JUDGMENT NO. 146

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of April 30, 1992 (New Highway Code), brought by the Justice of the Peace of Ancona in the proceedings pending between A. S. and the Prefecture - Territorial Office of the Government of Ancona, by means of an order dated December 1, 2025, registered under no. 262 of the register of orders 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 3, 1st special series, for the year 2026.

Having heard in chambers on June 22, 2026 the Judge Rapporteur Angelo Buscema;

Deliberated in chambers on June 22, 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto (The Facts)

1.– By an order dated December 1, 2025, registered under no. 262 of the register of orders 2025, the Justice of the Peace of Ancona raised questions as to the constitutionality of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of April 30, 1992 (New Highway Code) "insofar as they do not provide that, in the event of the extinction of the offense related to the violation of Article 189 of the Highway Code due to the successful completion of community service [lavori di pubblica utilità] or probation [messa alla prova], the Prefect shall reduce by half the accessory administrative sanction of the suspension of the driving license.”

The referring judge is seized of an opposition against the order issued by the Prefecture-UTG of Ancona pursuant to Article 224, paragraph 1, of the Highway Code, whereby the suspension of the driving license held by the appellant was ordered for a duration of eleven months, starting from the date of proper notification of the prefectural measure. The contested measure follows a prior order issued by the Prefecture-UTG of Ancona by which the same license had been provisionally suspended for a duration of one month. The appellant was served with the criminal penal decree [decreto penale di condanna] issued by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations at the Ordinary Court of Ancona, whereby he was charged with the violation of Article 189, paragraph 6, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of 1992 and ordered to pay a pecuniary fine of €4,500.00.

The appellant filed an application pursuant to Article 459, paragraph 1-ter, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, requesting – pursuant to Article 56-bis of Law No. 689 of November 24, 1981 (Amendments to the Criminal System) – the replacement of the custodial sentence with the substitute sanction of community service. The Judge for Preliminary Investigations, having deemed the request admissible, granted a deadline for the filing of the relevant program prepared by the District Office for External Criminal Enforcement, which was duly submitted to the case file.

By a measure dated April 3, 2024, the Judge for Preliminary Investigations ordered the conversion of the custodial sentence into sixty days of community service. By a subsequent measure dated July 30, 2024, the same GIP declared the substitute sentence executed and extinguished all criminal effects of the offense charged in the penal decree. The referring judge reports that, notwithstanding the intervening extinction of the offense following the successful performance of community service, the Prefecture adopted the measure suspending the driving license, applying the statutory minimum provided for by Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code, without providing for any reduction connected to the appellant’s completed restorative pathway.

The latter has therefore raised the issue of the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of 1992 insofar as – unlike what is provided for driving under the influence (Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code) – they do not allow any reduction in the duration of the license suspension upon the successful outcome of community service or probation.

1.1.– The referring judge considers that the question is relevant because a potential declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the aforesaid provisions would allow the application of the reduction criterion regarding the accessory administrative sanction of driving license suspension, directly affecting the lawfulness of the contested prefectural measure. Otherwise, the current regulations would remain applicable, characterized by the complete absence of any possibility to graduate the measure, leading to outcomes incompatible with the principles of reasonableness and equality.

1.2.– The question of constitutional legitimacy is argued to be not manifestly unfounded with reference to Articles 2, 3, and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution and Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

1.2.1.– Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code would first violate Article 3 of the Constitution by creating a disparity in treatment.

In this regard, reference is made to the judgment of this Court No. 163 of 2022, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code insofar as it did not provide for the reduction of license suspension in the event of the extinction of the offense under Article 186 of the Highway Code (Driving under the influence of alcohol) due to the successful outcome of probation, holding it to be "manifestly unreasonable” that the aforesaid benefit, provided for community service, was not also recognized for the aforementioned probation.

According to the referring judge, the principle enunciated in the aforesaid judgment – the need for consistency between the criminal sanction and the supplementary administrative sanction – should also apply to the case at hand. Indeed, under Article 186 of the Highway Code, the legislature links the reduction of the administrative sanction to the successful outcome of community service and probation; whereas under Article 189 of the Highway Code, despite the existence, according to the judge *a quo*, of an identical mechanism for the extinction of the offense through community service or probation, the provision for a reduction of the administrative suspension is entirely lacking, resulting in a disparity of treatment between individuals who have engaged in identical restorative activities. Homogeneous situations – such as the extreme proximity between the offenses under Article 186 and Article 189 of the Highway Code, within the logic of road safety, and the identity of the extinguishing criminal benefit – would receive entirely different treatments without adequate regulatory justification.

1.2.2.– The contested provisions would also violate Articles 27, third paragraph, and 2 of the Constitution with regard to the rehabilitative function of punishment and the appreciation of restorative conduct.

The extinction of the offense through the performance of community service or probation would attest to the individual's full social recovery, whereas the automatic application of the administrative sanction at its statutory minimum would nullify the rehabilitative effects already achieved through the restorative pathway, introducing a form of punitive "ultra-activity” no longer justified by the public interest, given that the goal of general and special prevention has already been attained. Furthermore, such a mechanism would conflict with the principle of proportionality and graduation of the sanctioning system.

1.2.3.– Finally, the referring judge complains of a violation of the supranational principles referred to in Article 49 of the CFREU and, in particular, the principle of proportionality of sanctions – both criminal and administrative – affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This is because the contested regulation mandates a fixed suspension, insensitive to the extinction of the offense and the restorative behavior, thereby proving potentially disproportionate.

Considerato in diritto (The Law)

2.– The Justice of the Peace of the Court of Ancona, by the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 262 of 2025), has raised questions concerning the constitutionality of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code, with reference to Articles 2, 3, and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, as well as Article 49 of the CFREU, insofar as they do not provide, in the event of the extinction of the offense following the successful outcome of community service or probation, that the accessory administrative sanction of driving license suspension be reduced by half, following the model provided by Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code for the offense of driving under the influence not causing a traffic accident.

2.1.– Regarding relevance, the referring judge points out that any upholding of the objections would allow the application of the fifty-percent reduction criterion, directly affecting the prefectural measure contested in the main proceedings.

3.– Regarding the non-manifest unfoundedness, the judge *a quo* considers that Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code would violate, first of all, Article 3 of the Constitution from the perspective of inequality of treatment. On this point, the judge *a quo* recalls the judgment of this Court No. 163 of 2022, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code insofar as it did not provide, for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, for the reduction of license suspension in the event of extinction due to the successful outcome of probation.

According to the referring judge, although the offense examined today is subject to the same extinction mechanism established for the offense under Article 186 of the Highway Code, the provision for a reduction of the administrative suspension is nevertheless missing, resulting in a disparity of treatment between individuals who have carried out identical restorative activities.

4.– Articles 2 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution would likewise be violated with regard to the rehabilitative function of punishment and the valorization of restorative conduct.

In the referring judge's opinion, the extinction of the offense following the performance of community service or probation would attest to the subject's achieved social recovery; however, the automatic application of the administrative sanction at the statutory minimum would frustrate the rehabilitative effects already achieved by the restorative pathway, from which the conflict of the contested provisions with the principle of proportionality of the sanctioning system would derive.

5.– Finally, the judge *a quo* alleges a violation of the supranational principles referred to in Article 49 of the CFREU and, in particular, the principle of proportionality of sanctions affirmed by the EU Court of Justice, since the contested legislation imposes a fixed-term license suspension, regardless of the potential extinction of the offense due to the successful outcome of substitute sanctions.

6.– Turning to the examination of the individual questions, it must be preliminarily noted *ex officio* that the objection raised with reference to Article 2 of the Constitution is inadmissible due to a failure to state reasons regarding its non-manifest unfoundedness. The violation of the constitutional parameter is indeed apodictically put forward by the referring judge without any adequate and autonomous illustration of the reasons why the contested provisions would integrate a violation of said constitutional parameter (to this effect, *ex plurimis*, Judgment No. 54 of 2026).

7.– Equally inadmissible is the objection concerning the alleged violation of the principle of proportionality referred to in Article 49 of the CFREU, because the judge *a quo* failed to illustrate the reasons that would bring the contested provision within the scope of application of European Union law (Judgment No. 73 of 2026).

8.– For the purposes of examining the merits, it is useful to recall the content of the contested provisions.

Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code establishes that "[a]nyone who, under the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, in the event of an accident resulting in personal injury, fails to comply with the obligation to stop, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to three years. The accessory administrative sanction of the suspension of the driving license from one to three years shall apply, pursuant to Chapter II, Section II, of Title VI. In the cases referred to in this paragraph, the measures provided for in Articles 281, 282, 283, and 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable, even beyond the limits provided for by Article 280 of the same code, and it is possible to proceed with arrest, pursuant to Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even beyond the penalty limits provided therein.”

Article 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code establishes, insofar as relevant, that "[i]n the event of the extinction of the offense for another cause, the prefect shall proceed to ascertain the existence or otherwise of the legal conditions for the application of the accessory administrative sanction and shall proceed pursuant to Articles 218 and 219 in their compatible parts. The extinction of the punishment subsequent to the irrevocable judgment of conviction has no effect on the application of the accessory administrative sanction.”

9.– On the merits, the questions concerning the constitutionality of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code, raised with reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, are unfounded.

9.1.– It must first be recalled that, according to the consistent case law of this Court, the identification of administrative sanctions and the scope of reward-based mechanisms falls within the discretion of the legislature: it has indeed been affirmed that the legislature enjoys broad discretion in identifying offenses and choosing the relative punitive treatment (Judgment No. 194 of 2023); that legislative discretion in choices regarding the *an* and *quantum* of administrative sanctions encounters the limit of manifest unreasonableness (Judgments No. 266 of 2022, No. 62 of 2021, and No. 115 of 2019); and that the exercise of such discretion can be reviewed in constitutional legitimacy proceedings only if it translates into choices that are manifestly unreasonable or disproportionate (*ex plurimis*, Judgments No. 212 and No. 115 of 2019).

In the present case, however, as will be seen following the examination of the individual parameters invoked, it must be ruled out that the legislature's discretion has translated into manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate legislation.

9.2.– With specific reference to the alleged violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, the assumption of the referring judge cannot be shared. By invoking Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code as a *tertium comparationis*, the judge posits a manifestly unreasonable distinction between situations deemed analogous and homogeneous, crossing the boundary of arbitrariness, and seeks to extend the reward mechanism provided for the offense of driving under the influence not causing a traffic accident to the offense of failing to stop in the event of an accident with personal injury. This is despite the fact that the aforementioned reward mechanism is expressly confined by the legislature, even within the offense of driving under the influence itself, exclusively to cases where such state has not caused an accident, even if without personal injury, and despite the fact that failing to comply with the obligation to stop constitutes a more serious offense.

Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code, indicated by the referring judge as a *tertium comparationis* and introduced by Article 33, paragraph 1, letter d), of Law No. 120 of July 29, 2010 (Provisions regarding road safety), provides that: "[o]utside the cases provided for by paragraph 2-bis of this article [i.e., if the driver in a state of intoxication causes a traffic accident], the custodial and pecuniary sentence may be replaced [...] with that of community service [...]. In the event of the successful performance of community service, the judge shall set a new hearing and declare the offense extinguished, ordering a reduction by half of the license suspension sanction.”

The referring judge improperly invokes the aforementioned extinguishing effect of the offense – deriving from having served the substitute sentence with a positive outcome – provided for the petty offense (*contravvenzione*) under Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code, but not for the felony (*delitto*) under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code.

This is a fundamental differential element, which denotes a more rigorous attitude of the legislature toward fleeing the scene of an accident compared to driving under the influence that has not caused a traffic accident, thereby demonstrating the unsuitability of Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code to be assumed as a valid *tertium comparationis*.

Equally improperly, the judge *a quo* invokes this Court's Judgment No. 163 of 2022. In that case, indeed, the issue was to equate – regarding the reduction of the administrative sanction of driving license suspension and exclusively in relation to the crime of driving under the influence not causing an accident – community service under Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code and probation under Article 168-bis of the Criminal Code.

This Court highlighted that the aforesaid institutes are both characterized by the reward function of the substitute sentence – the positive performance of which leads to the favorable consequences of a declaration of extinction of the offense for the convicted person – as well as by the homogeneity of the situations compared, given that both institutes consist in the performance of unpaid work in favor of the community (*ex plurimis*, Judgment No. 76 of 2019).

In equating community service and probation, in light of the identical consequence of the extinction of the offense operating within a reward perspective, this Court nevertheless excluded cases where the intoxicated driver causes a traffic accident.

In this regard, it is useful to note that the Court of Cassation – also regarding driving under the influence – has affirmed that "having caused an accident, understood as any unexpected event that, interrupting the normal flow of road traffic, may cause danger to the community, without any relevance being attached to the involvement of third parties or other vehicles,” constitutes a "precluding condition for the replacement of the custodial and pecuniary sentence with community service” (Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, Judgment No. 13150 of March 12-April 4, 2025).

Therefore, while the existence of a traffic accident traceable to the behavior of the road user constitutes one of the prerequisites for the offense under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code, the same cannot be said for the offense of driving under the influence, in which the traffic accident is merely an aggravating circumstance that, inter alia, excludes the application of the institutes of community service and probation, consequently also preventing the fifty-percent reduction of the administrative sanction.

Further prerequisites for the configuration of the offense under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code are having caused personal injury through the traffic accident and having failed to comply with the obligation to stop. The material element of the offense, usually referred to as "flight” (*fuga*), "consists in moving away from the place of the collision so as to prevent or even just hinder the ascertainment of one's personal identity, the identification of the colliding vehicle, and the reconstruction of the circumstances of the accident” (Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, Judgment No. 8431 of December 9, 2021-March 14, 2022).

As for the subjective element of the same offense, intent (*dolo*) is required, which must encompass the non-compliance with the obligation to stop in relation to the event of an accident concretely capable of producing injurious repercussions to persons, and not necessarily the existence of actual harm to them (Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, Judgment No. 26012 of February 15-June 16, 2023).

Where, furthermore, the accident actually results in injury to individual physical integrity or even to the lives of the persons involved, the provisions of the Criminal Code protecting such legal interests come into play (Judgment No. 195 of 2023).

The intentional conduct that the driver, by fleeing, adopts after the accident takes on a special disvalue because it expresses the conscious determination not to assume responsibility for one's actions (again, Judgment No. 195 of 2023). This entails that, in assessing proportionality in relation to the contested provisions, it cannot be considered that they cross into the realm of manifest unreasonableness.

The different treatment provided for the two offenses – driving under the influence and that under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code – is also justified in relation to the evidently lesser gravity of the first compared to the second, which can be deduced – in addition to what has been highlighted above – from a plurality of elements. The first offense falls into the category of petty offenses (*contravvenzioni*), whereas the second falls into felonies (*delitti*). The first is punished under both intent (*dolo*) and negligence (*colpa*), whereas the second is punished solely under intent (*dolo*) (and therefore in the latter case, only subjectively more serious conduct is targeted). Furthermore, the first offense presupposes that no traffic accident has occurred (indeed, if an accident occurs, the benefit is expressly excluded, and the suspicion of unconstitutionality regarding such exclusion was declared manifestly unfounded by this Court with Order No. 247 of 2013), whereas a traffic accident with personal injury constitutes one of the prerequisites of the offense under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code; the custodial statutory penalty range of the first offense (from six months to one year) is milder than that of the second (from six months to three years). Finally, the first is an offense of presumed danger, punishing the mere act of driving under the influence (Judgment No. 194 of 2023), whereas the second is an offense of danger concretely capable of producing injurious events (Court of Cassation, Second Criminal Section, Judgment No. 42744 of September 22-November 22, 2021) in which the perpetrator, "while necessarily aware that their conduct related to the collision is capable of causing harm to persons, [...] decides to abandon the scene of the accident, accepting to do so, moreover, under a ‘veil of ignorance’ as to the consequences produced by their own action and amplifying the danger to the physical safety and life of other persons involved” (Judgment No. 195 of 2023).

Moreover, the reward mechanism of reducing the administrative sanction by half, which the applicant seeks to extend to the offense under Article 189, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code, far from constituting a general principle with potential expansive aptitude, is expressly confined by the legislature – even within the same offense of driving under the influence – exclusively to cases where such state has not caused an accident (to this effect, Judgments No. 163 of 2022, No. 75 of 2020, and No. 198 of 2015).

The considerations set out above lead to the conclusion that the contested legislative choice – besides not being unreasonable – is not even in breach of Article 3 of the Constitution from the perspective of inequality of treatment.

9.3.– As for the objection raised with reference to Article 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution concerning the principle of the rehabilitative purpose of punishment, this Court (Judgment No. 212 of 2019) has affirmed that this principle refers solely to criminal liability and not to administrative liability. More specifically, the extension of principles concerning criminal responsibility to administrative sanctions has been ruled out with regard to the rehabilitative purpose provided for by the third paragraph of the aforementioned Article 27 of the Constitution, which is deemed connected to punishment in the strict sense, insofar as it is "deprivative, or at least restrictive, of personal liberty” (Judgment No. 112 of 2019).

In the present case, the criminal substitute sanction and the administrative one serve distinct and independent roles, with the former fulfilling a typically punitive function (in this sense, Judgment No. 75 of 2020), while the latter has a distinctly preventive function (Judgment No. 148 of 2022), such that it cannot be affirmed that having served the criminal substitute sanction can affect the administrative one, rendering the individual deserving of a reduction in the duration of the latter.

On these terms, a violation of Article 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution must therefore be ruled out.

10.– In conclusion, the questions concerning the constitutionality of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of the Highway Code, raised with reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, must be declared unfounded.

per estos motivi (on these grounds)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) Declares inadmissible the question of the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of April 30, 1992 (New Highway Code), raised, with reference to Article 2 of the Constitution, by the Justice of the Peace of Ancona, by means of the order indicated in the heading;

2) Declares inadmissible the question of the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of 1992, raised, with reference to Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by the Justice of the Peace of Ancona, by means of the order indicated in the heading;

3) Declares unfounded the questions of the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 189, paragraph 6, and 224, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of 1992, raised, with reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Justice of the Peace of Ancona, by means of the order indicated in the heading.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 22, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Angelo BUSCEMA, Author of the Judgment [Redattore]

Roberto MILANA, Head of the Registry [Direttore della Cancelleria]

Filed in the Registry on July 23, 2026

The anonymized version conforms in its text to the original