JUDGMENT NO. 141

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of December 23, 2000, laying down «Provisions for the formulation of the annual and multiannual state budget (Finance Law 2001)», brought by the Court of Cassation, Labour Section, in the proceedings between the National Social Security Institute (INPS) and V. M., by means of the order of March 8, 2023, registered under no. 82 of the register of orders 2023 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 26, 1st special series, of the year 2023.

Having regard to the appearance in the proceedings of V. M. and INPS;

having heard at the public hearing of June 24, 2026, the Judge Rapporteur Maria Rosaria San Giorgio;

having heard counsel Alberto Guariso for V. M. and Mauro Sferrazza for INPS;

having deliberated in chambers on June 24, 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto (Summary of the Facts)

1.– By order of March 8, 2023, registered under no. 82 Reg. Ord. of 2023, the Court of Cassation, Labour Section, raised questions as to the constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of December 23, 2000, laying down «Provisions for the formulation of the annual and multiannual state budget (Finance Law 2001)», with reference to Articles 3, 11, 38, first paragraph, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution – the latter in relation to Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive (EU) 2011/98 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 13, 2011, on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State –, «insofar as it makes the payment of the social allowance to non-EU citizens conditional upon the possession of the (former) residence permit [carta di soggiorno]».

The referring court reported that it was called upon to rule on the appeal brought by the National Social Security Institute (INPS) for the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Florence which, reforming the first-instance ruling, had upheld the claim for recognition of the social allowance referred to in Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of August 8, 1995 (Reform of the compulsory and complementary pension system) brought by V. M., an Albanian citizen lacking a long-term residence permit.

The appellate judges had indeed held that Article 20, paragraph 10, of Decree-Law No. 112 of June 25, 2008 (Urgent provisions for economic development, simplification, competitiveness, stabilization of public finance, and tax equalization), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 133 of August 6, 2008, by making the recognition of the social allowance conditional upon the continuous stay of the entitled person for at least ten years in the national territory, had implicitly repealed the requirement – provided for by Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 – of holding a residence card (now the EU long-term residence permit).

The judge a quo, on the basis of its own previous rulings, holds instead that the aforementioned Article 20, paragraph 10, of Decree-Law No. 112 of 2008, as converted, requires an additional requirement, rather than a substitute one, compared to the requirement of holding a long-term residence permit provided for by the censured provision.

The referring court nevertheless intended to ascertain whether the contested judgment could be upheld on the basis of the argument, raised by the respondent also in the appellate proceedings, according to which the provision making the recognition of the economic benefit in question conditional upon the possession of the aforementioned requirement is incompatible with the principle of equal treatment in the field of social security set forth in Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/UE.

In this regard, the judge a quo recalled that this Court, by judgment No. 50 of 2019, has already scrutinized Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000, ruling out its unconstitutionality also with reference to the aforementioned directive, on the assumption that it, «for the purpose of equating non-EU foreign citizens to Italian citizens, refers to Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 [...] on the coordination of social security systems, which mandates equal treatment between foreign workers and citizens of the host European State as regards the social security sector, the position of workers not being under consideration here».

The referring court nevertheless observed that the Court of Justice of the European Union, seized by way of a preliminary reference ordered by this Court with order No. 182 of 2020, in the Grand Chamber judgment of September 2, 2021, Case C-350/20, O. D. and Others, held that the aforementioned Article 12, paragraph 1, of Directive 2011/98/EU applies both to third-country nationals who have been admitted to a Member State for employment purposes and to those admitted for other purposes who are permitted to work and who hold a residence permit pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 of June 13, 2002, laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals.

The aforementioned judgment – the judge a quo recalled – also reiterated that the principle of equal treatment enshrined by the said directive concerns benefits falling within the social security sectors defined by Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004, on the coordination of social security systems, referred to in letter (e) of paragraph 1 of the aforementioned Article 12.

The referring court therefore noted that Article 3, paragraph 3, of that regulation specifies that its rules apply not only to the social security sectors enumerated in paragraph 1 above, but also to special non-contributory cash benefits referred to in Article 70 of the same regulation, and therefore also to those benefits which are intended to provide supplementary, substitute, or accessory cover for the risks corresponding to the social security sectors referred to in the aforementioned Article 3, paragraph 1, and to guarantee persons concerned a minimum subsistence income in relation to the economic and social context of the Member State concerned, for which financing derives exclusively from compulsory taxation intended to cover general public expenditure, without any contribution from the beneficiary, which benefits «are listed in Annex X» to the same regulation.

The judge a quo added that this Annex, as regards Italy, under letter (g), contemplates the social allowance referred to in Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995, which «from the perspective of Union law proves to be, therefore, a "special non-contributory cash benefit”, aimed at providing supplementary cover against the risk of old age (Article 3(1)(d) of the cited regulation) through the disbursement of a minimum subsistence income charged to public expenditure».

All of which being premised, the Court of Cassation deemed that the question of the constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 must be raised anew, given that the Court of Justice of the EU has clarified that the principle of equal treatment in access to benefits under Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 does not concern solely holders of a single work permit, but applies equally to holders of a residence permit for purposes other than employment who are authorized to work in the host Member State.

The referring court further observed that the reference made by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU to Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 must not be limited solely to the sectors referred to in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the same regulation, as it also refers to the benefits indicated in the subsequent paragraph 3, among which the social allowance must be counted.

A restrictive reading would indeed not be consistent with the wording of the provision in question, «given that paragraph 3 still aims to provide cover "in a complementary, substitute or accessory manner for the risks corresponding to the social security sectors referred to in Article 3, paragraph 1” and, above all, has not been endorsed by the Court of Justice of the European Union» (reference is made to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of June 21, 2017, Case C-449/16, Martinez Silva, and Case C-350/20, O. D. and Others).

In the most recently cited judgment – the judge a quo observed – the Court of Justice of the EU stated that the right to equal treatment in the field of social security, defined in its essential contents by Directive 2011/98/EU, «gives concrete expression to the right of access to social security benefits set out in Article 34(1) and (2) of the Charter».

The referring order then cited judgment No. 54 of 2022, by which this Court clarified that the principle of equal treatment in the field of social security, in the terms outlined by Article 34 of the CFREU and secondary law, is linked to the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution and «corroborates and illuminates their axiological content, with the aim of promoting a broader and more effective integration of third-country nationals».

The referring order therefore noted that, notwithstanding that this Court, with judgment No. 50 of 2019, scrutinized the present question for conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, declaring it not unfounded, the constitutional obligation to grant the social allowance to a foreigner lacking a long-term residence permit could be grounded upon the «recognized axiological interpenetration of the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution and Article 34 of the CFREU» as well as upon the different interpretation of Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU provided by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

In the opinion of the judge a quo, the censured norm would also conflict with Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, «there being no doubt as to the close correlation existing between it and Article 34 of the CFREU, which, in enshrining the right to social assistance and housing assistance, aims to "ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources” (CJEU, April 24, 2012, C-571/10)».

Lastly, the Court of Cassation, considering that in this case there is an instance of so-called double preliminary reference [doppia pregiudizialità] – since the norm subjected to review conflicts both with Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, and with Article 34 of the CFREU and Article 12 of the cited Directive 2011/98/EU – on the basis of this Court’s judgment No. 269 of 2017, intended to prioritize «first and foremost» the question of the constitutional legitimacy of the censured provision also with reference to Articles 11 and 117 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 34 of the CFREU and 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU.

2.– INPS, a party in the proceedings a quo, entered an appearance, requesting that the questions raised be declared inadmissible or, in any event, not unfounded.

The Institute preliminarily objected that the referring court had failed to consider its defensive argument according to which the EU residence permit for family reasons, on the strength of which the respondent in the main proceedings entered Italy in 2006, presumes that the family member with whom reunification took place receives sufficient income to maintain the person concerned as well.

The judge a quo furthermore failed to adequately state the grounds for the objections raised, having failed, in particular, to clarify what would be, with reference to the social allowance, «the aims directed at remedying serious situations of urgency, such as to require its disbursement without any temporal discrimination of stable and lasting permanence in the country intended to disburse the benefit».

On the merits, INPS observed that, on the one hand, the social allowance, as a welfare benefit intended to last over time, is necessarily linked to the holding of a long-term permit and, on the other hand, it is not subject to the principle of equal treatment set forth by Directive 2011/98/EU, so that the differentiated rules provided for non-EU citizens «do not automatically entail a violation of Articles 14 and 34 ECHR [recte: Articles 14 ECHR and 34 CFREU]», Member States possessing a certain margin of discretion in differentiating access to the benefit in consideration of its aims, as well as the limitation of available financial resources.

The Institute also recalled that constitutional case law itself has clarified that, within the limits permitted by Article 11 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of November 25, 2003, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, the legislature may reserve certain welfare benefits solely to citizens and persons residing in Italy equated to them, whose status is in itself capable of generating an adequate link between participation in the political, economic, and social organization of the Republic and the disbursement of the welfare provision.

In support of this proposition, INPS cited this Court’s judgment No. 50 of 2019, insofar as it highlighted that «the Constitution mandates preserving equality in access to social assistance between Italian and EU citizens on the one hand, and non-EU citizens on the other, only with regard to services and benefits which, in satisfying "a primary need of the individual that does not tolerate a distinction correlated to territorial rootedness” (judgment No. 222 of 2013), reflect the enjoyment of inviolable rights of the person».

The party then emphasized that the Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, judgment of November 14, 2014, Case C-333/13, Dano and Others, clarified that non-contributory cash benefits fall among the assistance schemes established by public authorities at the national level, to which a person who does not have sufficient economic resources to meet their own basic needs and those of their family and who risks becoming a burden on the public finances of the host State may have recourse. Although social assistance benefits may, in theory, fall among the social security benefits of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, equal access to them would concern only «permanent residents, whereas for short-term residents, if inactive, the grant of the benefit is and remains a purely discretionary measure».

INPS also recalled the rulings of the CJEU in which it was reiterated that recognizing to Union citizens who do not benefit from a right of residence under Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, the possibility of enjoying social assistance benefits on the same basis as those of the host Member State would allow economically inactive Union citizens to use the social protection system of that State to finance their own sustenance.

It would therefore be paradoxical, according to INPS, to admit limitations on long-term social benefits for family members of European citizens who do not hold a permit intended to last over time, and then to allow family members of non-EU workers to access long-term benefits intended to remedy the risk of poverty.

The declaration of unconstitutionality of the censured provision would moreover generate considerable financial burdens of difficult quantification for the Italian State, obliging it, like other European States, to issue to the foreigner a residence permit for elective residency – because the applicant himself had become the holder of a benefit granted by the same State – «in open violation of the public policy regulations in force in Italy and referred to in the Consolidated Text [Testo Unico]».

3.– V. M., a party in the proceedings a quo, also entered an appearance, requesting, principally, that the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy be declared inadmissible on the ground that the incidental proceedings should be settled – like those of this Court’s judgment No. 67 of 2022 – by recognizing the «power/duty of the referring judge to give direct application to the obligation of equal treatment which that same judge has identified in secondary law».

In the alternative, subject to a potential preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the party requested that the censured provision be declared unconstitutionally illegitimate insofar as it makes the payment of the social allowance to non-EU citizens conditional upon the possession of the (former) residence card.

3.1.– Ahead of the public hearing of June 10, 2024, the parties filed supplementary briefs.

INPS highlighted that the referring order introduces no new arguments compared to those already evaluated by this Court in judgment No. 50 of 2019.

The present questions of constitutional legitimacy, having been reproposed in the same terms as those scrutinized at that time, should therefore be declared manifestly unfounded.

V. M. replied to the defenses of INPS and further developed the arguments put forward in support of the conclusions taken in the appearance brief.

4.– By order No. 29 of 2024, this Court submitted the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union: «whether Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive (EU) 2011/98 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 13, 2011, on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, as a concrete expression of the protection of the right of access to social security benefits recognized by Article 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that its scope includes a provision such as the social allowance pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of August 8, 1995 (Reform of the compulsory and complementary pension system), and whether, therefore, Union law precludes national legislation which does not extend the aforementioned provision to foreign nationals who are holders of the single permit under that directive, already recognized to foreign nationals on condition that they hold an EU long-term residence permit».

4.1.– The CJEU, First Chamber, by judgment of March 5, 2026, Case C-151/24, Luevi, answered the aforementioned preliminary question by ruling that «[a]rticle 12, paragraph 1, point (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 13, 2011, on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, must be interpreted as meaning that: it does not apply to a special non-contributory cash benefit within the meaning of Article 70 of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004, on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 988/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 16, 2009, and, therefore, it does not preclude national legislation which makes the grant, to third-country nationals referred to in Article 3, paragraph 1, points (b) and (c), of that directive, of such a benefit in the form of a social allowance intended for persons over 65 years of age (from January 1, 2019, over 67 years of age) who are in a disadvantaged economic situation and whose work capacity is limited due to their age, conditional upon the possession of an EU long-term residence permit».

5.– The questions of constitutional legitimacy have therefore returned for examination by this Court, which fixed the public hearing of June 24, 2026, for the continuation of the proceedings.

5.1.– Ahead of that public hearing, INPS filed a further supplementary brief in which it reiterated the conclusions set out in its previous defensive briefs.

The Institute first noted that the intervention of the CJEU provided an answer to the interpretive questions raised through the preliminary reference, clarifying that Union law does not preclude the censured provision, which makes the social allowance conditional upon the applicant foreigner holding a long-term residence permit.

From this it follows, in the opinion of INPS, that the denounced conflict of the censured norm with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution – in relation to the principle of equal treatment under Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU, and Article 34 of the CFREU – ceases to exist.

According to the Institute, the objections alleging the violation of Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution are likewise unfounded.

In support of this proposition, the party argues that, as clarified by this Court in the aforementioned judgment No. 50 of 2019, the social allowance is not aimed at satisfying a primary need of the individual, i.e., a requirement linked to the very survival of the subject or relating to the protection of the right to health or sustenance in the event of disability.

Yet, only for benefits aimed at addressing the aforementioned needs would the discriminatory element based on citizenship conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution and the very prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR.

The Institute recalls that, from this perspective, the cited judgment No. 50 of 2019 declared not unfounded the question of constitutional legitimacy of the very provision now under review with reference to Articles 3, 38, 10 (first and second paragraphs), and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter two in relation to the aforementioned conventional provision.

5.2.– In the imminence of the public hearing, V. M. also filed a further supplementary brief.

The private party observed that the Court of Cassation, although focusing mainly on the compatibility of the censured rules with Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU – i.e., the question upon which the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled by excluding the hypothesized conflict with the principle of equal treatment in social security – also evoked Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, so that the violation of those parameters must be independently examined, since «not everything that is permitted by secondary law is for that very reason compatible» with the aforementioned constitutional precepts.

The judge a quo, discerning an instance of double preliminary reference in the case under review, considered the denounced violations distinctly.

Confirmation of this is to be found in the conclusions submitted by the Advocate General in the proceedings pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, which, while agreeing with the decision subsequently adopted by the Court of Justice, contain the clarification that «the competent national authorities in the field of social assistance are required to verify that a refusal to grant such benefits does not expose such citizens, who do not have resources to meet their basic needs, to a concrete and current risk of violation of their fundamental rights, in particular that enshrined in Article 1 of the CFREU».

In the party's opinion, this observation, although not expressly considered by the CJEU, could be «usefully taken up here», since respect for dignity, which the Advocate General linked to the recognition of a subsidy guaranteeing the vital minimum, receives «autonomous protection» both in Article 1 of the CFREU and in Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

The private party itself declares awareness of the fact that the conformity of the censured norm with the aforementioned constitutional parameters has already been scrutinized in the cited judgment No. 50 of 2019, but expresses the hope that some of the aspects examined therein can be re-evaluated.

To this end, it premises that, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995, the social allowance, unlike other welfare benefits, is granted taking into account the applicant's own income and possibly that of the spouse, without the income condition of other family members, even if cohabiting, being relevant.

The purpose of this legislative choice would be to grant the aforementioned economic benefit «to the elderly person "in their own right”», as recognition of a vital minimum that prescinds from the potential solidarity of other family members, whether cohabiting or not.

In the party's opinion, the provision of the welfare measure in question implements the principle, «implicit in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution», according to which «no elderly person lawfully residing in the national territory and lacking a minimum income can be abandoned in conditions of absolute poverty without the State providing a contribution specifically intended for them, regardless of the behavior and social condition of family members other than the spouse».

Moreover, the amount of the social allowance would in any case be lower than the absolute poverty threshold as determined by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).

Having clarified this, V. M. identifies some of the situations in which a non-EU citizen over 67 years of age and regularly residing in Italy, despite not having accrued the right to a contributory pension because they lack a long-term residence permit, cannot enjoy the social allowance.

The examples given would lead to the assertion that the question posed by the Court of Cassation is, essentially, the following: «whether the condition of a foreign citizen no longer of working age, not occasionally present in the territory (being regularly resident there for over 10 years) to whom the State recognizes the right of residence – as an effect of their past work activity or even modest income of the family unit [...] or as an effect of the prevailing protection assigned to the family bond [...] – who is in conditions of total indigence or in any case below the absolute poverty threshold and who is nevertheless left devoid of the sole support provided by the legal system for such situations, indispensable to guarantee survival and in any case a dignified life; a subsidy which in any case would not allow them to exceed the absolute poverty threshold, but would at least allow them to meet the minimum requirements of dignified survival» is compatible with Articles 3 and 38 of the Constitution.

Ultimately, the censured provision would be incompatible with the evoked constitutional parameters, because, on the one hand, the social allowance fulfills the function of the vital minimum and, on the other hand, Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, «re-read in the light of Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution», could not be referred solely to holders of status civitatis, but should be referred to all persons regularly residing in the national territory in a non-occasional manner and who lack resources ensuring them a dignified life.

The party therefore concluded by requesting that Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 be declared unconstitutionally illegitimate for violation of Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it makes the payment of the social allowance to non-EU citizens conditional upon the possession of a long-term permit, «even in the event that the applicant has an income lower than that determined pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335/1995 and nonetheless has the right to reside under a title other than the long-term permit».

Considerato in diritto (Considerations in Law)

6.– The Court of Cassation, Labour Section, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000, insofar as it makes the payment of the social allowance to non-EU citizens conditional upon the possession of the (former) residence card, now the EU long-term residence permit.

6.1.– In the referring court's opinion, the censured provision would violate, first of all, Articles 11 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 34 of the CFREU and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of the cited directive, as it would be incompatible with the principle of equal treatment in the field of social security enshrined by the cited Directive 2011/98/EU, which gives concrete expression to the right of access to social security benefits recognized by Article 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU.

6.2.– The norm subjected to review would furthermore conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, since the guarantee of equal treatment in the field of social security, as outlined by Article 34 of the CFREU, secondary law, and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is linked to the principles enshrined in the evoked constitutional provision, as it corroborates and illuminates «its axiological content, with the aim of promoting a broader and more effective integration of third-country nationals».

6.3.– In the opinion of the judge a quo, Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution would finally be infringed, given the «close correlation existing between it and Article 34 of the CFREU», which, in recognizing the right to social assistance and housing assistance, aims to guarantee a dignified existence to all those who lack sufficient resources.

7.– The questions raised primarily involve the interpretive question of whether or not the social allowance pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995 is attributable to social security benefits in respect of which third-country nationals equipped with a residence permit for employment purposes, or which in any case permits work, benefit from the equal treatment referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU.

Therefore, by order No. 29 of 2024, this Court promoted a preliminary reference pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, in order to ask the CJEU whether Union law allows a Member State to make the grant to third-country nationals of a welfare benefit such as the social allowance conditional upon the possession of a long-term residence permit.

In response to that question, the CJEU, First Chamber, by judgment of March 5, 2026, Case C-151/24, Luevi, clarified that the principle of equal treatment under Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU does not operate in relation to the social allowance.

This Court is now called upon to draw the necessary conclusions from the answers provided in the preliminary ruling and to take them into account not only in verifying the compatibility of the censured norm with Union parameters, but also in assessing its conformity with Article 3 of the Constitution.

In the referring order, the constitutional principle of equality was indeed evoked by reason of its close connection with the Union guarantee of non-discrimination in social security.

Consequently, the questions concerning the disparity in treatment between citizens and non-EU foreigners in access to the social allowance must be scrutinized from a unitary perspective, considering, that is, Article 3 of the Constitution and the Union parameters as mutually integrating, in line with the request of the judge a quo.

7.1.– Preliminarily, it must be noted that, subsequent to the preliminary reference, Directive 2011/98/EU was repealed and replaced, by means of recast, by Directive (EU) 2024/1233 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 24, 2024, on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, which, according to Article 20 thereof, entered into force on May 20, 2024, with effect, for various provisions including Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e) at issue here, from May 22, 2026.

The new directive has not, however, modified the provisions relevant in the proceedings a quo, but has reproduced them almost verbatim, also retaining their original numbering.

In particular, Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU, taken as a parameter of review in the controversial case, was transposed into Article 12 of Directive 2024/1233/EU.

In any event, the review of constitutional legitimacy must be conducted with reference to the repealed directive as applicable in the main proceedings.

8.– This having been stated, the inadmissibility objections raised by the parties must be preliminarily examined.

8.1.– First, the objection by which INPS laments that the referring court failed to consider that the EU residence permit for family reasons, by virtue of which the respondent in the main proceedings entered Italy, presupposes that the family member who requested reunification receives sufficient income to provide for the sustenance of the reunified person as well, must be dismissed.

In this regard, it is worth recalling that, for the purpose of recognizing the social allowance, the income condition of family members, even if cohabiting, of the applicant is not relevant, with the exception of that of the spouse, which, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995, is taken into account in calculating the applicant's income, to whom, in that event, the welfare provision is recognized up to twice the amount of the social allowance itself as established by law.

Where the reunification concerns the spouse – a situation which, according to what was reported by the private party in the brief filed on June 3, 2026, would apply in the present case –, the minimum income of the requesting foreigner required by Article 29, paragraph 3, letter (b), of Legislative Decree No. 286 of July 25, 1998 (Consolidated Text of provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the condition of foreigners) for the purpose of issuing the residence permit for family reasons in favor of the reunified person is equal to the amount of the social allowance increased by half.

Consequently, such an income requirement does not prevent, ex se, the reunified foreigner from receiving the social allowance, albeit to a reduced extent, within the terms indicated by the cited Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995.

8.2.– Nor is the objection founded which imputes to the referring court a deficient reconstruction of the reference regulatory framework and, in particular, of the regime of special non-contributory cash benefits.

Contrary to what the Institute maintained, the judge a quo took it upon himself to illustrate the hermeneutical premises upon which the constitutional doubt is founded and to reconstruct the reference regulatory framework in an exhaustive manner, also with regard to the special non-contributory cash benefits referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, adducing non-implausible arguments in support of including them within the scope of application of the principle of equal treatment set forth by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU.

8.3.– The arguments advanced by INPS in support of the manifest unfoundedness of the questions furthermore do not merit agreement.

According to the Institute, the referring order introduces no new arguments compared to those already evaluated by this Court in judgment No. 50 of 2019, by which the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 – now under review anew – raised with reference to Articles 3, 38, and 10 (first and second paragraphs) of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 14 of the ECHR, were declared not unfounded.

Differently from what the Institute supposed, the referring order proceeds precisely from the aforementioned 2019 constitutional ruling to emphasize that, in light of the hermeneutical guidance offered by the subsequent case law of the CJEU regarding the scope of the principle of equal treatment expressed by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU, the question «has reason to be posed anew».

The judge a quo indeed censured Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 not only with reference to the constitutional precepts of Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution, already evoked in the proceedings settled with the cited judgment No. 50 of 2019, but also in relation to European-law parameters – Article 34 of the CFREU and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU – which were not scrutinized at that time, but only mentioned in order to exclude their operativity in the controversial case, albeit with a statement not functional to the decisum.

In addition, Articles 3 and 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution themselves are now evoked from a different perspective, the judge a quo having primarily valorized their axiological connection with the principles expressed by Article 34 of the CFREU.

8.4.– Finally, the inadmissibility objection by which the private party argues that the referring court should have given direct application to the principle of equal treatment in social security, enshrined by Directive 2011/98/EU, cannot be accepted.

The Court of Cassation indeed justified the choice to propose the incidental constitutional question on the basis of the finding that the provision subject to censure conflicts, on the one hand, with Article 3 of the Constitution and, on the other hand, with the principle of equal treatment enshrined by Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU, which gives concrete expression to the right of access to social security benefits guaranteed by Article 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU.

As already affirmed by this Court when ordering the preliminary reference, «the direct effect of the primary and secondary law rules evoked by the judge a quo (judgment No. 67 of 2022, as well as CJEU, Case C-350/20, O. D. and Others) does not render the questions inadmissible, since they set forth the conflict between a national statutory provision and rights of the Charter which "intersect to a large extent the principles and rights guaranteed by the Italian Constitution itself” (judgment No. 149 of 2022)» (order No. 29 of 2024, point 2 of Considerations in Law).

Consequently, once the judge has identified the constitutional incident as the «most appropriate remedy, weighing the peculiarities of the case submitted to their examination» (judgment No. 1 of 2025) – on the basis, in this instance, of the evident suitability of a ruling with erga omnes effect to remove the discrimination at its root – this Court may well respond «with the instruments proper to it and which comprise a vast range of decisional techniques» (again, judgment No. 1 of 2025 and order No. 21 of 2025), contributing to ensuring full effectiveness to Union law in an «increasingly integrated» manner (judgments No. 31 and No. 7 of 2025; in the same sense, judgments No. 1 of 2025, No. 181, and No. 15 of 2024), it being necessary to exclude that «centralized constitutional review stands in antithesis with a decentralized mechanism for the implementation of European law» (judgments No. 71 of 2026 and No. 31 of 2025).

8.5.– Conversely, the questions raised with reference to Articles 38, first paragraph, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution – the latter in relation to Article 34, paragraph 3, of the CFREU – must be declared inadmissible ex officio.

Although not specified, it is indeed evident how, in this case, the cited provision of the Charter was evoked not in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2, which guarantee access to social security benefits, but with reference to paragraph 3, according to which «[c]ombating social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices».

In support of such objections, the judge a quo valorizes the «close correlation» between the guarantee enshrined by the first of the cited constitutional provisions and the right to social and housing assistance set forth by the Charter, and cites the Grand Chamber judgment of the CJEU of April 24, 2012, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj.

The referring court itself does not clarify, however, how the connection and mutual completion between Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution and the evoked Union principle could affect the definition of the level of welfare protection guaranteed by the Constitution, thereby inducing this Court to reconsider the orientation already expressed with judgment No. 50 of 2019.

By that ruling, the question of the constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 – insofar as it makes the recognition of the social allowance to the non-EU foreigner conditional upon the possession of a long-term residence permit – was declared not unfounded with reference to Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

9.– Before examining the merits of the remaining questions – which denounce the incompatibility between the selective requirement demanded by the censured norm and the Union guarantee of equal treatment in social security, which, from the perspective of the judge a quo, intersects Article 3 of the Constitution, illuminating its axiological content – it is appropriate to preface a concise reconstruction of the reference regulatory and jurisprudential framework into which the discipline of the social allowance fits.

9.1.– This welfare provision consists of a cash benefit that INPS pays, upon application, to persons over sixty-five years of age (from January 1, 2019, over sixty-seven years of age) who are in disadvantaged economic conditions, as they lack income or perceive it to an extent lower than the threshold established annually by law at the maximum amount of the allowance itself.

The social allowance was introduced by Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995, but part of its discipline is found in the legislation on the social pension [pensione sociale], which constitutes its historical antecedent.

The establishment of the social pension by Article 26 of Law No. 153 of April 30, 1969 (Revision of pension systems and rules on social security) indeed represented the first recognition of universal social protection.

Anchored, in its original wording, solely to demographic and income data, the discipline of the institution was subsequently enriched – first by Article 2 of Law No. 140 of April 15, 1985 (Improvement and equalization of pension treatments and increase of the social pension) and then by Articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 544 of December 29, 1988 (Raising of social treatment levels and pension improvements), which established certain increases – with the textual reference to the «state of need», which confirmed the welfare character of the provision in question.

Subsequently, Article 3 of Law No. 335 of 1995, in paragraph 6, replaced the social pension with the social allowance «with effect from January 1, 1996», but, in paragraph 7, provided for the applicability to the latter of the provisions laid down for the former by Law No. 153 of 1969, «insofar as not otherwise provided».

9.2.– The benefit in question is recognized regardless of whether the beneficiary was a worker and has a «purely welfare» nature (judgment No. 137 of 2021).

The social allowance aims, indeed, exclusively to address the state of need, deriving from indigence, in which persons lacking adequate economic resources find themselves and who, due to old age, suffer a reduction in their working capacities.

It is thus distinguished both from welfare benefits designed to relieve needs caused by severe disability or lack of self-sufficiency of the entitled person (judgments No. 40 of 2025, No. 42 of 2024, No. 137 of 2021, No. 12 of 2019, and No. 400 of 1999), and from support measures which – like the repealed citizenship income [reddito di cittadinanza] and inclusion income [reddito di inclusione] – are motivated by further purposes, such as reintegration into employment and social inclusion (judgments No. 97 of 2026, No. 34 and No. 19 of 2022, No. 137 of 2021).

Moreover, as already emphasized by this Court in the order by which it ordered the preliminary reference to the CJEU, the institution in question is also distinguished from the social allowance which operates as a substitute benefit for disability provisions already enjoyed.

In that event, once the disabled or incapacitated person who is already a holder of a civil disability benefit has reached the aforementioned age limit, the disability pension and disability allowance are automatically replaced by the social allowance, «upon which is projected the social security function of protection in the event of the adverse contingency of disability» (order No. 29 of 2024, point 5.1 of Considerations in Law).

9.3.– In addition to the age and income requirements, Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995 requires the beneficiary to have Italian citizenship and residence in Italy.

Italian citizens residing in Italy are equated to citizens of a European Union State and, pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000, which is censured, to third-country nationals holding a residence card, a title replaced by the EU long-term residence permit pursuant to Article 9 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of July 25, 1998 (Consolidated Text of provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the condition of foreigners), as replaced by Article 1, paragraph 1, letter (a), of Legislative Decree No. 3 of January 8, 2007 (Implementation of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents), implementing Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Article 9 of the Immigration Consolidated Text, the long-term residence permit is granted upon the occurrence of a series of prerequisites such as the «possession, for at least five years, of a residence permit in current validity», the «availability of an income not lower than the annual amount of the social allowance», a «suitable accommodation» (paragraph 1), and the «passing by the applicant of an Italian language knowledge test» (paragraph 2-bis). The permit is of indefinite duration (paragraph 2) and the loss of the aforementioned prerequisites is not provided for among the grounds for its revocation.

These are therefore requirements that pertain either to census parameters or to general living conditions, up to including an element of a purely temporal nature, linked to the period of stay in Italy with a regular residence permit.

The introduction, through the norm subjected to review, of the selective requirement of holding a long-term permit constitutes a derogation from the general provision laid down regarding social and welfare benefits in favor of non-EU citizens by Article 41 of the Immigration Consolidated Text, according to which «[f]oreigners holding a residence card or a residence permit of a duration of not less than one year, as well as minors registered in their residence card or permit, are equated to Italian citizens for the purpose of enjoying welfare provisions and benefits, including economic ones, of social assistance, including those provided for persons afflicted with Hansen's disease or tuberculosis, for deaf-mutes, for civil blind persons, for civil invalids, and for indigents».

9.4.– Finally, it must be recalled that Article 20, paragraph 10, of Decree-Law No. 112 of 2008, as converted, makes the recognition of the social allowance conditional upon the interested party having legally resided, on a continuous basis, for at least ten years in the national territory.

This requirement concerns all entitled persons, including non-EU citizens, and, for the latter, concurs with that of holding a long-term residence permit (ex aliis, Civil Court of Cassation, Labour Section, judgment of March 13, 2023, No. 7229).

10.– All of which being premised, the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Articles 3, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU, are not unfounded.

10.1.– The interpretive clarifications provided by the Court of Justice following the preliminary reference have indeed confirmed the hypothesis advanced by this Court that the social allowance does not fall within the material scope (ratione materiae) of the Union principle of equal treatment in social security.

10.2.– In the *Luevi* judgment it was first highlighted how Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of the directive in question determines its own scope of operation by referring to the «social security sectors defined in Regulation [No. 883/2004]».

In order to benefit from equal treatment – the CJEU added – it is therefore necessary that the benefit in question falls within one of the social security sectors listed in Article 3, paragraph 1, of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 (CJEU, judgment Case C-350/20, *O. D. and Others*, point 51).

This latter provision, entitled «Scope ratione materiae», in paragraph 1, establishes that the cited regulation applies to all legislation concerning the social security sectors relating to sickness benefits, maternity and equivalent paternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, survivors' benefits, benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases, death grants, unemployment benefits, pre-retirement benefits, and family benefits.

The subsequent paragraph 3 specifies, however, that Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 itself applies «also» to special non-contributory cash benefits governed by Article 70 of the same regulation, which will be accounted for further below.

10.3.– The CJEU then recalled that, according to its case law, a provision may be considered a «social security benefit» within the meaning of Article 3, paragraph 1, of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 if, on the one hand, it is granted to beneficiaries independently of any individual and discretionary assessment of their personal needs, on the basis of a situation defined ex lege, and, on the other hand, it relates to one of the risks expressly listed in that provision (CJEU, Tenth Chamber, judgment of October 28, 2021, Case C-462/20, *ASGI and Others*, point 25).

The Court also specified that, as regards, in particular, old-age benefits referred to in Article 3, paragraph 1, letter (d), of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, they are characterized by the purpose of guaranteeing the means of subsistence to those who, having reached a certain age, cease working activity and are no longer required to remain at the disposal of the competent employment administration authorities (CJEU, First Chamber, judgment of September 16, 2015, Case C-361/13, *European Commission v. Slovak Republic*, point 55).

Furthermore, the CJEU specified that a provision paid as a «supplementary allowance» to beneficiaries of an old-age or survivor's pension, whose funding sources are the same as those provided for old-age and survivor's pensions and which is added to the old-age pension, also constitutes an old-age benefit pursuant to the aforementioned provision (CJEU, First Chamber, judgment of March 5, 2026, Case C-151/24, *Luevi*, point 49).

10.4.– This having been premised, the Luxembourg Court noted that the social allowance pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6, of Law No. 335 of 1995 is not granted exclusively to beneficiaries of an old-age pension, but aims to address the state of need deriving from indigence in which persons lacking adequate economic resources find themselves and who, because of their age, experience a reduction in their working capacity (again, CJEU, *Luevi* judgment, point 50).

Therefore, such an economic provision does not constitute a social security benefit within the meaning of Union case law and, consequently, does not fall within the scope of application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 34 of the Charter, nor is it subject to the guarantee of equal treatment referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU.

The benefit in question must rather be traced back to the paradigm of special non-contributory cash benefits pursuant to Article 70, paragraph 2, of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.

In this regard, the *Luevi* judgment first reiterated that in the system outlined by this latter normative source, social security benefits and non-contributory benefits are mutually exclusive (CJEU, Grand Chamber, judgment of February 21, 2006, Case C-286/03, *Hosse*).

The social security benefits indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the cited 2004 regulation are indeed granted to beneficiaries independently of any individual and discretionary assessment of their personal needs, on the basis of a situation defined ex lege and referring to one of the risks listed in that provision.

Conversely, the benefits referred to in Article 70, paragraph 2, of the same regulation provide supplementary, substitute, or accessory cover for the risks corresponding to the social security sectors referred to in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the aforesaid regulation; guarantee interested parties a minimum subsistence income in relation to the economic context of the Member State; must be financed exclusively by compulsory taxation intended to cover general public expenditure and not through the contribution of the person concerned; when they are granted as a supplement to a contributory benefit, they cannot for that reason be considered contributory; the same special non-contributory cash benefits, to be considered as such, must be listed in Annex X to the same Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.

According to the Court of Justice, the social allowance falls among special non-contributory benefits as it is aimed at ensuring means of subsistence to persons who cannot guarantee their own sustenance and is financed not through contributions, but through taxation.

Furthermore, the said allowance appears in the list of benefits in Annex X.

10.5.– The provision in question – the Luxembourg Court added – also falls within the notion of social assistance deducible from Article 70, paragraph 1, of the cited 2004 regulation, coinciding with the set of assistance schemes established by public authorities to which a person who does not have sufficient resources to meet their own basic needs and those of their family and who «runs the risk, for that reason, of becoming a burden on the public finances of the host Member State during their stay which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State» may have recourse (again CJEU, *Luevi* judgment, point 54).

10.6.– On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the CJEU clarified that, although Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, in paragraph 3, provides that the regulation applies «also» to special non-contributory cash benefits referred to in Article 70, this does not mean that these latter benefits also fall within the scope of application of Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU.

Supporting this conclusion is, first of all, the literal text, according to which the cited Article 3, in its entirety, defines the scope of operation of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, whereas Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU, in order to identify the perimeter of application of the principle of equal treatment, refers not to the entire Article 3 of the regulation, but only to the «social security sectors defined [therein]».

Furthermore, systematic interpretation shows how social security benefits and special non-contributory cash benefits are subject to different legal regimes.

Indeed, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, only social security benefits are exportable, in the sense that they must be paid under certain conditions by a Member State even when their beneficiary does not reside in its territory, whereas the benefits referred to in Article 70, paragraph 2, of the same regulation are paid exclusively in the Member State where the person concerned resides and pursuant to its legislation.

10.7.– Ultimately, the Court of Justice observed, the Union legislature did not intend to extend the right to equal treatment to benefits that cannot be classified as social security benefits.

With reference to such benefits, Member States are therefore not required to respect the rule of equal treatment under Article 12, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU and may decide to make their recognition to third-country nationals conditional upon the occurrence of requirements – such as that of integration proven by the possession of a long-term residence permit – different from those required for their own citizens.

The CJEU also emphasized that such an interpretive solution «guarantees coherence between the various statuses recognized to third-country nationals as resulting from Union law, depending on their level of integration» (CJEU, *Luevi* judgment, point 67).

On the other hand, the status of long-term resident provided for by Directive 2003/109/EC corresponds to the most advanced level of integration for third-country nationals and justifies guaranteeing them equal treatment with citizens of the host Member State both as regards social security and as regards social assistance and protection (CJEU, Grand Chamber, judgment of July 20, 2024, Joined Cases C-112/23 and C-223/22, *CU and ND*).

10.8.– Lastly, the *Luevi* judgment underlined that Article 24, paragraph 2, of Directive 2004/38/EC allows Member States to make the enjoyment of social assistance benefits conditional upon the condition that such citizens possess a right of permanent residence in their territory, acquired following an uninterrupted period of residence of five years in that territory.

Equal treatment in the enjoyment of the social assistance benefit between a Union citizen and citizens of the host Member State operates only if the residence of the former complies with the requirements set by Directive 2004/38/EC.

In such a context – the Court of Justice argued – as an effect of excluding the integration requirement demanded of non-EU citizens, the non-contributory benefit also having the nature of a social assistance benefit would end up guaranteeing non-EU citizens a more favorable condition than that ensured to Union citizens, thus giving rise to a dystonic consequence with respect to the objectives set out in recital 2 of Directive 2011/98/EU itself, according to which third-country nationals are recognized rights and obligations analogous to those of Union citizens (again, CJEU, *Luevi* judgment, point 76).

10.9.– In conclusion, the clarifications provided by the CJEU confirm that Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000 does not conflict with Articles 11 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU and 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU.

10.10.– It must likewise be excluded that the censured provision conflicts with Article 3 of the Constitution.

As already highlighted, this constitutional parameter was indeed evoked by the judge a quo «by reason of the recognized axiological interpenetration of [its] provisions» with the principle of equal treatment in social security in the terms outlined by Article 34 of the CFREU and the cited directive, the incidence of which in the controversial case was excluded by the Luxembourg Court.

10.11.– Conversely, the censure arguments illustrated by the private party in the brief filed ahead of the public hearing of June 24, 2026, cannot be taken into consideration, as they are extraneous to the thema decidendum outlined by the referring order.

The party asks, in particular, this Court to verify «whether the condition of a foreign citizen no longer of working age, not occasionally present in the territory (being regularly resident there for over 10 years) to whom the State recognizes the right of residence – as an effect of their past work activity or even modest income of the family unit [...] or as an effect of the prevailing protection assigned to the family bond [...] – who is in conditions of total indigence or in any case below the absolute poverty threshold and who is nonetheless left devoid of the sole support provided by the legal system for such situations, indispensable to guarantee survival and in any case a dignified life; a subsidy which in any case would not allow them to exceed the absolute poverty threshold, but would at least allow them to meet the minimum requirements of dignified survival» is compatible with Articles 3 and 38 of the Constitution.

This question broadens the scope of the present incidental proceedings, because, on the one hand, it solicits the examination of a profile of conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution that lies outside the perimeter of the vulnus denounced by the referring court, in order to reach the reasonableness of the rules subjected to review; on the other hand, it integrates the content of the censure of violation of the right to social assistance under Article 38, first paragraph, of the Constitution formulated by the judge a quo.

Both sets of arguments, introducing areas of investigation that the judge a quo did not submit to constitutional legitimacy review, are excluded from this Court's review (ex aliis, judgment No. 4 of 2025).

11.– In conclusion, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000, raised with reference to Articles 3, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive 2011/98/EU must be declared not unfounded.

on those grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of December 23, 2000, laying down «Provisions for the formulation of the annual and multiannual state budget (Finance Law 2001)», raised with reference to Articles 38, first paragraph, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution – the latter in relation to Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – by the Court of Cassation, Labour Section, by the order indicated in the headnote;

2) declares not unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 80, paragraph 19, of Law No. 388 of 2000, raised with reference to Articles 3, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 34, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the CFREU and Article 12, paragraph 1, letter (e), of Directive (EU) 2011/98 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 13, 2011, on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, by the Court of Cassation, Labour Section, by the order indicated in the headnote.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 24, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on July 21, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms in text to the original