JUDGMENT NO. 160

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 29 September 1973 (Provisions on the collection of income taxes), as added by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 21 October 2021 (Urgent economic and fiscal measures, for the protection of employment and for indifferible requirements), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 215 of 17 December 2021, substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 29 July 2024 (Provisions concerning the reorganization of the national tax collection system), subsequently repealed by Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 24 March 2025 (Consolidated Act on payments and tax collection) and inserted into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to the aforementioned legislative decree, with effect from 1 January 2027, pursuant to Article 243, raised by the Justice of the Peace of Milan, First Civil Section, in the proceedings pending between C. C. and Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione, by order of 3 November 2025, registered as No. 8 of the Register of Orders 2026 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, 1st Special Series, No. 5 of the year 2026.

Having regard to the appearance in proceedings of C. C., as well as the intervention brief of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in the public hearing of 7 July 2026 the Judge Rapporteur Luca Antonini;

having heard counsel Francesco Musacchio and Margareta Kosa for C. C., as well as State Counsel Emanuele Manzo for the President of the Council of Ministers;

having deliberated in the chambers on 7 July 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto

1.– By order of 3 November 2025 (registered as No. 8 of the Register of Orders 2026), the Justice of the Peace of Milan, First Civil Section, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 29 September 1973 (Provisions on the collection of income taxes), with reference to Articles 3, 10, 11, 24, 77, first and second paragraphs, 97, first paragraph (recte: second paragraph), 111, 113, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as added by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 21 October 2021 (Urgent economic and fiscal measures, for the protection of employment and for indifferible requirements), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 215 of 17 December 2021, substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 29 July 2024 (Provisions concerning the reorganization of the national tax collection system), subsequently repealed by Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 24 March 2025 (Consolidated Act on payments and tax collection) and inserted into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to the aforementioned legislative decree, with effect from 1 January 2027, pursuant to Article 243.

1.1.‒ The referring judge premises that, by the censured provision, the legislature introduced limitations on the taxpayer's right to directly challenge the tax roll and the tax payment notice (cartella di pagamento) when not validly notified.

The judge points out, in particular, that these limitations were established, firstly, by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 2021, as converted, which added paragraph 4-bis to Article 12 of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, pursuant to which "[t]he tax roll extract (estratto di ruolo) may not be challenged. The tax roll and the payment notice alleged to have been invalidly notified may be directly challenged solely in cases where the debtor acting in legal proceedings demonstrates that the entry in the tax roll may cause prejudice with regard to participation in a procurement procedure, pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 4, of the Public Contracts Code, under Legislative Decree No. 50 of 18 April 2016, or for the collection of sums owed to the debtor by public bodies referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of the regulation under Ministerial Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance No. 40 of 18 January 2008, as a result of the verifications referred to in Article 48-bis of this decree, or lastly, for the loss of a benefit in relations with a public administration.”

The judge further highlights that, subsequently, the legislature, by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, substituted Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, introducing further grounds for direct challenge, establishing that "[t]he tax roll extract may not be challenged. The tax roll and the payment notice alleged to have been invalidly notified may be directly challenged in cases where the debtor acting in legal proceedings demonstrates that the entry in the tax roll may cause prejudice: a) as a consequence of provisions set forth in the Public Contracts Code under Legislative Decree No. 36 of 31 March 2023; b) for the collection of sums owed to the debtor by public entities referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of the regulation under Ministerial Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance No. 40 of 18 January 2008, including as a result of the verifications referred to in Article 48-bis of this decree; c) for the loss of a benefit in relations with a public administration; d) within the framework of procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019; e) in relation to financing operations by authorized entities; f) within the context of the transfer of a business, taking into account the provisions of Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 18 December 1997, n. 472.”

Finally, the referring judge specifies that Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 2025 provided for the repeal of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, "replacing it with the new Consolidated Act […], which entered into force on 27 March 2025 and was last updated on 16 April 2025,” applicable, pursuant to Article 243 of the same legislative decree, starting from 1 January 2027.

2.– Following the illustration of the content of the censured provision, the referring judge states that, in the originating complaint of the main proceedings, the taxpayer had pointed out: a) the intention to access, "as an over-indebted small entrepreneur,” the composition procedure for over-indebtedness crises pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019 (Business Crisis and Insolvency Code implementing Law No. 155 of 19 October 2017); b) that, in order to assess the existence or otherwise of the conditions for accessing the procedure, it was deemed necessary to "precisely define the tax debt situation and possibly draft a plan referring exclusively to sums actually due and not to those merely entered in the tax roll”; c) that, for this reason, an application for access to administrative records had been submitted to the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione.

The referring judge thus reports that, upon consulting the tax roll extracts, the taxpayer discovered the existence of certain payment notices (totaling €4,200.54) which were alleged never to have been notified, and, after submitting a request for ex officio annulment (autotutela), filed an appeal against the implied refusal (silenzio-rifiuto), contesting the failure to notify the payment notices and the intervening lapse of time (decadenza) and limitation period (prescrizione) of the claims.

2.2.‒ The judge *a quo* notes having previously raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning the limits established by the censured provision regarding the challengability of the tax roll and the invalidly notified payment notice, and that this Court, by Order No. 81 of 2024, declared them inadmissible due to an insufficient description of the specific factual scenario which resulted in a "deficiency in the reasoning concerning the relevance of the questions,” given that the referring judge failed to indicate "the specific methods used for the notification of the […] payment notices, clarifying whether or not they had been regularly carried out.”

3.‒ Having stated this, the referring judge preliminarily ascertains that the payment notices appearing in the tax roll extract had not been regularly notified.

This verification affects the relevance of the questions.

Indeed, according to the Justice of the Peace of Milan, despite the ascertainment of the invalidity of the notification of the payment notices entered in the tax roll, "the taxpayer's application would be destined to be declared inadmissible,” since the censured provision precluded the direct challenge of the tax roll and payment notices; whereas, should the same provision be declared constitutionally illegitimate, the taxpayer's appeal should be upheld, given the non-existence of the limitation on immediate challenge and, on the merits, the invalidity of the notification of the payment notices.

3.1.‒ The referring judge specifies that the situation of the party in the main proceedings cannot be traced back to any of the hypotheses for which the legislature provided specific derogations from the general rule of non-direct challengability of the tax roll and payment notice.

With reference to this aspect, the referring judge focuses attention on the provision set forth in Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, pursuant to which the tax roll and the payment notice are immediately challengeable when the debtor acting in legal proceedings demonstrates that the entry may cause prejudice "within the framework of the procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019.”

In this regard, the judge affirms that the taxpayer, despite being an "over-indebted small entrepreneur,” was nonetheless unable to initiate any procedure referred to in the aforementioned Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), since the activation presupposes that the debtor preliminarily ascertains the existence or non-existence of the over-indebtedness condition and precisely defines their debt situation; otherwise, initiating the procedure "in the dark,” without precise awareness of the debts actually existing, could expose the debtor to the risk "of denial or revocation of the homologation, denial or loss of debt discharge (esdebitazione), and even criminal liability.”

4.– Regarding the merits, the *a quo* judge considers that the censured provision conflicts with Article 3 of the Constitution due to a violation of the principle of equality.

4.1.‒ Firstly, there exists "an unjust and illegitimate disparity in treatment between taxpayers who received the payment notice via regular notification and those who, as a result of errors attributable to the Administration, did not receive it.”

Indeed, the referring judge observes, the payment notice, "as an outward manifestation of the tax roll, constitutes an act expressly challengeable pursuant to Article 19 of [Legislative Decree No. 546 of 31 December 1992 (Provisions on tax litigation in implementation of the delegation to the Government contained in Article 30 of Law No. 413 of 30 December 1991)],” as well as any act that lawfully brings a specific tax claim to the taxpayer's attention. Unjustly, therefore, the censured provision denied the taxpayer—against whom the notification of the payment notices had been invalidly executed—the possibility of immediate challenge.

4.2.‒ Furthermore, according to the *a quo* judge, the typification of the hypotheses in which the direct challenge of the tax roll and the invalidly notified payment notice is permitted entails an inevitable "discrimination between subjects or needs deserving of no less significant protection, without any reason, necessity, or justification,” leaving other hypotheses without protection, such as those aimed at preventing the initiation of precautionary and enforcement measures, or at obtaining tax certifications attesting to the regularity of tax compliance, or at avoiding being subjected to "reports to the tax register registry with consequent investigations.”

4.3.‒ For the Justice of the Peace of Milan, there is also "an abnormal and unjustified disparity even between the subjects of the tax relationship.”

The judge emphasizes, in fact, that "whereas the notifications of procedural acts are immediately scrutinized by the judge and, if invalid or untimely, produce no effect to the detriment of the addressee, with regard to tax imposition acts, the invalidity of the notification has as its sole immediate effect not the corrective intervention of the judge, but rather the impossibility for the taxpayer to know the act and, therefore, to activate judicial review over it.”

This would have the consequence that, in the absence of challenges, the collection procedure could not be interrupted, proceeding all the way to forced enforcement without the taxpayer being able to exercise the right of defense.

4.4.‒ A further discriminatory effect is identified by the referring judge in the fact that "the irregularly notified tax roll and payment notice result, under the current regulatory provision, not independently challengeable, whereas any other irregularly notified fiscal enforcement title—such as the notice of assessment or the tax injunction [pursuant to Royal Decree No. 639 of 14 April 1910 (approving the annexed consolidated text of legal provisions relating to the collection of the State's patrimonial revenues)]—can instead be contested before the judge.”

According to the referring judge, this disparity in treatment "appears incomprehensible, unreasonable, and intrinsically discriminatory, given that all the aforementioned acts have an impositive and executive nature, directly affect the taxpayer's patrimonial sphere, and constitute a title for coercive collection.”

5.– Moreover, the *a quo* judge considers that the censured provision violates the right of defense protected by Article 24 of the Constitution.

The judge notes, firstly, that the mere possibility of challenging subsequent acts would not ensure effective protection for the taxpayer, since, although acts subsequent to the tax roll entry, such as the payment injunction (intimazione di pagamento), the notice of administrative freeze (preavviso di fermo amministrativo), or the registration of a mortgage, are challengeable, they nevertheless grant the taxpayer extremely reduced deadlines to comply, effectively making it impossible to obtain effective judicial protection; indeed, no judicial authority could issue precautionary rulings within such tight deadlines.

The judge additionally adds that, although the legislature has progressively expanded the instances of direct challenge of the tax roll and the invalidly notified payment notice, precisely because such situations are by nature unpredictable and easily changeable, the assessment concerning the interest to challenge should be entrusted to the judge on a case-by-case basis; whereas, by virtue of the censured provision, the taxpayer is unjustifiably precluded from the outset from immediately bringing an action before the judge, even in the presence of invalid notifications.

Conclusively, under the profile of the violation of the right of defense, the referring judge observes that such right should not be compromised: a) to cope with an increase in litigation, since this purpose "could easily be pursued through other legal instruments”; b) to prevent abusive access to justice, as recourse can be made to instruments already provided for by the legal system, such as condemnation to litigation costs and for reckless litigation (lite temeraria); c) by postponing the possibility of protection to a later moment, since it could occur that "certain harmful effects of the act have already materialized.”

6.– The referring judge also suggests the violation of Article 77, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitution, because: on the one hand, "[i]n the present case, the Government, without delegation from the Chambers, issued Decree-Law No. 146/2021 without any enabling law,” although the censured provision "governs a matter, such as that of justice and access thereto, [which is] reserved to the regulatory power of Parliament”; on the other hand, the same provision was "promulgated in the absence of the requirement of specific necessity and urgency.”

7.– Articles 111 and 113 of the Constitution would also be violated, inasmuch as the censured provision introduced "an utility solely and exclusively in favor of the Public Administration into the legal system,” precluding "the taxpayer's right of defense, restricting it to taxative cases, most of which are always the exclusive prerogative of the Public Administration.”

8.– For the *a quo* judge, Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution would also be violated, given that "doubts arise regarding the adoption of urgent measures of tax justice in the absence of an enabling law by means of a Decree-Law,” such that "paragraph 4-bis added to Article 12 of the aforementioned Presidential Decree No. 602/1973 appears illegitimate for having been unconstitutionally introduced by means of urgent decree-making.”

9.– A further doubt of constitutional legitimacy is raised by the Justice of the Peace of Milan with reference to Article 97, second paragraph, of the Constitution, given that the censured provision, by failing to recognize the taxpayer's possibility of immediate protection and postponing it instead to the moment when the taxpayer receives notification of a subsequent act, could entail for the tax administration the emergence of costs for enforcement procedures unlawfully instituted and the aggravation of compensable damages "arising from any enforcement based on unlawful claims,” to the detriment of the sound administration and impartiality of the public administration.

10.‒ Finally, the referring judge considers that the censured provision violates Articles 10, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as it is incompatible with EU and convention law.

In particular, it conflicts with: Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), which recognizes "the right to good administration (hearing, statement of reasons, access to files)”; Article 47 CFREU, which guarantees "the right to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal”; Article 52 CFREU, which mandates "respect for the principle of proportionality for any limitations on the rights recognized by the Charter”; Article 273 of [Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax], which allows "Member States to establish procedural obligations to ensure the exact collection of VAT only if proportionate and if they do not compromise effective collection and the taxpayer's rights”; Articles 4, 6, and 7 of [Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Restructuring and Insolvency Directive)], which govern "access to restructuring and debt relief procedures”; Articles 2 and 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union, which guarantee Union citizens the possibility of access "to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal”; Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, which protect the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and to a fair trial.

11.‒ In conclusion of the illustration of the merits underlying the current questions of constitutional legitimacy, the referring judge cites, among other things, the passage of the reasoning of Judgment No. 190 of 2023 by which this Court, ruling on questions of constitutional legitimacy relating to the same provision, stated that "the abuse of those who take advantage of the system's vulnerability—where often the collection agent is even unable to provide proof of regular notification—and thus generate concerning serial litigation, cannot systematically compress the need for ‘early’ protection of subjects (even if few) who lawfully invoke it.”

The referring judge observes, in this regard, that the legislature subsequently intervened, "not by repealing the prohibition (and introducing legitimate solutions to the alleged harm), but by adding other hypotheses of access to the jurisdiction, while nevertheless unjustifiably leaving all other categories without protection.”

12.– By an act filed on 18 February 2026, C. C., a party in the main proceedings, entered an appearance, arguing for the relevance of the questions of constitutional legitimacy and requesting that they be upheld.

12.1.– C. C. highlights firstly that the questions are relevant since the regulatory amendments concerning the challengability of the tax roll and the invalidly notified payment notice limited the right to immediate judicial protection.

The party points out, in particular, that the situation cannot be traced back to any of the typified hypotheses with which the legislature exceptionally permitted the immediate challengability of the tax roll and payment notice. Indeed, the party emphasizes being unable to avail itself of the provision set forth in Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, according to which the tax roll is challengeable when the debtor acting in legal proceedings demonstrates that the entry may cause prejudice "within the framework of the procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019.”

This is because, prior to accessing these procedures, the party needs to ascertain the real extent of its tax debts in order to "verify the actual existence of an over-indebtedness situation and draft, where appropriate, a plan referring exclusively to sums actually due.”

12.2.‒ As to the merits, C. C. adheres to the doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised by the *a quo* judge, whose supporting arguments are extensively reported, and highlights in particular that the censured provision introduced "an external and generalized limit to access to judicial protection, aprioristically selecting the situations deemed ‘deserving’ of examination. In this way, rather than regulating a condition of action, the provision achieves a compression of the fundamental right of access to the court, with unreasonable and discriminatory effects.”

13.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office (Avvocatura generale dello Stato), requesting that the questions be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

13.1.– According to the State Attorney's Office, the questions are, firstly, inadmissible due to a lack of relevance.

State defense points out that the *a quo* judge, in holding that the taxpayer lacked standing for the direct challenge of the tax roll and payment notices as permitted by Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973—that is, when entry in the tax roll may cause prejudice within the framework of procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code (hereinafter: CCII)—failed to consider that, "while it is true that the judicial application for crisis composition must be accompanied by a ‘debt restructuring plan that specifically indicates times and methods to overcome the over-indebtedness crisis’ (Article 67 CCII), such an application must obligatorily be submitted through the competent Over-Indebtedness Crisis Resolution Body (Organismo di Composizione della Crisi - OCC), pursuant to Article 68 CCII.”

Therefore, State defense argues, "the judicial phase is always preceded by an out-of-court phase in which the debtor, with the assistance of the competent OCC, prepares the proposal for creditors, following the ascertainment of the actual debt exposure.”

It follows, the State Attorney concludes, that the referring judge should have verified whether the taxpayer had "at least submitted an application to the competent OCC and thus initiated the out-of-court phase preliminary to the eventual presentation of the judicial application,” thereby incurring "an incomplete description of the specific factual scenario which vitiates the reasoning regarding the requirement of relevance, preventing the assessment of the necessity to apply the censured provision.”

13.2.– The State Attorney's Office further considers that the questions are inadmissible due to the erroneousness of the interpretive premise.

In particular, it highlights that the referring judge erroneously believed that "the censured norm imposes on the debtor the obligation to always initiate the judicial procedure ‘in the dark,’ in order to pre-constitute an interest to challenge pursuant to the aforementioned letter d) of paragraph 4-bis—thus exposing the debtor to multiple risks in the event of a negative outcome—without however considering that the reference discipline contemplates an out-of-court phase specifically aimed at determining the amount of the debt exposure and defining the repayment plan. It is primarily in that phase that the censured norm is destined to find application.”

13.3.– Finally, State defense considers that the questions are inadmissible due to an incomplete reconstruction of the reference regulatory framework.

This is because the *a quo* judge failed to take into account that the legislature, taking up the admonition contained in Judgment No. 190 of 2023 of this Court, introduced with Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024 measures aimed at disposing of the backlog of files managed by the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione, proceeding with an overall reorganization of the collection system.

14.– As to the merits, for State defense, the questions are unfounded.

14.1.– Regarding the violation of Articles 77, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, it is observed that Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 2021, as converted, which added paragraph 4-bis to Article 12 of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, was introduced by means of an amendment during the conversion stage, so the decree-law could not "bear, in its recitals, the indication of the reasons of indifferibility and urgency of a provision not present therein.” Those conditions, however, had been highlighted in the final report of the Interministerial Commission for the Reform of Tax Justice, consisting of "the ‘enormous proliferation […] of instrumental litigation challenging tax roll extracts brought by debtors entered in the tax roll’” and the consequent "heavy managerial and administrative costs for handling the related litigation.”

14.2.– The State Attorney's Office also believes that the questions raised with reference to Articles 3, 24, 111, and 113 of the Constitution, which it examines jointly, are unfounded.

14.2.1.– Firstly, it observes that there is no protection gap for taxpayers who do not find themselves in the conditions provided by the legislature to directly challenge the tax roll and the invalidly notified payment notice, because challenge remains in any case possible, albeit in an "indirect” manner: in such cases, therefore, "access to the courts is not prevented, but merely postponed.”

14.2.2.– Furthermore, the censured provision neither violates the principle of equality nor is it intrinsically unreasonable.

According to State defense, the legislature, by establishing a limit on the possibility of immediate challenge of the tax roll and payment notice, intended to strike a balance between two interests worthy of protection: on the one hand, that of "curbing the initiation, often instrumental and pretextual, of a mass of litigation potentially capable of prejudicing the functionality of the judicial system as a whole”; on the other hand, that of "ensuring protection to the taxpayer in any case, in instances where the need is recognized, i.e., whenever the specific prejudice contemplated therein exists.”

The State Attorney adds in this regard that from the summary table of litigation data attached, it emerges that "from 1 January 2017 to 20 December 2021, i.e., until the date of entry into force of the aforementioned Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, as many as 213,691 challenges against tax roll extracts were notified (approximately 55,000 new lawsuits per year), largely concentrated in only certain geographical areas of the country and mostly of very low value (approximately 90% of such disputes fall within the value threshold of [euro] 5,000). With the advent of the new regulatory provision, however, in the first year of its application, only about 8,000 new disputes were instituted (of which about 6,700 within the [euro] 5,000 value threshold).”

These data demonstrate, therefore, that the chosen means is proportionate to the objective needs that the legislature intended to satisfy, as it is the result of a balanced weighing of constitutionally relevant interests and is aimed at ensuring immediate protection only in cases of "objective existence of a specifically identified interest,” without prejudice to the fullness and immediacy of precautionary protection.

14.3.– As for the other hypotheses that should justify an extension of anticipatory protection, the State Attorney's Office maintains that the referring judge "fails to isolate situations, other than those under Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, characterized by the presence of actual prejudice.”

Indeed, State defense adds, given the extreme breadth of situations that, according to the *a quo* judge, would deserve immediate protection, to allow the direct challengability of the tax roll and invalidly notified payment notices "it would necessarily be necessary to make them challengeable always and in any case.”

Therefore, on this point State defense observes that "allowing judicial protection even when […] the taxpayer has no interest or serious possibility of participating in it, would mean allowing the activation of the non-unlimited resource of ‘justice’ in the absence of a concrete and current interest to act, thus triggering a potentially abusive proliferation of lawsuits entirely unsuitable to bring effective utility to the appellant.”

14.4.– The State Attorney's Office adds that the principle according to which "the interest to act must be understood as the essential and preliminary prerequisite of any judicial action” finds support in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

It cites, in particular, Court of Justice of the European Union, Fourth Chamber, judgment of 20 December 2017, Case C-268/16 P, Binca Seafoods GmbH […], which stated that "an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only if that person has an interest in the annulment of the contested act. Such an interest presupposes that the annulment of that act must be capable, of itself, of having legal consequences and that the action may therefore, through its outcome, procure an advantage to the party which brought it (judgments of 4 June 2015, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, C-682/13 […], paragraph 25; of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C-33/14 P […], paragraph 55; and order of 6 April 2017, Proforec v Commission, C-176/16 P […], paragraph 32).”

14.5.– Regarding the questions raised with reference to Articles 10, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, State defense highlights that "despite the evocative list of supranational norms and principles, the challenge in question is substantially devoid of autonomy compared to that of the violation of Articles 3, 24, 111, and 113 of the Constitution.”

15.– Written opinions as *amicus curiae* were filed in the proceedings by the Association of the Lombard Chamber of Tax Lawyers (Associazione camera lombarda degli avvocati tributaristi) and the Association of Law Professionals (Associazione professionisti del diritto), which were admitted by presidential decree of 26 May 2026.

The *amici curiae* develop arguments substantially analogous to those contained in the referral order in support of the constitutional illegitimacy of the censured provision.

16.– Near the public hearing, the party filed a first brief replying to State defense's exceptions of inadmissibility of the questions.

The party maintains, in particular, that the exception of non-relevance of the questions—based on the consideration that the referring judge failed to verify whether the taxpayer had filed an application for access to a composition procedure with the competent crisis resolution body—is unfounded.

This remark is incorrect since case files show that the referring judge acknowledged that the appellant had a mere intention to access the procedure, and this circumstance cannot be considered equivalent to actual initiation.

Furthermore, regarding State defense's assertion that the censured provision aims to curb the proliferation of abusive appeals, the party observes that such a purpose could have been pursued with measures suitable to prevent manifestly unfounded or purely dilatory procedural initiatives, without necessarily resorting to the radical preclusion of immediate access to the court.

On 26 June 2026, and thus tardily, the party filed an additional brief.

Considerato in diritto

17.‒ The Justice of the Peace of Milan, First Civil Section, by order registered under Register of Orders No. 8 of 2026, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, with reference to Articles 3, 10, 11, 24, 77, first and second paragraphs, 97, second paragraph, 111, 113, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as added by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 2021, as converted, substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, and subsequently repealed by Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 2025 and inserted into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to the aforementioned legislative decree, with effect from 1 January 2027, pursuant to Article 243.

The referring judge focuses on the standing of the appellant in the main proceedings and, in particular, on the limitation on the direct challenge of the tax roll and the payment notice alleged by the taxpayer not to have been validly notified, as provided by Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, as subsequently substituted.

After ascertaining that the payment notices entered in the tax roll and challenged by the appellant in the main proceedings were not regularly notified, the referring judge considers that the appellant does not fall within any of the situations legitimizing a direct challenge, not even the one contemplated by Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, as substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, which extended this possibility also to the hypothesis where the prejudice arising from the tax roll entry of the invalidly notified payment notice arises "[w]ithin the framework of the procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019.”

In this regard, the referring judge reports that the appellant in the main proceedings is an "over-indebted small entrepreneur” who, nonetheless, did not initiate the procedure referred to in the aforementioned Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d)—i.e., that provided by the CCII—because, prior to submitting the access application before the competent judge, the appellant would necessarily have had to define the debt situation; otherwise, the referring judge affirms, the appellant would have been forced to initiate it "in the dark,” without precise awareness of the debts actually existing, exposing themselves to the risk "of denial or revocation of homologation, denial or loss of debt discharge, and even criminal liability.”

18.‒ Regarding relevance, the *a quo* judge considers that, despite the ascertainment of the invalidity of the notification of the payment notices entered in the tax roll, "the taxpayer's application would be destined to be declared inadmissible,” since the censured provision precluded the possibility of a direct challenge of the tax roll and payment notices; whereas, should the same provision be declared constitutionally illegitimate, the taxpayer's appeal should be upheld, given the non-existence of the limitation on immediate challenge.

19.‒ As to the merits, according to the referring judge, the censured provision, by failing to recognize the standing of the appellant in the main proceedings to bring a direct challenge, violates Articles 3, 10, 11, 24, 77, first and second paragraphs, 97, second paragraph, 111, 113, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter with reference to various EU and convention parameters.

19.1.‒ A first question concerns the violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, as the limitation on immediate challenge entails a disparity in treatment between taxpayers who received the payment notice via regular notification and those who, as a result of errors attributable to the tax administration, did not receive it.

19.2.‒ Another reason for disparity in treatment concerns "the subjects of the tax relationship,” because "whereas the notifications of procedural acts are immediately scrutinized by the judge […] with regard to tax imposition acts, the invalidity of notification has as its sole immediate effect […] the impossibility for the taxpayer to […] activate judicial review over it.”

19.3.‒ A further discriminatory effect is identified by the referring judge in the fact that "the irregularly notified tax roll and payment notice result, under the current regulatory provision, not independently challengeable, whereas any other irregularly notified fiscal enforcement title—such as the notice of assessment or the tax injunction [pursuant to Royal Decree No. 639 of 1910]—can instead be contested before the judge.”

20.‒ Regarding the violation of Article 24 of the Constitution, the referring judge complains that the censured provision limits the hypotheses of immediate challenge and, therefore, the taxpayer must await the notification of a subsequent act, such as the payment injunction, the notice of administrative freeze, or the registration of a mortgage, but this would result in the loss of effective judicial protection, since such acts grant an extremely reduced deadline to comply, within which it would not even be possible to receive precautionary protection.

21.‒ Furthermore, the referring judge suggests the violation of Article 77, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitution, because the censured norm was promulgated by means of a decree-law without the requirement of specific necessity and urgency, and furthermore without the Government having received any delegation from Parliament, to which alone the power to legislate in the matter of justice is reserved.

22.‒ Another reason for censure is identified with reference to Articles 111 and 113 of the Constitution, since the censured norm introduced utilities solely in favor of the public administration, resulting in a violation of the principle of fair trial and equality of arms in judicial proceedings, and judicial protection was restricted only to specifically identified hypotheses.

23.‒ According to the referring judge, there is also a conflict with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, given that the norm was introduced by means of a decree-law in the absence of an enabling law.

24.‒ Finally, the referring judge considers that the censured provision violates Articles 10, 11, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, as it is incompatible with EU and convention law under different profiles, such as: the right to good administration and an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal; the principle of proportionality for any limitations on rights recognized by the CFREU; the principle of equality; the right that no public authority may evade the legality review of its claims; the right to a fair trial.

25.‒ As a preliminary matter, the exceptions of inadmissibility formulated by the President of the Council of Ministers must be examined.

25.1.‒ Firstly, State defense alleged a lack of relevance of the questions because the *a quo* judge should have verified whether the appellant had "at least submitted an application to the competent OCC and thus initiated the out-of-court phase preliminary to the eventual presentation of the judicial application,” thereby incurring "an incomplete description of the specific factual scenario which vitiates the reasoning regarding the requirement of relevance.”

25.2.‒ The exception is unfounded.

The referral order specifies, in fact, that the appellant in the main proceedings is an "over-indebted small entrepreneur” burdened, as evidenced by the tax roll extract transmitted by the tax administration, with payment notices not regularly notified: this, for the purposes of controlling the plausibility of the reasoning on the relevance of the questions, is sufficient to exclude an incomplete description of the specific factual scenario.

26.‒ A further exception of inadmissibility of the questions was raised on the grounds of the erroneousness of the interpretive premise.

According to State defense, the referring judge erroneously believed that the censured provision imposes on the debtor the obligation to initiate the judicial procedure "in the dark,” i.e., without precisely knowing existing debts towards the tax administration.

Indeed, the procedure referred to in Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973 contemplates an out-of-court phase, to be conducted before the over-indebtedness crisis resolution bodies, aimed at determining the amount of the debt exposure and defining the repayment plan: it is precisely in this phase that the censured norm is primarily destined to find application.

26.1.‒ The exception is unfounded as it pertains to the merits of the questions.

27.‒ Finally, the State Attorney's Office proposed the exception of inadmissibility of the questions due to an incomplete reconstruction of the reference regulatory framework, based on the consideration that the *a quo* judge failed to take into account the overall and renewed discipline that the legislature, taking up the admonition contained in Judgment No. 190 of 2023 of this Court, introduced with Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, in particular providing measures aimed at disposing of the backlog of files managed by the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione, with an overall reorganization of the collection system.

27.1.‒ The exception is unfounded.

State defense is correct in noting that the referring judge omitted to consider the provisions contained in Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024 concerning the revision of the collection system, but this does not entail profiles relating to the inadmissibility of the questions, which occurs only when "the omission of the reconstruction of the reference regulatory and jurisprudential framework irremediably compromises the logical-argumentative path underlying the referring judge's evaluations on relevance […] (ex plurimis, judgments No. 61 and No. 15 of 2021, No. 264 and No. 228 of 2020, and No. 150 of 2019)” (Judgment No. 258 of 2021).

28.‒ Conversely, the inadmissibility of the questions concerning the alleged violations of Articles 77, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution must be declared *ex officio* due to insufficient and contradictory reasoning regarding their non-manifestly unfounded nature (ex plurimis, judgments No. 52 of 2025 and No. 136 of 2022).

The violation of Article 77, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitution is indeed put forward by the referring judge by referencing Decree-Law No. 146 of 2021, as converted, which added paragraph 4-bis to Article 12 of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, introducing for the first time the restrictive regime on the immediate challenge of the tax roll and payment notice.

However, the same referring judge highlights, without further explanation and in a contradictory manner, that the provision censured by him is not the one introduced by the aforementioned decree-law—in respect of which he contests the absence of "delegation from the Chambers”—but rather that of Article 12 of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, which entirely substituted the former.

Entirely generic and lacking sufficient reasoning is also the invocation of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution aimed at maintaining that it is not possible to intervene through urgent decree-making in the matter of tax justice, asserted to be reserved to Parliament.

29.‒ Before examining the merits of the further doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised by the *a quo* judge, it must be premised that questions not dissimilar to the present ones were examined by this Court in Judgment No. 190 of 2023 in relation to the then-current version of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973.

In that ruling, of which the *a quo* judge is indeed aware, while on the one hand a vulnus to the "need” for judicial protection was highlighted because this might emerge "in situations different from those considered in the censured norm,” on the other hand it was specified that the "remedy for the situation that occurred as a effect of the censured norm involves however profiles entrusted—as regards forms and methods—to the discretion of the legislature and does not belong, at least in the first instance, to this Court; such a result can, in fact, be achieved by intervening in multiple directions, which are not alternative: both, on the one hand, by extending, with the criteria deemed appropriate, the possibility of ‘early’ protection to additional scenarios (such as those indicated herein) compared to those provided by the censured norm, and, on the other hand, by acting at the root, i.e., on the pathologies that still persist in the Italian collection system.”

The aforementioned judgment must therefore be placed in the "genus of rulings classified by doctrine as ‘systemic inadmissibility,’ since, while finding a doubtful compatibility with the invoked constitutional parameters, they do not resolve with a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy, but remit, in the first instance, to the discretion of the legislature (thus, among others, judgments No. 130 and No. 71 of 2023 and No. 22 of 2022) the *quomodo* of the necessary intervention—which can be achieved according to a range of plausible solutions—aimed at removing the identified vulnus” (Judgment No. 46 of 2025).

29.1.‒ The legislature promptly followed up on the pressing auspice contained in Judgment No. 190 of 2023 with Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024: on the one hand, significantly expanding the hypotheses of immediate challenge; on the other hand, revising the collection system.

29.1.1.‒ Regarding the first profile, Article 12 of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024—which amended Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, transposed into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to Legislative Decree No. 33 of 2025, taking effect from 1 January 2027—established: "4-bis. The tax roll extract may not be challenged. The tax roll and the payment notice alleged to have been invalidly notified may be directly challenged in cases where the debtor acting in legal proceedings demonstrates that entry in the tax roll may cause prejudice:

a) as a consequence of provisions set forth in the Public Contracts Code under Legislative Decree No. 36 of 31 March 2023;

b) for the collection of sums owed to the debtor by public entities referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of the regulation under Ministerial Decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance No. 40 of 18 January 2008, including as a result of the verifications referred to in Article 48-bis of this decree;

c) for the loss of a benefit in relations with a public administration;

d) within the framework of procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019;

e) in relation to financing operations by authorized entities;

f) within the context of the transfer of a business, taking into account the provisions of Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 472 of 18 December 1997.”

29.1.2. ‒ Regarding the second profile, with Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, the legislature reformed the collection system by operating on multiple fronts.

Firstly, it established specific duties for the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione aimed at preventing, for the future, the formation of a backlog of uncollected claims (Article 2).

Secondly, it defined precise rules for the automatic and early discharge of loads entrusted to the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione (Articles 3-5).

Thirdly, it regulated verification and control powers as well as the responsibilities of the collection agent (Article 6).

Finally, it established a commission tasked with analyzing the backlog held by the Agenzia delle entrate-Riscossione and reporting to the Minister of Economy and Finance, proposing possible solutions to be implemented through subsequent legislative measures to achieve the discharge of all or part of the aforementioned backlog (Article 7).

30.‒ Having premised this, the questions raised with reference to Articles 3, 10, 11, 24, 97, second paragraph, 111, 113, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution are unfounded due to the erroneousness of the interpretive premise from which the referring judge moves (ex plurimis, Judgment No. 38 of 2021).

The aforementioned legislative amendment has indeed provided, under Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter d), of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, for standing to directly challenge the tax roll and the payment notice assumed not to be validly notified even when entry may cause the taxpayer prejudice "within the framework of procedures provided for by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code under Legislative Decree No. 14 of 12 January 2019.”

It must therefore be observed that the referral order qualifies the appellant in the main proceedings as a "small over-indebted entrepreneur.” The reference is thus to the notion of "minor business,” i.e., an enterprise which, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter d), of Legislative Decree No. 14 of 2019, jointly presents limits on patrimonial assets (€300,000), revenues (not exceeding €200,000), and debts (not exceeding €500,000). Where these requirements exist, the debtor may access the procedure of "minor composition” (concordato minore) as well as "controlled liquidation of the over-indebted” (liquidazione controllata del sovraindebitato).

The error in the interpretive reading of the censured provision made by the referring judge lies in believing that, despite such qualification, the taxpayer is aprioristically excluded from the scope of application of the legislative novelty and exposed to initiating "the procedure ‘in the dark’”ㆍwith the risk "of denial or revocation of homologation, denial or loss of debt discharge, and even criminal liability”ㆍas the taxpayer is forced to submit the application before the competent judge for the composition of the over-indebtedness crisis without being able to preliminarily know whether the tax administration's claim is actual or not.

The referring judge fails to consider, in fact, that the taxpayer, based on a correct interpretation of the censured provision, has full standing to immediately challenge the tax roll and payment notices alleged to have been invalidly notified; this is because it falls within the scope of procedures provided for by the CCII in favor of the minor entrepreneur as early as the establishment of the out-of-court phase before the OCC.

These procedures, which consist of the minor composition and the controlled liquidation of the over-indebted, indeed provide for a preparatory, out-of-court phase that is activated before filing the application before the competent judge.

For the minor composition, Article 76 CCII establishes, in particular, in paragraph 1, that "[t]he application is formulated through an OCC” and, in paragraph 2, that such body attaches to the application a "detailed report of the OCC, which includes: a) the indication of the causes of indebtedness and the diligence employed by the debtor in assuming the obligations; b) the exposition of the reasons for the debtor's inability to fulfill the assumed obligations; c) the indication of the potential existence of acts in fraud or acts of the debtor challenged by creditors; d) the evaluation of the completeness and reliability of the documentation deposited in support of the application, as well as the feasibility of the plan and its convenience compared to the alternative of controlled liquidation; e) the presumable indication of the costs of the procedure.” Furthermore, in paragraph 4, Article 76 CCII provides that "[t]he OCC, within seven days from the conferral of the assignment by the debtor, gives notice thereof to the collection agent and to the tax offices, including local authorities, competent on the basis of the applicant's last fiscal domicile, which within fifteen days must communicate the ascertained tax debt and any pending assessments.”

For controlled liquidation, Article 269 CCII provides that "1. The petition may be presented personally by the debtor, with the assistance of the OCC. 2. A report drawn up by the OCC must be attached to the petition, which presents an assessment of the completeness and reliability of the documentation deposited in support of the application and illustrates the economic-patrimonial and financial situation of the debtor. The report indicates the causes of indebtedness and the diligence employed by the debtor in assuming the obligations and contains the attestation referred to in Article 268, paragraph 3, fourth period. 3. The OCC, within seven days from the conferral of the assignment by the debtor, gives notice thereof to the collection agent and to the tax offices, including local authorities, competent on the basis of the applicant's last fiscal domicile.”

The taxpayer, therefore, without having to expose themselves to the feared risks of presenting a judicial application "in the dark,” has full standing to immediately challenge the tax roll and payment notice alleged not to have been validly notified by representing to the judge that the out-of-court phase has been initiated (which also serves a consultative function for the debtor) before the OCC and concurrently providing proof of standing to challenge by attaching the condition of over-indebtedness and the prejudicial impact that the "weight” of the debt resulting from the tax roll and payment notices would have for the regular conclusion of the procedure intended to be activated.

Ultimately, no prejudice occurs for the taxpayer, and the immediate challengability hoped for by the referring judge subsists.

Moreover, it must be considered that, systematically, even for the other situations legitimizing the direct challenge of the tax roll and payment notice provided by the censured provision, the legislature used particularly broad formulas, such as: "for the loss of a benefit” in relations with the public administration (Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter c); "in relation to” financing operations by authorized entities (Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter e); "within the context of” the transfer of the business (Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, letter f).

This is justified because the various expressly contemplated hypotheses are characterized by different contexts and situations: what matters, rather, is the proof of actual prejudice, the burden of which, in relation to the various contemplated hypotheses, rests upon the taxpayer, and whose evaluation is entrusted to the court hearing the challenge.

31.‒ From the erroneousness of the interpretive premise follows the falling away of the remaining doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised, which are inseparably linked to the asserted lack of standing of the appellant in the main proceedings to bring an immediate challenge, which in this case proved to be non-existent (Judgment No. 53 of 2018).

per estos motivos

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares inadmissible the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 29 September 1973 (Provisions on the collection of income taxes), as added by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 21 October 2021 (Urgent economic and fiscal measures, for the protection of employment and for indifferible requirements), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 215 of 17 December 2021, substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 29 July 2024 (Provisions concerning the reorganization of the national tax collection system), subsequently repealed by Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 24 March 2025 (Consolidated Act on payments and tax collection) and inserted into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to the aforementioned legislative decree, with effect from 1 January 2027, pursuant to Article 243, raised with reference to Articles 77, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Justice of the Peace of Milan, First Civil Section, by the order indicated in the headpiece;

2) declares unfounded the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 12, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 602 of 1973, as added by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law No. 146 of 2021, as converted, substituted by Article 12, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree No. 110 of 2024, subsequently repealed by Article 241, paragraph 1, letter c), of Legislative Decree No. 33 of 2025 and inserted into Article 91 of the Consolidated Act of legislative provisions concerning payments and tax collection, appended to the aforementioned legislative decree, with effect from 1 January 2027, pursuant to Article 243, raised with reference to Articles 3, 10, 11, 24, 97, second paragraph, 111, 113, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Justice of the Peace of Milan, First Civil Section, by the order indicated in the headpiece.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 7 July 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Luca ANTONINI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Deposited in the Registry on 6 October 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms, in its text, to the original