JUDGMENT NO. 137

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of December 30, 2024 (State Forecast Budget for the 2025 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2025–2027 Triennium), brought by the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, through three orders dated December 11, 2025, registered under numbers 259 and 260 of the 2025 Register of Orders and under No. 30 of the 2026 Register of Orders, and by the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento, through an order dated January 22, 2026, registered under No.
28 of the 2026 Register of Orders, and published in the Official Journal of the Republic, numbers 2 and 9, 1st Special Series, for the year 2026.

Having regard to the briefs in intervention filed by the National Forensic Association (ANF) and the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in chambers on June 8, 2026, the Judge Rapporteur Luca Antonini;

having deliberated in chambers on June 8, 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto

1.– By four similarly worded orders—three issued by the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section (registered under numbers 259 and 260 of the 2025 Register of Orders and No. 30 of the 2026 Register of Orders), and one by the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento (registered under No. 28 of the 2026 Register of Orders)—questions of constitutional legitimacy are raised, with reference to Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, concerning Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of December 30, 2024 (State Forecast Budget for the 2025 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2025–2027 Triennium).

This provision inserts paragraph 3.1 after paragraph 3 of Article 14 of Presidential Decree No. 115 of May 30, 2002, enacting the «Single Text of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions concerning Justice Costs (Text A)», which reads as follows: «[w]ithout prejudice to the cases of exemption provided for by law, in civil proceedings, a case may not be entered on the general docket unless the amount determined pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 1, letter a), or the lesser contribution due by law, has been paid».

The aforementioned Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Single Text on Justice Costs establishes the amount of the unified contribution, and the lowest amount provided therein is that referred to in letter a), set at 43 euros.

Furthermore, pursuant to subsequent paragraph 3 of the same Article 13, the sum due as a unified contribution is reduced by half for specific proceedings and certain disputes.

2.– Regarding relevance, the Court of Cassation reports that it is called upon to rule on appeals filed after the entry into force of the censured provision, which it must therefore apply.

Indeed, the judges *a quo* specify that, by a measure dated June 10, 2025, the First President of the Court of Cassation ruled that the registry, in the event of failure to pay the aforementioned «minimum quota» of the unified contribution, must nonetheless transmit the case files to the «Section competent by subject-matter for the adoption of the relevant jurisdictional measures».

2.1.– Still concerning relevance, the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento states that the applicant company in the proceedings brought before him had previously filed in a timely manner an opposition to an injunction order, which had not been entered on the general docket due to the failure to pay the unified contribution.

The opponent subsequently filed a new appeal after the expiration of the deadline for lodging an opposition, requesting restoration of the time limit (restitutio in integrum).

The legal basis for this request was, however, contested by the opposing party on the grounds that, in light of the censured provision, the late filing of the second appeal could not be attributed to a cause not imputable to the opponent. Hence the necessity of applying the provision.

3.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness of the claims, the referring judges, having recalled the tax nature of the unified contribution, preliminarily review the constitutional case law that has declared constitutionally illegitimate provisions which in various ways condition judicial protection upon the fulfillment of fiscal burdens.

First, they invoke Judgment No. 21 of 1961, whereby this Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy, for violation of Articles 3, 24, and 113 of the Constitution, of Article 6, second paragraph, of Law No. 2248 of March 20, 1865 (For the Administrative Unification of the Kingdom of Italy), Annex E (Law on Administrative Litigation), which enshrined the rule of *solve et repete*.

Second, they cite Judgment No. 333 of 2001, which is held to have distinguished «between burdens imposed for the purpose of ensuring that proceedings unfold in a manner better conforming to their function and requirements», which «are permitted as an instrument of that very judicial protection that is to be guaranteed», and «burdens aimed instead at satisfying interests entirely extraneous to procedural purposes», which «result in a preclusion or an obstacle to the pursuit of judicial protection and consequently entail a violation of Article 24 of the Constitution».

Third, they recall that Judgment No. 522 of 2002 declared the constitutional illegitimacy of the provision that did not allow, except after payment of the registration tax, the issuance of the original or a copy of the judgment or other jurisdictional measure for the purpose of proceeding with enforcement.

Finally, they recall that the same provision was subsequently declared constitutionally illegitimate by Judgment No. 140 of 2022, which identified «an unreasonable limit to the right to judicial protection», also insofar as it did not permit—again in the absence of the payment of the registration tax—the issuance of a copy of the judgment or other jurisdictional measure for the purpose of bringing an action for compliance (*giudizio di ottemperanza*) before the administrative judge.

3.1.– On the other hand, the referral orders issued by the judges of legitimacy do not consider «useful to invoke, in support of the constitutional legitimacy» of the suspected provision, other rulings (Judgments No. 142 of 1976 and No. 56 of 1963 and Order No. 63 of 1964 are cited) whereby this Court instead excluded the constitutional illegitimacy of norms governing the so-called deposit in cases of defeat (*cauzione per il caso di soccombenza*).

These would indeed be provisions which, unlike the censured norm, were limited to imposing a mere «"deposit”, the loss of which was only eventual, depending on the outcome of the litigation».

3.2.– As for the specific objections, the judges *a quo* first allege the violation of Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, given that the questioned discipline, in their view, unreasonably impedes access to judicial protection.

In this regard, they highlight that Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of 2024, from a first perspective, would entail that «it is even the registrar, through an independent measure, who orders the refusal» of the entry on the general docket. They therefore point out the «manifest unacceptability» of the choice to entrust this administrative organ with the fate of a judicial claim.

From a second perspective, the censured provision would preclude the possibility of initiating proceedings without any discernible «connection between the imposition of the tax and an objective of rationalizing the justice service», meaning that the fiscal burden introduced thereby would not be connected «with the better performance of the jurisdictional function».

3.3.– In the opinion of the referral orders issued by the judges of legitimacy, the suspected provision would also foster an unreasonable disparity in treatment, within the context of cassation proceedings, between the main appellant and the incidental appellant: the latter, in fact, «is not entitled to [request] the entry on the general docket», with the consequence that the burden in question would not weigh upon them.

Finally, all the referring bodies consider that the challenged norm: a) unjustifiably equates all civil disputes, providing for the payment of the same amount regardless of their value; b) unreasonably groups together those who are able to bear the cost of the minimum contribution and those who, conversely, lack the financial means to do so, without providing anything to enable the latter to exercise their right to take legal action; c) introduces a more detrimental regime compared to that resulting from the «previous rules», under which the failure to pay the unified contribution did not preclude access to judicial protection.

3.4.– The referring bodies conclude by questioning whether the raised doubts of constitutional legitimacy can be dispelled in view of the meager amount of the minimum contribution provided for by the censured norm, but they rule that this falls outside their powers, as it pertains exclusively to this Court to evaluate the merits of the legislature's choice.

4.– In all proceedings, the President of the Council of Ministers intervened, through substantially identical briefs, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office (*Avvocatura generale dello Stato*), requesting that the raised questions be declared unfounded.

4.1.– The State’s defense observes, preliminarily, that the unified contribution is strictly correlated to the exercise of judicial activity and recalls that, as affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union with specific reference to the duty to pay the contribution within administrative jurisdictional proceedings concerning public procurement, «Article 1 of Directive 89/665/EEC […] as well as the principles of equivalence and effectiveness must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which requires the payment of court fees […] upon the filing of an action […]» (Fifth Chamber, Judgment of October 6, 2015, Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute - Studio Infermieristico Associato).

Generally speaking, moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has also repeatedly affirmed that, pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right of access to an impartial and independent tribunal may be subject to limitations, provided that they do not impair its very essence, pursue a legitimate aim, and are proportionate to that objective (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment of April 5, 2018, Zubac v. Croatia; Fourth Section, Judgment of January 21, 2014, Valchev and Others v. Bulgaria; First Section, Judgment of April 24, 2008, Kemp and Others v. Luxembourg; Judgment of October 23, 1996, Levages Prestations Services v. France; Plenary, Judgment of February 21, 1975, Golder v. United Kingdom).

4.2.– This having been premised, the State Attorney General’s Office first rules out that the constitutional case law invoked by the referring bodies points toward the alleged constitutional illegitimacy of the suspected provision.

In the case of the *solve et repete* rule, examined by this Court in Judgment No. 21 of 1961, the payment required as a prerequisite for bringing a legal action had as its object the very tax obligation contested in court, the amount of which could moreover be very high, whereas the censured Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of 2024 requires the payment of an extremely modest sum, which in no way coincides with the claim forming the subject matter of the dispute.

As for the judgments of this Court No. 333 of 2001, No. 522 of 2002, and No. 140 of 2022, the State Attorney General’s Office emphasizes that the fiscal burden imposed on the parties by the rules examined on those occasions was not aimed at satisfying interests correlated to procedural purposes, whereas the burden introduced by the provision subject to the present incident, concerning the unified contribution—which is intended to sustain the operating expenses of justice—is instrumental to the realization of the claim for judicial protection.

4.3.– Turning to the specific objections raised, the State’s defense, having highlighted the uneconomic nature of the recovery activity for the unified contribution in cases where the amount is meager, observes that the introduction of the fiscal burden in question, besides discouraging the filing of merely vexatious actions, has fostered voluntary compliance.

Therefore, in addition to the deflating effect on tax litigation, the censured provision has brought about an «anticipation and maximization of collection flows in favor of the Treasury», a «sensible reduction in costs connected with recovery procedures», and a «significant release of human resources», which are «destined to be more effectively reallocated to further services provided on behalf of the Ministry of Justice».

This is confirmed by the «Trend Report on the Impacts of the 2025 Budget Law regarding the Recovery of the Unified Contribution» drawn up by Equitalia Giustizia S.p.A.

Indeed, it emerges therefrom that there has been a marked contraction in requests for the recovery of the unified contribution by judicial offices: in 2025, there were «as many as 71,854 fewer requests compared to 2023 and 57,542 fewer compared to 2024, corresponding to a decrease [respectively] of 25 percent and 21 percent».

This decrease, the State Attorney General’s Office points out, was recorded to a most significant extent precisely with reference to the «minimum bracket of the unified contribution comprised between 0.01 and 43 euros, with respect to which the evasion rate has thus [subsequently] been essentially wiped out».

In light of the preceding observations, it cannot be held that the suspected provision, as argued by the judges *a quo*, lacks a «connection [with] an objective of rationalizing the justice service».

On the contrary, it constitutes a reasonable and balanced reconciliation between the protection of the right to take legal action and «the need to ensure the procurement of the resources necessary for the functioning of the administration of justice».

Hence, ultimately, the groundlessness of the objection alleging the violation of Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution.

4.4.– The questions raised with reference to the principle of equality are also devoid of foundation.

4.4.1.– The comparison between wealthy and non-wealthy parties rests on an erroneous premise.

The State’s defense recalls in fact that non-wealthy persons may be admitted to legal aid at the State’s expense (*patrocinio a spese dello Stato*) and that such a benefit entails the deferred accounting entry (*prenotazione a debito*) of the unified contribution: contrary to what is assumed by the referring bodies, therefore, it cannot be held that the censured provision precludes them from receiving judicial protection.

4.4.2.– Nor is there any discernible breach of the principle of equality claimed as a consequence of the provision requiring the payment of the same amount regardless of the value of the dispute.

The State’s defense takes the view that reference to the value of the dispute is not pertinent, since the censured provision is directed at preventing the «initiation of any jurisdictional activity whatsoever» in the absence of the payment of the minimum amount of the unified contribution.

On the other hand—the State Attorney General’s Office adds—a dispute of substantial value could well be initiated even by persons endowed with modest economic resources. Therefore, the establishment, for the purpose of entering the case on the general docket, of an amount parameterized to the value of the litigation could have resulted in an excessive restriction of the right to take legal action.

4.4.3.– The aspect of the objection under examination based on the unjustified disparity in treatment, within cassation proceedings, between the main appellant and the incidental appellant is also unfounded, because it rests on an untenable premise.

Pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Single Text on Justice Costs, the party obliged to pay the unified contribution for entry on the general docket is in fact the one that «first enters an appearance in the proceedings».

Consequently, in the opinion of the State Attorney General’s Office, the burden under the censured provision does not invariably fall upon the main appellant, as it may also weigh upon the counter-appellant (and thus also upon the counter-appellant who brings an incidental appeal), where the latter «first enters an appearance in the proceedings».

On the other hand, in the event that the case is instead entered on the general docket by the main appellant, the challenged provision is «physiologically inapplicable» to the incidental appellant.

No disparity in treatment is therefore discernible.

4.5.– Conclusively, the State Attorney General’s Office notes that, given the meager amount of the sum required, it cannot be held that its payment represents a burden such as to make the exercise of the right to take legal action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.– In the proceedings relating to the order registered under No. 30 of the 2026 Register of Orders, the National Forensic Association (ANF) submitted, as *amicus curiae*, a written opinion, admitted by Presidential Decree of May 4, 2026.

The ANF takes the view that the censured provision violates Articles 3 and 24 of the Constitution both because it imposes a burden functional to the protection of a fiscal claim entirely extraneous to any procedural interest, and because it entrusts to the registrar «the exceptional power to determine […] a highly grave procedural situation [...]» (Judgment of this Court No. 82 of 1966 is cited).

The provision subject to complaint is also intrinsically unreasonable, inasmuch as its intended objective of avoiding subsequent recovery actions would be frustrated if the burdened party has paid the minimum contribution but not the remaining amount potentially due.

It furthermore violates the principle of equality, inasmuch as: a) it does not exclude from its scope those who lack economic resources, thus prejudicing the principle of substantive equality; b) it does not distinguish cases where the claim is, for example, subject to a limitation period (*termine di decadenza*); c) it places the burden contemplated thereby exclusively on the party entering the case on the general docket and not also on the party bringing a counterclaim or incidental appeal; d) it is not applicable to proceedings other than civil ones.

6.– In the same proceedings, the ANF, by a document likewise filed on March 19, 2026, also filed an intervention, with content substantially identical to that of the *opinio*.

In support of the admissibility of its intervention, the ANF points out that, under its statutory provisions, it operates for the protection of the right to take legal action and to defend oneself in court, and that the challenged provision entails an obstacle to access to judicial protection.

Considerato in diritto

7.– By four similarly worded orders, the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section (Nos. 259 and 260 of the 2025 Register of Orders and No. 30 of the 2026 Register of Orders), and the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento (No. 28 of the 2026 Register of Orders) challenge the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of 2024, which inserts paragraph 3.1 after paragraph 3 of Article 14 of Presidential Decree No. 115 of 2002.

The censured provision reads as follows: «[w]ithout prejudice to the cases of exemption provided for by law, in civil proceedings, a case may not be entered on the general docket unless the amount determined pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 1, letter a), or the lesser contribution due by law, has been paid».

The aforementioned Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Single Text on Justice Costs establishes the amount of the unified contribution, and the lowest amount provided therein is that referred to in letter a), set at 43 euros.

Furthermore, pursuant to subsequent paragraph 3 of the same Article 13, the sum due as a unified contribution is reduced by half for specific proceedings and certain disputes.

8.– In the opinion of the referring judges, the challenged provision violates Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, as it unreasonably precludes the possibility of taking legal action, under several profiles.

First, because it entails that «it is even the registrar, through an independent measure, who orders the refusal» of the entry on the general docket, with «the manifest unacceptability» of the consequence that this administrative organ would be entrusted with the fate of a judicial claim.

Second, because the fiscal burden introduced thereby would lack «any connection [with] an objective of rationalizing the justice service».

According to the referral orders issued by the judges of legitimacy, the suspected provision would also foster an unreasonable disparity in treatment, within cassation proceedings, between the main appellant and the incidental appellant.

Finally, all the referring bodies consider that the challenged norm: a) unjustifiably equates all civil disputes, providing for the payment of the same amount regardless of their value; b) unreasonably groups together those who are able to bear the cost of the minimum contribution and those who lack the financial means to do so; c) introduces a more detrimental regime compared to that resulting from the «previous rules», under which the failure to pay the unified contribution did not preclude access to judicial protection.

9.– *In limine*, the joinder of the proceedings must be ordered so that they may be decided with a single judgment, since the formulated objections concern the same provision and are founded upon the same parameters and substantially identical arguments.

10.– Still preliminarily, it must be noted that, in the proceedings relating to the order registered under No. 30 of the 2026 Register of Orders, the ANF filed an intervention which was declared inadmissible by Order No. 98 of 2026.

11.– Finally, it must be specified that aspects of constitutional legitimacy other than those deduced in the referral orders, formulated by the *amicus curiae*, remain extraneous to the *thema decidendum* (Judgments No. 4 of 2025, No. 138 of 2024, and No. 180 of 2021).

12.– For the purpose of analyzing the merits of the individual questions raised, it is appropriate to consider the conclusions reached by constitutional case law concerning fiscal burdens, among which the unified contribution unquestionably falls, given its tax nature (*ex plurimis*, Judgment No. 42 of 2013).

In Judgment No. 140 of 2022 this Court, indeed, reviewing the complex legislative and case-law evolution intervening in this regard, clarified, on the one hand, that, as occurred in the hypothesis of *solve et repete*, «it is not possible to subordinate the exercise of the right to judicial protection to the fulfillment of the tax duty, thus understood, when it is a question "of contesting the legitimacy of the tax imposition”, because this violates Article 24 of the Constitution (Judgment No. 61 of 1970; similarly, Judgments No. 522 of 2002 and
No. 111 of 1971)». On the other hand, however, since the tax duty expresses «a legal principle of integration pertaining to those values of solidarity that are structural in the constitutional design», it «has not excluded such a possibility when this occurs outside of such a hypothesis», so that «the tax duty may indeed translate into burdens concerning the exercise of the very right to judicial protection», with the caveat «that, in concrete terms, this may occur only in compliance with the principle of proportionality and in particular of strict necessity, thus proving constitutionally legitimate only when the fulfillment of such a duty cannot be adequately protected in any other way» (again, Judgment No. 140 of 2022).

It is therefore with regard to these tests of proportionality and strict necessity that the censured legislation must be considered.

12.1.– From this perspective, it must first be noted that there was an extremely high rate of evasion prior to the newly minted rule regarding the unified contribution concerning civil proceedings, given that the relative recovery requests pertaining to the year of general docket entry 2023 and made in the same year amounted to 59,474; those relating to the 2024 general docket year, likewise made in the same year of entry, amounted to 77,867. Conversely, following the entry into force of Article 14, paragraph 3.1., of the Single Text on Justice Costs, recovery requests dropped drastically, amounting in 2025 to a mere 23,871 (Table 1 of the «Trend Report on the Impacts of the 2025 Budget Law regarding the Recovery of the Unified Contribution», Equitalia Giustizia S.p.A., filed in these proceedings by the State Attorney General’s Office).

It also emerges from the breakdown of the data that the contraction in recovery requests, while having concerned almost all brackets of the unified contribution, relates to a greater extent precisely to the minimum contribution referred to by the censured norm: indeed, it appears that in 2025 the drop in recovery requests referring to the lowest bracket (from 0.1 to 43 euros) was equal to 87 percent compared to 2023 and 89 percent compared to 2024 (Table 2 of the cited report). This highlights, *a contrario*, how the highest number of recovery requests (and thus of corresponding evasions) was concentrated, in previous years, on the lower contribution brackets.

12.2.– This situation highlights how precisely on the lowest fiscal amounts, such as that relating to the minimum bracket of the unified contribution, the national collection system was gravely inefficient, since the modest amount of the contribution itself clearly rendered the collection procedure uneconomic.

Moreover, meager amounts contribute to the «singular existence of a "warehouse” of uncollected revenue amounting to over one thousand billion euros» (Judgment No. 190 of 2023), upon which this Court has dwelled on multiple occasions, stigmatizing the «inefficiency of coercive collection, which impacts negatively on an essential phase of the dynamics of public revenue extraction», and not failing to remark precisely the «enormous […] number of rolls relating» to modest amounts, which contribute «to the genesis of the impressive figures that characterize the mass of uncollected sums» (Judgment No. 120 of 2021).

Finally, it is appropriate to recall that, most recently, the Court of Auditors (*Corte dei conti*) noted that from the average annual flow (in the 2019–2024 period) of tax collection notices (*cartelle esattoriali*) and other enforcement titles issued by the Revenue Agency-Collection (*Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione*, to which rolls formed by Equitalia Giustizia S.p.A. are also delivered) emerges a «strong numerical concentration for the lower-amount brackets (up to 10,000 euros)», «which constitute overall 95.48 percent of the total», even though they express, in terms of burden, only 22.04 percent of the total (Court of Auditors, Joint Control Sections, Hearing within the framework of the fact-finding inquiry on the management of the tax warehouse by the collection entity and on Bill A.S. 1375, March 2025).

12.3.– In light of this serious situation, and in relation to the need to ensure more widespread fulfillment of the tax duty, this Court, starting from Judgment No. 51 of 2019, has urged the legislature to revise the collection criteria, emphasizing, precisely by reason of the difficulties occurring with small amounts, «the need for more effective, proportionate, and timely collection systems to be arranged for smaller claims […]».

13.– Having premised these considerations, for the purpose of examining the merits, it is necessary to invert, compared to that proposed by the referring bodies, the order of the questions, all concerning the violation of Articles 3—with regard to both the principle of reasonableness and the principle of equality—24, and 111 of the Constitution, but raised with reference to different profiles, leaving for last the one concerning the role of the registrars.

13.1.– The question concerning the absence of any «connection between the imposition of the tax and an objective of rationalizing the justice service» is not founded.

Unlike what is argued by the judges *a quo*, indeed, the unified contribution is peacefully connected to the «expense […] for the judicial service» (*ex plurimis*, Judgment No. 73 of 2005) and is directed at «financing the expenses that the administration of Justice must bear for the processing and decision of the dispute» (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgment No. 4315 of February 20, 2020), contributing «to the proper functioning of the justice system» (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgment No. 20621 of July 17, 2023).

Such a conclusion cannot be undermined, as the referring bodies probably believe, by emphasizing the slenderness of the amount of the minimum contribution: this Court has long since specified that the «slenderness of the amount» requested does not exclude the purpose that the norm pursues (Judgment No. 56 of 1963; in the same sense, Judgment No. 142 of 1976).

On the contrary, precisely the extreme modesty of the outlay, on the one hand, contributes to making the fiscal burden in question, under this aspect, appear not disproportionate and, on the other hand, under the profile of the strict necessity test, in light of the considerations set out in the premises, demonstrates the high risk of a failure to implement an unyielding duty of solidarity in the absence of automatic or, in any event, simplified mechanisms.

This can justify, under the profile of the balancing of opposing principles at play, the restriction of the right to take legal action in the presence of an unjustified failure to fulfill the tax duty with reference to such a modest amount.

13.2.– Equally unfounded is the question concerning the discrimination that would derive, within cassation proceedings, from the circumstance that, unreasonably, the suspected provision would not reserve the same treatment provided for the main appellant to the incidental appellant, since the latter is not burdened by the entry on the general docket and, therefore, by the fiscal contribution in question.

The premise from which the referring bodies start is untenable.

In cassation proceedings, it is not possible to «distinguish […] between the positions of the appellant and the counter-appellant» (Cass., United Civil Sections, No. 20621 of 2023), in the sense that the latter, where they first proceed to file the counter-appeal—which entails the entry of the case on the general docket—shall also be bound to pay the unified contribution.

This may happen both in the event that the counter-appellant, upon receiving notification of the main appeal, files the counter-appeal with an incidental appeal before the main appellant proceeds with their own filing, and in the event that the main appellant fails to file the appeal within the twenty-day time limit and the counter-appellant files the counter-appeal with an incidental appeal, having an interest in having the main appeal declared inadmissible (*improcedibile*) and in obtaining an examination on the merits of the incidental one.

In these hypotheses, therefore, the censured norm will be applicable to the incidental appellant, who first activated the jurisdictional function, giving impetus to the proceedings.

13.3.– Nor is the question concerning the unreasonable equating of civil disputes founded, inasmuch as they are all subject, for the purpose of entry on the general docket, to the payment of the same minimum amount, regardless of their value.

The challenged provision, as has been highlighted, is indeed aimed at achieving in a rapid and simplified manner the payment of a minimum quota—otherwise difficult to collect—of the patrimonial resources deployed by the State for the exercise of the jurisdictional function.

When one considers, furthermore, that the total amount of the unified contribution remains due in any event, failing to impose, for the purpose in question, the payment of differentiated amounts depending on the value of the case does not translate into an unreasonable violation of the principle of equality.

13.4.– The question concerning the discrimination of non-wealthy persons, who would allegedly be unable to sustain even the cost of the minimum contribution, is also not founded.

It is true that the censured Article 14, paragraph 3.1., of the Single Text on Justice Costs does not expressly regulate the hypothesis where the acting party is a non-wealthy person.

The judges *a quo*, however, fail to take into consideration the general rules laid down in favor of non-wealthy persons, who may be admitted to legal aid at the State’s expense, such that the «situation of economic disparity [between the parties] is rebalanced by the deferred accounting entry (*prenotazione a debito*)» (Judgment No. 87 of 2021), which follows from admission to the aforementioned legal aid pursuant to Articles 11, paragraph 1, and 131, paragraph 2, letter a), of the same Single Text.

In this case, in fact, the unified contribution «must not be paid […]» (Cass., United Civil Sections, No. 4315 of 2020).

To this must be added that, according to the circular of April 24, 2025, of the Ministry of Justice - Department for Justice Affairs (Entry on the general docket of civil proceedings pending the measure for admission to legal aid at the State's expense and new provisions on the payment of the unified contribution - Budget Law No. 207 of 2024), which provided clarifications on the questioned norm, for such a purpose it is not even necessary that the competent Bar Council (*Consiglio dell'ordine degli avvocati*) has already resolved upon admission to legal aid at the State's expense, it being sufficient that the party attaches the relevant request regularly filed and stamped with a protocol number by the Council itself.

13.5.– Lastly, the question concerning the unreasonable disparity in treatment that the newly minted norm allegedly brought about by introducing a detrimental regime compared to that resulting from the «previous rules»—under which the failure to pay the unified contribution did not preclude access to judicial protection—is unfounded.

According to the consistent case law of this Court, indeed, «differentiated treatment applied to the same factual scenarios, but at different times, does not in itself conflict with the principle of equality, since the passage of time may constitute a valid element of diversification of legal situations […]» (recently, Judgments No. 41 of 2026 and No. 7 of 2024; in the same sense, Order No. 170 of 2009).

It follows that «there is no unjustified disparity in treatment for the sole reason that situations which are otherwise identical are subject to different rules *ratione temporis*» (Orders No. 112 of 2013 and No. 31 of 2011).

14.– On the other hand, the question raised with reference to the legislature's choice to entrust an administrative organ with the fate of a judicial claim, on the grounds that «it is even the registrar […] who orders the refusal» of the entry on the general docket, must be deemed inadmissible.

Indeed, pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 3.1., of the Single Text on Justice Costs, in the event of failure to pay the minimum contribution, without prejudice to the cases of exemption provided for by law, the case «may not be entered on the general docket» and, pursuant to Article 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the activity of entering cases on the general docket is delegated to the registrar.

Consequently, having verified the non-payment and the fact that the proceedings do not fall among those exempt from the obligation to pay the unified contribution, it is the registrar who must refuse entry on the general docket, thereby precluding "upstream” the assignment of the proceedings themselves to the judge.

14.1.– Such a solution indeed places itself in contrast with the parameters invoked by the referring bodies.

It is true that against the refusal of entry it would still be possible—for example because the party considers itself exempt, pursuant to Article 10, paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Single Text on Justice Costs, from the obligation to pay the unified contribution—to take action through ordinary jurisdictional remedies, and then, once the right to entry has been ascertained, to promote the proceedings *ab initio* precluded; however, forcing the party to a veritable "double proceeding” by reason of the "veto power” essentially recognized to the registrar results in an irrational hindrance to taking legal action or, at the very least, in a disproportionate burden.

Moreover, this Court, as early as Judgment No. 82 of 1966, found a violation of Article 24 of the Constitution in a similar factual scenario, observing that, «[w]hile the normal functions of the registrar are those of receiving acts, registering them, holding them in deposit, and issuing copies or certificates thereof, the challenged norm entrusts to the registrar's responsibility the exceptional power to determine, through the non-reception of the act, a highly grave procedural situation [...]. Which is tantamount to saying that the fate of the action can be irremediably compromised by a measure of an organ other than the judge».

In reality, in that factual scenario, the scrutinized provision made the preclusive effect depend on the failure to pay the contribution for the National Provident and Assistance Fund for Lawyers and Procurators (*Cassa nazionale di previdenza ed assistenza a favore degli avvocati e dei procuratori*) and, therefore, there was no issue, as there is in the case examined today, of a fiscal burden strictly connected to the functioning of the justice service.

The provision struck down by this Court at that time therefore exhibited a much more marked defect of proportionality and necessity.

However, the observation remains that the norm questioned today attributes to an organ other than the judge the power to preclude access to justice.

Such an inconvenience must, however, be remedied in the first instance by the legislature, within its discretion, because the *quomodo* of the solutions through which the power to preclude access to justice in the event of failure to fulfill the obligation to pay the minimum contribution could be returned to the judge covers a spectrum of possibilities from which a choice must be made through a discretionary assessment.

The solution, in fact, could, for example, consist in: attributing to the judge the power to declare the claim inadmissible (*improcedibile*) at the first hearing; permitting an immediate form of complaint against the denial of entry addressed to the president of the judicial office where the registrar exercises their functions; providing, as had been to some extent foreshadowed in preparatory works, that at the first hearing the judge, upon noting the failure or partial payment of the minimum contribution, grants the interested party a term of thirty days to comply, adjourning the case to a subsequent hearing at which, if the failure to pay persists, the extinction of the proceedings is declared; finally, providing that the assignment of such a term by the judge occurs at a time prior to the holding of the first hearing.

The solution adopted, furthermore, might require systemic coordination in light of the special features of the various civil process procedures and the incidental nature of any judicial ascertainment regarding whether or not the minimum unified contribution is due.

The question raised by the referring bodies with reference to Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, under the profile of the unreasonable attribution to the registrar of the power to decide the fate of the action, must therefore be declared inadmissible, because the raised needs imply systemic legislative modifications falling within the scope of choices reserved to the legislature's discretion (*ex plurimis*, Judgments No. 84 of 2026, No. 183 of 2025, and No. 71 of 2023).

on these grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

1) declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of December 30, 2024 (State Forecast Budget for the 2025 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2025–2027 Triennium), raised, by the orders indicated in the headnotes, by the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, and by the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento with reference to Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, regarding the profile of the limitation of the right to take legal action by virtue of the attribution to the registrar of the power to decide upon the entry of the case on the general docket;

2) declares unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 812, letter a), number 2), of Law No. 207 of 2024, raised, by the orders indicated in the headnotes, by the Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, and by the Honorary Peace Judge of Benevento with reference to Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution, regarding the profiles of the limitation of the right to take legal action by virtue of a fiscal burden devoid of connection with an objective of rationalizing the justice service and of the breach of the principle of equality.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 8, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Luca ANTONINI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on July 21, 2026