ORDER NO. 25

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

ORDER

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of March 28, 1997 (Urgent measures for the rebalancing of public finance), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 140 of May 28, 1997, and of Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of May 31, 2010 (Urgent measures for financial stabilization and economic competitiveness), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 122 of July 30, 2010, brought by the Regional Administrative Court for the Marche, First Section, by order of February 15, 2025, by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, Fifth Section, by order of February 25, 2025, and by the Regional Administrative Court for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, by order of August 7, 2025, registered respectively under numbers 55, 61, and 209 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, special series, numbers 14, 16, and 45 of the year 2025.

Having examined the appearances of the National Institute for Social Security (INPS), of F. M., S. M., and G. C., as well as the intervening acts of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the reporting Judge Maria Rosaria San Giorgio at the public hearing of February 10, 2026;

having heard the lawyers Pietro Frisani for F. M., S. M., and G. C., Gino Madonia and Piera Messina for the INPS, and the State Attorney Fabrizio Fedeli for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in the chamber on February 12, 2026.
Factual Findings

1.– By three orders of similar content dated February 15 and February 25, 2025, and August 7, 2025, registered respectively under numbers 55, 61, and 209 of the 2025 register of orders, the Regional Administrative Court for the Marche, First Section, the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, Fifth Section, and the Regional Administrative Court for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, raised, with reference to Article 36 of the Constitution, questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of March 28, 1997, converted, with amendments, into Law no. 140 of May 28, 1997, and of Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of May 31, 2010, converted, with amendments, into Law no. 122 of July 30, 2010.

The Regional Administrative Court (TAR) for Lazio and the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia further alleged a violation of Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.

1.1.– In the order registered under no. 55 of the 2025 register of orders, the TAR for the Marche, First Section, explains that it must decide on the appeal in which F. M., a senior executive of the State Police who ceased service due to reaching age limits effective September 30, 2022, requested that the National Institute for Social Security (INPS) be ordered to pay, without delay, the amount still due as end-of-service indemnity (TFS), in addition to interest and monetary revaluation.

The remitting court reports that, in support of the application, the applicant challenged the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, and Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, observing that the delays in the payment of the end-of-service indemnity (TFS) provided therein conflict with Articles 36 of the Constitution and 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, citing the judgments of this Court no. 130 of 2023 and no. 159 of 2019.

1.2.– The court *a quo* considers, first of all, that the relevance of the raised issues is not precluded by the INPS’s payment of the first two installments of the due treatment and the impending disbursement of the third, as the applicant also contested the lack of provision, within the scrutinized norms, for monetary revaluation to compensate for the payment delay. Therefore, should the challenged norms be declared unconstitutional, the applicant would still have the right to monetary revaluation on the amounts received.

1.3.– The same remitting court rules out that the scrutinized norms, due to their unambiguous tenor, lend themselves to a constitutionally oriented interpretation.

1.4.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness, the referral order cites extensive passages of judgment no. 130 of 2023, noting how that ruling ascertained the constitutional illegitimacy of the provisions now under scrutiny again without, however, declaring it "formally”, on the assumption that the organic reform of the matter lies solely with the legislator, as political considerations are involved, primarily regarding the procurement of the financial means necessary to restore the system to constitutional legitimacy.

However, the court *a quo* observes that the legislator has not yet "objectively adapted” to the warning expressed by this Court, and the reforms enacted so far cannot be considered decisive.

The TAR for the Marche therefore raises questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, and Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, "regarding the profile relating to the failure to adapt the aforementioned norms to the judgments of the Constitutional Court no. 159 of 2019 and no. 130 of 2023, given that the legislator’s inertia reiterates the substantial injury to the public employee’s right, upon cessation of service due to reaching age limits, to receive a (in this case deferred) remuneration sufficient and proportionate to the work performed by the interested party (Article 36 of the Constitution).”

The "substantial injury,” the remitting court adds, derives from the temporal deferral and the installment-based payment of the sum due, "not accompanied by a mechanism to adjust the amounts paid to inflation.”

In the alternative – should it be held that the "warning judgments” do not bind either the legislator or the Constitutional Court itself – the court *a quo* denounces the conflict of the challenged norms with Article 36 of the Constitution for the profiles already highlighted in the aforementioned judgment no. 130 of 2023.

2.– In the order registered under no. 61 of the 2025 register of orders, the TAR for Lazio, Fifth Section, reports that in the *a quo* proceedings, S. M., an employee of the Ministry of the Interior placed in retirement as of September 30, 2023, requested that the INPS be ordered to pay, without delay, the amount still due as end-of-service indemnity, plus interest and monetary revaluation.

2.1.– Regarding relevance, the remitting court observes that the application of the challenged provisions – which, due to their "textual clarity,” do not lend themselves to an interpretation compliant with the Constitution – would lead to the dismissal of the appeal.

2.2.– In support of the non-manifest groundlessness, the TAR for Lazio also refers to the judgments of this Court no. 130 of 2023 and no. 159 of 2019, observing that no organic revision of the subject matter has followed.

Given this, the remitting court believes that the challenged norms conflict with Article 36 of the Constitution, as, by introducing a restrictive measure of a non-contingent but structural nature, they infringe the rights of public employees in an unreasonable and disproportionate manner.

The provisions under examination would also violate Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR.

The right to TFS would fall within the notion of "possessions” relevant under the European Convention on Human Rights (citing the judgments of the ECHR, Grand Chamber, September 5, 2017, Fabian v. Hungary and April 15, 2014, Stefanetti v. Italy).

Therefore, the court *a quo* considers that, since this claim matures and becomes part of the holder’s estate from the moment the requirements for retirement due to age or service limits are met, the deferral and installment-based payment, having now become structural, prejudice the "essence of the individual’s pension rights,” in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR.

3.– Lastly, in the order registered under no. 209 of the 2025 register of orders, the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, states it is called upon to decide on the appeal in which G. C., an employee of the Ministry of the Interior placed in retirement due to reaching age limits as of May 31, 2024, requested that the INPS be ordered to pay him without delay the entire amount due, plus interest and monetary revaluation.

3.1.– Regarding relevance, the remitting court observes that the norms under scrutiny, which, due to their "unambiguous literal tenor,” do not allow for a constitutionally compliant interpretation, would prevent the granting of the request made by the applicant.

3.2.– As for non-manifest groundlessness, the referral order recalls the arguments made by the TAR for the Marche in the proceedings promoted with the order registered under no. 55 of the 2025 register of orders, further noting that, given the legislator's failure to adapt to the warnings of this Court, the right to TFS is "violated to an extent that distorts its content, both due to the installment-based payment and the fact that the temporal delay is not compensated by the monetary revaluation of the sums owed to the former public employee.”

The challenged provisions would, therefore, conflict both with Article 36 of the Constitution, as the non-temporary sacrifice caused by the delay in TFS payment infringes the principles of proportionality and adequacy of remuneration; and with Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, as the treatment in question is the subject of a legitimate expectation of the person, already integrated into their estate upon the occurrence of the requirements demanded by law.

Ultimately, according to the court *a quo*, the legislator’s failure to adapt to the indicated judgments no. 130 of 2023 and no. 159 of 2019 "reiterates the substantial injury to the public employee’s right, upon cessation of service due to reaching age limits, to receive a (in this case deferred) remuneration sufficient and proportionate to the work performed,” as the deferral and installment-based payment are not accompanied by a mechanism of inflation adjustment, which would translate into a violation of Article 36 of the Constitution and the aforementioned conventional precept.

Like the TAR for the Marche, the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia finally specified that – should it be held that the "warning judgments do not bind either the legislator or the Constitutional Court” – the "same questions of constitutional legitimacy of the aforementioned legal provisions must be raised again, with reference to Articles 36 and 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, insofar as they provide – as measures now structural and no longer linked to specific financial emergencies – the deferral of the effective disbursement of the T.F.S. and (in the event of amounts exceeding € 50,000.00, as is the case for the applicant herein) the installment-based payment, not accompanied by the revaluation of the sums gradually disbursed to the former public employee who has ceased service due to reaching age limits.”

4.– In the constitutional legitimacy proceedings, the applicants in the main proceedings have entered an appearance, requesting that the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy be upheld and referring entirely to the arguments and deductions made in their respective introductory acts, which are attached to the appearances.

4.1.– The INPS has also entered an appearance in the proceedings, requesting, as its primary argument, that the proceedings be referred back to the court *a quo*, pointing out that the legislator partially modified the disciplined subject to censure, given that Article 16, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 25 of March 14, 2025 (Urgent provisions regarding the recruitment and functionality of public administrations), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 69 of May 9, 2025, established that the end-of-service and end-of-employment treatment for employees who are disabled, incapable, or unfit for work and service shall be disbursed within the three-month period referred to in Article 3, paragraph 5, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted.

In the INPS’s view, the normative intervention in question has significantly expanded the base of public employees to whom the end-of-service treatment is disbursed within the three-month period, including those entitled to a disability allowance who were previously excluded.

This would demonstrate that, following the warning issued by judgment no. 130 of 2023, the legislator has not remained inert.

Hence, according to the Institute, it is necessary to refer the documents back to the courts *a quo* so that they may proceed with a new assessment of the relevance and non-manifest groundlessness of the raised questions.

4.2.– The INPS has, in any case, objected to the inadmissibility, on several grounds, of the censures formulated in the referral orders.

The remitting courts allegedly limited themselves to motivating the doubts of constitutional illegitimacy *per relationem* through reference to the judgments of this Court no. 130 of 2023 and no. 159 of 2019.

Furthermore, the erroneous and incomplete indication of the reference constitutional parameters is contested, on the assumption that the referral orders did not invoke either Article 3 of the Constitution – which was instead deduced, under the profile of disparity of treatment, in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concluded with judgment no. 159 of 2019 – or Article 38 of the Constitution, despite the fact that, as highlighted by the constitutional rulings mentioned above, the TFS also serves a social security function.

To support this assumption, the INPS presents extensive arguments intended to identify, on the one hand, the numerous and significant differences of the TFS compared to the private-sector end-of-service treatment (TFR), and to demonstrate, on the other hand, the purely social security nature of the former.

The referral orders supposedly overlooked this distinction, suggesting an erroneous overlap between private-sector end-of-service treatment and the severance indemnity.

Regarding, in particular, the proceedings initiated by the TAR for the Marche, the INPS discerned an additional profile of inadmissibility in the lack of motivation regarding relevance.

The Institute observes that the applicant, at the date of the filing of the appeal, had already received the first installment of the TFS, so that no utility could derive to him as an effect of the potential declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, even under the profile of the recognition of monetary revaluation, as said benefit was not the subject of a specific request.

Regarding the questions concerning the installment-based payment, the INPS highlights that two of the three installments due to the applicant were paid prior to the referral order, so that the relevance of the questions concerning Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, would be limited solely to the recognition of monetary revaluation with respect to the second and third installments of the treatment.

In all proceedings, the Institute also argued that the questions would be inadmissible due to the insufficient reconstruction of the facts of the case.

Since the main censure addressed to the disciplined subject under scrutiny concerns the lack of provision for a tool compensating for monetary devaluation, the remitting courts should have indicated with precision the dates of disbursement of the TFS installments to the applicants, also reporting the trend of inflation starting from the expiration of the three-month period from the employee's cessation of service. Furthermore, the courts *a quo* did not specify the type of end-of-service treatment due to the applicants, as it is not specified whether they are holders of the right to the severance indemnity or the end-of-service treatment pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers "December 29 [recte: 20], 1999” (End-of-service treatment and establishment of pension funds for public employees).

The raised questions would, moreover, be inadmissible due to "redundancy” (ultroneità), as the remitting courts did not limit the censures to the specific typology of services being the subject of the *a quo* proceedings, but extended the scrutiny to the entire scope of the challenged provisions, which refer to all end-of-service treatments, however named.

Lastly, the INPS believes that the questions are also inadmissible due to the vague motivation regarding the impossibility of interpreting the challenged norms in a constitutionally compliant manner.

4.3.– On the merits, in support of the groundlessness of the questions raised by the remitting courts, the INPS observed that the legislator has followed up on the warning contained in judgment no. 130 of 2023 of this Court, as made evident by the aforementioned Article 16, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 25 of 2025, as converted. In any case, the enduring validity of the deferral and installment-based payment of the TFS would be consistent with the constitutional principle of solidarity and, notably, with the need to ensure a sustainable and balanced social security system.

In order to corroborate this assumption, the respondent recalls constitutional jurisprudence on solidarity contributions, which requires an adequate evaluation of the economic-financial context in which the challenged legislative choice is situated (citing, in addition to the indicated judgments no. 130 of 2023 and no. 159 of 2019, judgment no. 250 of 2017).

The Institute therefore emphasizes how the persistence of the geopolitical crisis "occasioned by the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, on one hand, and between Israel and Palestine,” on the other, as well as the "violent turbulence” in international trade generated by the tariff policies decided by the United States of America have worsened the socio-economic context of reference, whose evaluation is indispensable in order to verify the constitutional legitimacy of the norms under scrutiny, given that these factors prevent the adoption of expansive measures of public spending, if not at the price of reducing the essential levels of services provided to insured persons and pensioners, with a distorting effect on the balance of the social security system.

Moreover – the INPS observes – the severance indemnity not only results in being more advantageous than the TFR, but also enjoys the tax relief introduced by Article 24 of Law-Decree no. 4 of January 28, 2019 (Urgent provisions regarding citizen’s income and pensions), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 26 of March 28, 2019, consisting of the partial tax deduction of the rate pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 2-bis, of the Decree of the President of the Republic no. 917 of December 22, 1986 (Approval of the consolidated text of income taxes), to be applied to the taxable amount of TFS, however named, with an amount up to 50,000 euros.

The declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the discipline under scrutiny would, therefore, conflict with the principle of solidarity referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution, which constitutes the foundation of the entire social security system, in consideration of the very significant burdens that would weigh upon the INPS and, therefore, upon the State’s consolidated budget as a consequence of it.

The Institute underscores the particular burdensomeness of such costs, as it would emerge from the statistical-actuarial consultancy attached to its appearance, in which an additional expenditure for 2025 equal to 4.2 billion euros was calculated in the case of eliminating only the deferral, 11.6 billion euros in the case of eliminating only the installment-based payment, and 15.6 billion euros in the case of eliminating both dilatory mechanisms.

In the proceedings initiated by the TAR for Lazio and the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in relation to the censures alleging a violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR, the INPS argued the irrelevance of the conventional parameter, observing that, if, in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the provision under examination does not guarantee the right to a pension of a particular amount, *a fortiori* it cannot ensure the right to the payment of a one-off benefit in shorter times than those provided for by the legislation under scrutiny.

The Institute further recalls that the ECHR itself has repeatedly affirmed that, although the reduction of the pension benefit amount or its cessation integrates an interference with the "possessions” of the holder that requires justification in the general interest, it is nevertheless necessary to verify whether the violation of the social security right was such as to prejudice its essence. The imposition of a reasonable and proportionate reduction – that is, justified by general reasons, such as the economic crisis, and limited in time and scope – does not necessarily entail the violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR.

In the further alternative, the INPS asks this Court to evaluate an "alternative path to the immediate declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the norms under scrutiny” that recognizes an "ultimate opportunity” for the legislator to exercise its own discretion by proceeding to compose the different interests relevant in the specific case.

According to the Institute, in line with the solution adopted, albeit in different areas, with orders no. 97 of 2021 and no. 207 of 2018, this Court could indicate a deadline for the legislator to act, with a simultaneous postponement of the examination of the issue to a hearing subsequent to its expiration.

In the further alternative, a ruling "to the minimum extent necessary to bring the norms back into the fold of constitutionality” is requested, or, in a further graded alternative, an additive principle ruling that guides the legislator and also the judges in identifying the rule to be provisionally applied to the concrete case.

The INPS indicates as an example some possible "profiles of manipulative intervention” in the recognition of monetary revaluation on amounts due subsequent to the first installment of the end-of-service treatment, so as to ensure the real value of the sums received by public employees who ceased service due to reaching age limits over time; in limiting this Court's intervention solely to the end-of-service treatment that presents a discipline similar to that of the TFR of private workers, with the exclusion of the more favorable emoluments, such as those that are the subject of the *a quo* proceedings, in relation to which the deferral and installment-based payment operate only as counterweights to the higher treatment recognized; in limiting the corrective intervention to cases where the remuneration is not replaced by the receipt of the pension treatment or other retributive or substitute treatment of it.

5.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, has intervened in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings, requesting that the raised questions be declared inadmissible and, in any case, groundless.

The intervening party recalled, first of all, the affirmation contained in judgment no. 130 of 2023 according to which "the *quomodo* of the solutions draws upon the discretion of the legislator,” in order to highlight that, in reason of the financial impact that the non-gradual removal of the dilatory mechanisms under examination would entail, this Court could not intervene on the norms under scrutiny in the terms hoped for by the remitting judges.

In support of this assumption, it is recalled that in 2024 two bills were proposed (XIX legislature, A.C. 1254 and A.C. 1264) that intended to follow up on this Court’s warning through the reduction of the dilatory term for their liquidation in cases of cessation from service due to reaching age or service limits, as well as through the revaluation of the amount bands for the installment-based disbursement of the same treatments.

Such proposals, continues the state defense, did not have follow-up due to the negative opinion expressed by the State General Accounting Office on the grounds that they would have caused "worsening effects on public finance balances, especially in terms of borrowing requirement and net indebtedness, lacking coverage.”

6.– In the proceedings promoted by the TAR for Lazio, the National Association of Teachers and Trainers (ANIEF) submitted, as *amicus curiae*, a written opinion, pursuant to Article 6 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, with which it made conclusions of an adhesive nature to the censures of the remitting court.

The opinion was admitted by presidential decree of January 7, 2026.

In support of its standing, the association argued that it is a collective subject representing the interests of public workers and, in particular, of school staff, which falls within the vast audience of employees targeted by the discipline under scrutiny.

On the merits, the document re-proposes and develops the arguments spent by the remitting court, also citing the principle enunciated by constitutional and conventional jurisprudence, according to which budget reasons and spending containment do not meet the principles of proportionality if their application determines the infringement of fundamental rights.

7.– With illustrative memoranda of almost identical content, filed on January 19, 2026, the applicants in the *a quo* proceedings, replying to the INPS’s arguments, observed, on the one hand, that Articles 3 and 38 of the Constitution were not invoked by the remitting judges because they do not fit the facts deduced in the proceedings and, on the other hand, that the TFS does not have a social security nature, but a retributive one.

The applicants then contest the Institute’s assumption according to which public sector pensioners, enjoying a more advantageous regime than that reserved for private workers, should bear the deferral of the disbursement of the treatment being challenged.

They object that the TFS constitutes deferred remuneration, the fruit of the work performed – and, therefore, an integral part of the beneficiary's estate – intended to accompany the worker in the delicate phase of leaving active working life.

To the objected inadmissibility for lack of relevance, which the INPS derives from the occurrence of payment, in their favor, of one or more installments of the end-of-service treatment, they reply that from a potential declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provisions, the advantage of obtaining the monetary revaluation would derive anyway.

The applicants further deduce that, contrary to what is claimed by the respondent, the referral orders reconstructed the relevant facts for the purposes of the decision completely, indicating, in particular, the dates of disbursement of the tranches received and specifying the type of treatment that is considered in the respective *a quo* proceedings.

Then, the affirmation of the remitting judges according to which, in the face of the tenor of the challenged provisions, the doubts of constitutional illegitimacy could not be overcome through a constitutionally compliant interpretation would be entirely shareable.

The applicants, finally, replied to the arguments made by the INPS in support of the groundlessness, remarking, in particular, how to the warning formulated by the judgment of this Court no. 130 of 2023 the legislator has not given follow-up, as the reduction of the deferral operated by Law no. 199 of December 30, 2025 (State budget forecast for the financial year 2026 and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2026-2028) cannot be considered satisfactory for this purpose.

7.1.– In the imminence of the public hearing, the INPS also filed, in relation to the different proceedings, illustrative memoranda, of almost coincident content, with which it insisted on the conclusions submitted in the appearances, remarking, among other things, that the deferral and installment-based payment of end-of-service treatments represent a "very modest burden” to balance the yield deriving from the peculiar calculation method of the end-of-service treatments.

The INPS, in any case, reiterated the request for referral of the documents to the courts *a quo*, noting that, after judgment no. 130 of 2023, the legislator implemented the warning formulated therein also through the provision, in Article 1, paragraph 198, of Law no. 199 of 2025, of the reduction of the term for the deferral of the disbursement of the TFS from twelve to nine months.
Legal Findings

8.– With the three orders indicated in the epigraph, the TAR for the Marche, First Section, the TAR for Lazio, Fifth Section, and the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, First Section, doubt the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, and of Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, denouncing their conflict with Article 36 of the Constitution.

The TAR for Lazio and the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia also invoke Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR.

8.1.– The remitting judges request, first of all, the ablation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, in the part in which it provides that, for public employees who ceased service due to reaching the age or service limits provided by the respective regulations or for retirement *ex officio* due to reaching the maximum years of service, the disbursing entity liquidates the end-of-service treatment twelve months after the termination of the employment relationship and that the same entity provides for the disbursement of the amount to the entitled persons within the subsequent three months, after which interest is due.

The aforementioned provision is, therefore, censured in the version prior to the modification introduced by Article 1, paragraph 198, of Law no. 199 of 2025, which, effective from January 1, 2027, and in relation to employees who on that date will mature the requirements for retirement, reduced the term for the liquidation of the TFS by three months, leaving the further quarterly term provided for the disbursement of the due sums intact.

The judges *a quo* also request the invalidation of the installment payment discipline referred to in Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, again in the part in which it applies to cases of termination of the employment relationship due to reaching age or service limits or for retirement *ex officio* due to reaching the maximum years of service.

This provision outlines a further dilatory mechanism based on concatenated forecasts of increasing thresholds, establishing, in particular, that the recognition of the end-of-service treatment is carried out: "a) in a single annual amount if the total amount of the benefit, gross of the relative tax withholdings, is globally equal to or less than 50,000 euros; b) in two annual amounts if the total amount of the benefit, gross of the relative tax withholdings, is globally higher than 50,000 euros but lower than 100,000 euros. In such case, the first annual amount is equal to 50,000 euros and the second annual amount is equal to the residual amount; c) in three annual amounts if the total amount of the benefit, gross of the relative tax withholdings, is globally equal to or higher than 100,000 euros; in such case, the first annual amount is equal to 50,000 euros, the second annual amount is equal to 50,000 euros and the third annual amount is equal to the residual amount.”

8.2.– According to the TAR for the Marche, the provisions subject to censure would conflict with Article 36 of the Constitution, as the legislator’s failure to adapt to the warnings contained in the judgments of this Court no. 159 of 2019 and no. 130 of 2023 "reiterates the substantial injury” to the right of the employee who ceased service due to reaching age limits to a deferred remuneration sufficient and proportionate to the work activity performed.

In particular, the denounced *vulnus* would derive from the deferral and the installment-based payment of the emolument "not accompanied by a mechanism for adjusting the amounts paid to the trend of inflation.”

In the alternative, if it is held that the "warning judgments” do not bind either the legislator or the Constitutional Court itself, the court *a quo* denounces the violation of Article 36 of the Constitution, "for the profiles already amply highlighted by the Constitutional Court” in judgment no. 130 of 2023.

8.3.– The TAR for Lazio also believes that the provisions under scrutiny conflict with Article 36 of the Constitution, as "the provision of an installment payment” of the TFS, which is not contingent but structural, would infringe the principle of adequacy and sufficiency of remuneration, which is substantiated not only in the congruence, but also in the timeliness of the disbursement of the sums due.

Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution would also be violated, in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR.

In support of this censure, the remitting court argues that "pensions and, consequently, also the end-of-service treatment matured as an effect of working life constitute a ‘possession’ according to the Convention,” given that the relative claim becomes part of the right-holder’s estate at the moment the requirements for retirement due to reaching age or service limits are met.

The invoked conventional parameter would be violated as the deferral and installment-based payment of the TFS imposed by the norms under scrutiny, having now become structural, would prejudice "the essence of the individual’s pension rights.”

8.4.– Lastly, with censures of similar tenor, the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia laments that the legislator’s failure to adapt to the warnings expressed by the recalled judgments no. 159 of 2019 and no. 130 of 2023 of this Court "reiterates the substantial injury” to the right of the employee who ceased service due to reaching age limits to a deferred remuneration sufficient and proportionate to the work activity performed, specifying that such *vulnus* also originates from the lack of provision, alongside the dilatory mechanisms, of the monetary revaluation of the amounts disbursed.

In the alternative, Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, and Article 12, paragraph 7, of Law-Decree no. 78 of 2010, as converted, are censured with reference to Articles 36 and 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR for profiles analogous to those invoked, always in the alternative, by the TAR for the Marche.

9.– Preliminarily, the proceedings must be joined, as they concern the same provisions and are based on almost coincident censures and parameters.

10.‒ Still preliminarily, it must be noted that the modification of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, by Article 1, paragraph 198, of Law no. 199 of 2025, although occurring subsequent to the filing of the referral orders, not affecting the controversial relationships – as they arose prior to the date from which it will produce effect – is irrelevant in the *a quo* proceedings.

Unlike what is believed by the INPS, there is, therefore, no reason to arrange for the referral of the documents back to the remitting judges for a new assessment of the relevance and non-manifest groundlessness of the issues (judgment no. 231 of 2018).

Such a provision is not made necessary even by the reform introduced by Article 16, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 25 of 2025, as converted, which extended the provision referred to in Article 3, paragraph 5, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, which recognizes to disabled workers the non-deferred disbursement of the TFS, to disabled and unfit-for-work employees.

Since this legislative innovation did not affect the mandatory content of the challenged provisions, any fallout on the main proceedings must be excluded (judgment no. 236 of 2018).

11.– Still preliminarily, the objections of inadmissibility formulated by the INPS must be examined.

They are not founded.

11.1.– It is, in the first place, to be excluded that the judges *a quo* motivated the censures *per relationem*, limiting themselves, that is, to recalling judgments no. 159 of 2019 and no. 130 of 2023 or, regarding the TAR for Lazio, the act of promoting the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concluded with the second of those rulings.

The remitting judges, while reporting extensive excerpts of the aforementioned decisions, made the reasons for the non-manifest groundlessness of the issues examined therein sufficiently explicit.

The essential nucleus of the censures – with which the contrariety of the contested dilatory mechanisms to the principle of adequacy of remuneration sanctioned by Article 36 of the Constitution and the failure to remove such *vulnus* despite the warnings expressed by this Court are denounced – results, therefore, delineated in sufficiently defined terms.

11.2.– The objection contesting the erroneous and incomplete indication of the reference constitutional parameters on the assumption that the referral orders did not invoke either Article 3 of the Constitution – which was instead deduced, under the profile of disparity of treatment, in the constitutional legitimacy proceedings concluded with judgment no. 159 of 2019 – or Article 38 of the Constitution, despite the fact that the TFS also performs a social security function, is not founded either.

The circumstance that the provisions under scrutiny lend themselves to being examined with reference to a plurality of constitutional precepts does not exclude that the invocation of Article 36 of the Constitution – and, regarding the orders registered under numbers 61 and 209 of the 2025 register of orders, also of Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution in relation to Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR – results in itself as being suitable to lead to the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the dilatory mechanisms in question.

11.3.– The objection of inadmissibility for insufficient reconstruction of the facts of the case does not merit acceptance.

Contrary to what is believed by the Institute, the indications provided by the referral orders allow for the reconstruction of the cadences of the installment-based payment operating for each of the applicant workers, as well as the status of the payments made in their favor, nor is the identification of monetary revaluation rates in the reference periods to be considered necessary for the purposes of overcoming the admissibility threshold of the constitutional legitimacy issues, having regard to the publicity of the coefficients of inflation increase and the automaticity of the criteria with which, even for public employees, in proceedings having as their object the recognition of retributive entitlements, the accessory competence in question is granted.

11.4.– Furthermore, the objection with which the INPS complains about the lack of specification, by the remitting judges, of the type of end-of-service treatment due to the applicants, cannot be accepted.

Indeed, from the overall reading of the referral orders, it emerges clearly that the applications proposed in the *a quo* proceedings have as their object the severance indemnity.

11.5.– Moreover, the inadmissibility for "redundancy” that the INPS derives from the lack of limitation of the censures of constitutional illegitimacy to the specific typologies of end-of-service treatment that are the subject of the main proceedings and from the consequent extension of the scrutiny to the entire scope of the contested provisions, which, as already highlighted, refer to all end-of-service treatments, is not identifiable.

The system of deferrals subject to censure has, in fact, a generalized scope, as it operates for all types of end-of-service treatment ("however named”) due to employees of public administrations indicated in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree no. 165 of March 30, 2001 (General norms on the organization of work in the service of public administrations) and included in the consolidated economic account, the list of which is published annually by ISTAT pursuant to Article 1 of Law no. 196 of December 31, 2009 (Law on accounting and public finance).

Since, therefore, by the light of the provisions under scrutiny, the deferral and the installment-based payment operate in the same way for the entire *genus* of end-of-service treatments, the remitting judges correctly formulated the censures without circumscribing them to the specific cases of TFS deduced in the main proceedings.

11.6.– The objection with which the failure to motivate the impracticality of an interpretation compliant with the Constitution is denounced is likewise unfounded, as, conversely, the remitting judges argued that conclusion on the basis of the assumption that the unequivocal literal tenor of the challenged provisions stands in the way of overcoming the doubts of constitutional illegitimacy by way of interpretation.

11.7.– The objection with which the lack of relevance of the censures addressed by the TAR for the Marche to Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, is contested does not merit acceptance either.

The INPS notes that, at the date of the proposal of the appeal, the plaintiff had already received the first installment of the TFS, so that no utility could derive to him as an effect of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the cited Article 3, paragraph 2, not even under the profile of the recognition of monetary revaluation, as said competence was not the object of a specific application.

It is, however, necessary to consider that, with non-implausible motivation in support of the relevance of the issues, the court *a quo* argued that the applicant, despite having already received the first two tranches of TFS – the first of which prior to the initiation of the main proceedings –, in the event of a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the norms under scrutiny, would, in any case, have the right to the disbursement of "a sum equal to the monetary revaluation of the amounts liquidated to him.”

From that conclusion, it is derived that, in the remitting judge’s view, the application for monetary revaluation put forward by the plaintiff concerns all the installments of the treatment, including the first one, which falls within the application perimeter of Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted.

11.8.– Finally, the observation, made by the INPS in relation to the referral orders of the TAR for Lazio and the TAR for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, according to which the probable completion, in the interval of the proceedings, of the payments of the benefits due to the applicants would render the ablation of the norms under scrutiny insusceptible of affecting their outcome, "with the exception of the profile of the recognition of the right […] to monetary revaluation,” is to be considered irrelevant.

In the perspective of the applicants, shared by the judges *a quo*, even the application having as its object that accessory competence is, in fact, conditioned to the invalidation of the dilatory mechanisms introduced by the norms under scrutiny.

That appears sufficient for the issues to be considered relevant.

12.– All this having been premised, it must first be recalled that this Court has already signaled the necessity to remove the provisions on the deferred and installment-based payment of end-of-employment indemnities for the cases in which public employees cease from employment due to reaching age and service limits or for retirement *ex officio* due to reaching the maximum years of service.

With judgment no. 159 of 2019, the urgency of redefining a discipline "not devoid of problematic aspects” was, in fact, underlined, within the scope of an organic revision of the entire subject matter, in that, "[w]ith particular reference to the cases in which age and service limits are reached, the dual retributive and social security function of end-of-employment indemnities [...] risks being compromised, in contrast with the constitutional principles which, in guaranteeing fair remuneration, even deferred, protect the dignity of the human person.”

Subsequently, judgment no. 130 of 2023 reiterated the contrariety to Article 36 of the Constitution of the delays imposed by the same norms now under scrutiny, on the assumption that the constitutional guarantee of fair remuneration, even deferred, is substantiated not only in the congruence of the emolument, but also in the timeliness of its disbursement.

This Court has, however, held that it cannot remedy the detected *vulnus*, as the identification of the solutions necessary for this purpose draws upon the legislator’s discretion also in reason of the "significant impact in terms of cash procurement that the overcoming of the deferral in question [...] entails” (judgment no. 130 of 2023).

It therefore declared the inadmissibility of the raised questions, indicating, however, as a remedy to the detected violation, a reform that, starting from the treatments of the most modest amount, involves all others subsequently and with gradualness.

Ultimately, judgment no. 130 of 2023, despite having detected the conflict with the invoked parameters, did not reach the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy, but referred, in the first instance, to the legislator’s discretion the *quomodo* of the intervention necessary for that purpose (judgments no. 46 of 2025, no. 71 of 2023, no. 22 of 2022, and no. 120 of 2021), remarking, at the same time, the non-postponability of the *reductio ad legitimitatem*.

12.1.– To the pressing invitation contained in the aforementioned ruling, the legislator gave a first, only partial feedback with two recent reformatory interventions.

It was, in the first place, expanded the number of public employees who, in reason of their condition of fragility, can benefit from the disbursement of the end-of-service or end-of-employment treatment within the term of three months from the cessation of service, without further delays.

Article 16, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 25 of 2025, as converted, in fact, provided that, in addition to the subjects incapable of work, even the disabled and the unfit can receive the TFS within the quarterly term referred to in Article 3, paragraph 5, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted.

A subsequent legislative intervention directly invested the discipline now the subject of censure, reducing the extension of the annual term for the liquidation of end-of-service entitlements.

Article 1, paragraph 198, of Law no. 199 of 2025 established, in particular, that "[w]ith effect from January 1, 2027 and with reference to subjects who mature the requirements for retirement starting from the aforementioned date, in Article 3, paragraph 2, first period, of Law-Decree no. 79 of March 28, 1997, converted, with amendments, by Law no. 140 of May 28, 1997, the words: ‘twelve months’ are replaced by the following: ‘nine months’.”

By effect of that provision, for employees who will mature the requirements for retirement, due to reaching age or service limits, starting from January 1, 2027, the term for the liquidation of the TFS is, therefore, reduced by three months.

12.2.– It certainly cannot be held that the modifications introduced by the recalled reforms have initiated in a substantial way that process of gradual, but complete, elimination of the terms for the recognition of end-of-service entitlements urged by this Court.

They are, indeed, provisions of restricted scope, given that the first concerns only a restricted group of right-holders, namely disabled and unfit workers, and the second, although affecting the provisions under scrutiny, has reduced the times of disbursement of the treatment only in a meager measure, moreover limiting the abbreviation to the sole term of liquidation referred to in Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law-Decree no. 79 of 1997, as converted, and deferring the operativity of the ordered reduction to January 1, 2027.

To this must be added that from the formulation of Article 1, paragraph 198, of Law no. 199 of 2025 it is not derived that the operated reduction fits into a plan of progressive removal of both dilatory mechanisms nor, consequently, that the legislator has provided that similar measures will follow it within a defined temporal margin.

Even in the preparatory works of the new provision – from which, moreover, it emerges that the contraction of the TFS disbursement times is primarily intended to follow up on the warning expressed by this Court – no references to future developments of the reformatory intervention are found.

12.3.– The still persistent incompatibility of the deferred and installment-based payment of end-of-service treatments with the guarantee of adequacy of remuneration consecrated in Article 36 of the Constitution, at present, however, cannot lead to the invalidation of the challenged provisions.

This Court cannot, in fact, exempt itself from considering, once again, that an ablative intervention would entail the simultaneous and retroactive expunction of every deferral and, consequently, the immediate enforceability of the treatments, including those matured prior to the ruling and in the process of disbursement.

Such a ruling would translate at least into a temporary, but very significant impact on public finances in terms of cash requirements; which requires remitting to legislative discretion "the definition of the gradualness with which the pur indefectible intervention must be implemented” (judgment no. 130 of 2023), for the purpose, constitutionally necessary, of the elimination of the dilatory mechanisms under scrutiny (judgment no. 32 of 2021).

12.4.– It pertains, therefore, to the legislator to plan a reform that, even under the sign of gradualness, gives continuity to the measures recently adopted, so as to re-establish, within a defined and reasonable time horizon, the physiological rhythm of the payments of TFS, possibly distributing over more financial years the cash effect correlated to the removal of the deferral and the installment-based payment of the disbursement of the same.

12.5.– To allow the legislator to assume the relative decisions, this Court, making use of its own powers of management of the constitutional process, deems it necessary to arrange for the postponement of the ongoing proceedings, setting a new discussion of the questions of constitutional legitimacy for the hearing of January 14, 2027, at the outcome of which the potential occurrence of a legislative innovation that plans the elimination of the dilatory mechanisms in question "in conformity with the signaled protection requirements” may be evaluated (order no. 207 of 2018).

In the case under examination, in which the protection of rights guarded by the constitutional guarantee of fair remuneration, by affecting the correct management of financial flows, involves choices demanded, in principle, to the legislator, the "spirit of loyal and dialectical institutional collaboration” (again, order no. 207 of 2018; in a compliant sense, orders no. 97 of 2021 and no. 132 of 2020) makes it mandatory to allow the legislator itself to identify the most suitable measures to temper the non-postponable need for a legislative intervention for the purpose of the *reductio ad legitimitatem* with the need to plan the temporal distribution of the increase in cash requirements correlated to it.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

postpones to the public hearing of January 14, 2027, the consideration of the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with the orders indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 12, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Reporting Judge

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancellery

Deposited in the Chancellery on March 5, 2026

 

The anonymized version is consistent, in text, with the original