JUDGMENT NO. 153

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of December 30, 2021 (State Budget for the 2022 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2022-2024 Triennium) and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of Presidential Decree No. 917 of December 22, 1986 (Approval of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes), brought by the First-Instance Tax Court of Florence, Section 1, in the proceedings pending between Studio notarile G.-V. professional association, V. G., and C. V., and the Italian Revenue Agency – Provincial Directorate of Florence, by means of an order dated November 17, 2025, registered as No. 254 in the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, No. 1, 1st special series, for the year 2026.

Having regard to the appearance in proceedings of Studio notarile G.-V. professional association, V. G., and C. V.;

having heard Judge Rapporteur Francesco Saverio Marini at the public hearing of July 8, 2026;

having heard attorney Thomas Tassani on behalf of Studio notarile G.-V. professional association, V. G., and C. V.;

having deliberated in the chambers on July 8, 2026.

RITENUTO IN FATTO (The Facts)

1.– By order dated November 17, 2025 (reg. ord. No. 254 of 2025), the First-Instance Tax Court of Florence, Section 1, raised questions as to the constitutional legitimacy, with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 41 of the Constitution, of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of December 30, 2021 (State Budget for the 2022 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2022-2024 Triennium) and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of Presidential Decree No. 917 of December 22, 1986 (Approval of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes), insofar as they fail to provide for "the exemption from IRAP [Regional Tax on Productive Activities] of associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of notarial activities."

2.– The referring judge states that the applicant notarial professional association had submitted a refund claim, pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree No. 546 of December 31, 1992 (Provisions on tax litigation implementing the Government delegation set forth in Article 30 of Law No. 413 of December 30, 1991), regarding the regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) paid for the year 2022, on the grounds that it was exempt pursuant to the aforementioned Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021, which provides that the said tax "is not owed by natural persons engaging in commercial activities and those engaging in arts and professions referred to in letters b) and c) of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the same Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997."

The said association subsequently challenged the constructive refusal (silence-rejection) of the Revenue Agency, arguing that the notarial professional activity, even if performed in an associated form, invariably retains a personal character because it involves the exercise of a public function; consequently, the professional association should be exempt from IRAP in the same manner as individual natural persons practicing the same profession.

3.– The Tax Court observes, conversely, that the assimilation—"for income tax purposes"—of "associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of arts and professions" to simple partnerships, pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, applies equally to associations among notaries, "given the breadth of the definition," thereby entailing their subjection to IRAP, given that simple partnerships are subject thereto pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 446 of December 15, 1997 (Establishment of the regional tax on productive activities, revision of personal income tax brackets, rates, and deductions, establishment of a regional surcharge thereon, and reorganization of local taxation rules).

Applying the provision thus interpreted, the appeal should therefore be dismissed; hence the relevance of the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021 and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes.

4.– Regarding the non-frivolous nature of the claims, the referring judge observes that professional associations are governed by Law No. 1815 of November 23, 1939 (Legal regulation of assistance and consultancy practices), constitute independent centers of legal relations pursuant to Article 36 of the Civil Code, lack legal personality, and do not derogate from the principle of the personal nature of professional performance enshrined in Article 2232 of the Civil Code.

Still according to the referring judge, "the reference of the performance and activity to the individual professional, already inferable from the regulations governing professional associations, is even more evident and mandatory with reference to the exercise of the notarial function," which "assumes the characteristics of a public function that by law cannot be exercised in a corporate form." Article 82, paragraph 1, of Law No. 89 of February 16, 1913 (Regulation of the Notariat and Notarial Archives) permits associations of notaries solely "to pool, in whole or in part, the proceeds of their functions and subsequently distribute them, in whole or in part, in equal or unequal shares"; thereby attributing to them "an exclusively internal dimension [...], which affects neither the relationship with clients nor the exercise of the activity and the public function, to a much more marked extent than occurs for other professional associations."

The notarial activity performed by a notary within a professional association "always and in any event remains attributable to the natural person, never to the association" and is therefore comparable to that performed by a notary on an individual basis, which is excluded from IRAP.

In the referring judge's opinion, this creates a differentiation between "two entirely comparable situations: notarial activity performed outside a professional association and that performed within the scope of a professional association." These situations would be comparable as to "nature, [...] regulatory modalities of performance and liability, as well as the attribution of the exercise and the result of the activity in any event to the individual notary." This results in a violation of the "principle of equality set forth in Articles 3 and 53, paragraph 1, of the Constitution."

5.– The questions would also be non-frivolously founded with reference to Article 41 of the Constitution, inasmuch as "the IRAP taxation of professional activity performed in an associated form" would impact "the free exercise of economic activity," disfavoring and thereby disincentivizing professional aggregations.

6.– Finally, in the referring court's opinion, the questions should be limited solely to notarial associations, both because they "present peculiar aspects" and because the main proceedings were initiated by a notarial association.

7.– Studio notarile G.-V. and individual notaries V. G. and C. V., applicants in the main proceedings, have entered an appearance and requested that the questions be declared well-founded.

In the view of the parties' defense, the questions are relevant because, if upheld, the professional association would not be subject to IRAP and, consequently, its claim for an order against the Revenue Agency for the refund of the tax paid for 2022 should be granted.

8.– On the point of the non-frivolous nature of the claims, the parties observe that Article 2, paragraph 1, final period, of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997, according to which "activity carried on by companies and entities, including organs and administrations of the State, in any event constitutes a taxable event," refers to "all collective entities, regardless of whether their activity is economic or non-economic, commercial or non-commercial," and presumes that their activity is always relevant for tax purposes, considering the "super-individual and impersonal dimension" of the collective entity to be decisive, rather than its "material organizational structure."

With Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021, according to which IRAP "is not owed by natural persons engaging in commercial activities and engaging in arts and professions," the legislature "affected the taxable event in a similar manner (but with opposite effects)," meaning that it attributed "exclusive relevance to the subjective element while devaluing the material/quantitative one."

The current system would thus provide for "two 'equal and opposite' normative qualifications": natural persons would never be capable of realizing the taxable event and their activity could never be defined as autonomously organized; whereas for companies and entities, the taxable event would materialize in any event, as they are subjects presumed capable of expressing autonomous organization.

The "different definition of the taxable event (and of autonomous organization) as a function of the subjective variable (i.e., the subject—natural person or company/entity—to whom the activity is attributable)" finds justification in the "structural difference between the two types of subjects."

Companies and entities are characterized by a "normative dimension of organization" and a "depersonalization" of the activity, "attributable [...] to the collective structure and not to individual natural persons operating within the entity." Such characteristics do not subsist, however, "with reference to activity performed by a natural person."

Although the legislature said nothing regarding professional associations—the parties' defense continues—the Revenue Agency (Circular No. 4/E of February 18, 2022, entitled "Article 1, paragraphs 2 to 8, of Law No. 30 December 2021, n. 234 (2022 Budget Law) – Personal Income Tax (Irpef) Taxation and Exclusion from IRAP") and case law of the supreme court (referring to Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgment No. 7291 of April 13, 2016) have held that, by virtue of their assimilation to simple partnerships pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, they must be included within the presumption set forth in Article 2, paragraph 1, final period, of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997 for companies and entities and, consequently, be subjected to IRAP. However, "the legislative/interpretative option of deeming professional associations to realize the taxable event under the same terms as companies and entities highlights a clear violation of Articles 3 and 53, paragraph 1, of the Constitution." This would apply, in particular, to notarial associations, where the professional activity and the results thereof are attributable to individual notaries as natural persons, rather than to a collective and impersonal entity, as clarified by supreme court case law and notarial law. Moreover, "the specificity of the notarial association [...] is based on the peculiar characteristics of the notary's role within the legal system," the activity of which cannot be exercised in a corporate form since it "represents a public function, and as such is always and solely traceable back to the notary as a natural person," "documented by Notarial Repertories, [which refer] only to individual notaries" and subject to "particularly incisive public control over the correct exercise of the function." The notarial association thus resolves itself "into a contractual module for professional activities directly performed by natural persons," which "can never be termed 'common' nor can it be attributed [...] to an 'entity' different from the individual [notaries]."

9.– That having been premised, "the choice (legislative and interpretative) to confine the exclusion set forth in Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234/2021 solely to natural persons who do not perform their activity within the scope of a professional association" would be unreasonable, as is "the assimilation between professional associations and simple partnerships" deriving from the combined provisions of Articles 3, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997 and 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes.

In particular, the violation of the principle of tax equality set forth in Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution emerges both because different situations are treated in a similar manner—professional activities performed in an associative context are assimilated to the activities of companies and entities—and because analogous situations are treated differently—notarial activity performed on an individual basis, which is excluded from taxation, and that exercised in an associated form, which is subject thereto.

Finally, the censured provisions would also infringe Article 41 of the Constitution because they incentivize "professionals to dissolve associations in order to practice individually to achieve tax savings."

10.– In view of the public hearing, the National Council of the Notariat submitted a written opinion as an amicus curiae, admitted by presidential decree of May 4, 2026, arguing that the raised questions are well-founded.

In particular, it was highlighted how notaries "under no circumstances may constitute associations 'for the associated practice' of the function/profession of notary and [...] the association among notaries, although permitted by law in a completely peculiar form, cannot in any way be assimilated to simple partnerships."

Indeed, Article 82 of the Notarial Law permits associations among notaries solely "to pool, in whole or in part, the proceeds of their functions and subsequently distribute them, in whole or in part, in equal or unequal shares, but such freedom of association in no case relates to the 'pooling' of the activity."

In the case of the notarial association, therefore, the prerequisite for taxation—namely, the associated practice of the profession—is lacking, because the notarial profession, which constitutes a public function, is practiced on an individual basis, remaining at all times attributable to the individual natural person and not to the professional association. It would therefore be unreasonable "to subject to IRAP a notary who has entered into an association," thereby creating "a dangerous equality between companies and notarial associations."

Furthermore, "by imposing IRAP on associated notaries, but not on those who are not part of any association," a "discrimination would be created between notaries who, while all performing the exact same activity, would be subjected or not subjected to a tax by virtue of an associative choice that, at that point, would become more complex to adopt."

CONSIDERATO IN DIRITTO (The Law)

11.– By the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. No. 254 of 2025), the First-Instance Tax Court of Florence, Section 1, challenges, with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 41 of the Constitution, the constitutional legitimacy of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021 and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes.

In particular—the referring court observes—the censured Article 1, paragraph 8, provided that, starting from the 2022 tax period, IRAP is not owed by natural persons engaging in commercial, artistic, and professional activities referred to in letters b) and c) of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997.

The aforesaid exclusion provision does not apply—as also clarified by the Revenue Agency in Circular 4/E/2022—to "associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of arts or professions," which would consequently continue to be subject to the tax.

Indeed, Article 3, paragraph 2, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997, in identifying tax-liable subjects, includes "simple partnerships and those assimilated thereto pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 3," of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes "engaging in arts and professions" provided for by Article 53, paragraph 1, of the same consolidated text. The aforementioned Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), in turn, provides that "associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of arts and professions are assimilated to simple partnerships."

In the referring judge's opinion, the assimilation of professional associations to simple partnerships, pursuant to the cited Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, applies equally to associations of notaries, "given the breadth of the definition," and entails their subjection to IRAP.

That having been premised, the referring court complains that the censured provisions, insofar as they fail to provide for "the exemption from IRAP of associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of notarial activity," violate the principle of tax equality set forth in Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution.

Indeed, they would differentiate between "two entirely comparable situations: notarial activity performed outside a professional association and that performed within the scope of a professional association," as regards "nature, [...] regulatory modalities of performance and liability, as well as the attribution of the exercise and result in any event to the individual notary."

The censured provisions would also conflict with Article 41 of the Constitution, inasmuch as "the IRAP taxation of professional activity performed in an associated form" would impact "the free exercise of economic activity," disfavoring and thereby disincentivizing professional aggregations.

12.– It is appropriate to briefly reconstruct the relevant regulatory and case-law framework.

12.1.– As already noted by this Court, IRAP—"which was introduced into the legal system at the time to increase the financial autonomy of the regions, replacing five pre-existing and diverse forms of levy”—finds "its specific justification in the manifestation of a productive capacity deriving from the power of organization and coordination of the factors of production" (Judgment No. 21 of 2024).

Through it, the legislature "identified as a new index of contributory capacity, different from those used for the purposes of any other tax, the added value produced by autonomously organized activities," which "is nothing other than the new wealth created by the individual productive unit, which is subjected to taxation via IRAP even before it is distributed to remunerate the various factors of production, transforming into income for the organizer of the activity, its financiers, its employees, and collaborators" (Judgment No. 156 of 2001; similarly, most recently, Judgments No. 171 and No. 21 of 2024).

Indeed, "the prerequisite of IRAP has been identified in the habitual exercise of an autonomously organized activity directed toward the production or exchange of goods or the rendering of services, as well as, in any event, in the activity carried on by companies and entities, including organs and administrations of the State (Article 2, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997)" (Judgment No. 12 of 2022).

Article 2, paragraph 1, final period, of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997 specifies, as mentioned, that "the activity carried on by companies and entities, including organs and administrations of the State, in any event constitutes a taxable event." Therefore, for companies and entities, the organizational requirement is deemed configured ex lege, with the effect that the tax is always owed.

With reference to the taxpayers subject to the tax, Article 3, paragraph 2, letter c), of the same decree identifies, among others, "natural persons, simple partnerships, and those assimilated thereto pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 3, of the [...] Consolidated Text [of Income Taxes] engaging in arts and professions referred to in Article 49, paragraph 1, [now, Article 53, paragraph 1] of the same consolidated text."

As regards professional associations, however, the IRAP law makes no mention of them, but Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, to which the aforementioned Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997 refers, provides, as a general rule for income tax purposes, the assimilation between "associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of arts and professions [and] simple partnerships," with the consequence that the former are also subject to IRAP.

In this regard, supreme court case law holds that the activity performed by professional associations also "constitutes ex lege, in any event, a taxable event, thereby excluding the need for any assessment regarding the existence of autonomous organization" (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgments No. 7371 and No. 7291 of April 14, 2016; in the same sense, ex multis, Tax Section, Judgments No. 15203 of June 4, 2019, and No. 3622 of February 7, 2019, as well as Orders No. 30873 of November 26, 2019, No. 26848 of October 21, 2019, and No. 12763 of May 19, 2017).

The same case law affirms, however, the "exclusion from IRAP of [...] professional associations and associated practices" engaging in self-employed work, when it is demonstrated "that no productive activity is exercised in an associated form" (Court of Cassation, Tax Section, Orders No. 13129 of April 27, 2022, and No. 39578 of December 13, 2021).

Professional associations may therefore escape the payment of IRAP not by proving "the non-existence of autonomous organization in the associated practice of the activity," which, according to case law constituting living law, is implicit therein, "but rather the non-existence of the associated practice of the activity itself" (Cass., United Civil Sections, No. 7371 of 2016).

12.2.– It must also be recalled that, "as a result of numerous regulatory amendments that have stratified over time upon the original framework, the rules concerning the determination of the taxable base of individual activity sectors and the nature of taxable subjects have developed in a highly articulated and complex manner, characterized by 'particular regimes, specifically identified by the legislature by reason of different activities' (Judgment No. 12 of 2022)" (Judgment No. 21 of 2024).

For what is relevant here, Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021 provided that, starting from the 2022 tax period, IRAP is not owed by natural persons engaging in commercial, artistic, or professional activities, thereby inserting itself into that "trend toward the progressive hollowed-out reduction of such tax" already highlighted by this Court (again, Judgment No. 21 of 2024).

The legislative intervention, as clearly emerges from the preparatory works, pursues the rationale—in addition to reducing the tax burden in favor of such subjects—of simplifying the application of the tax.

Indeed, since Judgment No. 156 of 2001, this Court has excluded that the "organizational element" is inherently connate to "self-employed work, even if performed with a character of habituality, in the sense that it is possible to hypothesize a professional activity performed in the absence of an organization of capital or third-party labor," with the consequence that, in such a case, "the very prerequisite of the tax will be lacking."

By operating a negative delimitation of the scope of application of the tax through a reconnaissance of taxpayers, Law No. 234 of 2021 thus eliminated the need to verify, on a case-by-case basis, whether the organizational structure utilized by the professional is such as to justify taxation, overcoming relative application uncertainties. Indeed, economic activity is never capable of realizing the taxable event if it is attributable to a natural person, who cannot (any longer) assume the role of a taxpayer subject thereto.

In short, the censured Article 1, paragraph 8, limited passive tax liability for IRAP solely to entities other than natural persons, operating a distinction based on the form in which the activity is performed—individual or collective—regardless of the presence of the autonomous organization requirement.

13.– That having been premised, the questions raised by the First-Instance Tax Court of Florence are unfounded for the following reasons.

The referring judge proceeds from the interpretative assumption that the combined provisions of the censured rules would exclude from the scope of application of IRAP "natural persons" engaging in professional activity and not "associations" formed between them, regardless of the associated practice of the same activity. This would also apply to professional associations formed among notaries pursuant to Article 82 of the Notarial Law, which would consequently remain subject to the tax at all times.

Such an assumption is erroneous.

It has already been highlighted that, pursuant to Articles 3, paragraph 2, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 446 of 1997 and 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, to which the former refers, "associations without legal personality formed between natural persons for the associated practice of arts and professions" are also taxpayers subject to IRAP.

As emerges from the wording of the provision, which refers to the "associated practice" of arts and professions, however—for the purpose of assimilating such associations to simple partnerships and, therefore, of configuring them as tax subjects, distinct and autonomous from the natural persons composing them—it is not sufficient that a professional association (or associated practice, so to speak) be present; rather, it is necessary that, within its scope, the professional activity be carried on in common, i.e., precisely "in associated form" by the professionals belonging to it.

Conversely, as clarified by supreme court case law (cited in point 12.1.), if the professional activity is performed personally, individually, and autonomously by the individual professionals, this prevails over the chosen associative form, and the tax does not apply. In such a case, indeed, the said activity, although performed within the scope of an associated practice, is attributable not to the association, but to the natural persons constituting the associative bond. Natural persons who, as clarified, are excluded from the application of the tax precisely by virtue of the censured Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021.

With the introduction of this provision, indeed, it is rendered even more evident that the qualifying aspect in the application of the tax has become functional autonomy in the exercise of professional activity: the tax comes into play only if there is a phenomenon of "depersonalization" of said activity, such as to render it directly ascribable to the collective entity. This means that—differently from what occurs in companies or entities—in professional associations such a "depersonalization" phenomenon does not always occur, because it is entirely possible that the association does not practice professional activity on its own account, but exhausts its function for purely internal organizational or economic purposes proper to the association itself. Consider, for example, the hypothesis in which individual professionals perform their professional activity individually and separately, and the association is constituted for the sole purpose of regulating legal relations not strictly professional, albeit instrumental to the practice of the profession: such as the sharing of expenses and proceeds, the rental of an office, the purchase of capital goods, or the regulation of the services of auxiliary personnel.

It is for this reason that the legislature, in defining IRAP tax liability and establishing the assimilation between professional associations and simple partnerships, attributed relevance to the form—individual or associated—in which the professional activity is practiced. It follows that, where the profession is practiced in an individual form, the tax is not owed in any event, regardless of whether or not an autonomous organization subsists. Therefore, if "the individual professionals have concretely practiced the professional activity in an autonomous and non-associated manner," the tax is excluded, and cannot be applied "on the basis of the mere existence of the Associated Practice" (Cass., Order No. 39578 of 2021).

14.– The opposite interpretation would end up conflicting with the parameters invoked by the referring judge, with the consequence that the interpretation set forth herein finds confirmation in a constitutionally oriented reading of the provisions, capable of rendering their normative wording compliant, in particular, with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, ensuring that the performance of professional activity—when devoid of the aforesaid connotation of "associated form"—is indifferent, for the purpose of equal exclusion from the tax, both for the individual professional and for the professional association.

Indeed, it is evident that an assimilation between professional associations and companies, even where the mandate is conferred upon the individual professional and the professional activity is performed individually and autonomously by the natural person, would end up conflicting with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, differentiating equal situations without adequate justifications, as well as with Article 41 of the Constitution, representing a disincentive to the choice of association impacting the freedom of private economic initiative.

15.– The preceding considerations cannot fail to have an impact on the evidentiary plane.

Indeed, given that professional activity is performed, as a rule, individually and that certain activities are reserved by respective professional laws to the individual professional understood as a natural person, the legislature, in Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, provided for a requirement of assimilation between companies and professional associations. This requirement consists in the "associated practice" of the profession, and the financial administration bears the burden of proving its existence in order to apply the assimilation.

This, obviously, must not legitimize evasive conduct on the part of the taxpayer, in the perspective of loyal cooperation between the financial administration and the private party—which, as this Court has had occasion to note (Judgment No. 137 of 2025), finds justification, in the constitutional conception, in the *pactum unionis* (rather than in the *pactum subiectionis*), underlying the tax duty. Such loyal cooperation is incumbent both upon the financial administration (in terms, for example, of duties of information, respect for adversarial proceedings, or statement of reasons) and upon the taxpayer (who has, inter alia, the duty to provide complete and truthful information in tax returns, to respond promptly and correctly to requests for clarification or documentation from the financial administration, and to avoid evasive or fraudulent behaviors that might impede the correct functioning of the fiscal system).

These principles are also essential to regulate the hypothesis in which, within the scope of the same association, the professional activity is performed by the "associated" professionals partly in an individual manner and partly in an associated form. In such a case, the income of "exclusive derivation from the professional work performed by the individual associates," i.e., "generated solely by their personal work" (Cass., Order No. 13129 of 2022), shall not be subjected to IRAP, provided it is adequately separated from that produced by other activities carried out by availing oneself of the organization of the professional association.

16.– On the basis of the foregoing considerations, notarial associations—which form the subject of the present questions and are relevant in the main proceedings—lack, as a rule, the requirement of the effective associated practice of the relative activity and, therefore, do not constitute a tax subject distinct from the individual associated notaries.

Indeed, the activity of the notary, although classifiable among the liberal professions, displays the characteristics of a public function—such as third-party neutrality, mandatory nature of ministry, legality control, specific territorial competence, duty of assistance at the seat—which attribute to it a markedly personal character. As a rule, therefore, the association of notaries, constituted pursuant to Article 82 of the Notarial Law, lacks "structural and functional autonomy of its own" (Court of Cassation, Labor Section, Order No. 32248 of November 21, 2023) and has instead a "merely internal significance (Cass., March 12, 1987, No. 2555), relating to a modality of distribution of fees, without any interference with the notarial activity, which remains strictly personal" (Court of Cassation, Labor Section, Judgments No. 10354 of October 21, 1997, and, in the same sense, No. 1933 of March 5, 1997).

17.– In light of the preceding considerations, the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of 2021 and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes, raised with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 41 of the Constitution, must be declared unfounded in the terms set forth in the grounds, inasmuch as an interpretive reading capable of harmonizing them with the invoked constitutional parameters is possible.

ON THOSE GROUNDS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares unfounded, in the terms set forth in the grounds, the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the combined provisions of Article 1, paragraph 8, of Law No. 234 of December 30, 2021 (State Budget for the 2022 Financial Year and Multi-Year Budget for the 2022-2024 Triennium) and Article 5, paragraph 3, letter c), of Presidential Decree No. 917 of December 22, 1986 (Approval ofalities of the Consolidated Text of Income Taxes), raised with reference to Articles 3, 53, and 41 of the Constitution by the First-Instance Tax Court of Florence, Section 1, by means of the order indicated in the heading.

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on July 8, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco Saverio MARINI, Rapporteur

Valeria EMMA, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on July 24, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms in text to the original