JUDGMENT NO. 159

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 155 of the Criminal Code and of Articles 420-quater, paragraph 1, and 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and, in the alternative, of Article 554-ter, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure), brought by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, in the criminal proceedings against M. D., by means of an order dated July 7, 2025, registered under no. 170 of the 2025 order register and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 38, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having regard to the intervention brief filed by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in chambers on June 22, 2026, the Judge Rapporteur Stefano Petitti;

having deliberated in chambers on June 22, 2026.

Ritenuto in fatto (The Proceedings in Fact)

1.– By an order dated July 7, 2025, registered under no. 170 of the 2025 order register, the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 155 of the Criminal Code and of Articles 420-quater, paragraph 1, and 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and, in the alternative, of Article 554-ter, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure), with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution:

a) to the extent that they do not provide that, if the searches for the defendant pursuant to Article 420-bis, paragraph 5, of the Code of Criminal Procedure yield a negative result, in the event of a subsequent remission of the complaint, the judge shall issue a judgment of no case to answer (sentenza di non luogo a procedere) for extinction of the offense (rather than a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings), without ordering the defendant against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs;

b) in the alternative, for cases in which the defendant – notwithstanding a lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings – received formal notice of the proceedings during the investigative phase, to the extent that said provisions do not provide that, if the searches for the defendant pursuant to Article 420-bis, paragraph 5, of the Code of Criminal Procedure yield a negative result, where a remission of the complaint has occurred, the judge shall issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense (rather than a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings);

c) in a further alternative, to the extent that the same provisions do not provide that, if the searches for the defendant pursuant to Article 420-bis, paragraph 5, of the Code of Criminal Procedure yield a negative result, where a remission of the complaint has occurred, the judge shall issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense (rather than a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings), without ordering the defendant against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs, provided that the amount of such costs renders the continuation of the searches for the defendant manifestly unreasonable.

2.– The referring judge states that he is presiding over proceedings against a person charged with the offense of attempted aggravated theft pursuant to Article 625, first paragraph, numbers 4) and 8-bis), of the Criminal Code, who failed to appear at the pre-trial hearing following direct summons, without the conditions for proceeding in absentia pursuant to Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure being met, and indeed in the presence of multiple elements from which it could be inferred that the defendant herself was unaware of the pending proceedings.

The defendant had in fact been assisted, since the beginning of the proceedings, by a court-appointed defense counsel, who reported having had no contact with her; furthermore, the defendant had refused to elect a domicile for service of process and had not been involved in any further acts.

At the same hearing, the injured party declared the remission of the complaint. Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure – incorporated by reference in Article 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure for proceedings initiated by direct summons – an adjournment of the hearing was ordered, with personal notification of the summons to trial and the hearing minutes to the defendant by the judicial police, following searches. Thereafter, at the subsequent hearing, having noted the negative outcome of the searches, the parties requested the issuance of a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings, pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court of Florence observed that: the offense charged against the defendant is prosecutable upon a complaint by the injured party; the complaint itself had been remitted; the defendant, who did not appear at the hearing "and in all probability was unaware of the pending proceedings,” was "consequently unaware even of the aforementioned remission of the complaint,” nor was she in a position to know of it; from this it followed that it was impossible to consider fulfilled, as an effect of the failure to appear, the requirement of the absence of a refusal of the remission, which is necessary for the latter to cause the extinction of the offense (citing for this interpretation, among others, Court of Cassation, United Criminal Sections, Judgment no. 27610 of May 25–July 13, 2011).

3.– Based on these premises, the referring judge assessed the relevance of the indicated questions of constitutional legitimacy, observing that the censured provisions do not permit the issuance of a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense, nor to proceed in the absence of the defendant. Rather, the judge would be required to issue a judgment pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordering the judicial police to continue searches to trace the person, until the expiration of the time limit indicated in the final paragraph of Article 159 of the Criminal Code, equal to twice the statute of limitations periods referred to in Article 157 of the same code, namely, in the present case, until November 4, 2036.

Conversely, upholding the raised questions would permit the immediate issuance of a judgment of no case to answer for the extinction of the offense resulting from the remission of the complaint.

As regards the question raised in the alternative, the *a quo* judge points out that the defendant had received notice of the proceedings when, immediately following the acts attributed to her, she was identified by the judicial police, invited to elect a domicile and appoint a retained counsel, and subjected to a personal search (with a negative result).

With reference to the question raised in the further alternative, the Court of Florence notes that the amount of the procedural costs to be charged to the person against whom the complaint was brought pursuant to Article 340, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event of a declaration of extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint, would equal "the lump-sum amount of 80 euros,” rendering manifestly unreasonable, "from an economic standpoint,” the issuance of the judgment referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the continuation of the searches for the person against whom the complaint was brought, in relation to the possibility of recovering the aforementioned costs from her.

4.– As to the non-manifestly unfounded nature of the questions, the Court of Florence doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 155 of the Criminal Code and of Articles 420-quater, paragraph 1, 554-bis, paragraph 2, and 554-ter, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the latter in a subordinate capacity), with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, to the extent that, in the face of a remission of complaint, these norms compel the judge to issue a judgment pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to order further searches for the defendant "even for many years by reason of the abstract possibility of a rejection of the remission by the defendant, a hypothesis that is almost purely academic.”

4.1.– The referring judge maintains that, in such an event, allowing the issuance of a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense due to remission of complaint would serve the interests of both the defendant and the administration of justice.

4.2.– Under the first aspect, the declaration of extinction of the offense would allow the immediate finalization of the proceedings, without any negative consequences for the defendant (not even in terms of prejudicial entries in the criminal records), thereby avoiding the hardships that may derive from the continuation of searches for her by the judicial police pursuant to Article 420-quater, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the continuing effectiveness of personal precautionary measures and the persistence of any seizures ordered, in accordance with Article 420-quater, paragraph 7, of the same code.

From the standpoint of the administration of justice, the possibility of immediately rendering a judgment of no case to answer for remission of the complaint would prevent the employment of further activities and resources entailed by paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given that the interest of the injured party – and consequently also the interest of the legal system – in conducting the proceedings has lapsed.

4.3.– If, on the other hand, one were to justify the censured legislative choice in the opposite sense in the name of the defendant's interest in obtaining an acquittal on the merits with an exculpatory formula, in the opinion of the Court of Florence this interest should be considered subordinate both to the defendant's own interest "in exiting the criminal proceedings as soon as possible,” and to the State's interest in the immediate finalization of the trial, as affirmed by this Court in Judgment No. 41 of 2024, regarding the exclusion of a right of a person under investigation to waive the statute of limitations in the face of a request for dismissal formulated in their regard.

To support this proposition, the referral order also adduces the consideration that, even after the reformulation of Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure effected by Legislative Decree No. 150 of October 10, 2022 (Implementation of Law No. 134 of September 27, 2021, containing delegation to the Government for the efficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as in the matter of restorative justice and provisions for the swift finalization of judicial proceedings), the judge, once noting the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings, must issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense if the offense is time-barred. This would result in an unjustified diversity of treatment between the hypothesis of the extinction of the offense due to the statute of limitations and that of the extinction of the offense due to the intervening remission of the complaint.

To corroborate the expressed criticisms, the referring judge further invokes Judgment No. 195 of 2002 of this Court, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy, with reference to Articles 3 and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, of Article 32, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of September 22, 1988 (Approval of provisions on criminal proceedings against minor defendants), as modified by Article 22 of Law No. 63 of March 1, 2001 (Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the formation and evaluation of evidence in implementation of the constitutional law reforming Article 111 of the Constitution), to the extent that it did not provide that the judge of the preliminary hearing, in the absence of the consent of the contumacious or untraceable minor defendant, could issue a judgment of no case to answer, which does not presuppose a finding of liability, thereby frustrating the deflatory purposes inspiring the framework of the juvenile preliminary hearing and imposing a trial development that is entirely superfluous and in any event not advantageous to the defendant.

4.4.– In the opinion of the *a quo* judge, the censured regulatory framework could not be justified even by the consideration that, in the event of an acquittal for extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint, the procedural costs, unless otherwise agreed, remain the responsibility of the person against whom the complaint was brought, who, if unaware of the proceedings, would not be in a position to assess the advisability of such an acquittal coupled with the charging of costs.

In this regard, the referring judge observes that while it is true that, according to the United Criminal Sections, the order requiring the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay procedural costs pursuant to Article 340, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure rationally requires that the person subject thereto be placed in a position to reject the remission of the complaint (Cass., no. 27610 of 2011).

It would nonetheless be unreasonable to have a system that, in order to spare the untraceable person the charging of minimal procedural costs, compels the State to continue searching for them for years. A solution that excludes the charging of procedural costs to the person against whom the complaint was brought in such cases would be preferable, given that these are generally negligible amounts whose effective recovery is in any event exceedingly uncertain.

4.5.– In light of these considerations, the referring judge asks this Court, principally, to declare constitutionally illegitimate the censured norms to the extent that, in the hypothesis at issue, they do not provide that the judge shall issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense due to remission of complaint (rather than a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings), without ordering the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs.

In the alternative, he invokes a ruling that allows the judge to declare the offense extinguished by remission of complaint in the event that the defendant – notwithstanding a lack of knowledge of the proceedings – "received formal notice of the proceedings during the investigative phase.” In such a hypothesis, according to the *a quo* judge, the circumstance that the defendant had official contact with the investigative activities and despite this did not trouble to inform herself about the evolution of the proceedings could justify charging the costs to her, which "would not have a sanctioning purpose, but solely a reparatory one.”

In a further alternative, the referring judge maintains that the issuance of a judgment declaring the extinction of the offense should be provided for, without ordering the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs, if the amount of such costs renders the continuation of searches for her person manifestly unreasonable. Given that in hypotheses that are "statistically exceptional” the procedural costs could be of appreciable amount, such as to justify the continuation of searches with a view to potentially charging them to the person against whom the complaint was brought, the proposed solution would allow the judge to evaluate the situation on a case-by-case basis, avoiding in particular the adoption of the judgment referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the prolongation of searches appears in concrete terms manifestly "uneconomic.”

4.6.– Finally, the referring judge specifies that the literal wording of the censured provisions and the consolidated exegesis thereof provided by case law render an interpretation conforming to the dictates of Article 3 of the Constitution unviable.

5.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, asking that the questions be declared inadmissible, or in any event unfounded.

5.1.– The inadmissibility of the questions is argued first of all for lack of the requirement of relevance, since the interpretation of the case law holds that, for the purposes of Article 155, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the failure of the person against whom the complaint was brought to appear at the hearing – having been informed of the remission of the complaint or otherwise placed in a position to know of it – constitutes the absence of a rejection of the remission suitable to legitimize the pronouncement of extinction of the offense.

To this end, the State's defense objects that the *a quo* judge could have deemed the remission accepted by the person against whom the complaint was brought since she had been placed in a position to know of it, being assisted by a court-appointed defense counsel and having refused to elect a domicile for service of process during identification by the judicial police. This would have allowed the Court to issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense.

The President of the Council of Ministers identifies a further ground of inadmissibility of the criticisms, arguing that they aim to achieve a manipulative intervention affecting the substantive rules governing the extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint, limited to the subjective condition of the defendant who is unaware of the pending proceedings, while combining therewith – both in the principal *petitum* and in the further alternative *petitum* – the effect of exempting the person against whom the complaint was brought from the order to pay trial costs, thereby implicating both substantive and procedural law institutes.

Furthermore, the error of the *tertium comparationis* identified by the Court of Florence with reference to the rules governing the pronouncement of extinction of the offense due to the statute of limitations is pointed out, as the latter is rooted in an instance of extinction that has already occurred, whereas extinction by remission of the complaint does not occur if the person against whom the complaint was brought has no opportunity to oppose it.

In the view of the State defense, the very outcome of upholding the questions would run counter to Article 3 of the Constitution, as it would differentiate the regime of extinction of the offense by remission of complaint and the subjection of the person against whom the complaint was brought to the payment of procedural costs depending on the existence of the condition referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all for a supposed and unproven economic advantage of the administration of justice, which should eventually be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

5.2.– On the merits, the State Attorney General's Office counters that the interest of the accused person in defending themselves in the trial cannot be deemed subordinate to the requirements of immediately arriving at a declaration of extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint. Nor is there any reason why the defendant should prefer a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings for extinction of the offense over a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings for lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings.

The judgment rendered pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, moreover, equally a procedural dismissal decision, which becomes irrevocable when the time limit provided by Article 159, final paragraph, of the Criminal Code is exceeded without the person against whom it was issued having been traced. According to the State Attorney General's Office, the same judgment "leaves open to the defendant, once subsequently traced, a quite broad range of options: to expressly accept the remission of the complaint, to reject it just as expressly and defend themselves on the merits, or alternatively to trust in the maturation of the statute of limitations.”

The State defense also contests the assumption that the order to pay costs to the detriment of an untraceable person against whom a complaint was brought is unreasonable under Article 340, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the practical consideration of the modest amount of such costs in the present case cannot be relevant in the review of constitutional legitimacy, and furthermore, such an order finds adequate justification in the defendant's choice to disinterest themselves in the proceedings.

The intervention brief also dwells on the point that the judgment governed by Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure serves to conclude the proceedings in line with, inter alia, what was affirmed in Judgment No. 192 of 2023 of this Court and in the judgment of the Court of Cassation, United Criminal Sections, no. 5847 of September 26, 2024–February 13, 2025.

Consequently, the alleged existence of a prevailing interest of the judicial administration in concluding the proceedings with a declaration of extinction of the proceedings due to remission of the complaint is refuted. The very fulfillment of the searches ordered from the judicial police, in accordance with Article 420-quater, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure – the potential excessive burden of which worries the referring judge – amounts – specifies the State defense – to the performance of the formalities prescribed by Article 143-bis of Legislative Decree No. 271 of July 28, 1989 (Implementing, coordinating, and transitional provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure), pursuant to which the judgment must be transmitted to the local judicial police section for entry into the Data Processing Center referred to in Article 8 of Law No. 121 of April 1, 1981 (New organization of the Public Security Administration), and subsequent amendments.

Nor does the represented interest of the defendant to avoid the hardships caused by the continuation of searches for her by the judicial police merit attention, as she herself caused them by failing to elect a domicile, and furthermore, this is an effect of the implementation of the defensive guarantees provided by procedural law.

Considerato in diritto (The Law)

6.– By the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 170 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 155 of the Criminal Code and of Articles 420-quater, paragraph 1, and 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and, in the alternative, of Article 554-ter, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure), with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution.

The referring judge states that he is seized, during the pre-trial hearing stage, of criminal proceedings against a person charged with the offense of attempted aggravated theft, which is prosecutable upon a complaint, who failed to appear without the conditions for proceeding in absentia pursuant to Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure being met. At the hearing, however, the injured party declared the remission of the complaint. Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, incorporated by reference in Article 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an adjournment of the hearing was ordered with personal notification of the summons to trial and the hearing minutes to the defendant by the judicial police, following searches, which however remained without result.

The Court of Florence notes that the defendant, presumably unaware of the pending proceedings, was consequently unaware even of the remission of the complaint, nor had she been placed in a position to know of it, so that it could not be considered fulfilled, as an effect of the failure to appear, that the absence of a rejection of the complaint was capable of legitimizing, pursuant to Article 155 of the Criminal Code, the pronouncement of extinction of the offense.

The referring judge therefore affirms that he can do nothing other than issue, pursuant to Article 420-quater, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (incorporated by reference for the pre-trial hearing by Article 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure), a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings: a judgment which entails the continuation of searches to trace the person, until the expiration of the time limit indicated in the final paragraph of Article 159 of the Criminal Code, equal to twice the statute of limitations periods referred to in Article 157 of the same code.

In the opinion of the referring judge, it would nevertheless be unreasonable, and therefore in contrast with Article 3 of the Constitution, that in the face of a remission of the complaint, a judgment must be issued compelling the continuation of searches for the person by the judicial police even for many years – with the expenditure of resources and potential hardships for the person sought – solely by reason of the abstract possibility that the latter, once traced, might reject the remission in order to obtain an acquittal on the merits. This, whereas an immediate declaration of extinction of the offense would clearly respond to the interests of both the defendant and the administration of justice.

Nor, on the other hand, could the censured framework be justified by the interest of the person against whom the complaint was brought to avoid the charging of procedural costs, which in the event of a declaration of extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint would normally remain her responsibility (Article 340, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Taking into account, in fact, the generally negligible amount of such costs and the uncertainty of their recovery, it would be reasonable for the State to waive them, so as to avoid an expenditure of resources vastly superior.

The referring judge therefore asks this Court to declare constitutionally illegitimate the aforementioned provisions to the extent that, in the hypothesis considered, they do not provide that the judge shall issue a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint, without ordering the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs, rather than a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings.

The Court of Florence invokes, in the alternative, the possibility of nevertheless pronouncing a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense following the remission of the complaint when the defendant – although unaware of the pending proceedings – "has had formal notice of the proceedings during the investigative phase”: a circumstance that would justify her condemnation to costs in a "reparatory” function, in the face of the disinterest shown by the person against whom the complaint was brought in informing herself about the evolution of the proceedings themselves, even after official contact with the investigative authorities.

In a further alternative, he requests an additive ruling that would allow the judge to immediately issue a declaration of extinction due to remission of complaint without ordering the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs, when the amount of such costs renders, in concrete terms, the continuation of searches for her person manifestly unreasonable.

7.– Before examining the questions raised by the referring judge, it is appropriate to outline the essential features of the judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings, pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7.1.– Overcoming the choices made by Law No. 67 of April 28, 2014 (Delegations to the Government regarding non-custodial custodial penalties and reform of the sentencing system. Provisions regarding the suspension of proceedings with probation and with respect to untraceable persons), which had eliminated the institution of *contumacia* (default), replacing it with that of *assenza* (absence), Article 23 of Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022 proceeded to a comprehensive revision of proceedings *in absentia*.

Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus identifies the conditions under which the judge may proceed in the absence of a non-appearing defendant, listing first, in paragraph 1, the hypotheses in which knowledge of the proceedings by the defendant is taken as certain (so-called "absence-presence”). Outside of these cases, in which the judge is only required to verify formal regularity, paragraph 2 authorizes proceedings *in absentia* based on an evidentiary assessment concerning actual knowledge of the pending proceedings by the defendant and therefore concerning the voluntary and conscious nature of their choice not to appear, an assessment for which the provision indicates certain symptomatic elements (method of notification, acts performed by the defendant prior to the hearing, appointment of a retained counsel), finally establishing an open clause ("any other relevant circumstance”). Paragraph 3 finally establishes that proceedings shall take place in absence even if the defendant is a fugitive "or has otherwise voluntarily evaded knowledge of the pending proceedings,” thereby giving relevance to the intentionality of the absence.

The first three paragraphs of Article 420-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure therefore regulate the hypotheses of absence that do not preclude the procedural course, which are contrasted with impeding absence, destined to result in procedural bar under Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Paragraph 1 of the latter establishes that, "[o]utside of the cases provided for by Articles 420-bis and 420-ter [which governs the legitimate impediment of the defendant or counsel], if the defendant is not present, the judge shall issue an unappealable judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings.”

The subsequent paragraphs indicate the content of such a judgment, which includes the warning that the proceedings will be reopened at a hearing on a fixed date determined based on the time of tracing the person, for whom searches by the judicial police are indeed ordered until the time limit provided by Article 159, final paragraph, of the Criminal Code (i.e., twice the ordinary statute of limitations period for the offense) is exceeded for all offenses charged.

Paragraph 6 of Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that, once this time limit has elapsed without the person having been traced, the judgment of procedural bar "can no longer be revoked.” Being correlated to the statute of limitations period for the offense, the irrevocability of the judgment does not occur for the offenses indicated in Article 157, final paragraph, of the Criminal Code ("[t]he statute of limitations does not extinguish offenses for which the law provides the penalty of life imprisonment, including as an effect of the application of aggravating circumstances”).

7.2.– The legal nature of the judgment issued pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure was already examined by this Court in Judgment No. 192 of 2023, where it was noted that the transformation of impeding absence, effected by Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022, from a cause of suspension of proceedings, as in the former Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, into an instance of procedural bar has aligned itself "with the solution adopted for infirm persons ‘eternally subject to trial’ by Article 72-bis of the Criminal Code,” inserted by Article 1, paragraph 22, of Law No. 103 of June 23, 2017 (Amendments to the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the penitentiary system), as already observed in Judgment No. 65 of 2023.

This Court therefore recognized in the "form-content of the judgment referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, containing both a pronouncement of procedural bar that is virtually conclusive and a *vocatio in iudicium* at a predefined hearing in the event the defendant is traced,” a "two-faced nature.” Such ambivalence is "nevertheless destined to dissolve with the passage of time, since, pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 6 of the same Article 420-quater, at the moment when the time limit provided by Article 159, final paragraph, of the Criminal Code (i.e., twice the time necessary to time-bar the offense) is exceeded for all offenses charged, without the person against whom it was issued having been traced, the judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings becomes irrevocable.”

As this Court therefore observed, "unless it is an imprescriptible offense, the judgment of procedural bar due to lack of knowledge by the defendant is capable of concluding the proceedings in an irreversible manner.”

The more recent Judgment No. 128 of 2025 emphasized that the modification of Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, made by Article 23, paragraph 1, letter e), of Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022, with the abandonment of the solution of "[s]uspension of proceedings for absence of the defendant,” which left in a condition of uncertainty all proceedings in which it was not possible to proceed in absence, introduced a type of pronouncement that concludes the proceedings preventing them from remaining pending and preventing the judge from having to order new searches for the defendant every year.

In the aforementioned judgment, it was also observed that the pronouncement provided for by Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a "procedural” ruling, which prescinds from any assessment on the merits, unappealable, and endowed with "limited preclusive efficacy, as it is destined to be revoked, albeit within certain time limits indicated therein, when the person against whom it was issued is traced.”

Lastly, Judgment No. 12 of 2026 (point 9.4.2.), with regard to the guarantees inherent to proceedings *in absentia* and the representative power attributed to the court-appointed defense counsel by Article 420-bis, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterated that "only a voluntary waiver by the defendant to participate in the trial, ‘as an expression of their free and uncoercive defensive choice,’ can justify, on a constitutional level, the limitation of adversarial proceedings solely to representation by counsel (Judgment No. 9 of 1982).”

7.3.– In the case law of the Court of Cassation, relevance is assumed by Judgment No. 5847 of 2025 of the United Criminal Sections, which defined the pronouncement under Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a peculiar "procedural” provision, conclusive "of a phase,” which is premised on the finding of the non-existence of conditions to declare absence, or of knowledge of the proceedings by the defendant, resulting in the non-voluntariness of the failure to appear, such that the judge, having made a final attempt at personal notification of the notice of hearing fixing, the request for committal to trial, and the hearing minutes, has the duty to issue the pronouncement of dismissal/stay of proceedings.

The Court of Cassation recalled what was maintained in the explanatory report to Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022 concerning the judgment in question, namely that it "concludes the proceedings, so that the recipient thereof is no longer a defendant and the file is specifically archived for [their] easier retrieval.”

The United Criminal Sections also highlighted that the revocability of the judgment pursuant to Article 420-sexies of the Code of Criminal Procedure is contemplated in the current framework as a consequence of a "single fact,” namely the tracing of the defendant with personal service of the judgment containing the *vocatio in iudicium* and with a return of service documenting the communication of the pending proceedings. Conversely, there are no provisions – unlike what the former Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for the order suspending proceedings – for hypotheses of revocation deriving from certain proof of knowledge of the proceedings, or connected to the pronouncement of a judgment on the merits, such as the extinction of the offense due to death or the statute of limitations.

The Court of Cassation thus favored the interpretation that allows immediate recourse to the Court of Cassation against the judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the proceedings; such a judgment, in fact, rests on a series of evaluations by the judge regarding the existence of the prerequisites justifying the decision of procedural bar, as an alternative to the ordinary procedural sequence.

8.– Having stated this, the exceptions of inadmissibility formulated by the State Attorney General's Office must first be addressed.

8.1.– The first exception complains of a lack of the relevance requirement since – in light of the interpretation of case law according to which, for the purposes of Article 155, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code, the failure of the person against whom the complaint was brought to appear at the hearing, having been informed of the remission of the complaint or otherwise placed in a position to know of it, constitutes the absence of a rejection of the remission suitable to legitimize the pronouncement of extinction of the offense – the referring judge could well have deemed the remission of the complaint accepted. The defendant, in fact, had been placed in a position to know of it, being assisted by a court-appointed defense counsel and having refused to elect a domicile for service of process during identification by the judicial police.

8.2.– This first exception is unfounded.

The Court of Florence noted that, in the present case, there is no element to suggest that the defendant, who did not appear at the hearing, is aware of the pending proceedings against her, with various elements indeed pointing in the opposite direction (supra, point 2). Consequently, according to the referring judge, it must be excluded that the defendant can be considered aware of the remission of the complaint – made by the injured party at the hearing – or even simply in a position to know of it.

This further entails that from the simple failure of the defendant to appear at the pre-trial hearing, her will not to reject the remission of the complaint cannot be inferred, and therefore it cannot be considered that the condition provided by Article 155, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code for the perfection of the extinctive fact of the offense is met (in this sense, Cass., un. pen., no. 27610 of 2011, as well as Court of Cassation, Second Criminal Section, judgments of November 11–December 20, 2022, no. 48272 and May 21–October 1, 2013, no. 40552).

This is an adequate and certainly not implausible reasoning, not vitiated by the State Attorney General's references to the fact that the defendant was assisted by a court-appointed defense counsel (who, moreover, according to what was reported by the referring judge, never had any contact with his client), or to the circumstance that she refused to elect a domicile for service of process in the immediate aftermath of the act for which proceedings are brought.

8.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers identifies a subsequent ground of inadmissibility of the questions, as they aim to achieve a manipulative intervention modifying the rules governing the extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint for a defendant who is unaware of the pending proceedings, while combining therewith, in the question raised principally as well as in the further alternative question, the effect of exempting the person against whom the complaint was brought from the order to pay trial costs, thereby implicating both substantive and procedural law institutes.

In the view of the State Attorney General's Office, the outcome of potentially upholding the questions would indeed run counter to Article 3 of the Constitution. The regime of extinction of the offense by remission of complaint and the subjection of the person against whom the complaint was brought to the payment of procedural costs would result in being differentiated depending on the existence of the condition referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Evident would also be the error of the *tertium comparationis* identified by the Court of Florence with reference to the rules governing the declaration of extinction of the offense due to the statute of limitations, as the latter is rooted in an instance of extinction that has already occurred, whereas extinction by remission of the complaint does not occur if the person against whom the complaint was brought has no opportunity to oppose it.

8.4.– This further exception is also unfounded.

The assumption of the State Attorney General's Office that no actual unreasonableness would derive from the application of the censured provisions with regard to the interests of the defendant and the judicial administration concerns the merits, and not the admissibility, of the questions raised.

Equally concerning the merits is the objection relating to the alleged unsuitability of the additive solution requested by comparison with the *tertium comparationis*, due to a lack of identity of *ratio*; it is up to this Court, in fact, should it deem the questions submitted to it to be well-founded, to identify the most suitable pronouncement for the *reductio ad legitimitatem* of the censured provisions, nor is the formulation of possible alternative models for regulating the legal situation sufficient to pose procedural obstacles to the examination of the questions (among the most recent, Judgments no. 146 and no. 53 of 2025, no. 46 of 2024).

Arguments concerning the discretion recognized to the legislature also pertain to the merits rather than the admissibility of the questions of constitutional legitimacy, as they entail an examination of the *ratio* and application prerequisites of the censured norm (Judgments no. 248, no. 224, and no. 137 of 2020, no. 35 of 2017).

9.– On the merits, the principal question is unfounded.

9.1.– In the referring judge's view, the censured framework would violate Article 3 of the Constitution by conflicting, first of all, with the principle of reasonableness, since it would compel, in the situation considered, the pronouncement of a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings due to the defendant's lack of knowledge of the pending proceedings, which is followed by the continuation of searches for her person even for a long time, with a waste of energy and resources in view of a potential reopening, whereas an immediate finalization of the trial would be possible through a judgment of no case to answer due to the extinction of the offense by remission of the complaint: a judgment that would clearly respond to the interests of both the defendant herself and the administration of justice.

9.2.– The referring judge's assumption cannot be shared.

It is helpful to premise that, according to the consistent case law of this Court, the legislature enjoys broad discretion in shaping procedural institutes, which can be censured only where the framework reveals profiles of manifest unreasonableness (most recently, Judgments no. 75 and no. 59 of 2026).

Now, the combined provisions of the censured norms do not denote any unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the choices made by the legislature in shaping the substantive and procedural institutes involved, the regulation of which is the result of delicate balancings between principles and interests in natural mutual conflict. The corrective interventions suggested by the Court of Florence, declaredly aimed at ensuring broader protection of the interests of the defendant and the administration of justice, risk, conversely, altering the overall balance of the system (among many, Judgment No. 39 of 2025).

The requirement that the person against whom the complaint was brought, who failed to appear at the hearing, has been made aware of the remission of the complaint or has been placed in a position to know of it, so that the absence of a rejection of the remission of the complaint can be deemed fulfilled for the purpose of pronouncing the extinction of the offense for such a cause, is indeed based on the need to safeguard the interest of the same person against whom the complaint was brought in obtaining a positive judicial affirmation of their innocence regarding the act attributed to them by the complainant.

Therefore, a regulatory framework that preserves this interest even in the event that the defendant, through no fault of her own, is unaware of the pending proceedings against her cannot be deemed unreasonable.

Nor do the considerations advanced by the *a quo* judge appear persuasive in the opposite direction to support the thesis that, in the hypothesis under discussion, this interest should be considered subordinate to that of the defendant herself in having her position finalized immediately, avoiding potential hardships connected to the continuation of searches for her person by the judicial police and the prolongation of the effectiveness of personal and real precautionary measures potentially adopted (Article 420-quater, paragraph 7, of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Such considerations translate, in fact, into criticisms, intrinsically debatable, of the legislative appreciation underlying the current regulatory framework, which exceed the scope of the review that this Court ordinarily performs in relation to procedural rules.

Nor can a regulatory framework be considered manifestly unreasonable which – in a situation where the lack of knowledge of the proceedings (and of the remission of the complaint) is not attributable to the defendant – prioritizes the aforementioned interest even over that of the administration of justice to avoid the "waste of energy and resources” entailed by the judgment referred to in Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to "the performance of searches by the Judicial Police, the necessary registry fulfillments, the maintenance in custody […] of seized assets, the revocation of the judgment, and the resumption of proceedings in the event of subsequent tracing.”

9.3.– Furthermore, the denounced violation of Article 3 of the Constitution under the profile of unreasonable inequality of treatment cannot be identified.

In the *a quo* judge's view, in the event that it is not possible to proceed in the absence of the defendant and the statute of limitations period has already elapsed, the judge should issue a judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings because the offense is extinguished for that cause, even though the defendant was not placed in a position to waive the statute of limitations because she was unaware of the proceedings. This, unlike what happens with regard to the extinction of the offense due to remission of the complaint, despite the interest at stake being the same (that of the defendant to defend herself against the accusation on the merits): hence an unreasonable inequality of treatment of analogous situations.

The interpretative premise on which the criticism rests is, however, erroneous. Precisely because the interest at stake is the same, the principle also applies in relation to the statute of limitations that it cannot be declared, in the procedural phase, if the defendant has not been placed in a position to be heard on it, so as to be able to exercise the right to waive it.

In this regard, it must be recalled that this Court, with Judgment No. 111 of 2022, declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 568, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when interpreted to mean that an appeal to the Court of Cassation brought against the appellate judgment which, in the pre-trial phase and without any form of adversarial proceedings, declared that proceedings should not be brought due to the intervening statute of limitations of the offense is inadmissible for lack of interest to appeal.

That judgment stated that the balancing between the defendant's interest in appealing for the failure to evaluate grounds for acquittal on the merits pursuant to Article 129, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a *de plano* judgment declaring the extinction of the offense due to the statute of limitations without any activation of adversarial proceedings between the parties, and the principle of the reasonable duration of proceedings, did not appear respectful of Articles 24, second paragraph, and 111, second paragraph, of the Constitution.

The more recent case law of the Court of Cassation has consequently affirmed the essentiality of establishing adversarial proceedings for the purpose of declaring that proceedings should not be brought against the defendant because the offense is extinguished by the statute of limitations, so as to allow the defendant also to waive the statute of limitations, or to be heard regarding the potential application of more broadly exculpatory formulas (Court of Cassation, Sixth Criminal Section, Judgment of October 19–November 8, 2023, no. 45104; Fifth Criminal Section, Judgment of October 5–November 22, 2022, no. 44417).

Nor, on the other hand, is the referring judge's assumption shareable according to which, even when the conditions for proceeding in absence are lacking, the judge should nonetheless acquit the defendant for the intervening statute of limitations of the offense based on the general provision of Article 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a provision is not, in fact, incorporated by reference in the new text of Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as replaced by Legislative Decree No. 150 of 2022, unlike what occurred with the previous formulation, which expressly saved its application: a modification that correlates with the configuration of the judgment of dismissal/stay of proceedings currently provided by the censured provision as a procedural acquittal ruling, as previously observed (supra, point 7).

In conclusion, therefore, the denounced inequality of treatment cannot be identified.

9.4.– The idea of sacrificing the effectiveness of knowledge or knowability of the remission of a complaint by a defendant who, as in the case of the *a quo* proceedings, is not even aware of the pending proceedings, purely to spare them the feared hardships and increased costs of the judgment under Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not even find a comparable homogeneous situation in the denial of the existence of a constitutional right to waive the statute of limitations on the part of the person under investigation, according to what was decided by Judgment No. 41 of 2024 of this Court.

That judgment, in fact, in excluding that preliminary investigations are structured by the legislature as a place suitable for exercising the right of the person subjected to them to "defend themselves by proving,” reiterated that such right must instead "physically be exercised within the framework of the trial, in which all rights and defensive guarantees recognized to the defendant by the code of criminal procedure, and even before that by the Constitution, unfold,” since they are "formally accused of committing an offense by the public prosecutor, through an act exercising criminal action that is functional to the establishment of proceedings,” and thus guaranteed for the purpose of seeing the baselessness of such an accusation recognized on the merits.

10.– The question raised in the alternative is likewise unfounded.

With this question, the Court of Florence invokes the possibility of nonetheless pronouncing a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense following the remission of the complaint when the defendant – although unaware of the pending proceedings – has had formal notice of the proceedings during the investigative phase: a circumstance that would justify her condemnation to costs in a "reparatory” function, in the face of the disinterest shown by the person against whom the complaint was brought in informing herself about the evolution of the proceedings themselves, even after official contact with the investigative authorities.

10.1.– Compared to the protection of the right to defend oneself on the merits of the accusation, underlying the interpretation that conditions the pronouncement of extinction of the offense on knowledge or knowability of the remission of the complaint, as well as the application of the rules according to which it is established that the absence of the defendant from the trial can be deemed an expression of a conscious waiver to participate in it, it would constitute, rather, an intolerable setback to render equivalent, albeit for the purpose of issuing a judgment of no case to answer for extinction of the offense, the formal notice of the proceedings obtained in the investigative phase, as proposed in the first question raised in the alternative.

The objective criterion of efficiency of the administration of justice, of which the principle of reasonable duration is also an expression, presupposes in truth a trial conducted in compliance with the primary and fundamental guarantee of adversarial proceedings, of which both Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the shared interpretation of Article 155 of the Criminal Code are expressions (Judgments no. 96 of 2024, no. 116 and no. 67 of 2023, no. 111 of 2022).

11.– Lastly, the question raised in the further alternative is also unfounded.

With this question, the referring judge urges an additive ruling that would allow the judge to immediately issue a declaration of extinction of the offense due to remission of complaint without ordering the person against whom the complaint was brought to pay the procedural costs, when the amount of such costs renders, in concrete terms, the continuation of searches for her person manifestly unreasonable.

11.1.– Practical inconveniences and application uncertainties regarding the prolonged duration of police searches necessary to trace the person against whom the judgment pursuant to Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been issued, as well as the hypothesized corresponding escalation of procedural costs that the person against whom the complaint was brought must bear pursuant to Article 340, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, do not translate into a defect of constitutional legitimacy of the censured provisions (on the unsuitability of factual inconveniences to give rise to a defect of constitutional legitimacy, most recently, Judgments no. 75 of 2026 and no. 205 of 2025).

Searches, moreover, are entailed by the very nature of the judgment under Article 420-quater of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is premised on the finding of the non-existence of conditions to declare absence, or of knowledge of the proceedings by the defendant, resulting in the omitted establishment of adversarial proceedings and the non-voluntariness of the failure to appear. The procedural closure of this initial phase is therefore followed by new searches for the person and a *vocatio in iudicium* suitable to reopen the completed proceedings.

In projecting potential prejudice to the administration of justice and the increase in procedural costs, the referring judge fails to consider that, at least immediately, the fulfillment of the searches ordered from the judicial police, in accordance with Article 420-quater, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, amounts in most cases – as the State defense alleges – to the execution of the formalities prescribed by Article 143-bis of the implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., the transmission of the judgment to the local judicial police section for entry into the Data Processing Center referred to in Article 8 of Law No. 121 of 1981, so as to enable tracing the person on the various occasions when they come into contact with the public administration.

12.– In light of the preceding considerations, both the question raised principally and those raised in the alternative must therefore be declared unfounded.

on these grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares unfounded the questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 155 of the Criminal Code and of Articles 420-quater, paragraph 1, and 554-bis, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as, in the alternative, of Article 554-ter, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting as a single judge, by the order indicated in the heading.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 22, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Stefano PETITTI, Rapporteur

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Registrar

Filed in the Registry on October 2, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms, in its text, to the original