ORDER NO. 178
YEAR 2025
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has issued the following
ORDER
in the judgment concerning the conflict of attribution between State powers arising from the resolution of the Council of Ministers of April 4, 2025, regarding Decree-Law of April 11, 2025, No. 48 (Urgent provisions concerning public security, protection of personnel in service, as well as victims of usury and the penitentiary system), initiated by Deputy Riccardo Magi, against the Government of the Republic, in the person of the Prime Minister, with a petition filed in the Registry on May 5, 2025, and registered under conflict of State powers No. 6 of 2025, admissibility stage.
Heard in the deliberative chamber on October 20, 2025, the Reporting Judge Luca Antonini;
Deliberated in the deliberative chamber on October 20, 2025.
Considering that, with the petition filed on May 5, 2025 (reg. confl. pot. No. 6 of 2025), Deputy Riccardo Magi initiated a conflict of attribution between State powers against the Government of the Republic, in the person of the Prime Minister;
that the petitioner requests this Court to declare that it was not within the Government’s competence to approve the resolution of April 4, 2025, concerning what would later become Decree-Law No. 48 of April 11, 2025 (Urgent provisions concerning public security, protection of personnel in service, as well as victims of usury and the penitentiary system), and, consequently, to annul the said resolution and the aforementioned decree-law, "in its entirety or – alternatively – in the parts deemed to lack the original requirement of extraordinary necessity and urgency”;
that the petitioner states that on January 22, 2024, ordinary bill A.C. 1660 (Provisions concerning public security, protection of personnel in service, as well as victims of usury and the penitentiary system) was presented to the Chamber of Deputies;
that the petitioner retraces the stages of the parliamentary proceedings, explaining that, after a series of hearings and the examination of the proposed amendments, the joint Committees I (Constitutional Affairs) and II (Justice), acting in a referring capacity, instructed four rapporteurs to report to the Chamber’s Assembly;
that the Assembly commenced the examination of the text proposed by the said Committees (A.C. 1660-A) on September 10, 2024, and approved it on the following September 18;
that the bill was then transmitted to the Senate of the Republic (A.S. 1236) and assigned therein to the joint Committees 1st (Constitutional Affairs) and 2nd (Justice) in a referring capacity, which, on March 26, 2025, after a "close political confrontation,” instructed two rapporteurs to report to the floor;
that, however, the Senate’s examination of the bill, although scheduled, was suspended, considering the substantial overlap between the provisions of the bill and those introduced by Decree-Law No. 48 of 2025;
that, regarding the admissibility of the raised conflict, the petitioner argues, as for his standing, by referring to this Court’s Order No. 17 of 2019 – to the extent that it affirmed that the "constitutional status of a parliamentarian comprises […] a complex of attributions relating to the right to speak, to propose, and to vote, which belong to him as a single representative of the Nation, individually considered, to be exercised autonomously and independently, which cannot be removed or modified at the initiative of another parliamentary body” – and subsequent consistent constitutional jurisprudence (Orders No. 193 and No. 188 of 2021 and No. 60 of 2020 being cited);
that, moreover, the petitioner asserts that in the "present case the situation is substantially different” from the cases examined in the aforementioned rulings, since "[t]he attack on the prerogatives of individual parliamentarians comes from a power external to Parliament (i.e., the Executive)”;
that the Government, by resolving to adopt the aforementioned decree-law while the "exercise of the attributions of individual parliamentarians” was underway – such as "the power of legislative initiative” under Article 71, first paragraph, of the Constitution and "participation in the legislative process pursuant to Article 72 of the Constitution” – would have rendered them "entirely vain”;
that, specifically, Deputy Magi assumes that the Government, by approving a decree-law reproducing the bill under examination by the Senate in the absence of the prerequisites of extraordinary necessity and urgency, arbitrarily "amputated” the parliamentary debate that had been ongoing for eighteen months and, in so doing, "injured the constitutional competence of the Chambers,” whose role would have been "radically preempted”;
that, therefore, the Government’s act of "claimed urgency” would have "seriously infringed upon the prerogatives of the Chambers and, simultaneously, those of individual parliamentarians”;
that, in this regard, the petitioner, on the one hand, recalls that, according to this Court, the broad "political autonomy of the Government in resorting to decree-laws […] cannot justify the emptying of the political and legislative role of Parliament” (Judgment No. 146 of 2024 being cited); on the other hand, he argues that in this case the deputies had developed "the certainty that they would return to discuss” the bill, since the text under examination by the Senate contained amendments (introduced by the aforementioned joint Committees) compared to the text approved by the Chamber;
that, the petitioner further states, the alleged "emptying of the parliamentary function” and the supposed infringements of the constitutional prerogatives of the deputies were also the basis for the five preliminary objections presented to the Chamber – and subsequently discussed and rejected by it – during the conversion process into law of Decree-Law No. 48 of 2025;
that the petitioner also observes that D.L. No. 48 of 2025 also introduced criminal provisions and that, although the use of urgent decree powers is not *per se* contrary to the reservation of law under Article 25, second paragraph, of the Constitution, in the present case the Government should have "refrained” from adopting the decree-law, in order to allow for adequate parliamentary debate, given that this Court tends "in criminal matters […] to express a preference for the law enacted by Parliament” (Judgments No. 32 of 2014 and No. 487 of 1989 being cited).
Considering that Deputy Riccardo Magi initiated a conflict of attribution between State powers against the Government of the Republic, in the person of the Prime Minister;
that the petitioner requests this Court to declare that it was not within the Government’s competence to approve the resolution of April 4, 2025, concerning what would become D.L. No. 48 of 2025, and, consequently, to annul the said resolution and the aforementioned decree-law, "in its entirety or – alternatively – in the parts deemed to lack the original requirement of extraordinary necessity and urgency”;
that the acts giving rise to the conflict occurred when the Chamber of Deputies had already approved ordinary bill A.C. 1660-A and transmitted it to the Senate of the Republic, which, however, did not proceed to examine the text as its provisions had, in the meantime, been substantially reproduced in the aforementioned decree-law;
that, in the view of the litigant, the Government, by transferring the provisions of the ordinary bill, some of which are criminal in nature, into the mentioned decree-law in the absence of the requirements of extraordinary necessity and urgency, "arbitrarily ‘amputated’” the ongoing parliamentary debate, thus "injuring the constitutional competence of the Chambers,” whose "role [would have been] radically preempted”;
that the constitutional attributions of individual parliamentarians were simultaneously impaired, particularly the power of legislative initiative and the right to participate in the legislative process belonging to them;
that, at the present stage of the proceedings, this Court is called upon to rule, in a deliberative chamber and without adversarial debate, on the existence of the subjective and objective requirements prescribed by Article 37, first paragraph, of Law of March 11, 1953, No. 87 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), i.e., to decide whether the conflict arises between bodies competent to definitively declare the will of the power to which they belong and for the delimitation of the sphere of attributions determined for the various powers by constitutional norms;
that constitutional jurisprudence has recognized, from the subjective viewpoint, the existence of a sphere of constitutional prerogatives, "relating to the right to speak, to propose, and to vote,” which can be defended by the individual parliamentarian through the remedy of a conflict of attribution between powers, should they "be infringed by other parliamentary bodies” ( *ex plurimis*, among the most recent, Order No. 154 of 2022);
that it must, instead, be "excluded that the individual parliamentarian is entitled to initiate a conflict of attribution against the Government” when acting "to protect prerogatives attributed by the Constitution to the entire Chamber to which he belongs” (Order No. 17 of 2019);
that, regarding the latter point, this Court specified in Order No. 151 of 2022 that it has repeatedly emphasized the necessity that the allegedly infringed constitutional attributions "belong to the individual parliamentarian as such,” requiring that a position "at least distinct and autonomous from that belonging to the Chamber of membership” must be recognizable in him;
that, conversely, the petitioner’s grievances concerning the eccentricity of the Government's *modus operandi* directly involve the entire Assembly, consisting essentially in the alleged removal of the legislative function from Parliament, which, pursuant to Article 70 of the Constitution, is exercised collectively by the Chambers;
that, when an ousting of Parliament from the exercise of the legislative function is alleged and the situation underlying the conflict involves the entire Assembly, holder of the sphere of constitutional attributions allegedly injured and, therefore, possibly entitled to initiate a conflict, it is the Chamber of membership of the individual parliamentarian and not the latter who is entitled to do so (in this sense, also Orders No. 154 and No. 151 of 2022, as well as Nos. 67 and 66 of 2021);
that, moreover, it is not sufficient, for the purpose of the admissibility of the conflict, to assert, as the petitioner does, that the Government has also impaired the individual prerogatives of individual parliamentarians, or that, "alongside” the prerogatives of the Chambers, the act of "claimed urgency” adopted by the Government also injured those of the parliamentarians *uti singuli*;
that, in fact, in cases such as the present one, the position of the individual parliamentarian remains "‘absorbed’ by that of his Chamber of membership” (Order No. 151 of 2022 again);
that, furthermore, on multiple occasions this Court has denied the possibility of concurrence between the active standing of the individual parliamentarian and that of the Chamber of membership ( *ex plurimis*, Orders No. 151 of 2022, No. 67 and No. 66 of 2021), excluding that the parliamentarian himself can represent – in a conflict initiated against the Government – the entire institution to which he belongs ( *ex plurimis*, Orders No. 80 of 2022 and No. 277 of 2017), as he is not "holder of individually constitutionally protected attributions vis-à-vis the Executive” ( *ex plurimis*, Orders No. 151 and No. 80 of 2022 and No. 67 of 2021);
that it must also be noted, from the objective viewpoint, that the petitioner has not alleged "a substantial denial or an evident impairment” ( *ex plurimis*, Order No. 212 of 2022) of his constitutional prerogatives;
that, in fact, the petition offers an incomplete reconstruction of the parliamentary process concerning the conversion into law of D.L. No. 48 of 2025, limiting itself to reporting the presentation of five preliminary objections in this regard, one of which was signed by Deputy Magi himself, the present petitioner, aimed at precluding the further examination of the conversion bill due to the alleged violations also raised in this venue;
that, however, precisely the presentation of these objections, which were extensively discussed and subsequently rejected by the Chamber during the sitting of April 23, 2025, demonstrates that, even after the suspension of the examination of the ordinary bill, parliamentary debate was not entirely absent, and that the petitioner "had the opportunity to exercise his constitutional functions, participating in the conversion procedure” (Order No. 275 of 2019; *mutatis mutandis*, Order No. 197 of 2020);
that, for the reasons set forth above, the petition must be declared inadmissible.
For these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares inadmissible the petition for conflict of attribution between State powers, initiated by Deputy Riccardo Magi, named in the heading.
So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 20, 2025.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Luca ANTONINI, Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry
Filed in the Registry on December 1, 2025