RULING NO. 186

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

RULING

in the constitutional legitimacy judgment concerning articles 22, paragraph 6, 41, paragraphs 3 and 4, 42 to 45, 59, and 144 of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism), promoted by the President of the Council of Ministers with an appeal notified on March 10, 2025, filed at the Registry on the same date, registered under no. 14 of the appeals registry 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 14, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having regard to the statement of defence of the Tuscany Region;

having heard in the public hearing of October 8, 2025, the Reporting Judge Giovanni Pitruzzella;

having heard the State Lawyers Maria Gabriella Mangia and Giorgio Santini for the President of the Council of Ministers and the lawyer Andrea Pertici for the Tuscany Region;

deliberated in the Chamber of Council of October 8, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, challenged – with the appeal registered under no. 14 of the 2025 appeals registry – several provisions of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism), including art. 22, paragraph 6; arts. 41, paragraphs 3 and 4; 42; 43; 44; 45 and 144; as well as art. 59.

The first challenged provision is art. 22, paragraph 6, which states as follows: "Hotels may associate in the management, to increase their receptive capacity and within the limits of 40 per cent thereof, unless the Municipality establishes a lower percentage, residential real estate units in their availability, located within two hundred meters, measured by the shortest possible pedestrian route, from the structure itself, provided that unity of management, the use of the hotel facility’s services, and quality and safety standards analogous to the hotel’s classification level are guaranteed. Without prejudice to the possibility of maintaining the structural and health and safety requirements provided for dwellings, the use of real estate units for the activities referred to in this paragraph is permitted upon prior change, for planning purposes, of the intended use from residential to tourist-receptive.”

According to the appellant, this provision violates, first, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under art. 3 of the Constitution, "since the municipal power to establish a percentage lower than 40 per cent of the receptive capacity is not linked to any predetermined legal criterion and may, therefore, lead to arbitrary and unjustified applications.”

Furthermore, the "freedom of enterprise of hoteliers,” protected by art. 41 of the Constitution, is allegedly infringed, in relation to which the possibility of increasing the company’s receptive capacity is functional. This freedom would be exposed to the "risk of territorial limitations not justified by real reasons of public interest”; municipalities could even eliminate the possibility of increasing receptive capacity.

The appellant recalls that limitations on the freedom of economic initiative are subject to the rule of statutory reservation. It also notes that this freedom is subject to balancing with social utility, but the identification of the latter must not be arbitrary. The power granted to municipalities represents a "manifestly incongruous measure,” leading to a strong conditioning of entrepreneurial choices.

2.– The second ground for appeal challenges articles 41, paragraphs 3 and 4; 42; 43; 44; 45 and 144 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which lay down provisions concerning non-hotel tourist accommodation facilities with the characteristics of dwellings.

2.1.– Art. 41, paragraph 1 (not challenged), provides that "[n]on-hotel tourist accommodation facilities with the building characteristics of dwellings are: a) guest rooms; b) bed and breakfasts; c) holiday homes and apartments; d) historic residences.”

Paragraph 3 establishes that "[t]he exercise of the activities referred to in this Article is permitted exclusively in properties and property units having, for urban planning purposes, a tourist-receptive intended use,” excluding those with a residential intended use.

Art. 41, paragraph 3, is allegedly manifestly illogical and inconsistent with the fundamental characteristics of non-hotel accommodation. Indeed, if the accommodation facilities are defined by the fact that they have "the characteristics of a dwelling,” it is not understandable for what objective reason of public interest they cannot have a residential intended use from an urban planning perspective. This provision allegedly violates the principle of reasonableness and infringes the exercise of the right to property; furthermore, it does not meet imperative needs of general interest that can justify restrictions on the freedom of enterprise.

The transitional provision in art. 144, paragraph 3, is also challenged, according to which "[t]he provisions of article 41, paragraph 3, shall apply from July 1, 2026. Until that date, dwellings used for the activities referred to in the same article 41 may have, for urban planning purposes, both a residential and a tourist-receptive intended use.”

This transitional provision allegedly creates an unreasonable discrimination "between owners who, on the date of entry into force of art. 41, paragraph 3 (July 31, 2026), carried out” the non-hotel activities with both residential and tourist-receptive intended use, "who may continue to do so in conformity with the pre-existing urban planning legislation, and those who intend to avail themselves of this option for the first time subsequently, for whom it is precluded.”

2.2.– Art. 41, paragraph 4, states that "[t]he activity of guest rooms, or bed and breakfast, or historic residence carried out by the same subject, or by controlled or connected companies pursuant to article 2359 of the Civil Code referable to the same, in multiple accommodation facilities within the same building may in no case exceed the number of rooms and the receptive capacity of a single facility.”

This provision allegedly violates the principle of reasonableness and infringes the right to property and the freedom of economic initiative, as it precludes "the accommodation activity carried out in an entrepreneurial form from finding the organizational and dimensional structure deemed most suitable for wealth creation.”

2.3.– Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 respectively regulate guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, holiday homes and apartments, and historic residences. All these provisions prescribe that management must occur solely "in an entrepreneurial form.”

These provisions allegedly violate the exclusive state legislative competence in matters of civil law, under art. 42, second paragraph, and art. 117, second paragraph, letter l), of the Constitution. The choice not to allow the exercise of the aforementioned activities in a non-entrepreneurial form in the Tuscan territory strongly limits "the possibility for the (only) owners of properties in the region to fully enjoy their ownership right, by granting third parties the enjoyment thereof for tourist purposes.” The content of the right to property falls squarely within the matter of civil law, since art. 832 of the Civil Code establishes that "[t]he owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of things fully and exclusively, within the limits and in compliance with the obligations established by the legal system.” The challenged provisions cannot be justified in light of art. 42, second paragraph, of the Constitution and art. 832 of the Civil Code, which refer to limitations on the right to property, because the obligation of management in an entrepreneurial form would result in "a legal restriction not connected either to a peculiarity of the Tuscan territory compared to the rest of the Republic, or to needs of public interest.” Instead, it would be a disproportionate and unreasonable constraint.

The situation is aggravated by the unreasonable discrimination introduced in the transitional provisions, between owners who, on the date of entry into force of the law, carried out these activities in a non-entrepreneurial form, who may continue to do so in conformity with pre-existing legislation, and those who intend to avail themselves of this ownership faculty for the first time subsequently, for whom it is precluded.

Overall, articles 41, paragraphs 3 and 4, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 144 allegedly violate arts. 3, 41, 42, 117, second paragraph, letter l), of the Constitution, in relation to art. 832 of the Civil Code.

3.– With the third ground for appeal, the President of the Council of Ministers challenges art. 59 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024.

This provision concerns "Criteria and limits for the exercise of the short-term tourist letting activity.” Pursuant to paragraph 1, "[m]unicipalities with the highest tourist density, […] and in any case all provincial capital municipalities, may, with their own regulation, identify zones or areas where specific criteria and limits are established for the exercise, for tourist purposes, of the short-term letting activities referred to in article 4, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 50 of April 24, 2017 […] exercised also in an entrepreneurial form.”

Paragraph 2 provides as follows: "The criteria and limits referred to in paragraph 1, in compliance with the principles of strict necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination, are identified in order to pursue the correct tourist enjoyment of the historical, artistic, and cultural heritage, the preservation of the social fabric, as well as to guarantee a sufficient and economically accessible supply of accommodation intended for long-term letting. These criteria, with reference to the zone or area concerned, are defined taking into account, in particular: a) the ratio between the number of beds in residential real estate units subject to short-term letting and the resident population; b) the distribution and receptive capacity of hotel and non-hotel accommodation facilities; c) the characteristics of the urban fabric; d) the need to protect, also with reference to environmental sustainability, the archaeological, historical, artistic, and landscape value; e) the need to ensure that reception services are provided with high quality standards; f) any other element useful for assessing the impact, direct or indirect, of the spread of short-term lettings on the availability of affordable housing and on the residential character, also in qualitative terms.”

Pursuant to paragraph 3, the aforementioned criteria "may consist, in particular: a) in the limitation, for certain homogeneous zones, of the exercise of the short-term letting activity; b) in the identification of a specific ratio that must exist between the surface area of the property and the number of guests admitted; c) in the definition of quality requirements and standards that properties used for short-term letting must possess with reference, in particular, to the accessibility of spaces, hygiene and health standards, decorum of the premises, as well as the presence of connectivity services.”

Paragraph 4 establishes that, in municipalities "equipped with the regulation referred to in paragraph 1, the exercise of the short-term letting activity, for the zones or areas concerned, is subject to the issuance to the lessor of an authorization valid for five years for each real estate unit intended to be let,” and that "The Municipality may establish a maximum limit for authorizations for certain homogeneous zones.”

Pursuant to paragraph 7, municipalities, "within the scope of the regulation referred to in paragraph 1, shall establish transitional provisions aimed at ensuring a gradual implementation of the criteria and limits provided for by this Article. These provisions, during the initial implementation phase of the regulation, shall exclude from the application of the same limits, for a period of not less than three years and not more than five years, properties and real estate units already used, during the year 2024, for short-term letting activity, in conformity with the legislation in force at that time.”

Art. 59 allegedly infringes upon the exclusive state legislative competence in matters of civil law because, "apart from the description of the prerequisites for introducing such an invasive administrative regime at the local level for the exercise of the short-term letting activity, it ends up allowing micro-territorial limitations on the proprietary rights of real estate owners.”

Furthermore, art. 59 allegedly illegitimately interprets public interests that art. 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution reserves to the exclusive legislative power of the State, as evidenced by the reference to the "correct tourist enjoyment of the historical, artistic, and cultural heritage.”

Moreover, the municipal secondary normative power itself (which would fall under the matter of territorial governance) is not provided as a fundamental principle of the matter in any sectoral state law: neither Legislative Decree no. 267 of August 18, 2000 (Consolidated Act on the laws concerning the organization of local authorities), nor Presidential Decree no. 380 of June 6, 2001, concerning the "Consolidated Act on legislative and regulatory provisions on building matters (Test A),” nor Legislative Decree no. 42 of January 22, 2004 (Code of Cultural and Landscape Heritage, pursuant to Article 10 of Law no. 137 of July 6, 2002), in any way allow municipalities to intervene on the specific phenomenon of short-term tourist lettings.

Finally, the challenged provision is allegedly "also seriously contradictory” because it indicates as objectives the pursuit of "the preservation of the social fabric” and "guaranteeing a sufficient and economically accessible supply of accommodation intended for long-term letting” (art. 59, paragraph 2), but then provides means inconsistent with the stated objectives, given that the elements listed in letters b), c), d), and e) of the same paragraph 2 have no bearing on the issue of the availability of an adequate number of affordable accommodations.

Therefore, art. 59 allegedly violates arts. 3, 117, second paragraph, letters l) and s), of the Constitution, in relation to art. 832 of the Civil Code.

4.– The Tuscany Region filed a statement of defence on April 17, 2025.

4.1.– Regarding art. 22, paragraph 6, of the challenged regional law, the respondent notes that provisions aimed at limiting the expansion of hotel capacity on residential real estate units in their availability "may be consistent with the protection of social utility and the environment,” recalled by art. 41, second paragraph, of the Constitution. Indeed, the tourism reception activity allegedly has "an impact on social coexistence within the city” and "an increased environmental impact (in terms of waste, water and energy consumption, discharge of chemical products into water, etc.).”

The Region observes that art. 8 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 assigns administrative functions concerning accommodation facilities to the municipalities and that this is not the first case where the determination of the extent to which the reception activity may be carried out is entrusted to the municipalities; art. 37-bis of Decree-Law no. 50 of May 17, 2022 (Urgent measures concerning national energy policies, business productivity and investment attraction, as well as social policies and the Ukrainian crisis), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 91 of July 15, 2022, is mentioned, which grants the Municipality of Venice the possibility to set "the maximum limits and prerequisites for the allocation of residential properties to short-term letting activities.”

Furthermore, it is noted that administrative discretion can never lead to arbitrariness: in the implementation of art. 22, paragraph 6, municipalities must balance "the interests of the owners of the properties on which to carry out reception activities to be able to use them in the most remunerative way possible with those of other property owners not to be completely engulfed by a ‘hotel city’.” According to the respondent, a lower percentage of increase in receptive capacity could be linked, for example, to the different tourist vocation of the municipality or the strong presence of hotels, whereas the aforementioned reduction of the percentage could not result from "the mere will to penalize hoteliers in the absence of reasonable grounds.” The reasonableness of the municipal choice would be subject to judicial review by the administrative judge.

The regional legislator allegedly took into account the great variety of Tuscan municipalities, in the face of which it would have been unreasonable not to provide for any flexibility. Municipalities should establish the extent of the expansion by a general administrative act, addressed to all hotels.

4.2.– Regarding articles 41, paragraphs 3 and 4; 42; 43; 44; 45 and 144 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, the respondent observes that these provisions fall within the scope of tourism and not civil law. They do not limit the possibility for property owners to fully enjoy their ownership right, but concern the "modalities of exercising the tourist-receptive activity, in relation to the dimensional limits and the entrepreneurial form thereof,” to which the further aspect of the intended use of the properties, attributable to territorial governance, is linked.

The Region recalls this Court’s Ruling no. 94 of 2024, which upheld a legislative provision of the Autonomous Region of Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste, challenged for setting the maximum duration of letting of tourist-use accommodations at one hundred and forty days per year. Reference is also made to this Court’s Ruling no. 80 of 2012, which declared several provisions of Legislative Decree no. 79 of May 23, 2011 (Code of State Legislation on the organization and market of tourism, pursuant to article 14 of Law no. 246 of November 28, 2005, as well as implementation of Directive 2008/122/EC, concerning timeshare contracts, long-term holiday products contracts, resale and exchange contracts) unconstitutional. In that decision, this Court allegedly identified, "as the legislative basis for interventions in the field of accommodation facilities, both hotel […] and non-hotel, including the possible provision for the obligation of entrepreneurial management of the same, the matter of ‘tourism,’ which falls under the residual legislative competence of the Regions.”

The challenged provisions are aimed at governing the evolution of the economic system, which sees, especially in Tuscany, "an unstoppable proliferation of tourist-receptive activities,” with negative consequences on the residential rental market and repercussions to the detriment of students in university cities.

The Region emphasizes that owners will be able to continue to carry out tourist reception activities (which are not subject to prohibitions), simply with a more correct and orderly regulation.

Regarding the necessity of managing non-hotel facilities in an entrepreneurial form, this is considered "a choice of rationalization,” which, moreover, does not entirely exclude the non-entrepreneurial form when the activities are carried out in the home where the manager has both residence and domicile. The Region recalls art. 4, paragraph 3-bis, of Decree-Law no. 50 of April 24, 2017 (Urgent provisions on financial matters, initiatives in favor of local authorities, further measures for areas affected by seismic events and measures for development), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 96 of June 21, 2017, which provided for a regulation to define the "criteria on the basis of which the letting activity referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is presumed to be carried out in an entrepreneurial form.” This provision allegedly indicates "a need […] to prevent an activity certainly in constant growth, generating significant income, generally equipped with a remarkable organization, from escaping the entrepreneurial form, with relevant consequences from the point of view of VAT […]” and competition with hotels.

With reference to art. 41, paragraph 3, the Region underlines the importance of the correct urban planning intended use, referring to certain rulings of the Court of Cassation, according to which the infrastructural endowments of the territory are linked to the different area designations. Therefore, the erroneous qualification of the intended use compared to the function actually performed by the asset alters the organization of the municipal territory, frustrating the very purpose of planning. The necessity of changing to a tourist-receptive intended use, referred to in art. 23-ter, letter a-bis), of Presidential Decree no. 380 of 2001, is consistent with the actual use of the asset and is confirmed by what is provided for in the aforementioned art. 37-bis of Decree-Law no. 50 of 2022, as converted.

As for art. 41, paragraph 4, the Region notes that this provision intends to "avoid circumventing the limit of the receptive capacity of the single facility, with consequent heavy social and environmental impact.” It does not pertain to the right to property but to the exercise of non-hotel reception activity and, therefore, falls within the matter of tourism.

With reference to art. 144, the Region first raises doubts about the admissibility of the challenge, "since the provision is identified as a whole, even though it consists of four paragraphs, each of which has an autonomous content.” The Region notes that the reasoning of the appeal expressly mentions only art. 144, paragraph 3 (which establishes a transitional provision regarding the tourist intended use), while implicitly referring only to art. 144, paragraph 1 (which establishes a transitional provision regarding management in an entrepreneurial form). The object of the challenge is therefore poorly defined, with an "evident contradiction” between the challenge of the entire article and the reference of the challenges only to two of its paragraphs.

On the merits, art. 144, paragraph 3, is entirely reasonable, as it aims to provide owners with adequate time to assess whether to proceed with the change of intended use and municipalities to manage the applications. In any case, the provision does not create any discrimination: for all owners, the necessary tourist-receptive intended use is provided for starting from July 1, 2026.

A difference between those who already carry out the reception activity at the time the law enters into force and those who start it subsequently is, however, provided for by art. 144, paragraph 1, since those who have already undertaken the activity may continue to carry it out even in a non-entrepreneurial form. This differentiation would result from a choice made reasonably by the Tuscan regional legislator in the exercise of its legislative competence in the matter of tourism. Indeed, it would have protected the legitimate expectation accrued by those who already carried out the reception activity in a non-entrepreneurial form.

4.3.– Finally, with reference to art. 59, the Region notes that this provision concerns the matter of tourism and not civil law, which, "if it were to extend to every aspect of the use of assets, and particularly to the activities carried out on them, would end up almost totally depriving the Regions of their legislative competence.” According to the respondent, this Court has clarified that, in matters of tourist lettings, "the regulation of the contractual activity and its effects pertains to the matter of civil law – and therefore to the exclusive legislative competence of the State – while the discipline of the aspects connected to said activity that are touristic falls under the matter of tourism – and therefore under the residual legislative competence of the Regions.”

In the case of art. 59, the identification of zones where criteria are to be defined for the exercise, for tourist purposes, of short-term letting activities does not translate into a regulation of the contractual activity and its effects, "and this for the simple but decisive reason that the first normative activity logically precedes the second, affecting contractual autonomy only indirectly and potentially.” In other words, the imposition of constraints on contractual autonomy would not always imply a discipline of the contractual activity, also because "opinions to the contrary would lead, for example, to bringing all urban planning and building legislation under the matter of civil law.”

The challenge regarding the violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution is also unfounded: the reference to the "historical, artistic, and cultural heritage” (art. 59, paragraph 2) is strictly linked to its "tourist enjoyment,” which is the scope of regional legislative competence. If anything, the tourist enjoyment of that heritage could have elements of connection with the concurrent matter of the "enhancement of cultural and environmental assets and promotion and organization of cultural activities.”

The manner in which it is intended to intervene, i.e., through a regulation, is essentially that of urban planning, allowing regions to dictate detailed rules in the matter of "territorial governance.”

The objectives indicated in the first sentence of paragraph 2 are "suitable for imposing limitations on the modalities of carrying out a specific activity (tourist-receptive),” just as the elements indicated in letters a) to f) of the same paragraph 2 are reasonable.

5.– On April 18, 2025, the associations Host + Host, Myguestfriend – responsible hospitality, and Confedilizia – Italian Confederation of Building Ownership, filed written opinions pursuant to art. 6 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court. These opinions were admitted by Presidential Decree of July 11, 2025.

6.– On September 17, 2025, both the President of the Council of Ministers and the Tuscany Region filed supplementary memoranda, reiterating the arguments supporting their requests.

Law Considered

1.– The President of the Council of Ministers challenges – with the appeal registered under no. 14 of the 2025 appeals registry – several provisions of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, which establishes the consolidated act on tourism. The decision on the further questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the same appeal is reserved for a separate ruling; those relating to arts. 22, paragraph 6; 41, paragraphs 3 and 4; 42; 43; 44; 45 and 144; as well as art. 59, are examined herein.

The challenged provisions concern hotels (art. 22, paragraph 6), non-hotel accommodation facilities with the characteristics of dwellings (arts. 41, paragraphs 3 and 4; 42; 43; 44; 45 and 144), and tourist lettings (art. 59). The content of these provisions will be illustrated below, examining the individual challenges.

2.– The questions raised regarding art. 22, paragraph 6, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 are unfounded.

Art. 22, paragraph 2, of the same regional law provides that "[i]n hotels, the presence of dwelling units, consisting of one or more rooms and equipped with an independent kitchen and private bathroom, is permitted, within the limit of a receptive capacity not exceeding 40 per cent of the total capacity of the establishment.”

The challenged art. 22, paragraph 6, establishes that "[h]otels may associate in the management, to increase their receptive capacity and within the limits of 40 per cent thereof, unless the Municipality establishes a lower percentage, residential real estate units in their availability, located within two hundred meters […]”. As is clear from the preamble of the challenged law and the preparatory works, this provision aims to bring residential units already used for tourist purposes under hotel management (with a consequent improvement of services). It seeks to allow a margin of flexibility in the hotel supply, increasing, within defined limits, the receptive capacity, in the presence of urban planning requirements that would not allow for extensions.

The provision is challenged only in the part where it grants municipalities the power to reduce this possibility, setting a lower percentage increase in receptive capacity. This municipal power was introduced following an amendment presented to the Second Council Committee on December 4, 2024. The explanatory note for the amendment observes that the change aims to give the municipality the possibility to take into account "the different territorial contexts.”

2.1.– Firstly, the appellant believes that the provision in question violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under art. 3 of the Constitution, because it does not lay down suitable criteria to limit the municipal power to set a lower percentage for the increase in receptive capacity.

Preliminarily, it is appropriate to recall that, within the framework of regional legislative competence regarding accommodation establishments (most recently, on the hotel constraint, Ruling no. 143 of 2025), the determination of the placement of hotels in the municipal territory falls to the municipalities, in the context of "functional zoning” pursuant to art. 7 of Law no. 1150 of August 17, 1942 (Urban Planning Law). This power was confirmed by art. 8 of Law no. 217 of May 17, 1983 (Framework Law for Tourism and Measures for the strengthening and qualification of the tourist offer), subsequently repealed. Municipalities are then competent regarding the exercise of accommodation facilities. Art. 8, paragraph 1, of the challenged law establishes that "[a]dministrative functions in the matter of: […] b) accommodation facilities, including classification, are assigned to the municipalities,” and art. 48, paragraph 1, of the same law provides that "[t]he exercise of accommodation facilities […] is subject to SCIA” pursuant to art. 19 of Law no. 241 of August 7, 1990 (New provisions on administrative procedure and right of access to administrative documents), "to be submitted, exclusively electronically, to the competent one-stop shop for productive activities (SUAP) for the territory.” This legislation is consistent with the state legislation, resulting from art. 17 of Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011, art. 13, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 83 of May 31, 2014 (Urgent provisions for the protection of cultural heritage, the development of culture and the relaunch of tourism), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 106 of July 29, 2014, and Legislative Decree no. 222 of November 25, 2016, concerning "Identification of procedures subject to authorization, certified start of activity notification (SCIA), silence-approval and communication and definition of the administrative regimes applicable to certain activities and procedures, pursuant to Article 5 of Law no. 124 of August 7, 2015,” which, among other things, identifies the procedures subject to SCIA (see point 75 of Table A in the Annex).

The rationale of art. 22, paragraph 6, is to allow an increase in the hotel supply, even by way of derogation from the provisions adopted by individual municipalities regarding hotel establishments. Considering this, the challenged provision – which grants municipalities the possibility to reduce the percentage increase in receptive capacity – is not manifestly unreasonable. On the contrary, it harmoniously complements the basic provision: if the latter guarantees a margin of flexibility at the regional level in hotel management, the challenged provision saves the possibility for the individual municipality to temper the expansion of hotel activities, taking into account the needs of its own territory (varying, for example, based on the number of existing hotel beds or the opportunity to maintain non-hotel tourist accommodation).

In conclusion, the challenged provision confirms the general municipal function of regulating settlements in its territory, a function that does not require specific guidelines in the law, being characterized by high discretion (e.g., Council of State, Fifth Section, Ruling of November 4, 2024, no. 8718; Fourth Section, Ruling of September 25, 2024, no. 7790; Sixth Section, Ruling of July 21, 2023, no. 7147), provided that general principles of reasonableness and impartiality are respected.

2.2.– The issue raised with reference to art. 41 of the Constitution is also unfounded.

The arguments put forward by the appellant echo those just examined, despite the difference in the parameter: the freedom of economic initiative of hoteliers would be exposed to the "risk of territorial limitations not justified by real reasons of public interest”; the absence, in art. 22, paragraph 6, of criteria aimed at guiding the limiting municipal power would render the identification of social utility under art. 41, second paragraph, of the Constitution "arbitrary.”

Firstly, it must be stressed that the limitation denounced by the appellant is of modest scope. Based on art. 22, paragraph 2, of the challenged law itself, in Tuscany hotels can, in general, include dwelling units, consisting of one or more rooms and equipped with an independent kitchen, within the limit of a receptive capacity not exceeding 40 per cent of the total capacity of the establishment. Art. 22, paragraph 6, allows an increase in receptive capacity compared to what was originally provided for in the building permit, irrespective of municipal urban planning rules. The challenged provision, therefore, grants municipalities the possibility to limit an increase in receptive capacity provided for by way of derogation. Furthermore, even if a municipality were to adopt limiting provisions, hotels could use the residential unit in their availability for tourist purposes, as a non-hotel accommodation facility.

This being established, the limitation contemplated by the challenged provision can be justified under art. 41, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as it is aimed at pursuing a social utility, consisting in the possibility of adapting the expansion of hotel reception to the actual needs of the municipal territory. The absence of guidelines in art. 22, paragraph 6, is not constitutionally illegitimate for the reasons already stated in point 2.1., i.e., due to the broad discretion characterizing the municipal regulatory function. Reasoning otherwise would also lead to questioning the constitutional legitimacy of art. 7 of Law no. 1150 of 1942, which provides – without laying down guidelines – for the municipal power of functional zoning, capable of limiting the economic initiative of owners.

3.– The issues relating to the provisions concerning "non-hotel tourist accommodation facilities with the characteristics of a dwelling” must now be examined.

Art. 41, paragraph 1, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 lists these facilities (which are guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, holiday homes and apartments, and historic residences) and lays down some common provisions.

Paragraph 3 establishes that "[t]he exercise of the activities referred to in this Article is permitted exclusively in properties and property units having, for urban planning purposes, a tourist-receptive intended use,” excluding those with a residential intended use. This provision represents a novelty, as it moves in the opposite direction to art. 54, paragraph 2, of the previous Tuscany Regional Law of December 20, 2016, no. 86 (Consolidated Act of the Tuscan Tourism System). From point 8 of the preamble to the challenged regional law, the rationale for the new provision can be inferred: it is aimed at making the intended use of the property consistent with its entrepreneurial management (provided for by articles 42 to 45 of the challenged law, as will be seen).

3.1.– The first challenge raised in relation to art. 41, paragraph 3, for violation of art. 3 of the Constitution, is unfounded.

According to the appellant, art. 41, paragraph 3, is illogical and inconsistent because, if the accommodation facilities in question are defined (in the challenged law itself) by the fact of having "the characteristics of a dwelling,” it is not understandable why they cannot have a residential intended use from an urban planning perspective. In essence, the appellant challenges art. 41, paragraph 3, for intrinsic unreasonableness.

According to the case law of this Court, the principle of reasonableness is infringed when the existence of an intrinsic contradiction between the overall purpose pursued by the legislator and the provision expressed by the challenged norm is ascertained (among others, Ruling no. 223 of 2022).

Art. 41, paragraph 3, mandates a tourist-receptive intended use for all properties, having the characteristics of a dwelling, used for the exercise of non-hotel tourist accommodation activities. Articles 42 to 45 of the same Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 define the individual facilities and prescribe management in an entrepreneurial form for all of them.

As will be seen (point 6.2.), the obligation of entrepreneurial management implies several consequences: the first, intrinsic to the concept of entrepreneur (art. 2082 of the Civil Code), is the necessary professionalism of the activity, i.e., its stability.

If a property is used stably and organized as a non-hotel accommodation facility, the provision for a tourist-receptive intended use cannot be considered inconsistent or unreasonable. It is necessary, in fact, to distinguish the structural-building profile of the asset (which has "the characteristics of a dwelling”) from the management profile, i.e., from its stable use for accommodation activities. The obligation for a tourist-receptive intended use does not contradict "the characteristics of a dwelling” because it is precisely linked to the management profile (in this sense, Council of State, Sixth Section, Rulings of July 27, 2022, no. 6609, and August 3, 2022, no. 6824) and to the fact that the residential and tourist-receptive uses represent two functionally autonomous categories from an urban planning perspective (art. 23-ter of Presidential Decree no. 380 of 2001 and art. 99 of the Tuscany Regional Law of November 10, 2014, no. 65, concerning "Rules for territorial governance”; see also Court of Cassation, Third Penal Section, Ruling of September 12-November 19, 2024, no. 42369).

The non-unreasonableness of the link between stable reception activity and change of intended use also emerges from state legislation: pursuant to art. 37-bis, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 50 of 2022, as converted, the Municipality of Venice may "establish, with specific regulatory provisions, that the exercise of the activity referred to in letter a) [short-term letting] for a duration exceeding one hundred and twenty days, even if not consecutive, in each calendar year is subject to the change of intended use and functional category of the property.”

3.2.– The other issues raised, for violation of arts. 41 and 42 of the Constitution, are inadmissible due to insufficient reasoning.

According to the case law of this Court, "the requirement of adequate reasoning to support the appeal is rigorous in proceedings brought as a principal matter, in which the appellant has the burden not only to identify the challenged provisions and the constitutional parameters whose violation is alleged, but also to substantiate the reasons for the alleged conflict with clear, complete, and sufficiently articulated arguments”; the appellant must present "reasoning that is not merely assertive but contains a specific and congruous indication of the reasons for the conflict with the evoked parameters, supported by a concise substantive argument” (Ruling no. 126 of 2025).

With reference to art. 42 of the Constitution, the appeal limits itself to stating that art. 41, paragraph 3, "infringes the exercise of the right of ownership,” without any argument: thus, in this case, the reasoning is entirely absent.

With reference to art. 41 of the Constitution, the appeal observes that the challenged provision "does not meet imperative needs of general interest that can justify restrictions on the freedom to organize and carry out business activities.” The reasoning is insufficient because the appellant does not examine at all the possible "social utility” deriving from the alignment of the urban planning intended use with the actual use of the asset.

4.– Art. 41, paragraph 3, just examined, is accompanied by a transitional provision, laid down by art. 144, paragraph 3, of the same Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024: "[t]he provisions of article 41, paragraph 3, shall apply from July 1, 2026. Until that date, dwellings used for the activities referred to in the same article 41 may have, for urban planning purposes, both a residential and a tourist-receptive intended use.”

In essence, the operation of the obligation imposed by art. 41, paragraph 3, is deferred until July 1, 2026: until that date, the residential intended use of the property may be maintained, even if used as a non-hotel accommodation facility.

Art. 144, paragraph 3, is challenged for violation of art. 3 of the Constitution.

4.1.– Firstly, the exception of inadmissibility raised by the Tuscany Region must be examined. It deems the identification of the object of the challenge deficient and recognizes a contradiction between the challenge of the entire provision and the development of challenges referring only to two of the four paragraphs (the paragraphs have since become five following the amendments introduced by the Tuscany Regional Law of June 6, 2025, no. 28, concerning "Law for the maintenance of the regional order 2025”).

The exception is unfounded.

The heading of ground number 2 and the conclusions (of the same ground and of the appeal) mention art. 144 as a whole, but it is clear that the appeal does not concern paragraphs two and four, which are not dealt with at all.

The appeal, however, makes an implicit reference to art. 144, paragraph 1: after challenging articles 42 to 45 (which impose the management of non-hotel facilities in an entrepreneurial form), the appellant notes that the situation would be "aggravated” by the unreasonable discrimination introduced by the transitional provision, contained in art. 144, paragraph 1. This passage of the appeal, however, is inadequate to translate into an autonomous question of constitutional legitimacy. Interpreting the act of appeal in light of the Council of Ministers' resolution (e.g., Ruling no. 147 of 2022), it must be held that the implicit reference to the transitional provision under art. 144, paragraph 1, only serves to reinforce the challenge relating to articles 42 to 45, not to challenge art. 144, paragraph 1.

In conclusion, although the appeal refers to art. 144 as a whole, the only provision clearly mentioned is art. 144, paragraph 3, in conformity with the content of the Council of Ministers' resolution. Thus, despite some ambiguity, the object of the challenge relating to art. 144 is sufficiently specified and is limited to paragraph 3. The memorandum filed by the President of the Council of Ministers on September 17, 2025, confirms that only paragraph 3 of art. 144 is contested.

4.2.– On the merits, the question is unfounded.

Art. 144, paragraph 3, is challenged as it would determine an "unreasonable discrimination” between owners who, on the date of entry into force of art. 41, paragraph 3 (i.e., July 1, 2026), "carried out non-hotel accommodation activities with a residential intended use […], who may continue to do so,” and "those who intend to avail themselves of this option for the first time subsequently, for whom it is precluded.”

In reality, art. 144, paragraph 3, does not distinguish at all between different categories of owners, but allows all of them to maintain the residential intended use until July 1, 2026, and requires all of them to switch to the tourist-receptive intended use from that date, if the dwelling unit with the characteristics of a dwelling is used as a non-hotel accommodation facility. This is a provision aimed at allowing the definition of change of intended use applications and, even before that, at leaving owners a margin of time to evaluate whether to proceed with the change of intended use or renounce the entrepreneurial non-hotel accommodation activity.

5.– Art. 41, paragraph 4, establishes that "[t]he activity of guest rooms, or bed and breakfast, or historic residence carried out by the same subject […] in multiple accommodation facilities within the same building may in no case exceed the number of rooms and the receptive capacity of a single facility.”

This provision refers to the subsequent articles 42, 43, and 45, which, regarding (respectively) guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, and historic residences, set dimensional limits, related to the number of rooms and beds.

The preamble of the challenged regional law identifies the rationale of art. 41, paragraph 4, in a need for "consistency with the sizing of these types of facilities, limited compared to hotel facilities” (point 8).

Art. 41, paragraph 4, is also accompanied by a transitional provision, laid down by art. 144, paragraph 2, and worded as follows: "[u]ntil December 31, 2025, those who manage in an entrepreneurial form two guest room and/or bed and breakfast establishments within the same building on the date of entry into force of this law may continue to carry out this activity in compliance with what is provided for by the previous provisions of Tuscany Regional Law 86/2016.” The clause "[u]ntil December 31, 2025” was added by art. 2 of the Tuscany Regional Law of January 17, 2025, no. 7 (Corrective provisions regarding hiking shelters and guest rooms and bed and breakfasts. Amendments to Tuscany Regional Law 61/2024), autonomously challenged by the President of the Council of Ministers.

In the previous Tuscany Regional Law no. 86 of 2016, with reference to guest rooms and bed and breakfasts, arts. 55, paragraph 3, and 56, paragraph 3, provided that the same subject could manage no more than two establishments within the same building.

Art. 41, paragraph 4, is challenged for violation of arts. 3, 41, and 42 of the Constitution.

5.1.– The issues raised with reference to arts. 3 and 42 of the Constitution are inadmissible due to lack of reasoning: in fact, the violation of the principle of reasonableness and the right to property is merely asserted, without any supporting argument.

Instead, the reasoning regarding the conflict with art. 41 of the Constitution, although very concise, reaches the threshold of admissibility.

5.2.– On the merits, the issue raised with reference to art. 41 of the Constitution is unfounded.

According to the appellant, art. 41, paragraph 4, curtails the freedom of economic initiative as it "precludes the accommodation activity carried out in an entrepreneurial form from finding the organizational and dimensional structure deemed most suitable for wealth creation.”

Firstly, it should be noted that the appellant does not contest the dimensional limits relating to the individual facilities, established by articles 42, 43, and 45, but only the impossibility of exceeding these limits by managing multiple accommodation facilities in the same building. In fact, the classification and discipline of accommodation facilities fall within the regional legislative competence in the matter of tourism. This Court’s Ruling no. 80 of 2012 declared the constitutional illegitimacy, among others, of arts. 8, 9, and 12 of Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011, dealing with hotel, para-hotel, and non-hotel accommodation facilities, as they determined a "centralization of legislative functions ordinarily pertaining to the Regions, by virtue of their residual legislative competence in the matter of tourism” (point 6.6. of the Considered in Law; see also points 6.5. and 6.9.).

The Tuscany Region has therefore provided for different types of accommodation facilities, which reflect the variety of operators and the different needs of users. Some facilities (guest rooms and bed and breakfasts) are characterized by a "family” dimension, to which dimensional limits are inherent, as also shown by the previous state legislation: see the repealed art. 6, ninth paragraph, of Law no. 217 of 1983 and arts. 9, paragraph 8, and 12, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011.

This being established, it is within the discretion of the regional legislator to choose the way to avoid possible circumventions of the individual norms that set the dimensional limits of the different facilities. As seen, Tuscany Regional Law no. 86 of 2016 allowed a margin of flexibility, permitting the same subject to manage no more than two guest rooms or bed and breakfasts in the same building. Art. 41, paragraph 4, of the challenged law, instead, adopted a stricter approach, requiring that the subject managing multiple facilities in the same building comply with the dimensional limits of the single facility.

In this way, art. 41, paragraph 4, aligns with the subsequent articles 42, 43, and 45, pursuing the social utility underlying the limited dimensional configuration of guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, and historic residences. The limitation of entrepreneurial choices is therefore justified in light of art. 41, second paragraph, of the Constitution, as the challenged provision aims to prevent circumventions of the established limits in order to guarantee a diversified supply of accommodation facilities.

6.– Articles 42 to 45 of the challenged regional law regulate the four non-hotel tourist accommodation facilities with the characteristics of a dwelling, listed in art. 41. For all these facilities (guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, holiday homes and apartments, and historic residences), the provisions in question mandate management "in an entrepreneurial form.”

These provisions are also accompanied by transitional regulations. Taking into account that, under Tuscany Regional Law no. 86 of 2016, the activity of guest rooms and bed and breakfasts could also be carried out in a non-entrepreneurial form, art. 144, paragraph 1, of the challenged law provides that "[t]hose who carry out the activity of guest rooms and bed and breakfasts in a non-entrepreneurial form on the date of entry into force of this law may continue to carry out the activity in compliance with what is provided for by the previous provisions of, respectively, article 55, paragraph 4 and article 56, paragraph 4 of Tuscany Regional Law 86/2016.”

The appellant contests the obligation of entrepreneurial management, for violation of art. 117, second paragraph, letter l), and art. 42 of the Constitution.

6.1.– The issue raised with reference to art. 117, second paragraph, letter l), of the Constitution is unfounded.

According to the appellant, the obligation of entrepreneurial management strongly limits "the possibility for the (only) owners of properties in the region to fully enjoy their ownership right, by granting third parties the enjoyment thereof for tourist purposes,” and the content of the right to property falls squarely within the matter of civil law (art. 832 of the Civil Code is cited). For its part, the Region affirms that it has exercised its full legislative competence in the matter of tourism.

This Court has already ruled on "borderline cases” between the matter of tourism and that of civil law (Rulings no. 94 of 2024, no. 84 of 2019, no. 1 of 2016, no. 80 of 2012, and no. 369 of 2008). In particular, Ruling no. 80 of 2012 judged a discipline (contained in art. 12 of Legislative Decree no. 79 of 2011, which defined non-hotel accommodation facilities, also focusing on the entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial nature of the management) substantially corresponding, in terms of subject matter, to that of articles 42 to 45 of the challenged regional law. The provision was declared constitutionally illegitimate by this Court, which recognized the regional competence on the matter, stating that the delegated legislator, by providing for "a classification and discipline of non-hotel accommodation facilities […] carried out a state centralization of functions ordinarily pertaining to the Regions, based on their residual legislative competence in the matter of tourism” (point 6.9. of the Considered in Law).

This assertion can be confirmed here. From an objective point of view, the challenged norms, which establish the obligation of entrepreneurial management, are extraneous to civil law and can be attributed to the matter of tourism, which falls under the full legislative competence of the Regions pursuant to art. 117, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution (among others, Rulings no. 130 of 2024 and no. 123 of 2022).

They discipline the four non-hotel accommodation facilities with the characteristics of a dwelling, setting requirements related to receptive capacity, the "property” location of the facility, the services provided, and, precisely, the form of management. Whoever intends to manage a reception activity must comply with these requirements if they wish to "enter” the regional tourism system, i.e., one of the four classifications provided (guest rooms, bed and breakfasts, holiday homes and apartments, historic residences).

The obligation of entrepreneurial management, therefore, represents a condition pertaining to the modalities of exercising the accommodation facility, the compliance with which is necessary to manage a "classified” facility. The challenged norms are extraneous to civil law because they do not define when the reception activity must be considered carried out in an entrepreneurial form, but refer to the concept of "entrepreneurial form” resulting from state provisions. Furthermore, they do not affect the regulation of contractual activity and its effects: if the accommodation facilities referred to in the challenged norms are managed in a non-entrepreneurial form, no civil consequence is provided for.

Even from the teleological point of view, the provision of the obligation of entrepreneurial management does not intend to regulate relationships between private parties, but to limit the tourist operators subject to tourism governance. It therefore concerns the regional administrative activity of promotion and supervision of tourism.

Regarding the argument put forward by the appellant, the fact that a norm implies a curtailment of the right to property does not in itself bring it within the scope of civil law. It is well known that the limitation of contractual autonomy derives in many cases from the administrative regulation of economic activities, established in the public interest: to remain in the tourism sector, it can be recalled that the discipline of the hotel constraint falls under the regional legislative competence in the matter of tourism and territorial governance (Ruling no. 143 of 2025). In general, this Court has recognized that "the regional legislator can well shape even the faculties pertaining to private individuals” (Ruling no. 175 of 2019), including the content of the right to property (Ruling no. 190 of 2001). Moreover, the limitation of property rights is an intrinsic reflection of urban planning discipline.

In conclusion, the norms in question set an organizational standard to be respected, in order to gain entry into the circuit of classified accommodation facilities.

6.2.– The issue raised with reference to art. 42 of the Constitution is unfounded.

According to the appellant, the choice not to allow non-entrepreneurial management of non-hotel accommodation facilities deprives owners, "in a completely disproportionate and unreasonable manner,” of the possibility of deriving income from their asset.

In reality, the appellant fails to consider the fact that the obligation imposed by articles 42 to 45 does not absolutely deprive owners (who do not wish to submit to it) of the possibility of letting the property for tourist purposes, as tourist letting in a non-entrepreneurial form is provided for by national and regional legislation (art. 60 of the challenged regional law), subject to the limits introduced by the municipalities pursuant to art. 59, autonomously challenged (point 7).

This being established, it must be specified that the obligation of entrepreneurial management essentially entails three consequences: a) the obligation to register in the business register; b) the obligation to open a VAT number; c) the application of rules on business income taxation, instead of those on land income taxation.

Therefore, the challenged provisions entail an interference in the free choices of owners, although less than what is alleged in the appeal. It is therefore necessary to verify the possibility of justifying the provisions in question under art. 42, second paragraph, of the Constitution, which allows property to be limited "with the aim of ensuring its social function.”

From point 8 of the preamble to Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, it emerges that the provision for entrepreneurial management of non-hotel accommodation facilities has the "aim of qualifying the hospitality offer” by these facilities. From the preparatory works, the objective of including only tourism enterprises in the regional tourism system and subjecting accommodation facilities to the same rules also emerge (see the explanatory report of the bill and the report of the session of the Regional Council of December 20, 2024).

In addition, the challenged norms pursue the objective of limiting the proliferation of non-hotel accommodation facilities. It is known, in fact, that so-called home sharing, which has spread thanks to the creation of online platforms, on the one hand represents an opportunity for income integration for numerous families, but on the other hand has contributed to phenomena of overtourism in various cities, which have produced negative "externalities.” Firstly, there has been a contraction of available accommodation for workers and non-resident students, with a consequent inflationary effect on the cost of housing itself. Moreover, overtourism can lead to "the urban transformation of entire neighborhoods and centers, with significant repercussions also on the management of local public services” (Ruling no. 94 of 2024).

The purpose of limiting these effects was expressly considered worthy by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in a judgment concerning French urban planning legislation that requires prior municipal authorization for the change of intended use and the exercise of letting activities against payment of furnished premises to transient customers: "a national regulation which, for reasons aimed at ensuring a sufficient supply of affordable long-term rental housing, subjects certain letting activities against payment of furnished premises […] to a prior authorization scheme applicable in certain municipalities where the pressure on rental prices is particularly high, is justified by an imperative reason of general interest relating to the fight against the scarcity of rental housing and is proportionate to the objective pursued, since the latter cannot be achieved by a less restrictive measure, particularly as a subsequent check would be too late to be truly effective” (Grand Chamber, Ruling of September 22, 2020, joined cases C-724/18 and C-727/18, Cali Apartments, point 75).

Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 11, 2024, on the collection and sharing of data relating to short-term accommodation letting services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, also acknowledges the problems caused by short-term rentals and the public policies aimed at containing them: recitals 1 and 4 and art. 2, paragraph 2.

Furthermore, from the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court no. 64 of March 13, 2025, concerning the Decree-Law of the Government of Catalonia no. 3 of 2023, it appears that the limitation of the designation for tourist use of "properties that have been classified by urban planning as habitual residences is a necessary measure to avoid damage to the urban environment, particularly to protect the model of the city envisaged by urban planning” (point 5 of the reasoning).

Moreover, as early as 1975, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected the issues raised, for infringement of the right to property, with reference to a law which provided for the possibility of establishing that, "in municipalities where access to housing for the population under adequate conditions is particularly jeopardized, living space may be used for purposes other than housing only with the authorization of the authority designated by the government of the Land” (Order of the BVerfG of February 4, 1975, 2 BvL 5/74).

In conclusion, in the matter at hand, correcting "market failures” is among the options legitimately available to the legislator. The other objective pursued by the challenged norms also proves worthy, i.e., to include only "professional” facilities in the regional tourism system (with related obligations and advantages: see point 7), to the benefit of users and fair competition among operators.

Once the social function of the challenged norms is established, it is necessary to verify that they are not affected by illogicality or disproportion with respect to the objective pursued (Rulings no. 143 of 2025, no. 119 and no. 5 of 2023). The provision of the obligation of entrepreneurial management is capable of passing this test: on the one hand, as seen, the pursued objectives (in particular, that of limiting the effects of overtourism) appear to be of particular relevance, so much so that the aforementioned Regulation (EU) no. 2024/1028 aims to support national administrations in developing public tourism policies aimed at limiting the spread of "short-term” lettings, even if considered liberalized "services” under Directive no. 123/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006, on services in the internal market (see the aforementioned CJEU Ruling, Grand Chamber, Cali Apartments, point 34); on the other hand, the challenged norms are included – as stated – in a framework that also contemplates non-entrepreneurial tourist lettings, with the resulting possibility for the owner to avoid the obligation in question, even while letting their property for tourist purposes.

7.– Finally, the issues relating to art. 59, concerning short-term tourist lettings, must be examined.

7.1.– A brief reconstruction of the relevant regulatory context is appropriate beforehand.

As already mentioned, the challenged regional law regulates, under Title II, non-hotel accommodation facilities with the characteristics of a dwelling and, under Title III, "Tourist Lettings.”

In state legislation, tourist lettings first appeared in art. 1, paragraph 2, of Law no. 431 of December 9, 1998 (Discipline of lettings and release of properties used for residential purposes), but the distinction between these and "classified” accommodation facilities was introduced (after a fleeting mention in art. 1, letter f, of the Interministerial Decree of September 13, 2002, concerning "Implementation of the agreement between the State, the Regions, and the Autonomous Provinces on the principles for the harmonization, enhancement, and development of the tourism system”) by art. 13-quater, paragraph 4, of Decree-Law no. 34 of April 30, 2019 (Urgent measures for economic growth and resolution of specific crisis situations), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 58 of June 28, 2019. This distinction was then confirmed by art. 13-ter of Decree-Law no. 145 of October 18, 2023 (Urgent measures in economic and fiscal matters, in favor of local authorities, for the protection of labor and for urgent needs), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 191 of December 15, 2023; paragraphs 7 and 8 of this provision indicate that tourist lettings can also be managed in an entrepreneurial form.

Given the regional competence on the classification of accommodation facilities, the distinguishing criterion between non-hotel accommodation facilities and tourist lettings cannot be identified in general, but only with reference to a single region.

Examining Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, it appears that non-hotel accommodation facilities are fully part of the regional tourism system, which implies, on the one hand, the need to comply with certain requirements and subjection to articulated administrative powers, and on the other hand, the possibility of benefiting from the advantages offered by the regional system itself, i.e., possible provisions and "services offered by the public system of tourism governance” (as per the explanatory report of the bill). Tourist lettings, on the other hand, fall under a semi-private regime, in the sense that: a) they are subject to structural hygiene and safety requirements but not to the requirements established by law and regulation for accommodation facilities (arts. 41, paragraph 2, and 58); b) non-entrepreneurial ones are not subject to SCIA but only to the communication referred to in art. 60; c) the holder of non-entrepreneurial lettings does not need to have any subjective requirement, while entrepreneurial lettings only need the requirements referred to in art. 61, paragraph 2; all this without prejudice to the possibility of the limits referred to in art. 59 (point 7.1.).

Since art. 61 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024 also provides for entrepreneurial tourist lettings (in implementation of the aforementioned art. 13-ter, paragraphs 7 and 8, of Decree-Law no. 145 of 2023, as converted), the distinction between non-hotel accommodation facilities and tourist lettings, in Tuscany, consists of the lack of additional services in the latter: this is clear from art. 63 of the challenged law, which provides – for those who carry out a tourist letting – an administrative sanction "in the event that accessory or complementary services typical of accommodation facilities are provided.” Furthermore, articles 42 to 45, which regulate non-hotel accommodation facilities, provide for the possibility of offering services for each, variously regulated.

7.2.– This being established, it should be noted that, in relation to tourist lettings, the regional law challenged dedicates some provisions to all Tuscan municipalities (arts. 58 and 60 to 64) and, instead, directs the discipline of art. 59 (Criteria and limits for the exercise of the short-term tourist letting activity) to municipalities with high tourist density and provincial capital municipalities.

These bodies "may, with their own regulation, identify zones or areas where specific criteria and limits are established for the exercise, for tourist purposes, of the short-term letting activities referred to in article 4, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law no. 50 of April 24, 2017 […] exercised also in an entrepreneurial form” (paragraph 1).

Paragraph 2 lays down articulated rules aimed at guiding the regulatory power of municipalities, and paragraph 3 indicates some possible criteria and limits that may be introduced by them.

Paragraph 4 provides that, "[i]n municipalities equipped with the regulation referred to in paragraph 1, the exercise of the short-term letting activity, for the zones or areas concerned, is subject to the issuance to the lessor of an authorization valid for five years for each real estate unit intended to be let. The Municipality may establish a maximum limit for authorizations for certain homogeneous zones.”

Paragraphs 6 and 7 introduce two mitigating factors to the restrictive discipline of short-term tourist lettings: on the one hand, it is specified that "[l]etting of a portion of the real estate unit in which the lessor has their residence, as well as of a single room within the same real estate unit, remains permitted, without prior authorization,” on the other hand, a transitional discipline is introduced aimed at protecting pre-existing situations.

In implementation of art. 59, the Municipality of Florence approved Resolution of May 5, 2025, no. 27, concerning the Regulation for short-term tourist lettings (currently the subject of a challenge before the Regional Administrative Court for Tuscany).

It should be noted that a similar provision (concerning, however, only the city of Rome Capital) is contained in art. 5, paragraph 3-ter, of the Lazio Regional Law of August 6, 2007, no. 13, concerning "Organization of the Lazio tourism system. Amendments to the Regional Law of August 6, 1999, no. 14 (Organization of functions at the regional and local level for the realization of administrative decentralization) and subsequent amendments,” added by art. 4, paragraph 1, letter h), of the Lazio Regional Law of May 24, 2022, no. 8, concerning "Amendments to the Regional Law of August 6, 2007, no. 13 (Organization of the Lazio tourism system. Amendments to the Regional Law of August 6, 1999, no. 14 ‘Organization of functions at the regional and local level for the realization of administrative decentralization’ and subsequent amendments) and subsequent amendments.”

The particular situation of the Municipality of Venice also induced the state legislator to intervene, with art. 37-bis of Decree-Law no. 50 of 2022, as converted. It provides that, "[i]n order to promote the increase of the supply of long-term residential rental housing and the residential character in the historic center as well as to protect the historical-artistic and environmental heritage of world importance […] the Municipality of Venice may: a) supplement its urban planning instruments with specific regulatory provisions to define, in a differentiated manner for homogeneous areas, with particular regard to the historic center and the islands of the Venetian lagoon, the maximum limits and prerequisites for the allocation of residential properties to short-term letting activities […]”

The issue of regulating short-term tourist lettings has also been addressed at the administrative level, especially in regions comprising cities that are strong tourist attractions. The Municipality of Venice intervened by introducing specific limits in its building regulation, approved by City Council Resolution of December 13, 2019, no. 70 (arts. 42 and 63). In relation to these norms, the Regional Administrative Court for Veneto, Second Section, denied their relevance to civil law, attributing them to urban planning and building discipline and emphasizing the goal of limiting the negative effects of the massive tourist flow concerning Venice (Rulings of July 8, 2023, no. 1022, and December 27, 2022, no. 1961). The Municipality of Bologna also intervened with Resolution of November 11, 2024, amending its building regulation and adopting a variant to the town plan in order to regulate tourist lettings. In particular, the so-called "minimum accommodation,” i.e., the requirement of a minimum surface area of 50 sq m for tourist use of residential properties in the historic city, was introduced (to ensure the availability of small accommodations for non-resident workers and students). These norms were challenged before the Regional Administrative Court for Emilia-Romagna, Second Section, which rejected the appeal with Ruling of March 31, 2025, no. 308, noting that the phenomenon of tourist lettings is also attributable to territorial governance, so that, "where it is functional to the orderly planning of the territory, the regulation of this phenomenon falls within the legislative power of the Regions, and, consequently, falls within the administrative competences assigned by law to the Municipalities.”

7.3.– In reconstructing the constitutional system of the regional State, it must be borne in mind that a guiding principle is that of subsidiarity. It "excludes an abstract model of function attribution, but instead requires that, for each specific function, the most appropriate territorial level be chosen, in relation to the nature of the function, the local context and also the more general context in which its allocation takes place,” considering appropriateness as correspondence "to the best way to realize constitutional principles” (Ruling no. 192 of 2024, point 4.1. of the Considered in Law). With regard to legislative function, the principle of subsidiarity is not intended as a tool to nullify the constitutional division of powers, but as an interpretative criterion that may lead to favoring the reasons for unity or autonomy: under the first aspect, Ruling no. 192 of 2024 carried out a systematic interpretation of art. 116, third paragraph, of the Constitution, using the principle of subsidiarity to link differentiated autonomy to the principle of unity, with the effect of limiting possible conferrals to specific functions; under the second aspect, in some cases this Court has held that a specific discipline was validly adopted by the region also in consideration of a greater appropriateness to realize constitutional principles in the specifically considered situation (Rulings no. 185 and no. 16 of 2024).

In the case at hand, given that art. 59 is not attributable to civil law either from an objective or a teleological perspective (see the following point 7.4.), it is appropriate to note that the problems posed by short-term tourist lettings are concentrated in certain areas of the territory and present different peculiarities in each of them. The regional and local levels, therefore, are generally more adequate to adopt the administrative discipline aimed at reconciling the interests of owners and users with the opposing interests (of a social and urban planning nature). In other state legal systems (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Spain), there is a link between the discipline of tourist lettings and territorial governance, with the consequent provision of regulatory and authorization powers for local authorities.

The aforementioned Regulation (EU) no. 2024/1028 also expressly mentions norms – in addition to national ones – "regional or local that discipline access to short-term accommodation letting services” (art. 2, paragraph 2, letter a). The document from the European Commission, Transition pathway for tourism: Taking stock of progress by 2023, of 2024, acknowledges that "[t]he need of local authorities to have tools to monitor and regulate platform-based short-term rentals has grown alongside the intensifying discussions about overtourism in city centres” (point 2.1.1.).

7.4.– According to the appellant, art. 59 violates, firstly, art. 117, second paragraph, letter l), of the Constitution, as it encroaches upon the exclusive state legislative competence in matters of civil law, by allowing limitations on the rights of real estate owners.

The question is unfounded.

From an objective point of view, art. 59 is attributable, firstly, to the matter of tourism, as it provides for the possibility of introducing a more stringent administrative regime than the ordinary one for the start and exercise of short-term tourist letting activity (paragraph 4, which contemplates five-year authorization). This Court has already clarified that the discipline of administrative procedures relating to tourist activities falls within the residual legislative competence of the Regions (Ruling no. 80 of 2012, point 6.13. of the Considered in Law). In essence, the Tuscany Region has autonomously implemented art. 9 of Directive no. 123/2006/EC, based on art. 117, fifth paragraph, of the Constitution and the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Justice Cali Apartments.

The challenged norm also affects territorial governance, as it provides that municipalities may regulate the intended uses of specific zones of their territory.

From a teleological perspective, art. 59 is attributable to the matter of tourism, whose "sustainable” exercise it seeks to ensure, and to that of territorial governance, because the objective of "guaranteeing a sufficient and economically accessible supply of accommodation intended for long-term letting” (paragraph 2), in addition to satisfying social demands (certainly not extraneous to regional legislative competence), results in a rational organization of the territory, which must also preserve spaces intended for residential use in the most "attractive” areas. Furthermore, given the objective of "pursuing the correct tourist enjoyment of the historical, artistic, and cultural heritage” (art. 59, paragraph 2), the norm also relates to the "protection […] of cultural assets” (art. 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution) and the "enhancement of cultural assets” (art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution).

It is appropriate to recall that this Court upheld, with Ruling no. 94 of 2024, a provision of an Aosta Valley law concerning precisely short-term tourist lettings, attesting that even in relation to these "the regional legislator has an area of intervention, which becomes relevant particularly with reference to the field of tourism, as well as that of territorial governance and urban planning.” The Court thus excluded that, unlike non-hotel accommodation facilities, the discipline of short-term tourist lettings falls within civil law. In fact, already in Ruling no. 84 of 2019 it was stated that "[t]he fundamental assumption from which the appellant proceeds, according to which the discipline of holiday homes is to be ascribed entirely to the residual competence in the matter of tourism and that of tourist lettings to civil law, is not in line with the case law of this Court, according to which the touristic aspects also of the latter fall under the residual competence of the Regions (Ruling no. 80 of 2012), while the regulation of the contractual activity and its effects belongs to civil law” (point 4). According to Ruling no. 94 of 2024, the touristic aspects "include all administrative fulfillments, provided they are antecedent and external to the contract as such.”

As seen, the approach followed by this Court finds confirmation both at the comparative level and in common case law (points 7.2. and 7.3.).

The appellant challenges the "local” limitation of the proprietary power of owners. In light of what has been highlighted (point 6.1.), while it is up to civil law to directly regulate the contractual autonomy of private parties, the indirect limitation thereof is a typical effect of innumerable administrative law provisions, which regulate and subject private activities to conditions, in order to pursue various public interests (see, for example, Legislative Decree no. 222 of 2016).

If the limitation of the right of owners to use the property for tourist letting purposes, in certain city zones characterized by overtourism, fell within the matter of civil law, the discipline should be dictated directly by the state legislator: which would clearly be incongruous. In fact, as seen in point 7.2., art. 37-bis of Decree-Law no. 50 of 2022, as converted, provided for the regulatory-urban planning intervention of the Municipality of Venice in order to set maximum limits for the allocation of residential properties to short-term tourist lettings. The very local character of the norms limiting tourist lettings confirms their extraneousness to civil law, whose attribution to the exclusive legislative competence of the State is based – in addition to the "vocation” of the regions (Ruling no. 7 of 1956) – on the necessary uniform discipline of relationships between private parties.

In conclusion, art. 59 dictates administrative discipline that predominantly intersects the matters of territorial governance and tourism, as it provides for a municipal regulatory power – which concerns an economic activity of a tourist nature and is reflected in the organization of the territory – and establishes a (possible) authorization administrative regime.

Owners, on the one hand, can challenge the adopted regulations before the administrative judge, and on the other hand, can use their asset in other ways: either by starting a non-hotel accommodation facility (in an entrepreneurial form) or by addressing a non-tourist clientele. The designation of a residential property for tourist letting cannot be considered an essential element of the right to property.

7.5.– According to the appellant, art. 59 also violates art. 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, as it illegitimately interprets public interests reserved for the exclusive legislative power of the State in matters of protection of cultural heritage.

The question is unfounded.

Firstly, the aim of "pursuing the correct tourist enjoyment of the historical heritage” (art. 59, paragraph 2) is attributable not only to protection but also to the "enhancement of cultural assets,” which falls under concurrent legislative competence (art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution).

Furthermore, as seen (point 7.4.), by examining art. 59 from both an objective and teleological perspective, the full regional competencies (tourism) or concurrent ones (territorial governance and enhancement of cultural assets) prevail over the protection of cultural assets.

It can also be observed that regions, when exercising the legislative competencies assigned to them by the Constitution, can also take into account the need to protect the environment and cultural heritage, given that art. 9 of the Constitution assigns the task of protecting the "historical and artistic heritage of the Nation” to the "Republic,” which also includes the regions (art. 114, first paragraph, of the Constitution). State legislative competence would be violated if the regions pursued the objective of protection outside the exercise of one of their own competencies or by lowering the standards set by the State.

7.6.– Finally, according to the appellant, art. 59 violates art. 3 of the Constitution, as the challenged provision is "also seriously contradictory,” given that the elements listed in letters b), c), d), and e) of paragraph 2 have no bearing on the issue of the availability of an adequate number of affordable accommodations.

The question is unfounded.

Art. 59, paragraph 2, indicates three objectives for municipal regulations and provides that the limiting criteria must take into account, in particular, a series of elements. The latter do not appear to be inconsistent with the three objectives set for the regulations. In particular, letters a) and f) refer to elements clearly linked to the availability of accommodation, and letter c) does not appear extraneous to it either. Letters a) to d) recall elements connected to the other two objectives: "pursuing the correct tourist enjoyment of the historical, artistic, and cultural heritage, the preservation of the social fabric.”

The contradiction denounced by the appellant is therefore nonexistent.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

reserving for a separate ruling the decision on the further questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the appeal indicated in the heading;

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 41, paragraph 3, of the Law of the Tuscany Region of December 31, 2024, no. 61 (Consolidated Act on Tourism), raised, with reference to arts. 41 and 42 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

2) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 41, paragraph 4, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to arts. 3 and 42 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

3) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 22, paragraph 6, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to arts. 3 and 41 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

4) declares unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 41, paragraph 3, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to art. 3 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

5) declares unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 41, paragraph 4, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to art. 41 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

6) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of articles 42 to 45 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to arts. 42 and 117, second paragraph, letter l), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

7) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of art. 59 of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to arts. 3, 117, second paragraph, letters l) and s), of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading;

8) declares unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 144, paragraph 3, of the Tuscany Regional Law no. 61 of 2024, raised, with reference to art. 3 of the Constitution, by the President of the Council of Ministers, with the appeal indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 8, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on December 16, 2025