JUDGMENT NO. 171

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concerning Article 624-bis, paragraphs two and three, of the Penal Code, initiated by the Ordinary Court of Florence, first Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, and by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Court of Milan, with orders dated December 9, 2024, and March 14, 2025, respectively registered under numbers 246 of the register of orders 2024 and 59 of the register of orders 2025, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, first special series, numbers 4 and 15, of the year 2025.

Having seen the intervention submissions of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in the Council Chamber on September 22, 2025, the Reporting Judge Angelo Buscema;

deliberated in the Council Chamber on September 22, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– The Ordinary Court of Florence, first Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, by order registered under no. 246 of the register of orders of 2024, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, insofar as it does not provide for a reduction of the penalty imposed thereby, not exceeding one third, when, due to the nature, type, means, methods, or circumstances of the action, or the particular slightness of the damage or danger, the act is of minor significance, for violation of Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

The referring court reports that it must adjudicate a man charged with the offense, aggravated by recidivism within five years, under Article 628, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, who, for the purpose of procuring an unjust profit, after having stolen a gold necklace from an individual walking in a square in Florence by snatching it from their neck and immediately fleeing on foot, was pursued and stopped by another individual; at that point, to secure possession of the necklace and ensure impunity, he unsuccessfully attempted to break free.

The perpetrator of the offense was arrested for the crime of improper robbery and presented to the judge for validation of the arrest and subsequent summary trial.

The judge validated the arrest and, following the classification of the act as snatch-theft pursuant to Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, proceeded with the summary trial; after several adjournments, the accused requested continuation under the abbreviated procedure, conditional upon the production of certain documents, and the judge complied accordingly. The Public Prosecutor requested the conviction of the accused for the crime of snatch-theft to a final penalty – following recognition of generic mitigating circumstances – of two years and eight months of imprisonment and a fine of EUR 618; the defense requested the exclusion of the alleged recidivism, the recognition of the mitigating circumstances under art. 62, numbers 4) and 6), of the Penal Code, and generic mitigating circumstances, with the application of the minimum penalty.

The originating judge considers that the commission of a snatch-theft by the accused is undisputed and notes that the necklace was recovered by the man who pursued him, who subsequently returned it to the victim of the theft.

The referring court observes, regarding the relevance of the question, that Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code criminalizes the conduct of "whoever unlawfully appropriates movable property belonging to another, by taking it from the person holding it, with the aim of deriving profit for themselves or others, by snatching it from the person's hand or body." For this conduct, the penalty indicated in the first paragraph of the same article concerning theft in a dwelling is provided, namely imprisonment from four to seven years and a fine from EUR 927 to 1,500.

Among the hypothetical facts attributable to the criminal offense in question, the episode now charged is distinguished by its minor significance, as evidenced by several elements.

Firstly, the accused acted alone and the energy deployed to commit the theft was limited: he proceeded on foot and not, for example, on a motorcycle, and the victim (a middle-aged man and thus neither a minor nor an elderly person) suffered no type of bodily harm, not even abrasions.

Furthermore, the act took place in broad daylight, in a city square, and not at night in an isolated place, which could have caused psychological harm to the victim.

The object of the snatching was a necklace which, even if made of gold, would have had a relatively limited value. In any case, the necklace was recovered shortly after the fact, so there is no residual damage on the patrimonial level.

The disvalue of the act subject to the proceedings is ultimately extremely low.

If, as hoped, a mitigated offense for the hypothesis of minor significance were provided for, such circumstance could undoubtedly apply in the present case, without prejudice to the possible application of further mitigating circumstances invoked by the defense based on different elements.

As to the non-manifest groundlessness, according to the originating judge, the provision is constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it does not provide for a mitigation of the sanctioning treatment of the statutory minimum penalty of four years' imprisonment, in addition to the fine, in relation to criminal conduct which, although conforming to the type, proves to be of very limited gravity.

The referring court states its awareness that a similar question, concerning Article 624-bis, first paragraph, of the Penal Code (theft in a dwelling), has previously been submitted for constitutional review and declared inadmissible by Judgment No. 117 of 2021; however, a reassessment of the considerations made in light of the subsequent judgments of this Court, No. 86 of 2024 and No. 120 of 2023, which introduced a similar mitigating circumstance, respectively, for the crimes of robbery and extortion, would be possible.

Moreover, whereas in relation to certain crimes such as theft, the particular severity of the sanction is mitigated by the possibility of balancing with a mitigating circumstance, in snatch-theft, conversely, the exceptional harshness of the sanctioning treatment is already expressed in the basic statutory framework; thus, the possible recognition of the mitigating circumstances provided for by the legal system – while possible – would not be sufficient to make this sanctioning excess compatible with constitutional principles, so that Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code violates Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

The extreme harshness of the statutory minimum for the aforementioned crime violates the principle of necessary reasonableness in the determination of the penalty, especially when linked to the fundamental rehabilitative function that the latter must pursue as explicitly dictated by the Constitution. In the absence of a specific provision contemplating a milder penalty for acts of minor significance – as is provided for other offenses – in cases such as the present one (in which, due to the methods of conduct and the extent of the harm, the act concretely committed is of limited gravity), it would not be possible to correctly adapt the sanctioning treatment to the gravity of the act and the necessary rehabilitation of its perpetrator.

With regard to Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, the failure to provide for a mitigated offense for cases of minor significance is subject to censure both as regards the intrinsic reasonableness of the sanctioning treatment and under the more general profile of the principle of equality in relation to what is provided for other criminal conduct.

Under the first profile, faced with a statutory framework that provides for a minimum penalty of four years' imprisonment (in addition to a fine), the failure to provide for a penalty mitigation for acts of minor significance would be unreasonable.

Under the second profile, the failure to provide for a mitigated offense for cases of minor significance violates the principle of equality in relation to what is provided for the crimes of robbery and extortion.

The facts of snatch-theft and aggravated robbery are, as noted by the Court of Cassation, so to speak, bordering: in both there is the seizure of another's property by means that are broadly violent, but the two crimes are distinguished by the direction of the violence exerted by the agent.

The Constitutional Court itself, the referring court continues, in Judgment No. 125 of 2016, affirmed that the distinction between the criminal offense of snatch-theft (Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code) and that of robbery (Article 628 of the Penal Code) lies in the different direction of the violence exerted by the agent. There is a snatch-theft when the violence is immediately directed towards the object, and only indirectly towards the person holding it, whereas it constitutes robbery the unlawful appropriation of movable property belonging to another by means of violence directed at the person. In snatch-theft, the victim suffers the violence only indirectly, as an effect of the violence used on the object to snatch it from the hand or body of the person, whereas in robbery, violence against the person constitutes the means through which the subtraction occurs.

In light of the cited differentiation, the crime of robbery is easily identifiable as more serious than the crime of snatch-theft.

The same greater seriousness can also be identified for the crime of extortion.

The referring court observes that if the current accused had exerted modest direct violence (and not only indirect) against the victim to appropriate the property, the act should have been classified as robbery (a more serious crime), but it could have been considered of minor significance, given the limited gravity of the violence, the context (in broad daylight, in a city square), the object of the conduct, and the subsequent recovery of the property.

Similarly, if – after the subtraction by snatching – to obtain possession of the property or ensure impunity, the snatcher had used a minimum of violence or threat against the victim or the person who pursued him, the more serious crime of improper robbery would have been constituted, and in that case, the accused could have benefited from the mitigating circumstance introduced by the Constitutional Court's judgment No. 86 of 2024 and thus, paradoxically, had a milder sanctioning treatment.

In particular, in the case of robbery mitigated for the minor significance of the act, the minimum penalty that could be imposed would be three years and four months of imprisonment plus a fine, without prejudice to the application of any further mitigating circumstances (for example, that under art. 62, number 4, of the Penal Code, and generic mitigating circumstances). A similar penalty would be applicable for extortion, recognizing the mitigating circumstance of minor significance.

For snatch-theft – which, according to the referring court, is a less serious crime – the minimum penalty that can be imposed is, conversely, four years of imprisonment plus a fine, without considering any mitigating circumstances.

The unreasonableness of the provision is evident, as it imposes a more severe sanctioning treatment for a less serious crime compared to that provided for the more serious crime.

Such a penalty, unreasonable both from an intrinsic perspective and in relation to the more serious offenses of robbery and extortion, could not, moreover, fulfill the rehabilitative function referred to in Article 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution. The penalty itself would in fact be excessive and unjust, violating the standard of proportionality with respect to the criminal act committed and in comparison with the cited more serious offenses. Being disproportionate, it could not be perceived by the convicted person as just and therefore could not exert its rehabilitative function; on the contrary, the convicted person could only perceive it as unreasonable and not comply with the rehabilitative treatment.

Finally, interpretations conforming the challenged provision to the constitutional parameters invoked are not feasible, as the literal meaning is clear and unequivocal.

2.– The Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Court of Milan, with order registered under no. 59 of the register of orders of 2025, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, for violation of Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, concerning Article 624-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the Penal Code, insofar as it does not provide for a reduction of the penalty imposed thereby, not exceeding one third, when, due to the nature, type, means, methods, or circumstances of the action, or the particular slightness of the damage or danger, the act is of minor significance.

The referring court reports that it must adjudicate a man charged with the offense under Articles 624-bis, second paragraph, and 625, first paragraph, number 8-bis), of the Penal Code. Specifically, aboard a train, during the train's stopping phase, he unlawfully appropriated a gold chain with an aquamarine pendant, snatching it from the victim's neck and fleeing, getting off the now-stopped train inside the Milan Affori station.

The originating judge asserts that the accused was detained on suspicion of the crime of aggravated snatch-theft, committed on public transport.

The Public Prosecutor initiated the criminal action with a request for immediate trial, and the preliminary investigation judge issued the relevant decree; the accused requested to proceed under the abbreviated procedure, and the originating judge, as the judge for the preliminary hearing, scheduled the hearing for the admission of the procedure and any discussion.

After admission to the abbreviated procedure, the defense counsel requested the judge to raise a question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 624-bis of the Penal Code regarding the penalty quantum, specifically the statutory minimum, for violation of Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution.

The referring court deems the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised to be relevant, concerning the alleged lack of proportionality and unreasonableness of the current legislative provision regarding snatch-theft pursuant to Article 624-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the Penal Code, for alleged violation of the principles of substantive equality and rationality under Article 3 of the Constitution, as well as the principles of personal responsibility in criminal law and the rehabilitative purpose to which the penalty must always tend, enshrined in Article 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution.

The resolution of the questions of constitutional legitimacy would directly affect the proceedings pending before the originating judge, should the referring judge decide to convict the accused for the conduct in question.

The referring court observes that constitutionally oriented interpretations of the challenged provision do not appear feasible and that Article 5 of Law No. 36 of April 26, 2019 (Amendments to the Penal Code and other provisions on legitimate defense) increased the penalty for snatch-theft, re-establishing the statutory framework from a minimum of four to a maximum of seven years.

The referring court deems that the mitigation of the sanctioning treatment through the recognition of generic mitigating circumstances pursuant to Article 62-bis of the Penal Code is not feasible, given that these cannot fulfill the function of correcting any disproportion in the statutory limits set by the legislator.

As to the non-manifest groundlessness, the referring court holds that, in the present case, the same ratio underlying the rulings of the Constitutional Court No. 120 of 2023 (for cases of extortion) and No. 86 of 2024 (for the crime of robbery) is present.

The current legal system, following the reforms implemented in recent years to increase penalties and disincentivize the commission of the crime in question, allegedly provides for a discipline contrary to the principles of equality and reasonableness under Article 3 of the Constitution and the principle of the rehabilitative purpose of the penalty, pursuant to Article 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution.

The equation of snatch-theft with theft in a dwelling is considered unreasonable and disproportionate, as the latter offense is characterized by greater harmfulness, given that the provision also protects the sphere of personal domicile.

Likewise, the equalization in the sanctioning treatment, particularly in the statutory minimum, between cases of aggravated snatch-theft and those of simple robbery and extortion, characterized by violence against the person, appears unreasonable.

In the present case, the statutory minimum penalty limit has been raised without introducing a "safety valve" that allows the judge to temper the sanction when the concrete harmfulness of the criminal act does not justify such a severe punishment.

Article 624-bis of the Penal Code, by not providing for an adequate mitigated offense or, at least, a penalty reduction up to one third, therefore unjustifiably equates heterogeneous situations, eroding the discretion of the judge and the possibility of valuing the peculiarities of the concrete case.

The prospect of serving an excessively harsh penalty, as in the present case, is also likely to instill in the convicted person the conviction of being the victim of an unjust abuse, a sentiment that would frustrate any effective rehabilitative process, which penalties must always tend towards.

3.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in both proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, requesting that the questions be declared inadmissible as the remitting orders allegedly lack an adequate and autonomous illustration of the grounds for relevance and those for which the challenged legislation constitutes a violation of the principles of reasonableness and the rehabilitative function of the penalty.

The Court of Florence and the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Court of Milan allegedly limit themselves to asserting the excessiveness of the statutory minimum in relation to acts of minor significance, without, however, explaining the concrete reasons for this alleged disproportion.

Furthermore, even if the petition of the questions raised relates to the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code with regard to the sanctioning treatment for violation of the constitutional parameters under Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution, the related causa petendi focuses on the unreasonableness of the excessively high sanctioning treatment in the minimum, so that the referring court should have provided reasoning regarding this aspect, an obligation that, in the opinion of the Attorney General's Office, was not met, which would constitute grounds for inadmissibility of the raised questions.

Regarding the alleged violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, the remitting orders allegedly err in identifying the interpretative premise from which the constitutional legitimacy proceedings were initiated, namely that the same aspects that led the Constitutional Court to introduce, with the cited judgments No. 120 of 2023 and No. 86 of 2024, a mitigating circumstance for acts of minor significance in the crimes of extortion and robbery, respectively, should also be assessed for the crime of snatch-theft.

In fact, according to the State defense, the cited judgments highlight that the introduction of the sanctioning "safety valve" for minor acts was justified, in the aforementioned offenses, by the need to modulate and render the sanction proportionate to the concrete case, as these are crimes characterized by the essential element of "violence or threat," with a "latitude" such as to include a "plurality of material conduct" not entirely overlapping; conversely, snatch-theft is an offense defined in definite terms.

The Attorney General's Office finally recalls that the Constitutional Court pointed out that the legislative technique, consisting in "carving out" offenses of lesser gravity for the purpose of an overall rebalancing of criminal law, is essentially suited to those cases in which the base crime has a very broad formulation (Judgment No. 88 of 2019 is cited).

Considered in Law

1.– The Ordinary Court of Florence, first Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge (reg. ord. no. 246 of 2024), raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, in reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it does not provide for a reduction of the penalty imposed for the crime of snatch-theft, not exceeding one third, when, due to the nature, type, means, methods, or circumstances of the action, or the particular slightness of the damage or danger, the act is of minor significance.

The referring court believes, first of all, that the principle of reasonableness is violated because snatch-theft, lacking a minor significance mitigation, is characterized by an exceptional harshness of the sanctioning treatment and, in particular, by a minimum statutory penalty of four years' imprisonment and a fine of EUR 927, a sanction that would not allow, in cases of lesser harmfulness, to keep the penalty within the limits of proportionality with respect to the gravity of the act and the importance of the legal interest infringed.

It also believes that the principle of equality is violated, compared to the crimes of robbery and extortion – which are considered more serious than snatch-theft as they are characterized by violence against the person – for which the mitigating circumstance of minor significance is provided.

Finally, the principle of the rehabilitative purpose of the penalty is considered violated, as this would be an excessive and disproportionate sanction that could not be perceived by the convicted person as "just."

2.– The Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Court of Milan (reg. ord. no. 59 of 2025) also raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, by reference to Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, concerning Article 624-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the Penal Code, with the same petitum.

The referring judge formulates the same criticisms but extends them, in addition to the second paragraph of Article 624-bis of the Penal Code, also to the third paragraph (according to which "[t]he penalty shall be imprisonment from five to ten years and a fine from EUR 1,000 to EUR 2,500 if the crime is aggravated by one or more of the circumstances provided for in the first paragraph of Article 625 or if one or more of the circumstances indicated in Article 61 occurs"), which identifies different and more severe penalties in the case of aggravated snatch-theft.

The originating judge further holds that the principle of equality is violated because snatch-theft is equated, in terms of sanctioning treatment, to theft in a dwelling, the latter being an offense characterized by greater harmfulness, given that this crime is intended to protect domicile, a constitutionally protected legal interest.

3.– Given the correspondence of the petitum and the parameters invoked, and acknowledging that the grounds for complaint are similar and largely overlapping, all aimed at complaining about the excessiveness of the statutory minimum provided for the crime of snatch-theft and requesting the introduction of the minor significance mitigation, the orders may be joined and decided jointly.

4.– The State Attorney General's Office objects to the inadmissibility of the constitutional legitimacy questions due to a lack of reasoning regarding relevance and non-manifest groundlessness, and for incoherence of the petitum in relation to the causa petendi.

The censures allegedly focus, more than on the unreasonableness of the absence of the minor significance mitigation, on the excessiveness of the sanctioning treatment in the minimum.

The aforementioned complaints would also be inadmissible due to an erroneous interpretative premise, since, contrary to the crimes of extortion and robbery for which this Court introduced the minor significance circumstance, respectively, with Judgments No. 120 of 2023 and No. 86 of 2024, snatch-theft is characterized by well-defined elements, so that it would not be possible to identify cases of minor significance of the act.

5.– The objections are unfounded.

5.1.– Regarding the lack of reasoning, the referring judges have in fact adequately argued the relevance of the questions both by precisely reporting the charges in which the concrete conduct they are required to judge is described clearly and in detail, and by plausibly setting out the reasons that lead them to believe, in the concrete case, that minor significance acts may be present, and they have finally set out the reasons why the minimum statutory penalty provided for snatch-theft would be excessive.

In particular, as to the alleged absence of adequate and autonomous illustration of the reasons why the challenged statutory minimum would be too high for acts of minor significance, both orders plausibly reason about the excessiveness of the sanctioning treatment compared to the concrete hypotheses that the judges are called upon to judge and which both deem to be of such low disvalue as not to justify a statutory minimum of four years' imprisonment.

According to constant constitutional jurisprudence, the reasoning on relevance formulated by the originating judge is subject to a mere external review by this Court, limited to ascertaining that the reasoning is not implausible, manifestly erroneous, and contradictory, with regard to the applicability of the norm in the main proceedings (ex plurimis, Judgments No. 137 and No. 129 of 2025, No. 122 and No. 23 of 2024). This review does not extend to an autonomous examination of the elements that led the originating judge to certain conclusions, as this Court can only review such an assessment if it appears absolutely baseless.

Furthermore, both orders focus on the aspects of extrinsic unreasonableness of the challenged provision, identifying in part divergent tertiae comparationis (the order registered under no. 246 of the register of orders of 2024 insists, in particular, on cases of minor significance extortion and robbery; the order registered under no. 59 of the register of orders of 2025 highlights the undue equation between theft in a dwelling and snatching, on the one hand, and that between aggravated snatch-theft and simple robbery and extortion, on the other), but all coherent and homogeneous with respect to the challenged provision.

5.2.– The objection concerning the lack of relevance of the questions due to the unsuitability of the petitum to eliminate the constitutional violation and its incoherence with the causa petendi is equally unfounded.

Regarding, in particular, the order registered under no. 59 of the register of orders of 2025, although Article 624-bis, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code provides for the so-called "total" "armoring" of the aggravating circumstances under Article 625 of the Penal Code, it is always true that, even if mitigating circumstances cannot be deemed equivalent or prevailing, the provision establishes that "the penalty reductions shall be applied to the amount of the penalty resulting from the increase consequent to the aforesaid aggravating circumstances."

The provision therefore requires that the increase for the aforementioned aggravations must always be applied, but establishes that, once this penalty increase is performed, the mitigating circumstance of minor significance can be applied.

This results in the relevance of the questions, since, should they be accepted, the judge could, in any case, apply a penalty reduction resulting from the minor significance circumstance, even if it must be related to the penalty determined at the conclusion of the penalty increase provided for the aggravation.

5.3.– As to the objected incoherence of the petitum in relation to the causa petendi, it is observed that, in light of constitutional jurisprudence, there may be talk of a contradiction in the petitum that leads to the inadmissibility of the question only when the argumentative modalities of the remitting order do not allow for a clear identification of the content and "direction" of the complaints, hypothesizing interventions of a different and opposing nature (ex plurimis, Judgments No. 138 of 2024, No. 221 of 2023 and No. 205 of 2021).

In the present case, the "direction" of the complaints appears clear, consisting in the request for the possibility of imposing a lower penalty than that provided by the statutory minimum for simple or aggravated snatch-theft, in cases of minor significance.

5.4.– Finally, the objection of inadmissibility due to an erroneous interpretative premise is unfounded because it is an objection that pertains to the merits (ex plurimis, Judgments No. 101 and No. 23 of 2025 and No. 131 of 2024).

6.– Preliminarily, this Court deems it necessary to briefly reconstruct the legislative evolution of the crime of snatch-theft (also simply called "snatching").

In the original structure of the Penal Code of 1930 ("Rocco Code"), both theft in a dwelling and snatch-theft were contemplated in Article 625 of the Penal Code, respectively under number 1) ("if the perpetrator, to commit the act, enters or remains in a building or other place intended for a dwelling") and under number 4) ("if the act is committed [...] by snatching the object from the person's hand or body"), as simple special aggravations of theft, punished, at that time, in the basic form under art. 624 of the Penal Code, with imprisonment up to three years and, therefore, with a minimum penalty of fifteen days' imprisonment.

The social alarm generated by the perceived spread of thefts and the relevant danger to individual security led the legislator in 2001, with art. 2 of Law No. 128 of March 26, 2001 (Legislative interventions on the protection of citizen safety) to eliminate the two aggravating hypotheses from the text of art. 625 of the Penal Code, which were transferred to a new art. 624-bis of the Penal Code and transformed into autonomous criminal offenses.

The legislator's intent was, in particular, to isolate two manifestations of theft considered rather significant and alarming and, by transforming them into autonomous criminal offenses, to remove them from the balancing mechanism of circumstances under art. 69 of the Penal Code.

Thus, the possibility for the judge to neutralize the penalty increase provided for the aggravated hypothesis, through the judgment of equivalence with any opposite circumstances or in cases where mitigating circumstances were deemed prevailing, ceased.

The emphasis placed at the time on these two peculiar types of theft was justified because, in addition to the patrimonial offense, there was also an infringement of interests of a more eminently personal nature: this is the case for theft in a dwelling, where the act occurs in the domicile, as well as for snatch-theft, where the subtraction is carried out through violence that, although indirect, ends up involving the victim of the patrimonial aggression.

Over the years, the offense has been the subject of various legislative interventions that have modified its sanctioning discipline, with a strong tightening of the punitive response.

Initially, with art. 1, paragraph 6, of Law No. 103 of June 23, 2017 (Amendments to the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penitentiary System), the statutory framework was raised, for the basic offense, to imprisonment from three to six years plus a fine, and for the aggravated offense, from four to ten years plus a fine; this legislative amendment also "armored," completely removing them from the balancing judgment with any opposite circumstances, the hypotheses of aggravated snatch-theft pursuant to art. 625 of the Penal Code (hypotheses that are, moreover, extremely frequent).

As a result of the "armoring," any reductions are now applied, pursuant to the last paragraph of art. 624-bis of the Penal Code, to the amount of the penalty resulting from the increase for the aforementioned aggravations.

Most recently, with Law No. 36 of 2019, the penalty of imprisonment was further increased, reaching the current measure: from four to seven years plus a fine for the basic offense (first paragraph of art. 624-bis of the Penal Code), from five to ten years plus a fine for the aggravated hypothesis (third paragraph of art. 624-bis of the Penal Code).

Article 3, paragraph 1, of the aforementioned law also intervened on the text of Article 165 of the Penal Code, establishing that "[i]n the case of conviction for the offense provided for by Article 624-bis, the conditional suspension of the sentence is in any case subject to the full payment of the amount due for compensation for damages to the victim."

The result is, therefore, an overall sanctioning framework of undeniable severity, which this Court has repeatedly highlighted, noting that "the punitive pressure currently exerted regarding offenses against property has now become extremely relevant" (Judgment No. 190 of 2020; in the same sense, Judgments No. 259 and No. 117 of 2021): this derives not only from the provision of a substantial statutory minimum, such as the currently effective one of four years plus a fine, but also from the legislative choice to preclude the balancing of any mitigating circumstances (with the exception of minority and the hypotheses of post-factum collaboration under art. 625-bis of the Penal Code), with respect to the aggravating circumstances of the crime in question, which start the base penalty from five years' imprisonment plus a fine.

7.– After outlining the legislative evolution of snatch-theft within offenses against property, it is necessary to address the current wording of Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, according to which: "[t]o the same penalty as provided in the first paragraph [imprisonment from four to seven years and a fine from EUR 927 to EUR 1,500] is subject whoever unlawfully appropriates movable property belonging to another, by taking it from the person holding it, with the aim of deriving profit for themselves or others, by snatching it from the person's hand or body. The penalty shall be imprisonment from five to ten years and a fine from EUR 1,000 to EUR 2,500 if the crime is aggravated by one or more of the circumstances provided for in the first paragraph of Article 625 or if one or more of the circumstances indicated in Article 61 occurs. Mitigating circumstances, other than those provided for in Articles 98 [perpetrator at least fourteen but under eighteen years of age] and 625-bis [perpetrator who has enabled the identification of accomplices or those who have purchased, received or concealed the stolen property or have otherwise intervened to have it purchased, received or concealed], concurrent with one or more of the aggravating circumstances referred to in Article 625, cannot be deemed equivalent or prevailing over these, and the penalty reductions shall be applied to the amount of the penalty resulting from the increase consequent to the aforesaid aggravating circumstances]."

The referring courts request that this provision be declared constitutionally illegitimate, insofar as it does not provide that the penalty is reduced by an amount not exceeding one third when, due to the nature, type, means, methods, or circumstances of the action, or the particular slightness of the damage or danger, the act is of minor significance, for violation of Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

8.– On the merits, the questions are unfounded.

8.1.– It should be recalled that this Court has progressively extended the "indefinite" mitigation of minor significance (or lesser gravity) of the act to numerous criminal offenses for which the legislator has provided particularly high statutory minimums: "to extortionate sequestration ([Judgment No. 68 of 2012]), to military sabotage (Judgment No. 244 of 2022), to extortion (Judgment No. 120 of 2023), to robbery (Judgment No. 86 of 2024), to child pornography (Judgment No. 91 of 2024), and most recently to permanent disfigurement or scarring of the face (Judgment No. 83 of 2025)" (Judgment No. 113 of 2025).

This Court has highlighted that "in addition to the harshness of the statutory minimum, the common feature of the offenses subject to these rulings is the typical latitude of the criminal fact, such as to encompass 'episodes markedly dissimilar, in criminological terms and in the degree of disvalue'" (Judgment No. 83 of 2025, referring to the crime of permanent facial disfigurement under art. 583-quinquies of the Penal Code).

The same concept was reaffirmed in Judgment No. 113 of 2025 (concerning the crime of kidnapping for extortion purposes under art. 630 of the Penal Code), which states that "the specific function of the mitigation" is that of "mitigating a sanctioning response calibrated by the legislator with reference to a central core of criminal types generally characterized by high disvalue, but which would prove disproportionate if applied in relation to facts that, while integrating all the requirements of the abstract offense, are concretely characterized by a markedly lower disvalue, being rather at the margins of the criminal offense."

It has also been stated that "in the constitutional legitimacy review of the proportionality of the penalty, the particularly broad wording of the challenged provision, whose normative latitude is such as to encompass fact patterns significantly diversified on the criminological level and in the degree of disvalue, assumes a central role; and precisely in these cases the need to provide for mitigations has been emphasized in order to guarantee the possibility of graduating and individualizing the sanction with respect to the specific disvalue of the individual conduct and ensure compliance with the principles set by Articles 3 and 27 of the Constitution (ex multis, Judgments No. 120 of 2023, No. 244 of 2022, No. 117 of 2021, No. 88 of 2019, No. 106 of 2014 and No. 68 of 2012)" (Judgment No. 91 of 2024 referring to the crime of production of child pornography under art. 600-ter of the Penal Code).

In the same ruling, this Court noted that "the failure to provide a 'safety valve' that allows the judge to modulate the penalty, in order to adapt it to the concrete gravity of the act [...], can lead to the imposition of a sanction that is not proportionate whenever the act itself is completely immune from the aspects of social alarm that induced the legislator to establish a statutory minimum of considerable harshness for this type of crime" (Judgment No. 120 of 2023).

Indeed, the very fact that the minor significance circumstance has been introduced in the most diverse crimes suggests that it is precisely the possibility of identifying conduct that in concrete terms significantly deviates from the abstract offensive scope of the crime that makes the introduction of this "safety valve" constitutionally obligatory, which allows the penalty to be adapted to the concrete harmfulness of the act, according to the principles of equality and proportionality.

8.2.– It must be assessed here whether this mitigation should also apply to snatch-theft, hypothesizing the possible manifestations of the crime to verify the need to introduce a "safety valve" for acts that, while integrating all the requirements of the abstract offense, are concretely characterized by a markedly lower disvalue, being at the margins of the criminal offense.

Well, according to the unequivocal jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, "'the snatching' referred to in art. 624[-bis] of the Penal Code [is] characterized by some degree of violence, albeit exerted on the object and not on the person, directly aimed at the dispossession of the property" (Court of Cassation, fourth criminal section, judgment November 7, 2024 - January 27, 2025, no. 2985; in the same sense, fifth criminal section, judgment June 9 - October 26, 2016, no. 44976).

It has also been affirmed that, for the application of Article 624-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, "it is necessary [...] that the victim materially perceives the violent action directed at the res [...] Otherwise [...] theft by sleight of hand would be constituted" (Court of Cassation, fifth criminal section, judgment June 21 - September 20, 2022, no. 34740).

Moreover, the same Court of Cassation had already affirmed in the past that "snatching is a theft that consists of a violent act exerted on an object which is suddenly detached from the person of the holder in such a way that the latter perceives the violence of the act" (Court of Cassation, second section, judgment November 24, 1981 - May 8, 1982, no. 4813).

It thus emerges that in snatch-theft, the appropriation of another's property by the perpetrator necessarily occurs with a violence that must be characterized by a certain force, and that the crime is well-defined and extremely "compact" in relation to the homogeneity of its offensive scope.

The intrinsic gravity of snatch-theft is demonstrated by the fact that this crime is always accompanied by violence perceived by the person snatched and by an intrusion into their personal sphere through contact with the perpetrator (even if mediated by the stolen object); furthermore, snatch-theft presents significant dangerousness aspects, as it can easily escalate into a more serious crime and, in any case, cause further harmful consequences (consider the classic example of a person who, following the snatching of a bag or other object by the snatcher, falls to the ground with potential consequences for their own physical integrity), such as to fuel a widespread feeling of insecurity and frustration that affects the quality of life, potentially conditioning the future decisions of members of society regarding their movements.

It is undeniable that the conduct typical of "snatching," as it is directed to snatching an object that is in direct contact with the person from their hand or body, and as the violence is necessarily perceived by the victim, constitutes a violent intrusion into the inviolable personal sphere of the latter, a violent intrusion that does not lend itself to significant gradations in terms of harmfulness.

Moreover, as this Court affirmed with regard to the different offense of theft in a dwelling (Judgment No. 117 of 2021), snatch-theft is also an offense described by Article 624-bis of the Penal Code in rather definite terms, in which acts that deviate significantly from the abstract offensive scope of the offense are not conceivable in concrete terms.

In other words, snatching, by virtue of the aforementioned homogeneity in its concrete offensive scope, does not encompass within itself offenses diversified on the criminological level and in the degree of disvalue, such as to necessitate the acceptance of the question.

8.3.– It must therefore be highlighted that, with regard to the crime of snatch-theft, concrete acts "totally immune from the aspects of social alarm that induced the legislator to establish a statutory minimum of considerable harshness for this type of crime" (Judgment No. 120 of 2023) are not conceivable. Moreover, the very episodes that are the subject of the pending proceedings are characterized by sudden violence; in both cases, the element of surprise was exploited to steal a good of far from negligible value from the victim, and these unequivocally suggest a widespread social alarm.

It follows that no violation of Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, with regard to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the penalty, can be found.

8.4.– As for the alleged disparity of treatment compared to other criminal hypotheses, it is observed that the introduction of the mitigation in question, capable of "personalizing" the penalty by adapting it to the concrete disvalue of the conduct, by virtue of the principle of "personality" of criminal responsibility, established by the first paragraph of Article 27 of the Constitution, is justified for crimes such as robbery and extortion and not for snatch-theft.

Unlike the crime of snatch-theft, in robbery, violence is not an essential element for its configuration; in its place, there can be only a threat, which constitutes something of lesser gravity than any act of violence; the crime of robbery therefore encompasses a series of highly varied conduct, of more modest or very notable gravity, so that the mitigation of minor significance is well justified for it.

The same reasoning can be developed in comparison with the crime of extortion under art. 629 of the Penal Code, for which, with the aforementioned Judgment No. 120 of 2023, the same minor significance mitigation was introduced: this also includes within its scope of application episodes notably dissimilar, in criminological terms and in the degree of disvalue, particularly due to the more or less marked "occasionality" of the criminal initiative, as well as the reduced extent of the harm to the victim and the low utility demanded.

8.5.– Finally, the comparison with theft in a dwelling does not seem relevant, if only because this crime also does not provide for the mitigating circumstance of the minor significance of the act, nor can an unreasonable assimilation of the offenses provided for in the first and second paragraphs of art. 624-bis of the Penal Code be asserted in terms of penalties: while it is true that theft in a dwelling, in addition to property, infringes the inviolability of the domicile (art. 14 of the Constitution), snatch-theft involves in the typical harm not only patrimonial values but also those inherent in the physical integrity of the person.

8.6.– The same considerations apply, a fortiori, also to the aggravated hypothesis provided for in the third paragraph of art. 624-bis of the Penal Code, which differs from the basic offense only by the element of greater gravity (common aggravations under art. 61 of the Penal Code and specific aggravations under art. 625 of the Penal Code) which justifies the penalty increase.

Snatch-theft, therefore, even in its aggravated form – which can only lead to an overall assessment of the harm in terms of greater gravity – does not comprise within itself facts characterized by a degree of disvalue such as to necessitate the introduction, by this Court, of the mitigating circumstance of minor significance.

Furthermore, it cannot fail to be noted that "the 'privileged force' of the aggravations under the combined provisions of art. 624-bis, fourth paragraph, and art. 625 of the Penal Code yields not only to the mitigating circumstance of minority under art. 98 of the Penal Code, but also to that of the perpetrator's collaboration under art. 625-bis of the Penal Code, a mitigating circumstance 'with a special effect,' the latter, specifically introduced by Law No. 128 of 2001, the provision of which contributes to the overall balance of a sanctioning discipline that is certainly severe" (Judgment No. 117 of 2021).

9.– Having established the significant difference between the compared offenses, this Court finds no violation of the principle of equality.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 624-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the Penal Code, raised, overall, in reference to Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Florence, first Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, and by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Court of Milan with the orders indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on September 22, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Angelo BUSCEMA, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Registrar Director

Filed in the Registry on November 27, 2025