrictive prescriptions for the person, even if provided for by law and necessary to pursue the 'constitutionally defined purpose' that justifies them (Judgment no. 219 of 2008), cannot escape the jurisdiction reservation, because they, by separating the individual or a restricted group of individuals from the rest of the community, and reserving a detrimental treatment to them, carry with them a high degree of potential arbitrariness, to which the rule of law opposes the control filter of the judge, as the body responsible for the objective application of the law in conditions of independence and impartiality" (Judgment no. 127 of 2022).
Equality and equal social dignity are in fact potentially compressed where the measure does not have a coercive nature, and can therefore appear at first glance restrictive only of freedom from personal services or freedom of movement, but is adopted against a specific individual and based on a personal assessment of traits of their personality capable of differentiating them from the undifferentiated remainder of the community.
This approach, moreover, finds textual foundation in the reinforced reservation of Article 16 of the Constitution, which, unlike Article 13 of the Constitution, requires that the limitation of freedom of movement be established by law "in general terms." And it is, for example, on this assumption that this Court has held that the measure of so-called quarantine, experienced during the COVID-19 epidemiological emergency period, did not fall within the scope of application of Article 13 of the Constitution, also by reason of the fact that the measure concerned "a vast and indeterminate number of people" (Judgment no. 127 of 2022).
With Judgment no. 203 of 2024, this Court had the opportunity not only to reconstruct the jurisprudential evolution on the matter but also to offer a further clarification, in continuity with its decades-long jurisprudence.
On that occasion, the provision that does not contemplate subjection to the jurisdiction reservation for the personal preventive measure of the mandatory expulsion order (Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 159 of 2011) was under discussion. And in the face of a provision of an individual nature, arising from a singular appreciation of the individual's personality, this Court, in declaring the question unfounded, affirmed that "the legal degradation determined by the measure is not per se sufficient [...] to trigger the guarantees of Article 13 of the Constitution. It is also necessary for this purpose that the detrimental treatment of the individual compared to the rest of the community significantly affects their freedom of movement from a 'quantitative' point of view, in relation to the particular burden of the restrictions imposed through the measure" (Judgment no. 203 of 2024 and, in the same sense, Judgment no. 68 of 1964).
Moreover, even in the face of measures involving some form of physical coercion and which would therefore seem to draw upon a decisive component of personal liberty, the guarantees of Article 13 of the Constitution remain inoperative when the coercive interventions have a "merely momentary character and are not invasive of the corporeal sphere and the intimacy of the person" (Judgment no. 203 of 2024, and, in the same sense, judgments no. 13 of 1972 and no. 30 of 1962). A fortiori, it does not appear possible to disregard the existence of an appreciable quantitative level of sacrifice for the recipient of the preventive measure when the limitation of personal liberty is reconstructed in light of the so-called legal degradation criterion. The latter, therefore, can produce an expansion of the scope of application of the constitutional guarantees provided for personal liberty, due to the operation of the principle of equality and equal social dignity, but only in the presence of a quantitatively appreciable sacrifice.
Thus, in line with its precedents, this Court has reiterated that, as it stands, the mandatory expulsion order does not determine the overcoming of the minimum threshold of sacrifice to qualify the measure as an act limiting personal liberty, while noting that "this jurisprudence may well be reconsidered in the event that the legislator were, in the future, to excessively extend the prohibitions inherent in the measures in question, in terms of both the extension of the spaces from which the subject is barred, and the duration of the prohibition itself, thus rendering the assumption, on which this jurisprudence is implicitly based, of the generally lesser impact of the prohibition to go to a specific place compared to the obligation to go periodically to a police office, or to remain in one's home during the night hours, no longer sustainable" (Judgment no. 203 of 2024).
11.1.– The foregoing highlights that this Court's judgment on the assignability of a certain restrictive measure to the scope of application of personal liberty is dynamic, in the sense that, from time to time, it is necessary to assess whether legislative developments, by tightening the prerequisites, contents, and effects of the measure itself, should lead to deeming the minimum threshold to have been crossed, beyond which the observance of the jurisdiction reservation is required.
There is no doubt that the legislator has discretion in configuring preventive measures, whose foundation lies "in the principle that the orderly and peaceful conduct of social relations must be guaranteed, beyond the system of repressive rules for illicit acts, also by a system of preventive measures against the danger of their future occurrence: a system that corresponds to a fundamental requirement of every legal system, accepted and recognized in Articles 13, 16, and 17 of the Constitution" (Judgment no. 23 of 1964 and, in the same sense, Judgment no. 27 of 1959). The above prescriptions aim precisely to guarantee said preventive protection purpose, also in order to allow adequate controls by the public security authority (Judgment no. 282 of 2010).
Faced with new challenges to the primary good of public security, the legislator, in the exercise of their discretion, has provided a plurality of responses: among these, alongside essential non-restrictive measures of personal liberty – such as strengthening police forces, combating addiction, regulating weapons, urban planning interventions to improve living conditions in the peripheries and depressed areas, as well as adequate social policies – preventive measures are also included. With regard to these, this Court does not consider the advancement of the protection threshold precluded, in compliance with the principle of proportionality. The latter eventuality, however, when it involves exceeding a certain threshold of restrictiveness, requires strengthening the application guarantees through the essential intervention of the judicial authority, which becomes necessary whenever the measure is potentially likely to determine appreciable quantitative restrictions on the lawful conduct of the individual affected by it.
11.2.– Therefore, admitting the compatibility of preventive measures with the Constitution in general and in principle, this Court's judgment can only concern the specific legislative provision, it being obvious that reaching an adequate quantitative threshold of restriction may concern a certain measure and not another, even belonging to the same legal type (that is, in the present case, to the category of preventive measures). Thus, the circumstance, recalled by the State Attorney’s Office, that the mandatory expulsion order continues to operate outside the realm of personal liberty (as clarified in Judgment no. 203 of 2024) implies nothing, as to this aspect, with regard to the different personal preventive measure of the contested "anti-brawl DASPO," regarding which it is therefore necessary to independently assess the degree of pervasiveness.
It is merely necessary to add that, in the context of a constitutional legitimacy review, the verification of the quantitative impact of the measure must focus not on the degree of restrictiveness it produces in the specific concrete case of application, but in relation to the maximum potential for expansion that the law assigns to it, in the face of which the observance of the jurisdiction reservation may be required.
12.– With respect to the criteria that this Court applies in determining the quantitative element and the threshold of restrictiveness for the purpose of applying the guarantees provided for the protection of personal liberty, a primary role is assumed – as mentioned – by the distinction between "prohibition to go to a certain place" and "obligation to go to, or remain in, a determined place" (Judgment no. 203 of 2024).
The former is generally considered "less burdensome" than the latter and represents a relatively safe dividing line in distinguishing between different levels of intensity of measures that nevertheless affect the person's freedom to move in space" (still Judgment no. 203 of 2024). The same constitutional jurisprudence has not excluded, however, as already recalled above, that prohibitions could be so extended as to no longer render sustainable the assumption of the generally lesser impact on the person's faculties of the prohibition to go to a specific place compared to the corresponding obligation.
To establish when such an eventuality occurs, this Court can only take into consideration several factors. In principle, these include: the duration of the measure (in relation to both the minimum and the maximum abstractly applicable); the application prerequisites (both as to the facts or indicator crimes, and as to the contemporaneity of the underlying facts and the level of verification required); the effects connected to any transgression (with respect to which the overall sanctioning treatment connected to the statutory framework of the penalty must be taken into account); the territorial scope of reference (it being obviously different if the scope is municipal, provincial, or regional); the relevance of access to the places for the performance of activities instrumental to sustenance or essential for social life (the interdiction from attending a sports event having a different impact, for example, than the prohibition from accessing a plurality of public establishments); the connection with the life habits of the interested party (a higher degree of restrictive impact being found in measures that can also operate in the place of residence of the person subject to the measure); the determinacy of the prohibited or limited places (it being significant whether the person subject to the measure is enabled to know exactly the places to which they are prohibited or which are otherwise affected by the measure).
13.– Based on these premises, the judge a quo believes that the measure imposing the "anti-brawl DASPO" constitutes the quantitative threshold of sacrifice necessary to configure a limitation of personal liberty when it is combined with another personal preventive measure, still in effect against the same individual. In the referring judge's opinion, the only way to remedy the defect would then be to mandate the measure by the judicial authority for the adoption of the "anti-brawl DASPO" whenever the recipient is already subject to another preventive measure.
This solution, however, is unconvincing, as the quantity of the sacrifice of each preventive measure varies considerably due to the different type. The plurality of provisions, in the presence of mild measures – such as, for example, oral notice – could, therefore, not be significant and presumptively capable of constituting the quantitative element. Not to mention that the solution would present aspects of manifest unreasonableness, since in the presence of two preventive measures the "anti-brawl DASPO" should be adopted by the judge instead of the Police Commissioner only if adopted second (in relation to a previous preventive measure), while it would remain without the invoked guarantee if adopted first (and followed by another preventive measure), even though it is entirely evident that the two situations present themselves as totally homogeneous.
Moving, however, along the lines of the question raised by the referring judge, which remains marked by the identification of the object of the norm, the constitutional parameter, and the argument underlying the doubt of constitutional legitimacy, this Court, in seeking the most suitable solution to remove any defect (judgments no. 135, no. 78 and no. 7 of 2025), is required to consider whether the element of relevance in quantitative terms possessed by the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO" manifests itself even before, and without the need for it to overlap with a previous personal preventive measure, so that the guarantees of Article 13 of the Constitution find application.
14.– In light of what was previously observed in relation to the legislative evolution of the "anti-brawl DASPO," it is undeniable that, with a constant will confirmed across different legislatures, the legislator has deemed it appropriate to entrust this measure with an increasingly significant and incisive function for preventive purposes against facts harmful to public security.
This has occurred, first of all, by expanding its application prerequisites, the assessment of which, once detached from the necessity of a prior criminal conviction, now rests on a broad discretion in evaluating the relevance to be attributed to facts subject only to reporting. The degree of restrictiveness of the measure has then constantly increased, with regard both to the spatial scope potentially inhibited to the person, and to the duration of the interdiction, and to the effects connected to the transgression, which are now such as to allow, in abstract terms, the imposition of a penalty of imprisonment of up to three years, and therefore, among other things, exempt from the fundamental benefit of conditional suspension.
With regard to the measure provided for by the contested Article 13-bis, therefore, precisely that type of legislative choice emerges which, moving in the direction of "excessively extending the prohibitions inherent in the measures in question," requires scrupulous scrutiny aimed at ascertaining whether the prohibitions to go to a place, prefigured by the doubted norms, retain the usual character of lesser impact on the subject's faculties compared to the obligation to remain in a place (Judgment no. 203 of 2024).
15.– This Court deems that, in the light of the elements highlighted, the measure imposing the "anti-brawl DASPO" regulated by the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, does not infringe personal liberty in a restrictive sense.
For this aspect, it must in fact be considered that the prohibition of access provided for therein concerns multiple public establishments and venues for public entertainment "specifically identified" based on the places where the relevant facts were committed or which are frequented by the persons with whom the person subject to the measure associates.
A condition of legitimacy of the measure, in other words, is that it prohibits access only to those establishments that the public security authority has been able to link to the commission of the conduct or to the presence of persons habitually associated with the person subject to the measure.
From this it follows that the sacrifice imposed in this way does not appear quantitatively excessive and therefore does not rise to the level of a restriction of personal liberty, as the recipient of the provision remains able to frequent, even habitually, other public establishments and venues of the same nature, where they can not only procure what is necessary but also form any new social relationships.
16.– Conversely, this Court believes that the measure under the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, although resulting in a prohibition from accessing certain places, rather than an obligation to remain there, constitutes a restriction of personal liberty pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution.
It is decisive to consider, in this regard, that the measure, only in this aggravated form, has an extremely vast scope of application, because it potentially extends to all public establishments and venues for public entertainment in the provincial territory. It is true that the principle of proportionality requires the public security authority to limit restrictions to the minimum necessary, and it is assumed that this occurs in the generality of cases, but, as has already been clarified, this is irrelevant for the purpose of classifying the institute in light of Article 13 of the Constitution. What matters for this purpose are not the peculiar application events of each concrete hypothesis, but the characteristics that the measure subject to constitutional legitimacy review assumes at the legislative level, especially since the jurisdiction reservation has the primary purpose of shielding persons from arbitrariness made possible by the wording of the laws restricting liberty.
Now, the prohibition to access all public establishments in the province (in fact, in most cases, where one resides or habitually dwells) risks creating a "curtain" of isolation, which reaches the person precisely in very close relational contexts, where the "social stigma" connected to the prohibition becomes particularly accentuated and punitive. Whereas the mandatory expulsion order (whose constitutional regime is insisted upon by the State Attorney’s Office) moves the person subject to the measure away from municipal areas where they do not reside or habitually dwell, allowing them to carry out all activities permitted in the places where their life is regularly rooted, the so-called "aggravated anti-brawl DASPO" limits the person's social integration activities in a vast number of spaces intended for this purpose, due to the extension of the prohibition to the entire provincial area.
Furthermore, the law leaves the places precluded to the person subject to the measure undetermined, the measure being extended to all public establishments in the province, as well as the surrounding areas: it is evident that this indeterminacy, if the Police Commissioner’s measure does not contain adequate specifications, could make it difficult for the person subject to the measure to exactly identify the prohibited places.
Nor is this a short-term restriction, and therefore unable to significantly affect the social life of the person subject to the measure, considering that the prohibition can now remain effective for up to three years and has a minimum extension of one year (whereas the mandatory expulsion order can abstractly be contained within six months, that is, for a period not so long as to necessarily imply profound consequences on social life).
Finally, a prohibition of very broad application (as it is a measure adoptable in the presence of any non-negligent felony against the person or property) now corresponds, in case of non-compliance, to a sanctioning response capable of heavily conditioning the subject's life, also considering the already noted possibility that the penalty imposed, given the maximum statutory penalty of three years imprisonment, remains outside the conditional suspension (whereas transgression of the mandatory expulsion order may result in a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding eighteen months: Article 76, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 159 of 2011).
The combination of these converging factors, framed in light of the legislative process of strengthening the measure, leads to the conclusion that the so-called "aggravated anti-brawl DASPO" (or provincial), also by reason of its extension to the entire provincial territory, has now crossed the minimum threshold of restrictiveness, beyond which even a mere prohibition to go to determined places must be subject to the guarantees offered by Article 13 of the Constitution for the protection of personal liberty.
17.– Since the introduction of the contested Article 13-bis, the legislator has subjected the application measure of the so-called "anti-brawl DASPO" to validation by the judicial authority only in cases where the Police Commissioner has also prescribed the obligation to appear periodically at a police office or command, in compliance with the jurisprudence of this Court developed on a similar prescription (judgments no. 193 and no. 143 of 1996).
This occurred due to paragraph 5 of the same Article 13-bis, through reference to the discipline, insofar as compatible, set forth in Article 6, paragraphs 3 and 4, of Law of December 13, 1989, no. 401 (Interventions in the sector of illegal gambling and betting and protection of fairness in the conduct of sports events), according to which the public security authority's measure is immediately transmitted to the Public Prosecutor, who, within 48 hours, decides whether to request its validation from the judge for preliminary investigations. The latter has another 48 hours to rule, under penalty of cessation of the measure's effectiveness.
Furthermore, the validation proceedings, in which the judge autonomously assesses the existence of the application requirements, and, in particular, the proportionality of the measure, may also result in a modification of the adopted prescriptions and leads to an order appealable to the Court of Cassation.
The constitutional illegitimacy in which the legislator incurred by introducing paragraph 1-bis into Article 13-bis consists, then, in having accentuated the punitive traits of the measure, without adapting it to the constitutional discipline of personal liberty and, in particular, to the jurisdiction reservation contained in Article 13 of the Constitution.
For this reason, Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, must be declared constitutionally illegitimate, insofar as it does not provide that, in relation to the Police Commissioner's measure established therein, the provisions of Article 6, paragraphs 3 and 4, of Law no. 401 of 1989 apply, insofar as compatible. These provisions represent, in fact, an already existing entity in the legal system, as mentioned, they refer to the sports DASPO with an obligation to report. A measure that presents traits of analogy with the "anti-brawl DASPO" and for which the legislator, correctly configuring it as restrictive of personal liberty, provided for validation by the judicial authority. This is, therefore, a constitutionally adequate solution that the legislator has moreover already adopted in the contested Article 13-bis, in relation to the measure of the same "anti-brawl DASPO" but with an obligation to report.
18.– The questions raised alternatively by the referring judge are absorbed. Not only are they expressly raised "alternatively" and "as a final alternative," but such qualification is consistent with the reasoning developed by the judge a quo. To justify the non-manifest groundlessness of the alternative questions, the referring judge uses Article 16 of the Constitution as a parameter, on the explicit assumption that this Court has previously declared the primary question unfounded and has denied the assignability of the contested Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, to the scope of application of Article 13 of the Constitution.
for these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1-bis, of Decree-Law of February 20, 2017, no. 14 (Urgent provisions on city security), converted, with amendments, into Law of April 18, 2017 no. 48, insofar as it does not provide that, in relation to the Police Commissioner's measure established therein, the provisions of Article 6, paragraphs 3 and 4, of Law of December 13, 1989, no. 401 (Interventions in the sector of illegal gambling and betting and protection of fairness in the conduct of sports events) apply, insofar as compatible;
2) declares unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 13-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 14 of 2017, as converted, raised, with reference to Article 13 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, with the order indicated in the heading.
Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on January 12, 2026.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Francesco Saverio MARINI, Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery
Filed in the Chancellery on February 24, 2026
The Director of the Chancellery
Signed: Roberto MILANA
The anonymized version conforms, in text, to the original