JUDGMENT NO. 134

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, brought by the Ordinary Court of Imperia, Civil Section – Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, in the civil proceedings initiated by M. P., by order of January 9, 2025, registered under no. 232 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Journal of the Republic no. 50, first special series, of the year 2025, the hearing for which was scheduled for the chambers session of May 18, 2026.

Having heard in the chambers session of May 20, 2026, Judge Rapporteur Maria Rosaria San Giorgio;

Deliberated in the chambers session of May 20, 2026.

Summary of Facts

1.– By order dated January 9, 2025, registered under no. 232 of the 2025 register of orders, the Ordinary Court of Imperia, Civil Section – Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, "insofar as it does not grant the judge, when the consent of the adult children of the adopter is withheld, the power to pronounce the adoption nonetheless, if their dissent is deemed unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, as provided for by the aforementioned rule in relation to the dissent expressed by the parents of the adoptee and by the non-cohabiting spouse (not legally separated) of the adopter and of the adoptee.”

1.1.– The referring court states that it is seized of proceedings initiated by Mauro Pellegrini concerning the "adoption of an adult.”

The applicant, father of M. P., born from his first marriage on August 27, 1984, submitted that after obtaining a divorce in 2007, he married L. S., a Ukrainian national and mother of V. N. S., born in Ukraine on October 10, 1991.

The latter, who is divorced and the mother of two young daughters, moved from Ukraine to Italy in 2022 and has since lived, together with her daughters, with her mother, L. S., and her mother's husband, the applicant M. P. Hence the latter's request for the adoption of V. N. S.

The a quo judge reports that the applicant's adult son, M., upon entering an appearance, withheld his consent to the adoption, whereas the adoptee, heard at the hearing of December 9, 2024, gave her consent and stated that she had never known her biological father, that she regards M. P. as a parent, and that she forms a family with him, her mother, and her two daughters.

The referring judge adds that the adopter's son was also heard, who described a situation of bitter conflict with his father, stating that he has had no relations with the applicant for years, does not consider him a father, and harbors deep resentment due to "alleged serious wrongs that the latter allegedly inflicted upon him and above all upon his mother,” having used violence against both and having appropriated over one hundred thousand euros withdrawn from the spouses' joint account without ever returning it. Finally, he specified that he withheld his consent to the adoption for economic reasons, as he intends to protect his position as a legitimate heir.

The a quo judge further sets forth that L. S., in giving her consent to the adoption, stated that the applicant has welcomed V. N. S. as a daughter.

Lastly, the referring Court notes that M. P. is not a wealthy person, that since 2007 he and his son have lived apart and have no affectionate bond, their relations being "almost non-existent and, in any event, resentful and bitter.”

1.2.– Having thus premised, the a quo judge, in reconstructing the relevant regulatory and case-law framework, recalls that this Court, by Judgment No. 557 of 1988, declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 291 of the Civil Code insofar as it does not allow adoption by persons who have adult legitimate or legitimated descendants, and that, by Judgment No. 245 of 2004, it declared the same provision constitutionally illegitimate also insofar as it does not provide that the adoption of adults may be pronounced in the presence of natural children recognized by the adopter, provided they are adults and consenting.

The referring court considers that it may be unequivocally inferred from the aforementioned rulings that adoption is permitted only if the adult child of the adopter gives consent, with their expression of dissent being configured as "binding and not surmountable by the judge” and thus acting as a bar to the granting of the application.

Nor is the case of dissent expressed by the adult descendant of the adopter included among the cases in which the law excludes that the withholding of consent assumes binding scope.

Ultimately, the binding nature of the latter's consent is to be derived from constitutional jurisprudence and, specifically, from the aforementioned judgments No. 557 of 1988 and No. 245 of 2004 and "from the combined provisions of Articles 291 and 297 of the Civil Code, even in the absence of a specific regulatory provision.”

The referring court notes that this interpretation has also been adopted by other trial courts, with the exception of the Court of Appeal of Cagliari, which, in Judgment No. 3 of May 9, 2023, through a constitutionally oriented interpretation, held that the dissent of the adult children of the adopter who do not cohabit with him is not a bar to adoption, "holding for the Court ‘a value that is not absolute and unreviewable, amounting to mere arbitrariness… but rather a more limited and contained value,’ receiving protection ‘only in the event that the adoption causes them serious prejudice.’”

The a quo judge agrees with the aforementioned ruling regarding the need for the ordinary judge to seek an interpretation which, in line with conventional jurisprudence on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (reference is made in particular to the European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Judgment of October 13, 2015, S. H. v. Italy) and with the pronouncements of the Court of Cassation (reference is made to the Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment No. 7667 of April 3, 2020), tends to provide legal recognition to stable family situations consolidated over time and founded on deep affectionate bonds.

It also recalls that the exclusively economic purpose that originally characterized the adoption of adults, coinciding with the possibility for those without descendants to transmit their name and estate, has eroded over time, to the extent that the institution has become an instrument for consolidating affectionate relationships and guaranteeing family unity, as in cases where one intends to establish a legal bond with the adult child of a spouse or partner, or to bring a grandchild or a dear person into one's family unit.

The referring judge states that he is aware of the need to verify, before raising a question of constitutional legitimacy, the possibility of ascribing a constitutionally compliant meaning to the suspected provision; nevertheless, he considers that in the present case such an interpretation would appear to "transgress the letter of the law, resulting in the non-application of the regulatory text,” given that, on the one hand, Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code does not provide that the judge may override the dissent of adult children if deemed unjustified and, on the other hand, based on the aforementioned judgments of this Court No. 557 of 1988 and No. 245 of 2004, for adoption to take place it is necessary that the adult child of the adopter be consenting.

Hence the necessity to raise the question of constitutional legitimacy.

1.3.– With reference to relevance, the a quo judge observes that the decision with which he is seized depends upon the outcome of the incidental constitutional proceedings, given that if the challenged provision – insofar as it does not provide that the court, when the adult child of the adopter withholds consent, may nonetheless declare the adoption if it deems the dissent unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee – were declared constitutionally illegitimate, the dissent expressed in this case by M. P. could in all probability be considered unjustified and, consequently, adoption could nonetheless take place.

1.4.– On the point of non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring court notes, first of all, that under the provision at issue, the withholding of consent by the parents of the adoptee can always be overridden by the judge if it proves to be unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, whereas the refusal of the spouse of the adopter and of the adoptee who are not legally separated can be disregarded only when there is no cohabitation.

Finally, the withholding of consent expressed by the adult descendants of the adopter is always unsurmountable.

The a quo judge therefore notes how, in the case of cohabitation, the positions of the spouse and of the adult child – to be considered homogeneous by virtue of the fact that both subjects belong to the adopter's family unit, thus "being emotionally affected in the same way by the entry of a new person into their family and nurturing the same succession interests” – turn out to be "regulated in the same way by the law.”

The constitutional flaw is discernible when there is no cohabitation, given that in such a case, if the adult child dissents, the judge must in any event disregard the adoption application without being able to evaluate the reasons thereof, whereas if it is the spouse who withholds consent, the same judge may grant the application if he deems the refusal unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee. Two comparable situations would thus be "treated by the law in an unjustifiably different manner,” and this would appear unreasonable and contrary to the principle of equality.

The binding scope of the dissent – "even if unmotivated or unjustified” – of the non-cohabiting adult child of the adopter would, on the one hand, frustrate the will expressed by the adopter, the adoptee, and the subjects indicated by Article 297 of the Civil Code, thereby preventing, in disagreement with the evolution of the institution registered in constitutional and legitimacy jurisprudence, profound affectionate bonds from obtaining legal recognition; on the other hand, it would sever the "relationship of congruence present in the system,” in conflict with the "criterion of coherence and balance underlying the principle of equality pursuant to Article 3 of the Constitution.”

Conversely, according to the same a quo judge, reasonableness, coherence, and balance could be safeguarded if the judge were allowed to evaluate the dissent of the adult child not cohabiting with the adopter – as occurs for the non-cohabiting spouse of the adopter himself – following a balancing of the interests of all subjects involved.

The judge, in particular, could deem the refusal unjustified in the event that the only prejudice for the interested party consisted in the reduction of his inheritance expectations, especially in the hypothesis, such as the one under scrutiny, where the dissenting child of the adopter is not on good terms with the parent, does not visit him, lives in another region, and has "a life that does not connect with his,” such that he "would not be emotionally and affectively affected by the adoption.”

2.– Neither the President of the Council of Ministers nor the parties to the main proceedings intervened or entered an appearance in the proceedings.

Considered in Law

3.– The Court of Imperia, Civil Section – Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, questions the constitutional legitimacy of Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code insofar as, in the event of the withholding of consent to the adoption of adults by the adult children of the adopter, it does not allow the judge to pronounce the adoption nonetheless, if he deems their dissent unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, as provided by the challenged provision in the hypothesis of dissent by the parents of the adoptee and by the non-cohabiting spouse (not legally separated) of the adopter and of the adoptee.

The provision under scrutiny would violate Article 3 of the Constitution, as it would treat in an unjustifiably different manner substantially comparable situations in which the withholding of consent to adoption is expressed by the adult child or by the spouse of the adopter who do not cohabit with him, given that in the former case dissent is always a bar to adoption, whereas in the latter case the judge, if he deems the refusal unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, may nonetheless pronounce the adoption.

Furthermore, the "criterion of coherence and balance underlying the principle of equality pursuant to Article 3 of the Constitution” would be infringed, since the in-any-event binding scope of the dissent of the adult child of the adopter, not cohabiting with him, would frustrate the will expressed by the parent, the adoptee, and the subjects indicated by Article 297 of the Civil Code, thereby preventing – in contrast with the evolution of the function of the institution at issue – stable affectionate bonds from obtaining legal recognition.

In the referring court's opinion, the challenged discipline would, conversely, comply with "[r]easonableness, coherence, and balance” if the judge were permitted to balance the reasons for the dissent of the non-cohabiting adult child with the interests of the adopter and of the other persons called upon to express consent, especially in the case, like the present one, where the child himself, not being on good terms with the parent, not visiting him, and having "a life that does not connect with his, would not be emotionally and affectively affected by the adoption.”

4.– Before examining the merits of the questions of constitutional legitimacy, it is useful to preface the reconstruction, including diachronic, of the regulatory and case-law framework within which the challenged discipline is embedded.

4.1.– In recent decades, the social evolution of adult adoption has been marked by a paradigm shift.

The institution, originally aimed at ensuring that an adopter unable to beget offspring could acquire an heir who could give continuity to their name and estate, has assumed unprecedented meanings and motivations over the years, becoming an instrument to confer legal form on consolidated affectionate relationships capable of representing the personal identity of the adopter and the adoptee.

The capacity of ordinary adoption to accommodate new socially appreciable and therefore worthy of protection instances was grasped, first of all, by legitimacy jurisprudence.

An emblematic confirmation of this aptitude is found in the ruling which, with specific reference to the hypothesis of the adoption of the adult child of a spouse who already participates in the affectionate and organizational context of the welcoming family, emphasized how, in such a case, the institution gives formal shape to a de facto family relationship, consolidated over time, which anticipates, rather than follows, the construction of the legal relationship (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment No. 2426 of February 3, 2006).

In the same perspective, the legitimacy judges have recognized in adult adoption "the function of legal recognition of a social, affectionate, and identity relationship, as well as of a personal history of the adopter and adoptee [as] an instrument aimed at allowing the formation of families between subjects who, albeit adults, are bound together by strong personal, moral, and civil ties,” in compliance with the principles of family unity pursuant to Article 30 of the Constitution and respect for private and family life pursuant to Article 8 of the ECHR (Cass., Judgment No. 7667 of 2020).

The jurisprudence of this Court has subsequently restored a physiognomy to the institution at issue consistent with the changed social context, coming to configure it as a "multifunctional institution” (Judgment No. 53 of 2025).

In the rulings of recent years, in addition to the confirmation of the traditional and primary purpose of transmitting name and estate, further functions responding to "solidarity-based instances, variously declined,” have in fact emerged (Judgment No. 135 of 2023).

This Court has emphasized that adult adoption can "embrace both the situation in which ‘persons, often elderly, rely on a strengthening – thanks to adoption – of the solidarity bond that has de facto already been established with the adoptee,’ and the cases of the ‘adult adoptee who already lived within the family unit of the adopter, by reason of [family] foster care decided at the time when he was a minor, or even that of the adult child of the spouse (or partner) of the adopter who lives in that family unit’ (Judgment No. 135 of 2023)” (Judgment No. 53 of 2025).

Furthermore, constitutional jurisprudence has identified in the institution at issue an expression of the right to personal identity, emphasizing that "[t]he enhancement of an affectionate history, to the extent that it has already found solid social expression, reflects the existence of a matured path of personal identity, which cannot be deprived of due legal recognition, under penalty of violation of Article 2 of the Constitution” (Judgment No. 5 of 2024).

Yet, the realization of the will to bring about an adult adoption encounters a limit in the protection that the legal system also recognizes for the interests of members of the respective families of origin, who, while remaining third parties with respect to the adoptive filiation bond – given that, pursuant to Article 300, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, the adoption in question, save for exceptions established by law, does not give rise to any civil relationship between the adopter and the adoptee's family, nor between the adoptee and the adopter's relatives –, may be affected by its relative effects both morally and patrimonially.

4.2.‒ Alongside the consent of the parties (Article 296 of the Civil Code), Article 297 of the Civil Code indeed requires, as a further condition for adoption to take place, the consent of the non-legally separated spouse of the adopter and of the adoptee, of the parents of the adoptee, and – by effect of judgments No. 557 of 1988 and No. 245 of 2004 of this Court, to be accounted for below – of the adult children of the adopter.

In the original wording of the provision at issue – according to which "If the adoptee or the adopter are married, the consent of the spouse is always necessary. The consent of the parents of the adoptee is likewise necessary” – the expressions of adhesive will by the spouse of the adopter and of the adoptee and by the parents of the latter were configured as necessary and never reviewable by the judge, regardless of the reason for any refusal.

Moreover, the lack of consent constituted an obstacle to adoption even if it depended on the untraceability or incapacity of the person called upon to give it.

Such a legislative option intended to safeguard the higher interest of the legitimate family, preventing the entry of an outsider into the family of origin from occurring against the will of all its members.

The regulation of consents was subject to significant revision by Law No. 151 of May 19, 1975 (Reform of Family Law).

In the new regulatory framework taking shape with the advent of the Constitution, the preeminence recognized to personal rights over the interest of the family group and the assumption by the family of a role instrumental to the full development of the personality of its members (Article 2 of the Constitution) have in fact brought to light the excessive rigidity of the rules dictated by Article 297 of the Civil Code.

It therefore became necessary to mitigate the rule of the unsurmountability in judicial proceedings of the dissent of parents and spouses and to admit adoption even in the event of the impossibility for such persons to express consent due to untraceability or incapacity.

Indeed, the new text of Article 297 of the Civil Code, after establishing in the first paragraph that "For adoption, the consent of the parents of the adoptee and the consent of the spouse of the adopter and of the adoptee are necessary, if married and not legally separated,” specifies in the second paragraph that "When the consent provided for by the first paragraph is withheld, the court, having heard the interested parties, upon application by the adopter, may, if it deems the refusal unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, pronounce the adoption nonetheless, unless it concerns the consent of parents exercising parental responsibility or of the spouse, if cohabiting, of the adopter or of the adoptee. Likewise, the court may pronounce adoption when it is impossible to obtain consent due to the incapacity or untraceability of the persons called upon to express it.”

4.3.– Article 297 of the Civil Code therefore requires, first of all, the consent of the parents of the adoptee, but specifies that any refusal is binding only if it comes from the parent exercising parental responsibility, and may otherwise be overridden by the court if it proves unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee.

It must, however, be considered that the reform introduced by Law No. 184 of May 4, 1983 (The Minor's Right to a Family), in limiting – through the amendments made by Articles 58, 59, and 60 – civil adoption exclusively to adults, tacitly repealed the clause contained in the second paragraph of Article 297 of the Civil Code, which precisely safeguards the expression of will of parents exercising responsibility over the adoptee.

It follows that the dissent of the parents of the adoptee must be deemed always surmountable by the court if it is devoid of justification or in contrast with the interests of the adoptee.

4.4.– The expression of adhesive will by the spouse, also prescribed by the provision at issue, connects with Article 144, first paragraph, of the Civil Code, which, by establishing that "The spouses agree between themselves on the direction of family life,” enshrines the principle whereby all activity of the family community must be based on agreement, in the absence of which the family itself is destined for the crisis of cohabitation.

Such consent is subject to a differentiated regime, depending on whether the spouse is legally separated or not, or, in the latter case, whether they cohabit with the adopter or the adoptee.

From the coordinated reading of the first and second paragraphs of Article 297 of the Civil Code, it is inferred, first of all, that adherence is not required if the spouse is legally separated.

With the suspension of duties – except that of material assistance – arising from marriage consequent upon personal separation, the need to consult the spouse of the adopter or of the adoptee indeed ceases, inasmuch as only the existence of a "very close” relationship can justify the exercise of the veto power recognized by the provision at issue (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment No. 6925 of November 25, 1986).

The consent of the cohabiting spouse is, instead, always binding, and no cases are provided in which the judge may review the reasons for any dissent.

The refusal raised by a spouse who is not cohabiting can, conversely, be evaluated by the court and possibly disregarded, if deemed unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adopter or of the adoptee.

4.5.– The regulation of consents to adoption dictated by Article 297 of the Civil Code systematically connects and is completed with that contained in Article 291 of the Civil Code, as resulting from the interventions of this Court.

The first paragraph of the latter provision, which established the prohibition of adopting for anyone who had "legitimate or legitimated descendants” – a distinction subsequently abolished by Article 105, paragraph 4, of Legislative Decree No. 154 of December 28, 2013 (Revision of current provisions concerning filiation, pursuant to Article 2 of Law No. 219 of December 10, 2012) – was declared constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it did not allow adoption by persons having adult legitimate or legitimated descendants, provided they were "consenting” (Judgment No. 557 of 1988).

This Court affirmed that if, under the current discipline, the existence of a spouse – provided they give consent pursuant to Article 297, first paragraph, of the Civil Code – does not prevent adoption from taking place, there is no rational reason not to believe that the "substantially identical” situation of adult children also allows it, in that case too conditioned upon the giving of consent by them.

It therefore deemed evidently incongruous the different legislative evaluation of the consent of persons such as the spouse and children, "all forming part of the adopter's legitimate family, and equally interested, both morally and patrimonially” (again, Judgment No. 557 of 1988).

The need for an expression of adhesive will by the adult child of the adopter would subsequently be reaffirmed by Judgment No. 245 of 2004, also with reference to "natural children” recognized by the adopter.

4.6.– The prescriptive content of Article 297 of the Civil Code was further specified by Judgment No. 345 of 1992, by which this Court, by way of interpretation, extended to adult offspring the rule – dictated by the second period of the second paragraph of such provision – concerning the irrelevance, for the purposes of pronouncing adoption, of the lack of consent due to the incapacity or untraceability of the persons called upon to express it.

5.– All of the above having been premised, the question of constitutional legitimacy is not founded.

5.1.– The referring court, as specified above, considers that the challenged provision determines an unjustified disparity of treatment between substantially comparable situations, since in the event that the non-cohabiting spouse of the adopter withholds consent to adoption, it allows the court to proceed with it anyway if the refusal proves unjustified or contrary to the best interests of the adoptee, whereas it does not provide for a similar possibility in the hypothesis where the refusal comes from the adult child of the same adopter, who is likewise non-cohabiting.

The discipline of the dissent of the adopter's non-cohabiting spouse, assumed by the a quo judge as a normative term of reference, is not, however, capable of acting as a *tertium comparationis*, as it is founded on a *ratio* that does not permit its assimilation to the factual scenario of the refusal raised by the non-cohabiting adult child, at issue here.

In this regard, it must first be considered that the trait of assimilation upon which the comparison made by the referring court is hinged – non-cohabitation with the adopter – assumes a completely different significance in the spousal relationship and in the adult filiation relationship.

In the former, since pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code cohabitation is the object of a primary obligation arising from marriage, the separation of spouses, unagreed and not justified by contingent or working reasons, can constitute a symptomatic index of the breakdown of their material and spiritual communion (Judgment No. 209 of 2022).

The objective and stable interruption of cohabitation is, moreover, indicative of the possibility that the dissolution of the relationship on a factual level may be followed by the cessation of the legal bond itself, given that de facto separation can evolve into legal separation and the definitive dissolution of marriage.

Conversely, in the adult filiation relationship, cohabitation does not affect the existence of the filiation bond, as it does not constitute – unlike in the spousal relationship – the object of an obligation, nor does it condition the rights arising from it. Rather, the progressive acquisition of independence by adult children ordinarily leads to the cessation of cohabitation.

The subsistence or otherwise of stable cohabitation with parents is indeed relevant under other profiles, such as that of the emergence, incumbent upon the economically self-sufficient adult child, of the obligation to contribute, based on his or her own capacities, means, and income, to the *ménage* of the family community (Article 315-bis, fourth paragraph, of the Civil Code).

5.2.– That having been specified, the exception to the binding nature of the dissent of the non-cohabiting spouse provided for by Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code is justified by the fact that de facto separation, as a voluntary and effective rupture of the *consortium vitae*, reveals, as clarified, a loosening of the marital bond and thus also a weakening of the spouses' obligation to agree, in compliance with Article 144 of the Civil Code, on decisions pertaining to the family, including choices that, while concerning the personal sphere of one of them, may affect the unity and stability of relations among members of the family of origin.

The diversification of the scope of the spouse's consent – operated by the challenged provision through the provision of the binding nature of refusal in case of cohabitation, its surmountability in case of non-cohabitation, and its irrelevance in case of legal separation – connects with the fact that the spousal relationship is susceptible to legally relevant changes.

A similar gradation of the relevance of dissent is not, however, configurable with respect to the adult descendants of the adopter, since the filiation relationship not only, in adulthood, does not imply cohabitation between parent and child, but furthermore, unlike the spousal relationship, is not subject to cessation.

The status of child – with the rights and duties correlated thereto – indeed persists even when the concrete affectionate bond with the parent deteriorates.

Ultimately, given that the violation of the principle of equality exists when homogeneous situations are regulated in an unjustifiably different manner and not when a diversity of regulation corresponds to non-comparable situations, the failure to provide, for the withholding of consent raised by the adopter's adult child with whom he does not cohabit, a margin of reviewability similar to that allowed for the spouse of the same adopter who is likewise non-cohabiting, does not determine a manifest and unjustified disparity of treatment, because it is founded on the different conformation of the relationships, of filiation and of marriage, placed in comparison.

5.3.– Nor does the omitted provision, for the withholding of consent coming from the adopter's adult child, of a tempering similar to that contemplated for the refusal of the adopter's non-cohabiting spouse and of the adoptee's parents, conflict with the "criterion of coherence and balance underlying the principle of equality pursuant to Article 3 of the Constitution,” as denounced by the referring court.

The impossibility for the judge to balance the reasons for the child's dissent with the interests of the other subjects involved is not out of tune with the conclusions of the hermeneutic itinerary, briefly reviewed above, according to which adult adoption has become a ductile instrument sensitive to the demands of society, through which it is possible to give legal form to social, affectionate, and identity relationships worthy of protection.

It must indeed be considered that the constitution of the new bond can affect the harmony and stability of existing relationships within the adopter's family unit.

5.4.– The binding nature without exceptions of the dissent of the adopter's adult children – as well as that of the cohabiting spouse – is therefore not devoid of reasonableness, since it does not result in an unjustified sacrifice of the aspirations of the parties to the adoption relationship, but responds to the equally worthy of consideration need to preserve pre-existing family relationships.

Where the adoption project does not find correspondence in the communion of intent of the spouse and adult children of the adopter, the establishment of the adoption relationship could in fact alter the affectionate dynamics of the family unit of origin, undermining harmony and cohesion among its members, or, in any event, aggravate or definitively compromise already conflictual situations.

For these reasons, the challenged provision makes the cohabiting spouse and the adult child of the adopter participants in the constitution of the new bond, granting them a power of control over a choice which, although pertaining to the personal sphere of the adopter and of the adoptee – as an expression of their freedom of self-determination (Judgment No. 33 of 2025) and of their personal identity (ex aliis, Judgment No. 5 of 2024) –, is destined to reflect upon family relations that already exist at the time it is matured.

6.– The question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, must therefore be declared not founded.

on those grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Declares not founded the question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 297, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Imperia, Civil Section – Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, by the order in the heading.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on May 20, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on July 21, 2026

The anonymized version conforms in text to the original