JUDGMENT NO. 5

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, initiated by the Judge for Preliminary Hearings of the Ordinary Court of Potenza, in the criminal proceedings against M. P., with an order dated September 19, 2024, registered under no. 189 of the register of orders for 2024 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 43, special first series, of the year 2024, the hearing of which was set for the consultative hearing on November 17, 2025.

Having seen the statement of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the Reporting Judge Francesco VIGANÒ in the consultative hearing of November 20, 2025;

deliberated in the consultative hearing of November 20, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– With an order dated September 19, 2024, registered under no. 189 of the register of orders for 2024, the Judge for Preliminary Hearings of the Ordinary Court of Potenza raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, in reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, "insofar as it provides that in relation to the crime referred to in Article 423-bis, paragraph 2, of the P.C., the Judge cannot deem the offense to be of particular insignificance."

1.1.– The referring judge is called upon, at the preliminary hearing stage, to assess the existence of the prerequisites for the committal for trial of M. P.

The defendant is charged with the crime of negligent forest fire, provided for by Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C., allegedly committed on August 3, 2023, according to the prosecution's presentation.

The referring judge reports that personnel from the Provincial Command of the Firefighters of Potenza, called to intervene by the defendant himself, ascertained "the presence of a scrub fire," which extended to affect a wood storage area and the "dry grassy cover and brambles of the undergrowth" adjacent thereto, "involving a forest area of no particular extent and causing slight damage to the crowns of the trees." The defendant declared to the intervening firefighters that he himself had set fire to "plant residues divided into several small piles." However, the fire allegedly spread in an unforeseen manner, following "the sudden change in wind direction."

Based on the service report of the Carabinieri Station of Pietragalla, it was subsequently found, by using a regional IT application called "RSDI" (Regional Spatial Data Infrastructure), that the flames had affected a total area of 500 square meters of uncultivated land constituting the appurtenances of the defendant's dwelling and 3500 square meters of coppice oak forest.

A person passing near the defendant's dwelling at the time finally declared having seen the defendant engaged in an attempt to extinguish a "small fire resulting from piles of dry grass."

1.2.– The referring judge believes that the analysis of the investigation records allows for a reasonable prognosis of conviction, which would necessitate the issuance of the decree ordering the trial. Indeed, all the objective and subjective elements of the crime under Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C. appear to be present. In particular, a forest fire would be constituted in light of the definition offered by Article 2 of Law no. 353 of November 21, 2000 (Framework Law on Forest Fires), according to which "[f]or forest fire is understood a fire capable of spreading to wooded, scrub, or arboreal areas, including any man-made structures and infrastructures located within the aforementioned areas, or to cultivated or uncultivated land and pastures adjacent to said areas."

However, the circumstances of the case would suggest that the act attributed to the defendant is of particular insignificance pursuant to Article 131-bis of the P.C.

In fact, the flames allegedly "affected only the dry grassy cover and the brambles of the undergrowth, involving a forest area of no particular extent and causing slight damage to the crowns of the trees"; the fire allegedly caused no significant danger to public safety; the defendant's degree of culpability would be limited, given that the burnings carried out by the defendant concerned small piles of scrub located within the defendant's own property, who did not notice the change in wind direction; his conduct after the event, consisting of attempting to stop the fire and calling for help himself, would also be worthy of consideration.

The referring judge, however, notes that, in the present case, the application of the ground for non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act is precluded: Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the P.C., in fact, prevents the offense from being considered of particular insignificance with respect to the crime of negligent forest fire. It is precisely the constitutional legitimacy of this express exclusion that the referring judge doubts.

1.3.– The questions would be relevant.

The referring judge recalls, in fact, that a similar question had already been raised by the Ordinary Court of Florence and declared manifestly inadmissible by this Court's order no. 113 of 2024. In that case, however, this Court had deemed the question irrelevant, since the act object of the pending proceedings had been committed before the entry into force of Article 1, paragraph 1, letter c), number 3), of Legislative Decree no. 150 of October 10, 2022 (Implementation of Law no. 134 of September 27, 2021, delegating the Government for the efficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as on matters of restorative justice and provisions for the swift definition of judicial proceedings), with which the legislator expressly amended Article 131-bis of the P.C., providing that the offense cannot be deemed of particular insignificance when proceedings are brought, among others, for the crimes, consummated or attempted, provided for by Article 423-bis of the P.C. The act forming the subject of the present proceedings, however, was committed after this regulatory change.

1.4.– As to the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, in the opinion of the referring judge, it would be "appropriate to conduct an intrinsic and extrinsic reasonableness judgment of the 'absolute presumption of non-insignificance of the offense' of the crime under Article 423 bis, paragraph 2 of the P.C., introduced by Article 131 bis, paragraph 3, no. 3) of the P.C."

The referring judge observes that the assessment of the particular insignificance of the act, as clarified by the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation (Criminal Cassation, united criminal sections, judgment February 25-April 6, 2016, no. 13681, is cited), "postulates a comprehensive evaluation of all the peculiarities of the concrete case, pursuant to Article 133, first paragraph of the P.C., including the modalities of the conduct and the degree of culpability, and not only of the aggression to the protected legal interest." In this context, the ground for non-punishment governed by Article 131-bis of the P.C. would aim to implement the "constitutional principle of the criminal sanction as a measure of last resort."

According to the referring judge, the "'absolute presumption of non-insignificance'" might appear rationally justifiable for the intentional instance of the crime of forest fire, governed by Article 423-bis, first paragraph, of the P.C., which would relate to "serious criminal phenomena" manifesting "a high degree of social alarm" and highlighting the marked dangerousness of the offender. Such treatment would not be justified, however, for negligent acts not attributable to criminal phenomena, characterized by "substantially non-existent" damage and a modest degree of negligence, "not found in carelessness and disregard for the environment."

Having established this, it would also be "peculiar" that among the crimes "statutorily" excluded from the application of the ground for non-punishment under Article 131-bis of the P.C., the only negligent crime is that under Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C., which would, moreover, constitute a crime of mere danger.

Furthermore, "[e]ven with reference to 'common danger' crimes, the only crime excluded from the application of the ground for non-punishment is Article 423-bis paragraph 2 of the P.C., which is substantially treated as if it were an intentional crime, given that all negligent 'common danger' crimes are not excluded from the application of Article 131-bis of the P.C."

Even the crime of negligent environmental disaster under Article 452-quinquies of the P.C., punishable with a minimum sentence slightly lower and a maximum sentence higher than negligent forest fire, would not be included among the crimes for which the judge is precluded from recognizing the particular insignificance of the offense; and this, despite the fact that the two instances, in the opinion of the referring judge, are "partially shared" concerning the protected legal interest, as the configuration of forest fire as an autonomous crime, distinct from the general figure of "common" fire under Article 423 of the P.C., would express the legislator's intention to protect not only public safety but also the preservation of forest assets, understood as an integral part of the broader environmental interest. The disparity in treatment between the two crimes would therefore be unreasonable, resulting in a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution.

1.5.– The challenged regulation would also lead to a violation of the principle of proportionality of the penalty. In the opinion of the referring judge, the provision under scrutiny, by imposing the imposition of a criminal sanction even in cases where "the blameworthiness is minimal," and where even the application of the statutory minimum would appear incongruous with the modest extent of the act, would be incompatible with Articles 3 and 24 (recte: 27, third paragraph) of the Constitution.

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, requesting that the questions be declared manifestly unfounded.

Preliminarily, the intervener notes that, according to the constant jurisprudence of this Court, grounds for non-punishment constitute derogations to general criminal norms, "so that their extension structurally involves a judgment of weighing with an open outcome between different and conflicting reasons, which 'primarily belongs to the legislator' (Judgment no. 156 of 2020, no. 140 of 2009 and no. 8 of 1996)"; with the consequence that "the legislator's choices regarding the scope of application of the ground for non-punishment under Article 131-bis of the P.C. are 'subject to review only for manifest unreasonableness' (Judgment no. 156 of 2020, no. 207 of 2017 and no. 30 of 2021)."

However, the challenged provision could not be deemed affected by such a defect.

The State Attorney's Office emphasizes that Article 1, paragraph 1, letter c), number 3), of Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022, in amending Article 131-bis of the P.C., introduced further objective exclusions to the applicability of the ground for non-punishment to balance the general expansion of its scope of application, which is now extended – in principle – to all crimes for which a custodial sentence not exceeding two years is provided. Thus, it was deliberately intended to prevent the institution of non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act from finding application for "offenses of particular gravity or social alarm, such as forest fire," with respect to which criminal policy evaluations, based on criminological or systemic evidence, "suggest the appropriateness of further express exclusions."

The intervener also observes that the crime of negligent environmental disaster would in no case be suitable to serve as a *tertium comparationis*. The two instances would be incomparable in terms of structure and protected legal interests. Forest fire, in fact, falls under the crimes against public safety, constituting a crime of common danger committed by violence, in which the protected interest would be represented by the life, physical integrity, and health of persons, whereas the protection of forest assets would be relevant "only instrumentally, i.e., only if its compromise can result in prejudice to the aforementioned interests."

In this regard, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation has clarified that, in the crime of forest fire, the material object may also include land covered by thicket, scrub, or Mediterranean maquis, as the legislator intended to protect natural components fundamental to human life (citing Criminal Cassation, first criminal section, judgments of October 6-November 10, 2020, no. 31345 and April 30-June 26, 2001, no. 25935).

Conversely, the crime of negligent environmental disaster belongs to the category of crimes against the environment, included in the new Title VI-bis of Book Two of the Penal Code, and its main purpose is the protection of the "biological environment."

Likewise unfounded would be the question of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Article 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution. According to the Attorney's Office, the censure is based on the erroneous premise that the ground for non-punishment governed by Article 131-bis of the P.C. applies where there is no offensiveness in the conduct. On the contrary, it has now been clarified, both by this Court (citing Judgment no. 207 of 2017) and by the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation (Cass., united criminal sections, no. 13681 of 2016), that the institution "requires the existence of an offense, albeit minimal, in the act to be judged."

Furthermore, the principle of proportionality of the penalty would be safeguarded by the possibility for the judge to take into account the specific characteristics of the act, both in determining the penalty based on Article 133 of the P.C., and in relation to the possible recognition of general mitigating circumstances.

Considered in Law

3.– With the order above, the Judge for Preliminary Hearings of the Court of Potenza raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the P.C., in reference to Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular insignificance when proceedings are brought for the crime of negligent forest fire under Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C.

This exclusion would be unreasonable considering the merely negligent nature of the conduct, as well as leading to a disparity of treatment compared to negligent common danger crimes under Chapter III, Title VI, Book II of the Penal Code and the crime of negligent environmental disaster, none of which are excluded from the scope of application of Article 131-bis of the P.C.

The challenged regulation would also lead to a violation of the principle of proportionality of the penalty, by imposing the imposition of a criminal sanction even in cases of minimal offensiveness and blameworthiness of the conduct.

4.– Preliminarily, the question raised with reference to the principle of proportionality of the penalty under Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution must be declared inadmissible. The referring judge, in fact, is deciding on the committal for trial of the defendant, and is not currently called upon to make any assessment concerning the determination of the penalty, which will be the sole responsibility of the trial court, should it find the elements of the defendant's criminal liability to exist. The question must, consequently, be deemed entirely hypothetical and contingent.

5.– On the merits, the question raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution is well-founded.

5.1.– The crime of negligent forest fire has been examined on the merits by this Court on two distinct occasions.

5.1.1.– With Judgment no. 3 of 2023, Article 656, paragraph 9, letter a), of the Code of Criminal Procedure was declared constitutionally illegitimate, for violation, among others, of Article 3 of the Constitution, in that it established that the suspension of execution could not be ordered against those convicted of the crime of negligent forest fire.

This Court emphasized, on that occasion, the absolute anomaly of this legislative preclusion, as it was the only negligent crime among those for which, exceptionally, the suspension of the execution of sentences not exceeding four years of imprisonment does not apply (point 3.4.1 of the Considered in Law); and it observed that, "While the undoubted objective gravity of the crime is certain," it is "truly difficult to assert that – from a subjective point of view – the perpetrator of a merely negligent conduct exhibits a special dangerousness, such as to justify the legislator's choice to ensure a 'passage to prison,' pending the assessment by the supervisory court of the prerequisites for admission to an alternative measure to detention" (point 3.4.2 of the Considered in Law).

At the same time, the disparity of treatment compared to other negligent crimes of equal or greater gravity, such as aggravated negligent homicide, traffic homicide, and all negligent disasters, including negligent fire, was highlighted. In particular, the latter crime, this Court observed, is "structurally similar" to forest fire, but is "intended to protect public safety," "i.e., the life and safety of an indeterminate number of people, thus a legal interest even more important than forest assets" (point 3.4.3 of the Considered in Law).

5.1.2.– With the very recent Judgment no. 191 of 2025, however, a question of constitutional legitimacy, also raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, concerning Article 168-bis, first paragraph, of the P.C., insofar as it does not allow the suspension of proceedings with probation for the crime of negligent forest fire, was deemed unfounded.

In this ruling, the broad discretion of the legislator in defining the objective limits within which "non-custodial" criminal law institutions can find application was first emphasized, provided that the legislative choice does not appear manifestly unreasonable, creating unsustainable disparities of treatment or, in any case, producing manifestly disproportionate results (on this point, lastly, judgments no. 157 of 2025, point 4 of the Considered in Law, and no. 139 of 2025, point 8.1. of the Considered in Law). Such manifest unreasonableness cannot be inferred from the mere negligent nature of the crime. In fact, "while it is true that the institution in question has resocializing purposes and negligence is one of the elements that the legislator may take into account in establishing its scope of application, it should be noted, on the one hand, that probation also pursues sanctioning and deflating purposes; and, on the other, that – as this Court has often affirmed – the legislator, in its broad discretion, may consider, in addition to the subjective element, other factors, such as the protected legal interest, the incriminated conduct, or the sanctioning treatment. Moreover, the significance here attributed by the legislator to the subjective element of negligence attests to the importance of the protected legal interest" (point 3.3. of the Considered in Law).

5.2.– The question now submitted to this Court presents distinct characteristics compared to both precedents.

5.2.1.– The essential *ratio decidendi* of Judgment no. 3 of 2023 lay in the absolute anomaly of a provision that – for the purposes of regulating the suspension of the execution order of a sentence – derived from the commission of a negligent crime a presumption of social dangerousness such as to justify imprisonment, pending the assessment by the supervisory court of the prerequisites for admission to an alternative measure to detention.

With respect to the objective exclusions from the scope of application of non-punishment for particular insignificance of the act, which are under consideration today, the negligent nature of the crime cannot be considered a decisive argument here: both because other negligent crimes are also excluded in all cases where "the conduct has caused or resulted, as unintended consequences, the death or very serious injury of a person" (consider, for example, all crimes of negligent homicide and the instance of death or very serious injury as a consequence of another crime under Article 586 of the P.C., attributable to this clause); and because the legislator's decision not to allow the definition of the proceedings and the trial under Article 131-bis of the P.C. for a specific crime does not depend here on the presumed subjective dangerousness of its author, but on the criminal policy evaluation of the opportunity not to leave unpunished acts attributable to certain abstract types of crime, or committed with particular modalities or motives.

5.2.2.– Regarding Judgment no. 191 of 2025, it concerned an institution – the suspension of proceedings with probation – which is, in fact, linked to non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act by a logic, broadly speaking, of "diversion" from the outcome traditionally represented by custodial sentences as the sole response to the crime; but it remains characterized by marked differences. Suspension of proceedings with probation, on the one hand, allows the person under investigation or the defendant to avoid any formal affirmation of responsibility for the commission of the act, which is instead implicit in a judgment under Article 131-bis of the P.C.; and, on the other hand, it provides for the carrying out of a path with distinctly reparative and resocializing contents, the positive outcome of which conditions the extinction of the crime: a path entirely absent in the case of a judgment of non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act.

The structural heterogeneity between the two institutions is also reflected in the different catalog of crimes admitted and excluded from the application of one and the other. The general criterion that identifies the area of admitted crimes is also different: crimes for which a custodial sentence not exceeding two years in the minimum is provided, or a pecuniary penalty, in the case of Article 131-bis of the P.C.; crimes punishable with a custodial sentence not exceeding four years in the maximum, or a pecuniary penalty, in the case of Article 168-bis of the P.C. The technique for identifying derogations to this general criterion is also different: a list of excluded hypotheses in Article 131-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the P.C.; and conversely, the extension of the institution to all crimes listed in Article 550, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure – that is, to those crimes punishable with a maximum custodial sentence exceeding four years for which direct summons to trial is nevertheless provided – in the case of Article 168-bis of the P.C.

It is also worth noting that the suspension of proceedings with probation is not applicable to negligent common danger damage crimes, for which Article 449 of the P.C. provides maximum custodial sentences exceeding four years; nor to the crime of negligent environmental disaster, for which, pursuant to Article 452-quinquies of the P.C., maximum sentences exceeding four years are likewise provided (more precisely, ten years under the first paragraph and six years and four months under the second). For all these crimes, since none of the exclusions under Article 131-bis, second and third paragraphs, of the P.C. apply, a judgment of non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act is possible – except in the case of negligent forest fire – since the statutory minimums provided are less than two years.

5.3.– The assessment that this Court is now called upon to make must therefore take into account the specific logic and the peculiar regulatory coordinates of non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act: a logic and coordinates different both from those of the suspension of the execution order of a conviction, the subject of Judgment no. 3 of 2023, and from those of the suspension of proceedings with probation, the subject of Judgment no. 191 of 2025.

Now, constant constitutional jurisprudence recognizes the broad discretion of the legislator in identifying the objective scope of the ground for non-punishment under Article 131-bis of the P.C., except for the limit of manifest unreasonableness (ex aliis, judgments no. 156 of 2020, point 3.5. of the Considered in Law, and no. 207 of 2017, point 6 of the Considered in Law).

Contrary to the view of the referring judge, such manifest unreasonableness cannot be considered present based on the argument that negligent forest fire would be the only negligent crime excluded from the scope of operation of the exemption. In reality, as observed a moment ago, pursuant to Article 131-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C., the offense cannot be considered of particular insignificance "when the conduct has caused or resulted, as unintended consequences, the death or very serious injury of a person": which is precisely what happens in crimes of common negligent homicide and injury (Articles 589 and 590 of the P.C.) or traffic or nautical (Articles 589-bis and 590-bis of the P.C.), as well as in the instance of death or very serious injury as a consequence of another crime (Article 586 of the P.C.).

Moreover, it is beyond doubt that the legislator intended to establish a particularly severe punitive treatment against forest fire, both in its intentional and negligent forms, for which – following the amendment made by Decree-Law no. 105 of August 10, 2023 (Urgent provisions on criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, combating forest fires, recovery from drug addiction, health and culture, as well as on judicial and public administration personnel), converted, with modifications, into Law no. 137 of October 9, 2023 – a sentence of two to five years of imprisonment is now provided. This, moreover, is consistent with the particularly high rank of the protected legal interest, also in light of the recent reform of Article 9 of the Constitution, which commits the Republic to protecting "the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems, also in the interest of future generations": interests, all, more or less intensely affected by fires that affect forest assets. This could well explain the exclusion of the crime from the list of those for which the aforementioned ground for non-punishment is applicable.

It is true, however, that – as the referring judge rightly points out – non-punishment due to the particular insignificance of the act, precluded for forest fire, is instead applicable to all negligent common danger damage crimes (Article 449 of the P.C.), as well as – it should be added – to negligent crimes against public health (Article 452 of the P.C.), including epidemic and poisoning of waters: the latter crimes, which are very serious, and punishable with particularly severe penalties if committed intentionally (life imprisonment and imprisonment up to twenty-four years, respectively, if no death occurs). This constitutes an evident disparity of treatment between crimes with at least analogous legal objects.

Perhaps the most evident incongruity, which the referring judge particularly emphasizes, concerns the crime of negligent environmental disaster, which is also included in the list of those to which Article 131-bis of the P.C. is applicable.

The minimum penalty provided for by Article 452-quinquies, first paragraph, of the P.C. for this crime (five years minus two-thirds, and therefore one year and eight months of imprisonment), is in fact now slightly lower than that provided for the crime of negligent forest fire (equal, as just noted, to two years of imprisonment). However, the legislative description of the crime of environmental disaster centers on three alternative macro-events characterized by a degree of offensiveness towards the environment far higher than that characterizing forest fire: "1) the irreversible alteration of the balance of an ecosystem; 2) the alteration of the balance of an ecosystem whose elimination is particularly burdensome and achievable only with exceptional measures; 3) the offense to public safety due to the relevance of the act for the extent of the compromise or its injurious effects or for the number of persons injured or exposed to danger" (Article 452-quater of the P.C.).

The third event, moreover, is described in such terms as to include, in addition to extensive environmental damage, an additional dimension of injury or danger to public safety, and therefore – again in this case – to the life and physical integrity of an indeterminate number of people.

In light of all this, the exclusion of negligent forest fire under Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C. from the scope of application of the non-punishment for particular insignificance of the act constitutes an inexplicable anomaly, especially since the facts attributable to the legal figure of forest fire can be characterized, in concrete terms, by highly heterogeneous objective gravity. In fact, they include both the large-scale destruction of entire forests, with very serious damage to the environment, ecosystems, and landscape itself; and, according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, events much less catastrophic (such as mere "scrub" fires: Cass., no. 31345 of 2020 and prior conforming precedents), as was the case in the matter subject to the present proceedings, described by the referring order as a fire that allegedly affected "only the dry grassy cover and the brambles of the undergrowth, involving a forest area of no particular extent and causing slight damage to the crowns of the trees."

It is therefore manifestly unreasonable that the ground for non-punishment of the particular insignificance of the act is admitted for the more serious crime and, conversely, excluded for the less serious crime (similarly, Judgment no. 172 of 2025, point 3.2.2. of the Considered in Law).

5.4.– From this derives the manifest unreasonableness of the exclusion of the crime of negligent forest fire from the scope of application of the exemption under Article 131-bis of the P.C.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the unconstitutionality of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the Penal Code, insofar as it provides that the offense cannot be deemed of particular insignificance when proceedings are brought for the crime provided for in Article 423-bis, second paragraph, of the P.C.;

2) declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 131-bis, third paragraph, number 3), of the P.C., raised, with reference to the principle of proportionality of the penalty under Articles 3 and 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Judge for Preliminary Hearings of the Court of Potenza with the order indicated above.

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on November 20, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco VIGANÒ, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on January 22, 2026

The anonymized version is textually compliant with the original