JUDGMENT NO. 190

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning a conflict of attribution between powers of the State, arising from the failure by the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the Ordinary Court of Rome and the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the same Court, in relation to the conduct of Giusi Bartolozzi, to initiate the proceedings provided for by Constitutional Law no. 1 of January 16, 1989 (Amendments to Articles 96, 134, and 135 of the Constitution and to Constitutional Law no. 1 of March 11, 1953, and rules concerning proceedings for the offenses referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution) and by Law no. 219 of June 5, 1989 (New provisions concerning ministerial offenses and offenses provided for by Article 90 of the Constitution), brought by the Chamber of Deputies, by means of an appeal notified on July 20, 2026, filed with the registry on the subsequent July 28, 2026, registered under no. 3 of the register of conflicts between powers of the State for 2026, and published in the Official Journal of the Republic no. 31, 1st special series, for the year 2026, merits phase.

Having regard to the appearance in proceedings of the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Rome;

having heard in the public hearing of October 6, 2026, the Judge Rapporteurs Francesco Viganò and Luca Antonini;

having heard counsel Vittorio Manes for the Chamber of Deputies;

having deliberated in the chambers on October 6, 2026.

Rits in Fact

1.– By an appeal notified on July 20, 2026, and filed on the subsequent July 28, the Chamber of Deputies brought a conflict of attribution between powers of the State, alleging that – within the context of the criminal proceedings instituted against the Minister of Justice Carlo Nordio, the Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi, and the Undersecretary of State Alfredo Mantovano for the offenses of refusal of official acts, aiding and abetting, and embezzlement, in connection with the release and repatriation of Osama Almasri – the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the Ordinary Court of Rome (hereinafter also: the Panel) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the same Court (hereinafter also: the Prosecutor’s Office) failed to initiate, «in relation to the overall conduct maintained by Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi», Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Justice at the material time, «the special procedure outlined by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 and Law no. 219 of 1989, omitting the procedural steps provided therein, which are instrumental to the protection of the constitutional prerogatives recognized to the Chambers pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution, and in particular that concerning "the unreviewable assessment that the accused acted for the protection of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or for the pursuit of a paramount public interest”, thereby resulting in the infringement thereof».

1.1.– As to the facts, the applicant states:

– that following a complaint filed by a private citizen regarding the release and repatriation of Osama Almasri, who was arrested in Turin on January 19, 2025, criminal proceedings were initiated against Carlo Nordio, Minister of Justice, Matteo Piantedosi, Minister of the Interior, and Alfredo Mantovano, Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, in relation to the offenses of: refusal of official acts (Article 328, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code), for failing to give effect to the requests for cooperation addressed to Italy by the International Criminal Court; aiding and abetting (Article 378 of the Criminal Code), for having agreed upon the issuance of the expulsion decree for Osama Almasri and his subsequent transfer to Libya via a flight operated by Compagnia Aeronautica Italiana (CAI) spa; and – with reference solely to Minister Piantedosi and Undersecretary Mantovano – embezzlement (Article 314 of the Criminal Code), for the diversion of the aircraft from its intended use and the appropriation of the fuel necessary for the repatriation flight of Osama Almasri;

– that on August 5, 2025, the Panel formulated a request to the Chamber of Deputies for authorization to proceed against the persons under investigation pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution;

– that on October 9, 2025, said request was rejected by the Assembly, resulting in the dismissal of the proceedings by the Panel by means of a decree dated the subsequent October 16;

– that in its request for authorization to proceed, the Panel characterized the statements made by the Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, Giusi Bartolozzi – who was heard during the investigation as a person informed of the facts – as «unreliable and mendacious»;

– that concurrently, the Panel reported Dr. Bartolozzi to the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Rome in relation to the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code (False information to the public prosecutor or to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court), resulting in her registration by the Prosecutor’s Office in the register of notice of offenses for such alleged offense;

– that on October 13, 2025, Group Presidents Bignami, Molinari, Barelli, and Lupi requested the President of the Chamber to invite the Bureau of the Chamber to evaluate the opportunity of «raising a conflict of attribution between powers of the State before the Constitutional Court to protect the prerogatives of the Chamber itself allegedly infringed by the omission-based conduct of the prosecuting judiciary (Panel for Ministerial Offenses of Rome and Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Rome), with regard to the registration, on August 7, 2025, of Dr. Bartolozzi in the register of notice of offenses for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, without transmitting to this branch of Parliament the request for authorization to proceed pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution»;

– that on the basis of the report of the Committee on Parliamentary Authorizations dated November 4, 2025, the Bureau of the Chamber on April 1, 2026, proposed to promote a conflict of attribution between powers of the State before the Assembly;

– that, in the session of April 14, 2026, the Assembly of the Chamber resolved accordingly.

1.2.– The Chamber argues, first of all, the existence of the admissibility requirements of the appeal, specifically maintaining that the branches of Parliament have the competence to decide on requests for authorization to proceed also regarding the so-called «lay suspects», and more specifically those who, while not holding the office of minister, have «conspired in the [ministerial] offense or have committed an offense functionally connected thereto». In the case at hand, the competence of the applicant Chamber to rule on the authorization to proceed against Minister Nordio, a serving member of Parliament, «attrac[ts] the competence to rule also on the requests concerning the co-suspects».

It then recalls that the branch of Parliament competent pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution could express «its own assessment on the nature of the act charged against the President of the Council of Ministers, or a minister, provided that it is placed within the procedure for a ministerial offense initiated by the judicial authority, or is instrumental to claiming that said procedure be followed, and provided that such assessment results exclusively in the reaction permitted by the legal order against a qualification, by the judiciary, of the offense as ordinary rather than ministerial, or in recourse [to the] Court by means of a conflict of attribution» (reference is made to Judgment no. 87 of 2012 of this Court).

Precisely this factual scenario would recur in the present case, in which «the choice to proceed through ordinary channels against the Chief of Cabinet, even though it pertains to the Judiciary, has prevented the Chamber, partly due to the failure to communicate to it the decision concerning the non-ministerial nature of the offense, from making any assessment on the "derived” ministerial nature of the offense charged against Dr. Bartolozzi».

1.3.– The applicant then illustrates the reasons supporting the merits of the appeal, which aims to assert a twofold violation.

Firstly, the appeal complains that both the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in transmitting its requests pursuant to Article 6 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of January 16, 1989 (Amendments to Articles 96, 134, and 135 of the Constitution and to Constitutional Law no. 1 of March 11, 1953, and rules concerning proceedings for the offenses referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution), and the Panel for Ministerial Offenses – «especially in the face of the assessment pointedly solicited by the Public Prosecutor of Rome in his opinion of July 7, 2025» –, omitted to identify Dr. Bartolozzi as a «conspirator in the offenses hypothesized against the Ministers». In particular, the aforementioned bodies failed to follow the special procedure outlined by the aforementioned constitutional law and by Law no. 219 of June 5, 1989 (New provisions concerning ministerial offenses and offenses provided for by Article 90 of the Constitution), omitting to transmit to the Chamber of Deputies the request for authorization to proceed also against her on the grounds of conspiracy and, in any event – in the face of the exclusion of her liability as a co-conspirator –, omitting the «communication [...] of the dismissal of her position», pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

Secondly, the appeal complains that the request for authorization to proceed against Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code was omitted, despite this being an «offense connected to the ministerial ones such that the ascertainment thereof encompas[ses] as a primary matter the ascertainment of the alleged ministerial offenses, thus frustrating the protection of the function guaranteed by Article 96 of the Constitution». By virtue of a constitutionally oriented interpretation of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, such provision should be deemed applicable also to «subjects lacking the office of minister but "involved” in "ministerial offenses”» even in the case of teleological connection provided for by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, failing which it would be constitutionally illegitimate.

1.4.– Before arguing more analytically the two alleged violations, the applicant preliminarily observes that it follows from the rules of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 that, save for cases in which criminal proceedings are immediately halted due to the manifest unfoundedness of the notice of the offense or for further hypotheses leading thereto, the interested Chamber should «be placed in a position to have adequate knowledge of the charges» brought against members of the Government, «in order to express the assessments falling within its purview», namely to pronounce itself first «regarding the ministerial nature of the hypothesized offense» and, consequently, «regarding the motivations and purposes to which the hypothetical ministerial unlawful conduct may be directed».

Confirming the indispensability of this parliamentary step is the provision set forth in Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, establishing the obligation for the judicial authority to inform the parliamentary body «also in the event of final dismissal not accompanied by any further provision concerning the translatio judicii».

Citing Judgment no. 241 of 2009 of this Court, the applicant maintains that the implementing regulations of Article 96 of the Constitution have the ratio of «balancing the guarantee of the governmental function and the equality of all citizens before the law», such that «[t]o achieve a reasonable balance between these two principles, both constitutional provisions and ordinary law provisions aim to place both the judicial authority and the political authority in a position to protect, in their mutual relations: the former, the power-duty to prosecute offenses committed by any citizen, regardless of the office held; the latter, the power-duty to implement concretely the guarantee provided by Article 96 of the Constitution».

1.5.– In support of the first ground of complaint, the applicant notes that in the request for authorization to proceed sent to the Chamber on August 5, 2025, by the Panel, the statements of various persons informed of the facts, heard during the investigations, are reported, «attributing to Dr. Bartolozzi a leading role played [...] in the affair concerning the repatriation of the Libyan commander Almasri». In particular, the applicant emphasizes:

– that Dr. Luigi Giuseppe Birritteri, an executive of the Ministry of Justice, defined the figure of the Chief of Cabinet as «the minister's alter ego», specifying that «when the Department Head writes to the Chief of Cabinet it is as if they were writing to the Minister»;

– that Dr. Cristina Lucchini, also an executive, acknowledged that communications with the International Criminal Court «had been centralized in the Cabinet»;

– that Dr. Giovanni Caravelli, Director of the External Information and Security Agency (AISE), reported that the Chief of Cabinet had been «present at all meetings where the issue of Almasri's repatriation was discussed»;

– that from the summary witness statements given by Dr. Bartolozzi herself, it emerges that the latter used «the personal pronoun "we” (and never "they”) in illustrating every event concerning the initiatives and decisions taken on the "Almasri affair”»: an element that would render evident «how the Chief of Cabinet did not play the role of a mere "external spectator”».

The applicant also points out that the Panel, expressing its views on the content of the meetings with top institutional figures, observed that, according to what was reported by the other participants, the subject of such meetings «had been not only the legal question on the legitimacy or otherwise of the arrest, but also what would have been done in the event that the Court of Appeal ordered Almasri's release, agreeing also, in such meetings, on the necessity/opportunity of expelling and repatriating him via a CAI flight».

The applicant therefore complains that, although the Panel accounted «for how Dr. Bartolozzi's role was central and [she] actively collaborated in Almasri's repatriation, coordinating for this purpose the activity of Minister Nordio», the Panel itself considered the Chief of Cabinet extraneous to the hypothesized offenses, proceeding to hear her as a person informed of the facts.

On this point, after recalling that the Public Prosecutor himself, in the opinion rendered pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, «precisely by reason of the role described above», had expressly deemed the overall conduct of Dr. Bartolozzi subsumable «under an offense hypothesis from a twofold perspective: either that of conspiracy in the offenses attributed to Minister Nordio, or that provided for by Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code», the applicant remarks that, «in the face of such explicit request» on the twofold possible qualification, «the Panel nevertheless omitted any formal, explicit, and reasoned feedback, subsequently limiting itself» to transmitting to the public prosecutor a report for the aforementioned offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code.

The Panel's conduct, consisting in having «omitted to take due and formal determinations regarding the configurability against Dr. Bartolozzi of conspiracy in the ministerial offense», would thus integrate «an omission of the procedural steps» provided for by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 and Law no. 219 of 1989, which, «if observed, would reasonably have led – on the basis of the considerations made by the Panel itself and recalled above, as well as the assessments made by the Prosecutor's Office in the aforementioned opinion – to the request for authorization to proceed» also against the aforementioned person, thereby allowing the Chamber «to assess the existence or otherwise of those paramount interests of the State to the protection of which the authorization itself is ordained».

In this instance, one would witness «a break in logical-legal consequentiality» between the reconstruction of Dr. Bartolozzi's role in the Almasri affair, which the Panel deemed «central or in any case secondary», and the «total failure to consider the same [...] for the purposes of conspiracy in the offense ascribed to the Ministers».

This finding would serve to integrate the consummation of the alleged infringement, considering that the assessment made by the Chamber concerning the existence of the paramount reasons referred to in Article 9, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 «would remain devoid, and thereby impaired», of a feature of Dr. Bartolozzi's conduct, which would appear «intrinsically intertwined with that of the Ministers, thereby sharing, at least in the abstract and without prejudice to the autonomous and specific assessment by the Chamber, the same ratio».

1.5.1.– All of the above «also in relation to the specificity of the role of Chief of Cabinet»: a figure falling among those «of direct collaboration», of which the Minister avails himself «[for] the exercise of the functions» of «political-administrative direction», as provided by the combined provisions of Articles 4, paragraph 1, and 14, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Legislative Decree no. 165 of March 30, 2001 (General rules on the organization of labor employed by public administrations).

The collaboration between the Minister and the Chief of Cabinet would thus be configured as a «participation [in ministerial direction] on the part of the serving office»; so much so that the Chief of Cabinet, «while not holding the ministerial office», certainly could not be considered «any ordinary "layperson”», constituting «a sort [of] longa manus of the Minister», assisting his action «in every way for the realization of government policy». Therefore, «[a]lready by virtue of her function [...], barring different evidence and/or internal dissents, the chief of cabinet maintains a demeanor that typically "conspires” with the (functional) action of the Minister».

1.5.2.– The applicant also recalls the orientation of criminal case law, according to which, «for the purposes of configurability of conspiracy of persons in an offense, the conspiratorial contribution assumes relevance not only when it has causal efficacy, posing as a condition of the injurious event, but also when it takes the form of a facilitating contribution» (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, Sixth Criminal Section, Judgment no. 36818 of May 22-September 25, 2012), namely «a positive participatory contribution – moral or material – to the criminal conduct of another, which is realized even merely by assuring the other conspirator of the stimulus to criminal action or a greater sense of security, thereby making manifest a clear adherence to the criminal conduct» (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, First Criminal Section, Judgment no. 8400 of November 21, 2024-February 28, 2025).

In the face of such case law, «the choice to consider the position of the Chief of Cabinet as extraneous to the hypothesized facts», and therefore as a mere person informed of the facts, would place itself «in contrast with the rules on the conspiracy of persons in an offense and, consequently, also with the principle of mandatory institution of criminal proceedings enshrined in Article 112 of the Constitution».

In light of constitutional case law (reference is made to Judgment no. 58 of 2026), this principle would imply an obligation on the public prosecutor to conduct tendentially complete investigations, in order to allow the prosecuting body to assess the existence of evidence such as to make reasonably foreseeable the conviction of the defendant at trial.

Moreover, in the applicant Chamber's opinion, the same principle would presuppose first of all that the obligation to register the notice of the offense is not circumvented, without prejudice to the fact that the defensive guarantees granted by the law to the person under investigation «must be deemed fully operational even in the absence of registration» (reference is made to Order no. 307 of 2005 of this Court).

Moving in this direction would be the new Articles 335-ter and 335-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure – introduced by Article 15, paragraph 1, letter b), of Legislative Decree no. 150 of October 10, 2022 (Implementation of Law no. 134 of September 27, 2021, containing delegation to the Government for the efficiency of the criminal trial, as well as regarding restorative justice and provisions for the swift definition of judicial proceedings) – which, respectively, allow the judge for preliminary investigations to order the public prosecutor to register in the register of notice of offenses the person to whom the fact for which proceedings are held must be attributed, and regulate the procedure, which can be activated by the person under investigation, for ascertaining the timeliness of the registration of the notice of the offense concerning him and his name.

In the applicant's opinion, there would therefore be «no doubt [...] that in the context of a conflict of attribution the legal system allows the assessment also of the correct exercise of the power of registration, where it has had the effect of depriving Parliament of certain prerogatives».

1.5.3.– From yet another perspective, the appeal recalls the case law of the Joint Chambers of the Court of Cassation, which does not make the qualification to be attributed to the declarant (person informed of the facts or co-suspect) dependent on formal acts such as registration in the register of suspects, since the judge may «in any case "independently” appreciate, ex post (and provided, of course, that he has factual elements suitable to allow him such a judgment) the correct qualification to be attributed to the "declarant”». In particular, there would come into play «the power to verify in substance – beyond the finding of formal indices, such as the already occurred or non-occurred nominative registration in the register of notice of offenses – the attributability, to the declarant, of the quality of suspect at the moment in which the statements themselves are made» (reference is made to the Judgment of the Joint Criminal Chambers, no. 15208 of February 25-April 21, 2010).

Furthermore, the applicant emphasizes how, regarding the prohibition on the use of statements of a person who should have been heard from the outset in the capacity of defendant or person under investigation, established by Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, legitimacy case law has noted that the applicability thereof cannot be made subordinate «to the actual registration of the suspect» in the register of notice of offenses, since otherwise it would be left «to the arbitrio of the public prosecutor the operativeness of a sanction destined precisely to stigmatize his conduct» (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, Sixth Criminal Section, Judgment no. 25425 of March 4-September 8, 2020).

Also from the highlighted perspective, the applicant therefore deems it evident that, if the ordinary judge can independently appreciate «ex post» the correct qualification to be attributed to the person called upon to make statements, whether as a conspirator in the offense or a person informed of the facts, «a fortiori the Constitutional Court can do so in the context of conflicts of attribution, where the alleged deprivation of Parliament's prerogatives depends thereon».

1.5.4.– The applicant deduces that «[t]he omitted identification of the prerequisites for the integration of the conspiracy of persons in ministerial offenses» would determine, «firstly, the deprivation to the Chamber of the prerogatives provided for by Article 96 of the Constitution», since the request for authorization to proceed formulated for Ministers Nordio and Piantedosi should, if anything, have been extended also to Dr. Bartolozzi; secondly, such omission would determine the illegitimacy of taking summary statements from the Chief of Cabinet which are alleged to be false, given the prohibition, provided for by Article 197, paragraph 1, letter a), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to take as witnesses «co-defendants of the same offense or persons charged in connected proceedings pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), unless an irrevocable judgment of acquittal, conviction, or application of penalty pursuant to Article 444 has been pronounced against them». In other words, had conspiracy in the ministerial offense been recognized, the offense now hypothesized against Dr. Bartolozzi «could not even have hypothetically materialized».

As to the first of the two profiles, relevant for the purposes of the conflict of attribution between powers, the applicant Chamber acknowledges that «the legal evaluation of the facts and [their] criminal relevance» falls, in this instance, to the Panel for Ministerial Offenses and, in the manner provided by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

However, if as an effect of the legal framing operated by the Panel there were to result, as in the present case, «a (hypothetical) deprivation of the prerogatives pertaining to the Chamber of Deputies, in compliance with the principle of separation of powers», it would fall to the Chamber itself to promote a conflict of attribution between powers, since the non-observance of procedural rules would translate into an infringement of the prerogatives referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution.

The situation at hand would be, mutatis mutandis, similar to that of the so-called "asystematic” dismissal, which occurs when the Panel for Ministerial Offenses concludes regarding the ordinary nature of the offense charged against the Minister and therefore transmits the files to the Prosecutor's Office so that it may proceed in ordinary forms. A situation, the latter, which also pertains to the legal qualification of the fact, and which likewise requires information to be given to Parliament, pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, so that the competent Chamber has the opportunity to assess whether to raise a conflict of attribution (reference is made to Judgments no. 87 of 2012 and no. 241 of 2009 of this Court).

In both situations, the assessment of the judicial authority risks precluding Parliament from «the possibility of assessing the prerequisites for the application of Article 96 of the Constitution and, therefore, of considering the potential prejudice that may derive to governmental activity». Parliament should therefore be granted the possibility to raise a conflict of attribution between powers of the State «entering into the merits of the "ministerial” qualification of the hypothesized offense», which falls to the judiciary, «in the event that a layperson is excluded from the roster of suspects for whom there are clear elements pointing to his conspiracy in the offense ascribed to the Minister».

Moreover, observes the Chamber, «that such an assessment – analogous to that performed in the case of so-called asystematic dismissal – was accomplished is demonstrated by the fact that [...] the Public Prosecutor, in the context of an opinion to the Tribunal of Ministers, expressly invited the Panel to perform an assessment of the conduct maintained by Dr. Bartolozzi, also for the purposes of a verification concerning the eventual ministeriality of the offense».

The appeal for conflict of attribution would precisely be functional to assessing whether the choice made by the Panel for Ministerial Offenses regarding the ministeriality or otherwise of the offense «can be said to be correct and whether Parliament's prerogatives have been respected», it being necessary to hold that, otherwise, the full explication of the protections of Article 96 of the Constitution «would depend on unreviewable choices of the Judiciary, potentially erroneous or, worse, even instrumental».

As to the second effect of the denounced omitted identification of the prerequisites for the integration of the conspiracy of persons in the offense, the applicant deduces that, had she been indicated as a conspirator in the offense, Dr. Bartolozzi could not have committed the offense of false statements to the public prosecutor, referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, since a suspect is not bound by the obligation to tell the truth pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the Chamber's opinion, «[o]nly the aforementioned choice to exclude her from the roster of suspects for the offenses charged against the Ministers» would therefore have allowed the Panel to transmit to the Public Prosecutor's Office a report for the aforementioned offense, the ascertainment of which would postulate «the performance of the same investigative and in-depth activity that would have been necessary to ascertain the offenses charged against the Ministers and which was deemed by the Chamber (through the denial of authorization to proceed) prejudicial to governmental activity».

1.6.– Regarding the second ground of complaint, the applicant deduces that – even disregarding the violation deriving from the failure to charge Dr. Bartolozzi with conspiracy in the ministerial offenses – the crime referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code charged against her «should be deemed [...] to fall within the competence of the special Panel for Ministerial Offenses, with the consequence that authorization to proceed should have been requested also for it», considering that the close interdependence existing between that charge and the facts imputed to the Ministers would have required «a unitary treatment of the different offenses».

Indeed, the statements deemed mendacious by the Panel would concern «the same facts for which functional offenses are attributed to the Minister, with the effect that the ascertainment of the falsity or truthfulness of the information provided entails an investigation aimed at scrutinizing the very facts attributed to the Minister», in relation to which, however, authorization to proceed had been denied for the protection of Government activity.

1.6.1.– Having noted moreover that there is no «norm specifically dedicated to regulating whether and in what cases the procedure provided for so-called "ministerial” offenses must be extended to "laypersons”», the applicant deems it «necessary to define what situations concerning "lay subjects” are in which authorization to proceed must be requested to guarantee the full extrication of the purposes underlying the constitutional prerogative referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution»; an in-depth study, the latter, all the more necessary considering that «in the previous regulations» it was expressly provided that the judgment on the Minister's act extended also to third parties, not only in hypotheses of conspiracy, but also in those of connection, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 16 and 27 of Law no. 20 of January 25, 1962 (Rules on proceedings and judgments of accusation).

Within the framework of current legislation, the applicant believes that, while it is indisputable that the Chambers must have the possibility to rule on procedural status also regarding the conspirator in the offense committed by the minister, in the silence of the legislature there should be no obstacles to considering as falling within the prerogative of Article 96 of the Constitution also cases, such as the present one, «which, by reason of a functional connection with the ministerial offense, likewise jeopardize the Minister's function and government activity».

Situations would in fact be conceivable in which autonomous but instrumental conduct, subordinate to those of the minister, are attributable to the subject lacking the ministerial office, «such as to have no raison d’être in the absence of the conduct held by him and likewise functional to government action».

Insofar as immunities are subject to strict interpretation, the special regulation of the ascertainment of offenses stemming from Article 96 of the Constitution, not being connected to the person of the minister, but to the function held by him, should be considered from the perspective of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or a paramount public interest in the exercise of the Government function, both indicated by Article 9, paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

Therefore, concludes the appeal, the protection referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution could not encounter obstacles in the presence of «an offense intimately connected to the ministerial one and such as to determine the same political implications»: «denying authorization to proceed for that committed by the Minister, but not for the connected one attributable to the third party, would equate (at a political level and in terms of repercussions on government activity) to subjecting the Minister himself to trial».

According to the applicant, such a situation would occur in the present case because, on the one hand, the statements whose falsity is alleged «could not even have been requested in the absence of the charge against the Minister»; on the other hand, the hypothesis of the falsity of the statements would be unthinkable «except by presupposing the motive of "covering” the alleged offense of Minister», this purpose coinciding with that of the guarantee referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution, namely the protection of the correct governmental function.

Furthermore, the statements in question would concern facts «pertaining to the institutional activity of the Chief of Cabinet»: a figure, as already highlighted, «entrusted with collaborating with the Minister for the performance of the exercise of political-administrative direction functions».

Finally, since the ascertainment of the offense imputed to Dr. Bartolozzi would necessarily presuppose the investigation of the same facts attributed to the Minister, the reasons that led the Chamber of Deputies to deny authorization to proceed would present themselves «just the same following the registration of Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi in the register of suspects according to ordinary forms».

The aforesaid considerations would impose, in the applicant Chamber's opinion, «a constitutionally oriented interpretation» such as to include, among the cases of authorization to proceed functional to the prerogative referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution, also those of offenses connected to the ministerial one, «which by their nature are functional thereto and entail for their ascertainment the preliminary reconstruction of the facts ascribed to the Minister».

1.6.2.– Alternatively, the applicant urges this Court to raise before itself a question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4 of Law no. 219 of 1989, «in the part in which it unjustifiably fails to provide, in addition to the case "relative to an offense committed by multiple subjects in conspiracy with each other”, also that of multiple offenses in functional connection with the ministerial one – at least if committe[d] in the exercise of the function by subjects who assist the Minister and [...] such as to require the demonstration of the offense ascribed to the Minister – for contrast with Articles 96, 70, 72, 94, 95, 105, 3 of the Constitution».

The combined provisions of the invoked constitutional rules, regulating the division between powers of the State and attributing to each its sphere of operativeness, would justify the possibility of limiting the ascertainment of offenses that affect the government function, according to the canon of reasonableness referred to in Article 3 of the Constitution.

1.7.– In conclusion, the Chamber of Deputies asks this Court to rule, «alternatively:

a) that the Panel for Ministerial Offenses and the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Rome were aware of elements, present from the outset and, in any event, confirmed during the investigations, such as to make it mandatory to consider Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi as a conspirator in the offenses of the Minister of Justice Nordio and that therefore the request for authorization to proceed should have been extended also to her figure; in any event, having made the assessment of non-ministeriality of the conduct, the outcome of such assessment should have been communicated to the Chamber in order to allow it to guarantee the protection of its constitutional attributes;

b) that – possibly after raising before itself a question of constitutional legitimacy for contrast with Articles 96, 70, 72, 94, 95, 105, 3 of the Constitution of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219/1989, where it fails to mention also the cases of functional connection with the offenses of the Ministers for conduct attributable to "lay” subjects – offenses committed by third parties must also be considered "ministerial” if functionally connected with those of the Minister and such as to frustrate, if ascertained, the correct governmental function and that therefore the discipline dictated by Constitutional Law no. 1/1989 also applies to the hypothesis of the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code attributed to Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi and the transmission of the files to the Panel for Ministers and the subsequent necessary request for authorization to proceed is extended also to that case».

2.– By Order no. 122 of 2026, this Court deemed the subjective and objective prerequisites of the conflict to be met and declared it admissible pursuant to Article 37, first paragraph, of Law no. 11 of March 11, 1953 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), ordering the notification of the introductory appeal and of the admissibility order to the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the Court of Rome and to the Public Prosecutor at the same Court, as well as to the Senate of the Republic, «in view of the identity of the constitutional position of the two branches of Parliament in relation to the questions of principle to be treated».

3.– The Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Rome entered an appearance in the proceedings, in the person of the Public Prosecutor and two deputy public prosecutors, asking that both the conflict of attribution promoted by the Chamber and the hypothesized questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989 be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

3.1.– The respondent first acknowledges that it issued against Dr. Bartolozzi a direct summons decree for trial regarding the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, charging her with having made false statements and in any case concealed what she knew to the Panel, which had heard her as a person informed of the facts in the criminal proceedings against Minister Carlo Nordio and others.

3.2.– The Prosecutor's Office therefore raises an objection of inadmissibility regarding the first ground of appeal, concerning the failure to register Dr. Bartolozzi as a conspirator in the offenses attributed to the Ministers.

The Chamber's appeal would in fact ask this Court for a review of the assessment of the indices of the offense, potentially resulting in an order to the Prosecutor's Office to effect the registration of the relative *notitia criminis*. This is not provided for by rules of the Constitution or of equivalent rank, and would transform the conflict of attribution into an «atypical instrument of challenge directed against judicial acts» (reference is made to Judgment no. 87 of 2012), without, moreover, «complete copies of the acts of the criminal proceedings [...] in which Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi should have been registered» having been produced, which would in any case deprive this Court of the tools suitable for making the requested assessment.

3.3.– In any event, the denounced infringement would be unfounded on the merits, since Article 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure identifies exclusively the public prosecutor as the holder of the power-duty of registration in the register of notice of offenses, without prejudice to hypotheses of judicial review over the exercise of said power.

Such a system would not suffer exceptions even in the special procedure for ascertaining ministerial offenses, since «the power of initial registration» falls to the office of the public prosecutor indicated by Article 6 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, and «judicial control over the correctness of the registrations [...] is entrusted to the Tribunal of Ministers and, in the event of the exercise of criminal action, to the Trial Judge».

In the present case, the hypothesis of «conspiracy of the *extraneus* in the ministerial offense» was expressly excluded by the Panel for Ministerial Offenses, «a body constitutionally mandated to perform such vetting», since it ordered registration against [Dr.] Bartolozzi for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code «with careful reasoning shared on the merits, which excluded the existence of indices of co-authorship against her, the ascertainment of which posed as a logical *prius* to the aforesaid registration».

The Prosecutor's Office extensively recalls Judgment no. 87 of 2012, highlighting how the present case is different from the one subject to the cited ruling, which concerned the ministerial or non-ministerial nature of the fact registered in the register of notice of offenses and attributed to a minister. Today's applicant, instead, asks this Court «to rule as a priority on the correct constitutional qualification to be given to a fact not registered in the register of notice of offenses, namely the hypothetical conspiracy in the ministerial offenses». From a subjective point of view, then, the offense now discussed is hypothesized against a subject different from the minister: and this through a «twofold logical step offered by the prior requalification of Giusi Bartolozzi's procedural status in the sense of a substantial suspect» in the criminal proceedings for the ministerial offense and by the «subsequent, indirect recognition of the chrism of ministeriality to the offense-fact subject to ascertainment» in the criminal proceedings for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code. «The request thus understood», besides finding no precedent in constitutional case law, would entail the need for this Court to perform incidentally, substituting itself for the criminal judge, «a vetting typically on the merits that presupposes in-depth knowledge of all investigative acts and the relative chronological sequence».

Moreover, the circumstance that Dr. Bartolozzi was charged with a fact different from the ministerial one «does not brin[g] risks of compromising parliamentary prerogatives». Indeed, if the Court of Rome, during the trial for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, were instead to discern indices relating to the defendant's conspiracy in the ministerial offense, it should pronounce a judgment of acquittal and return the files to the public prosecutor so that they may proceed with the registration in the register of notice of offenses of the same person in the capacity of a conspirator in the ministerial offense itself. In this case, the Public Prosecutor should activate the special procedure provided by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, by virtue of the connection pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter a), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the fact originally ascribed to the ministers.

3.4.– The respondent Prosecutor's Office then illustrates the reasons why elements of Dr. Bartolozzi's conspiracy in the offenses charged against Minister Nordio would not emerge from the investigative records, contrary to what was stated by the Chamber of Deputies.

The Prosecutor's Office recalls how the crime of refusal of official acts, charged against the Minister, is a proper omission offense, with respect to which a subject lacking subjective qualification can conspire only on condition that they provide a «determining material or moral contribution to the refusal». In the present case, however, Dr. Bartolozzi, «in her capacity as Chief of Cabinet and thus as a member of the technical staff», limited herself to acting – as emerges from the records – «within the limits of her technical role, reporting to the Minister, informing him of meetings, offering him all elements to make his determinations, leaving to the Minister every political decision on the conduct to be maintained».

On the other hand, the circumstance «of having participated, according to her role, in the hectic meetings» preceding the release of the Libyan citizen would not suffice to integrate those specific indices that substantiate a *notitia criminis*, otherwise having to hold that all those who participated in the meetings or otherwise operated within the Ministry of Justice had to be registered in the register of notice of offenses as conspirators «for the sole reason of having provided their institutional work in the affair».

Furthermore, the respondent Prosecutor's Office, affirming that it itself urged the Tribunal of Ministers to evaluate Dr. Bartolozzi's liability «alternatively for conspiracy in the offenses attributable to the Ministers or for falsity of her statements», points out that the Panel nevertheless evaluated this aspect «reaching the second conclusion, namely her liability pursuant to Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code».

Indiciary elements would not emerge either from the statements of Prefect Caravelli, nor from those of the members of the Department for Justice Affairs, from which it would be gathered «exclusively the technical study activity of the question personally carried out by Bartolozzi on behalf of the Minister».

As to the statements of the Ministry's executive, Dr. Maria Emanuela Guerra, which moreover are subsequent to Dr. Bartolozzi's hearing and thus cannot be considered as indiciary elements against her at the time of her examination, they would merely have confirmed the traceability to the Minister alone of «the assessment and decision concerning whether or not to follow up on the arrest request» and the existence of «implications of a political-international character that required maintaining the utmost confidentiality».

From the acquired statements it would thus emerge that Dr. Bartolozzi, despite having tried to «exclude as much as possible» the ministerial personnel from the activities of receiving and analyzing the arrest request advanced by the International Criminal Court, «nevertheless instructed the DAG Office to prepare the relative acts of competence», sent to her in draft form for submission to the Minister, «thereby performing her function as Chief of Cabinet» in such a way that the Minister was provided with adequate tools to assist him in making his determinations.

On the other hand, considering that the decision to omit the official act was taken in the meeting of January 20, 2025, in the presence of the Minister, the conduct subsequently maintained by Dr. Bartolozzi, who did not inform the officials, letting them prepare the drafts of the provisions without giving them directives, could not integrate conduct reinforcing the purpose of refusal and aiding and abetting in favor of the arrestee, given that the decision already taken «was sufficient in itself to determine the event of release and removal from the arrest procedure initiated by the ICC».

3.5.– As to the second ground of appeal, the respondent Prosecutor's Office emphasizes that, in light of the literal tenor of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, the shift of competence to the Tribunal of Ministers for a crime connected to the ministerial one would be possible only in the case of conspiracy of persons in this latter crime, and not also in hypotheses of connection between crimes pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letters b) or c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This would in fact be a provision directly implementing Articles 5, 6, paragraph 1, and 11 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, special rules of strict interpretation, not susceptible to analogical application, as they result in a derogation from the principle of the equality of citizens before the law.

After all, if the justifying reason for the derogation brought by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 to ordinary rules on criminal proceedings lies in the protection of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or a paramount public interest, the ratio of such derogation could not extend to the conduct charged against Dr. Bartolozzi, namely «having lied in order not to reveal the existence of an eminently political decision by the Minister of Justice».

The interested party should instead have cooperated with the checks carried out by the Panel, functional to the assessment in fact and in law of the Minister's conduct; conduct with respect to which the Chamber could then in any case have opposed the denial of authorization to proceed, in the presence of the prerequisites referred to in Article 9, paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989. Having «concealed or lied about circumstances highlighting the Minister's decision taken» would rather have risked polluting investigative checks and, consequently, the political body's assessment of the existence of a paramount public interest to justify ministerial conduct.

On the other hand, the proposition of the existence of a teleological connection would not be shareable, it not being able to be held that «the activity of making statements pending criminal proceedings concerning a ministerial offense constitutes the exercise of ministerial function in a broad sense».

Furthermore, «a purported protection of the confidentiality of national interests» would not come into play, nor would the connection hypothesized by the applicant Chamber between «making statements before the prosecuting authority and the "full and correct exercise of the ministerial or governmental function”, regarding facts such as "to frustrate, if ascertained, the correct governmental function” [...], all the more so since State secrecy or secrecy of another nature was never opposed (and affixed) on the Al Masri affair».

In this regard, the Prosecutor's Office observes that the regulation for the ascertainment of ministerial offenses would not be set up to safeguard State secrets or in any case professional secrets, for the guarantee of which the system provides appropriate tools, and adds that it would rather be fundamental that, «precisely for the purposes of democratic control», the judicial authority be placed in a position to ascertain every aspect of ministerial conduct.

3.6.– Finally, the respondent Prosecutor's Office raises an objection of inadmissibility and in any event unfoundedness regarding the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, in the terms formulated by the Chamber of Deputies.

Having noted first of all the absence of reasoning and the consequent inadmissibility of the doubts with reference to all parameters other than Article 96 of the Constitution, as to the latter the question would be irrelevant for the purposes of decision, and thus inadmissible, because the functional connection between the conduct of mendacity to the public prosecutor and the exercise of ministerial functions would be missing.

In any event, the respondent puts forward «the absolute and radical unfoundedness» of the formulated questions, since the recalled Article 4 would constitute a provision directly implementing Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, in particular the combined provisions of Articles 5 and 11, which expressly reserve the regulation of ministerial offenses exclusively to those who hold the ministerial office or who acted in conspiracy with the aforesaid in the commission of the act; and this in coherence with «[t]he legislature's will to circumscribe the discipline of the ministerial offense to lay co-conspirators in the proper offense alone», resulting from the preparatory works (in this regard, reference is made to the explanatory report of the 1st Permanent Commission of the Senate of the Republic, Constitutional Affairs, Affairs of the Presidency of the Council and of the Interior, General Organization of the State and of Public Administration, Publishing, Digitization, of May 2, 1989, A.S. no. 1603-A, X Legislature).

Therefore, being constitutional rules of detail with respect to the provision of Article 96 of the Constitution, from their applicability based on the specialty criterion there derives the full constitutional legitimacy of the discipline set forth in Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989.

4.– The Panel for Ministerial Offenses and the Senate of the Republic, to which the appeal and the order of this Court were duly notified, did not enter an appearance in the proceedings.

5.– Close to the public hearing, the Chamber filed an explanatory brief.

5.1.– In reply to the objection of inadmissibility of the first ground of appeal raised by the Prosecutor's Office, the Chamber emphasizes that the registration of a name in the register of notice of offenses constitutes «the prerequisite for activating the guarantee of Article 96 of the Constitution» and that the omission of such fulfillment would thus affect Parliament's prerogatives. In the present case, this «not only determined the failure to initiate criminal proceedings against Dr. Bartolozzi, but constituted the prerequisite to proceed against her for the offense of false statements, without the possibility for the Chamber of Deputies to interact». The conflict of attribution between powers would be precisely ordained to remedy similar «pathological hypotheses», as recognized by Judgment no. 87 of 2012 itself.

On the other hand, this Court would be asked to ascertain not the criminal liability of the interested party, but the «correct exercise of the power of registration» and the «existence of constitutional prerequisites that mandated the activation of the guarantee procedure»; this in order to verify «whether there has been an adequate explication of the parliamentary prerogatives referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution», in compliance with the paradigm outlined by the cited judgment. In this perspective, it would also be possible to evaluate, «incidentally», the possible violation of the procedural rights of the investigated person, to the extent that it also determines «an omission of Parliament's prerogatives».

5.2.– On the merits and still in relation to the first ground, it would be irrelevant that the Chamber did not attach to the appeal the records of the investigation carried out before the Panel, as these are necessary only for the ascertainment of Dr. Bartolozzi's criminal liability and not instead for verifying the existence of prerequisites for the registration of her name in the register of notice of offenses; registration which would be configured as a «due act» in the presence of indices resulting even from a single investigative act (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, Joint Criminal Chambers, Judgment no. 32584 of June 26-October 2, 2025).

The circumstance that Dr. Bartolozzi played a «central role» of «close collaboration and coordination» with the Minister would not exclude the hypothesis of cooperation in the offenses ascribed to him, since such functions could if anything constitute «occasion for possible facilitating contributions, if not even configuring, in some cases, a position of guarantee».

In any event, precisely from the excerpts of the summary statements reported in the Prosecutor's appearance act, «unequivocal indices [...] regarding the involvement of the Chief of Cabinet» would emerge, just as, moreover, the Public Prosecutor's Office itself, in its opinion of July 7, 2025, had «abstractly projected the configurability of a conspiracy with respect to the conduct maintained by Dr. Bartolozzi».

5.3.– Regarding the second ground of appeal, the applicant excludes that the theme of an extensive interpretation of a special regulation, in derogation from the principle of equality, comes into play, the problem being rather that of «correctly identifying – in the absence of explicit discipline – the perimeter of application of Parliament's prerogatives, dictated by the Constitution for the correct conduct and functioning of government activity».

Furthermore, the appeal did not intend to affirm that the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code concretizes «the exercise of political-administrative functions», but rather to remark how the conduct charged against Dr. Bartolozzi, as it was teleologically oriented to avoid the charge of offenses against the Minister – as well as to shield him from «attacks regarding his work in the exercise of his function» –, could be said to be teleologically connected, pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to that for which the Minister himself was under investigation. Since, in other words, «those statements preserved the activity of the Minister, considered by Parliament – with the denial of authorization to proceed against him – functional to the pursuit of a paramount public interest in the exercise of the Government function», as a guarantee of the prerogatives of Parliament itself, the proceedings against Dr. Bartolozzi for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code should have been subjected to the authorization required by Article 96 of the Constitution.

5.4.– Finally, the applicant observes that the anticipated merits of the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989 would not imply «deeming the discipline set forth by Articles 5 and 11 of Constitutional Law no. 1/1989 to be subordinate to Article 96 of the Constitution», since these latter provisions would not establish any explicit limitation of ministerial guarantees to lay co-conspirators of Government members alone.

Rits in Law

6.– By the appeal in the heading, the Chamber of Deputies promoted a conflict of attribution against the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the Court of Rome and the Public Prosecutor's Office at the same Court, alleging the infringement of its constitutional prerogatives in relation to the determinations of said bodies concerning the position of Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi, at the material time Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, Hon. Carlo Nordio, in the criminal proceedings instituted against Minister Nordio himself, the Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi, and the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers Alfredo Mantovano, in relation to the facts concerning, in particular, the arrest of the Libyan citizen Osama Almasri, which occurred between January 19 and 21, 2025.

The affair in question is detailedly reconstructed by the final report of the Panel, dated August 1, 2025, and transmitted to the Chamber of Deputies by the Prosecutor's Office (Doc. no. 1 attached to the introductory appeal). For the purposes of this decision, it will suffice to highlight:

– that on January 18, 2025, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against the Libyan citizen Osama Almasri for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

– that on the same date the International Criminal Court asked the Italian authorities to proceed, inter alia, with the provisional arrest of the same;

– that on the following day, January 19, the Mobile Squad-DIGOS of Turin executed the arrest;

– that on January 20, the Prosecutor General at the Court of Appeal of Rome, competent for the surrender procedure to the International Criminal Court pursuant to Article 11 of Law no. 237 of December 20, 2012 (Rules for adaptation to the provisions of the statute establishing the International Criminal Court), communicated to the Minister of Justice that he was awaiting his determinations regarding the execution of the arrest warrant in question, as provided by Article 2 of the same law (in the version prior to Judgment no. 143 of 2026 of this Court);

– that on January 21, upon application by Almasri's defense counsel and with the conforming opinion of the Prosecutor General, the Court of Appeal of Rome – having received no request in the meantime from the Minister of Justice – ordered the release of the arrestee, who was then effectively repatriated to Libya on the subsequent January 22 via a State flight;

– that in relation to this affair the Public Prosecutor's Office of Rome initiated criminal proceedings against the Minister of Justice, the Minister of the Interior, and the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, hypothesizing in particular against the first the crimes of refusal of official acts (Article 328, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code) and aiding and abetting (Article 378 of the Criminal Code), both realized – according to the prosecution's hypothesis – through the omission-based conduct consisting in failing to give effect to the request for arrest and surrender of Osama Almasri coming from the International Criminal Court;

– that on March 31, 2025, the Panel for Ministerial Offenses, invested with the investigations pursuant to Article 8 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, among other activities performed, took summary witness statements from Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi, Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Justice at the material time;

– that, in the opinion rendered on July 7, 2025, pursuant to the recalled provision, the Public Prosecutor, inter alia, submitted to the Panel «the assessment of the subsumability of Dr. Bartolozzi's overall conduct under an offense hypothesis from a twofold perspective: either that of conspiracy in the offenses attributed to Minister Nordio, or that provided for by Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code»;

– that the Panel concluded the aforementioned investigations by ordering, on August 1, 2025, the transmission of the files to the Prosecutor's Office so that it could remit them to the Chamber for deliberation on the authorization to proceed against the indicated Ministers and the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers;

– that on October 9, the Assembly of the Chamber, upon a conforming proposal by the Committee on Authorizations, denied the request for authorization, on the grounds that they had acted «to protect constitutionally relevant interests of the State and to pursue paramount public interests in the exercise of government function, pursuant to and for the effects of Article 9 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989»;

– that on October 16, taking note of the denial of authorization, the Panel dismissed the proceedings.

The applicant Chamber, having learned of the opening of separate criminal proceedings against the Chief of Cabinet of Minister Nordio, Dr. Bartolozzi, for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, in relation to the statements made by her to the Panel on March 31, 2025, now complains of two distinct violations of its attributes, both of an omission-based nature.

6.1.– From a first perspective, the Prosecutor's Office and the Panel allegedly improperly omitted to proceed against Dr. Bartolozzi for the hypothesis of conspiracy in the offenses charged against the Minister of Justice in relation to the facts that occurred between January 19 and 21, 2025, and in particular the failure to surrender Osama Almasri to the International Criminal Court. According to the applicant, such omission – in the presence of elements known from the outset of the investigation, and then confirmed during the same, univocally indicative of Dr. Bartolozzi's participation in the Minister's decisions – allowed the Panel and the Prosecutor's Office not to extend the request for authorization to proceed to Dr. Bartolozzi's position. This improperly precluded the Chamber from assessing, pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution, whether or not to grant such authorization. In any event, had the Panel not deemed it appropriate to qualify Dr. Bartolozzi as a conspirator in the offenses attributed to the Minister, the assessment of the «non-ministeriality» of her conduct should have been communicated to the Chamber, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989.

More precisely, as better clarified at the hearing by the Chamber's defense counsel in response to a specific question, with the first ground of appeal the applicant complains that the Panel and the Prosecutor's Office:

(a) failed to qualify Dr. Bartolozzi (evidently by registering her in the register of notice of offenses) as a conspirator in the offenses of refusal of official acts and aiding and abetting attributed to the Minister of Justice for the facts that occurred between January 19 and 21, 2025, and consequently failed to request authorization to proceed also against her for these offenses;

(b) and in any event failed to make explicit and communicate to the Chamber the reasons why they deemed not to discern in such conduct the elements of conspiracy in the same offenses (this being how the expression «assessment of non-ministeriality of conduct» used in the applicant's conclusions must be understood, as confirmed by counsel).

6.2.– From a second and distinct perspective, the applicant complains that the Prosecutor's Office and the Panel failed to consider as a ministerial offense also the crime of false statements to the public prosecutor, hypothesized against Dr. Bartolozzi in relation to her statements made to the Panel on March 31, 2025, and consequently failed to request the authorization to proceed provided by Article 96 of the Constitution also for this different offense. This is because, in the applicant's opinion, the regime of authorization to proceed should extend also to offenses which, even if committed by persons lacking ministerial qualification, are nevertheless in «functional connection» with the offenses committed by the minister pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The applicant maintains that such an outcome should be reached through a constitutionally oriented interpretation of current legislation. In the event, however, that such an interpretation were deemed precluded by the literal wording of this legislation, the applicant urges this Court to raise before itself questions of constitutional legitimacy – with reference to Articles 96, 70, 72, 94, 95, 105, and 3 of the Constitution – of the pertinent provisions, to the extent that they do not extend the special guarantees surrounding ministerial offenses to offenses that, even if committed by subjects lacking ministerial qualification, are nevertheless functionally connected to the former.

7.– The conflict was declared admissible by Order no. 122 of 2026, in which this Court deemed the subjective and objective prerequisites of the conflict of attribution between the powers of the State prescribed by Article 37, first paragraph, of Law no. 87 of 1953 to be met, with reasoning to be understood here in full as recalled.

Following the integration of the adversarial proceedings, the respondent Prosecutor's Office formulated two objections of inadmissibility, which cannot, however, be accepted.

7.1.– The Prosecutor's Office first objects to the inadmissibility of the first ground of appeal, which would aim to confer on this Court an anomalous power of review over the assessment of indices of the offense, potentially resulting in an order to the Prosecutor's Office to effect the registration of the relative *notitia criminis*.

The objection is unfounded. The Chamber's appeal assumes that the failure to configure against Dr. Bartolozzi a possible liability for conspiracy in the offenses ascribed to the Minister of Justice – and thus, implicitly, the failure to register the same in the register of notice of offenses for this alleged offense – determined an infringement of the constitutional attributes of the Chamber itself. Whether and to what extent this proposition is sustainable in law, as well as founded in point of fact, constitutes an issue – as will be better stated below – that is novel in the case law of the Court, which must be examined *funditus* when examining the merits of the grievance.

7.2.– The Prosecutor's Office also asserts the inadmissibility of the second ground of appeal, with specific reference to the request formulated to the Court to raise before itself questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning the failure to extend the discipline provided for ministerial offenses to offenses functionally connected thereto. According to the respondent, the question would be irrelevant, there being in its view no relationship between the conduct of mendacity to the public prosecutor and the exercise of ministerial functions. Furthermore, the appeal would lack any illustration of the asserted *vulnus* to the invoked parameters other than Article 96 of the Constitution.

In this regard, however, it must be specified that the urging for this Court to raise before itself a question of constitutional legitimacy of the discipline that must find application in a given proceeding cannot be confused with a ground of appeal, as such subject to a preliminary admissibility check. Rather, this Court finds itself in such cases in the position of any judge, who – pursuant to Article 23, second paragraph, of Law no. 87 of 1953, recalled for what concerns conflicts of attribution between powers of the State by Article 37, fifth paragraph, of the same law – is required to assess the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the constitutional doubt formulated by the party, without being bound to the latter's proposition as to the parameters alleged to be violated, nor to the reasons for such asserted violation.

These assessments must therefore also be reserved for the examination on the merits of the grounds of appeal.

8.– The first ground of appeal must be examined first, with which the applicant complains about the failure to configure against Dr. Bartolozzi a possible liability for conspiracy in the offenses ascribed to the Minister of Justice.

As an effect of such non-qualification, according to the applicant, the Chamber was deprived of the possibility to assess whether the conduct ascribed to Dr. Bartolozzi had been performed, like that ascribed to the Minister, for the protection of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or for the pursuit of a paramount public interest in the exercise of government function; an assessment that could have led, pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, to the denial of authorization to proceed against her.

Furthermore, the applicant maintains that the Panel and the Prosecutor's Office also infringed the Chamber's prerogatives under a "procedural” profile, omitting to communicate to it their decision not to configure against Dr. Bartolozzi such liability on the grounds of conspiracy for the facts that occurred between January 19 and 21, 2025.

8.1.– On the configurability *in point of fact* of such conspiracy, the parties' propositions diverge radically.

According to the Chamber, Dr. Bartolozzi's conspiracy in the offense attributed to the Minister is evidenced, inter alia, by the following circumstances:

– her will, manifested multiple times to various Ministry executives heard in summary statements by the Panel, to centralize exclusively in the cabinet the management of the Almasri affair between January 19 and 21, 2025;

– her participation, attested by numerous witnesses, in meetings held via teleconference with Government members and officials of other Ministries in which the decisions challenged by the Prosecutor's Office were taken;

– her insistent use, in her own statements made to the Panel on March 31, 2025, of the first-person plural, to indicate the persons responsible for the decisions taken on the "Almasri affair”;

– her *de facto* role as the Minister's «alter ego» and her *de jure* functions as Chief of Cabinet, an apex figure of direct collaboration of which the Minister avails himself for the exercise of political-administrative direction functions: which would highlight her necessary, and physiological, participation in the entire «(functional) action of the Minister».

According to the Prosecutor's Office, conversely, no elements would emerge from the records to allow discerning a determining moral or material contribution with respect to the offenses (of an omission-based nature) attributed to the Minister. Rather, it would have emerged that Dr. Bartolozzi acted within the limits of her technical role, offering the Minister all elements to make the decisions falling within his purview. Nor would her participation in the meetings where the affair was discussed constitute a decisive element in the sense of her moral conspiracy in the decisions taken therein, otherwise having to hold that all other participants in such meetings had for that reason alone conspired in those decisions. On the other hand, the will to centralize the management of the issue in the cabinet alone would be indicative of the intention to reserve, in reality, every decision to the Minister himself, given the «implications of a political-international character that required maintaining the utmost confidentiality».

8.2.– For the purposes of the decision, it is necessary to preliminarily clarify within what limits this Court may generally review, in the context of a conflict of attribution, the choice of the Panel, and prior to that of the Prosecutor's Office, not to configure against a person lacking ministerial qualification a hypothesis of liability on the grounds of conspiracy in the offense ascribed to the Minister.

The exercise of such review, as already observed, is firmly contested by the respondent Prosecutor's Office, in whose view it is solely up to the public prosecutor to assess whether the prerequisites exist to register such a person in the register of notice of offenses, no other subject being able to substitute themselves for this assessment.

The theme of the evaluative powers of subjects other than the judicial authority regarding the constituent facts of the offenses contemplated by Article 96 of the Constitution has already been addressed in various precedents of this Court (Judgments no. 29 of 2014, no. 88, and no. 87 of 2012, no. 241 of 2009), which however concern the different hypothesis in which the judicial authority deems that the fact for which it is proceeding does not configure a ministerial offense, but an ordinary offense, not subject as such to the special authorization procedure configured by Article 96 of the Constitution, by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, and by Law no. 219 of 1989.

Two essential principles can be deduced from these precedents.

8.2.1.– Firstly, the choice of the 1989 constitutional legislature was to transfer to «ordinary jurisdiction» the assessment of the criminal liability of the President of the Council of Ministers and the ministers «for offenses committed in the exercise of their functions», albeit within the framework of special proceedings providing for investigations to be conducted by an *ad hoc* panel and the necessary authorization of the Chambers.

Such a fundamental choice entails that – unlike what happened under the old Article 96 of the Constitution and what still happens in relation to the offenses referred to in Article 90 of the Constitution – the criminal-legal qualification of their conduct today falls, in principle, to ordinary jurisdiction: first of all to the public prosecutor, at the moment of registering the notice of the offense against such subjects; then to the Panel for Ministerial Offenses (the so-called Tribunal of Ministers), called upon to perform investigations exclusively on the *notitia criminis* and to assess whether the prerequisites exist to request authorization to proceed from the competent Chamber; and finally, downstream of the authorization, to criminal judges according to the ordinary rules of the code of criminal procedure.

The assessment entrusted in principle to ordinary jurisdiction, with the sequences recalled above, concerns moreover not only the *an* of criminal liability and the title of the offense – thus, the criminal-legal qualification of the conduct –; but also concerns the "ministerial” or "non-ministerial” nature of the offense itself: in other words, whether or not it was committed «in the exercise of [...] functions». This latter assessment falls *in primis* to the public prosecutor, who, upon receiving the *notitia criminis*, must decide whether to transmit the files to the panel for ministerial offenses or to continue with ordinary investigations; and then falls to the panel itself, when – upon completion of the investigations – it must determine whether to request authorization to proceed, dismiss the proceedings *tout court*, or return the files to the public prosecutor, through a so-called "asystematic” dismissal, so that ordinary forms may be proceeded with on the basis of the qualification of «non-ministeriality» of the offense.

8.2.2.– All of this, however, does not mean – and this is the second principle deducible from the cited case law – that the Chambers are precluded from any assessment concerning the legal qualification of the facts charged against the President of the Council of Ministers or the ministers.

In particular, this Court has emphasized, already in Judgment no. 241 of 2009, that the competent Chamber «cannot be deprived of its own autonomous assessment on the ministerial or non-ministerial nature of the offenses subject to judicial investigation, nor even – should it not share the negative conclusion expressed by the tribunal of ministers – of the possibility of raising a conflict of attribution before the Constitutional Court, assuming that it has been impaired, as an effect of the judicial decision, of the power recognized to it by Article 96 of the Constitution» (point 4.4.). The theme was then taken up and deepened, with formulations substantially overlapping each other, by Judgments no. 87 and no. 88 of 2012, where it is emphasized that «the exclusive attribution of the judicial authority relative to the ascertainment of the elements of the penal fattispecie coexists, as a rule, with the competence of other public bodies to assume determinations, which in turn can be linked to a legal assessment regarding the existence and nature of an offense»; so much so that «it must be recognized that the branch of Parliament competent pursuant to Article 96 of the Constitution can express its own assessment on the nature of the fact charged against the minister, provided that it is placed within the procedure for a ministerial offense initiated by the judicial authority, or is instrumental to claiming that said procedure be followed, and provided that such assessment results exclusively in the reaction permitted by the legal order against a qualification, by the judiciary, of the offense as ordinary rather than ministerial, or in recourse to this Court by means of the conflict of attribution» (Judgment no. 88 of 2012, point 3.3., as well as – in almost identical terms – Judgment no. 87 of 2012, point 5.3., emphasis added).

In other words: the qualification in terms not only of criminal law, but also of constitutional law, of the offense committed «in the exercise of [...] functions» by the President of the Council of Ministers and the ministers indeed falls, in the first instance, to ordinary jurisdiction; but the competent Chamber can challenge, by means of the conflict of attribution instrument, such qualification, for the primary purpose of avoiding an evasion of its constitutional prerogatives – and specifically the power to assess whether the fact attributed to such subjects by the judicial authority was performed «for the protection of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or for the pursuit of a paramount public interest in the exercise of government function» pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 3, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989. Such an evasion could in fact be achieved through an incorrect qualification, on the part of the judicial authority, of the fact as extraneous to the exercise of ministerial functions.

Precisely to guarantee the Chambers the opportunity for a complete and timely assessment regarding the eventual proposal of a conflict of attribution in similar hypotheses, this Court has affirmed, since Judgment no. 241 of 2009, that the "asystematic” dismissal of proceedings – i.e., the return by the Panel for Ministerial Offenses of the files to the Public Prosecutor's Office so that it may proceed in ordinary forms on the basis of the «non-ministerial» nature of the offense – must also be communicated to the competent Chamber: «also and above all in this situation», it was observed, «the competent Chamber has a constitutionally protected interest to be promptly informed, through institutional channels and in official form, of the dismissal that has occurred, as prescribed, without exceptions, by [...] paragraph 4 of Article 8 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989. Such communication is, moreover, the only instrument that allows the Chamber itself to appreciate that it is a dismissal that does not imply a closure, but, on the contrary, a continuation of the proceedings for a different legal qualification of the offense-fact and thus to exercise, in this regard, its own powers» (point 4.4.).

Following the promotion of a conflict of attribution by the competent Chamber, the definitive assessment on the nature of the offense charged against the President of the Council of Ministers and the ministers – and thus on their effective subjection to the guarantees of Article 96 of the Constitution and Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 – can only fall to this Court, on the basis of the items of evidence submitted to it by the parties.

8.3.– It is now necessary to assess whether and to what extent these principles are transferrable to the case now under examination, which is entirely unprecedented in constitutional case law.

It presents at least two peculiarities that distinguish it from those previously examined.

8.3.1.– First of all, what is now under discussion is the possible criminal liability of a person who did not possess at the material time the subjective qualifications indicated in Article 96 of the Constitution, but whom the Chamber assumes to have been a conspirator in the offense hypothesized against the Minister, in her capacity as the holder of an office of direct collaboration with the Minister himself.

It must therefore be preliminarily clarified whether the guarantee of Article 96 of the Constitution is susceptible of extending also to those who have conspired in the offenses committed by the President of the Council of Ministers or a minister.

At least two textual data in Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 support the affirmative solution to this question. Firstly, Article 10, paragraph 1, regulates a special procedure for authorizing the performance of various investigative acts «[i]n proceedings for the offenses indicated in Article 96 of the Constitution», initiated against the President of the Council of Ministers, the ministers, as well as «other suspects»: and thus subjects lacking the qualifications indicated in Article 96 of the Constitution, but equally subject to the same proceedings. Furthermore, and above all, Article 11, paragraph 1, in dictating the discipline concerning territorial competence in judgments for ministerial offenses, expressly mentions «offenses committed by the President of the Council of Ministers and Ministers in the exercise of their functions, and in conspiracy with them by other persons» (emphasis added), thus implicitly confirming that all those who conspire in offenses committed by the subjects indicated in Article 96 of the Constitution are subject to the overall discipline dictated by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

Coherently, the immediately subsequent Law no. 219 of 1989, implementing the new constitutional precepts, provides in Article 4, paragraph 2, that «[i]f the proceedings relate to an offense committed by multiple subjects in conspiracy with each other, the assembly indicates which conspirator, even if neither Minister nor parliamentarian, is not referred to by the denial, due to the absence of the prerequisites referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 9 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of January 16, 1989» (emphasis added), namely that «the accused [...] acted for the protection of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or for the pursuit of a paramount public interest in the exercise of Government function»: thus confirming *a contrario* – as expressly highlighted also by the report to the governmental bill originating Law no. 219 of 1989 and by the report thereon by the 1st Commission of the Senate – that the denial of authorization can concern even a suspect who does not possess the subjective qualifications indicated in Article 96 of the Constitution, but has conspired in the offense committed in the exercise of ministerial functions.

Oriented in the same sense are, moreover, both the absolutely prevailing practice of the panels for ministerial offenses and, without exceptions, that of the Chambers in matters of authorization. The panels' practice, initially motivated by recalling the provisions of Articles 5 and 11, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, as well as Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989 – as in requests addressed to the Chamber of Deputies in the 11th Legislature, Doc. IV-bis no. 9, no. 11, no. 11-bis, and no. 14, and to the Senate of the Republic in the 12th Legislature, Doc. IV-bis no. 5, no. 8, and no. 9 –, was then followed, in substantial adherence to such arguments, in dozens of subsequent cases against so-called lay suspects, conspirators in the offense ascribed to the subject endowed with ministerial qualification. In the only two cases where requests concerning the minister did not also involve the «lay» co-conspirator – Chamber of Deputies – 10th Legislature, report of the Committee on Authorizations to Proceed of July 13, 1989, Doc. IV-bis no. 3-A, approved by the Assembly on July 20, 1989, and 16th Legislature, report of the Committee on Authorizations to Proceed of October 7, 2010, Doc. IV-bis no. 1-A, approved by the Assembly on October 19, 2010 – the Chamber took care to specify its own interpretation, conforming to the prevailing one of the judicial authority itself. Such practice was lastly followed in the same criminal proceedings at issue today, in which the Chamber denied authorization to proceed both against the two ministers (of Justice and of the Interior) subjected to investigation, and against a co-suspect (the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers) lacking such qualification, but attracted into the functional competence of the Panel, as he was deemed by the latter to be a conspirator in the offenses ascribed to them, without anyone raising objections in this regard.

8.3.2.– The second peculiarity of the case now under examination is that the Chamber complains not of an «asystematic» dismissal by the Panel for Ministerial Offenses, with the consequent continuation of criminal proceedings in ordinary forms for an offense-fact originally qualified as «ministerial» by the public prosecutor; nor does it complain of the pendency, against the President of the Council of Ministers, a minister, or their co-conspirator, of proceedings for an offense ascribed to them qualified from the outset by the public prosecutor and then by criminal judges as independent of the exercise of their functions. The Chamber here complains, precisely to the contrary, of the absence of criminal proceedings against a person whom the same Chamber assumes to have played the role of a conspirator in a ministerial offense, for which it has moreover already denied authorization to proceed.

A grievance thus constructed immediately poses the theme of the exact identification of the *vulnus* that the Chamber believes has derived from such omission-based conduct by the judicial authority.

The Chamber's defense insisted, in its appeal and in oral argument, on the obligation of the Prosecutor's Office to exercise criminal action pursuant to Article 112 of the Constitution. However, the monitoring of the punctual observance in each concrete case of such an obligation – the implications of which for the public prosecutor were recently analyzed by this Court in Judgment no. 58 of 2026, extensively cited by the applicant – evidently does not fall among the constitutional attributes of the Chamber, susceptible of being asserted, as such, through the instrument of conflict between powers.

Secondly, the applicant Chamber dwells in the appeal on two specific consequences of the failure to configure the hypothesis of conspiracy in ministerial offenses against Dr. Bartolozzi, represented (a) by her hearing as a person informed of the facts by the Panel, as well as (b) by the subsequent ascription to her of the different offense hypothesis referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code (evidently deemed integrated also in the case of false statements to the Panel for Ministerial Offenses by virtue of the recall set forth in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, according to which «the panel proceeds to the investigations referred to in paragraph 1 with the powers belonging to the public prosecutor in the preliminary investigation phase»), in relation to the statements allegedly false made by her to the Panel on March 31, 2025.

According to the Chamber, such consequences would not have occurred had Dr. Bartolozzi been heard from the outset as a person under investigation in the capacity of a conspirator in the offenses hypothesized at the time against the Minister of Justice. In such case, in fact, the Panel should have preceded the hearing with the warnings due to persons under investigation pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in particular that concerning the right to remain silent. In any event, the offense hypothesis referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code would not have been conceivable *in radice* against her, given the incompatibility to testify of a co-defendant in the same offense (Article 197, paragraph 1, letter a, of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

The question remains unprejudiced here as to whether the aforesaid consequences effectively redound to as many violations of the Chamber's constitutional prerogatives. Likewise unprejudiced is whether they can be vetted as violations of the defendant's defense rights, to be asserted as such in the criminal trial that might be celebrated against her. For the purposes relevant here, it is sufficient to note that – by highlighting such circumstances – the Chamber assumes to have a concrete interest in urging this Court to review the Panel's decision not to proceed against Dr. Bartolozzi as a conspirator in the offenses attributed to the Minister, referred to the events that took place between January 19 and 21, 2025.

8.4.– Such a review could not in any case be performed by this Court on the basis of the sole documentation in the files of these proceedings.

This is not only due to the circumstance, emphasized by the respondent Prosecutor's Office, that no party produced the entire file relating to the investigation conducted by the Panel before this Court; but also because, more fundamentally, the Panel did not express itself at all on such a possible configuration, despite the Prosecutor's Office, in the opinion rendered on July 7, 2025, after the conclusion of the investigations, having expressly urged it to assess the «subsumability of Dr. Bartolozzi's overall conduct under an offense hypothesis from a twofold perspective: either that of conspiracy in the offenses attributed to Minister Nordio, or that provided for by Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code».

Now: while it is indubitable that the criminal-legal assessment of conduct attributable to the fold of guarantees of Article 96 of the Constitution falls in principle to ordinary criminal jurisdiction; and while it is equally indubitable that the competent Chamber can urge this Court, through the instrument of conflict of attribution, to verify that such assessment has not involved a surreptitious evasion of the constitutional guarantee (supra, 8.2.); it necessarily follows that such verification presupposes that ordinary criminal jurisdiction has first made explicit its assessment on that conduct, even if only to motivate its criminal irrelevance.

This, precisely, did not happen in the present case.

8.5.– Precisely this latter omission by the Panel – an omission that logically and chronologically precedes the very failure to communicate to the Chamber the reasons for the negative assessment on Dr. Bartolozzi's liability on the grounds of conspiracy in the offenses ascribed to the Minister, of which the applicant expressly complains – instead redounds to a *vulnus* to the Chamber's prerogatives, which this Court is able to appreciate in these proceedings.

Indeed, even in the absence of formal registration of Dr. Bartolozzi in the register of notice of offenses, the signaled circumstance that the Prosecutor's Office specifically invited (albeit alternatively) the Panel to qualify her conduct in terms of conspiracy in the offenses ascribed to the Minister entails that the Panel had – and still has – the duty to make explicit its position in this regard and to communicate it, through the Prosecutor's Office, to the Chamber. This is in order to place the latter in a position to eventually challenge, by means of the conflict of attribution between powers, the logical and argumentative *iter* followed to reach the conclusion of the criminal irrelevance of Dr. Bartolozzi's conduct in relation to the events that took place between January 19 and 21, 2025, or in any case of the impossibility of exercising criminal action against her in light of the evidentiary standard of the absence of a «reasonable prediction of conviction» – a standard applicable in general to any hypothesis of dismissal of proceedings pursuant to Article 408, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus also to the dismissal of proceedings concerning ministerial offenses regulated by Article 8, paragraph 2, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

Such an obligation of communication is not, in truth, expressly statuted by current legislation, which in Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 provides only for communication by the public prosecutor of the dismissal of proceedings that has occurred: a dismissal which paragraph 2 assigns to the competence of the Panel itself, but which presupposes – in the lexicon of the procedural code – prior registration by the public prosecutor of the notice of the offense in the relative register, which in the case now under examination never occurred.

However, the constitutional principle of loyal cooperation between the various institutions and powers of the Republic – a principle underlying the entire architecture of the Constitutional Charter (Judgment no. 379 of 1992, point 6 and, more recently, *ex multis* Judgment no. 157 of 2023, point 10.1., Orders no. 132 of 2020, point 8, and no. 207 of 2018, point 11; as well as – with specific reference to relations between the judicial order and other powers of the State – Judgments no. 168 of 2013, point 4.1.; no. 26 of 2008, points 4.1. et seq.; no. 149 of 2007, point 5, no. 110 of 1998, point 7, no. 403 of 1994, point 7) – suggests interpreting Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 in a reasonably extensive manner, according to which «[t]he public prosecutor gives communication of the dismissal that has occurred to the President of the competent Chamber». It follows that, precisely in light of the principle in question, in the peculiar context of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, the lemma «dismissal» must be assigned a broader meaning than the current one in criminal proceedings: so as to encompass also situations, like the one now examined, in which the public prosecution body, in the opinion rendered pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1, of the recalled constitutional law, hypothesized for a close collaborator of a minister a possible liability on the grounds of conspiracy in the offense allegedly committed by the latter, and the Panel did not deem it appropriate to accept such a proposition.

It is not a question, in other words, of establishing *ex novo* an obligation of communication not provided for by the constitutional legislature (which this Court has in the past excluded being able to derive from the principle of loyal cooperation itself: Judgments no. 87 and no. 88 of 2012, points 7 and 5 respectively); but rather of harmonizing the peculiarities of the case at the attention of this Court to the context of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

Therefore, in such a case, the needs for loyal cooperation between the Panel and the competent Chamber dictate that the reasons supporting the Panel's decision be made explicit in a transparent manner to the political authority, so that the latter is placed in a position to ponder whether its constitutional prerogatives have been impaired in any way as a result of such a decision.

In such a scenario, the verification that this Court must perform does not imply an inadmissible exercise by constitutional jurisdiction of responsibilities relating to the criminal-legal qualification of the fact, which the 1989 constitutional legislature intended to attribute to ordinary jurisdiction. Rather, this Court's task is to verify that the criminal-legal assessment performed, within the scope of respective competences, by the public prosecutor and the Panel for Ministerial Offenses does not resolve itself into an evasion of the guarantees that the constitutional legislature itself intended to reserve to one of the two Chambers.

8.6.– In conclusion: the Chamber's first ground of appeal cannot be accepted to the extent that it asks this Court to declare that it did not belong to the Prosecutor's Office and the Panel to omit to «consider Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi as a conspirator» in the offenses ascribed to the Minister and, consequently, to omit to request authorization to proceed from the Chamber also against her, in the absence – at this stage – of any reasoning by the Panel on the reasons why it did not deem it appropriate to accept the request, formulated alternatively by the Prosecutor's Office in its opinion of July 7, 2025, to configure against Dr. Bartolozzi such liability for facts that took place between January 19 and 21, 2025.

The appeal is, instead, well-founded to the extent that it complains (a) that the Panel failed to make explicit, in its final report, the reasons why it did not deem it appropriate to share the proposition formulated in this sense, albeit alternatively, by the Prosecutor's Office, and (b) that the Prosecutor's Office failed to communicate the Panel's relative determination to the Chamber, pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 4, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

9.– With the second ground of appeal, the Chamber calibrates its focus on the different offense hypothesis, ascribed to Dr. Bartolozzi, of false statements to the public prosecutor pursuant to Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, allegedly committed by her on the occasion of her hearing by the Panel as a person informed of the facts on March 31, 2025.

According to the applicant, such an offense hypothesis would be bound by «functional connection» (or «teleological connection») with respect to the offenses attributed to the Minister, pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure: which would determine its necessary subjection to the same guarantees that apply to ministerial offenses, by way of interpretation of current legislation or, subordinately, as an effect of a hoped-for ruling of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, to the extent that it mentions only «multiple subjects in conspiracy with each other» and not also the perpetrators of offenses bound by a teleological nexus with ministerial offenses (and thus committed «to execute or to conceal» these latter offenses).

The ground now examined is unfounded (infra, 9.1.), and the question of constitutional legitimacy put forward – even if relevant for the decision of the case – does not pass the test of non-manifest unfoundedness (infra, 9.2.).

9.1.– As recalled shortly before (supra, 8.3.1.), multiple normative indices in the legislation of constitutional rank (represented in this matter by Article 96 of the Constitution and Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989) and ordinary legislation (consisting of Law no. 219 of 1989) lead to the conclusion that the guarantees surrounding offenses committed by the President of the Council of Ministers and ministers in the exercise of their functions extend also to persons who have conspired with them in the commission of the offense, pursuant to Articles 110 et seq. of the Criminal Code.

Analogous indices are not to be found, instead, with respect to the hypothesis, which comes into consideration here, of offenses simply connected to «ministerial» ones, pursuant in particular to Article 12, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Not only is no mention made of such offenses in the legislation in question; but indeed such discipline clearly distinguishes itself, under this specific profile, from that dictated by Law no. 20 of 1962, which in Article 16 – deemed not constitutionally illegitimate by Judgment no. 125 of 1977, pronounced following a referral order originating from this Court in an integrated composition, pursuant to Article 135, seventh paragraph, of the Constitution – expressly provided for the possibility for the Inquiring Commission and Parliament in joint session, in the course of accusation proceedings, to order the joinder, if deemed necessary, of proceedings instituted against the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of Ministers, or ministers with proceedings concerning «offenses connected pursuant to Article 45 of the CCP» (emphasis added). In turn, Article 45 of the repealed procedural code, exactly like current Article 12, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, flanked the hypothesis of conspiracy between multiple persons in the same offense with that of offenses «committed to execute or to conceal the others».

The failure to mention the generality of connected offenses by the new legislation, together with the express mention of co-conspirators in the ministerial offense alone (in Article 11, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989 and in Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989), certainly reflects the conscious choice of the legislature (constitutional and then ordinary) to limit to the hypothesis of conspiracy alone the scope of application of the special discipline based on the amended Article 96 of the Constitution.

In the same sense is, moreover, steadily oriented parliamentary practice (starting from cases subject to requests for authorization to proceed examined by the Chamber of Deputies on December 18, 1993, Doc. IV-bis, no. 9-bis, and by the Senate of the Republic on November 17, 1994, Doc. IV-bis, no. 5), as well as the scarce case law of legitimacy (Court of Cassation, First Criminal Section, Judgment no. 5581 of November 7-December 11, 1995).

Such a restrictive choice is, moreover, consistent with the fundamental inspiration of the reform of the discipline of ministerial offenses implemented in 1989: a reform aimed, as recalled shortly before, at entrusting ordinary jurisdiction in principle with cognizance over these offenses, save for the provision of a possible intervention of Parliament for the protection of government activity, conceived as a mere diaphragm between investigations (entrusted to a special panel of ordinary magistrates, and not subject to any political authorization) and judgment (subordinate instead to the authorization of the competent Chamber).

The reform thus marks a radical paradigm shift compared to the previous discipline, which excluded ordinary jurisdiction from any competence regarding criminal proceedings for ministerial offenses. «The 1989 constitutional legislature», as observed in unison by Judgments no. 87 and no. 88 of 2012 (points 5.1. and 3.1. respectively), «embarked [...] in the opposite direction, opting for the full re-expansion of common jurisdiction, outside the sole exceptional limits suggested by the justifying reason of political justice institutions», on the basis of an «assumption of adequacy of the ordinary judge to the exercise of jurisdiction for ministerial offenses».

Precisely the exceptional nature, directly founded on sources of constitutional rank, of the political guarantees still provided today for the protection of government activity – as Judgments no. 87 and no. 88 of 2012 observed once more – imposes a «strict interpretation» thereof, which as such opposes «evolutionary interpretations that go in the direction of expanding the area of constitutional immunities beyond the provisions of the Constitution» (points 5.1. and 3.1. respectively) as well as sources of equivalent rank, such as Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989.

On the other hand, the relative extension of the guarantee would end up in practice covering all conduct of aiding and abetting, false statements to the judicial authority, as well as procedural fraud and tampering, carried out to shield the political subject from liability. This would redound to a serious obstacle to the activity of ascertaining facts constituting the ministerial offense: an activity that the 1989 constitutional legislature wanted to preserve intact in the hands of the *ad hoc* established judicial body, to allow the political authority if anything to perform its own assessment on granting or refusing authorization to hold a trial on the basis of investigations already thoroughly carried out by the Panel. This presupposes that the Panel is placed in a position to perform effective investigations, albeit within the limits imposed by Article 10 of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, including through the hearing of persons informed of the facts, counting on the circumstance that these – as normally happens before the judicial authority – are subject to the obligation to tell the truth, unless they are themselves under investigation for the offense on which the judicial authority is investigating.

Potential needs for institutional confidentiality concerning circumstances learned by the person interrogated by the Panel can, moreover, receive adequate protection in our legal system, where statutory conditions are met, through the instrument of opposing State secrecy and its subsequent confirmation by the President of the Council of Ministers: an instrument, the latter, punctually regulated by law (Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), whose potential abuse can be sanctioned, as a last resort, by this very Court as a result of a conflict of attribution.

Since it is thus impossible to access an extensive interpretation of provisions expressly mentioning co-conspirators in the ministerial offense so as to include within parliamentary guarantees also the authors of offenses merely functionally connected to ministerial ones, it cannot be held that the Panel violated the Chamber's constitutional attributes in ordering the transmission of the files to the Prosecutor's Office so that it could assess the existence of elements of the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, without requesting authorization to proceed for such offense from the Chamber itself; nor that the Prosecutor's Office violated such attributes for its part in registering Dr. Bartolozzi in the register of suspects (and then, as attested by the Prosecutor's Office in its appearance act, in notifying her of a direct summons decree for trial) for such title of offense.

9.2.– Finally, this Court does not deem the prerequisites for self-referral of questions of constitutional legitimacy urged by the applicant to be met, for the purpose of achieving the same result that cannot be attained by way of interpretation.

The questions put forward would be, in truth, relevant for the decision of the case, given that their acceptance would determine the need for the judicial authority to request authorization to proceed from the competent Chamber also for offenses committed by third parties that turn out to be functionally connected to ministerial ones, such precisely as the crime referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code.

They, however, do not pass the test of non-manifest unfoundedness, for the absorbing reason that Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 219 of 1989, while mentioning co-conspirators in the offense but not authors of connected offenses, appears substantially reproductive – under this specific profile – of Article 11, paragraph 1, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1989, which likewise refers to the former but not to the latter category of persons.

on these grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares that it was not for the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the Ordinary Court of Rome to fail to make explicit the reasons why it did not discern possible liability of Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi for conspiracy in the offenses attributed to the Minister of Justice in relation to facts that occurred between January 19 and 21, 2025, and that it was not for the Public Prosecutor's Office at the same Court to fail to communicate the Panel's relative determination to the Chamber;

2) declares that it was for the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of Rome to initiate investigations and exercise criminal action against Dr. Giusi Bartolozzi for the offense referred to in Article 371-bis of the Criminal Code, in relation to statements made by her to the Panel for Ministerial Offenses at the same Court on March 31, 2025, without having obtained prior authorization from the competent Chamber pursuant to Constitutional Law no. 1 of January 16, 1989 (Amendments to Articles 96, 134, and 135 of the Constitution and to Constitutional Law no. 1 of March 11, 1953, and rules concerning proceedings for offenses referred to in Article 96 of the Constitution).

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 6, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco VIGANÒ

Luca ANTONINI, Rapporteurs

Valeria EMMA, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on November 6, 2026