JUDGMENT NO. 75

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 18 June 1998 (Regulation of subcontracting in manufacturing activities), as introduced by Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 5 August 2022 (Annual Law for the Market and Competition 2021), initiated by the Ordinary Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, in the proceedings between F. srl and M.T.S. srl, by referral order of 3 September 2025, registered under no. 206 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, no. 44, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearance of F. srl and the intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the reporting judge Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi at the public hearing of 11 March 2026;

having heard counsel Davide Rossi for F. srl, and State Attorney Massimo Santoro for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in the chambers on 11 March 2026.

Legal Findings (Ritenuto in fatto)

1.– By referral order of 3 September 2025 (reg. ord. no. 206 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 18 June 1998 (Regulation of subcontracting in manufacturing activities), as introduced by Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 5 August 2022 (Annual Law for the Market and Competition 2021), with reference to Articles 3, 24(1), 25(1), 111(1) and (2), and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

2.– The referral order states that the case a quo arises from an injunction obtained for the recovery of sums claimed in connection with a relationship "presented as a subcontracting agreement”.

Opposition was filed against the injunction, and the relevant file was assigned – "ratione materiae and according to the criteria of the organizational schedules (tabelle)” – to one of the ordinary civil sections of the Court of Milan.

The respondent, upon entering an appearance, requested a declaration of nullity of "various clauses of the contract inter partes due to abuse of economic dependence”, such that the judge initially assigned "remitted the file” to the head of the office for assignment to the specialized section for business matters of the same Court of Milan, pursuant to the provision of Article 9(3) of Law no. 192 of 1998, which grants that section jurisdiction over "civil actions” concerning abuse of economic dependence.

Upon assuming the case, the specialized section rejected the motion for provisional execution of the injunction filed by the respondent, and subsequently raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 1998, specifically insofar as it mandates that civil actions concerning abuse of economic dependence, including claims for injunctive relief and damages, must be brought before specialized business sections.

3.– In support of the non-manifest groundlessness, the referring judge provides a reconstruction of the genesis of the specialized business sections and the legislation governing their jurisdiction.

The referring judge recalls, in particular, that these sections, established by Legislative Decree no. 168 of 27 June 2003 (Establishment of specialized sections for industrial and intellectual property in courts and courts of appeal, pursuant to Article 16 of Law no. 273 of 12 December 2002), were initially aimed at "centralizing at each court of appeal district disputes regarding intellectual property, joint-stock companies, public contracts above thresholds, and antitrust matters”, with the provision of wider territorial jurisdictions (reducing the competent locations to three: Milan, Rome, and Naples) in certain matters and in cases involving "participation of foreign companies”. Their jurisdiction was then progressively extended to include collective actions, "whether for damages/restitution or injunctive, both national […] and European”.

For the referring judge, the rationale for the establishment of these sections, as well as the subsequent expansions of their jurisdiction, has always been to "ensure high specialization” of the assigned judges – who, pursuant to Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003, must be "endowed with specific expertise” (paragraph 1) and may be tasked with different cases only "provided this does not cause delay in the handling and decision of business-related cases” (paragraph 2) – as well as "efficiency in the handling, instruction, and decision of proceedings”, generally characterized by high levels of complexity and technicality.

Abuse of economic dependence, however, would be configurable, based on the parties' assertions, in the context of the "most diverse substantive legal relationships (subcontracting, procurement, franchising, IT services, etc.)”, which are normally handled through distribution between ordinary sections of the same judicial office "based on schedule criteria” and "ordinary rules of territorial jurisdiction”.

Therefore, it would be sufficient for "only one of the parties to outline (not artificially) in its pleadings the existence of an abuse of economic dependence” to trigger, pursuant to the challenged provision, the "(exclusive and mandatory) jurisdiction” of the specialized business section.

4.– This being stated, the broad discretion recognized to the legislature in procedural matters would have been exercised "in contrast with the canons of reasonableness and efficiency provided for by Articles 3 and 111(2) of the Constitution”, as well as with the "principle of effectiveness of judicial protection, enshrined in Article 24(1) and Article 111(1) of the Constitution, as well as in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR”, cited as interposed parameters, through Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in violation also of the principle of the natural judge pre-determined by law, protected by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.

4.1.– In particular, in violation of Articles 3 and 111(2) of the Constitution, the attribution of jurisdiction over a "trans-typical” legal issue such as abuse of economic dependence would not be consistent with the described "rationale of specialization and efficiency” of the specialized business sections, which are already called upon to handle, by virtue of Article 3(3) of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003, all cases that present reasons of connection with the specialized ones contemplated by the first two paragraphs of the same provision. This is particularly true since the subsequent Article 4(1-bis) of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003 further concentrates jurisdiction in certain locations in cases of subjective joinder pursuant to Article 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when among several defendants there is a company based abroad.

This would constitute an "extrinsically and unreasonably extravagant jurisdiction” compared to the matters assigned to specialized sections by Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003, because it would "funnel” into the latter "all cases of the district (and of the region, […] in the case of a foreign company) in which claims for abuse of economic dependence are brought”.

The "indeterminable a priori” nature of the aforementioned rule of jurisdiction attribution – marked by the "intrinsic vagueness” of the notion of abuse of economic dependence itself – would prejudice the specialization and efficiency required of the referring section, undermining the "strong specialized and experiential knowledge” inherent to specialized sections (which would be lacking in the "numerous assigned matters”) and infringing upon the principle of reasonable duration of the proceedings.

4.2.– For the same reasons, "possible and harmful practices of forum shopping” would be favored, based on the mere allegation of one of the parties, in violation of the principle of the natural judge pre-determined by law under Article 25(1) of the Constitution. This principle would apply, in fact, "not only to criteria of jurisdiction and competence, but also to the distribution of business within the same judicial office, based on pre-established, clear, and certain schedule criteria”, which would suffer an unreasonable derogation.

4.3.– The jurisdiction attribution in question, also affecting "the composition of the adjudicating body, which becomes collegiate instead of monocratic”, would infringe, "at the same time”, once again the principle of the natural judge and the canons of specialization and efficiency, considered "foundational” to the very establishment of the specialized business sections.

4.4.– Finally, the principles of effectiveness of protection and efficiency of the judicial response would be infringed, as a consequence of the attribution "of all cases, in the most disparate matters, in which one of the parties alleges an abuse of economic dependence”, with the attraction of all other related claims, in violation of Articles 24(1), 111(1) and (2), and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.

5.– F. srl entered an appearance in the proceedings, and after reconstructing the salient features of the main case, summarized the essential points of the referral order, declaring its agreement with the arguments and conclusions therein.

6.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the raised questions be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.

7.– Citing constitutional case law, the intervenor highlights that, in matters of procedural regulation, the legislature enjoys broad discretion, with the sole limit of manifest unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the choices made, which would not have been exceeded on the occasion of the extension of the jurisdiction of specialized business sections to all disputes involving an issue of abuse of economic dependence.

Such an extension, on the contrary, would be "entirely reasonable”, also because it is suitable for overcoming previous "interpretative critical issues” regarding jurisdiction over abuse of economic dependence.

For the intervenor – who cites legitimacy case law in support – even before the introduction of the challenged provision, the jurisdiction of the aforementioned specialized sections had been deemed to exist, "albeit only in cases where the abuses of economic dependence interfered with antitrust profiles”, with the assignment to "ordinary court sections” of cases of abuse of economic dependence "of exclusively contractual relevance”.

This was, however, a distinction far from simple to realize, a source of operational difficulties which the challenged attribution of jurisdiction would allow to be overcome.

For the State Attorney’s Office, the principle of the natural judge pre-determined by law would not be infringed either, since the "greater clarity in the identification of the competent judge”, far from favoring the "possibility of forum shopping”, would rather be preordained to avoid such practices.

The claim of violation of the principles "of effectiveness and efficiency of judicial protection” would also be unfounded, as the specialized judge would have suitable tools to address "more effectively and efficiently” – compared to ordinary sections – the issues in question, which presuppose an "analysis of the economic phenomenon underlying the assessment of economic dependence and the qualification of acts and agreements as an abuse”, thus ensuring a better quality of the judicial response.

The legislative choice, therefore, would be "fully reasonable and certainly not arbitrary”, because the verification of economic dependence – "normatively based on the lack of real possibilities to find sufficient alternatives in the market” – would require the adoption of "primarily economic criteria for the purpose of verifying the relevant market data”.

Legal Reasoning (Considerato in diritto)

8.– The Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, raises, with the order indicated in the epigraph (reg. ord. no. 206 of 2025), questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 1998 – which contains the regulation of subcontracting in manufacturing activities –, in the part where it provides, following the amendments made by Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 2022, that civil actions in matters of abuse of economic dependence, including injunctive relief and damages, "are brought before the specialized sections for business matters”.

9.– A subcontracting relationship existed between the parties to the case a quo, in the context of which the subcontractor – to recover sums claimed, "as a balance”, for services rendered – requested and obtained an injunction against which the principal firm filed an opposition, initiating proceedings initially assigned, according to schedule criteria, to one of the ordinary civil sections of the Court of Milan.

The respondent, upon entering an appearance, invoked the nullity of those contractual clauses through which a situation of "abuse of economic dependence” had allegedly been realized.

The judge initially in charge of the case then asked the President of the Court of Milan, precisely by virtue of the challenged provision, to assign the file to the specialized section for business matters.

Upon assuming the case, the latter raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, arguing that, in light of the rationale inspiring the establishment of this specialized body – consisting of ensuring "efficiency in the handling, instruction, and decision” of proceedings characterized by high rates of complexity and technicality –, the legislature had exercised its broad discretion in procedural matters in contrast with several constitutional parameters.

9.1.– Firstly, Articles 3 and 111(2) of the Constitution would be violated, as a phenomenon is concerned – the abuse of economic dependence – not only characterized by "intrinsic vagueness”, but also configurable in the context of multiple substantive legal relationships, normally assigned to ordinary sections.

The new attribution of jurisdiction, therefore, would not be consistent with the described "rationale of specialization and efficiency” of the specialized business sections, as the latter would not be endowed with specialized knowledge in the numerous new "assigned matters”.

Consequently, the principle of reasonable duration of the proceedings would also be infringed, due to the increase in workload not determinable a priori.

9.2.– For the same reasons, "forum shopping practices” would be favored, based on the mere allegation of one of the parties, in violation of the principle of the natural judge pre-determined by law under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, applicable, in the opinion of the referring judge, also to the distribution of business within the same judicial office, "based on pre-established, clear, and certain schedule criteria” which would suffer an unreasonable derogation.

9.3.– Furthermore, again in contrast with Articles 3 and 25(1) of the Constitution, the attribution of jurisdiction in question would also affect "the composition of the adjudicating body”, which would transition from monocratic to collegiate.

9.4.– Also as a consequence of the attribution "of all cases, in the most disparate matters, in which one of the parties alleges an abuse of economic dependence”, the principles of effectiveness of protection and efficiency of the judicial response would finally be infringed, with consequent violation of Articles 24(1), 111(1) and (2), and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.

10.– Before scrutinizing the questions so raised, it is appropriate to provide a brief illustration of the relevant regulatory and jurisprudential landscape.

10.1.– The subcontracting relationship, which forms the background to the substantive event from which the present incident of constitutionality originates, has spread alongside the affirmation of the "open production” model, which postulates the involvement of partner companies in the production process of a lead company, resulting in the fragmentation of the value chain.

As already noted by judgment no. 254 of 2017 of this Court, different approaches have been recorded in the jurisprudence of legitimacy regarding the legal configuration of this relationship, oscillating between the thesis of the typical contract (characterized by the "non-parity” form of entrepreneurial cooperation) and that of a "trans-typical” phenomenon, referable to a multiplicity of contractual figures (supply contract, sale of future things, work or service procurement or sub-procurement, franchising, etc.). The echoes of the interpretative divide remain even in recent case law (Court of Cassation, labor section, orders 19 July 2023, no. 21388 and 5 March 2020, no. 6299, as well as judgment 8 October 2019, no. 25172), as a reflection of the equally lively scholarly debate, in which the now prevalent thesis configures subcontracting as a general scheme, which stands with a character of transversality with respect to the types of contracts commonly used in practice for the realization of economic operations of productive collaboration involving a plurality of companies.

10.2.– In the described context, the most pressing need was identified in the necessity to correct the imbalances linked to the unilateral imposition of clauses – in a first phase contemplated in the legal system only with regard to contractual relationships between companies and consumers – also in relationships between companies. And this in order to protect small and medium-sized enterprises against the commercial partner who, in consideration of the characteristics of the contract, could exploit a position of contractual power to its advantage.

Thus, the introduction of the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence was reached, within the scope of the discipline of subcontracting dictated by Law no. 192 of 1998, born as an internal development of the prohibition – of antitrust matrix – of abuse of dominant position.

Regardless of the open debate between those who argue that the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence pursues the same goals (support for the economic efficiency of the system and economic development) as antitrust legislation and those who affirm, instead, that such abuse would be neutral for the overall functioning of the market, as, deriving from the asymmetry between the position of the predisponent and that of the counterparty, it would be relevant exclusively on the level of contractual justice, it is indisputable that the current version of Article 9 of Law no. 192 of 1998, which contemplates that prohibition, constitutes the outcome of a long process that has also benefited from various consultative contributions offered by the Competition and Market Authority (AGCM).

Since the original version, paragraph 1 of the provision in question prohibits, in the first sentence, "the abuse by one or more companies of the state of economic dependence in which a customer or supplier company finds itself, with regard to them”.

The object of the prohibition is, therefore, not the condition of greater contractual strength of a party – which can even be said to be physiological in a market economy – but the abuse that is made of that condition, through the imposition of clauses notably unbalanced in favor of the predisponent, which allow vexatious conduct towards the counterparty.

This is clarified well by the subsequent paragraph 2, which contains a merely exemplary list of hypotheses of abuse, identified: (a) in the refusal to sell or in the refusal to buy (to be understood as a refusal – arbitrary or unjustified – to engage generally in relationships with a given company); (b) in the imposition of unjustifiably onerous or discriminatory contractual conditions; (c) in the arbitrary interruption of ongoing commercial relations.

It is important to highlight, moreover, that there is now substantial agreement, in doctrine and jurisprudence, in considering the scope of application of the prohibition introduced by Article 9 of Law no. 192 of 1998 not limited to the subcontracting relationship (beyond the legal configuration of the latter), but extended to all relationships between companies: and this on the basis of the rationale and also the letter of the norm, which uses the expression "customer” rather than "client”.

The approach, moreover, has received the endorsement of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation (order 25 November 2011, no. 24906), according to which the abuse of economic dependence "configures a case of general application, which can disregard the existence of a specific subcontracting relationship”.

The solution is also shared by the present referring judge, so that the interpretative assumption from which the introducing act of the present judgment moves must be considered far from implausible.

10.2.1.– What should be understood by economic dependence is specified in the second and third sentences of paragraph 1 of Article 9 of Law no. 192 of 1998, according to which, respectively, "[e]conomic dependence is considered the situation in which a company is able to determine, in commercial relationships with another company, an excessive imbalance of rights and obligations” and "[e]conomic dependence is evaluated taking into account also the real possibility for the party that has suffered the abuse to find satisfactory alternatives on the market”.

In light of the regulatory dictates, the thesis has spread in doctrine and jurisprudence that economic dependence is mainly the result of relevant specific investments (relational specific investment), realized to meet the contractual commitments assumed with the strong entrepreneur and, consequently, of equally substantial conversion costs (switching cost), which "imprison” the weak party in a commercial relationship, depriving it of adequate alternative solutions.

In this perspective, it therefore becomes necessary to investigate, from time to time, whether the imbalance of the parties' rights and obligations is "excessive” and whether this makes the party who suffers it devoid of real economic alternatives on the market, having had to adapt the organization and investments in view of that specific (and sometimes unique) relationship (in this sense, among the most recent, Court of Cassation, third civil section, order 4 June 2025, no. 15023; first civil section, order 23 April 2025, no. 10573).

Further concrete indices on the basis of which to evaluate the existence of a state of economic dependence, on which the prohibited abusive conduct can be grafted, are normally identified by the jurisprudence of merit in the size of the company, in the turnover (and, therefore, in the significant impact of relationships with a given counterparty on the total volume of business) and in the duration of the relationship (Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, judgment 19 May 2022, which cites other rulings in the same sense).

On the level of remedies, in the original version, paragraph 3 of the repeatedly cited Article 9 was limited to providing for the nullity of the agreement "through which the abuse of economic dependence is realized”.

Article 11(1) of Law no. 57 of 5 March 2001 (Provisions regarding the opening and regulation of markets) then added the provision of the possibility of proposing, before the competent ordinary judge, "actions in matters of abuse of economic dependence, including those for injunctive relief and for damages”, thereby eliminating any doubt about the possibility that the company in a state of economic dependence can enjoy the protection offered by the indicated judicial initiatives.

Finally, Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 2022 added to the same paragraph 3 of Article 9 of Law no. 192 of 1998 the challenged provision, which attributes the actions that can be taken in matters of abuse of economic dependence to the cognition of the specialized sections for business matters.

10.3.– The latter represent the landing of a legislative evolution that saw their establishment, at some courts and courts of appeal, by Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003, initially under the name of "specialized sections in matters of industrial and intellectual property”. The intent – emerging, among other things, from the composition of the body integrated by "magistrates endowed with specific expertise” (Article 2) – was to introduce a peculiar discipline, substantive and procedural, aimed at ensuring a rapid, qualified, and effective judicial response in sectors very relevant on an economic level, in order to resolve certain types of disputes normally concerning relationships between companies (mostly constituted as legal entities) and characterized by particular technical-legal complexity.

The subsequent legislative interventions were oriented towards the progressive expansion of the business attributed to such sections: among them stands out Law Decree no. 1 of 24 January 2012 (Urgent provisions for competition, the development of infrastructures, and competitiveness), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 27 of 24 March 2012.

Article 2 of this regulatory corpus – besides modifying the name of the sections in question, attributing to them the current definition of "specialized sections in matters of business”, and increasing their number from twelve to twenty-one on the national territory – replaced Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 168, entrusting to the cognition of such specialized sections also numerous other disputes (regarding industrial law, violation of the competition discipline of the European Union, corporate relationships, public procurement and supplies and services of community relevance), to which must be added the related cases and proceedings.

To complete the picture, it must finally be remembered that, in the silence maintained by the legislature, the jurisprudence of legitimacy, in its maximum nomophylactic expression, has clarified that the relationship between specialized sections and ordinary ones of the same court or the same court of appeal, where the former have been established, "does not concern jurisdiction, but falls within the mere distribution of internal business of the judicial office” (Court of Cassation, civil united sections, judgment 23 July 2019, no. 19882).

11.– Having stated this, the raised questions are, in part, inadmissible and, in part, unfounded.

12.– Preliminarily, the inadmissibility of the question focused on the violation of the principles of effectiveness of protection and efficiency of the judicial response, which the referring judge believes are protected by Articles 24(1), 111(1) and (2), and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, must be declared.

The multiple constitutional parameters, in fact, are evoked cumulatively, without a precise motivation relative to each of them.

The grievance rests exclusively on the affirmation (already presented, per se, in a somewhat apodictic form) according to which the constitutional principles protected by the bundle of indicated parameters, also interposed, would have been violated as a consequence of the attribution "of all cases, in the most disparate matters, in which one of the parties alleges an abuse of economic dependence”, without further specifications.

It is not adequately explained, however, why the challenged rule would limit the power to assert rights before a judge, through an effective remedy and within the scope of a judicial proceeding, nor why it would infringe the guarantee consisting of ensuring "to everyone and always, for any dispute, a judge and a judgment” (such being the content of the guarantee claimed in light of the evoked parameters: among the many, judgments no. 48 of 2021 and no. 238 of 2014).

In particular, the reference to Article 111(1) of the Constitution, which would seem to evoke, by the work of the challenged provision, a violation of the principle of "due process regulated by law”, is not corroborated by any real argument in support of such an assumption.

13.– The remaining questions prove, instead, to be unfounded.

14.– In the first place, as illustrated previously (points 10.2. and 10.2.1.), it must be excluded that the notion of abuse of economic dependence deserves the stigma of the "intrinsic vagueness” postulated by the referring judge, remaining its undoubted suitability to embrace a plurality of contractual cases.

In any case, possible application uncertainties – destined physiologically to be overcome with the refinement of jurisprudence on shared solutions (which, moreover, precisely the concentration of jurisdiction in specialized sections will be able to favor) – constitute mere factual inconveniences and do not entail an intrinsic vice of constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged norm (in a similar sense, judgment no. 205 of 2025).

Having stated this, the central point of the first group of grievances, moved with reference to Articles 3 and 111(2) of the Constitution, is constituted by the assumption according to which the fundamental characteristic of specialization, which justified the establishment of sections in matters of business, would be lacking "for the numerous newly assigned matters”.

It is easy to observe, to the contrary, that the legislature, precisely in consideration of the vast experience and familiarity regarding relationships between companies already acquired by the aforementioned sections, has deemed the latter the most suitable to handle also cases of abuse of economic dependence, according to an evaluation falling within its broad discretion in the subject of the configuration of procedural institutes (judgments no. 146, no. 76, no. 39 and no. 36 of 2025, no. 189, no. 96 and no. 83 of 2024, no. 67 of 2023), recognized "also in the regulation of jurisdiction” (judgment no. 159 of 2014; in the same sense, judgments no. 117 of 2012, no. 237 of 2007 and no. 341 of 2006).

The exercise of such discretionary power, in the case in examination, does not appear at all as manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary, but, on the contrary, is easily justifiable.

The State Attorney’s Office hits the mark when it affirms that the specialized sections are better equipped to face and resolve issues that, in the scope of a contractual relationship between companies, presuppose an "analysis of the economic phenomenon” of dependence, on which the abusive conduct prohibited by law can be grafted.

Also in doctrine, moreover, it has been authoritatively highlighted that the assessment regarding the lack of real possibilities to find satisfactory alternatives on the market must be accomplished above all with economic criteria, besides the usual legal toolkit.

Again, it is not superfluous to underline that the challenged provision has inserted itself in a regulatory and jurisprudential landscape that is quite composite.

In particular, to the cognition of the specialized sections were already entrusted (ex Article 3(1)(c) of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003) the actions of nullity and damages, as well as appeals intended to obtain urgent measures, in relation to the violation of numerous provisions of Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990 (Norms for the protection of competition and the market), including those relating to the abuse of dominant position.

In the face of a consolidated approach in the jurisprudence of legitimacy (among many, Court of Cassation, sixth civil section, orders 23 February 2018, no. 4421 and 28 September 2017, no. 22747; fourth civil section, order 4 November 2015, no. 22584), according to which, in the distinct case of abuse of economic dependence, the specialized sections for business matters should not be approached, given the purely contractual nature (and, therefore, devoid of relevance for the protection of competition and the market) of the issue, the objective difficulty of drawing a precise discrimen between the two types of events, entailed, in many cases, uncertainty regarding the identification of the judge to whom to appeal.

It derives from this that the challenged provision evidently pursues the goal – certainly not unreasonable nor arbitrary – of simplifying the identification of the judge commissioned to handle disputes arising from possible "interferences” between the cases.

It is, moreover, a choice by no means eccentric with respect to the cognitive baggage of the specialized sections in question. Suffice it to think that, before the introduction of the challenged provision, not infrequently the rule of the extraneousness of disputes in matters of abuse of economic dependence to the jurisdiction of such sections suffered an exception if in court a claim had been asserted founded on the allegation of a situation of abuse of dominant position, subsequently reclassified as abuse of economic dependence (Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, judgment 6 December 2017, no. 12344); as also – in the case in which, at the same time, a claim falling within the jurisdiction of the specialized sections and one founded on the allegation of an abuse of economic dependence were advanced (Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, judgment, 18 November 2021) – it was deemed possible to invest the specialized sections of the entire dispute, for the force of attraction recognized by Article 3(3) of Legislative Decree no. 168 of 2003.

It is possible, obviously, that the challenged provision determines a burden of work, but the possible excessive lengthening of procedural times – presented as infringing the principle of reasonable duration of proceedings – is avoidable through a different distribution of resources between the various sections, specialized and ordinary, that compose the judicial office. In any case, these are inconveniences of mere fact, irrelevant, according to consolidated constitutional jurisprudence, for the purposes of constitutional control (judgments no. 117 of 2012, no. 303 of 2011 and no. 230 of 2010; orders no. 290 and no. 102 of 2011), because they do not entail an intrinsic vice of constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged norms (judgment no. 205 of 2025), having to be remedied "by preparing the suitable and opportune organizational measures” (judgment no. 216 of 2013).

15.– To the same outcome of groundlessness is destined the question raised with reference to Article 25(1) of the Constitution.

In constitutional jurisprudence, the expression natural judge pre-determined by law "indicates the judge established on the basis of general criteria fixed in advance and not in view of specific disputes” (again, judgment no. 205 of 2025; similarly, judgments no. 38 of 2025; no. 30 of 2011 and no. 452 of 1997); so that the principle protected by the evoked constitutional parameter can be considered respected when the adjudicating body has been established by law and its jurisdiction is defined on the basis of general criteria fixed in advance, in compliance with the reservation of law (judgments no. 5 of 2025 and no. 159 of 2014), as precisely happened in the case in point.

Possible application uncertainties of the jurisdiction rule must be overcome by interpretative jurisprudence and even a possible contrast regarding the meaning to be attributed to it could not "for this alone, make it considered infringing of the above-indicated principle” (judgment no. 117 of 2012).

Having stated this, the referring judge poses the question of the extension of the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge to the natural person magistrate and, therefore, in relation to the methods of distribution of business within the same judicial office.

In this regard, Article 7-ter(1) of Royal Decree no. 12 of 30 January 1941 (Judicial Order) provides that "[t]he assignment of business to individual sections and to individual boards and judges is carried out, respectively, by the head of the office and by the president of the section or by the magistrate who directs it, according to objective and predetermined criteria, indicated in a general way by the Superior Council of the Magistracy and approved contextually to the tables of the offices”, with the procedure outlined by the previous Article 7-bis.

The current referring judge does not complain of the violation of the schedule rules in force in the judicial office of belonging nor of their contradiction with the law attributing the jurisdiction in question (which would be denouncable, moreover, with other instruments); however, it complains that these rules, precisely because they are modeled in compliance with the challenged provision, have brought an "unreasonable derogation” to the setup pre-existing the normative modification suspected of constitutional illegitimacy.

In this regard, the unreasonableness of the legislative choice has already been excluded, for the reasons examined at point 14.

It must only be specified here how, in regard to the distribution of business between the different sections of the same judicial office, the schedule system – which regulates that distribution – stands in line with the guarantee protected by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.

In fact, the constitutional precept – besides the designation of the competent judge carried out, as in the case in point, directly by the legislature (provided that in a manner not arbitrary nor a posteriori) – admits that such identification also occurs through acts of subjects to whom the relative power has been attributed in compliance with the reservation of law (in this sense, orders no. 63 of 2002 and no. 152 of 2001), which imposes, even in that case, the adoption of objective criteria predetermined before the rise of the dispute (judgment no. 257 of 2017).

16.– Finally, the question raised with reference to Articles 3 and 25(1) of the Constitution must also be declared unfounded, according to which the attribution of disputes in matters of abuse of economic dependence to a body in collegiate composition would undermine transversally, once again, both the principle of the natural judge and the canons of specialization and efficiency.

Even wanting to overcome the apodicticity of the assumption, on one hand, it is precisely the collegiality of the decision that can make the elaboration of shared orientations within the specialized section easier; on the other hand, constitutional jurisprudence – on the observation that from the adjective "natural” no constitutionally bound normative content is given to be derived regarding the discipline of jurisdiction, left to the discretion of the legislature – has already excluded the possibility of attributing relevance, for the purposes of compliance with the principle protected by Article 25(1) of the Constitution, to the "different composition (monocratic, rather than collegiate) of the body” within the same judicial office (judgment no. 460 of 1994; in the same sense, order no. 343 of 2001).

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 18 June 1998 (Regulation of subcontracting in manufacturing activities), introduced by Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 5 August 2022 (Annual Law for the Market and Competition 2021), raised with reference to Articles 24(1), 111(1) and (2), for the profile of the effectiveness of protection and efficiency of the judicial response, and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by the Ordinary Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, with the order indicated in the epigraph;

2) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 9(3), final sentence, of Law no. 192 of 1998, introduced by Article 33(1)(c) of Law no. 118 of 2022, raised with reference to Articles 3, 25(1), and, for the profile of the reasonable duration of the proceedings, 111(2) of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Milan, specialized section for business matters, with the order indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 11 March 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Reporter

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Chancellor

Filed in the Chancery on 12 May 2026

 

The anonymized version complies, in its text, with the original