JUDGMENT NO. 90
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has issued the following
JUDGMENT
in the proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Articles 4(2), 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of August 21, 2025 (Provisions regarding quarries and the integrated water service. Amendments to Regional Law 35/2015 and Regional Law 69/2011), initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers through an appeal notified on October 24, 2025, filed with the registry on the same date, registered as no. 39 of the 2025 registry of appeals, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 46, first special series, of the year 2025.
Having examined the act of constitution of the Tuscany Region;
Having heard, at the public hearing of March 24, 2026, the Reporting Judge Giovanni Pitruzzella;
Having heard State Attorney Marco Stigliano Messuti for the President of the Council of Ministers, and Attorney Marcello Cecchetti for the Tuscany Region;
Having deliberated in the chambers on March 24, 2026.
Statement of Facts
1.– By way of an appeal registered as no. 39 of the 2025 registry of appeals, notified on October 24, 2025, and filed on the same date, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, challenged the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 4(2), 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of August 21, 2025 (Provisions regarding quarries and the integrated water service. Amendments to Regional Law 35/2015 and Regional Law 69/2011), with reference to Articles 41, 117(2)(e), and 120(1) of the Constitution.
1.1.– The provisions are challenged on the grounds that, despite their specific characteristics, they all mandate that at least fifty percent of the ornamental stone extracted in the Apuan-Versilian area must be processed within the local production system.
1.2.– These provisions, by impacting "substantially on the productive organization of companies and on the competitive dynamics of the sector" and compromising "the effective competitive parity between firms established within the regional territory and those located outside of it," are alleged to conflict, first and foremost, with Article 117(2)(e) of the Constitution, which confers upon the State exclusive legislative competence in the matter of "protection of competition."
The challenged provisions are also alleged to hinder the free circulation of goods and services, in violation of Article 120(1) of the Constitution.
Finally, the legislation under examination would infringe upon Article 41 of the Constitution, as it "directly affects the productive organization of firms in the sector" and produces "restrictive effects on competition," "altering the competitive balance between regional and extra-regional operators," without any "direct and necessary nexus" being established with the environmental impact reduction objectives mentioned in the law's preamble.
2.– By an act filed on December 3, 2025, the Tuscany Region entered an appearance, requesting that the challenges be declared inadmissible or, in any event, unfounded.
2.1.– Preliminarily, it is argued that the challenges are inadmissible as they pertain to the discretionary choices—which are far from arbitrary—of the regional legislator.
Furthermore, the grounds for challenge regarding Articles 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 are deemed inadmissible for lack of adequate supporting arguments.
2.2.– On the merits, the challenges are held to be unfounded.
The challenged legislation aims to safeguard the environmental compatibility of a heritage site unique in the world, without exceeding, according to the respondent Region, the limits of the residual regional legislative competence in the matter of quarries.
The legislation in question, without producing distorting effects on competition, merely regulates "the exercise of the extraction activity of Apuan marble in relation to the sustainability of impacts on resources and territory" with exclusive regard to ornamental material. The regional legislator has, therefore, not erected an indiscriminate barrier to entry nor imposed disproportionate burdens on an ordinary economic operator.
3.– Prior to the public hearing, both the appellant and the respondent filed supplementary briefs, reiterating their previously submitted conclusions.
3.1.– The appellant, in particular, requested the dismissal of the preliminary exceptions raised by the regional defense and, on the merits, highlighted that the challenged provisions introduce a "particularly incisive structural constraint," favoring firms already firmly established in the territory and influencing the possibility of free commercialization.
No nexus of necessity and proportionality with the declared objectives of environmental protection and sustainable development is identified; therefore, the interference in the exercise of free competition and business activity is claimed to be unjustified and disproportionate.
3.2.– The respondent Region, for its part, replied that the challenged legislation reconciles the freedom of enterprise with other primary values, "such as the preservation and proper use of the territory and resources, the protection of the environment, and the public health of citizens," without altering competition or limiting trade.
By regulating public and private quarries in a homogeneous manner, the provisions under examination pursue the sole objective of protecting and enhancing a resource unique in the world and implement a reasonable and proportionate balance between conflicting interests.
4.– At the public hearing, the parties insisted upon the conclusions formulated in their respective documents.
Reasons for the Decision
5.– By the aforementioned appeal (reg. no. 39 of 2025), the President of the Council of Ministers challenged Articles 4(2), 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025, alleging their conflict with Articles 41, 117(2)(e), and 120(1) of the Constitution.
6.– The regional legislation subject to this Court’s review aims, as a whole, to "set forth rules pursuing a comprehensive increase in quality processing within a short supply chain for all extracted ornamental stone material" (point 10 of the preamble).
The challenged provisions have their antecedent in the regulations set out by Article 38 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of March 25, 2015 (Provisions regarding quarries...), which already sought to favor "the processing of cutting material within the local supply chain—thereby incentivizing a positive impact on employment, the environment, and infrastructure—exclusively with reference to extraction activity exercised on assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage" (point 8 of the preamble to Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025).
As the appellant points out, these provisions were framed within a peculiar context and responded to an equally peculiar ratio. Committing to this undertaking represented "for extraction activities whose term was expiring between seven and twenty-five years from October 31, 2016, the 'conditio sine qua non' for increasing the duration of the existing authorization, or for obtaining the issuance of a new provision with an extended expiration, in any case not exceeding twenty-five years from October 31, 2016" (point 9 of the same preamble).
With the 2025 reform, it is provided "that the issuance of new concessions for the exercise of extraction activity on assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage is also subordinated to the stipulation of an agreement ensuring the commitment to process at least 50 percent of the cutting material within the local production system" (point 11 of the aforementioned preamble).
Furthermore, in order to make the applicable discipline homogeneous, "specific provisions are provided both for extraction activity exercised in 'mixed quarries'—those with the co-presence of marble-bearing land and appraised assets—and for that exercised in sites where there are no assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage" (point 12 of the preamble).
7.– It is within this horizon that the regional provisions suspected of constitutional illegitimacy by the appellant are situated.
7.1.– In particular, Article 4(2) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 replaces Article 35(6) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015 and establishes that the issuance of the concession for extraction activity of assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage within the Apuan-Versilian district is subordinated not only to the already required approval of the final project for the extraction activity, accompanied by all documentation, but also to a further condition: the "stipulation of an agreement ensuring the commitment to process at least 50 percent of the cutting material within the local production system, to be demonstrated through a product traceability system that provides effective guarantees, and with the possible commitment to the development of a project of general interest for the territory that, through new investments, is capable of generating a positive impact on employment, the environment, and infrastructure."
7.2.– Article 5(1) of the same Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 inserts paragraph 2-bis into Article 35-bis of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015, which concerns "Provisions for the cultivation of extraction sites containing assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage and other assets [...]".
The challenged provision regulates, in particular, "extraction sites where the extension of the asset belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage is not prevalent" and mandates, firstly, the application of Article 35-bis 1 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015, introduced by Article 6(1) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 (Art. 35-bis, paragraph 2-bis, first sentence, of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
By virtue of this reference, the final project must include "a plan for the use of materials certifying the commitment to utilize the local production system for the processing of at least 50 percent of the total extracted cutting material," and the authorization must contain prescriptions suitable to safeguard compliance with this commitment.
The same Article 5(1) further specifies that "the processing of at least 50 percent of the cutting material within the local production system is calculated on the unitary extraction site" (Art. 35-bis, paragraph 2-bis, second sentence, of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
Article 5(2) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 concerns extraction sites where the extension of the asset belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage is prevalent, adding a new sentence to Article 35-bis(3) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015, specifying that, even in this case, the commitment to process at least 50 percent of the cutting material within the local production system must be calculated on the unitary extraction site.
7.3.– The subsequent Article 6 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 places the aforementioned Article 35-bis 1 into Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015, concerning extraction sites without assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage, and mandates as an essential content of the final project a "plan for the use of materials certifying the commitment to utilize the local production system for the processing of at least 50 percent of the total extracted cutting material" (Art. 35-bis 1(1) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
The authorization also includes prescriptions aimed at ensuring compliance with this commitment (Art. 35-bis 1(2) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
7.4.– Article 9 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 supplements the discipline of Article 38 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015, relative to existing authorizations and concessions, and inserts paragraph 6-ter, which concerns extraction sites containing assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage and other assets. Even in this case, the commitment to process at least 50 percent of the cutting material within the local production system is calculated on the unitary extraction site (Art. 38, paragraph 6-ter, first sentence, of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
The provisions under examination do not apply to agreements signed before the entry into force of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 (Art. 38, paragraph 6-ter, second sentence, of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
7.5.– Finally, the subsequent Article 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 inserts Article 58-quater into Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015 and defers to January 1, 2035, the entry into force of provisions regarding the commitment to process within the local circuit material from extraction sites where the extension of the asset belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage is not prevalent (Art. 35-bis, paragraph 2-bis, of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015) and from extraction sites where there are no assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage (Art. 35-bis 1 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015).
The entry into force of provisions (Art. 21(1)(g-bis) of Tuscany Regional Law No. 35 of 2015) requiring the municipality to suspend the authorization in case of non-compliance with the commitment to process materials from Apuan-Versilian district extraction sites (lacking assets belonging to the municipal inalienable heritage) locally is also deferred to January 1, 2035.
8.– The appellant presents, under multiple profiles, the constitutional illegitimacy of the provisions now illustrated, on the assumption that they impose "the obligation to submit to processing within the local production system at least 50 percent of the materials extracted in the Apuan-Versilian area (Carrara marble)."
8.1.– Primarily, the regional legislation is alleged to infringe upon the State's exclusive legislative competence in the matter of "protection of competition" (Art. 117(2)(e) of the Constitution), which includes "the regulation of tender procedures and award criteria" and does not tolerate "divergent regional interventions, even if motivated by environmental or social purposes."
In the appellant's view, the challenged legislation would affect "substantially the productive organization of firms and the competitive dynamics of the sector" and conflict with "the principles of market openness and equal treatment."
8.2.– The challenged provisions are also alleged to be in contrast with Article 120(1) of the Constitution, as they would constitute "an obstacle to the free circulation of goods and services."
8.3.– Finally, the challenged provisions would be injurious to Article 41 of the Constitution. By preventing economic operators from freely choosing where to process materials and by introducing "a territorially rigid and generalized constraint," such provisions would in fact "directly affect the productive organization of firms in the sector" and would be neither "strictly necessary" nor "proportionate with respect to the environmental protection objective pursued," an objective only generically stated.
9.– In limine, the respondent party objected to the inadmissibility of the challenges under a dual profile.
The challenge is said to target the discretionary choices of the regional legislator, adopted in the exercise of the competence recognized by Article 117(4) of the Constitution in the matter of quarries, and is not, in any event, supported by adequate arguments with reference to Articles 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025.
Neither of these exceptions can be accepted.
9.1.– The complaints focus on the violation of the rules governing the division of competences between the State and the regions and have no relation to the discretionary appreciation that falls to the regional legislator within the scope of its powers.
As for the reasonableness of the balance implemented, it is a profile that involves the merits of the challenges and must, together with the merits, be examined.
9.2.– The challenges are further supported by adequate argumentation, which analyzes each provision and illustrates the reasons for the conflict with the evoked constitutional precepts, in a manner that is far from apodictic or incomplete.
The challenged provisions, despite their distinct traits, are united by the constraint of local processing for fifty percent of the extracted material and intervene to modulate this constraint also ratione temporis. In the particular arrangement defined by the inseparable connection of all the provisions under examination—each complementary and consequential to the other—resides the denounced vulnus, and the examination devolved to this Court cannot but be unitary.
10.– The challenges can therefore be scrutinized on their merits and prove to be well-founded with reference to all the evoked parameters.
11.– The regional provisions violate, first of all, the State's exclusive legislative competence in the matter of "protection of competition" (Art. 117(2)(e) of the Constitution).
11.1.– To the aforementioned title of competence, which does not present "the characteristics of a subject matter of certain extension" and is configured as a function destined to be exercised on the most diverse objects (Judgment no. 401 of 2007, point 6.7 of the Reasons for the Decision), this Court traces, in the first place, antitrust measures, which aim at acts and behaviors of firms capable of affecting the competitive structure of markets and regulate methods of control and sanctioning (Judgment no. 45 of 2010, point 4.1 of the Reasons for the Decision).
The notion of "protection of competition" reflects the notion of competition operating at the European level (Judgment no. 136 of 2025, point 4.4.1 of the Reasons for the Decision) and, in its dynamic meaning, "justifies public measures aimed at reducing imbalances, fostering conditions for sufficient market development, or establishing competitive structures" (Judgment no. 14 of 2004, point 4 of the Reasons for the Decision).
"Protection of competition," therefore, also translates as "promotion of competition among firms" (Judgment no. 36 of 2024, point 8 of the Reasons for the Decision) and, in this perspective, also embraces measures aimed at ensuring "competition in the market," eliminating "limits and constraints on the free expression of entrepreneurial capacity and competition among firms" (Judgment no. 44 of 2023, point 3.2.1 of the Reasons for the Decision).
Interventions aimed at guaranteeing "competition for the market" also cooperate in the promotion of competition (Judgment no. 36 of 2024, point 8 of the Reasons for the Decision), structuring competitive procedures so as to ensure the widest opening of the market to all economic operators and the extension "of the area of free choice for citizens and firms, the latter also as users, in turn, of goods and services" (Judgment no. 83 of 2018, point 1.3 of the Reasons for the Decision). Therefore, "the regulation of tender procedures, the regulation of the qualification and selection of competitors, of awarding procedures, and of award criteria" must be ascribed to the exclusive legislative competence of the State in question (Judgment no. 186 of 2010, point 4.1 of the Reasons for the Decision).
The Constitution has entrusted to the State, on an exclusive basis, the task of regulating competition uniformly across the national territory, and such uniformity "represents a value in itself" (Judgment no. 283 of 2009, point 3 of the Reasons for the Decision) and by definition excludes divergent regional regulations that give rise to regulatory gaps or territorial barriers (Judgments no. 60 of 2026, point 8.2.3 of the Reasons for the Decision, and no. 23 of 2022, point 4.2 of the Reasons for the Decision).
Precisely because it touches upon "the regulation of markets relevant to multiple and diverse economic activities" and has a "transversal" nature, the protection of competition must necessarily influence "also matters assigned to the legislative, concurrent, or residual competence of the Regions" (Judgment no. 430 of 2007, point 3.2.1 of the Reasons for the Decision) and acts as a limit also on the regulation that regions may dictate regarding quarries and peat bogs, attributed to residual legislative competence based on the amended Article 117(4) of the Constitution (Judgment no. 176 of 2018, point 4.2 of the Reasons for the Decision).
11.2.– Such a limit, in the present case, has been exceeded.
In its salient core, the regional regulation—due to the content and implications it presents and the ratio that inspires it—must be traced back to the matter of protection of competition, reserved for State legislation, and does not relate to the aforementioned residual legislative competence in the matter of quarries, which the respondent party mentions repeatedly.
The limitations imposed by the regional legislator are not limited to marginal aspects or details, and the fact that only ornamental material is discussed does not argue in the opposite direction, as such material has a significance and quality that are far from negligible.
The limitations concern a percentage that is by no means small, equal to fifty percent of the extracted ornamental material, have a generally applicable scope that disregards the legal regime of extraction sites, and are accompanied by rigorous sanctioning mechanisms for any potential non-compliance.
The obligation to process fifty percent of the extracted ornamental material locally orientates the choice towards a defined category of firms, qualified by the mere fact of their territory of operation.
A restrictive regime of this kind interferes with the competitive structure of the market itself and alters its dynamics, favoring firms located in the territory and discriminating against those headquartered elsewhere.
The repercussions of the restrictive discipline, precisely due to the structural nature emphasized by the appellant, transcend the exclusively local dimension and project themselves into the wider context of the general equilibrium of the reference market—an equilibrium that, by its nature, pertains to the "protection of competition."
Nor is it useful to object that the commitment assumed by firms takes place at a moment subsequent to the completion of tenders and thus does not relate to those awarding procedures that represent a paradigmatic manifestation of "protection of competition."
The obligation weighing on firms is an essential part of the authorizations and concessions issued, as it is a requirement for the issuance and retention of titles and, therefore, inevitably reverberates on the very conditions of participation in the tender and on the effective respect for the principles of parity and non-discrimination.
11.3.– Nor does the argument proposed by the respondent party regarding the reasonableness of the challenged regional legislation lead to different conclusions.
11.3.1.– Preliminarily, it must be reiterated that the faculty "to adopt, as a result of the balance between the interest in competition and other public interests and within the scope of a uniform regulation for the entire national territory, exceptional restrictions on the free access of economic operators to the market, which, if provided for by different regional regulations, would be liable to create regulatory gaps producing territorial barriers (Judgment no. 283 of 2009)" is entrusted to the State on an exclusive basis (Judgment no. 4 of 2022, point 4.1 of the Reasons for the Decision).
11.3.2.– Secondly, the restrictions on competition do not find an immediate and plausible justification in a legitimate objective and imperative reasons of general interest.
The landscape and cultural uniqueness of the Apuan Alps and Versilia district, emphasized by the regional defense, does not in itself justify the general and pervasive obligation to process a significant part of the ornamental material in the local market.
Such an obligation is not rationally connected to the environmental protection needs that the respondent party does not fail to adduce in support of the challenged limitations, also based on the provisions of the regional landscape plan.
Processing within the local production system does not serve to neutralize the prejudice that marble extraction has already caused to the harmony of the landscape and the unrepeatable lines that compose it.
The denounced obligation transforms, in its essence, into a measure of support for local industry and, in its all-encompassing scope, is not accompanied by any assessment of the effective environmental sustainability of the transformation processes that take place in this more limited territorial circuit.
Environmental protection, instead, postulates measures calibrated to the specificity of individual contexts and reasonably capable of containing the negative externalities implied by the extraction of a limited resource such as marble.
The challenged provisions, on the other hand, do not polarize attention on these externalities and do not take care to attenuate their impact.
The constraints imposed by regional law do not, therefore, prove to be strictly necessary for the preservation of the unique and irreproducible landscape of the Apuan Alps and Versilia and the environmental compatibility of extraction activity, in the terms that even the regional landscape plan outlines.
Nor can the provisions under examination be counted among those compensatory measures that the respondent party also alluded to in the public hearing.
Such measures, by their nature, must be directed at the entire community and, in this case, at the community that suffers the prejudicial consequences of the extraction activity, and must be structured in such a way as to counterbalance the imposed sacrifice and strengthen the protection of the same general interest that the depletion of the natural resource has compromised.
Also for the indicated measures, respect for the criteria of adequacy and proportionality and for the principles of parity and non-discrimination, which, in the constitutional design and in European Union law, permeate economic relations, is inescapable.
To these principles, on the other hand, the challenged legislation does not adhere, due to its marked protectionist imprint.
11.4.– The regional discipline is not only inconsistent with a logic of appropriate and authentic compensation, but it is not even in compliance with the canon of proportionality.
11.4.1.– Far from delineating a mere preferential criterion or a selective parameter anchored to the particularity of individual situations, the challenged provisions act as mandatory prescriptions, applicable in a rigid and indiscriminate manner and accompanied by an apparatus of sanctions.
The constraint, which concerns a considerable part of the extracted material, operates as a regime with general value and is not modulated in the more ductile terms of a rewarding criterion, an incentive, or a prescription concretely aimed at safeguarding environmental sustainability.
The restrictions imposed on competitive dialectics, detached from the original contingency that induced the regional legislator to introduce them in precise terms, thus rise to a protectionist scope, according to general and lasting connotations.
11.4.2.– The challenged legislation, therefore, in limiting the full unfolding of competition in a market of significant importance, has not chosen the means suitable for determining the least sacrifice of conflicting interests, without affecting their intangible core.
Such disharmonies are no less strident just because the regional legislator has deferred to January 1, 2035, the entry into force of many provisions and has intended to protect the trust of those who had already stipulated agreements under the force of the previous discipline.
11.5.– Nor can the need to dictate a uniform discipline, in the terms indicated by the preamble of the challenged law and by the defenses of the respondent party, attribute to the region any title to legislate in a scope that exceeds its competences.
11.6.– Ultimately, the measures prepared by the regional legislator are harbingers of an immediate impact on the competitive structure of the market.
12.– The same considerations lead to identifying also the deduced violation of Article 120(1) of the Constitution.
12.1.– The regional legislator is prohibited from erecting protectionist barriers of a territorial nature and discriminating against firms on the basis of a territorial localization element (Judgment no. 391 of 2008, point 1 of the Reasons for the Decision) that proves to be "devoid of a reasonable justification" (Judgment no. 64 of 2007, point 4 of the Reasons for the Decision).
Such diversified regimes break the principle enshrined in Article 120(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits regions from "adopting measures that in any way hinder the free circulation of persons and things between regions" and from "limiting the right of citizens to exercise their profession, employment, or work in any part of the national territory" (Judgment no. 440 of 2006, point 3 of the Reasons for the Decision).
A discipline differentiated according to criteria of territorial localization must "in any case ensure the equality of all citizens in matters of work and economic initiative and can be justified only to the extent that it is rationally founded on the need to protect interests the care of which is entrusted to the Region" (Judgment no. 168 of 1987, point 6 of the Reasons for the Decision).
The discipline cannot, therefore, translate "into the affixing of discriminatory barriers to the detriment of subjects not localized in the regional territory" (Judgment no. 207 of 2001, point 5 of the Reasons for the Decision).
12.2.– In introducing the denounced constraint, the challenged provisions erect a protectionist barrier to the detriment of firms operating in a different territorial sphere and preclude such firms from entering, under conditions of competitive parity, the particular market of processing the extracted materials.
The selective criterion typified by the challenged provisions and centered on the mere "connection with the regional territory" (Judgment no. 31 of 2021, point 4.3 of the Reasons for the Decision) reveals itself all the more injurious to the freedom of circulation as it concerns a market that is already characterized by the limitation of available resources and the high specialization required.
13.– Finally, for a similar order of reasons, the challenges are well-founded also with reference to Article 41 of the Constitution.
13.1.– In fact, by constant jurisprudence of this Court, "the legislator may well impose restrictions of a general nature on the freedom of private economic initiative, on the condition that such limits correspond to social utility and the protection of primary values pertaining to the human person and do not translate into arbitrary and incongruous measures" (Judgment no. 143 of 2025, point 5 of the Reasons for the Decision).
13.2.– Such conditions, in the present case, are not satisfied.
In today's judgment, the restriction of competition and free circulation does not reverberate only on the order of the market and its overall structure, but also on the freedom of economic initiative of individuals, of which the protection of competition represents "a further safeguard" (Judgment no. 67 of 2011, point 5.2 of the Reasons for the Decision).
The constraint prefigured by the regional law does not pursue environmental protection objectives nor does it reconnect to other needs deserving of special protection.
Furthermore, the compression of the freedom of private economic initiative is not only lacking reasonable and transparent justifications, linked to overriding general interests, but is implemented with disproportionate measures, which contravene the canon of the "minimum means."
The limits prescribed by the regional legislator pertain to a qualifying aspect of the freedom protected by Article 41 of the Constitution, which is expressed in the faculty to adopt the most appropriate organizational choices. In the present case, an indefeasible component of such choices is autonomy in identifying negotiating counterparts in the basic phase of processing the extracted material.
The challenged regional provisions sacrifice such autonomy and configure an unreasonable interference in the freedom to choose the most adequate organizational model.
They impose a constant and organic link with the local supply chain, even when such a solution proves in practice to be burdensome and unsuitable for safeguarding the very general purposes enunciated by the regional law.
A discipline so contrived, therefore, interferes in an unreasonable and disproportionate manner with the freedom protected by Article 41 of the Constitution.
14.– By virtue of the considerations exposed, the constitutional illegitimacy of Articles 4(2), 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of 2025 must be declared.
FOR THESE REASONS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Articles 4(2), 5(1) and (2), 6, 9, and 14 of Tuscany Regional Law No. 52 of August 21, 2025 (Provisions regarding quarries and the integrated water service. Amendments to Regional Law 35/2015 and Regional Law 69/2011).
Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 24, 2026.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Author of the judgment
Igor DI BERNARDINI, Clerk
Filed in the Clerk's Office on May 28, 2026