JUDGMENT NO. 157

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 23 December 1978 (Establishment of the National Health Service), brought by the Ordinary Court of Florence in proceedings between L. C. and the Municipality of Empoli, by means of an order dated 29 December 2025, registered under no. 29 of the 2026 order register and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 9, 1st Special Series, for the year 2026.

Having regard to the statement of intervention filed by S. P. et al.;

having heard in chambers on 6 July 2026 the Judge Rapporteur Stefano Petitti;

deliberated in chambers on 6 July 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto

1.– By order dated 29 December 2025, registered under no. 29 of the 2026 order register, the Ordinary Court of Florence raised, with reference to Article 24 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 23 December 1978 (Establishment of the National Health Service) "insofar as it does not prescribe that, immediately following the issuance of the validation order by the Mayor, the patient must be informed of the right to appoint retained counsel; insofar as, in the event of the appointment of counsel, it does not prescribe the obligation to communicate the mayoral order also to the counsel of the person concerned; insofar as it does not provide that the hearing of the patient must be conducted in the presence of counsel, if appointed; and, lastly, insofar as it does not prescribe the obligation to communicate the validation decree of the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction also to the appointed counsel."

2.– The referring court states that it is seized of an appeal brought by L. C. pursuant to Article 35, eighth paragraph, of Law No. 833 of 1978 against the validation measures concerning mandatory health treatment (TSO) under conditions of compulsory inpatient care and the relative extension issued by the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction at the same Court on 7 and 13 November 2025, respectively. Among the grounds of appeal, the appellant alleged the unconstitutionality of Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978 insofar as it does not provide for the right to appoint retained counsel or, in the absence thereof, the appointment by the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction of court-appointed counsel.

2.1.– The Court of Florence states that L. C., who suffers from a schizophrenic disorder, was subjected to mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care on the grounds of ""psychomotor agitation with behavioral alterations, expansive mood," confirmed by a second physician because "the patient presents in a state of psychomotor agitation, with expansive mood and ideoverbal acceleration. The patient does not take pharmacological therapy, refuses it, and shows a total lack of insight into the illness. The patient refuses pharmacological therapies and routine examinations."

During the hearing before the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction, L. C. stated, inter alia: "I have several lawyers and I want you to call my lawyers," specifically indicating their names. The referring court reports that there is no record of the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction having considered the request, as the judge proceeded to validate the treatment and ordered, in any event, that the communication be served also on the legal counsel of the person concerned.

2.2.– The *a quo* court deems the question relevant because the dispute cannot be settled without the application of Articles 33, 34, and 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978 (reference is made regarding relevance to judgments of this Court no. 59 of 2021, no. 254 of 2020, no. 174 of 2016, and no. 91 of 2013).

2.3.– As to the non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring court refers to judgment no. 76 of 2025 of this Court, which guaranteed the patient the right to be heard prior to validation and to be served the mayoral order, but did not provide for the possibility of technical defense, which would instead represent "a necessary prerequisite, at least insofar as it is requested, to render effective, for the person concerned, the possibility of challenging *ex post* the validation measure" pursuant to Article 35, eighth paragraph, of Law No. 833 of 1978.

2.3.1.– According to the referring court, since its earliest rulings this Court has construed the phrase "inviolability of the right to defense" contained in Article 24 of the Constitution in a dual sense: as a guarantee both of the right to technical defense and of the right to assert one's claims in judicial proceedings, which materializes in the adversarial principle between the parties (reference is made to judgments of this Court no. 39 of 1961 and no. 46 of 1957). Constitutional jurisprudence has emphasized the importance of technical-professional defense to ensure a complete and correct legal presentation of the reasons and requests of a party, which is necessary in judicial proceedings generally, albeit with different connotations.

While in criminal proceedings, according to the *a quo* court, technical defense is mandatory—with the exception of charges for minor offenses—such that if the defendant fails to appoint counsel, an ex officio appointment is made, in civil proceedings technical defense is a burden, being indispensable for entering an appearance in court and for other procedural activities; however, unlike in criminal proceedings, it is not required in certain hypotheses, as the empowered party may act in person and the right to defense is deemed sufficiently guaranteed provided the adversarial principle is secured (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, judgment of 2 February 1996, no. 894).

2.3.2.– In the referring court's view, the procedure for applying mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care, although classifiable within the sphere of civil proceedings of a voluntary jurisdiction nature, is not entirely comparable thereto due to its impact on personal liberty.

The referring Court of Florence cites Article 20 of Legislative Decree No. 30 of 6 February 2007 (Implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States), which, in paragraph 11, cross-refers to Article 13, paragraph 5-bis, of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 25 July 1998 (Consolidated Act on the provisions governing immigration regulations and norms concerning the status of foreigners), concerning the administrative expulsion of foreigners, which mandates technical defense.

Indeed, the validation hearing takes place with the mandatory participation of counsel who has been promptly notified. The foreigner is entitled to legal assistance by retained counsel furnished with a special power of attorney; he is also entitled to legal aid at State expense and, should he lack counsel, he is assisted by court-appointed counsel designated by the judge from among those included in the list referred to in Article 29 of Legislative Decree No. 271 of 28 July 1989 (Implementing, coordinating, and transitional provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

The referring court recalls that, by judgment no. 222 of 2004, this Court declared unconstitutional, for violation of the foreigner's right to defense in its core uncompromisable essence, Article 13, paragraph 5-bis, of the Consolidated Immigration Act as then in force, insofar as it did not provide that the person must be heard during validation by the judge with the assistance of counsel.

Although presenting significant differences compared to the procedure for the removal of a foreigner—as TSO primarily and essentially restricts the right of self-determination regarding healthcare choices—the procedure under Article 33 of Law No. 833 of 1978 also entails a deprivation of personal and movement liberty, given that the patient is involuntarily hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital ward and detained therein in order to protect their health needs.

2.4.– On the other hand, according to the *a quo* court, this regulatory gap cannot be bridged through a constitutionally oriented interpretation, because the Constitution requires a statutory reservation (*riserva di legge*) in this area, and the relative procedural steps must be provided for by the legislature, all the more so in proceedings characterized by the need for a swift decision.

3.– By an act filed on 21 March 2026, S. P., C.S. S., S. D.A., and F. S. intervened *ad adiuvandum*, in their capacity as parties to analogous proceedings in which mayoral orders mandating compulsory health treatments under hospital inpatient conditions against them were challenged.

The interventions were declared inadmissible by order of this Court no. 112 of 2026.

4.– On 23 March 2026, three *amicus curiae* written briefs were filed, admitted by presidential decree of 5 May 2026, all favoring the acceptance of the question.

4.1.– The "Associazione radicale diritti alla follia" reports that it submitted a popular initiative bill pursuant to Articles 7 and 48 of Law No. 352 of 25 May 1970 (Rules on referendums provided for by the Constitution and on popular legislative initiative), entitled "Adaptation of the procedure and execution of psychiatric TSO to the Constitution and to Italy's international obligations," as per the notice of the Court of Cassation published in the Official Gazette of 22 November 2024, no. 274.

The contents of the proposal are partly analogous to the present question, providing for the notification to the person concerned of the mayoral order accompanied by notice, under penalty of nullity, of the mandatory and free nature of technical defense; the application, during validation, of Article 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; in the absence of counsel, the appointment of court-appointed counsel pursuant to Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and the guarantee of a hearing for the person concerned upon request, including through counsel.

On the merits, according to the association, following judgment no. 76 of 2025 of this Court, which permitted self-representation during the hearing, the mandatory nature of technical defense would constitute a "constitutionally mandated development" under Articles 24 and 111 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the absence of technical defense would conflict with the principles of equality and non-discrimination under Article 3 of the Constitution and with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 2006, ratified and made enforceable in Italy by Law No. 18 of 3 March 2009, as well as in relation to Article 9, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, ratified and made enforceable by Law No. 881 of 25 October 1977.

4.2.– Analogous arguments are developed in the brief submitted by the "Comitato dei cittadini per i diritti umani Onlus (CCDU)."

The committee observes that mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care is the sole procedure entailing a restriction of personal liberty which, even in the judicial validation phase, does not ensure the assistance of counsel, thereby invoking a violation of Articles 3 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 9, paragraph 4, of the aforementioned 1966 Covenant.

4.3.– The association "L'altro diritto ODV" and the Interuniversity Research Center on Prisons, Deviance, Marginality, and Migration Governance "L'altro diritto (ADIR)" argue in their brief that the participation of counsel at the hearing would represent the most appropriate means to put an end to the "emptying out" of judgment no. 76 of 2025 of this Court, caused by the directions of many courts tending to "recommend," rather than "allow," remote hearings, thereby impeding a full hearing, partly due to the psychiatric suffering of the person heard, who is likely undergoing pharmacological therapy.

The brief contends, in any event, that the challenged legislation conflicts with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution in relation to Articles 12, 14, 17, and 25, letter d), of the aforementioned UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, asserting an absolute incompatibility between the conventional norms and compulsory hospital confinement.

5.– The President of the Council of Ministers did not intervene in the proceedings, nor did the appellant party in the *a quo* proceedings enter an appearance.

Considerato in diritto

6.– By the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 29 of 2026), the Court of Florence raised, with reference to Article 24 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978, insofar as it does not provide that, in the procedure for validating mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care, the person concerned has the right to the assistance of counsel.

6.1.– In the operative part of the referring order, the *a quo* court frames the question of constitutional legitimacy in terms of the omission of optional technical defense, indicating as the required addition the necessity that the recipient of the treatment be informed of the right to appoint retained counsel, the communication to the latter, if appointed, of the mayoral measure, their participation in the validation hearing, and the communication of the relative decree to them.

6.2.– In the grounds, however, the referring court observes that the procedure for applying health treatment, although classifiable within civil proceedings, directly affects personal liberty, rendering it comparable for this profile—notwithstanding the difference in their respective prerequisites—to the administrative measure of expelling a foreign national through compulsory escort to the border and the relative validation, given that both are non-criminal proceedings affecting personal liberty.

The Court of Florence cites judgment no. 222 of 2004, by which this Court declared the unconstitutionality of Article 13, paragraph 5-bis, of the Consolidated Immigration Act as then in force, insofar as it did not provide that the person must be heard during validation by the judge with the assistance of counsel, due to a violation of the right to defense in its uncompromisable core.

7.– The question is well-founded within the terms set forth below.

8.– By judgment no. 76 of 2025, this Court declared the unconstitutionality, for violation of Articles 13, 24, 32, and 111 of the Constitution, of Article 35, first and second paragraphs, of Law No. 833 of 1978, insofar as it did not provide for the communication of the mayoral order arranging compulsory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care to the person concerned or to their legal representative, if any, as well as the hearing of the person concerned by the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction prior to validation and the notification of the relative decree to such person or their legal representative. It consequentially declared the unconstitutionality of Article 35, fourth paragraph, of Law No. 833 of 1978, insofar as it did not provide for the communication to the person concerned and the legal representative, if any, of the mayoral order extending the treatment.

8.1.– This Court held that mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care, as regulated by Articles 33, 34, and 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978, constitutes a genuine compulsory health treatment, which may operate only in cases of *extrema ratio* for the paramount purpose of protecting the patient's own health. The measure engages a plurality of constitutional values, placing itself "on the ridge between the freedom of self-determination in healthcare matters and the rule of consent, on the one hand, and the need to protect the person's own health, on the other, which exceptionally justifies treatment imposed against their will through physical coercion" (judgment no. 76 of 2025).

It therefore affirmed that the nature of compulsory health treatment implies that the guarantees of Article 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution are supplemented by those of Article 13 of the Constitution, which protects personal liberty (judgments no. 76 of 2025 and no. 22 of 2022). Consequently, all guarantees of Article 13 of the Constitution apply to compulsory health treatments, "precisely as a consequence of the situation of evident physical subjugation of the individual to a public authority capable of overcoming any contrary will by force" (judgment no. 76 of 2025).

Constitutional jurisprudence—it was specified—excludes that individuals, merely because they are affected by physical or mental infirmities, are thereby deprived of constitutional rights, including the right to take legal action and to defend themselves in court, in violation of the personalist principle and the principle of equal social dignity expressed by Articles 2 and 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution. The legal treatment that the legal system reserves for persons affected by physical or mental infirmity invokes a complex of principles rooted in the fundamental motivating ideas of the constitutional design. Indeed, pursuant to Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Republic to remove material obstacles which, for vulnerable persons, impede the effective enjoyment of constitutional rights (judgments no. 197, no. 111, no. 76, no. 25, and no. 3 of 2025).

8.2.– Notwithstanding the broad discretion of the legislature in regulating procedural institutions, this Court therefore held that the failure to involve the person concerned in the treatment application procedure—arising from the omission of the communication of the mayoral order and the lack of a hearing before the validation judge—constituted a significant violation of the right to defense and the adversarial principle, as minimum contents of judicial protection; and it specified that this *vulnus* "assumes particular significance because it pertains to administrative measures adopted without the consent of the person concerned, in violation of the principle of freedom of treatment, and affecting [their] physical liberty, and thus the primary core of constitutional protection of personal liberty" (judgment no. 76 of 2025).

8.3.– Precisely the need to effectively guarantee the constitutional rights to defense and to a fair hearing led to mandating the hearing of the person subjected to treatment at the place where they are located, normally a psychiatric diagnosis and treatment service ward, recognizing multiple functions in the hearing: that of a minimum judicial safeguard, part of the constitutional statute of personal liberty pursuant to Articles 13, 24, and 111 of the Constitution; that of a guarantee ensuring compliance with the prohibition of physical and moral violence against persons subjected in any way to restrictions of liberty pursuant to Article 13, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution and the limits imposed by respect for human dignity pursuant to Article 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution; and that of an initial contact tool to ascertain the real conditions of the person, including the existence of a personal and family support network, enabling the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction to identify assistance pathways, including through the adoption of *ex officio* measures provided for by Article 35, sixth paragraph, of Law No. 833 of 1978, in compliance with the delicate balance existing between protective needs and individual autonomy.

9.– By judgment no. 76 of 2025, therefore, on the basis of Articles 13, 24, 32, and 111 of the Constitution, Article 35, first, second, and fourth paragraphs, of Law No. 833 of 1978 was supplemented with the steps necessary to enable the personal participation of the person concerned in the compulsory treatment procedure.

In the present proceedings, the question of constitutional legitimacy concerns the other aspect of the right to defense, namely the technical assistance of counsel.

9.1.– According to established jurisprudence, the right to defense belongs to the category of inviolable rights of the human person and is a cornerstone of the constitutional system (among many, judgments no. 125 of 2025, no. 111 of 2023, no. 18 and no. 10 of 2022, no. 157 of 2021). Since its earliest jurisprudence, it has been affirmed that the inviolable right to defense under Article 24 of the Constitution includes the effective power of technical and professional assistance in its dual valence: as a right of the individual to assert their claims, and as a condition, through the adversarial process, for the full exercise of the judicial function (judgment no. 46 of 1957). On multiple occasions it has been emphasized that "[attorney] representation constitutes a necessary instrument for the effective exercise of the right to defense referred to in Article 24 of the Constitution" (judgment no. 70 of 2025), as it fulfills an irreplaceable function for the proper conduct of procedural dynamics (judgment no. 171 of 1996), assuming essential importance in the dynamism of the judicial function (again, judgment no. 46 of 1957).

9.2.– Although the right to technical defense does not necessarily have to be regulated identically in every type of proceeding or at every procedural stage, this Court has recognized its essential nature, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, precisely when personal liberty is affected (judgments no. 222 of 2004, no. 74 of 1973, no. 168 of 1972, no. 69 of 1970, and no. 53 of 1968).

And since compulsory health treatment, as regulated by Article 35, first and second paragraphs, of Law No. 833 of 1978, affects personal liberty—indeed, its primary core, physical liberty—the failure to provide for technical defense undoubtedly constitutes a *vulnus* to the constitutional guarantee of the right to defense.

10.– This gap, however, cannot be filled solely in terms of optional technical defense, as requested by the Court of Florence in the operative part of the referring order.

10.1.– Once again, as the *a quo* court itself notes, the value at stake—namely personal liberty—precludes this. The close connection between Articles 13 and 24 of the Constitution requires, in fact, that the individual subject to physical coercion may rely on the technical and professional assistance of counsel, and that the judge's own conviction regarding the legitimacy of the use of force is formed within an adversarial framework, which is the primary and fundamental guarantee of a fair trial through which jurisdiction is exercised (among many, judgments no. 39 of 2025 and no. 96 of 2024).

10.2.– Furthermore, providing solely for the right to appoint retained counsel would produce a twofold distortive effect.

10.2.1.– On the one hand, such a right could be exercised in practice only by those who retain a sufficient degree of lucidity.

Compulsory health treatment, in fact, may affect individuals in the most diverse clinical conditions, suffering from persistent mental infirmity or in a state of temporary alteration, not infrequently due to social marginalization and abandonment, meaning that the existence of residual spaces of autonomy and decision-making capacity may vary from case to case (judgment no. 76 of 2025, citing Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, order of 11 January 2023, no. 509).

Regarding communication obligations drawn from Articles 13, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, judgment no. 76 of 2025 affirmed that the right to receive communication of measures restricting personal liberty is not vitiated by the state of psychological alteration in which the person subjected to compulsory health treatment finds themselves, but that precisely such a condition may impede their effective understanding.

An analogous consideration applies to the notice concerning the right to appoint retained counsel, which the person might not be capable of understanding. The guarantee of the constitutional right to defense would thus become merely theoretical, remaining conditioned by the type of pathology and the ways in which it manifests.

10.2.2.– On the other hand, the right to appoint retained counsel would be exercised in practice only by those who are in a position to contact a lawyer due to their economic status and the family and social network supporting them.

The guarantee of optional technical defense would therefore end up resulting in an intolerable discrimination based on the type of mental pathology and on economic and social conditions, with the paradox that precisely the most vulnerable persons would remain deprived of protection.

11.– The restoration of constitutional legality, instead, requires the introduction of mandatory technical defense, so as to give effect to the defense guarantee under conditions of formal and substantive equality.

Only mandatory technical defense ensures professional assistance to every individual at the moment they undergo authoritative physical coercion, regardless of the forms in which their psychological distress manifests and their economic and social standing. Ex officio technical defense enhances the "fair" nature of the proceedings in which it is rendered mandatory, being an *ex lege* service imposed by the State for the implementation of the right to defense under Article 24 of the Constitution, and is non-waivable as it is characterized by the duty to provide representation (recently, judgment no. 58 of 2025). This Court has recognized its necessity precisely to prevent the potential social weakness of individuals from negatively influencing the proceedings (judgments no. 58 of 2025 and no. 135 of 2019).

11.1.– Moreover, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in cases of deprivation of personal liberty due to psychological distress pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, letter e), of the European Convention on Human Rights, also deems the guarantee of legal assistance necessary in judicial proceedings aimed at challenging the lawfulness of the coercive measure (First Section, judgment of 19 February 2015, M.S. v. Croatia - no. 2, paragraphs 152–154; most recently, Fifth Section, judgment of 6 February 2025, M.B. v. Spain, paragraphs 48 and 49).

12.– The procedure for adopting mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care, regulated by Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978, must therefore be supplemented as follows.

At the time the mayoral order arranging the treatment is communicated, the recipient must be informed of the right to appoint retained counsel. In the absence of such appointment, the person subjected to treatment shall be assisted by *ex officio* counsel designated by the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction from among those included in the lists referred to in Article 29 of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Retained counsel or, in the absence thereof, *ex officio* counsel shall be promptly notified and may participate in the hearing of the person concerned conducted by the judge exercising tutelary jurisdiction prior to validation. The reasoned decree validating or declining to validate the mayoral measure shall likewise be served upon the counsel thus designated. Analogous guarantees are provided in the event of any extension of the treatment and the relative validation.

13.– This Court is fully aware of the organizational burden that the introduction of mandatory technical defense may entail, just as occurred with the personal hearing of the patient. The implementation of constitutional rights—both of liberty and of provision—inevitably requires the deployment of resources and the adoption of organizational frameworks. Such determinations rest primarily with the legislature, but also involve all entities that, within their respective spheres of competence, are called upon to give effect thereto and, consequently, those entrusted with the administration of justice.

13.1.– This Court is likewise aware that compulsory health treatment remains a health measure, in which clinical evaluations play a central role throughout the entire proceedings—from the initial assessment of the prerequisites, entrusted by Articles 33, 34, and 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978 to the reasoned proposal of a physician and the confirmation of a second physician of the local health authority, normally a specialist in psychiatry—to the methods of executing the measure, down to the judgment on the persistence or cessation of the reasons justifying it. Medical-scientific competence and the professionalism of healthcare workers thus constitute the primary guarantee not only of clinical appropriateness, but of the very legal legitimacy of the treatment.

13.2.– Within this framework, the constitutional guarantees of the right to defense and the adversarial principle, although inescapable, certainly do not exhaust the spectrum of measures necessary to ensure the best possible care for a patient suffering from a psychiatric disorder, with respect to which the dimension of care and respect for decision-making freedom retain a preeminent role.

13.3.– This Court has already expressed—and reiterates today—an invitation to the legislature to reconsider the regulatory framework of compulsory health treatment, also evaluating the possibility of providing for the appointment of a special curator (*curatore speciale*), so that effective respect for the constitutional statute of the individual is always guaranteed, as well as the provision of individuals with interlocutory and mediation functions, with the aim of fostering consensual care pathways.

Compulsory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care, moreover, addresses the acute phase of psychological distress that is often rooted in situations of social marginalization, meaning that taking charge of the recipient requires upstream structural interventions aimed at preventing its onset, supporting both mental health services and, more broadly, socio-assistance services supporting individuals and their families.

These are, however, as is evident, complex choices that fall outside the perimeter of the constitutional legitimacy review and are reserved for the legislature.

13.4.– Ultimately, the unconstitutionality of Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 1978 must be declared, insofar as it does not provide that the proceedings for validating mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care and any extension thereof must be conducted with the guarantees of technical defense, within the terms specified above (point 12).

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the unconstitutionality of Article 35 of Law No. 833 of 23 December 1978 (Establishment of the National Health Service), insofar as it does not provide that the proceedings for validating mandatory health treatment under conditions of hospital inpatient care and any extension thereof must be conducted with the guarantees of technical defense, within the terms set forth in the grounds.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 6 July 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Stefano PETITTI, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on 2 October 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms in text to the original