JUDGMENT NO. 44

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, initiated by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Ordinary Court of Pavia, with order of April 15, 2025, and by the Ordinary Court of Cassino, Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, with order of July 14, 2025, respectively registered under numbers 96 and 165 of the register of orders for 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic numbers 22 and 38, first special series, of the year 2025.

Heard in the closed session of February 23, 2026, the Reporting Judge Francesco Saverio Marini;

deliberated in the closed session of February 23, 2026.

Facts Considered

1.– With order of April 15, 2025 (Reg. Ord. No. 96 of 2025), the Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Ordinary Court of Pavia raised, in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, "insofar as it does not allow the offense to be considered of ‘particular tenuity’ when proceedings are brought for the completed or attempted crime of extortion not aggravated.”

2.– The referring judge states that he must decide on the request for dismissal, due to the particular tenuity of the act, submitted by the Public Prosecutor in criminal proceedings for the crime of attempted extortion charged against the investigated person, for having "threatened [the] injured party not to return their mobile phone […] unless the sum of 200 euros was paid"; payment that was not made due to the intervention of law enforcement.

In the opinion of the *judge a quo*, the act under consideration would be of particular tenuity, both due to the conduct's modalities, the threat having been carried out only by messages and having a purely pecuniary nature, and due to the small amount requested. However, the ground for non-punishability under review cannot apply to extortion, even if not aggravated, with the consequence that the request for dismissal should be rejected; hence the relevance of the question.

3.– Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring judge considers that the challenged norm violates Article 3 of the Constitution, in terms of unequal treatment compared to the crime of non-aggravated robbery, taken as a *tertium comparationis*.

The ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act is, in fact, excluded for the crime of robbery only in the aggravated cases referred to in Article 628, third paragraph, of the Penal Code, whereas for the crime of extortion, it is excluded in both the simple and aggravated forms.

In particular, the punitive treatment of the two crimes is the same (imprisonment from five to ten years) except for a "minimal difference only for the fine"; the same special aggravating circumstances are provided for in both criminal offenses (listed in Article 628, third paragraph, of the Penal Code and referred to in Article 629, second paragraph, of the Penal Code); this Court has included the mitigating circumstance of the act of slight gravity in each of the two offenses (Judgments No. 86 of 2024 and No. 120 of 2023), and for both, the ground for non-punishability under Article 649 of the Penal Code is inapplicable.

Regarding procedural regulation, on the one hand, discretionary arrest in flagrante delicto is provided for both crimes (Article 380, paragraph 2, letter f), of the Code of Criminal Procedure), and on the other hand, the aggravated hypotheses share the same maximum duration for preliminary investigations (Article 407, paragraph 2, number 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and concerning penitentiary benefits (Article 4-bis, paragraph 1-ter, of Law of July 26, 1975, No. 354, containing "Provisions on the penitentiary system and the execution of custodial and restrictive measures of liberty").

In conclusion – the referring judge observes – "in view of the substantial homogeneity of treatment of the two crimes in multiple regulations," the disparity regarding the ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act appears unreasonable, also considering the fact that this Court has equated the two offenses in terms of the mitigating circumstance of the act of slight gravity, with the consequence that, while both "can be 'of slight gravity'," only attempted robbery, and not attempted extortion, can be non-punishable due to the particular tenuity of the act."

4.– With order of July 14, 2025 (Reg. Ord. No. 165 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Cassino, Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, raised, in reference to Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, "insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular tenuity for the completed or attempted crime referred to in Article 629, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, and does not limit, as is the case for the crime referred to in Article 628, paragraph 3, of the Penal Code, the exclusion to the aggravated hypothesis referred to in Article 629, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code."

5.– The referring judge reports that he is proceeding, at the trial stage, against D. D.L., accused of the crime of attempted extortion, for having threatened the injured party, by means of two letters, with the aim of obtaining compensation for consulting activities never performed; the threat consisted of outlining a legal action and a report for untrue facts.

Regarding relevance, the *judge a quo* notes that – after the completion of the evidentiary activity – in the discussion phase, the defendant's defense requested "the application of the ground for non-punishability due to the particular tenuity of the act," which "would be applicable to the facts in question," given the offense "particularly tenuous with respect to the protected legal interests" and the "modalities of aggression bearing an equally tenuous disvalue": the pecuniary claim was, in fact, undetermined, and the threat consisted of outlining the exercise of a legal action.

However, although all the prerequisites provided for by Article 131-bis of the Penal Code are met, the provision referred to in the third paragraph, number 3), excludes its application to extortion even if not aggravated, as in the present case. The challenged norm thus constitutes the sole obstacle to the declaration of non-punishability due to the particular tenuity of the act.

6.– Regarding non-manifest unfoundedness, the referring Court considers, firstly, that Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code violates Article 3 of the Constitution, under the profile of unequal treatment compared to the crime of robbery, taken as a *tertium comparationis*.

The ground for non-punishability is excluded for the crime of extortion, both "in the simple form" and "in the aggravated form," whereas for the crime of robbery, it is excluded only in the aggravated hypotheses; however, "the structural and regulatory analogies between the two offenses [would be] such as to render this disparity of treatment unreasonable."

Under the "profiles of the offense and the structure of the typical act," the two crimes are characterized by offending the same legal interests, property and freedom of self-determination, by providing, as a means of coercion of will, threat or violence, and by being aimed at achieving an unjust profit; in robbery, however, the offense is more intense, because the "will is annihilated" and not "merely compromised." This "makes the unreasonableness of the legislative choice patent: to exclude the applicability of the ground for non-punishability under Article 131 bis of the Penal Code for the crime of simple extortion, in which the interest of freedom of self-determination is only compressed, and to allow it for the crime of simple robbery, in which freedom is totally annihilated."

Under the profile of regulation, the punitive treatment is the same (imprisonment from five to ten years), except for a "minimal punitive difference relating to the pecuniary penalty of the fine"; the special aggravating circumstances are also the same (listed in Article 628, third paragraph, of the Penal Code and referred to in Article 629, second paragraph, of the Penal Code) and the "particular regulation concerning penitentiary benefits under Article 4 bis co. 1 ter., Law No. 354/1975."

Furthermore, in each of the two offense hypotheses, this Court has included the mitigating circumstance of the act of slight gravity (Judgments No. 86 of 2024 and No. 120 of 2023), considering their "aptitude to encompass, despite the particularly severe punitive treatment, acts characterized by modest disvalue of the outcome and action."

In conclusion, the referring judge observes, "the analogous structure and regulation of the unaggravated hypotheses of robbery and extortion" would lead to the unreasonable disparity of treatment of the "legislative provision that allows the application of the ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act only for the hypotheses of unaggravated robbery referred to in Article 628 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, and not also for the hypotheses of unaggravated extortion referred to in Article 629 paragraph 1 of the Penal Code."

7.– According to the Court of Cassino, the questions would not be manifestly unfounded, also in reference to Article 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution.

Indeed, "to exclude *a priori*, even if the other application requirements are met, the possibility for the judge to qualify the act as of particular tenuity in relation to the modalities of the conduct or the smallness of the damage or danger" would result in a "preclusion [which in turn would result in a punitive automatism] that does not allow the judge [...] to individualize the institutional response to the act performed by the perpetrator," violating the principle of personality of criminal responsibility.

Finally, "the application of a penalty for an act possessing extremely low harmfulness and equally tenuous action disvalue," such as to "not deserve a punitive response," would conflict with the re-educational purpose of the penalty.

Considered in Law

8.– The Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Pavia and the Court of Cassino, Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, with the orders indicated in the heading (Reg. Ord. No. 96 and No. 165 of 2025) raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, insofar as it does not allow the offense to be considered of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought for the completed or attempted crime of unaggravated extortion provided for by Article 629, first paragraph, of the Penal Code.

Both *judges a quibus* suspect that the exclusion of the unaggravated crime of extortion from the scope of application of the defense of the particular tenuity of the act violates Article 3 of the Constitution, due to unequal treatment compared to the crime of robbery, taken as a *tertium comparationis*.

The ground for non-punishability is, in fact, excluded for the crime of extortion, both "in the simple form" (Article 629, first paragraph, of the Penal Code) and "in the aggravated form" (Article 629, second paragraph, of the Penal Code), whereas for the crime of robbery it is excluded only in the aggravated hypotheses (Article 628, third paragraph, of the Penal Code); however, "the structural and regulatory analogies between the two offenses [would be] such as to render this disparity of treatment unreasonable."

9.– Only the Court of Cassino also alleges the violation of Article 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, as "to exclude *a priori*, even if the other application requirements are met, the possibility for the judge to qualify the act as of particular tenuity in relation to the modalities of the conduct or the smallness of the damage or danger" would result – in conflict with the principle of personality of criminal responsibility – in a "preclusion [which in turn would result in a punitive automatism] that does not allow the judge [...] to individualize the institutional response to the act performed by the perpetrator."

Finally, "the application of a penalty for an act possessing extremely low harmfulness and equally tenuous action disvalue," such as to "not deserve a punitive response," would conflict with the re-educational purpose of the penalty.

10.– The two proceedings concern questions that are largely overlapping and, therefore, deserve to be joined for the purpose of the decision.

11.– As to the admissibility of the questions, the following must be observed.

11.1.– The Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Pavia is seized of the request for dismissal due to the particular tenuity of the act, submitted by the Public Prosecutor in criminal proceedings for the crime of attempted extortion, for the investigated person having "threatened [the] injured party not to return their mobile phone […] unless the sum of 200 euros was paid," payment which was not made due to the intervention of law enforcement.

The referring judge emphasizes that the modalities of the conduct and the smallness of the amount requested would lead to considering the prerequisites of the ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act, provided for by Article 131-bis of the Penal Code, to be met.

Likewise, the Court of Cassino proceeds, at the trial stage, for the crime of attempted extortion, for the investigated person having threatened, by means of two letters, the injured party with the aim of obtaining compensation for consulting activities never performed; the threat consisted of outlining a legal action and a report for untrue facts.

The referring judge reports that the ground for non-punishability due to the particular tenuity of the act "would be applicable to the facts in question," given the offense "particularly tenuous with respect to the protected legal interests" and the "modalities of aggression bearing an equally tenuous disvalue."

However, the defense in question cannot apply in the *judgments a quibus* as a result of the challenged norm, which establishes that "[t]he offense cannot also be deemed of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought: [...] for the completed or attempted crimes referred to in," among others, Article 629 of the Penal Code.

Hence the relevance of the questions, with reference to the attempted crime of simple or unaggravated extortion, provided for by the first paragraph of Article 629 of the Penal Code.

11.2.– Both referring judges, however, challenge Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code also with reference to the completed crime of simple extortion, requesting that – parallel to what occurs for robbery – the exclusion from the scope of application of non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act be limited to aggravated extortion.

This Court notes, in this regard, that "[t]he attempted crime constitutes [...] an autonomous form of crime, qualified by its own legal objectivity and its own structure, delineated by the combination of the specific incriminatory norm and the provision contained in Article 56 of the Penal Code, which renders punishable, with an autonomous penalty, acts not otherwise punishable, because they stopped short of consummation" (inter alia, Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, Judgment of October 22 - November 6, 2025, No. 36063).

This being established, since in the *judgments a quibus*, as highlighted, proceedings are being brought for attempted extortion, the questions raised in reference to the completed crime are inadmissible due to lack of relevance.

12.– On the merits, the question raised in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution is well-founded.

12.1.– Regarding the evolution of the norm under challenge, this Court recently recalled that, "[f]or the original text of Article 131-bis of the Penal Code, inserted by Article 1, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree No. 28 of March 16, 2015, containing 'Provisions on non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act, pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 1, letter m), of Law No. 67 of April 28, 2014,' punishability could be excluded, due to the particular tenuity of the act, for offenses with a maximum custodial sentence not exceeding five years. The so-called nominative exceptions, based on the title of the crime, were not provided, but it was established that the offense could not be deemed of particular tenuity when the perpetrator had acted for abject or futile motives, or with cruelty, including against animals, or had used torture or taken advantage of the victim's reduced capacity for self-defense, also with reference to the victim's age, or when the conduct had caused, or resulted from it, as unintended consequences, the death or very serious injury of a person" (Judgment No. 172 of 2025).

However, Legislative Decree No. 150 of October 10, 2022 (Implementation of Law No. 134 of September 27, 2021, delegating the Government for the efficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as regarding reparation justice and provisions for the speedy conclusion of judicial proceedings) "changed the paradigm in defining the operational scope of the defense, as it shifted its limit from the maximum statutory penalty (not exceeding five years of imprisonment) to the minimum (not exceeding two years). This resulted in the inclusion within the scope of application of the ground for non-punishability of many titles of crime, with a minimum statutory penalty not exceeding two years, which were previously excluded from it due to the maximum statutory penalty exceeding five years. This extension was balanced by the introduction of new nominative exceptions, detailed in the amended third paragraph of Article 131-bis of the Penal Code" (further, Judgment No. 172 of 2025).

12.2.– This Court has ruled on the constitutional legitimacy of these exceptions on two recent occasions.

Judgment No. 172 of 2025 declared the unconstitutionality of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, of the Penal Code, insofar as – in excluding that the offense cannot be deemed of particular tenuity – "it referred to Articles 336 and 337 of the same Code."

This Court, in fact – by carrying out a "comparison between the hypotheses under Articles 336 and 337 of the Penal Code, on the one hand, and that under Article 338 of the Penal Code, on the other" – deemed it "manifestly unreasonable that the ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act [was] admitted for the more serious crime, to the detriment of the collective public agent, and conversely excluded for the less serious crime, to the detriment of the individual public agent."

Judgment No. 5 of 2026 declared the unconstitutionality of the same Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, this time "insofar as it provided that the offense could not be deemed of particular tenuity when proceedings were brought for the crime" of negligent forest fire (Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code).

This Court found the manifest unreasonableness of excluding the crime under review from the scope of application of the defense under Article 131-bis of the Penal Code, as "non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act, precluded for forest fire, is instead applicable to all negligent crimes of damage causing common danger (Article 449 of the Penal Code), as well as [...] to negligent crimes against public health (Article 452 of the Penal Code), including epidemic and poisoning of water"; this constituted "an evident disparity of treatment," considering that these are "crimes with at least analogous legal objects."

The ruling, however, found the most evident incongruity in the relationship with the crime of negligent environmental disaster, included among those to which Article 131-bis of the Penal Code is applicable. "The minimum penalty provided for by Article 452-quinquies, first paragraph, of the Penal Code for this crime (five years minus two-thirds, and therefore one year and eight months of imprisonment)," this Court observes, "is today slightly lower than that provided for the crime of negligent forest fire (equal [today] to two years of imprisonment). However, the legislative description of the crime of environmental disaster centers around three alternative macro-events characterized by a degree of harmfulness to the environment much higher than that which characterizes the forest fire [...]. The third event, moreover, is described in terms such that it includes, in addition to extensive environmental damage, an additional dimension of injury or danger to public safety, and therefore – even in this case – to the life and physical integrity of an indeterminate number of persons. In light of all this, the exclusion of negligent forest fire under Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the Penal Code from the scope of application of non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act constitutes," this Court concludes, "an inexplicable anomaly, especially since the facts attributable to the legal figure of forest fire can be characterized, in concrete terms, by highly heterogeneous objective gravity."

12.3.– According to both referring judges, Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code – insofar as it does not allow the offense to be considered of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought for the attempted crime of unaggravated extortion – violates, firstly, Article 3 of the Constitution, creating an unreasonable disparity of treatment compared to the crime of robbery, taken as a *tertium comparationis*.

The defense under review is, in fact, excluded for the crime of robbery only in the aggravated hypotheses referred to in Article 628, third paragraph, of the Penal Code, whereas it is excluded for the crime of extortion even if unaggravated, despite the structural and regulatory analogies between the two offenses.

The consistent constitutional jurisprudence "recognizes the broad discretion of the legislator in identifying the objective scope of the defense under Article 131-bis of the Penal Code, except for the limit of manifest unreasonableness (ex aliis, Judgments No. 156 of 2020, point 3.5. of the Considerations in Law, and No. 207 of 2017, point 6 of the Considerations in Law)" (Judgment No. 5 of 2026).

12.4.– The comparison between the crime of extortion (Article 629 of the Penal Code), on the one hand, and that of robbery (Article 628 of the Penal Code), on the other, reveals this manifest unreasonableness.

The crimes under review, in fact, fall into the category of "crimes against property" provided for in Title XIII of Book II of the Penal Code and, in particular, among those committed "by violence against property or persons" (Chapter I). They have, as a common constituent element, the use of violence or threat, instrumental to the patrimonial aggression, so much so that they both constitute multi-offense crimes, because, alongside the offense to property, they imply the violation of the freedom of self-determination of the person and possibly their physical integrity itself.

As this Court has already highlighted, the distinguishing criterion between the two offense hypotheses lies in the type of coercion that the perpetrator exercises on the victim. In extortion, there is a "relative coercion (*vis compulsiva*)," whereas in robbery, there is an "absolute coercion (*vis absoluta*)" (Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

This implies "[t]heoretically [...] a greater seriousness of robbery," which "is distinguished [precisely] from extortion because in the latter the injured party undergoes a "direct and unavoidable" violence or threat, whereas in the former there is not this "total nullification of the passive subject's capacity to determine himself otherwise than to the will of the perpetrator" (ex plurimis, Court of Cassation, Second Criminal Section, Judgments of February 15 - May 17, 2023, No. 21078, and September 15 - October 28, 2021, No. 38830)" (ibid., Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

However, "it is the legislator himself who, by equating the minimum statutory penalties, demonstrates that he considers the two titles of crime homogeneous as to abstract harmfulness, on the implicit assumption that moral freedom must be protected no less than physical freedom" (ibid., Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

Moreover, despite some differential elements between the two offense hypotheses – such as the material object of the conduct, the type of violence that the perpetrator can employ, the necessary verification or not of the event of unjust profit with resulting damage for consummation, the consequent configuration of intent as generic or specific – this Court, considering the coincidence of the interest in their repression, has already proceeded to a "unitary consideration of the crimes of robbery and extortion," which led it to deem the addition of the mitigating circumstance of the slight gravity of the act as "constitutionally necessary" as a "safety valve" (Judgment No. 86 of 2024, extending the aforementioned mitigating circumstance already provided for by Judgment No. 120 of 2023 for extortion to robbery). The unitary consideration of the crimes of robbery and extortion also emerges – as correctly highlighted by the referring judges – from the regulation of the two offense hypotheses, both in terms of punitive treatment and the scope of conduct, and in procedural terms and penitentiary benefits.

Thus, specifically, regarding punitive treatment, the custodial sentence – equal, in both offenses, to imprisonment from five to ten years – "has undergone a progressive tightening over time, which has mainly affected the minimum statutory penalty" (Judgment No. 86 of 2024, similarly Judgment No. 120 of 2023), defined by this Court as "considerably harsh" and "introduced to contain criminal phenomena seriously harmful to the person and property" (ibid., Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

An identical system of special aggravating circumstances is also provided, which are listed by the third paragraph of Article 628 of the Penal Code and simply referred to by the second paragraph of Article 629 of the Penal Code: the ground for non-punishability provided for by Article 649 of the Penal Code for acts committed to the detriment of relatives is not applicable to either offense hypothesis.

Furthermore, as already pointed out, this Court has introduced the mitigating circumstance of the act of slight gravity in both criminal hypotheses. While it is true that this circumstance is different from the ground for non-punishability under Article 131-bis of the Penal Code (see Judgment No. 207 of 2017), this Court – in the cited pronouncements No. 86 of 2024 and No. 120 of 2023 – has equated the two titles of crime of extortion and robbery, "taking into account [both] the common high minimum statutory custodial penalty [and] the equal scope of the legal framework" (Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

With reference to the latter, the Court observed how the typical description provided by both Article 628 and Article 629 of the Penal Code highlights "a particularly wide variety of material conduct," since "the violence or threat can be of modest scope and the utility pursued, or the damage caused, of very low value" (Judgment No. 86 of 2024).

Procedurally, Article 380, paragraph 2, letter f), of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for mandatory arrest in flagrante delicto for both robbery and extortion, even in the unaggravated form; whereas Article 407, paragraph 2, number 2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sets the maximum duration of preliminary investigations at two years for robbery and extortion, but only in the event that one or more aggravating circumstances provided for, respectively, in Article 628, third paragraph, and Article 629, second paragraph, of the Penal Code are present.

With reference to penitentiary benefits, robbery and extortion, only in the aggravated forms referred to in Articles 628, third paragraph, and 629, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, belong to the so-called second bracket of crimes (Article 4-bis, paragraph 1-ter, Penitentiary Ordinance), for which the granting of such benefits is permitted, provided that there are no elements suggesting the existence of connections with organized, terrorist, or subversive crime.

Moreover, the preparatory work for Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022 indicates that the exclusion of the aggravated crime of robbery from the scope of application of the tenuity defense is justified, in addition to the particular seriousness and the capacity to cause social alarm, by the parallelism with the regulation established, regarding penitentiary benefits, by the aforementioned Article 4-bis of the Penitentiary Ordinance. From this point of view as well, the different treatment reserved for the two criminal figures of robbery and extortion is thus devoid of justification.

12.5.– Despite some differences in the typification of the criminal offenses compared, their homogeneity is thus discernible, attested by the identity of the constitutionally relevant legal interests protected, by the typical conduct being characterized by the use of violence or threat, by the structuring as damage crimes, by the identity of the statutory custodial penalty, which denotes, as already pointed out by this Court, a homogeneous consideration of the two titles of crime "as to abstract harmfulness" (ibid., Judgment No. 86 of 2024) and the propensity for concrete facts to deviate from it (Judgment No. 171 of 2025).

This homogeneity renders manifestly unreasonable the different regulation established, with reference to the defense under Article 131-bis of the Penal Code, for attempted extortion compared to attempted robbery, that is, the provision that the ground for non-punishability for the particular tenuity of the act is excluded for simple (attempted) extortion and not, as occurs for robbery, only for the aggravated hypotheses.

13.– For the reasons set forth above, the unconstitutionality of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code must be declared, insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought for the attempted crime referred to in Article 629, first paragraph, of the Penal Code.

The acceptance of the question raised in reference to Article 3 of the Constitution entails the absorption of the challenge concerning Article 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution.

For these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

1) declares the unconstitutionality of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought for the attempted crime referred to in Article 629, first paragraph, of the Penal Code;

2) declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular tenuity when proceedings are brought for the completed crime referred to in Article 629, first paragraph, of the Penal Code, raised, in reference to Articles 3 and 27, first and third paragraphs, of the Constitution, by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations of the Ordinary Court of Pavia and by the Ordinary Court of Cassino, Criminal Section, in single-judge composition, with the orders indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on February 23, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco Saverio MARINI, Rapporteur

Valeria EMMA, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on March 31, 2026

 

The anonymized version is textually compliant with the original