JUDGMENT NO. 52
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of December 29, 2022 (State budget for the 2023 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2023-2025 period), and Art. 1, paragraph 135, of Law no. 213 of December 30, 2023 (State budget for the 2024 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2024-2026 period), raised by the Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction of Trento, Labor Disputes Section, sitting as a single judge, in the proceedings pending between P. D. et al. and the National Institute for Social Security (INPS), by order of June 30, 2025, registered as no. 163 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 38, first special series, of the year 2025.
Having examined the appearances of P. D. and the INPS, as well as the intervening act of the President of the Council of Ministers;
Having heard, in the public hearing of February 25, 2026, Judge Rapporteur Maria Rosaria San Giorgio;
Having heard the lawyers Amos Andreoni for P. D., Antonella Patteri for the INPS, as well as State Attorney Fabrizio Urbani Neri for the President of the Council of Ministers;
Having deliberated in the chambers on February 25, 2026.
Statement of Facts
1.– By order of June 30, 2025, registered under no. 163 of the 2025 register of orders, the Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction of Trento, Labor Disputes Section, sitting as a single judge, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy, with reference to Articles 3, first paragraph, 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, regarding Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of December 29, 2022 (State budget for the 2023 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2023-2025 period), and Art. 1, paragraph 135, of Law no. 213 of December 30, 2023 (State budget for the 2024 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2024-2026 period).
These are the provisions which—respectively for 2023 and 2024—established the automatic pension revaluation rates, graduating them according to the amounts of the pension payments.
The provisions are challenged insofar as they "provide for the automatic equalization of pension payments according to the percentages provided therein, but calculated 'with reference to the total amount of the payments themselves' (the so-called 'block system'), rather than on the distinct 'income brackets' of the same payments (the so-called 'stepped system'), as prescribed by the 'general rule for cooling pension revaluation' (see Constitutional Court judgment no. 19 of 2025, points 7 and 9.1 of the 'Considerations of Law') contained in Art. 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of December 27, 2019 ('...the automatic pension revaluation index is applied, according to the mechanism established by article 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 448 of December 23, 1998: a) to the extent of ... for the income brackets of pension payments up to ... times the minimum INPS pension')".
The referring court reports that it must decide the appeal of P. D., holder of an old-age pension ("VOCUM" category) paid by the National Institute for Social Security (INPS), "with a current amount of € 7,268.00 gross (€ 4,698.00 net)". The appellant had filed an application for the income reconstitution of the pension in order to obtain the equalization, effective from January 1, 2023, according to the model of indexing by "steps" or "brackets" of the amount, as derived from the regulation under Art. 69, paragraph 1, of Law no. 388 of December 23, 2000, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget (2001 Financial Law)". The INPS had, however, rejected both the application and the subsequent administrative appeal; therefore, the dispute was brought before the judiciary.
Regarding relevance, the referring court observes that the main proceedings "cannot be resolved independently of the resolution of [...] the question of constitutional legitimacy," which was also proposed in the introductory document of the proceedings. It specifies that the appellant has submitted a technical report from which it emerges that the monthly pension installment paid to him by the INPS, according to the "block system," is "lower by € 170.30 in the year 2023 and by € 316.80 in the year 2024 compared to the monthly pension installment if settled according to the 'stepped system'."
As for the requirement of non-manifest groundlessness, the referring court recalls the constitutional case law on legislative interventions aimed at slowing down the equalization dynamics of pension payments (in particular, judgments no. 19 of 2025 and no. 234 of 2020), noting that equalization—mandated by the principles affirmed in Arts. 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution—constitutes a technical instrument aimed at ensuring, over time, in the face of inflationary pressures, the adequacy of the sums paid as a pension. The legislature, in establishing the specific equalization variations, is called upon to balance constitutional values, such as, on the one hand, the interest of pensioners in maintaining payments proportional to the quantity and quality of work performed during their working life and sufficient to ensure a free and dignified existence, and, on the other hand, "the general interest pertaining to budgetary requirements." The exercise of such discretion must be conducted according to reasonableness, safeguarding "the indispensable guarantee of the minimum protection needs of the person" (citations of this Court's judgments no. 70 of 2015, no. 316 of 2010, and no. 30 of 2004).
In particular, the referring court notes that a similar assessment should be conducted by differentiating pensions based on their amount, "given that higher pensions have wider margins of resistance to inflationary erosion, and the need for a systematic revaluation of the corresponding monetary value is, therefore, less pressing for them than it is for those of lower amounts" (with reference, again, to this Court's judgments no. 19 of 2025 and no. 234 of 2020).
In the reasonableness check on measures limiting equalization, the economic-financial data that determines the legislature's choice would also be relevant, since the sacrifice "of the pensioners' interest in preserving the purchasing power of their checks, especially the more modest ones, cannot be said to be reasonable when the financial needs underlying the intervention to limit revaluation are not detailed in full."
There would also be "a temporal limit, since the indefinite suspension of the equalization mechanism, or the frequent repetition of measures intended to paralyze it, would expose the system to evident tensions with the inviolable principles of reasonableness and proportionality," also with regard to higher-amount pensions, which "might not be sufficiently protected in relation to changes in the purchasing power of currency. This is also in consideration of the 'drag' effect, which makes even a temporary loss of purchasing power substantially permanent [...], given that subsequent revaluations will, in fact, be calculated not on the original real value, but on the last nominal amount, which has already been affected by the lack of adjustment" (with reference here to judgment no. 234 of 2020).
With the aid of tables taken from the procedural documents filed by the appellant, the lower court illustrates the negative effects for the pensioner that would result, over time, from the application of the contested "block" model. In particular, there would be effects of "overtaking" of a lower pension payment compared to the immediately higher one, as well as a "subsequent alignment of the different classes of payment" (this "by reason of the guarantee clause," provided by law, according to which the increase in revaluation, for a given income bracket, is granted up to the limit of the previous income bracket, as increased) and, further, effects of "dragging over time" of the values thus flattened. Specifically, the lower court suggests the hypothesis of a pensioner holding a payment of 2,626.90 euros for the year 2022 (corresponding to the maximum of the reference income class), whose revalued amount, for the year 2023, ends up corresponding to that of another pensioner who could count on a payment, originally, equal to the higher sum of 2,692.00 euros (as such, falling into the higher income class). Both pensions considered in this example, even if of originally different amounts and classes, are nonetheless aligned, due to the "block" equalization system (and the connected correction deriving from the guarantee clause), on the identical final amount of 2,807.76 euros, thereby eliminating the original divergence between the two payments, which in turn depended on the quantity and quality of the work performed during active life.
The referring court specifies that the question raised is different from those regarding the provision of decreasing revaluation rates, already examined by this Court in judgment no. 19 of 2025, which deemed them unfounded. Maintaining the aforementioned rates, the referring court requests a verification of whether or not it is "reasonable" to use the system that, as the challenged provisions provide, consists of "applying a single rate commensurate with the total amount of the payment when it rises above a certain threshold," in place of the previous system which, instead, applied "different rates for each pension bracket."
In short, "with the income differences existing between pensioners at the time of the settlement of the payments disappearing," the pension of those who, initially, received a higher amount would no longer be "proportional to the quantity and quality of the work performed by them." The "block" equalization system, by leading to the alignment of pension classes that were quantitatively distinct at the time of their settlement and the consequent flattening effect, would also conflict with "the principle of non-contradiction enshrined in the first paragraph of Art. 3 of the Constitution," considering the "concurrent validity [...] of pension payment calculation systems that refer to the remuneration received and/or the contributions credited over the entire working life."
2.– P. D., the appellant in the main proceedings, appeared in the proceedings, concluding for the acceptance of the questions raised by the Court of Trento.
In his opinion, the "block" equalization system, applied to his pension, "tends not only to the loss of value of amounts higher than 4 times the minimum pension but also to align pension classes that were originally distinct," thereby realizing a "blatant contradiction" with the remuneration and contribution mechanism for calculating pensions. This criterion, which provides for the application of a "flat percentage on the entire amount," would end up penalizing "those who benefit from one euro more than each threshold value." Conversely, the criterion of calculation by income brackets (the so-called stepped system), already provided as "the standard regime" starting from 2000, then confirmed in 2019 and analogous to "that adopted by tax legislation," would be "the fairest and most consistent with the constitutional dictates (Art. 53 of the Constitution)," as it would ensure that "the total income is not evaluated as a block but is broken down into segments, each of which is regulated independently with a specific percentage."
The private party illustrates the genesis of the "block" criterion, provided "for the first time" and "exceptionally" for the years 2014 and 2015 pursuant to Law no. 147 of December 27, 2013, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget (2014 Stability Law)," then extended for the following two three-year periods by effect of the provisions of Law no. 208 of December 28, 2015, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget (2016 Stability Law)," and Law no. 145 of December 30, 2018 (State budget for the 2019 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2019-2021 period). Only from 2022, the private party specifies, did the "stepped" system return to the standard regime, according to the provisions of Law no. 160 of December 27, 2019 (State budget for the 2020 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2020-2022 period), which also "extended the application of the 100% revaluation index to pension income brackets up to 4 times the minimum (previously it was up to 3 times the minimum)." However, with the budget laws for 2023 and 2024, the legislature returned to providing, "again in derogation, the punitive system of lower rates applied by blocks," therefore "with a negative remodulation of the rates for increasing classes of pension income." After 2021, the resulting negative effects "became substantial due to the subsequent inflationary spike."
The guarantee or "floating" clause—even if provided by law to avoid the overtaking effects connected to the block regulation—would not, however, allow for the avoidance of the compression of the various payments and their alignment across different income classes, just as it occurred in the years 2023 and 2024. The overall loss of value of pensions, in contrast with the principles of progressivity and proportionality, would, moreover, be even more marked for the higher income classes, not to mention the "gross/net divergence due to tax regulation." Conversely, the public coffers would have benefited from lower pension expenditure estimated, between 2012 and 2023, at "about 100 billion euros," with an annual increase "of about 10 billion due to the so-called drag effect."
Given the above, in the judgment of the private party, the relevance of today's question is linked to the comparison between the "block" system and the "stepped" system, from which a "substantial damage" to the appellant's pension (settled with effect from April 1, 2019) would emerge, estimated at 2,214.00 euros for the year 2023 and at 4,118.30 euros for the year 2024, with "a total loss due to dragging of € 6,641.82 for the five years of pension already enjoyed."
As to the non-manifest groundlessness, the private party perceives first of all a "systemic irrationality" (Art. 3 of the Constitution), as the criteria for calculating the pension of a contributory and remuneration type would not be consistent "with an equalization system that supports the flattening of payments." The "block" equalization mechanism, in fact, would eliminate the distances between the various income classes as derived from the original settlement of the pension payments, with resulting disparity of treatment. This would result in an inadmissible deviation between the trend of pensions and that of remuneration, in derogation of the principle, repeatedly reiterated by constitutional case law, according to which the adjustment should take into account individual commitment in the quantity and quality of work performed during active life.
From another perspective, Art. 3 of the Constitution would be violated due to the unreasonableness inherent in the "illegitimate repetition over time of exceptional systems, allegedly declared as temporary." In particular, every variation of the stepped system, as provided by the 2019 legislature and "endowed with particular strength of resistance," should be subjected "to a careful scrutiny of reasonableness." "Financial contingencies," while suitable for justifying a different modulation of rates year by year, could not instead configure a derogation from the calculation system dictated for the standard regime.
Having recalled, then, the violation of Art. 38 of the Constitution, especially in light of the drag effects previously highlighted, the private party dwells again on the injury to the "principle of legitimate expectation" (traced back to Arts. 2, 3, and 38 of the Constitution), highlighting that the challenged system "operates a retroactive negative modification of the calculation criteria [...] with which the amount of the pension payment had been established from the beginning," and concludes, finally, by highlighting the violation of Art. 36 of the Constitution, in its "inseparable link" with Art. 38 of the Constitution, recalling that, according to the case law of this Court, the principles of proportionality and adequacy must be constantly respected in relation to changes in the purchasing power of money.
3.– The INPS appeared in the proceedings, concluding for the inadmissibility or, in any case, on the merits, for the groundlessness of the questions.
The social security institute recalls, first of all, that the quantum of protection ensured by the 2022 legislature had already passed the reasonableness test, at the outcome of the question decided by this Court with judgment no. 19 of 2025. In that pronouncement, in particular, it was "affirmed the appropriateness and reasonableness of the amount of the equalization increase attributed to pensions according to the module established by Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022." Intervening "to cool the increase in revaluation," the aforementioned law provision had innovated with respect to the "general rule" referred to in Art. 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of 2019, modulating the increase "on six blocks, or clusters, of pension amounts" as identified by letters a) and b), as well as by numbers 1) to 5) of letter b), of the aforementioned paragraph 309.
The social security institute specifies that, through the "block" system provided by the 2022 law, "it may occur that the pension of an amount slightly higher than the maximum limit of the previous block, once revalued, arrives at an amount lower than the measure of the revalued pension of an original amount equal to or slightly lower than the maximum limit in the previous block": for this reason, the law introduced a specific safeguard clause that allows for the alignment of the two payments.
In this context, the Institute draws attention to the differentials that are recorded between the amounts of pension payments placed at the limit of two blocks and notes that those differentials, within which the alignment effect of the originally higher pension on the maximum amount that can be reached by a pension placed in the previous block is determined, settle on meager figures (ranging from 15.310 euros, for the differentials between the blocks provided for by numbers 2 and 3 of letter b, to 68.079 euros, for those between the blocks referred to in numbers 1 and 2 of the same letter b).
Given the above, the INPS raises the inadmissibility of the questions, noting that the appellant's pension in the main proceedings, being of an amount equal "to € 7,410.50," i.e., "more than 10 times the minimum," would not be affected or interested by the contested phenomenon of alignment. The relevance—which the referring judge deemed to appreciate by reason of the more favorable outcomes that the appellant would obtain through the application of the "stepped" revaluation system—being "merely indirect," would "argue rather for the inadmissibility of the question."
On the merits, however, the questions would not be well-founded.
The hypothesis examined by the referral order—that is, that of the two pensions of original amount, equal, respectively, to 2,626.90 euros and 2,692.00 euros, which, at the outcome of the "block" equalization, end up aligned on the same revalued amount—would testify to the marginality of the harmful effect lamented by the lower court. In fact, alignment differentials "of very limited amount" would be relevant (in the hypothesis mentioned, it is a differential such as not to exceed 68 euros), referred, that is, to pension payments which, in their comparison, could not be considered "representative of different working lives such as to require that the aforementioned proportion be always maintained, to the cent, in the case of a slowdown in indexation." Differences in amount so meager in the original calculation of pensions would not, indeed, derive from "structural differences in the working path of the holders," but from "absolutely marginal factors" (such as, for example, "birth in December or January of the following year, or the presence of a few weeks of contributions more or less"). In light of this, "it appears irrelevant whether the equalization adjustment is reached by the legislature through a stepped system or a block system," as it is necessary "to balance multiple needs."
Rather—it is noted—the equalization cooling module articulated by blocks, already experienced by the legislature with the interventions of 2015 and 2018, has been constantly judged consistent with the Constitution by this Court which, with judgments no. 234 of 2020 and no. 250 of 2017, as well as with order no. 96 of 2018, has always excluded that it—through the provision of the inverse progression of revaluation increases with respect to the amount of the payments—entails a disregard for the quantity and value of the work performed.
In short, also by effect of the safeguard clauses provided by both of the challenged provisions, no injury to the proportionality between pension and work performed would occur, in the awareness that all revaluation systems with rates lower than 100 percent are destined to affect, albeit with different effects, the original scale of proportion of pensions.
4.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, concluding for the inadmissibility or, in any case, on the merits, for the groundlessness of the questions.
The provisions challenged by the referring judge, in the opinion of the state defense, "do not appear to be the result of an unreasonable use of the discretion" that belongs to the legislature, it being necessary "to balance values, which also takes into account budgetary needs": the adequacy and proportionality of pension payments, which it is the task of equalization to ensure over time, would meet "always the limit of available resources."
The rationale of the provisions in question, as per the explanatory report of the draft budget law for 2023 (XIX Legislature, A.C. 643), would be that of obtaining a lower social security expenditure "equal to about 2.1 billion in 2023, 4.1 billion in 2024 and 4 billion in 2025." The case law of this Court, moreover, would have always considered not unreasonable the choice to apply decreasing equalization indices to the increase in the total pension payment amount, where this occurs in an attempt to balance constitutional interests, in the framework of economic and financial compatibilities. The failure to fully adjust, with respect to the increase in the cost of living, would therefore be legitimate as it is inspired by criteria of progressivity (mention is made of this Court's judgment no. 173 of 2016), it being necessary to remember that, in our legal system, there does not exist "a principle of unconditional protection of expectation in the pension payment," especially for recipients, such as the appellant in the main proceedings, "of social security amounts of considerable entity, which do not result in being susceptible to depriving the interested party of the means adequate to his own life needs."
The state defense emphasizes that the challenged provisions save amounts up to four times the minimum INPS payment and, modulating "the percentages of reduction in proportion to the increase in the amount" of pensions, they never arrive at totally excluding revaluation for any payment. The criteria of adequacy and proportionality, repeatedly recalled by constitutional case law, would therefore be respected.
5.– Pursuant to Art. 6 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and, jointly, the Italian Pensioners' Union-CGIL (SPI-CGIL), as amici curiae, filed a written opinion, admitted by presidential decree of January 13, 2026. In reporting to have intervened in the main proceedings as subjects bearing collective or diffuse interests pertaining to the controversial issue, the two associations dwell on the negative effects that would result, for pensioners, from the "block" calculation system, emphasizing that the decision of this Court is "destined to produce effects of exceptional importance for [...] Italian pensioners." Also exposed are the reasons which, in the opinion of the amici curiae, would lead to the admissibility and validity of the questions raised by the Court of Trento: reasons largely coinciding with those illustrated by the referral order.
Also the Association "Comma2-Lavoro è dignità" filed a written opinion as amicus curiae, likewise admitted by the aforementioned presidential decree, in which it is highlighted, with brief notes, the "irregular and random" incidence, to the detriment of pensioners, that the challenged rules would produce regarding the "loss of purchasing power of currency."
6.– With a memorandum filed in the imminence of the hearing, P. D. returned to present defenses, in reply to the opposing deductions.
In recalling that the "block" system was adopted by the legislature only "on a temporary basis," the private party emphasizes that it entails a flattening effect of pensions, with regard to those that fall at the border between two different income thresholds and which, once thus "twinned," "will grow in the years to come in the same measure." The difference between the two "twinned" amounts, contrary to what was argued by the INPS defense, would not be irrelevant at all, also in consideration of the "fiscal drainage" which already affects the relative purchasing power. While it must be recognized that "alignment produces effects close together in time only for central payments" (in the income scale identified by the two challenged provisions), it should nonetheless be considered that the cooling of equalization dynamics, as resulting from the "block" system, "operates for all payments," determining a "greater loss of value having regard to the comparison between equalization with rates applied by blocks, here sub judice, and the system of rates applied by steps as provided for by the standard legislation."
In this framework, the exception of inadmissibility raised by the INPS would not be well-founded, since, as would result from the documents submitted in the lower court proceedings, "for Dalpiaz the block system (in addition to aligning contiguous pensions for others) has produced a lower dynamic, accentuating the effects of the decreasing rate," with an economic loss estimable, for 2023, at 2,214.00 euros.
On the merits, the private party reiterates the reasons in support of the acceptance of the questions, reasons that would resist even what was recently stated in this Court's judgment no. 167 of 2025 (concerning the different topic of the legitimacy of decreasing rates). In particular, it is emphasized that the flattening between pensions of different amounts, while initially concerning "contiguous" pensions, over time and by effect of the "dragging" would be destined to involve "a multitude of payments even originally not contiguous." The whole would then be aggravated by the events of the years 2022 and 2023 "marked by high inflation and [by] the consequent loss of purchasing power of pensions." The "block" system would slow down equalization even more, compared to the severe and contextual decrease of the rates, and this, "in addition to the injury to the principle of expectation," would enter into conflict with the "principle of 'ne bis in idem'" and with that of "regulatory clarity," with the consequent overall unreasonableness of the legislature's choice.
Considerations of Law
7.– The Court of Trento, Labor Disputes Section, sitting as a single judge, doubts—with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution—the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022 and of Art. 1, paragraph 135, of Law no. 213 of 2023, in the part where they provide, respectively for the years 2023 and 2024, the automatic equalization of pension payments according to the percentages provided therein, "but calculated 'with reference to the total amount of the payments themselves' (the so-called 'block' system), rather than on the distinct 'income brackets' of the same payments (the so-called 'stepped' system), as prescribed by the general rule for cooling pension revaluation contained in Art. 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of December 27, 2019."
The challenged provisions establish, for the aforementioned years, the automatic revaluation rates, graduating them according to the amounts of the pension payments, and provide that, through the application of these rates, the revaluation is calculated "with reference to the total amount of the payments themselves." In this way—notes the referral order—prejudicial economic consequences are produced for the pensioner, all the more significant as time passes. There would be, first of all, a progressive effect of flattening between pension checks having contiguous amounts, determining, precisely by effect of the contested calculation system, a progressive realignment between different income classes. In some limit cases, moreover, there would also be effects "of overtaking," which the law has in any case provided to sterilize through the provision of specific safeguard clauses. These last ones, however, do not exclude the occurrence of the described alignment effect, which—the referring judge emphasizes—entails excessive penalization for the pensioner who, originally, could count on higher sums, precisely because, in this way, he would end up having the proportion originally existing between the different payments cancelled. The situation would then be further aggravated by the subsequent drag effect, given that, in the following years, the revaluation is destined to apply to the base amount as already penalized by the described effects, with the consequence that the value of pensions would be destined to decrease further, without any possibility of recovering the lost differential.
The referral order emphasizes that the described effects would not occur if there were adopted, for the purposes of calculating equalization, the different "stepped" system, which was already experimented, in the past, by the legislature, which, with Art. 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of 2019, chose it as the standard regime model. The two challenged provisions present themselves, therefore, as so many derogations, valid for the years 2023 and 2024, with respect to the system in force as the standard regime, as outlined by the aforementioned 2019 provision.
This would result in a violation of the principle of proportionality referred to in Art. 36, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as the pension, to be understood as deferred remuneration, would no longer be proportional to the quantity and quality of the work performed during active life and would no longer be sufficient to ensure the pensioner a free and dignified existence. The principle of adequacy would also be injured, which requires measuring the pension to life needs in case of invalidity and old age, in violation of Art. 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution.
Finally, a contradiction would be highlighted between the contested "block" calculation modality and the concurrent validity of the remuneration and/or contribution systems, given that this modality, in violation of Art. 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, would lead to the alignment of pension classes which, at the time of their settlement, presented quantitatively distinct amounts.
8.– In its defenses, the INPS first raised the inadmissibility of the questions due to a lack of relevance. In the main proceedings, the discussion concerns the revaluation of a pension of an amount "higher than 10 times the minimum," as such destined not to be affected nor in any way interested by the contested phenomenon of alignment. In the judgment of the INPS, therefore, the relevance of today's questions of constitutional legitimacy, with respect "[t]o the concrete position brought to judgment," would appear as "merely indirect."
The exception is not well-founded.
It must be premised that the statement on which the exception in question is based—that is, that the progressive effect of alignment concerns only pension amounts that are placed at the border between two medium-high income brackets, without pensions of an even higher amount being interested—corresponds to the reconstruction in fact operated by the referral order. This, in fact, to describe the economic prejudice deriving from the adoption of the "block" calculation system, selected, for the year 2023, an example that refers to pension payments placed in the medium-low income brackets of the reference model, referred to in Art. 1, paragraph 309, letter b), numbers 1) and 2), of Law no. 197 of 2022 (in fact, the negative effects that occur on pensions having, respectively, an amount between four and five times and an amount between five and six times the INPS minimum are compared). The private party itself, in the explanatory memorandum filed in these incidental proceedings, has moreover stated that "alignment produces effects close together in time only for central payments," thereby, therefore, recognizing that pensions of medium-high amount, among which is the one subject of the main proceedings, are not involved.
Nonetheless, regardless of the concrete incidence of the alignment effect, it is necessary to emphasize that the prejudice lamented by the appellant party in the lower court proceedings goes beyond this aspect, because it concerns, more generally, the economic loss suffered by the holder of the old-age pension. The main appeal—as reported in the premises of the referral order—illustrated, regarding the pension treatment that forms the object of the judgment, the occurrence of a monthly loss, in the year 2023, equal to 170.30 euros and, in the year 2024, equal to 316.80 euros, "compared to the pension installment if settled according to the 'stepped system'." The referring judge, therefore, is called to evaluate whether the described economic reductions suffered by the pension treatment of which the appellant is the holder are legitimate or not, regardless of the circumstance of whether they correspond to an effect of "alignment" between different income classes. To issue its decision, therefore, the lower court is called, primarily, to evaluate the legitimacy of the calculation system that those reductions entailed.
The relevance of today's questions follows.
9.– Still on a preliminary basis, it must be considered that the private party, in its defenses, supported the constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provisions also from the perspective of the violation of the principle of legitimate expectation. In this regard, it emphasized that the "block" calculation method, object of the criticisms raised by the Court of Trento, "operates a negative retroactive modification of the calculation criteria, whether they are of a remuneration type or a contribution type, with which the amount of the pension payment had been established from the beginning," with the consequent injury, under this different perspective, "of Art. 38 as well as Arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution."
This is, however, a profile of challenge that cannot find entry in today's judgment of constitutional legitimacy, the thema decidendum of which must be circumscribed to only the parameters indicated by the referral order. The case law of this Court is constant in affirming that "the object of the judgment of constitutional legitimacy in incidental proceedings is limited to the provisions and parameters indicated in the referral order, with the exclusion of the possibility of expanding the thema decidendum proposed by the referring judge, up to including questions formulated by the parties, which, however, he has not deemed to make his own" (so, among many, judgments no. 213 of 2025 and no. 239 of 2021).
10.– Before proceeding to the analysis of the merits of today's questions, it is useful to retrace the most significant steps that have marked the evolution of the reference regulatory framework, with particular attention to the introduction of the "block" calculation system for the revaluation of pension payments.
10.1.– As already repeatedly emphasized by this Court, the automatic equalization, or revaluation, of pensions is a technical instrument, provided and regulated by law, aimed at ensuring over time the adequacy of pension payments in the face of the loss of purchasing power of money, due, in particular, to inflationary pressures (most recently, judgments no. 19 of 2025 and no. 234 of 2020). The adjustment of amounts is guaranteed through a mechanism of inverse progression, which provides for the decrease of the percentage equalization rate as the base amounts to be revalued increase, articulated in different income brackets.
According to the system that currently constitutes the rule for the standard regime, valid from January 1, 2022 onwards—as introduced by Art. 1, paragraph 478, of Law no. 160 of 2019—three income brackets are provided: the first, referred to pension payments up to four times the minimum INPS payment, benefits from a revaluation rate of 100 percent; the second, referred to pension payments included between four and five times the minimum INPS payment, of a rate of 90 percent; the third, referred to pension payments higher than five times the aforementioned minimum payment, of an even smaller rate, equal to 75 percent.
10.2.– Since ancient times, moreover, the legislature has experimented with the introduction of corrective measures, aimed at achieving a "slowdown" of the equalization dynamic and, at the same time, a benefit for public finances in terms of savings on pension expenditure. Among them is that introduced by Art. 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 448 of December 23, 1998 (Public finance measures for stabilization and development)—which still today governs the automatic equalization of pension payments, by virtue of the constant reference to this provision made by subsequent legislative interventions, including those object of today's scrutiny (judgment no. 19 of 2025)—according to which revaluation is applied, for each individual beneficiary, "as a function of the total amount of payments" received, with the specification that the increase due is attributed "in proportion to the amount of the payment to be revalued with respect to the total amount."
In the general context of measures suitable for "cooling" the equalization dynamic, one can also place the mechanism that is today challenged by the lower court, that is, the calculation of "block" equalization. Based on this system, pension payments are revalued, still through the application of decreasing progressive rates, "with reference to the total amount of the payments themselves" (Art. 1, paragraph 477, letter b, of Law no. 160 of 2019, regarding the system introduced only for the years 2020 and 2021; the same literal formula, moreover, is found in letter b of each of the two provisions challenged today, which refer to the years 2023 and 2024). The entire pension amount, in this way, is subjected to revaluation through the rate of the corresponding income bracket. As argued by the referral order as well as, in particular, by the written opinions of the amici curiae, this calculation modality affects the final revalued amount to a greater extent, compared to what would be obtained, at equal rates, if the different "stepped" system were applied: the latter, in fact, breaks down the same pension payment into different income brackets and, therefore, applies the different progressive reference rates to each of these brackets, including those most favorable to pensioners.
10.3.– The application of rates with reference to a calculation base consisting of the entire income block therefore implements, in substance, an accounting mechanism that replicates, mutatis mutandis, the functioning of the accumulation system referred to in Art. 34, paragraph 1, of Law no. 448 of 1998, such as to contribute, similarly to the latter, to the cooling of the equalization dynamic for the purposes of greater public expenditure savings. This calculation modality, as already emphasized, more penalizing, appears to have been introduced, for the first time, for the purposes of pension equalization for the years 2012 and 2013, in a historical moment of particular pressure for public finances. Previously, the automatic equalization system had been articulated through the "stepped" calculation method, as evidenced by the first provisions that regulated it, starting from Art. 24, paragraph 4, of Law no. 41 of February 28, 1986, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget (1986 Financial Law)," and as was then confirmed, as the standard regime, by Art. 69, paragraph 1, of Law no. 388 of 2000. Based on these provisions, the "stepped" count was accompanied by the provision of only three income brackets, marked by decreasing rates fixed at 100 percent, 90 percent, and 75 percent.
Introduced, for the years 2012 and 2013, the exceptional measure of freezing equalization for payments of a total amount higher than three times the minimum INPS payment, the legislature subsequently had to intervene to redesign the revaluation system in force for both of those years, following this Court's judgment no. 70 of 2015, which had declared the constitutional illegitimacy of the emergency provisions dictated by Art. 24, paragraph 25, of Decree-Law no. 201 of December 6, 2011 (Urgent provisions for growth, equity, and the consolidation of public accounts), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 214 of December 22, 2011.
Art. 1 of Decree-Law no. 65 of May 21, 2015 (Urgent provisions regarding pensions, social safety nets, and severance pay guarantees), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 109 of July 17, 2015, therefore set the system of equalization of pension payments, for those two years, according to the use of the "block" calculation, that is, precisely, "with reference to the total amount of the payments themselves." This provision was accompanied by a more severe articulation of equalization rates, organized into four different income brackets (characterized by revaluation percentages more stringent than those previously in force). It was, moreover, excluded, on that occasion, any revaluation for pensions of the highest amount, totally higher than six times the minimum INPS payment.
With the financial difficulty situation persisting, the model of "block" calculation, accompanied by a similar articulation of income brackets and relative rates, was proposed again by the legislature also for the following years, still, in any case, as a system "in derogation" with respect to the ordinary rule provided by Art. 69, paragraph 1, of Law no. 388 of 2000 (which continued to provide, as the standard regime, the "stepped" calculation). In this sense, it provided, for the three-year period 2014-2016, Art. 1, paragraph 483, of Law no. 147 of 2013, which nevertheless remodulated the equalization percentages in melius. The overall system, precisely because it is inspired "by criteria of progressivity, parameterized on the constitutional values of proportionality and adequacy of pension payments," passed the scrutiny of constitutional legitimacy with this Court's judgment no. 173 of 2016.
In a similar sense, it was then provided, up to the end of 2018, by Art. 1, paragraph 286, of Law no. 208 of 2015 as well as, similarly, for the subsequent three-year period 2019-2021, by Art. 1, paragraph 260, of Law no. 145 of 2018. Judgment no. 234 of 2020 of this Court deemed the overall revaluation system, as introduced by this last law, consistent with the Constitution, observing, in particular, that it did not entail "the effect of paralyzing, or suspending indefinitely, the revaluation of pension payments, not even those of a higher amount, resolving itself conversely in a mere cooling of the equalization dynamic, implemented with gradual and proportional indices." A decisive relief, in this sense, this Court found in the fact that "in the period considered, inflation was marginal and that the forecasts indicate even a deflationary situation," it being therefore possible "to exclude that the cooling maneuver referred to in Art. 1, paragraph 260, of Law no. 145 of 2018 violated the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and adequacy, despite the 'drag' effect that it can generate and the existence of prior interventions on the indexing of checks" (point 15.4.2 of the Considerations of Law).
With the forecasts of a reduction in the inflation rate having partly materialized, the budget law for the year 2020 (Law no. 160 of 2019) indeed confirmed the derogatory rule of the "block" calculation up to the end of the year 2021 (Art. 1, paragraph 477), with the connected provision of six income brackets, but, at the same time, with effect from January 1, 2022, it re-established pro futuro the general rule of the "stepped" calculation (Art. 1, paragraph 478), articulated according to the traditional three income brackets and the relative rates of 100 percent, 90 percent, and 75 percent.
The rule, valid as the standard regime, of "stepped" calculation thus received application, in effect, for the revaluation of pensions in the year 2022. However, due to a new growth in inflation and the consequent difficulties for public finances, of which a trace is found in the accompanying reports to the relative government bills, the legislature again opted for the "block" calculation system. Precisely with the two provisions object of today's questions of constitutional legitimacy, in fact, it was established to derogate again from the ordinary system, providing, both for the year 2023, and for the year 2024, that the application of percentage rates was to be performed "with reference to the total amount of payments." At the same time, and similarly to what happened for the previous systems "in derogation," the rates went from three to six, articulated on as many income brackets, providing, therefore, the percentage measures of 100 percent, 85 percent, 53 percent, 47 percent, 37 percent, and, finally, for the highest income bracket, of 32 percent (valid, the latter, only for the year 2023 and replaced, for 2024, by the even lower rate of 22 percent).
Analogously to what was already provided by the previous disciplines "in derogation," however, both the provisions challenged today maintained the safeguard clause which—with reference to pension payments that are placed across two income classes—allows for rebalancing the equalized amount, avoiding inequitable "overtaking" effects: this, through the recognition of an increase in revaluation, attributed to the originally higher check up to the limit (increased) established for the income class immediately preceding, with a consequent final effect of alignment between different income classes, appreciable, in any case, within limited numerical differentials. In this sense, both Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022, and Art. 1, paragraph 135, of Law no. 213 of 2023 provided, with the clauses that are found in the respective letters b).
11.– Given the above, the questions raised with reference to the principles of proportionality, sufficiency, and adequacy of pension payments, deduced from Arts. 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, are not well-founded.
11.1.– This Court, in deeming not constitutionally illegitimate the automatic equalization system characterized by decreasing revaluation rates, as introduced, for the year 2023 only, by Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of 2022, judged it—with the recalled judgments no. 19 and no. 167 of 2025—overall as "less severe" compared to the majority of the previous models, which had already passed the constitutional legitimacy scrutiny. As far as is of greater interest here, the recalled rulings deemed that the new model "safeguards the full revaluation of the most modest pensions, the scope of which it actually widens, including in it those of an amount equal to four times (and no longer three) the minimum INPS payment." The "slowdown" of the equalization dynamic also provided, as this Court did not fail to specify, maintains "the technique of inverse progression with respect to the entity of the checks, without excluding any from revaluation. The latter, in fact, is provided—albeit in reduced percentages, but certainly not symbolic ones—also for payments of a higher entity, in obedience to a criterion of rationality that finds confirmation in the greater margins of resistance of pensions of a higher amount with respect to the effects of inflation" (judgment no. 19 of 2025, point 12.1 of the Considerations of Law).
11.2.– Similar considerations can be made with reference to the profile that comes into relief in today's questions, that of the calculation base, chosen by the legislature, for the application of decreasing progressive rates.
The consideration of the entire pension amount, rather than individual income brackets, with the consequent application of a single rate, calibrated to the total amount of the check, necessarily entails negative consequences for the holder of the benefit, up to the risk of seeing the pension amount "flattened" on that of payments originally more modest, resulting in "alignment" between different income classes. Precisely on the described prejudicial effects, the arguments of the lower court concentrate, which illustrate them in their concrete realization, with regard to the individual income classes involved, in the intent to make their illegitimacy emerge in relation to the constitutional principles of proportionality, sufficiency, and adequacy of pension payments.
However, as correctly pointed out by the defenses of the social security Institute (through factual elements that do not find denial in the writings of the private party, nor in the opiniones of the amici curiae), the differentials of the amounts, within which the contested effects of "alignment" and "flattening" occur, settle on meager values. The example brought by the referral order, which compares two pensions placed at the margins of the second and third income classes for the year 2023 (for amounts equal, respectively, to 2,626.90 euros and 2,692.00 euros), refers in fact to a differential of 65.10 euros. With the aid of a table, likewise referred to the results of the pension revaluation for the year 2023, the INPS also highlighted that the maximum differential, in the presence of which the alignment effect occurs (or, which is the same, the overtaking effect which is, however, neutralized by the regulatory safeguard clauses), is equal to 68.09 euros.
Therefore, a restricted range of value comes into relief to which, precisely for its meager measure, a determining role cannot be recognized in the key of proportionality review between the pension payments involved. Consequently, in the context of a policy of slowing down the equalization dynamic, the eventual cancellation of such a reduced range, while entailing the alignment of pension classes that guaranteed, originally, slightly different amounts, is not such as to revoke into doubt, by itself, the correspondence of the relative law provisions to the principles deducible from Arts. 36 and 38 of the Constitution.
As repeatedly stated by this Court, moreover, the constitutional coverage of the institution of automatic equalization (pursuant to Arts. 38, second paragraph, and 36, first paragraph, of the Constitution) does not allow concluding that revaluation must necessarily, year by year, be recognized to all pension payments and, even less, that it must be guaranteed in the same measure for all pension holders. On the contrary, the link between the pension adequacy garrisoned by Art. 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, and the proportionality and sufficiency of the remuneration received during active life, garrisoned by Art. 36, first paragraph, of the Constitution, must be considered only trend-based and does not lend itself to being declined in a rigid sense, it being necessary to recognize to the legislature a significant margin of discretion in the determination of the quantum in light of a necessary balancing with the needs of public finance, as documented in the accompanying reports to the budget bills. In this perspective, the cancellation of marginal gaps between different pension amounts, which may concretely occur as a consequence deriving from the application of a specific equalization system, cannot make the choice of the legislature that opted for that model be considered manifestly unreasonable, all the more so where that same model results in being suitable, conversely, to ensure a relevant saving of pension expenditure for social security coffers in historical moments of proven economic-financial difficulties.
As for the two years here under examination (2023 and 2024), the pension expenditure saving is adequately certified by the technical reports attached to the respective budget laws. Limitedly to that for 2023, moreover, this Court has already noted, recalling the Government's explanatory report, that such legislative initiative placed itself "in a macroeconomic scenario of uncertainty that feels the effects of geopolitical tensions and the increase in inflation, due mainly to the increase in the prices of energy products and raw materials" and, consequently, was "directed at limiting as much as possible the impact of the cost of energy on family budgets, especially the most fragile ones" (judgment no. 19 of 2025, point 12.2 of the Considerations of Law).
In this framework, it is not irrelevant to consider that the equalization increase of pensions, even those of a higher amount, remains in any case guaranteed, albeit to a lesser extent, also following the adoption of the "block" calculation system. The lower growth of pension checks, particularly appreciable for those belonging to the highest income classes (by virtue of the mechanism, which remains preserved, of the inverse proportion of the growth of rates), does not equate evidently to a measure of "freezing" of equalization indefinitely, which could lead—according to this Court's case law, consolidated with judgment no. 70 of 2015—to a friction with Arts. 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution.
11.3.– It must therefore be concluded that the "block" calculation system does not deviate, under practical effects, from the other instruments for cooling equalization dynamics, variously experimented by the legislature since the introduction of the revaluation logic and which have already passed the constitutional legitimacy scrutiny. Similarly to the others, even the one under examination, indeed, is pre-ordered to a general slowdown of equalization progressions and entails, as a consequence inherent in itself, the effect of "dragging," over time, of the consequent economic losses.
Compared to the other cooling instruments, the one under examination entails, as an accounting consequence, the production of a limited overtaking effect, causing a pension payment originally slightly lower than another to succeed in exceeding, at the outcome of revaluation, the amount of the latter. It is, however, precisely an effect inherent in this system, for this reason alone certainly foreseen and pondered by the legislature which, for both challenged provisions, consistently intervened with the aim of neutralizing it: this, through the provision of the remembered safeguard clauses, which allow, at the very least, maintaining aligned the pension amounts involved, which remain placed, in any case, within meager differential margins.
In short, the challenged provisions entail a limited deviation of the equalization dynamic, with respect to the original values of pension payments at the time of their first settlement. For what is illustrated, however, such an effect is not such as to make the legislature's choice manifestly unreasonable. Only in this last eventuality, as repeatedly emphasized by this Court, could one predicate the effective "non-suitability of the mechanism in concrete chosen to preserve the constant sufficiency of the pension to 'ensure the worker and his family means adequate to life needs for a free and dignified existence'" (in this sense, judgment no. 226 of 1993, point 6 of the Considerations of Law, as well as, more recently, judgment no. 259 of 2017, point 3.1 of the Considerations of Law).
11.4.– For what precedes, the question raised with reference to the parameters of Art. 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution must be declared not well-founded.
12.– Neither is the question centered on the parameter of Art. 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution well-founded, declined in the sense of making a presumed contradiction emerge between the provisions which, to implement the automatic equalization of pension payments, adopt the "block" calculation system and the concurrent articulation, both remuneration and contribution, of the pension model.
The challenge under examination re-proposes, under a different angle of view, the same criticism prospected through the evocation of constitutional principles deduced from Arts. 36 and 38 of the Constitution, that is, the one that laments the failure of the original proportions between the different pension payments. It, in fact, reiterates that the "block" calculation system leads to the "alignment" effect between different pension classes and adds that this would redound in violation of the canon of non-contradiction, it being necessary to consider that such checks had been differentiated, in their original amount, by effect of calculations referred to the remuneration received and/or the contribution credited over the entire working life.
Once clarified, however, that the principle of proportionality cannot be considered affected in consideration of the marginal variations that subsist between pensions "aligned" by effect of the "block" revaluation calculation, this serves to exclude that any system contradiction can be appreciated, it being a question of consequences inherent in the chosen equalization model that do not redound, for what has already been illustrated, in manifest unreasonableness.
Therefore, also the question raised with reference to Art. 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution must be declared not well-founded.
FOR THESE REASONS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1, paragraph 309, of Law no. 197 of December 29, 2022 (State budget for the 2023 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2023-2025 period), and of Art. 1, paragraph 135, of Law no. 213 of December 30, 2023 (State budget for the 2024 financial year and multi-year budget for the 2024-2026 period), raised, with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 36, first paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction of Trento, Labor Disputes Section, sitting as a single judge, with the order indicated in the epigraph, to be not well-founded.
Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 25, 2026.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery
Deposited in the Chancellery on April 16, 2026
The anonymized version conforms, in the text, to the original