JUDGMENT NO. 199
YEAR 2025
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the constitutional legitimacy trial concerning Article 1 of Decree-Law of September 21, 2021, No. 127 (Urgent measures to ensure safe public and private work through the extension of the scope of the COVID-19 Green Certificate and the strengthening of the screening system), converted, with amendments, into Law of November 19, 2021, No. 165, introducing Article 9-quinquies of Decree-Law of April 22, 2021, No. 52 (Urgent measures for the gradual resumption of economic and social activities while respecting the requirements for containing the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic), converted, with amendments, into Law of June 17, 2021, No. 87; Article 1 of Decree-Law of January 7, 2022, No. 1 (Urgent measures to address the COVID-19 emergency, particularly in workplaces, schools, and higher education institutions), converted, with amendments, into Law of March 4, 2022, No. 18, introducing Articles 4-quater and 4-quinquies of Decree-Law of April 1, 2021, No. 44 (Urgent measures for the containment of the COVID-19 epidemic, concerning SARS-CoV-2 vaccinations, justice, and public competitions), converted, with amendments, into Law of May 28, 2021, No. 76, promoted by the Ordinary Court of Catania, acting as a Labour Judge, in the proceedings between E.A. L., G.B.R. C. and the Department of Infrastructure and Transport of the Sicilian Region, with an order of February 17, 2025, registered under no. 74 of the 2025 ordinary registers and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 18, special series, of 2025.
Having noted the intervention act of S. G.;
having heard the Reporting Judge Maria Alessandra Sandulli in the deliberative session of November 17, 2025;
deliberated in the deliberative session of November 17, 2025.
Facts Considered
1.‒ By order of February 17, 2025 (ord. reg. no. 74 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Catania, acting as a Labour Judge, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, 32, first and second paragraphs, and 36 of the Constitution, regarding Article 1 of Decree-Law of September 21, 2021, No. 127 (Urgent measures to ensure safe public and private work through the extension of the scope of the COVID-19 Green Certificate and the strengthening of the screening system), converted, with amendments, into Law of November 19, 2021, No. 165, "insofar as it provides that, ‘for the purposes of access to workplaces, within the national territory, … the possession and exhibition, upon request, of one of the COVID-19 Green Certificates for vaccination, recovery, or testing is mandatory’,” as well as insofar as it provides that the public employee without a green certificate "is considered unjustifiably absent until the aforementioned certification is presented” and, in any case, no later than the "cessation of the state of emergency,” and that "for the days of unjustified absence referred to in the first period, remuneration or any other compensation or emolument, however named, shall not be due”; and concerning Article 1 of Decree-Law of January 7, 2022, No. 1 (Urgent measures to address the COVID-19 emergency, particularly in workplaces, schools, and higher education institutions), converted, with amendments, into Law of March 4, 2022, No. 18, "insofar as it provides that the vaccination obligation for the prevention of Covid-19 ‘applies’ to all citizens ‘who have reached the age of fifty,’ that all public and private workers over fifty ‘to whom the vaccination obligation applies’ ‘for access to workplaces within the national territory, must possess and are required to exhibit one of the COVID-19 Green Certificates for vaccination or recovery,’ and that workers over fifty subject to the vaccination obligation, if they ‘communicate that they are not in possession of the COVID-19 Green Certificate referred to in paragraph 1 or are found to be without the said certificate upon accessing the workplace,’ may not access ‘the workplace’ and ‘are considered unjustifiably absent,’ and that ‘for the days of unjustified absence…, remuneration or any other compensation or emolument, however named, shall not be due.’”
2.‒ The referring judge reports that the two claimants in the main proceedings are permanent employees of the Sicilian Region, serving at the Provincial Office of Civil Motorization in Catania, who, from October 15, 2021, in implementation of Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted (which introduced Article 9-quinquies into Decree-Law of April 22, 2021, No. 52, entitled "Urgent measures for the gradual resumption of economic and social activities while respecting the requirements for containing the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic,” converted, with amendments, into Law of June 17, 2021, No. 87), were prevented from accessing their workplace because they lacked one of the required COVID-19 Green Certificates attesting to vaccination, recovery, or the performance of a rapid or molecular antigen test (so-called basic green pass).
The impediment to access was maintained with the entry into force of the vaccination obligation for those over fifty, established by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted (which introduced Articles 4-quater and 4-quinquies into Decree-Law of April 1, 2021, No. 44, entitled "Urgent measures for the containment of the COVID-19 epidemic, concerning SARS-CoV-2 vaccinations, justice, and public competitions,” converted, with amendments, into Law of May 28, 2021, No. 76), since the claimants themselves did not intend to undergo vaccination and, consequently, could not access the workplace as they lacked the required certification.
Since the employee lacking the basic green pass and, after the introduction of the vaccination obligation, the employee over fifty lacking the enhanced green pass, could not access the workplace and was consequently considered unjustifiably absent, with loss of remuneration and any other compensation or emolument, the claimants, being over fifty and lacking the basic green pass and subsequently the enhanced green pass, as specified in the order, were considered unjustifiably absent from October 15, 2021, without entitlement to remuneration or any other emolument linked to the employment relationship.
With a claim filed on March 26, 2022, the two workers therefore requested, on an urgent basis, "to be reinstated in their jobs, with payment of the remuneration due from the date of exclusion from the workplace until effective reinstatement, or, subsidiarily, an order for payment of a suitable subsistence allowance, pending the final resolution of the proceedings.” On the merits, alleging the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned provisions for violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 32 and 36 of the Constitution, they requested the ascertainment of their "right to be immediately reinstated in their jobs and to receive payment of remuneration, and any other emolument however named, including the payment of pension contributions directly to the social security institution, commencing from October 15, 2021, or, in a purely subsidiary manner, commencing from February 15, 2022, and until effective reinstatement, with subsequent conviction of the defendant party to the immediate reinstatement of the workers and payment of the claimed sums,” and, always subsidiarily, the ascertainment of their "right, for the period between October 15, 2021, and the effective resumption of service, to at least receive a so-called subsistence allowance, equal to 50% of the current remuneration, or such other sum, higher or lower, as may be deemed equitable and just, plus family allowances.”
At the hearing set for the consideration of the precautionary request, the claimants withdrew the urgent request, acknowledging that they had been readmitted to service on May 2, 2022.
Following the hearing set for the consideration of the merits, the Court adopted the order mentioned above, by which it referred to this Court the already indicated questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted, and Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, 32, first and second paragraphs, and 36 of the Constitution.
3.‒ Excluding the possibility of a constitutionally oriented interpretation, the referring judge deems the proposed questions relevant on the assumption that "only if the provisions whose constitutional scrutiny is requested were deemed illegitimate, insofar as they impose the exclusion of the claimants from the working context and the consequent loss of their right to the related remuneration, including the payment of a subsistence allowance or any other welfare emolument, could the plaintiffs’ claims be upheld.”
4.‒ Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring judge expounds the alleged reasons for the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions in a unified manner, observing that "the application prerequisites (non-vaccination) are analogous and the foreseen consequences are analogous, in one case for non-compliance with the vaccination obligation and in the other for failure to undergo vaccination […] namely, substantial exclusion from the world of work, with the consequent loss of the related economic treatment,” and that "it is therefore possible to consider that the aforementioned Article [1] (as well as Articles 2 and 3) of Decree-Law No. 127/2021 already contained a surreptitious obligation to vaccinate, placing workers before the unavoidable alternative of getting vaccinated (if not recovered or exempt, or, as we shall see, if they did not intend to undergo testing every two days) or being temporarily removed from their workplace.”
That being established, the order first addresses the questions relating to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 36 of the Constitution, noting, first of all, that Article 2 of the Constitution, by providing special protection to the individual, both as a single person and within the social formations where their personality develops (which include workplaces), "does not seem to allow the adoption of measures which, due to their intransigence and rigor, might go so far as to violate human dignity, a circumstance that certainly occurs when, as provided by the challenged norms, access to the workplace and to any form of remuneration, normally intended for the sustenance of oneself and one's family, is precluded to that person” (reference is made to this Court’s Judgment No. 137 of 2021, which declared the unconstitutionality of Article 2, paragraph 61, of Law of June 28, 2012, No. 92, entitled "Provisions on labour market reform from a growth perspective,” insofar as it provided for the revocation of certain welfare benefits such as unemployment benefit, social allowance, social pension, and invalidity pension, even for those convicted of certain crimes who serve their sentence under a regime alternative to prison detention).
As a result of the challenged provisions, in fact, workers over fifty who failed to comply with the vaccination obligation, and, before the introduction of the said obligation, workers without the basic green pass, would have lost "any possibility of meeting their basic life needs, being unable to rely on any form of economic support, and, even before and more significantly, find themselves deprived of the fundamental right to the free expression of their personality in the workplace.” The provisions under review would therefore violate the right of unvaccinated workers to dignity and personal identity, understood as the freedom to self-determine in private life.
In particular, regarding the vaccination obligation, the referring judge states that it is obvious that, by being unable to frequent the workplace, maintain relationships with colleagues and users, and enhance their professional qualifications in the field, "unvaccinated workers, forced to stay home in conditions of complete inactivity, have suffered a serious and persistent injury to their sphere of personal dignity and moral integrity, ending up being unjustifiably ghettoized and discriminated against compared to the general body of workers, and this as a result of a choice—that of not getting vaccinated—which is free and conscious, constituting neither a crime nor a disciplinary offense.” Precluding "the unvaccinated worker from the possibility of performing the work activity (instead of applying other solutions, e.g.: subjecting the worker to a strict control system via virus detection tests; assignment to different duties, where possible, etc.)” would also mean depriving them of "a minimum sustenance to meet their basic needs […] to the excessive detriment of the value of human dignity, with possible violation, in addition to Article 2, also of Article 3 of the Constitution.”
The provision introduced by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted, which forced unvaccinated workers (including workers over fifty before the introduction of the vaccination obligation), if lacking proof of recovery, to undergo periodic testing (every two days) via "swab,” thus burdening them with an expense that "besides causing inevitable physical discomfort and suffering (caused by the repeated insertion of the appropriate device into the nostrils or pharynx) and taking up time from ordinary personal occupations, over time entailed a considerable economic outlay for those concerned,” would also be damaging to personal dignity.
4.1.‒ On another and connected ground, Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted, violates the principle of reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution, given that the legislature, in sanctioning a general and indiscriminate vaccination obligation for all subjects over fifty, anchored it exclusively to an age threshold and not to actual needs for the protection of individual health and the prevention of virus spread, "without any objective health reasons being understandable for which a healthy 50-year-old person was required to be vaccinated, while a frail, immunosuppressed subject of 49 years of age, conversely, was exempt from the related obligation,” and "without making any reasonable distinction between workers assigned to duties involving constant contact with the public of users (in relation to which containment needs for the risk of contagion could abstractly be hypothesized) and workers (such as the present claimants appear to be, assigned to a Motorization office) engaged in duties not involving such risks.”
4.2.‒ Regarding the alleged violation of Article 32, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the referring judge observes that in the present case the conditions required by this Court for imposing a mandatory health treatment, such as the vaccination provided for by the provisions under review, are lacking, as it neither preserves the health status of those who have not undergone it nor excludes negative consequences on the health status of those who have resorted to it. As for the first condition, the order notes that it is "acquired data that vaccination has not prevented the further circulation of the virus, vaccinated subjects being able to contract and transmit the infection equally,” and that "at most, it has prevented, for some frail subjects, hospitalization, admission to intensive care units, and death.” As for the second condition, it deems that vaccination has "produced, in those who have undergone it, injurious consequences that appear greater and more significant than those normal and inherent in any health or pharmacological treatment and, therefore, not ‘tolerable,’” it being "daily news that young and healthy people, sometimes even famous athletes and sportsmen, are affected by ‘sudden illnesses’ that cause their impairment or, in some cases, death” (reference is made to the annual report of the Italian Medicines Agency, AIFA, on the safety of anti-COVID-19 vaccines for the period December 27, 2020-December 26, 2022, and a study published in the journal Vaccine on April 2, 2024). Instead of adopting coercive and generalized measures, it would have been, in its opinion, more reasonable "to rely on the principle of personal self-responsibility, trusting in the prudence and caution of those affected by the disease who should have avoided leaving home and having contact with strangers,” as well as on the "principle of vaccination recommendation,” according to which "public authorities, through vaccination campaigns and other appropriate information initiatives, should attempt to suggest and advise citizens, convincing the mass of patients to voluntarily and consciously undergo vaccination, after having freely reflected upon and formed their own opinion on the matter.”
4.3.‒ With specific reference to Article 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution, the referring judge observes that "the extreme and draconian consequences imposed by law for workers not subjected to vaccination (exclusion from the workplace, marginalization from the working context, absence from work, deprivation of any emolument related to the employment relationship), with the necessary clamor created in the eyes of colleagues and users, have caused in the interested parties the injury of their right to privacy and to the maintenance of their working and social life,” in contrast with the constitutional provision which prohibits laws concerning mandatory health treatments from "violating the limits imposed by respect for the human person.”
4.4.‒ Lastly, the order notes that the impossibility for the unvaccinated worker to access even minimum forms of assistance, such as a subsistence allowance, would cause a further violation of Article 3 of the Constitution due to the violation of the principle of equality and reasonableness, since it results in the deprivation of those support measures "provided even in cases of precautionary suspension of the worker, where the latter has committed (or is suspected of having committed) certain acts constituting a crime, capable of also leading to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions” (various provisions are cited in support, including Article 82 of Presidential Decree of January 10, 1957, No. 3, entitled "Consolidated Text of Provisions Concerning the Statute of State Civil Servants,” and Article 76 of the Regional Labour Collective Agreement of the Sicilian Region of May 9, 2019, concerning the legal triennium 2016-2018).
5.‒ The parties to the referring proceedings did not appear before this Court, nor did the President of the Council of Ministers intervene in the proceedings.
S. G. filed an intervention act, stating that they are in the same position as the claimants in the referring proceedings (over fifty, unvaccinated, barred from work and deprived of remuneration and any other emolument) and that they have initiated a similar proceeding before the Ordinary Court of Velletri, raising the same questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the Court of Catania. In view of the deliberative session, the intervenor filed a late brief requesting that the proceedings be held in a public hearing.
The Droit Uniforme ASBL, the Legal Confederation for Human Rights, and the association Avvocati liberi - United Lawyers for Freedom filed written opinions, pursuant to Article 6 of the Supplementary Provisions for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, denouncing the unconstitutionality of the provisions under review also on grounds beyond those raised in the referring order. The opinions were admitted by Presidential Decree of October 14, 2025.
Considered in Law
1.‒ The Court of Catania, acting as a Labour Judge, with the order cited in the heading (ord. reg. no. 74 of 2025), raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, 32, first and second paragraphs, and 36 of the Constitution, regarding Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted, and Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted.
The first provision introduced Article 9-quinquies into Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021, as converted, which, as far as relevant for the purposes of these proceedings, stipulates that "[f]rom October 15, 2021, until December 31, 2021, the date of cessation of the state of emergency, in order to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection, personnel of the public administrations referred to in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree of March 30, 2001, No. 165, […], for the purposes of access to workplaces, within the national territory, where the aforementioned personnel carry out their work activities, the possession and exhibition, upon request, of the COVID-19 green certificate referred to in Article 9, paragraph 2, is mandatory,” and, in paragraph 6, that "[p]ersonnel referred to in paragraph 1, in the event that they communicate that they are not in possession of the COVID-19 green certificate or if they are found to be without the said certificate upon accessing the workplace, in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace, shall be considered unjustifiably absent until the presentation of the aforementioned certificate and, in any case, no later than December 31, 2021, the date of cessation of the state of emergency, without disciplinary consequences and with the right to preserve the employment relationship. For the days of unjustified absence referred to in the first period, remuneration or any other compensation or emolument, however named, shall not be due.”
The second provision, as far as relevant for the purposes of these proceedings, introduced Articles 4-quater and 4-quinquies into Decree-Law No. 44 of 2021, as converted, providing that "[f]rom the date of entry into force of this provision until June 15, 2022, in order to protect public health and maintain adequate safety conditions in the provision of care and assistance services, the vaccination obligation for the prevention of SARS-CoV-2 infection, referred to in Article 3-ter, applies to Italian citizens and citizens of other European Union Member States residing in the territory of the State, as well as to foreigners referred to in Articles 34 and 35 of the consolidated text of provisions concerning the discipline of immigration and rules on the condition of foreigners, of Legislative Decree of July 25, 1998, No. 286, who have reached the age of fifty, without prejudice to what is provided for in Articles 4, 4-bis and 4-ter” (Article 4-quater, paragraph 1); that "[f]rom February 15, 2022, subjects referred to in Articles 9-quinquies, paragraphs 1 and 2, 9-sexies, paragraphs 1 and 4, and 9-septies, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Decree-Law of April 22, 2021, No. 52, converted, with amendments, by Law of June 17, 2021, No. 87, to whom the vaccination obligation referred to in Article 4-quater of this Decree applies, for access to workplaces within the national territory, must possess and are required to exhibit one of the COVID-19 Green Certificates for vaccination or recovery referred to in Article 9, paragraph 2, letters a), b) and c-bis), of Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021” (Article 4-quinquies, paragraph 1); that "[w]orkers referred to in paragraph 1, in the event that they communicate that they are not in possession of the COVID-19 Green Certificate referred to in paragraph 1 or are found to be without the said certificate upon accessing the workplace, in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace, are considered unjustifiably absent, without disciplinary consequences and with the right to preserve the employment relationship, until the presentation of the aforementioned certificate and, in any case, no later than June 15, 2022. For the days of unjustified absence referred to in the first period, remuneration or any other compensation or emolument, however named, shall not be due. For businesses, until June 15, 2022, Article 9-septies, paragraph 7, of Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021 shall apply” (Article 4-quinquies, paragraph 4).
In summary, the first provision establishes that, "in order to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection,” public sector workers must possess and exhibit a certificate of vaccination, recovery, or testing (so-called basic green pass: Article 9, paragraph 1, letter a-bis, of Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021, as converted and amended) to access the workplace and that, in case of failure to possess the aforementioned certificate, the worker, "in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace,” is considered unjustifiably absent, without right to remuneration or any other compensation or emolument for the days of unjustified absence, although retaining the job and incurring no disciplinary consequences. The second provision, instead, enacts the vaccination obligation for those over fifty, establishing that, for access to the workplace, workers (public and private) subject to the vaccination obligation must possess and exhibit a certificate of vaccination or recovery (so-called enhanced green pass: Article 9, paragraph 1, letter a-ter, of Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021, as converted and amended), and that, in case of failure to possess the aforementioned certificate, the worker, "in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace,” is considered unjustifiably absent, without right to remuneration or any other compensation or emolument for the days of unjustified absence, although retaining the job and incurring no disciplinary consequences. The consequences for non-compliance with the obligations established by the two provisions are exactly the same, but, with the entry into force of the second provision, the vaccination obligation (or in any case the obligation to possess and exhibit a certificate of vaccination or recovery, so-called enhanced green pass) has replaced, for those subject to it, the obligation to exhibit and possess the basic green pass established by the first provision, which thus continued to operate exclusively for workers under fifty.
2.‒ The referring judge first holds that the consequences provided for non-compliance with the health prevention obligations established by the challenged provisions for access to workplaces are primarily damaging to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 36 of the Constitution. These consequences – identified as the prohibition of access to workplaces with loss of remuneration and any other emolument, including the subsistence allowance – would deprive non-compliant workers of "any possibility of meeting their basic life needs, being unable to rely on any form of economic support, and, even before and more significantly, […] the fundamental right to the free expression of their personality in the workplace,” so that, by being unable to frequent the workplace, maintain relationships with colleagues and users, and enhance their professional qualifications, "unvaccinated workers, forced to stay home in conditions of complete inactivity, have suffered a serious and persistent injury to their sphere of personal dignity and moral integrity, ending up being unjustifiably ghettoized and discriminated against compared to the general body of workers, and this as a result of a choice—that of not getting vaccinated—which is free and conscious, constituting neither a crime nor a disciplinary offense.”
2.1.‒ The aforementioned consequences would also conflict with Article 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution, which precludes laws concerning mandatory health treatments from "violating the limits imposed by respect for the human person.”
2.2.‒ On another ground, the impossibility for the unvaccinated worker to access (even) the subsistence allowance would result in a conflict with the principle of equality and reasonableness set forth in Article 3 of the Constitution, considering that the right to the said allowance is granted to the worker suspended precautionary from service following criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings.
2.3.‒ The referring judge also doubts the constitutional legitimacy of the vaccination obligation itself, arguably surreptitiously established by Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, insofar as it places "workers before the unavoidable alternative of getting vaccinated (if not recovered or exempt, or, […] if they did not intend to undergo testing every two days) or being temporarily removed from their workplace.” According to the referring order, both the aforementioned "obligations” (the explicit one and the surreptitious one) would constitute a mandatory health treatment that does not respect Article 32, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as it neither preserves the health status of those who are not subject to it nor excludes negative consequences for the health status of those who are subject to it. On the one hand, in fact, it is "acquired data that vaccination has not prevented the further circulation of the virus, vaccinated subjects being able to contract and transmit the infection equally”; on the other hand, vaccination has "produced, in those who have undergone it, injurious consequences that appear greater and more significant than those normal and inherent in any health or pharmacological treatment and, therefore, not ‘tolerable,’” it being "daily news that young and healthy people, sometimes even famous athletes and sportsmen, are affected by ‘sudden illnesses’ that cause their impairment or, in some cases, death.”
2.4.‒ Furthermore, the vaccination obligation for those over fifty would violate the principle of reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution, creating an unjustified disparity of treatment compared to those under fifty. As previously specified, the referring judge contests that the obligation is anchored exclusively to an age threshold, rather than to actual needs for the protection of individual health and the prevention of virus spread, and that it was imposed "without making any reasonable distinction between workers assigned to duties involving constant contact with the public of users (in relation to which containment needs for the risk of contagion could abstractly be hypothesized) and workers (such as the present claimants appear to be, assigned to a Motorization office) engaged in duties not involving such risks.”
2.5.‒ For its part, the necessity to "undergo testing every two days” to obtain the basic green pass in the absence of vaccination or recovery would violate personal dignity, as it would cause physical discomfort and suffering, take up time from ordinary personal occupations, and entail "over time” a considerable economic outlay.
3.‒ Preliminarily, with regard to the intervention of S. G., it is noted that, according to the constant case law of this Court (inter alia, orders attached to Judgments No. 140 of 2024, No. 39 of 2024, No. 130 of 2023 and No. 158 of 2020), participation in the incidental constitutional legitimacy trial is restricted to the parties to the referring proceedings, as well as to the President of the Council of Ministers and, in the case of a regional law, to the President of the Regional Government (Articles 3 and 4 of the Supplementary Provisions for proceedings before the Constitutional Court). In this context, the intervention of third parties extraneous to the main proceedings is admissible only if they hold a qualified interest, directly and immediately related to the substantive relationship alleged in the proceedings (Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Supplementary Provisions) and not merely regulated, like any other, by the norm subject to challenge (inter alia, orders attached to Judgments No. 66 of 2025, No. 140, No. 39 and No. 22 of 2024, No. 206 of 2019). Therefore, the circumstance that the subject holds interests analogous to those alleged in the main proceedings, or is a party in an analogous, but different, proceeding from the referring one, which this Court's decision could affect, is not sufficient to render the intervention admissible.
Since S. G. is not a party to the referring proceedings and, as noted above, cannot be considered to hold a qualified interest, directly and immediately related to the substantive relationship alleged in the proceedings, their intervention must be declared inadmissible.
4.‒ Also preliminarily, reference must be made to the constant orientation of this Court according to which "further questions or grounds of constitutionality alleged by the parties cannot be taken into consideration, whether they have been raised but not adopted by the referring judge, or whether they are aimed at subsequently expanding or modifying the content of the referring orders (inter alia, Judgments No. 271 of 2011, No. 236 of 2009, No. 56 of 2009, No. 86 of 2008)” (Judgment No. 203 of 2016; mutatis mutandis, Judgments No. 150 and No. 85 of 2020)” (Judgment No. 165 of 2020, point 2.1. of the Considered in Law). This Court must therefore rule only on the questions raised by the referring order, while any different questions, such as those raised in the opinions of the amici curiae, remain external to the thema decidendum.
5.‒ Turning to the merits, for reasons of logical and expository order, the questions concerning the challenged obligations per se will be examined first, and then those concerning the consequences resulting from their non-compliance.
6.‒ The question raised concerning the vaccination obligation established by Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, in reference to the principle of reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution, is unfounded.
6.1.‒ The reasons that led to the introduction of the obligation for the anti-SARS-CoV-2 vaccine for those over fifty are clearly evident also from the preparatory works of the conversion law of the said decree, which emphasize that the need to ensure maximum vaccination coverage for this population group is based on "national and international scientific evidence accumulated both during the pandemic and in the last month, a period of increasing circulation of the Omicron variant of the Sars-CoV-2 virus.” It is further added that "all available data have in fact shown a higher frequency (incidence) of severe infections and worse outcomes in subjects in this age group,” and it is also stressed that the incidence of hospitalizations, intensive care admissions, and deaths "is much higher compared to the younger population and especially in unvaccinated subjects”; and that, consequently, "in light of the data presented, for the protection of subjects over fifty years of age, vaccination and the related boosters administered according to the recommendations of the Ministry of Health remain the most effective intervention to reduce severe illness and the resulting recourse to healthcare” (thus the presentation report of the bill for the conversion into law of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022).
The vaccination obligation for those over fifty introduced by the aforementioned provision therefore took into account the scientific and statistical data available at the time, which identified this population group as the one most frequently affected by severe infections and worse outcomes of the disease, with the related consequences in terms of higher incidence of hospitalizations. As indicated by the provision itself, the introduction of the vaccination obligation aimed, in fact, to "protect public health” and "maintain adequate safety conditions in the provision of care and assistance services,” resulting in a measure aimed at protecting the most vulnerable and preserving hospitals (also) from excessive overload due to the increase in hospitalizations.
On other occasions, this Court has already noted how "scientific authorities unanimously attest to the safety of the vaccines for the prevention of SARS-CoV-2 infection subject to [conditional marketing authorization] CMA and their effectiveness in reducing the circulation of the virus (as evidenced by the decrease in the number of infections, as well as the number of hospitalized cases, in medical areas and intensive care, and the extent of deaths associated with SARS-CoV-2 relating to the period starting from the beginning of the mass vaccination campaign dating back to March-April 2021)” and that, therefore, it appears "evident […], in coherence with the medical-scientific data attesting to the full effectiveness of the vaccine and the suitability of the vaccination obligation with respect to the goal of reducing virus circulation, the non-unreasonableness of resorting to it, ‘in the face of a highly contagious respiratory virus, ubiquitously spread in the world, and which can be contracted by anyone’ (Judgment No. 127 of 2022) (Judgment No. 171 of 2022), characterized by the rapidity and unpredictability of contagion” (Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 11 of the Considered in Law). At the same time, vaccination has been considered a proportionate measure to the pursued objectives "due to the transitory nature of the imposition of the vaccination obligation, strictly linked to the trend of the pandemic situation” (Judgment No. 185 of 2023, point 7 of the Considered in Law).
These considerations also apply to the present question.
The objective of protecting the most vulnerable, consistent with the scientific and statistical evidence available at the time, clearly reveals a legitimate aim of protecting public health, also in terms of containing the hospital burden, which justifies the introduction of the obligation in question. As this Court has repeatedly stated, in fact, the discretion of the legislature in choosing the methods through which to ensure effective prevention of infectious diseases must be exercised "on the basis of the medical-scientific knowledge provided by sector authorities at the time of the decision” (Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 8.2. of the Considered in Law).
Consequently, the non-unreasonableness of the currently challenged provisions must be examined based on the medical-scientific knowledge available at the time of their adoption, as well as "taking into account the peculiarity of the epidemiological conditions” existing at that time and, in particular, "the gravity and unpredictability of the course of the pandemic” (Judgment No. 186 of 2023, point 5.1. of the Considered in Law).
In conclusion, the fact that the vaccination obligation is directed exclusively at subjects over fifty does not create an unreasonable disparity of treatment compared to those under fifty, but, as emerges from the preparatory works indicated, responds to a non-unreasonable assessment of the scientific evidence that identified the former as the subjects most exposed to severe illness. And the measure proves not disproportionately aimed at protecting public health, as it is intended to protect the most vulnerable subjects, contain the hospital burden, as well as, always, reduce the circulation of the virus.
6.2.‒ Nor does the alleged lack of a "reasonable distinction between workers assigned to duties involving constant contact with the public of users (in relation to which containment needs for the risk of contagion could abstractly be hypothesized) and workers (such as the present claimants appear to be, assigned to a Motorization office) engaged in duties not involving such risks” exclude the reasonableness and proportionality of the obligation under review. As already noted, the challenged vaccination obligation was introduced to protect all subjects over fifty as vulnerable and more exposed to severe illness, regardless of whether they are workers or the duties they may perform. The challenge appears therefore unfounded also under this aspect, as it misrepresents the ratio underlying the imposition of the obligation, mistakenly considering it anchored to the type of duties performed.
7.‒ The question raised with reference to Article 32, first paragraph, of the Constitution is also unfounded.
7.1.‒ Firstly, contrary to what is argued by the referring judge, the scientific evidence available at the time the vaccination obligation entered into force confirms the effectiveness of the anti-COVID-19 vaccination as a fundamental prevention measure to contain the spread of the infection. In this regard, this Court has already noted that, according to the Higher Institute of Health (ISS), "[t]he anti-COVID-19 vaccination constitutes a fundamental prevention measure to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection” and that "[n]umerous international scientific evidences have demonstrated the high effectiveness of the anti-COVID-19 vaccines currently available, both in the general population and in specific subgroups of at-risk categories, including healthcare workers (pages 2 and 3 of the ISS note)” (Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 10.2. of the Considered in Law). On the same occasion, it was then highlighted that "[a]part from the physiological heterogeneity of immune responses of individual subjects and the greater ability of the Omicron variant to evade immunity compared to previous variants, it is attested that ‘protection remains high especially against severe disease or worse outcomes’ (page 3 of the ISS note)” and that the ISS also clarified that "‘even if vaccine efficacy is not 100%, but no vaccine has such efficacy, the high circulation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus still makes the preventable proportion of cases relevant (page 5 of the ISS note)’” (again Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 10.2. of the Considered in Law).
7.2.‒ As for the point that mandatory health treatments must not harm the health of those subjected to them, this Court has carefully considered the conclusions of AIFA and ISS on the safety of anti-COVID-19 vaccines. In this regard, it particularly emphasized that, "[a]ccording to the conclusions set out, ‘the majority of adverse reactions to vaccines are not serious and fully resolve. Serious adverse reactions occur with a frequency ranging from rare to very rare and do not constitute a risk such as to outweigh the benefits of vaccination’; and added that ‘[n]or has any excess of deaths following vaccination been observed, and the number of cases in which vaccination may have contributed to the fatal outcome of the adverse event is extremely small and in any case not such as to invalidate the benefit of these medicines’ (pages 26 and 27 of the AIFA note)” (Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 10.3. of the Considered in Law). Furthermore, it specified that "[a]lso concerning the safety profile, the ISS, in turn, attests that ‘[t]o date, billions of people worldwide have been vaccinated against COVID-19. The approved anti-SARS-CoV-2 vaccines have been carefully tested and continue to be constantly monitored. Numerous international scientific evidences have confirmed the safety of anti-COVID-19 vaccines’ (page 6 of the ISS note)” (again Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 10.3. of the Considered in Law).
Moreover, this Court has affirmed, also with reference to anti-SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, that "the remote risk of adverse events, even serious ones, cannot, as such, be deemed intolerable, but rather constitutes […] grounds for compensation” and that "health treatments, including mandatory vaccinations, which, in order to protect collective health, may involve the risk of ‘unintended consequences, harmful beyond the limit of what is normally tolerable’ (Judgment No. 118 of 1996) shall be deemed lawful” (Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 5.3. of the Considered in Law). The fact that a health treatment may be considered lawful even if it involves the remote risk of adverse consequences, even serious ones, confirms the unfoundedness of the question also with regard to this aspect.
8.‒ The question concerning the necessity to "undergo testing every two days,” from which the referring judge infers an injury to personal dignity, is likewise unfounded.
The only elements adduced by the order to justify the alleged injury concern the "provocation of inevitable physical discomfort and suffering (caused by the repeated insertion of the appropriate device into the nostrils or pharynx),” the "taking up of time from ordinary personal occupations,” and the fact that "over time” the performance of the swab test would have entailed "a considerable economic outlay.” Even setting aside the generality of the aforementioned statements, it is evident that the time required for the swab test is not such as to prevent the performance of ordinary personal occupations, just as the operation itself, on the one hand, does not imply any negative assessment of the person undergoing it and, on the other hand, even considering its short duration, does not appear capable of causing significant physical suffering. Therefore, it is not such as to compromise or injure personal dignity. Furthermore, the referring judge does not specify the actual extent and incidence of the alleged "considerable economic outlay,” which, in any case, is not sufficient to condition self-determination to the point of prevailing over the need to reduce the spread of a virus of exceptional gravity such as SARS-CoV-2 in workplaces. The obligation in question is, in fact, a merely transitory measure (linked to the extraordinary context of the pandemic) which, in a way that is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, realizes that necessary "balancing of the right to health of the individual (including in its negative content of not being subject to unwanted or unaccepted health treatments) with the coexisting right of others and therefore with the interest of the community” (again Judgment No. 14 of 2023, point 5 of the Considered in Law, referring to Judgments No. 5 of 2018, No. 258 of 1994 and No. 307 of 1990, which, in point 2 of the Considered in Law, affirmed that the constitutional relevance of health as a community interest "requires that in the name of it, and therefore of solidarity towards others, each person may be obliged, thus legitimately limiting their self-determination, to a given health treatment, even if this involves a specific risk,” provided that any sacrifice of the health of each person for the protection of the health of others "implies the recognition, in the event that the risk materializes […] of fair compensation”).
Moreover, in another part of the order, the same Court identifies precisely in the "subjecting the worker to a strict control system via virus detection tests” one of the alternative measures that could have allowed the unvaccinated worker to perform the work activity and thus benefit from the sustenance necessary to meet their primary needs.
9.‒ At this point, the questions concerning the consequences of non-compliance with the obligations introduced by the challenged provisions for access to workplaces, raised with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 36 of the Constitution, can be examined. As already specified, the consequences are the same for non-compliance with both obligations and consist of the prohibition of access to workplaces, being considered unjustifiably absent, and the loss of remuneration and any other compensation or emolument related to the employment relationship.
9.1.‒ It is first necessary to note that, from the referring judge’s perspective, the alleged injury to personal dignity ends up merging with that of the right to work. This is clearly indicated in the passage of the order where it is stated that "the right to work constitutes one of the main prerogatives of the individual protected within the ‘fundamental principles’ of the constitutional Charter […]. At the moment when the law, by precluding the unvaccinated worker from the possibility of performing the work activity […], does not even allow them to benefit from a minimum sustenance, it cannot but expose itself to the doubt of being excessively unbalanced and disproportionate to the excessive detriment of the value of human dignity.” In essence, according to the referring judge, the injury to personal dignity stems from the injury to the right to work, based on the assumption that if a person is deprived of work, remuneration, and the benefits connected with attendance at the workplace (relationships with colleagues and users and consequent professional enrichment), they are unable to sustain themselves and live with dignity.
9.2.‒ That being established, since the workplace is one of the environments most exposed to virus circulation, it is necessary that the health of those who frequent it receive adequate protection. To this end, as already specified, Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted (inserting Article 9-quinquies into Decree-Law No. 52 of 2021, as converted) provided that, to access the workplace, public sector workers, regardless of age, must exhibit and possess the basic green pass (from vaccination, recovery, or testing) and that, in its absence, "in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace,” they cannot access it and are considered unjustifiably absent without the right to remuneration (although retaining the job and without disciplinary consequences). With Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted, for workers over fifty, the same purpose of protecting health in the workplace is fulfilled by the vaccination obligation, which, regardless of worker status, is already generally imposed on those who have reached fifty years of age, as vulnerable subjects, to protect general health and avoid overloading hospital facilities. It is, in fact, evident that, when a subject over fifty is also a worker, the vaccination obligation to which they are subject represents, according to elementary criteria of logic, the instrument also intended to "protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace.” The fact that those over fifty are precluded from accessing these places with the basic green pass is consistent with their status as subjects subject to the vaccination obligation. If, in fact, those over fifty were also allowed to access with only the basic green pass, the vaccination obligation imposed to protect their health and the resulting general effects would be weakened; an obligation which, when related to the working context, also effectively serves the function of protecting the health and safety of workers. It is for this reason that Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 1 of 2022, as converted (inserting Article 4-quinquies into Decree-Law No. 44 of 2021, as converted), in adopting the formula used by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 127 of 2021, as converted, stipulates that, "in order to protect the health and safety of workers in the workplace,” those over fifty lacking the enhanced green pass may not access the workplace and are considered unjustifiably absent without the right to remuneration (although retaining the job and without disciplinary consequences).
The aforementioned consequences of non-compliance with the respective health obligations, both of which are neither unreasonable nor disproportionate as extensively stated above, therefore respond, within the employment relationship, to the purpose of "protecting the health and safety of workers in the places” where it takes place; and at the same time represent an important deterrent—different from sanctions that punish access in violation of the prohibition—to induce workers to comply with the obligations in question.
9.3.‒ That being established, the questions raised require clarifying whether the right to perform work activity must always and in any case be guaranteed or whether, instead, there are cases in which it can be compromised or sacrificed. In this perspective, the issue has already been addressed by this Court, particularly with Judgment No. 15 of 2023, which affirmed that "[t]he fundamental right to work, guaranteed in the principles enunciated in Articles 4 and 35 of the Constitution, having regard to the employee who has freely chosen not to comply with the vaccination obligation, does not necessarily imply the right to perform the work activity if the latter constitutes a risk factor for the protection of public health (…)” (point 12.2. of the Considered in Law). In the objective of protecting the health and safety of workers, the vaccination obligation is, in fact, integrated ex lege into the employment contract, constituting an additional obligation inherent in the employment relationship. It was thus textually specified that "[f]or non-compliance with the vaccination obligation, the law imposing it attributes merely synallagmatic relevance, i.e., on the level of obligations and rights arising from the employment contract, as an event determining the subsequent and temporary impossibility for the employee to carry out work activities that involve, in any other form and considering the needs of the care environment, the risk of spreading SARS-CoV-2 contagion” (point 12.1. of the Considered in Law). If, therefore, this obligation remains unfulfilled by the worker due to their individual choice, the service offered by them "is not compliant with the contract, as integrated by law,” and, therefore, "the employer’s refusal of it must be considered justified” and "the state of quiescence into which the entire relationship enters is simply a means for preserving the legal-economic balance of the contract” (point 13.5. of the Considered in Law). In other words, as clarified by the aforementioned judgment, the non-payment of remuneration is consistent with the contractual synallagma, which, as integrated by law to protect the health and safety of workers, requires compliance with the health prevention obligations imposed by the challenged provisions.
The consequences resulting from non-compliance with these obligations therefore do not violate any of the invoked constitutional parameters: neither the right to work and remuneration (Articles 4 and 36 of the Constitution), nor the right to personal dignity in the sense adopted by the order (Article 2 of the Constitution), nor the principle of reasonableness and proportionality (Article 3 of the Constitution). Firstly, because they are in any case the result of an individual choice. Secondly, because non-compliance with these obligations assumes a "merely synallagmatic” relevance on the level of the conditions arising from the employment contract, in the sense that their non-fulfillment renders the service non-compliant with the rules of the relationship, thus justifying the preclusion from performing the work activity and the consequent deprivation of remuneration and any other compensation or emolument. Thirdly, because these are obligations established to protect the health of others, whose reasonableness and proportionality, in analogous cases, have been repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court (supra); lastly, because the obligations in question are merely transitory and their non-compliance neither results in the loss of the job nor disciplinary consequences.
In light of the above considerations, the reference—contained in the referring order—to this Court’s Judgment No. 137 of 2021, which declared the unconstitutionality of Article 2, paragraph 61, of Law No. 92 of 2012, insofar as it provided for the revocation of certain welfare benefits, such as unemployment benefit, social allowance, social pension, and invalidity pension (also) for those who, convicted of certain crimes, serve their sentence under a regime alternative to prison detention, is clearly irrelevant. As the referring judge also noted, the latter ruling concerns merely welfare benefits, while the question currently under review concerns remuneration related to the work performance.
10.‒ The preceding considerations can be extended to the question raised with reference to Article 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution. Beyond the formal reference to the aforementioned parameter, the question is essentially analogous to that raised with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 36 of the Constitution, as it essentially complains of an injury to relational life due to the consequences of non-vaccination. Therefore, like the other, this question must also be deemed unfounded for the reasons already set forth.
11.‒ Lastly, the question concerning the subsistence allowance, raised with reference to the principle of equality and reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution, based on the premise that, unlike workers non-compliant with the obligations established by the challenged provisions, those suspended from service following criminal or disciplinary proceedings would still be entitled to the said allowance, is also unfounded.
This issue has already been examined by this Court, reiterating for the subsistence allowance the conclusions reached regarding remuneration (Judgment No. 15 of 2023, points 14.2. and 14.3. of the Considered in Law and Judgment No. 188 of 2024, point 4 of the Considered in Law).
As with remuneration, the non-payment of a subsistence allowance to the worker non-compliant with the obligations imposed by the challenged provisions is justified based on the general principle of correspondence, since such an allowance is always linked to the work performance. Consequently, if the work performance cannot be carried out, the allowance cannot be granted.
11.1.‒ Nor could any disparity of treatment be found compared to the worker suspended from service following criminal or disciplinary proceedings. In this regard, this Court has already affirmed that, in the indicated cases, "the recognition of the subsistence allowance is justified in light of the need to ensure the worker with support when the temporary impossibility of the performance is determined by a unilateral waiver of the employer to avail themselves of it and by acts or conduct that require verification with a view to the continuation of the relationship,” but that it is quite different "when, due to the failure to comply with the vaccination obligation, it is the worker who decides to unilaterally refrain from the safety conditions that make their work performance, in the aforementioned terms, legitimately exercisable” (Judgment No. 15 of 2023, point 14.4. of the Considered in Law).
11.2.‒ The same conclusions apply even if the subsistence allowance is considered to have an assistance-based rather than a remuneration-based nature. As this Court has always noted, "even starting from this interpretative premise, however, the conclusion that the assumption by the employer of the solidarity provision, in favor of the worker who has not chosen to be vaccinated and who is therefore only temporarily unfit to perform their work activity, of an assistance-based provision, outside the rights of work, capable of ensuring the satisfaction of the living needs of the employee and their family, remains refuted. That is to say, since the payment of the subsistence allowance represents a net cost for the employer, without consideration, it is not unreasonable for the legislature to charge it to him when the event preventing the work performance is objective, and not also when the event itself reflects a choice—albeit legitimate—of the service provider” (Judgment No. 15 of 2023, point 14.5. of the Considered in Law; mutatis mutandis, Judgment No. 188 of 2024, point 5 of the Considered in Law).
for these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
1) declares the intervention of S. G. inadmissible;
2) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1 of Decree-Law of September 21, 2021, No. 127 (Urgent measures to ensure safe public and private work through the extension of the scope of the COVID-19 Green Certificate and the strengthening of the screening system), converted, with amendments, into Law of November 19, 2021, No. 165, raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, 32, first and second paragraphs, 32, and 36 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Catania, acting as a Labour Judge, with the order mentioned in the heading;
3) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1 of Decree-Law of January 7, 2022, No. 1 (Urgent measures to address the COVID-19 emergency, particularly in workplaces, schools, and higher education institutions), converted, with amendments, into Law of March 4, 2022, No. 18, raised, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4, 32, first and second paragraphs, and 36 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Catania, acting as a Labour Judge, with the order mentioned in the heading.
Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on November 17, 2025.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Registrar
Filed in the Registry on December 23, 2025
The anonymised version conforms, in text, to the original