ORDER NO. 117
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
ORDER
in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1(1)(b) of Law no. 114 of 9 August 2024 (Amendments to the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicial System, and the Military Penal Code), initiated by the Court of Campobasso, Criminal Section, with two orders dated 26 February 2025 and 26 March 2025; by the Court of Turin, Third Criminal Section, with an order dated 9 April 2025; and by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing at the Court of Siracusa, with an order dated 12 December 2024; registered respectively under numbers 67, 90, 110, and 111 of the 2025 register of orders, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, nos. 17, 21, and 24, First Special Series, of the year 2025.
Having considered the entry of appearance by F. D.G., and the petition of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;
having heard in the chambers on 18 May 2026 the Reporting Judge Francesco Viganò;
deliberated in the chambers on 18 May 2026.
Considering that four separate orders (registered as nos. 67, 90, 110, and 111 of the 2025 register) raise questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Art. 1(1)(b) of Law no. 114 of 9 August 2024 (Amendments to the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicial System, and the Military Penal Code), which repealed Art. 323 of the Penal Code, in reference to Articles 97 (orders registered as nos. 67 and 110 of the 2025 register), 11, and 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation to the obligations stemming collectively from Articles 7(4), 19, and 65(1) (orders registered as nos. 67, 110, and 111 of the 2025 register) or from the entirety of Article 65 (order registered as no. 90 of the 2025 register) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 October 2003, ratified and executed via Law no. 116 of 3 August 2009 (hereinafter referred to as: "Mérida Convention” or "Convention” or "UNCAC”);
that, by order dated 26 February 2025 (registered as no. 67 of the 2025 register), the Court of Campobasso reports that it must adjudicate, under ordinary proceedings, two charges of the crime of abuse of office pursuant to Art. 323 of the Penal Code, the first of which is in the form of continued criminal conduct pursuant to Art. 81(2) of the Penal Code;
that the facts contested in the first charge concern determinations made between 2020 and 2021 by E. F., the mayor of a municipality in the province of Campobasso and head of service, who, having failed to recuse himself despite having a personal interest, allegedly approved "the results of the public selection process, in simplified form, for the establishment of part-time, fixed-term employment relationships for the professional profile of Accounting Instructor": a selection procedure in which his son also participated, who ranked fourth and was subsequently hired using the previous ranking list;
that, by the second charge, the same defendant is accused of violating Art. 110 of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000 (Consolidated Act on the Laws for the Organization of Local Authorities) for having issued a mayoral decree directly appointing G. P. as Director of the administrative area for a period of 12 months, despite the fact that she was "devoid of proven multi-year experience, having completed only nine months of legal traineeship";
that, by order dated 9 April 2025 (registered as no. 90 of the 2025 register), the Court of Turin states that it must decide, following the trial hearing, on a charge, among others, for the crime of abuse of office, in relation to "a series of material acts and administrative measures adopted in the year 2020" by the mayor of a municipality in the Turin metropolitan area, which resulted, in early 2021, in retaliatory measures damaging the professional positions of two administrative managers of the same Municipality, who had reported the breach of official secrecy and opposed the mayor's initiatives during the drafting of the new urban plan;
that, by order dated 26 March 2025 (registered as no. 110 of the 2025 register), the Court of Campobasso reports that it must decide, under ordinary proceedings, on a charge of conspiracy to commit abuse of office, formulated against two persons—one in the capacity of the sole procedure manager at a municipality in Molise, the other as the legal representative of the private company benefiting from the former's illicit conduct—who allegedly acted in moral and material collusion so that the public official would award "the service of 'hot hire of vehicles for the maintenance and repair of the municipal water distribution network'" to a company, in violation of the specific rules of conduct expressly provided by current legislation; in fact, said company allegedly participated in the selection procedure despite its offer being submitted after the deadlines established and not extended by the public notice; despite this, the service was awarded to it, which procured an unfair financial advantage, with consequent prejudice to the other bidder;
that, by order dated 12 December 2024 (registered as no. 111 of the 2025 register), the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing at the Court of Siracusa states that they have been presented with a request for indictment against several persons charged (also) with the crime of abuse of office, in relation to a plurality of unlawful acts committed in their capacity as public officials or persons in charge of a public service, through which they allegedly participated in the "formation of false concessions for the use of sepulchral chapels in the cemetery of Siracusa, in the absence of public evidence procedures and upon payment of sums of money": the defendants, among other things, allegedly transferred corpses without the authorization order of the mayor, in violation of specific regulatory provisions, thus procuring for the beneficiaries "an unjust profit consisting of the failure to pay the municipal contribution for exhumation and transfer of the corpse";
that, regarding the relevance, all referral orders state that they must apply the challenged provision, either because they are tasked with the decision, at the outcome of the proceedings, on charges concerning the crime under Art. 323 of the Penal Code (orders registered as nos. 67, 90, and 110 of the 2025 register) and on express requests for immediate declaration of no need to proceed due to abolitio criminis, pursuant to Art. 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (orders registered as nos. 67 and 110 of the 2025 register), or because they are called to decide on the indictment regarding charges concerning the same criminal offense and, therefore, required to make a preliminary assessment regarding a reasonable prediction of conviction, pursuant to Art. 425(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (order registered as no. 111 of the 2025 register);
that, furthermore, regarding the admissibility of the issues, some referring judges show awareness of the preclusion that, in principle, constitutional legitimacy review faces in malam partem, due to the reservation of law in criminal matters under Art. 25(2) of the Constitution, but believe that it does not operate for the issues currently proposed (orders registered as nos. 90, 110, and 111 of the 2025 register);
that, regarding non-manifest lack of foundation, the underlying position of the a quo judges is that the repeal of Art. 323 of the Penal Code, provided by the challenged provision, has violated the obligation stemming from the UNCAC—interpreted in light of the explanations provided by the Legislative guide for the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereinafter, also: Legislative Guide), drafted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the criteria established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—to maintain the incriminating rule on abuse of office, or not to repeal it, if already present in domestic legislation at the time of ratification of the treaty (the so-called ban on regression or "stand-still" obligation);
that the provisions of the UNCAC from which the obligation to incriminate (and the correlative prohibition of repeal) of abuse of office would stem are identified by the referring judges, collectively, in the combined provisions of Articles 7(4), 19, and 65 (limited to its paragraph 1, for orders registered as nos. 67, 110, and 111 of the 2025 register);
that, on the level of literal interpretation, some of the referring judges acknowledge that the textual content of Art. 19 of the UNCAC, dedicated to "Abuse of functions," would not impose a specific obligation to incriminate, as the provision would commit State Parties only to "consider adopting" the introduction of the offense (orders registered as nos. 90 and 111 of the 2025 register);
that the Legislative Guide would explain the different nature of the UNCAC provisions (orders registered as nos. 90 and 111 of the 2025 register), which would not all express the same level of obligation ("do not all have the same level of obligation"), but would be distinguished into three categories (order registered as no. 90 of the 2025 register):
(a) a first group of provisions, employing the expression "shall adopt," would impose an "obligation to take legislative or other measures";
(b) a second group—in which Art. 19, regarding abuse of office, would fall—by means of the phrase "shall consider adopting," would establish an "obligation to consider";
(c) a third group, with the formula "may adopt," would provide for measures that "States parties may wish to consider";
that, in accordance with what is provided by paragraph 12 of the Legislative Guide (according to which State Parties "are urged to consider adopting a certain measure and to make a genuine effort to see whether it would be compatible with their legal system"), the provisions of the second type would not be merely optional and would not express simple recommendations, but would establish a genuine obligation for State Parties to make a reasonable effort to verify whether the introduction of a specific offense is compatible with their own legal system, such that, where such compatibility were found, the State would be obliged to introduce the incriminatory provision, or not to repeal the provision already in force (orders registered as nos. 90 and 111 of the 2025 register);
that, for the purposes of a correct systematic and teleological interpretation of Art. 19 of the UNCAC, other provisions of the same Convention should also be considered, among which, in particular, Art. 7(4), according to which "Each State Party shall endeavor, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest" (cited by all orders);
that, therefore, Art. 19 of the UNCAC, read in light of the interpretive indications contained in the Legislative Guide and, above all, in correlation to the aforementioned Art. 7(4) of the same Convention, would deploy a different binding efficacy, depending on whether the adhering State had or did not have the offense of abuse of office in its legal system at the moment of ratification, in the sense that: a) the State Party that had not introduced the offense before adhering to the UNCAC would be obliged to evaluate its introduction concretely and seriously in accordance with its domestic law, having to make a real effort to verify whether it is compatible with its legal system; b) the State Party that, on the contrary, like Italy, already had the offense in its domestic legal system before adhering to the UNCAC and had, therefore, already positively evaluated the compatibility of the offense with its own domestic law—having to maintain and strengthen the systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest (Art. 7(4))—would be obliged not to repeal the provision already in force (the so-called "stand-still" obligation);
that, moreover, there would be no circumstances that could justify the violation of international obligations, neither to "safeguard [...] the compatibility with the overall Italian regulatory system," nor to respect "the fundamental principles of domestic law," given that the explanatory report itself to "Draft Law 808," from which Law no. 114 of 2024 originated, would justify the repeal of Art. 323 of the Penal Code by making an "appeal to motivations of generic convenience," such as the imbalance between the crime reports for the offense of abuse of office entered in the register pursuant to Art. 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the conviction sentences pronounced, as well as the existence of extra-penal norms suitable to prevent "malpractice in the public sector" (thus the order registered as no. 90 of the 2025 register);
that according to some referring judges (orders registered as nos. 67 and 110 of the 2025 register), the repeal provided by the challenged norm would have also resulted in a vulnus to Art. 97 of the Constitution;
that the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General, intervened in all the proceedings, asking this Court to return the documents to the referring judges for re-examination of the relevance of the questions (in consideration of the outcome of the public hearing of 7 May 2025, which then led to judgment no. 95 of 2025, with which this Court has already decided identical questions raised by other judges), or, alternatively, to declare the questions themselves inadmissible or, in the alternative, unfounded;
that, as a preliminary matter, the State Attorney observes that the same questions have already been examined by this Court, which has declared them unfounded;
that, alternatively, the State Attorney objects to the inadmissibility of the questions due to inadequate motivation regarding the reasons for the believed possibility of including the conflict with international treaty law norms that impose obligations of criminalization among the exceptions elicited by constitutional jurisprudence to the general inadmissibility of questions aimed at obtaining rulings with effects in malam partem in the field of substantive criminal law;
that, indeed, the derogation provided in the case of norms contrary to supranational obligations would not apply, considered that all the judgments directly or indirectly referred to by the a quo judges (in particular, judgment no. 37 of 2019, as well as judgments no. 32 of 2014 and no. 28 of 2010, mentioned in the former) would be irrelevant, because they related to cases in which it was a source of EU law, and not of international treaty law, that militated in the sense of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy;
that the challenges raised with reference to Art. 97 of the Constitution would be inadmissible "for the Judge a quo having not even minimally motivated regarding the reasons for such believed violation" (order registered as no. 67 of the 2025 register) and, in any case, would be inadmissible and manifestly unfounded for the reasons already indicated in judgment no. 8 of 2022;
that, on the merits, all the questions would, in any case, be unfounded;
that, in particular, the challenges centered on the alleged conflict with Art. 117 of the Constitution, for violation of supranational obligations, would be devoid of foundation because a correct exegesis of the text of the UNCAC, respectful of the literal and systematic data and the criteria of interpretation set by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, would make it evident that none of the provisions of the UNCAC obliges States to introduce the crime of abuse of office or, in the case where they have already done so, to maintain it in the domestic legal system (an obligation, moreover, deemed logically admissible only in the face of the existence of the former);
that, in fact, the Convention would "expressly qualify the abuse of functions as a non-mandatory offence";
that the only obligation provided by treaty norms would be that, contained in Art. 19, to "consider" the introduction of the crime of "Abuse of functions": an "only procedural" obligation, which would commit the State to verify the compatibility of the crime with its own domestic law, without the potentially positive outcome of such verification resulting in the obligation to introduce the crime;
that no obligation to introduce, and even less to maintain, the incrimination of abuse of functions could be derived from a combined reading of two norms—those contained in Art. 7(4) and Art. 19 of the UNCAC—which are very heterogeneous, for literal formulation, scope of application, and systematic collocation, the first not concerning the matter of incriminations, but preventive measures, aimed at ensuring transparency in the public sector, and the norm itself limiting to providing that States make "a significant effort" in the indicated perspective;
that the repeal of Art. 323 of the Penal Code would be "the fruit of the exercise of the broad discretion recognized by the fundamental Charter to the Legislator (among others) in criminal matters and criminal policy," on the basis of judgments of opportunity that have taken into account, among other things, the imbalance between the number of crime reports for the crime of abuse of office entered in the register pursuant to Art. 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that of conviction sentences pronounced, the need to avoid phenomena of so-called defensive bureaucracy, as well as the existence in the legal system of a broad discipline suitable to prevent malpractices in the public sector;
that the explanatory report of the novella would reveal, furthermore, the awareness of the legislator to act in a manner compliant with the procedural obligation pursuant to Art. 19 of the UNCAC, the legislator itself having reserved to evaluate "specific additive interventions aimed at sanctioning, with circumscribed and precise formulations, conduct worthy of punishment by virtue of any indications of a Euro-unitary matrix that might occur";
that, in the proceeding registered as no. 110 of the 2025 register, the defendant F. D.G. has entered an appearance, asking that the questions be declared unfounded or inadmissible;
that the party proposes arguments analogous to those carried out by the State Attorney, specifying that Art. 65 of the UNCAC would represent a "classic 'execution or implementation clause,' aimed at adding for the member States of a treaty, to the obligation to respect it on the international level which is a consequence of its ratification and [...] entry into force, also that, equally international, of conforming its domestic legal system to it"; in such way, the provision would root "the international responsibility of member States that have not provided to execute or to execute correctly in the internal forum that given treaty";
that, with a defensive brief filed in proximity to the handling in chambers, the same party has recalled the motivations of judgment no. 95 of 2025, with which this Court, in excluding the existence of an international obligation to incriminate abuse of office, would have recognized to the national legislator "a margin of discretion that allows considering not constitutionally illegitimate the legislative choice to decriminalize the criminally relevant conduct subsumed in the cited Art. 323 of the Penal Code": such margin of discretion would not be affected by the European directive on the fight against corruption, "approved definitively by the European Parliament on 26 March 2026," which "makes generic reference to the 'illicit exercise of public functions,'" without mentioning abuse of office, and "which in any case must still be transposed by the Italian State."
Considering that the four referral orders indicated in the epigraph raise questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1(1)(b) of Law no. 114 of 2024, which repealed Art. 323 of the Penal Code, in reference, collectively, to Articles 97, 11, and 117(1) of the Constitution, the latter two in relation, collectively, to the obligations stemming from Articles 7(4), 19, and 65 of the UNCAC;
that the orders propose analogous questions and relative to the same provision, so that the related proceedings must be joined to be defined with a single decision;
that, in summary, the referrers argue, first of all, that the legislative choice to abolish the crime of abuse of office would conflict with the international obligations deriving from the Mérida Convention, with consequent constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provision in reference to Articles 11 and 117(1) of the Constitution, as the treaty source would impose upon State Parties that already provided for the incrimination of abuse of office in their respective penal systems at the time of ratification of the Convention a "ban on regression" (or "stand-still" obligation) and, therefore, the prohibition to repeal such incriminating norm;
that the orders registered as nos. 67 and 110 of the 2025 register also denounce the violation of Art. 97 of the Constitution;
that, in relation to the questions raised in reference to such last parameter, the exception of inadmissibility of the State Attorney is founded, first of all (proposed with regard to the order registered as no. 67 of the 2025 register, but on the basis of arguments that also fit the order registered as no. 110 of the 2025 register), in the lack of even minimal motivation regarding the vulnus that the questioned norm would inflict upon the principle of impartiality and good performance of public administration;
that the jurisprudence of this Court requires, in order of non-manifest lack of foundation, that the parameters be evoked in a non-apodictic and generic manner and that the reasons for which the violation of constitutional norms is considered verified be specified, on pain of manifest inadmissibility of the questions raised (ex multis, judgments no. 54 of 2026, point 6, no. 203 of 2025, point 6 of the Legal Considerations, and no. 160 of 2025, point 4 of the Legal Considerations; orders no. 127 of 2024, no. 159 of 2021, and no. 261 of 2012);
that the reason for manifest inadmissibility now highlighted has a preliminary and absorbing character with respect to every assessment of admissibility of the questions under another profile, concerning the limits of the constitutionality review in malam partem in criminal matters (a profile anyway examined in judgment no. 95 of 2025, point 5.2.5. of the Legal Considerations, where this Court declared the questions inadmissible, confirming its constant orientation precluding a review in malam partem with reference to Art. 97 of the Constitution, already expressed in the previous judgments no. 8 of 2022 and no. 447 of 1998);
that, furthermore, the manifest inadmissibility of the challenges formulated by all the referrers in reference to Art. 11 of the Constitution must be noted ex officio;
that, in fact, none of the orders explains for what reason the non-observance of international law obligations deriving from the provisions of the UNCAC (the only ones evoked as interposed parameters) would give rise to a violation—in addition to that of Art. 117(1) of the Constitution—also of Art. 11 of the Constitution, which the constant jurisprudence of this Court considers involved when obligations deriving not from international treaty law, but from European Union law, come into consideration (judgments no. 185 of 2025, point 4.2. of the Legal Considerations, and no. 95 of 2025, point 5.3. of the Legal Considerations);
that, on the contrary, the exceptions of inadmissibility formulated by the State Attorney General in relation to the remaining questions, raised in reference to Art. 117(1) of the Constitution, are unfounded, as they tend to achieve a ruling in malam partem in criminal matters, outside the hypotheses admitted by the jurisprudence of this Court;
that identical exceptions were examined and considered unfounded by this Court with judgment no. 95 of 2025, on the basis of considerations (points 5.3.1. to 5.3.4. of the Legal Considerations) integrally reiterated in the most recent judgment no. 185 of 2025 (point 4.2. of the Legal Considerations) and which, also in this seat, must be confirmed;
that, therefore, the only profiles on the merits that this Court must now address are those concerning the denounced injury of Art. 117(1) of the Constitution, for violation of the international obligation of non-retreat from incrimination (the so-called "stand-still" obligation), with the examination of the other questions being precluded by inadmissibility;
that, however, such challenges were already examined and declared unfounded by this Court with judgment no. 95 of 2025, filed on 3 July 2025 and, therefore, subsequent to all the referral orders under scrutiny, with motivations (point 7 of the Legal Considerations) that must be integrally reiterated in this seat;
that, with specific reference to the arguments spent by today's referrers, it can again be observed, in extreme synthesis, that the challenges move from an erroneous interpretive assumption, having to exclude the possibility of deriving from the Mérida Convention a prohibition to "decriminalize" abuse of office, considered that, as judgment no. 95 of 2025 has already clarified:
– unlike other provisions of the Convention which impose on State Parties a precise obligation of criminalization, "Art. 19 configures simply—in the language of the Legislative Guide to the Convention, elaborated by the [UNODC]—a 'non-mandatory offence': and that is conduct whose possible criminalization States have the mere (procedural) obligation to 'consider'" (point 7.1. of the Legal Considerations);
– "no element deducible from the text or from the ratio of Art. 19 of the Convention authorizes concluding that the State would be obliged to introduce (or to maintain) in its legal system the incrimination of conduct of abuse of office, under the sole condition that such incrimination results compatible with the general principles of the national legal system. The unequivocal text of the provision enunciates a mere obligation to 'consider' such introduction: and therefore not only to ensure the compatibility of the incrimination with the general principles of the national criminal system [...] but also to evaluate carefully the pros and cons of such option": every choice of criminalization, in fact, "presents obvious advantages, in terms of more energetic protection of the interests injured by the conduct that one wants to subject to penal sanction, but also a nourished series of disadvantages, as regards its sure incidence on the fundamental rights of the addressees of the precept, as well as its collateral effects to the detriment of other collective interests—such as the possible chilling effect with respect to licit and indeed useful conduct from the social point of view (in particular, with reference to the risks of 'defensive bureaucracy' connected to the incrimination of abuse of office, judgment no. 8 of 2022, point 2.4. of the Legal Considerations)" (point 7.3.1. of the Legal Considerations);
– the UNCAC "has chosen to entrust the comparative evaluation of the expected benefits and of the negative consequences of the incrimination of conduct of abuse of office to the prudent discretion of the legislator of each State," so that "there is no reason to believe that, once the choice to incriminate conduct of abuse of office has been made—before or after the ratification of the Convention—Art. 19 itself precludes the State from retracing its steps, and from (re)considering the pros and cons of the incrimination, eventually reaching the conclusion of abolishing it" (ibidem);
– the abolition of the crime of abuse of office neither violates Art. 7(4) of the Convention, which obliges States to endeavor to "adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest," with a provision that must be read in its systematic connections with the previous paragraphs: "in its complex Art. 7 deals with the measures aimed at preventing corruption through the application of principles of efficiency, competence, and transparency in the public sector," without there being deducible from such provision "implicitly also a 'prohibition of regression' (or obligation of 'stand still') in the repression of abuse of office." And "even hypothesizing that the repealed Art. 323 of the Penal Code could be interpreted as a tool functional to preventing conflicts of interest in public administration, from the conventional provision under examination no obligation of result seems deducible" (point 7.3.2. of the Legal Considerations);
– nor can a hypothetical prohibition of regression, or "stand-still" obligation, be derived from Art. 65 of the Convention, which provides for the obligation for each State Party to adopt the measures necessary "to ensure the execution of its obligations under the present Convention" (paragraph 1) and allows each State Party to "adopt measures more [restrictive] or sever[e] than those provided for by the present Convention" (paragraph 2), without introducing, however, "any additional obligation for States" and, above all, without establishing "—in defect of any textual hold that could corroborate such a conclusion, which would limit incisively the discretion of Parliament in the performance of its own criminal policy—any prohibition of regression with respect to the measures of penal protection that States had chosen autonomously to adopt" (point 7.3.3. of the Legal Considerations);
that, therefore, the questions raised in reference to Art. 117(1) of the Constitution must be declared manifestly unfounded (ex plurimis, orders no. 219, no. 195, and no. 50 of 2025, no. 97, and no. 78 of 2024).
for these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
having joined the proceedings,
1) declares the manifest inadmissibility of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1(1)(b) of Law no. 114 of 9 August 2024 (Amendments to the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicial System, and the Military Penal Code), raised in reference, collectively, to Articles 11 and 97 of the Constitution, by the Court of Campobasso, Criminal Section, by the Court of Turin, Third Criminal Section, and by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing at the Court of Siracusa, with the orders indicated in the epigraph;
2) declares the manifest unfoundedness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 1(1)(b) of Law no. 114 of 2024, raised, in reference to Art. 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation, collectively, to Articles 7(4), 19, and 65 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 October 2003, ratified and executed via Law no. 116 of 3 August 2009, by the Court of Campobasso, Criminal Section, by the Court of Turin, Third Criminal Section, and by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing at the Court of Siracusa, with the orders indicated in the epigraph.
So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 18 May 2026.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Francesco VIGANÒ, Reporting Judge
Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery
Deposited in the Chancellery on 30 June 2026
The anonymized version is, in text, compliant with the original