JUDGMENT NO. 70

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of February 19, 2016 (Organic Reform of Housing Policies and Reorganization of ATER), initiated by the Regional Administrative Court for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, in the proceedings between A. G. and the Territorial Agency for Residential Housing (ATER) of Pordenone, by way of non-final judgment of June 26, 2025, registered under no. 202 of the 2025 ordinance register and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 43, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearances of the Territorial Agency for Residential Housing (ATER) of Pordenone and A. G., as well as the intervention of the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia;

having heard in the public hearing of March 10, 2026, the Reporting Judge Filippo Patroni Griffi;

having heard the attorneys Giovanni Martorana for A. G., Luca Heros Mazzeo and Luca De Pauli for ATER of Pordenone, as well as Beatrice Croppo for the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia;

having deliberated in the chambers on March 10, 2026.

Statement of Facts

1.− The Regional Administrative Court for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, by way of a non-final judgment of June 26, 2025, registered under no. 202 of the 2025 ordinance register, has raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of February 19, 2016 (Organic Reform of Housing Policies and Reorganization of ATER), in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution. The provision is challenged insofar as it establishes, as a minimum requirement for the allocation of subsidized housing, "having been registered as a resident in the regional territory for at least five years, even if not consecutive, within the eight preceding years."

1.1.− The referring court reports that it is called upon to rule on the appeal of an individual – resident in Italy since 1990, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia from March 1996 to February 2012, and subsequently from July 2020 – who challenged, through four grounds of appeal, the measure of October 11, 2023, by which the Territorial Agency for Residential Housing (ATER) of Pordenone rejected the application for public residential housing (ERP) on the grounds that the applicant had not been a resident in the regional territory for at least five years, even if not consecutive, within the eight years preceding the application date. This requirement was established, in implementation of the challenged provision, by Article 4, paragraph 2, letter a), of the regulation approved by decree of the President of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region, no. 208 of October 26, 2016, entitled "Execution Regulation for the management of subsidized housing managed by regional ATERs, funding for said ATERs to support the construction, purchase, and recovery of subsidized housing, and the financing of the Social Fund referred to in Articles 16 and 44 of Regional Law no. 1 of February 19, 2016 (Organic Reform of Housing Policies and Reorganization of ATER)." The appellant had submitted an application, after the publication of the ERP ranking and as permitted by Article 11, paragraph 2, of the same regional regulation, to obtain available housing, having been subject to an eviction notice due to lease expiration. In addition to the denial measure, the appellant also challenges the minutes of the Commission for the assessment of subjective requirements provided for by the call for applications, the minutes approving the list of candidates who submitted an application for available housing, and the call for applications itself.

The court a quo, after rejecting the preliminary procedural objections raised by ATER of Pordenone, holds that the first three grounds of appeal are unfounded and states, in relation to the fourth, that the related decision cannot proceed without a constitutional legitimacy referral.

1.2.− With the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant proposed a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the applicable legislation, which would take into account judgment no. 44 of 2020 of this Court and which, ultimately, would consider the requirements provided by the regional law and regulation to be satisfied. The referring Regional Administrative Court (TAR), however, not deeming an interpretative adjustment possible due to the textual clarity of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, raised the present questions of constitutional legitimacy.

1.2.1.− Regarding relevance, the court a quo observes that the denial measure is based on the appellant’s failure to meet the requirement – provided for by the challenged provision and reproduced by the regional regulation (d.Pres.reg. Friuli-Venezia Giulia no. 208 of 2016) – of residence in the Region for at least five years within the eight years preceding the application, such that, "while the provision remains in force, the challenged measure would be exempt from the alleged defects."

1.2.2.− Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring TAR observes that the jurisprudence of this Court has already declared the constitutional illegitimacy of provisions analogous to the one challenged. Citing an extensive excerpt of judgment no. 147 of 2024, it is noted that a requirement such as that provided for by the regional law under scrutiny is entirely unrelated to the specific function of social housing, which is to ensure the concrete satisfaction of the right to housing; it creates an unjustified difference in treatment between people in the same condition of fragility; and it betrays the Republic's duty to remove economic and social obstacles that, by limiting the freedom and equality of citizens in practice, impede the full development of the human person.

2.− The appellant appeared before the TAR, requesting that the constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provision be declared.

2.1.− The counsel for the private party, after a comprehensive review of the facts, observes that it is settled that Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016 is "the indispensable regulatory prerequisite for the Regulation and the Call for Applications through which the appellant was denied ATER housing," excluded solely due to the lack of the prior five-year residence requirement.

2.2.− The reasons why the constitutional legitimacy questions should be upheld are easily inferred from the jurisprudence of this Court, which is discussed at length in the defensive brief.

In particular, the private party's counsel observes that, if public residential housing is intended to allow individuals in disadvantaged economic situations to access housing on subsidized terms, there is no reasonable correlation between this objective and prior and protracted residence in the regional territory; indeed, it denies access to ERP regardless of any assessment concerning the applicant's state of need or hardship.

3.− The ATER of Pordenone also appeared, requesting that the questions be declared inadmissible, procedurally barred, or unfounded, "for reasons to be set forth in a separate brief during the further course of the proceedings."

4.− The Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia subsequently intervened in the proceedings, requesting that the questions of constitutional legitimacy be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

4.1.− After accounting for the facts underlying the issue, the regional counsel clarifies that Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016 was adopted in the exercise of concurrent competencies regarding public housing (Article 5, number 18, of Constitutional Law no. 1 of January 31, 1963, containing the "Special Statute of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region") and urban planning (Article 4, number 12, of the same statute).

Among the various actions to support housing policies under the aforementioned regional law, subsidized housing, governed by Article 16, concerns the "implementation of interventions by ATER for the construction, purchase, and recovery of subsidized housing in order to increase the real estate assets to be allocated for permanent or long-term lease." For all actions, implementing regulations must be adopted, pursuant to Article 12, which provide, among other aspects, for the requirements of beneficiaries, in line with the minimum requirements provided for by the challenged provision.

Regarding the latter, the intervenor observes that, in its original text, it provided for residence in the regional territory "for at least twenty-four months." The text of the challenged provision is, instead, the result of amendments introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 24 of November 6, 2018 (Amendments to Regional Law no. 1 of February 19, 2016), which, however, maintained the minimum two-year residence for lease support measures (Article 19, paragraph 1, first sentence) and for cases of involuntary arrears (Article 20, paragraph 1). With Article 5, paragraph 8, of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of October 25, 2024 (Multisectoral Financial Measures), which occurred after the administration's acts challenged in the court a quo proceedings, "the more favorable two-year residence requirement was extended to the housing policy actions" provided for by Article 16 of the regional law, including subsidized housing measures.

According to Article 12 of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, the primary legislation was implemented through the regulation referred to in d.Pres.reg. Friuli-Venezia Giulia no. 208 of 2016, which has been amended over the years; however, due to the lack of amendment following the approval of Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, "the regulatory provisions contained in Article 4 of the D.P. Reg. (five years, even if not consecutive, in the eight preceding years) must be considered tacitly repealed due to incompatibility with the primary legislative source."

4.2.− Given the above, the intervenor's counsel points out, first, that the appellant in the court a quo proceedings had only proposed a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the applicable legislation, asserting that they possessed the five-year residence requirement, but had not challenged the requirement of residence itself, while simultaneously complaining of the constitutional illegitimacy of the regional legislative and regulatory provisions.

4.2.1.− In light of this, the Autonomous Region maintains that "the reasoning of the referral order does not set out with sufficient clarity the reasons for the necessity of applying the challenged provision, neither regarding the reconstruction of the petitum in the proceedings a quo, nor regarding the deliberation on the impossibility of resolving the case independently of the resolution of the question."

The referring judge, in fact, would have contradicted themselves by first observing that the appellant believes they meet the requirements, and then reporting that they challenge the constitutional legitimacy of the five-year residence requirement, which was in fact never the object of a challenge. This would result in an error or contradiction in the reasoning regarding relevance.

4.2.2.− The referring TAR also allegedly reconstructed the chain of administrative and regulatory acts governing the case insufficiently. In particular, it "failed to consider whether the challenged measure was compliant with the call for applications, whether the call was compliant with the regulation in force ratione temporis, and whether the secondary source was in turn compliant with the primary norm also in force ratione temporis." By doing so, the referring judge took only the primary normative provision as the parameter of legitimacy for the challenged measure, with the result that it failed to notice "the lack of an express challenge in court to the underlying regulatory provisions" and did not inquire "as to the existence or otherwise of a power to disapply such secondary provisions ex officio."

The intervenor's counsel observes, in this regard, that "the disapplication of a regulation in the absence of a request by a party is possible only if the secondary source is not the source of the injury from which the interest in appealing originates," in which case, instead, the annulment action must also be directed against the regulation, in addition to the administrative act (Article 29 of Annex 1, containing the "Code of Administrative Procedure," to Legislative Decree no. 104 of July 2, 2010, containing "Implementation of Article 44 of Law no. 69 of June 18, 2009, delegating the government to reorganize the administrative process"). Consequently, as the administrative court cannot exceed the limits of the petition and pronounce the annulment of the regulation, the questions would be inadmissible for lack of relevance.

According to the regional counsel, the peculiar challenging nature of the administrative process would, in any event, render the reasoning regarding relevance insufficient. In the proceedings a quo, in fact, the challenged provision was not invoked among the grounds for challenge, so that "the administrative proceedings could be resolved independently thereof," as questions of constitutional legitimacy can be raised ex officio provided they are instrumental "to the positive definition of the complaints actually pursued in the appeal" (citing Council of State, Sixth Section, judgment no. 5058 of August 25, 2009). There would, therefore, be a lack of "an effective and concrete relationship of instrumentality between the resolution of the constitutional legitimacy question and the resolution of the main proceedings."

4.3.− The questions would also be inadmissible due to deficient reasoning on the non-manifestly unfounded nature.

Constitutional jurisprudence, in fact, is constant in excluding reasoning per relationem, as the referral order must be self-sufficient, meaning the court a quo must adopt the grounds for non-manifest unfoundedness as its own. In the case at hand, the referring TAR limited itself to referring to certain precedents of this Court.

Furthermore, the court a quo limited itself to citing the principles of equality, reasonableness, and substantive equality, "without motivating the point regarding the grounds of merit in relation to the constitutional parameters, which are only formally identified."

4.4.− On the merits, the questions would in any case be unfounded.

The regional counsel notes that with judgment no. 222 of 2013, this Court deemed the previous regional legislation (Article 18 of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 6 of March 7, 2003, as amended by Article 7 of Regional Law no. 16 of November 30, 2011) to be free from constitutional legitimacy challenges, as it provided for a requirement of residence for at least twenty-four months. In this way, the rationale underlying said regulation was deemed acceptable, consisting of "the desire to prevent individuals not sufficiently linked to the territory who have been allocated housing from subsequently moving their registered residence and causing excessive turnover among allocatees, thereby undermining the efficiency of administrative action in the allocation procedure, which is, moreover, characterized by quite complex investigation."

It is based on this orientation that the regional legislator, in approving Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, re-proposed the same two-year residence requirement. Subsequently, the Autonomous Region decided to "strengthen the requirement of territorial roots," adopting the challenged provision, and then, noting the most recent jurisprudential trend of this Court, reintroduced the two-year registered residence requirement for access to subsidized housing.

Once it is noted that the recently reintroduced requirement would be "undoubtedly compliant" with constitutional jurisprudence, regarding the challenged provision, the intervenor's counsel observes how it differs from cases of other regional laws already examined by this Court, as it did not set a rigid threshold for access to the benefit, "because it does not crystallize the existence of the residency requirement in the regional territory at the moment immediately preceding the submission of the application, in a univocal and binding manner, but instead allows the aforementioned requirement to be taken into consideration even if, hypothetically, it has been accrued in distinct time segments, cumulatively considered over a longer time span, equal to 8 years."

5.− Near the public hearing, the appellant in the proceedings a quo filed a brief in which, after replying to the defenses of the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, they insisted on the acceptance of the constitutional legitimacy questions.

5.1.− Having recalled that regulatory provisions cannot be the subject of constitutional review and that therefore the regional regulation (d.Pres.reg. Friuli-Venezia Giulia no. 208 of 2016), which is merely implementation of Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, cannot be, the private party's counsel also observes that the implicit repeal of the challenged legislation and the regulation itself cannot affect the constitutional legitimacy questions, since all the acts challenged before the referring TAR were adopted on the basis of the previous legislation.

5.2.− The appellant also notes that they had raised in the court a quo proceedings "the error of the registered residence requirement as provided by Article 4 of D.P. Reg. 208/2016," so much so that they asked the TAR to interpret the regional legislation in a constitutionally oriented sense, based on the principles affirmed by this Court: it is precisely due to the deemed impossibility of interpretative adjustment that the administrative judge then decided to raise the constitutional legitimacy questions ex officio. On the other hand, the respondent ATER argued for the legitimacy of its own administrative activity "precisely on the strength" of the challenged provision.

5.3.− The appellant's counsel considers the further arguments put forward by the Region in support of the inadmissibility of the questions to be unfounded.

The TAR, first of all, correctly motivated the point of relevance, observing that the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy would result in "the acceptance of the public housing application by the appellant."

Furthermore, the lack of a petitum cannot be opposed. The referral order, in fact, "does not necessarily have to contain a full-fledged petitum," but must only define the thema decidendum, as the court a quo accurately did, leaving it then to this Court to adopt the most suitable ruling to remove the defect of constitutional illegitimacy.

The administrative judge did not incur any logical leap or omission in the examination of the underlying administrative and regulatory acts, both because the regulation had been the subject of a challenge by the appellant and, above all, because ATER identified in the challenged provision the foundation of the legitimacy of the challenged administrative measures, so that the TAR "dutifully" raised the present questions, as it could not limit itself to disapplying the regulation in the presence of the identical primary legislation.

The referral order, furthermore, accurately indicated the constitutional parameter deemed violated and did not perform any reasoning per relationem, as it adopted the arguments used by constitutional jurisprudence in support of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of norms analogous to the one challenged.

5.4.− On the merits, the private party's counsel – reviewing constitutional jurisprudence on the subject of access to ERP – reaffirms that the questions raised should be upheld.

6.− ATER of Pordenone also filed a brief, arguing regarding the inadmissibility and non-foundedness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy.

6.1.− According to the respondent in the administrative proceedings, the TAR did not adequately motivate regarding relevance. The challenged provision, in fact, was the subject of amendments by Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, which lowered to two years the residence required to obtain ERP housing: in the face of such normative change, the court a quo should have motivated regarding the persistence of a concrete and current interest of the appellant.

6.2.− The referral order would also be deficient regarding the reasoning on the non-manifestly unfounded nature, as the TAR only made a reference to the legal principles that this Court enunciated in analogous cases. The challenged provision, however, would be distinguished from other regional regulations deemed constitutionally illegitimate, in that the period of protracted residence can "also be discontinuous, provided that it has been accrued within a longer period, equal to eight years": the court a quo should therefore have motivated "on why the cited principles should apply also to the case at hand."

6.3.− On the merits, ATER's counsel observes that the right to housing is financially conditioned and that, therefore, it would be up to the legislator to perform "the necessary balancing between the economic cost of the services, the sustainability of the system, and the breadth of the pool of potential beneficiaries, identifying selective criteria consistent with the principles of reasonableness and substantive equality."

The challenged provision would be an expression of this discretion and would be aimed at "favoring those who are an integral part of the regional community that supports this service." Protracted residence, in fact, would allow for guaranteeing the right to housing for those who have "a more pressing need" for housing in the territory, because "[t]hose who have already experienced mobility are more inclined to move to obtain housing elsewhere, while those who have a history characterized by sedentariness will hardly make the difficult decision to emigrate elsewhere." Eliminating the requirement of protracted residence would instead open the service "to merely opportunistic applications from subjects who have no link to the territory," impacting the rights of those who cannot move elsewhere.

7.− Finally, the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia also filed a brief, insisting on the inadmissibility or non-foundedness of the constitutional legitimacy questions and requesting, in the alternative, the restitution of the documents to the court a quo.

7.1.− The intervenor's counsel clarifies that in the administrative proceedings the appellant did not expressly challenge the requirement of protracted residence, but on the contrary argued that they possessed it in light of a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the regional discipline, which would also count the "different time segments spent previously." The TAR, therefore, allegedly erred or in any case contradicted itself in believing that the appellant challenged the primary and secondary norms that provide for said requirement, having instead requested "a different application [...] to their particular case." This would render the reasoning on relevance patently erroneous and contradictory.

After reiterating the arguments already spent in the act of intervention, for which the questions would also be irrelevant because the repeatedly cited regulation was not challenged and is not disapplicable, the regional counsel believes that the court a quo did not adequately motivate the necessity of applying the challenged provision also under a further profile. Even for available housing, such as that requested by the appellant, an investigation into the state of need of the applicant must in fact be carried out, but "the court a quo did not notice or in any case did not take note of the phases of the investigation that preceded the denial, failing to motivate in relation to the score – an indicator of the state of need – that the appellant would have obtained based on their personal, family, and income situation": in the absence of this, it is not clear whether the appellant had obtained a score sufficient to be usefully placed in the ranking and this regardless of the possession of the requirement of prior and protracted residence.

7.2.− Having also recalled the arguments already spent regarding the inadmissibility for deficient reasoning on the non-manifestly unfounded nature or, in any case, for the non-foundedness of the questions, the intervenor's counsel requests, in the alternative, the restitution of the documents to the court a quo.

The latter, in fact, did not take note of the amendments made to the challenged provision by Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024 and did not consequently evaluate their impact on the questions. Following such amendments, for access to subsidized housing measures, a protracted residence of two years is sufficient, so that the appellant in the court a quo proceedings, if their application were re-evaluated, "would certainly have the residency requirements to access the benefit."

Considered in law

8.− The TAR Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, with the non-final judgment indicated in the header, questions the constitutional legitimacy of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, in the part where it provides, as a minimum requirement to result as an assignee of subsidized housing, "to be registered as a resident in the regional territory for at least five years, even if not consecutive, in the eight preceding years."

In the opinion of the referring judge, in accordance with what has already been stated by this Court, the requirement of prior and protracted residence is entirely unrelated to the specific function of social housing, which is to ensure in practice the satisfaction of the right to housing; it determines an unjustified difference in treatment between people in the same condition of fragility; and it betrays the duty of the Republic to remove economic and social obstacles that, by limiting the freedom and equality of citizens in practice, impede the full development of the human person.

9.− Preliminarily, it must be noted that, after the adoption of the administrative acts challenged in the proceedings a quo, but before the present questions were raised, the challenged provision was the subject of an amendment by Article 5, paragraph 8, of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, which inserted the words "referred to in Article 16, for the action" after the words "or, for the action." Following said amendment, to be an assignee of subsidized housing, it is necessary to have been registered as a resident in the regional territory for at least two years, and no longer for at least five years, even if not consecutive, in the eight preceding years.

The intervention of the regional legislator, however, is entirely irrelevant in the proceedings a quo. The legitimacy of the administrative acts challenged in that venue, as the private party also notes, can only be evaluated, based on the principle tempus regit actum, on the strength of the only legislation in force at the time of their adoption and therefore, as regards the primary legislation, in light of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, in the text in force before the entry into force of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024.

This consideration also serves to reject the objection of inadmissibility formulated by ATER of Pordenone, as the cited normative amendment does not in any way affect the interest in appealing in the administrative proceedings, so that the referring TAR did not need to argue on the point for the purposes of the correct initiation of the present proceedings. Nor can the request of the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia to return the documents to the court a quo be accepted: beyond the fact that, as stated, the normative amendment has no influence on the administrative proceedings, it predates the raising of the questions of constitutional legitimacy, so that it cannot even be considered ius superveniens.

10.− Still preliminarily, the various objections of inadmissibility put forward by ATER of Pordenone and the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia must be evaluated.

10.1.− Both complain that the reasoning on the non-manifestly unfounded nature was performed per relationem or was in any case deficient.

The objections are unfounded.

Regarding the alleged reasoning per relationem, it is sufficient to observe that the TAR reports an extensive excerpt of judgment no. 147 of 2024 of this Court, to then state textually that, "in consideration of the fact that the norm of the regional law of Friuli-Venezia Giulia contains a provision that traces those analogous already repeatedly challenged by the Constitutional Court, [said judge] cannot but share the considerations of the Judge of the laws." In this way, the court a quo demonstrated that it made the assumptions of constant constitutional jurisprudence its own and deemed them transposable to the challenged provision (judgments no. 29 of 2026, no. 171 of 2024, no. 178 and no. 109 of 2022).

Nor do the objections hit the mark where they complain of the failure to invoke the constitutional parameter or, in any case, the insufficient reasoning on the point. The referring TAR, in fact, accurately indicated as parameters of constitutional legitimacy both the principles of equality and reasonableness referred to in Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, and the principle of substantive equality referred to in Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution. Regarding the reasons for contrast, they are clearly inferable from the extensive passage of judgment no. 147 of 2024 which, as stated, is integrally reproduced in the initiation act and which the court a quo intended to adopt.

10.2.− The Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia also objected that the TAR did not motivate in relation to the score – an indicator of the state of need – regarding the personal, family, and income situation of the appellant, with which it would not be clear whether they had obtained a score sufficient to be usefully placed in the ranking, regardless of the possession of the requirement of prior and protracted residence.

This objection is also unfounded.

First of all, the challenged provision configures an admission requirement, the lack of which would not allow the administration itself to evaluate the conditions that integrate the state of need, given the preclusion of the examination of the merits of the application.

In any case, the referring judge gives express account, in several passages of the non-final judgment, of the fact that the challenged measure, as well as the endoprocedural ones, were adopted only and exclusively because the absence of the requirement of prior and protracted residence was found. Moreover, all the grounds of appeal revolve around the existence or non-existence of said requirement and, furthermore, the administrative judge expressly states that the appellant's application "turned out to be complete and not in need of integration," so much so that even their state of need does not come into consideration in the proceedings a quo.

10.3.− The Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, finally, puts forward further objections of inadmissibility for insufficient reasoning on relevance, which all revolve around the fact that the appellant did not challenge the requirement of prior and protracted residence, but argued, on the basis of an interpretative adjustment, that they possessed it. The regional regulation providing for said requirement, therefore, was not challenged, with the dual consequence that the administrative judge could not exceed the limits of the petition and pronounce its annulment and that the challenged norm, which establishes the same requirement replicated by the regulation, would not be relevant in the proceedings a quo.

Not even these objections are unfounded.

The challenged Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), as seen, provides that the minimum requirements of the final beneficiaries of the regional actions for housing policies be contained in the regulations that the Region, pursuant to Article 12 of the same Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, is called upon to adopt to govern each of them. For the action concerning subsidized housing – such as that for which the appellant had applied – the Region adopted the regulation referred to in d.Pres.reg. Friuli-Venezia Giulia no. 208 of 2016, whose Article 4, paragraph 2, letter a), contains a norm almost identical to the challenged one.

In spite of what was stated by the regional defense, the referring TAR gives adequate account of the relationship between the challenged primary legislation and the regulatory one and of the consequent relevance of the questions raised.

It must be observed, first of all, that the court a quo in several points of the initiation act reports the existence of the regulation and, indeed, rejects the first of the grounds of appeal precisely by deeming the discipline referred to in Article 4 of said regulation applicable in the concrete case.

Secondly, and above all, it must be noted that the TAR, when it goes on to examine the fourth ground of appeal, from which the present constitutionality incident arises, reports that the appellant "requests the acceptance of the appeal as a result of the constitutionally oriented interpretation of the discipline contained in the regional law and the implementing regulation," to then immediately state that "the primary norm contained in Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c) of L.R. 1/2016, due to its textual clarity, does not lend itself to interpretative or constitutionally oriented interpretations, being able to be subjected only to the scrutiny of constitutional legitimacy." It is at this point that the court a quo asserts that "the decision of the case cannot ignore the constitutionality incident of the regional norm relevant in the present venue," which provides for the requirement of prior and protracted residence and provides "that the regulations referred to in Article 12 (such as the cited D.P.Reg. 0208/Pres. of 26.10.2016) provide for this requirement." It asserts, finally, that "the appellant addressed this Tribunal in order to challenge the requirement of residence in the Region for at least five years in the eight preceding years, required for the allocation of housing, a requirement of which the denial measure made application and which results established by the regional norm in question, which excludes at the root the acceptableness of the appellant's application. With the consequence that, while the norm itself remains, the challenged measure would be exempt from the alleged defects."

The referring TAR, therefore, adequately motivated the point of relevance, assuming clearly that the obstacle to the acceptance of the appeal is constituted by the primary norm – replicated by the regulation and placed at the foundation of the denial measure – of whose constitutional legitimacy it doubts. This is enough for the correct initiation of the proceedings before this Court, to which remains foreign, as it is rather remitted to the court a quo, the question of the necessary challenge or the disapplicability of the regulation, in a case, moreover, where the regulation is compliant with the challenged regional law.

11.− On the merits, the questions are well-founded.

11.1.– There is no doubt that the right to housing falls "among the essential requirements characterizing the sociality to which the democratic State desired by the Constitution conforms," which therefore has the duty to guarantee a fundamental social right that contributes "so that the life of every person reflects every day and in every aspect the universal image of human dignity" (judgment no. 217 of 1988, recently recalled again by judgments no. 1 of 2026, no. 1 of 2025, no. 147 and no. 67 of 2024).

Public residential housing responds precisely to this duty of the Republic, as it is a service functional "to ensure in practice the satisfaction of this primary need, because it serves to 'guarantee housing to economically weak subjects in the place where their interests are located' (judgment no. 176 of 2000), in order to ensure a dignified existence to all those who do not have sufficient resources (Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), through a public service tasked with the 'provision of housing for workers and less affluent families' (judgment no. 168 of 2014)" (judgments no. 1 of 2026, no. 147 of 2024 and no. 44 of 2020; in terms almost analogous also judgment no. 1 of 2025).

11.2.− The jurisprudence of this Court is by now constant in the sense that "there is no reasonable correlation between the need to access the benefit of housing, if one is in conditions of economic fragility, and the prior and protracted residence – however one declines it [...] – in the regional territory" (judgment no. 67 of 2024). The criterion of prolonged residence, in fact, "prevents the satisfaction of the right to housing regardless of any assessment pertaining to the situation of need or hardship, which is not affected by the duration of the stay in the regional territory; it does not consider that precisely those who are in a state of need move frequently from one place to another in search of work opportunities; it is not an index of a perspective of rooting (judgments no. 67 of 2024, no. 145 and no. 77 of 2023, no. 44 of 2020 and no. 166 of 2018)" (judgment no. 147 of 2024). Constitutional jurisprudence therefore emphasizes that the requirement of prior and protracted residence, precisely because it is uncoupled from any assessment pertaining to the situation of need, configures "a rigid threshold that leads to denying access to ERP" and is therefore "incompatible with the very concept of social service, as a service intended primarily for economically weak subjects" (judgment no. 44 of 2020).

In light of these principles, this Court has repeatedly stated that such requirements – besides violating, as mentioned above, the principle of reasonableness – violate both the principle of equality in a formal sense (Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution), as they determine an unjustified disparity of treatment between people who are in the same conditions of fragility (judgments no. 1 of 2025 and no. 147 of 2024), and the principle of equality in a substantive sense (Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution), which entrusts the Republic with the task of "removing economic and social obstacles that, by limiting the freedom and equality of citizens in practice, impede the full development of the human person" (judgments no. 1 of 2025, no. 147 and no. 67 of 2024).

11.2.1.− At the same time, it has recognized that, just as it is reasonable to require residence in the regional territory at the time of the application (judgment no. 77 of 2023), so the regional legislator can take into consideration the territorial rooting when formulating the rankings where it is expressive of a reasonable perspective of stability (judgments no. 1 of 2026, no. 67 of 2024, no. 9 of 2021 and no. 44 of 2020). This – if it cannot happen by attributing an ad hoc score to the prior and protracted residence considered in itself, which would determine a prevalence of the criterion of territorial rooting over the indices revealing the state of need, in contrast with Article 3 of the Constitution (judgment no. 1 of 2026) – can happen, instead, with a proportionate enhancement of circumstances such as the seniority of presence in the rankings, which "documents the sharpening of social suffering due to the failure to satisfy the housing request" (judgments no. 1 of 2026, no. 147 and no. 67 of 2024) and from which "it can be inferred that the needy requester but not assignee of housing, who nevertheless remained in the territory, will hardly exercise their freedom of movement once – finally – their right to housing is satisfied" (again, judgment no. 1 of 2026).

11.3.− The challenged norm, providing for the requirement of prior and protracted residence to result as an assignee of subsidized housing, is entirely analogous to the other regional norms already scrutinized by this Court and, therefore, must likewise be declared constitutionally illegitimate due to contrast with Article 3 of the Constitution.

The argument of the regional defense according to which the provision would not set a rigid threshold for access to the benefit, because it would allow that the requirement of the prior five-year residence matures "in distinct time segments, cumulatively considered over a longer time span, equal to 8 years," does not argue in the opposite sense. Beyond the fact that structurally analogous norms have likewise been deemed constitutionally illegitimate (judgments no. 1 of 2025, no. 147 and no. 67 of 2024), this Court in this regard has already expressly observed that such a method of calculating the period of prior and protracted residence does not eliminate the unreasonableness of the requirement, as it still draws a scenario without functional connection with the goal of satisfying the housing need and incapable of inferring anything regarding the prospects of stability (judgment no. 67 of 2024).

11.4.− Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, in the text in force before the entry into force of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, must therefore be declared constitutionally illegitimate in the part where it provides, as a minimum requirement to result as an assignee of subsidized housing, the persistence of registered residence in the regional territory for at least five years, even if not consecutive, in the eight preceding years.

12.− Article 5, paragraph 8, of the recalled Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, as seen (supra, point 9), amended Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, providing that, to result as an assignee of subsidized housing, it is necessary to have been registered as a resident in the regional territory for at least two years. This norm is constitutionally illegitimate for the same reasons that determine the constitutional illegitimacy of the one challenged by the court a quo, requiring, again, prior and protracted registered residence for access to subsidized housing.

Pursuant to Article 27 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), therefore, Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016 must also be declared constitutionally illegitimate consequentially, in the text in force following the entry into force of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, limited to the words "for the action referred to in Article 16,".

13.− In conclusion and summarily, as a consequence of the declarations of constitutional illegitimacy adopted with the present judgment, the requirement of prior and protracted residence to result as an assignee of subsidized housing is removed from the regional legislation.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Law of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region of February 19, 2016, no. 1 (Organic Reform of Housing Policies and Reorganization of ATER), in the text in force before the entry into force of the Law of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region of October 25, 2024, no. 8 (Multisectoral Financial Measures), in the part in which it provides, as a minimum requirement to result as an assignee of subsidized housing, the persistence of registered residence in the regional territory for at least five years, even if not consecutive, in the eight preceding years;

2) declares, consequentially, pursuant to Article 27 of the Law of March 11, 1953, no. 87 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 29, paragraph 1, letter c), of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 1 of 2016, in the text in force following the entry into force of Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law no. 8 of 2024, limited to the words "for the action referred to in Article 16,".

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 10, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Reporting Judge

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery

Deposited in the Chancellery on May 7, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms, in the text, to the original