JUDGMENT NO. 155

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 29 December 2022 (State Forecast Budget for the 2023 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2023-2025 Triennium), brought by the Council of State, Sixth Section, in the proceedings pending between ARCI Caccia and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forestry, by means of an order dated 19 February 2026, registered under no. 47 of the 2026 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 12, 1st Special Series, of the year 2026.

Having regard to the appearance in proceedings of ARCI Caccia, as well as the intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard Judge Rapporteur Filippo Patroni Griffi at the public hearing of 23 June 2026;

having heard State Counsel Marinella Di Cave for the President of the Council of Ministers;

having deliberated in the chambers on 24 June 2026.

The Law in Fact

1.− By order dated 19 February 2026, registered under no. 47 of the 2026 register of orders, the Council of State, Sixth Section, raised questions as to the constitutional legitimacy – with reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 70, 76, 97, 113, and 117 of the Constitution – of Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 29 December 2022 (State Forecast Budget for the 2023 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2023-2025 Triennium), which vests the Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forestry (MASAF) with the power, inter alia, to review and amend, by ministerial decree, the composition of bodies, committees, and commissions operating within the said Ministry.

1.1.− The referring judge reports being called upon to rule on the lawfulness of several acts challenged by ARCI Caccia on five separate grounds, the last of which alleges the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured provision.

At the conclusion of the first-instance proceedings, the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio dismissed the appeal and the additional grounds, holding the question of constitutional legitimacy raised by the party – which was re-proposed in the appeal alongside the original grounds and reiterated in the defence brief – to be "manifestly unfounded and lacking relevance".

1.2.− For the purpose of substantiating the relevance of the questions raised, the Council of State sets out a reconstruction of the regulatory framework.

Pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 1, of Law No. 157 of 11 February 1992 (Rules for the protection of homoiothermic wildlife and hunting), the National Technical Wildlife and Hunting Committee (Comitato tecnico faunistico-venatorio nazionale - CTFVN) was established within the then Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, "with the duties of a technical-consultative body regarding the application of the law itself", as provided for in paragraph 3. The same provision, still under paragraph 1, stipulates that said Committee shall include, inter alia, "one representative for each recognized national hunting association".

Article 8, paragraph 2, of the same Law provides that the CTFVN shall be established by decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, which was enacted on 18 June 2009 in compliance with the composition mandated by the aforementioned law.

Subsequently, Article 12, paragraph 20, of Decree-Law No. 95 of 6 July 2012 (Urgent provisions for the revision of public spending with invariance of services to citizens, as well as capital-strengthening measures for enterprises in the banking sector), converted, with amendments, by Law No. 135 of 7 August 2012, established that "As from the expiry date of collegiate bodies operating within public administrations [...] the activities performed by said bodies are definitively transferred to the competent offices of the administrations within which they operate". The CTFVN expired on 18 June 2014 and, in accordance with the provisions of the 2012 legislature, was not renewed thereafter.

In implementation of the censured provision, by MASAF decree of 22 May 2023 – which references the directive of the same MASAF of 20 January 2023 setting out general guidelines on administrative activity and management for the year 2023, "which provides as a strategic objective the reconstitution of the CTFVN as it is deemed the most suitable technical-scientific venue to address issues related to the hunting management of homoiothermic wildlife" – the CTFVN was reconstituted, albeit with a composition different from that originally dictated by Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992, which the appellant association considers unlawful on multiple grounds: in particular, Article 1 provided for it to comprise three representatives of recognized national hunting associations (instead of one representative per association).

By subsequent decree of 31 July 2023, challenged through additional grounds, MASAF identified and appointed the members of the CTFVN, among whom were three representatives designated by hunting associations other than ARCI Caccia.

1.2.1.− Having premised the foregoing, the judge *a quo* rules out the possibility of granting the first four grounds of appeal.

The plea regarding the Minister’s lack of jurisdiction is held to be unfounded on the premise that, although Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 provides for the CTFVN to be established by decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, said Article 8, "even if not expressly repealed by the 2022 Law, must in any event be deemed implicitly repealed pursuant to the general rules governing conflicts of norms". The system established by the 1992 law is held to have been replaced by that provided for under the censured provision, which authorizes the Minister "to reconstitute and amend by ministerial decree the composition of the committees", thereby implementing deregulation on the basis of an entirely generic rule which, precisely for that reason, precludes a review of lawfulness.

For the same reason, neither Article 17, paragraph 2, of Law No. 400 of 23 August 1988 (Regulation of Government activities and organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers), which "in such cases mandates a Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers", nor the subsequent paragraph 3, which permits ministerial regulations, can be considered violated, since the censured legislative provision must be regarded as derogating from both.

Similarly lacking in foundation are the grounds alleging the violation of Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 concerning the composition of the CTFVN, given that this regulatory framework was likewise replaced by the censured provision "as implemented by the 2023 ministerial decree".

1.2.2.− Under the final ground of appeal, the appellant association objects to the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured provision on the grounds that, by granting the Minister "unlimited scope" regarding the modification of the composition of the Technical Committee in question, it brings about "a disproportionate sacrifice of the constitutional principles of representativeness and proportionality, entirely prejudicing associations which – despite having attained independent legal recognition – are denied the possibility of having a member within the representative Technical Body".

According to the Council of State, the alleged violation of the constitutional principles of representativeness and proportionality is not attributable to the challenged measure, but rather to the legislative provision establishing the Minister's competence "in extremely broad and indeterminate terms": hence the relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy.

The referring judge further observes that any potential declaration of constitutional illegitimacy would also affect the ground concerning the Minister’s lack of jurisdiction, which "might materialize were the attributing norm itself unlawful due to a violation of parameters relating to the principle of legality, as well as in relation to the other parameters argued under the fifth ground".

Indeed, the censured provision does not lend itself to interpretive compliance, both due to its textual clarity "and to its extremely generic content under the profile of the parameters of deregulation, expressly delegating to a ministerial decree – thus to a non-regulatory act and even to a non-regulatory instrument – the regulation of a matter of general and abstract scope", which was previously entrusted to a decree of the President of the Council of Ministers and is now stripped of the safeguards provided under Article 17, paragraph 2, of Law No. 400 of 1988. As stated, therefore, the plea of lack of jurisdiction should be declared unfounded.

Conversely, such a declaration of unfoundedness could not be made were the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured provision to be declared, as it constitutes "a classic example of ‘flight from regulation’", which "ends up rendering administrative offices precarious, confusing the regulatory level that must in the abstract govern their composition with the administrative acts reconstituting the bodies, and violating the relative – yet existing – statutory reservation in the matter".

Given the well-established case law principle whereby the defect of lack of jurisdiction takes priority, the relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy becomes evident.

1.3.− In arguing regarding the non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring judge starts from the observation that Article 17, paragraphs 2 and 3 (recte: paragraphs 2, 3, and 4), of Law No. 400 of 1988 requires, both for governmental and ministerial regulations, the opinion of the Council of State and registration by the Court of Auditors. Ministerial regulations must also be communicated to the President of the Council of Ministers to enable him to exercise powers connected to the function of maintaining the unity of political and administrative direction pursuant to Article 95 of the Constitution. Furthermore, such acts must be designated as "regulations" and published in the Official Gazette.

According to the Council of State, the censured provision contains norms of and on deregulation, in derogation of the aforementioned Article 17, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law No. 400 of 1988, permitting deregulation via a non-regulatory act in "open violation" of that model. This conflicts with Articles 70 and 97, first (recte: second) paragraph, of the Constitution, which concern the allocation of regulatory powers between Parliament and the Government and the "guarantees relating to the exercise of the deregulatory power", as well as with Article 113 of the Constitution, "since the absence of any determination regarding the exercise of the conferred power renders the law unsuitable to function as a parameter of lawfulness for the regulation (in this case, the non-regulatory act adopted by the Minister)".

The decree adopted by MASAF on the basis of the censured provision has "substantially regulatory content" and "moreover does not have the content of a mere execution or implementation regulation, but rather an independent nature". Furthermore, the legislature enabled such decree to "repeal a primary provision (Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992) without laying down criteria for the exercise of the power, thereby configuring a generic delegation to the regulation or to the deregulating administrative act that is incompatible with the rigid Constitution".

1.3.1.− The referring judge – after recalling how in Italy, ever since the Albertine Statute, in accordance with the rule of law, "the exercise of political-administrative functions must be predominantly governed by legal norms issued by an organ representative of the popular will" – notes that the republican Constitution "revolutionized regulatory matters", introducing a relative statutory reservation under Article 97.

Law No. 400 of 1988 – a law "of objective constitutional implementation value" – in governing regulatory power established the principle that "in relation to ministerial regulatory power, the law must proceed with a specific and targeted authorization": whereas for governmental regulations "legislative allocations made once and for all" would suffice, deregulatory and ministerial regulations instead require "specific legislative conferrals".

Constitutional case law is also oriented in this direction. The Council of State refers to Judgment No. 301 of 2003, which held Article 70 of the Constitution to be violated because the then censured norm granted the minister "the power to modify, by regulation, the law in any direction, moreover without indicating criteria", thereby entailing a form of deregulation distinct from that provided under Article 17 of Law No. 400 of 1988.

Confirming that deregulation should not fall within the purview of the individual minister, the referring judge then recalls the decision of the Court of Auditors, in its supervisory capacity, regarding a draft ministerial decree adopted pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 647, of Law No. 296 of 27 December 2006, bearing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-year State budget (2007 Finance Law)", wherein it was noted "that Article 17, paragraph 3, of Law No. 400 of 1988 ‘does not attach any repealing effect upon prior laws to ministerial or interministerial decrees, evidently because such effect can occur only following the rigorous procedure’ referred to in paragraph 2 of the same Article 17 (Court of Auditors, observations of the control office on Ministerial Decree of 7.12.2007, prot. C.d.c. no. 2 of 7 January 2008)" (Court of Auditors, Section of Control of Legality on Acts of the Government and State Administrations, Resolution No. 4/2008/P of 13 March 2008).

Finally, supporting the impossibility of achieving deregulation through a ministerial regulation is the opinion of the Council of State on a regulation provided for under Article 2 of Law No. 242 of 27 June 1988 (Amendments to the regulations on legal procurators' examinations), which had amended Article 2 of Law No. 406 of 24 July 1985 (Amendments to the regulations on advocacy before pretors and examinations for the legal procurator profession). On that occasion, it was noted that Law No. 400 of 1988 had expressly rationalized the institution of deregulation, elevating "to a general principle of the legal order that the degradation of the source engages the responsibility of the entire government, and no longer of a single minister" (Council of State, General Assembly, Opinion No. 100 of 16 November 1989).

The judge *a quo* therefore concludes by stating that the censured provision effected a deregulation of the CTFVN in violation of Articles 70, 76, 97, and 113 of the Constitution, "in light of the absolute generality of the delegation criteria of the deregulatory norm, upon the implementing acts of which it is not possible to exercise a judicial review of lawfulness".

1.3.2.− Finally, the Council of State deems the doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised by the party to be likewise not manifestly unfounded, given that "the legislature's choice to afford the Minister unlimited scope to proceed with the modification of the composition of the Technical Committee in question, which in concrete terms resulted in the elimination of representatives of entire national hunting associations as well as of other bodies and organs—thus of categories possessing national relevance and differentiated interests—causes a disproportionate sacrifice of the constitutional principles of representativeness, proportionality, and equality expressed [by Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 97, and 117 of the Constitution], permitting the reconstitution of the body in a composition different from that provided by prior legislation, in the absence of sufficiently specified legislative parameters".

2.− By act dated 13 April 2026, ARCI Caccia, appellant party in the proceedings *a quo*, entered an appearance, limiting its request to a declaration of the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured provision.

3.− By act dated 14 April 2026, the President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, concluding for the inadmissibility or unfoundedness of the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy.

3.1.− The intervener observes, first of all, that it was the Council of State itself which stated that Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 was implicitly repealed as early as Article 12, paragraph 20, of Decree-Law No. 95 of 2012, as converted. The reasoning of the referring judge is therefore inconsistent, inasmuch as the challenged provision purportedly authorized the repeal, by means of ministerial decree, of a norm that was indeed already repealed; consequently, it must conversely be held that "the contested intervention operated upon a vacuum in the legal landscape which was no longer regulated". Therefore, there is no deregulation here—by which is meant "the transfer of regulation to a secondary level"—precisely because at the time of the adoption of the ministerial decree there was no longer any primary norm governing the CTFVN.

Nor can the President of the Council of Ministers complain of a violation of the statutory reservation regarding the organization of public offices. Indeed, the "mere definition of the composition of the committee in question" may be entrusted to the competence of the ministry, since those contemplated by the censured provision are optional offices "of a technical-sectoral and only optionally consultative nature, which possess neither active administration powers nor the capacity to adopt externally effective acts"; so much so that precisely because they are unnecessary and thus not covered by the statutory reservation under Article 97 of the Constitution, they "could well be established through the mere organizational power that is immanent to every Ministry".

4.− Prior to the public hearing, the State Attorney General’s Office filed a brief insisting that the raised questions be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

4.1.− Re-iterating that Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 was already implicitly repealed by Article 12, paragraph 20, of Decree-Law No. 95 of 2012, as converted, the intervener observes that the CTFVN, "a technical body with a purely consultative function and no active administration", operated only between 2009—the year of its establishment by the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 18 June 2009—and 2014. The State Attorney General’s Office notes that the implicit repeal of Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 had already been acknowledged by the referring judge himself, thereby reaffirming the inconsistency of the reasoning underlying the raised questions, as no deregulation occurred, not even in the form contemplated under Article 17, paragraph 4-bis, of Law No. 400 of 1988.

Recalling the genesis and *ratio* of deregulation concerning the organization of ministries, the President of the Council of Ministers notes that in the present case, what is at issue is not "the organization strictly speaking of the Government or of the Ministry": this is because the CTFVN "is a purely technical-consultative, supplementary body that does not carry out active administration, which at most adopts programmatic acts, working tools, technical-scientific analyses, which is useful but not indispensable", composed of individuals who are not ministry employees and receive no remuneration.

Unlike regulations adopted pursuant to the aforementioned Article 17, paragraph 4-bis, the ministerial decree reconstituting the CTFVN did not affect the organization of the Ministry and therefore must not be considered a regulation resulting from deregulation, but merely "an instrument to reconstitute a simple consultative body whose utility has over time been considered and re-evaluated, and upon the functionality of which the Minister deemed—in 2023—to wish to focus once more". The decree adopted pursuant to the censured provision is therefore a "non-regulatory decree" legitimately provided for by law.

Reiterating the arguments regarding compliance with the statutory reservation in matters of public office organization, the State Attorney General’s Office further observes that the CTFVN should be considered among the "new bodies with a specific mission" provided for by the censured provision, given that it had been implicitly repealed in 2012.

4.2.− Finally, the doubts of constitutional legitimacy concerning the scope of action conferred upon the Minister by the censured provision are likewise unfounded, since the relative power is limited, in addition to general principles, by the objectives of "better pursuit of administrative action and more efficient management of financial resources".

The referring judge further specifies that the ministerial decree appointed representatives of the most representative associations as members of the CTFVN, while also specifying that, upon the expiry of the first two-year period, the "opportunity to implement a rotation of the members of the National Hunting Associations" would be evaluated.

Recalling also Order No. 299 of 2001 of this Court, the intervener observes that ARCI Caccia remains represented in any case, because it will be able to channel its requests through the representative of another association. Furthermore, the Lazio Regional Administrative Court, in its first-instance judgment challenged before the Council of State, recognized that there had been no violation of the principle of representativeness, but rather a choice—through the reduction in the number of representatives—aimed at guaranteeing better functioning and greater operational agility of the CTFVN: a choice that was appreciated by other hunting associations.

The Law in Reasoning

5.− The Council of State, Sixth Section, by the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 47 of 2026), raised questions of constitutional legitimacy – with reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 70, 76, 97, 113, and 117 of the Constitution – regarding Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 2022, which vests the Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forestry with the power, inter alia, to review and amend, by ministerial decree, the composition of bodies, committees, and commissions operating within the said Ministry.

The judge *a quo* takes the view that the censured provision permitted deregulation through a ministerial act rather than through a government regulation as provided under Article 17, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Law No. 400 of 1988, on the basis of an "absolute generality of the delegation criteria of the deregulatory norm": this would determine the violation of Articles 70, 76, 97, and 113 of the Constitution.

It also considers Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 97, and 117 of the Constitution to be violated, because the censured provision entrusts the Minister with "unlimited scope" in the reconstitution of the Ministry's bodies, including the power to suppress representatives of entire categories of subjects as well as to regulate their composition and modify their purpose, thereby causing a disproportionate sacrifice of the constitutional principles of representativeness, proportionality, and equal treatment among associations.

6.− This Court has already noted that "a common element to the various forms of deregulation possible in our legal system is undoubtedly constituted by the transfer of the regulatory function (concerning determined matters and activities) from the legislative venue to another venue. The aforementioned transfer, necessarily effected by law, determines that a subject or body, other than the one ordinarily entrusted with the exercise of the legislative function, has the power to regulate a given matter, adopting rules replacing those already laid down by law" (Judgment No. 130 of 2016). This responds to the need, felt by the legislature, "to counter the previous tendency to rigidify in the form of law even aspects of minor impact on the life of institutions and the community" (Judgment No. 138 of 2023), thereby attracting the latter to the forms and guarantees of secondary sources "on the basis of the assumption that they have a better capacity to evolve according to needs, and in turn permit immediate protection before ordinary jurisdictions" (again, Judgment No. 138 of 2023).

If the objective of deregulation in the strict sense is therefore not the elimination of the rules governing a given matter, but their transfer from the legislative to the regulatory venue, a typical element of deregulatory procedures must be considered to be the "temporal identity between the repealing effect and the entry into force of the regulation" (Judgment No. 130 of 2016), provided for – not by chance – under Article 17, paragraph 2, of Law No. 400 of 1988. We are in the presence of deregulation, therefore, "only when (in a matter not covered by an absolute statutory reservation) a legislative act provides that the repealing effect of statutory provisions is temporally linked to the subsequent enactment of a regulation" (Judgment No. 297 of 2012): the law authorizing deregulation, in fact, "does not deprive the laws that will be replaced by regulations of their force, but predetermines their repeal" (again, Judgment No. 130 of 2016), which will occur solely and exclusively if the regulatory act is adopted and enters into force (to the same effect, see also Judgments No. 192 of 2024, No. 99 of 2018, No. 200 of 2009, and No. 378 of 2004).

7.− Having premised this, the initial questions – raised with reference to Articles 70, 76, 97, and 113 of the Constitution – are inadmissible due to the erroneous premise from which they proceed, namely that the censured provision authorized deregulation.

7.1.− Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 provided for the establishment of the CTFVN, which was conferred "the duties of a technical consultative body for everything concerning the application" of the same Law No. 157 (paragraph 3). The same Article 8 set out the composition of the Committee (paragraph 1), providing that it be established by decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (paragraph 2) and renewed every five years (paragraph 4).

The Committee was established only by the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 18 June 2009.

In the meantime, Article 29 of Decree-Law No. 223 of 4 July 2006 (Urgent provisions for economic and social relaunch, for the containment and rationalization of public spending, as well as interventions in revenue matters and combating tax evasion), converted, with amendments, by Law No. 248 of 4 August 2006, had provided, for the purpose of containing expenses (paragraph 1), a mechanism for the progressive reorganization of commissions, committees, and bodies operating within state administrations, including through the suppression or merging of structures (paragraph 2), while also permitting the extension of bodies assessed as possessing enduring relevance (paragraph 2-bis).

The shortly subsequent Article 68 of Decree-Law No. 112 of 25 June 2008 (Urgent provisions for economic development, simplification, competitiveness, stabilization of public finance, and tax equalization), converted, with amendments, by Law No. 133 of 6 August 2008, further regulated, in a restrictive sense, the extension of said bodies, so as to "achieve, within the 2009-2011 triennium, the gradual reduction of such bodies until the definitive transfer of the activities entrusted to them within the institutional activities of the Administrations" (paragraph 1).

Subsequently, Article 12, paragraph 20, of Decree-Law No. 95 of 2012, as converted, substantially brought to completion the overall reorganization work initiated (at least) in 2006, providing that "[a]s from the expiry date of collegiate bodies operating within public administrations, under a regime of prorogation pursuant to Article 68, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law No. 25 June 2008, no. 112, converted, with amendments, by Law 6 August 2008, no. 133, the activities performed by the bodies themselves are definitively transferred to the competent offices of the administrations within which they operate".

In application of this regulatory data, the CTFVN, upon the expiry on 18 June 2014 of the five-year mandate of the body established by the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 18 June 2009, was not renewed.

It was within this framework that the censured provision intervened, which provides that the Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forestry "proceeds, by ministerial decree, [...] to the stocktaking of the bodies, committees, and commissions, however denominated, operating within the aforesaid Ministry and of the organs of the entities controlled or supervised by the same, to the revision of their respective composition and operating, control, and reporting methods, with the power also to modify their composition, transform their purposes and functions, establish new bodies with a specific mission, merge or suppress those deemed non-useful or functional for the better pursuit of administrative action and the more efficient management of financial resources and, as regards the organs of the entities, to revoke offices conferred where appropriate".

Having included, through the aforementioned directive of 20 January 2023, the "reconstitution" of the CTFVN among the political priorities and strategic and structural objectives of administrative action, MASAF adopted, on 22 May 2023, the decree for the new establishment of said Committee, providing for a composition different from that under Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 (Article 1, paragraph 1), while postponing the appointment of members to a subsequent decree (Article 1, paragraph 2). The CTFVN is conferred the duties of a technical consultative body for everything concerning the application of Law No. 157 of 1992 (Article 2). The decree, moreover, expressly provides that members "shall not be entitled to compensation, allowances, attendance tokens, expense reimbursements, or other emoluments however denominated" (Article 4).

By subsequent decree of 1 August 2023, MASAF then proceeded to appoint the members of the CTFVN.

7.2.− In light of the regulatory framework outlined, it must be excluded that, as regards the CTFVN, the censured provision authorized deregulation. Indeed, it must be held that Article 8 of Law No. 157 of 1992 – governing the establishment, composition, and functioning of the CTFVN – was implicitly repealed already by Article 12, paragraph 20, of Decree-Law No. 95 of 2012, as converted, which, as seen, transferred the activities performed by collegiate bodies operating within public administrations, starting from their expiry, to the competent offices of the administrations within which they operated; an expiry that, as regards the CTFVN established by Law No. 157 of 1992, occurred in June 2014.

It follows that when the legislature adopted the censured Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 2022, no primary provision (any longer) regulated the existence of the CTFVN, its composition, or its related functions. Therefore, the first of the typical elements of deregulation is missing – namely, the in-force status of statutory norms whose repeal is pre-determinable as from the subsequent adoption of regulatory norms – thereby removing the hermeneutical premise from which the referring judge proceeds, and with it the very possibility of verifying whether the censured provision, which entails no deregulation, violates the invoked constitutional parameters.

Once it is excluded that the censured provision can operate, in relation to the CTFVN, as a "‘norm of and on deregulation’" (Judgment No. 130 of 2016), it must be held that the decrees establishing and composing the (new) CTFVN are an expression of the exercise of regulatory power (within the terms already clarified by the Council of State, General Assembly, Opinions of 7 December 1989, no. 126, no. 127, and no. 131) traceable to Article 17, paragraph 3, of Law No. 400 of 1988, conferred by the same Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 2022. We are therefore dealing with a typical case of a "cascading" normative system (Council of State, General Assembly, Opinion No. 141 of 21 November 1991), composed of source-acts of a necessarily homogeneous nature, in which the regulatory order is progressively constituted by primary legislation and by the secondary legislation provided for by the former to complete the factual scenario that innovates the legal order. The censured provision, indeed, within the framework of a broader reassessment of the choice made by the 2012 legislature regarding the transfer to Ministry offices of functions previously entrusted to collegiate bodies, expressly authorizes the Minister, "[f]or the purpose of rationalizing spending, simplifying compliance, and increasing efficiency in the disbursement of financial support measures", also to "establish new bodies with a specific mission".

8.− Inadmissible, due to insufficient reasoning regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, are also the further questions raised with reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 97, and 117 of the Constitution.

The Council of State, in fact, limits itself in this regard to stating that Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 2022 gives "unlimited scope to the Minister" and that, since the elimination of representatives of entire national hunting associations has "in concrete terms" occurred, it causes a "disproportionate sacrifice of the constitutional principles of representativeness, proportionality, and equality expressed by the invoked constitutional parameters". In this way, the reasoning – when not entirely absent in relation to certain of these constitutional parameters – is apodictic and generic, as it fails to adequately illustrate the reasons for the alleged constitutional illegitimacy, as is instead required by the consistent case law of this Court (among many others, Judgments No. 51 of 2026, No. 160, No. 72, No. 45, and No. 5 of 2025, No. 184, No. 128, and No. 112 of 2024).

The reasoning on this point is all the more insufficient when considering, furthermore, that it asserts that the legislative choice translated "in concrete terms" into the elimination of representatives of entire national hunting associations. By this, the Council of State seems to allude to the circumstance that the purportedly disproportionate sacrifice of the invoked constitutional principles was determined not by the censured provision, but rather by the poor exercise of the regulatory power conferred upon the Minister: in that case, however, the relative review of lawfulness falls within the cognizance of the administrative judge.

9.− In conclusion, the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the Council of State must all be declared inadmissible.

on those grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 453, of Law No. 197 of 29 December 2022 (State Forecast Budget for the 2023 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2023-2025 Triennium) raised, with reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 18, 48, 49, 51, 70, 76, 97, 113, and 117 of the Constitution, by the Council of State, Sixth Section, by the order indicated in the heading.

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 24 June 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Deposited in the Registry on 29 September 2026