JUDGMENT NO. 166

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 100 of Presidential Decree No. 309 of October 9, 1990 (Consolidated Act on the laws governing narcotics and psychotropic substances, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of related drug addiction states), brought by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations at the Ordinary Court of Macerata, via the order of November 18, 2025, registered under no. 12 of the 2026 order register and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, 1st Special Series, No. 6, for the year 2026.

Having regard to the appearance submitted by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in chambers on July 6, 2026, the Judge Rapporteur Roberto Nicola Cassinelli;

deliberated in chambers on July 6, 2026.

The Proceedings in Fact

1.– By order of November 18, 2025, registered under no. 12 of the 2026 order register, the Judge for Preliminary Investigations at the Ordinary Court of Macerata raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 100 of Presidential Decree No. 309 of October 9, 1990 (Consolidated Act on the laws governing narcotics and psychotropic substances, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of related drug addiction states), to the extent that – while establishing, under paragraph 4, that movable and immovable property acquired by the State following a final confiscation order shall be assigned, upon request by the administration of affiliation, to police agencies that had use thereof following seizure, or may likewise be assigned, upon request, to associations, communities, or entities dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts – it does not provide that such property may also be assigned, likewise upon request, to police agencies that have not previously had use thereof and intend to utilize it for anti-drug police operations.

1.1.– The referring judge states that on March 18, 2025 – upon the conclusion of an investigation concerning significant transportation and dealing of narcotics, which also led to the seizure of a motor vehicle – a judgment pursuant to Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rendered against M. F., ordering inter alia the confiscation of the seized vehicle.

By note dated October 8, 2025, said vehicle was requested for use in anti-drug services by the Municipal Police of Macerata, who, however, specified – in a subsequent note dated October 17 – that they had never had the use of said vehicle and that, given its high mileage, it was presumably of no interest to other judicial police bodies.

1.2.– This having been premised, the *a quo* judge highlights that Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act establishes – under paragraph 1 – that registered movable property, ships, boats, watercraft, and aircraft seized during anti-drug judicial police operations may be entrusted to judicial custody by the proceeding judicial authority to police agencies that request them for use in anti-drug police operations, provided the judicial authority does not dismiss the application by reasoned decree, and only if procedural requirements do not preclude it. Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same Article 100, the expenses relating to the management of the property and the compulsory insurance of vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft shall be borne by the utilizing office or command. Finally, subsequent paragraph 4 provides – as stated – that such movable or immovable property, acquired by the State following a final confiscation order, shall be assigned, upon request by the administration of affiliation, to the police agencies that had use thereof, and may likewise be assigned, upon request, also to associations, communities, or entities dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts.

Now, this provision – the referral order highlights – "appears to fall within a category provided for also by other regulatory provisions derogating from the ordinary destination of confiscated assets", namely their sale or destruction, pursuant to Article 86 of Legislative Decree No. 271 of July 28, 1989 (Implementing, coordinating, and transitional provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

In this regard, reference is made, first of all, to Article 9 of Law No. 146 of March 16, 2006 (Ratification and implementation of the United Nations Convention and Protocols against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly on November 15, 2000, and May 31, 2001). Indeed, its paragraph 9-bis establishes – for IT or telecommunications assets used for the commission of offenses referred to in Book II, Title XII, Chapter III, Section I, of the Criminal Code, already seized and placed in judicial custody, which have been entrusted with the faculty of use (pursuant to the preceding paragraph 9) to judicial police agencies that have requested them for use in anti-drug counter-activities referred to in the same article, or for the performance of institutional duties – assignment to the same users.

Reference is then made to Article 18-bis of Legislative Decree No. 74 of March 10, 2000 (New regulations on offenses concerning income taxes and value-added tax, pursuant to Article 9 of Law No. 205 of June 25, 1999). Under this provision, assets – other than money and financial assets – seized in the context of criminal proceedings relating to offenses provided for by the same legislative decree and any other tax offense, may be entrusted in judicial custody by the judicial authority to the bodies of the financial administration that request them for their operational needs (paragraph 1), and may also be assigned, upon request, once acquired by the State following a final confiscation order, to the bodies of the financial administration (paragraph 1-bis).

Furthermore, reference is made to the provisions of Article 48 of Legislative Decree No. 159 of September 6, 2011 (Code of anti-mafia laws and prevention measures, as well as new provisions concerning anti-mafia documentation, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 136 of August 13, 2010). Indeed, pursuant to paragraph 12 of said article, movable property, including registered property, confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the same Legislative Decree No. 159 of 2011, may be used – by the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organized Crime (ANBSC) – for institutional activities, or allocated to other State bodies, territorial entities, or the subjects provided for by paragraph 3, letter c), of the same Article 48; provision is also made for the allocation of such assets, on a priority basis, to the National Fire Corps when trucks, construction machinery, operating machinery, forklifts, and any other special-purpose vehicles are involved, if functional to public rescue requirements (paragraph 12-bis); finally, a closing rule is laid down (paragraph 12-ter) according to which all remaining movable property, including registered property, not allocated pursuant to the two preceding paragraphs, may be put up for sale, with a prohibition on further transfer for a period of not less than one year, in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 5, sixth period, of Article 48, or, alternatively, destroyed.

Finally, the referring judge mentions Article 86-bis of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This provision, on the one hand, establishes under paragraph 1 that IT or telecommunications assets and instruments subject to seizure – which, following forensic technical analysis, prove to have been used, in whole or in part, for the commission of offenses under Articles 473, 474, 615-ter, 615-quater, 615-quinquies, 617-bis, 617-ter, 617-quater, 617-quinquies, 617-sexies, 635-bis, 635-ter, 635-quater, 635-quinquies, 640-ter, and 640-quinquies of the Criminal Code – shall be entrusted by the judicial authority, barring overriding procedural requirements, in judicial custody with faculty of use either to police agencies that have requested them for use in combating cybercrime, or to other State bodies for justice purposes. Furthermore, subsequent paragraph 2 provides that such assets and instruments, if acquired by the State following a final confiscation proceeding, shall be assigned to the administrations that request them and that have had the use thereof, or, if there has been no prior entrustment in judicial custody, to the police agencies that request them for use in combating cybercrime, or, finally, to other State bodies for justice purposes.

1.2.1.– Now, these rules – the *a quo* judge observes – "appear to be the expression of a generic favor for the use of assets confiscated from crime by public entities or in any case for public interest purposes, but apparently without any underlying unitary criterion".

Indeed, the referral order of the GIP further notes, while Article 9 of Law No. 146 of 2006 provides for the assignment, without an express destination constraint, to police agencies that have already had the use thereof, of IT or telecommunications assets used to commit certain typical offenses (namely, all those against individual liberty), on the other hand, Article 86-bis of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the assignment, with an express destination constraint, of IT or telecommunications assets and instruments – already subject to seizure and which, following forensic technical analysis, prove to have been, in whole or in part, used for the commission of other specifically identified criminal offenses – to the administrations that request them and have had the use thereof, or, where there has been no prior entrustment in judicial custody, to police agencies that request them, or, finally, to other State bodies, but solely for use in combating cybercrime or for justice purposes.

Even more distinct is the discipline under Article 18-bis of Legislative Decree No. 74 of 2000, a provision that provides for the assignment, without an express destination constraint, of any confiscated asset – with the exception of money and financial instruments – for tax offenses, even if not used for the commission thereof, to bodies of the financial administration, regardless of whether or not they have had the use thereof.

The same applies to Article 48 of Legislative Decree No. 159 of 2011, whose paragraphs 12, 12-bis, and 12-ter contemplate the assignment of mafia-confiscated assets to the aforementioned ANBSC, to State bodies, to territorial entities, to the National Fire Corps, as well as – by virtue of the cross-reference to letter c) of paragraph 3 of the same Article 48 – to communities (including youth communities), entities, associations most representative of local authorities, voluntary organizations, therapeutic communities and drug rehabilitation and treatment centers, environmental protection associations, other types of cooperatives provided they are based on prevailing mutuality, recognized social agriculture operators under current provisions, and national and regional park authorities.

1.2.2.– On this basis, the referring judge challenges Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act "in the part in which it does not provide, upon request, for the possible assignment of registered movable property", namely "ships, boats, watercraft, and aircraft" seized during anti-drug judicial police operations, "even to police agencies that have not previously had the use thereof pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and that intend to allocate them to anti-drug police activities".

The *a quo* judge emphasizes in this regard that the challenged provision provides for two different types of assignment of confiscated assets.

A mandatory one, as made evident by the wording of paragraph 4, first period, of the aforementioned Article 100 ("shall be assigned"), where the application is formulated by the administration to which belongs the judicial police that has already held in custody and in use such assets. The referring judge believes that such assignment cannot be correlated "to the prior assumption of costs", established by paragraph 3 of the same Article 100, because such costs might well be absent (where the vehicle was entrusted to the owner), so the purpose of paragraph 3 would solely be to "exempt the State from such costs by placing them upon whoever concretely uses the vehicle". Rather, such mandatory assignment is considered "the expression of the legislator's favor for the continuity of possession and potential use" of the asset by the judicial police already utilizing it.

By contrast, the assignment is optional – as would be made evident, once again, by the text of paragraph 4, second period, of the challenged Article 100 ("May also be assigned, upon request") – when requested by entities that have nothing to do with drug trafficking repression activities and are engaged in the distinct sector of drug addict rehabilitation.

Furthermore, for both categories of beneficiaries – the referring judge stresses – the rule does not expressly provide, unlike what is established for the entrustment of use to the judicial police, "specific purposes to which the assets must be allocated after final assignment, although they must clearly be used in the performance of the institutional duties of the beneficiary entities" (even mediately, "since nothing seems to exclude", it is argued, "that such asset once assigned to an entity" may then be "sold and the proceeds used for institutional purposes").

Now, in this context, the *a quo* judge deems it "entirely irrational", constituting a "manifestly unreasonable omission", that a judicial police body "which has never been entrusted with the seized assets cannot, after their confiscation, request their assignment (without prejudice clearly to the priority recognized to any police agencies that have had the use thereof, logically favored for continuity of possession and use) for deployment in anti-drug police activities, when [...] the same could have submitted such application prior to confiscation, subsequently becoming (if accepted) entitled to its definitive assignment". Indeed, the faculty to request the assignment of confiscated assets is recognized also to associations, communities, or entities dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts, subjects "who – however meritorious – the legislator appears to configure as less entitled", compared to judicial police forces, "inasmuch as they are not legitimized to request their use prior to confiscation".

It is further emphasized that – in the present case – "in the absence of other assignment applications" and pursuant to ordinary rules, "the potential uneconomical nature of the sale" would lead to "the destruction of the asset", which, instead, could be usefully employed by whoever requested it "in the performance of their institutional duties".

Finally, having excluded the possibility of employing, as a useful *tertium comparationis*, any of the above-indicated norms that also provide for the assignment of confiscated assets to entities, given their heterogeneity, the referring judge points out that they all establish "the allocation of confiscated assets to public bodies tasked with the protection of State interests", without providing in any case that private entities may receive preferential treatment compared to public entities excluded from competing for their assignment. This profile "further highlights the irrationality and anomaly of the challenged provision and its unjustified heterogeneity compared to the regulatory system".

1.3.– Finally, the referring judge states that the question raised appears relevant in the *a quo* proceedings, "given that the Municipal Police of Macerata requested the use for anti-drug services of a vehicle confiscated during an anti-drug judicial police operation which it never had in use while under seizure and which, therefore, the challenged provision does not provide can be assigned to it".

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, concluding for a declaration of manifest unfoundedness of the raised question.

2.1.– It is argued in particular that the referring judge, under the formal mantle of alleged (but non-existent) violations of Article 3 of the Constitution, essentially seeks an irregular review "on the point of appropriateness regarding the choices made by the Legislator, who is assigned, within the constitutional design, the broadest discretion, inter alia in matters of criminal policy, criminal law, and the administration of justice".

Indeed, according to the intervener, although the addition to the regulatory precept urged by the *a quo* judge may appear entirely reasonable (inasmuch as it is based on the assumption that, "if police forces can, after confiscation, obtain the assignment of the asset they previously had in use, and if other subjects can obtain such assignment even without prior use", it "might be argued that the police should also fall within the list of such subjects"), this is not sufficient for the acceptance of the raised question, since "it is not the existence of a non-manifestly unreasonable alternative that can ground a constitutional defect" of the challenged rule; rather, "it is the solution actually chosen by the Legislator that must be manifestly unreasonable".

2.2.– This premised, the regulatory provision under examination, besides not being manifestly irrational, maintains the President of the Council of Ministers, "indeed has its own clear and logical sense".

Indeed, the premise of the legislator's intervention – it is argued – "is that the assets, after final confiscation, are intended to contribute to the cause of rehabilitating persons suffering from addiction, and therefore it is the dedicated associations and communities that may request their assignment", the choice to favor associations, communities, and sector entities being "the expression of a modern vision of the dimension of solidarity that implies overcoming the idea that only the action of the public system is capable of carrying out activities of general interest".

However, if "those assets have already been assigned to police forces for temporary use prior to confiscation, then, in this case, definitive assignment may also occur in favor of such forces", since in this hypothesis, "a profile of continuity of administrative action was also intended to be enhanced".

Having thus reconstructed the rationale of the rule, "it is incomprehensible why the Legislator's choice should ever be deemed manifestly irrational", the logic of the choice not to permit post-confiscation assignment for the benefit of police agencies which, despite having the faculty, failed to request the entrustment of seized assets for use, and only subsequently to confiscation advanced an assignment request, being instead evident.

Finally, as regards the profiles of alleged constitutional illegitimacy for violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, the President of the Council of Ministers points out that this principle "does not require every similar situation to be regulated identically by the Legislator, but rather that equal situations be regulated in the same way, barring reasonable derogations (in the presence of which it is equally legitimate to regulate analogous situations differently)". This would thus confirm "the manifest unfoundedness of the censure moved by the *a quo* judge, who cites various norms similar to the one object of the present constitutional incident", specifying, however, himself "that this is a strongly heterogeneous system of norms", lacking a specific provision regulating "a factual scenario identical to the one of interest today" in a manner different from what is established by the challenged rule.

The Proceedings in Law

3.– The GIP of the Court of Macerata, by the order indicated in the heading, raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act, to the extent that – while establishing, under paragraph 4, that movable and immovable property acquired by the State following a final confiscation order shall be assigned, upon request by the administration of affiliation, to police agencies that had use thereof following seizure, or may likewise be assigned, upon request, also to associations, communities, or entities dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts – it does not provide that such property may also be assigned, likewise upon request, to police agencies that have not previously had use thereof and intend to utilize it for anti-drug police operations.

3.1.– The referring judge premises that the challenged provision "appears to fall within a category provided for also by other regulatory provisions derogating from the ordinary destination of confiscated assets", namely their sale or destruction, pursuant to Article 86 of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

To be exact, reference is made to:

– Article 9, paragraph 9-bis, of Law No. 146 of 2006, which, for IT or telecommunications assets used for the commission of offenses referred to in Book II, Title XII, Chapter III, Section I, of the Criminal Code, already seized and placed in judicial custody, which have been entrusted with the faculty of use (pursuant to the preceding paragraph 9) to judicial police agencies that have requested them for use in counter-activities referred to in the same article, or for the performance of institutional duties, establishes assignment to the same users;

– Article 18-bis of Legislative Decree No. 74 of 2000, which, for assets – other than money and financial assets – seized in the context of criminal proceedings relating to offenses provided for by the same legislative decree and any other tax offense, establishes the possibility of entrustment in judicial custody by the judicial authority to the bodies of the financial administration that request them for their operational needs (paragraph 1), as well as the assignment, upon request, once acquired by the State following a final confiscation order, to the bodies of the financial administration (paragraph 1-bis);

– Article 48 of Legislative Decree No. 159 of 2011, which, under paragraph 12, for movable property, including registered property, confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the same legislative decree, establishes the possibility of use – by the ANBSC – for institutional activities, or allocation to other State bodies, territorial entities, or the subjects provided for by paragraph 3, letter c), of the same Article 48, providing moreover for the allocation of such assets, on a priority basis, to the National Fire Corps when trucks, construction machinery, operating machinery, forklifts, and any other special-purpose vehicles are involved, if functional to public rescue requirements (paragraph 12-bis), and finally laying down a closing rule (paragraph 12-ter) according to which all remaining movable property, including registered property, not allocated pursuant to the two preceding paragraphs, may be put up for sale, with a prohibition on further transfer for a period of not less than one year, in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 5, sixth period, of Article 48, or, alternatively, destroyed;

– Article 86-bis of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which on the one hand establishes, under paragraph 1, that IT or telecommunications assets and instruments subject to seizure – which, following forensic technical analysis, prove to have been used, in whole or in part, for the commission of offenses under Articles 473, 474, 615-ter, 615-quater, 615-quinquies, 617-bis, 617-ter, 617-quater, 617-quinquies, 617-sexies, 635-bis, 635-ter, 635-quater, 635-quinquies, 640-ter, and 640-quinquies of the Criminal Code – shall be entrusted by the judicial authority, barring overriding procedural requirements, in judicial custody with faculty of use either to police agencies that have requested them for use in combating cybercrime, or to other State bodies for justice purposes, and furthermore provides, under subsequent paragraph 2, that such assets and instruments, if acquired by the State following a final confiscation proceeding, shall be assigned to the administrations that request them and that have had the use thereof, or, where there has been no prior entrustment in judicial custody, to police agencies that request them for use in combating cybercrime, or, finally, to other State bodies for justice purposes.

3.2.– This premised, the *a quo* judge deems it "entirely irrational" that – pursuant to the challenged provision – a judicial police body "which has never been entrusted with the seized assets cannot, after their confiscation, request their assignment (without prejudice clearly to the priority recognized to any police agencies that have had the use thereof, logically favored for continuity of possession and use) for deployment in anti-drug police activities, when [...] the same could have submitted such application prior to confiscation, subsequently becoming (if accepted) entitled to its definitive assignment". Indeed, the faculty to request the assignment of confiscated assets, the referring judge further observes, is recognized also to associations, communities, or entities dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts, subjects "who – however meritorious – the legislator appears to configure as less entitled", compared to judicial police forces, "inasmuch as they are not legitimized to request their use prior to confiscation".

Moreover, although – according to the referring judge – the possibility of utilizing, as a useful *tertium comparationis*, any of the above-indicated norms (which also provide for the assignment of confiscated assets to public entities) must be excluded due to their heterogeneity, one cannot overlook the circumstance that they all establish "the allocation of confiscated assets to public bodies tasked with the protection of State interests", without providing in any case that private entities may receive preferential treatment compared to public entities excluded from competing for their assignment. This profile "further highlights the irrationality and anomaly of the challenged provision and its unjustified heterogeneity compared to the regulatory system".

4.– As a preliminary matter, this Court must examine the potential influence, regarding the raised question, of the *ius superveniens* constituted by Decree-Law No. 23 of February 24, 2026 (Urgent provisions concerning public security, investigative activities of the judicial authority in the presence of justification grounds, functionality of police forces and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as immigration and international protection), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 54 of April 24, 2026, Article 5, paragraph 1 of which amended the text of paragraph 7-bis of Article 73 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act. Indeed, in its current formulation, it provides that, in the event of conviction or plea bargaining (whether one or the other occurred for the offense of illicit production, trafficking, and possession of narcotic or psychotropic substances), confiscation shall be ordered no longer solely of "things that are the profit or product thereof, unless they belong to a person extraneous to the crime", but also of "motor vehicles or other registered and unregistered movable assets that prove to have been used for the commission of one of the acts provided for by this article, or that have facilitated the commission of the same acts, unless they belong to a person extraneous to the crime".

4.1.– In relation to this supervening regulation, the problem arises of determining whether – by reason of the change in the regulatory framework of reference – the files should possibly be returned to the referring judge, so that the latter may examine the relationship between the amended paragraph 7-bis of Article 73 and paragraph 4 of Article 100 of the same consolidated act.

In this regard, scholarly commentary has argued that – in the absence of explicit coordination between the two norms enacted by the legislator, who limited himself to introducing the described ablative factual scenario (specifically, a new hypothesis of mandatory confiscation) without any modification to Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act, nor any express cross-reference thereto – such legislative silence could be interpreted to mean that the new regulatory provision stands in a relationship of specialization, subsidiarity, or complementarity with the pre-existing one.

4.2.– More specifically, three hermeneutic options have been outlined.

First, direct and unreserved application of Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act even in the event of (prior seizure and subsequent) confiscation of "motor vehicles or other registered and unregistered movable assets" that prove to have been used for the commission of one of the acts provided for by Article 73 of the same consolidated act, or that have facilitated the commission of the same acts. Article 100, it has been argued, constitutes a general rule contained in the same regulatory body to which Article 73 also belongs, governing the destination of all assets "confiscated following anti-drug operations", and this because even the new hypothesis of mandatory confiscation pursuant to Article 73, paragraph 7-bis, is peacefully ordered following proceedings for a narcotics-related offense, so there would be no reasons to exclude it from the scope of application of the repeatedly cited Article 100. Supporting this conclusion is both a literal argument – since Article 100, paragraph 4, of the Narcotics Consolidated Act does not specify what type of confiscation is involved, nor does it make distinctions among the various typologies contemplated in the same consolidated act – and a systematic argument, based on the finding that said consolidated act is characterized by the tendency to build an organic system of rules, so an interpretation segmenting it, excluding certain types of confiscation from the application of Article 100 without an express regulatory basis, would contradict this unitary logic.

Alternatively, the thesis of analogical application has been advanced, based on the assumption that Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act was *ab origine* conceived with reference to the confiscation of assets that constituted the primary instrument of anti-narcotics enforcement operations, whereas the new mandatory confiscation – destined to strike any movable asset that has even merely "facilitated" the commission of any of the criminal acts under Article 73 of the same consolidated act – has a broader scope. The application of Article 100 to this factual scenario would require, still according to this scholarly approach, an operation of *analogia iuris*, to be deemed admissible in any case since these are rules that do not pertain to the punishability of the act.

Finally, the third thesis is that of exclusion: Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act would now apply solely to assets seized in the context of specific "anti-drug operations", whereas the new mandatory confiscation may concern any movable asset, even if found in the context of ordinary police checks not classifiable as an anti-drug operation in a technical sense, the destination of which asset will be that established, in general terms, by Article 86 of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

4.3.– Whatever hermeneutic option is favored by future application practice, this Court deems that the illustrated *ius superveniens* is irrelevant in the present case.

Even indeed admitting that the scope of operation of Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act, and specifically of its paragraph 4, should be circumscribed – on the basis of the third of the reconstructive proposals illustrated above – solely to confiscations consequential to seizures ordered on the occasion of "anti-drug operations", the enduring application of such rule to the present case is undoubted, given that the referral order reports that the confiscated vehicle was indeed seized upon the outcome of an operation of this nature.

This finding excludes the necessity of returning the files to the *a quo* judge, since such return is required only when the *ius superveniens* can "condition the applicability of the challenged rules in the *a quo* proceedings" (thus, most recently, judgments No. 84 and No. 28 of 2026).

5.– Turning to the examination of the question of constitutional legitimacy raised by the referring judge, the same is not founded.

5.1.– In reviewing it, one must proceed from the finding that constitutional jurisprudence has rarely intervened on the topic of the destination of confiscated assets, having dealt with it principally under the profile of the division of competencies between the State and the regions, in order to trace back to the exclusive legislative power of the State in matters of public order and security, pursuant to Article 117, second paragraph, letter h), of the Constitution, the legislation concerning the effects of confiscation "also with reference to the assignment of assets and the supervision functions over the correct utilization thereof by the assignees" (thus, most recently, judgment No. 177 of 2020; but similarly also judgments No. 234 and No. 34 of 2012).

Of greater utility – for the purposes relevant here – is instead the judgment stating that the "general discipline" relating to the destination of confiscated assets "is provided by Article 86 of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by some of the provisions contained in Title III of Part IV of the Consolidated Act on Judicial Expenses", rules according to which "the 'ordinary' destination of confiscated assets is sale"; nevertheless, "this is a 'normal' destination, but not inescapable, exceptions being provided", highlighting that numerous provisions "indeed foreshadow specific destinations – other than sale – for certain categories of confiscated assets, or when confiscation is ordered in relation to certain offense typologies", with the further clarification that in "most cases special destination consists in the assignment of the asset to specific bodies or subjects – usually public, but sometimes also private – so that they may utilize them for particular purposes" (judgment No. 208 of 2023).

5.2.– From the foregoing it emerges that the destination of confiscated assets constitutes the object of a broadly discretionary choice by the legislator, since the derogation from the ordinary destination – sale – may consist in assignment to bodies or subjects, indifferently, both public and private (without, therefore, any preference, even a tendency one, being accorded to the former, as the referring judge instead appears to believe), legitimized to utilize them for "particular purposes", with respect to which there is no need to identify a, so to speak, "unifying" criterion.

It follows that the non-unreasonableness of derogating provisions with respect to the "normal" destination must be assessed not on the presupposition of a (non-existent) preference for assignment to bodies of the public administration, but rather solely in relation to the aptitude of the destination itself to allow the achievement of the purposes for which it is provided.

In light of these coordinates, the choice made by the challenged provision to allow, on a preferential basis, the definitive assignment, after confiscation, of assets seized pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act, "during anti-drug judicial police operations", precisely to those "police agencies" (even different, needless to say, from the authors of such operations) that have already made "request for use in anti-drug police activities", thereby obtaining provisional use thereof, appears entirely reasonable. In this manner, in fact, not only is continuity in utilization already underway guaranteed, but requests for provisional assignment are also encouraged—an occurrence that has its precise logic, given that the (immediate) operational use of the asset – as highlighted in scholarly commentary – makes it possible to eliminate custody costs, enhance the asset through its effective utilization, and reduce the risk of deterioration connected to warehousing. Thus, ultimately, to this same logic must be ascribed the legislator's choice not to give weight to "belated" requests coming from police agencies, as they are not equally capable of ensuring the purpose of eliminating custody costs and the risk of (rapid) obsolescence of the asset and its loss of economic value.

On the other hand, in the absence of prior use by police agencies (consequential precisely to provisional assignment in their favor), the legislator's choice to attribute such now-confiscated assets – an attribution considered residual in scholarly commentary (according to a hermeneutic option shared, moreover, by the referring judge himself) – to subjects dealing with the rehabilitation of drug addicts who request them appears non-unreasonable. Such an initiative, indeed, could be undertaken by them – since the challenged provision imposes no specific destination constraint on the asset – also for the purpose of arranging the sale of the confiscated asset, allocating the proceeds thus obtained to the rehabilitation purposes of drug addicts.

Finally, in the absence even of such an assignment request, proceeding is carried out, according to general rules, to the sale of the asset. Should this latter occurrence indeed take place, the legislator – in confirmation that within the *intentio legis* the interest in recovering victims of drug addiction is far from marginal, being able to recede only with respect to the necessity of ensuring the continuation of utilization already initiated with the provisional assignment of the asset – has established, under paragraph 5 of Article 100 of the Narcotics Consolidated Act, that "sums of money constituting the proceeds from the sale of confiscated assets flow into a dedicated chapter of the State budget revenues to be reassigned, in equal parts, on the basis of specific requests, to the relevant chapters of the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, which provides for disbursements of competence pursuant to Decree-Law No. 144 of April 22, 1985, converted, with amendments, by Law No. 297 of June 21, 1985, and of the Ministry of Health with a destination constraint for the rehabilitation activities of drug addicts".

These considerations, therefore, require dismissing the first censure of violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, raised by the referring judge by deducing – in essence – an intrinsic unreasonableness in excluding those police agencies that did not request assignment of the asset when seized.

5.3.– As for, instead, the second censure hypothesizing a violation of the principle of equality with respect to a series of factual scenarios – indicated above (point 3.1.) – united by the fact that, regarding the destination of confiscated assets, the legislator excluded "that private entities may receive preferential treatment compared to public entities", it is ultimately the referring judge himself who offers arguments to exclude its foundation.

He, in fact, recognizes that such factual scenarios, due to their heterogeneity (especially in relation to the provision – not common to all – of a destination constraint imposed on confiscated assets) cannot be assumed as *tertia comparationis*.

In examining this censure, therefore, it is sufficient to reiterate that the "model of the equality judgment in the strict sense" finds "at its core the concept of pertinence, since the regulatory treatment of a factual scenario can be deemed discriminatory in relation to that of another factual scenario only insofar as the comparison with such second factual scenario is precisely pertinent. All things, persons, or situations are similar in some respects and dissimilar in others, so that in order to make a meaningful comparison between them it is necessary to establish which respect is relevant. That is to say, it is a question of determining, among the so-called 'family resemblances' characterizing the elements of a certain set, which ones pertain to the equality judgment and which ones do not" (judgment No. 54 of 2026, in particular point 9.1., as well as, in similar terms, judgment No. 85 of 2026).

Ultimately, there are no relevant "family resemblances", either among the individual factual scenarios evoked as terms of comparison, or between them and the one object of the challenged provision (since it is not a question, in all cases, of the confiscation of *instrumenta sceleris*, lacking moreover, as a common requirement, by admission of the referring judge himself, even that of the specific destination constraint imposed on the confiscated things), and moreover, they are not even clarified by the referring judge.

5.4.– In conclusion, the raised question is not founded.

on those grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 100 of Presidential Decree No. 309 of October 9, 1990 (Consolidated Act on the laws governing narcotics and psychotropic substances, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of related drug addiction states), raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution by the Judge for Preliminary Investigations at the Ordinary Court of Macerata via the order indicated in the heading, to be not founded.

So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on July 6, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Registrar

Deposited in the Registry on October 9, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms in text to the original