ORDER NO. 147

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following

ORDER

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship) introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions regarding citizenship), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, brought by the Ordinary Court of Mantua, civil section, sitting in a collegial panel, by order of October 24, 2025, registered under number 4 of the 2026 order register and published in the Official Journal of the Republic, Number 2, 1st Special Series, of the year 2026, and by the Ordinary Court of Campobasso, specialized section for immigration, international protection, and free movement of European Union citizens, sitting as a single judge, by two orders dated February 9 and 6, 2026, registered respectively under numbers 40 and 41 of the 2026 order register and published in the Official Journal of the Republic, Number 11, 1st Special Series, of the year 2026.

Having regard to the appearances entered by M.C. S. and C. D.L., in their capacity as holders of parental authority over the minor A.V. D.L., by A. L.A. and J. L.A., and by F. C.D.S.C., as well as the interventions of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the Judge Rapporteur Giovanni Pitruzzella at the public hearing of June 9, 2026;

having heard counsels Alfonso Celotto for M.C. S. and C. D.L., Marco Mellone for A. L.A. and J. L.A., Monica Lis Restanio and Corrado Caruso for F. C.D.S.C., as well as State Counsel Lorenzo D’Ascia for the President of the Council of Ministers;

deliberated in chambers on June 9, 2026.

Relying on the Facts

1.– The Ordinary Court of Mantua, civil section, sitting in a collegial panel, by an order registered under No. 4 ord. reg. of 2026, and the Ordinary Court of Campobasso, specialized section for immigration, international protection, and free movement of European Union citizens, by two orders registered under numbers 40 and 41 ord. reg. of 2026, having identical content, have raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis – limited to the words "even prior to the date of entry into force of this article” and to the conditions set forth in letters a), a-bis), and b) – of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions regarding citizenship), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025.

1.1.– The first referring judge reports having been seized by the parents of a Brazilian minor, A.V. D.L., born and resident in Brazil, through an action brought – pursuant to Article 95 of the Decree of the President of the Republic No. 396 of November 3, 2000 (Regulations for the revision and simplification of civil status records, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 12, of Law No. 127 of May 15, 1997) – against the refusal of the Registrar of Vital Statistics of the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio to transcribe the birth certificate of the said minor. The applicants sought a judicial declaration recognizing the status of Italian citizen of A.V. D.L., as the child of a mother recognized as an Italian citizen by judgment No. 1532 of April 11, 2025, of the Ordinary Court of Brescia.

The referring judge observes that, under the legal framework prior to Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, the application would have been well-founded. Conversely, under the new framework laid down by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, A.V. D.L. would never have acquired Italian citizenship, as he does not fall within the "derogatory” provisions referred to in letters a) through d) of paragraph 1 of the same Article 3-bis.

The *a quo* judge recalls the case law of the Court of Cassation concerning the acquisition of citizenship (Joint Civil Sections, judgments No. 25318 of August 24, 2022, and No. 4466 of February 25, 2009) and notes that the challenged provision would result in the "implicit revocation” of citizenship for all those who, having been born prior to its entry into force, "had already acquired, by virtue of birth from an Italian citizen, the substantive ownership of the *status civitatis*, even though they had not yet formally applied for the recognition of the title to the right.”

As regards the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring judge argues that Article 3-bis infringes: a) Article 22 of the Constitution, which excludes the possibility that "the right of every individual citizen to the maintenance of their *status civitatis* may be sacrificed for reasons connected to the public interests of the community”; b) Article 3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the decision to act retroactively upon the recognition of the *status civitatis* has harmed the legitimate expectations of those who had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth; moreover, the difference in treatment between those who submitted the application for recognition prior to March 28, 2025, and those who submitted it thereafter is "entirely arbitrary”; c) Article 2 of the Constitution, as it impacts "in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner upon an inviolable human right”; d) Article 24 of the Constitution, as it unreasonably limits, "even from a temporal perspective, for a subject who has already acquired *ab origine* Italian citizenship *iure sanguinis*, access to judicial protection of the subjective right to citizenship”; e) Articles 1, second paragraph, 56, and 58 of the Constitution, inasmuch as Italian citizenship, retroactively excluded by the challenged provision, represents the indispensable prerequisite for active and passive political rights; f) Article 72, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution, inasmuch as the requirement of assembly-reserved legislation inherently implies a formal statutory reserve, thereby precluding acts having the force of law in the indicated matters; g) Article 77 of the Constitution, due to the lack of the prerequisites justifying recourse to emergency decrees; h) Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation "to compliance with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR, and in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization on December 16, 1966.

1.2.– The Court of Campobasso reports having been seized by two Argentine citizens (ord. reg. No. 40 of 2026) and two Brazilian citizens (ord. reg. No. 41 of 2026), through actions brought pursuant to Article 281-decies of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Ministry of the Interior, filed, respectively, on May 28, 2025, and August 26, 2025. The applicants sought the judicial declaration of their status as Italian citizens *iure sanguinis*, as descendants of an Italian citizen who emigrated, respectively, to Argentina and Brazil, without ever becoming naturalized.

The Court of Campobasso dwells upon its jurisdiction to adjudicate the *a quo* proceedings and upon the merits of the application in light of the legal framework preceding Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted. It then argues the applicability of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by the aforementioned decree, and the impossibility of providing it with a compliant interpretation. Furthermore, it specifies that it challenges Article 3-bis to the extent that it applies also to subjects born prior to Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, since it entails a "substantial revocation of an already acquired right.”

As regards the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring judge argues the following grounds of challenge. Article 3-bis would infringe, first of all, Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as: a) the decision to act retroactively on the recognition of the *status civitatis* has harmed the legitimate expectations of those who had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth; b) the difference in treatment between those who submitted the application for recognition prior to March 28, 2025, and those who submitted it thereafter is "entirely arbitrary”; c) it conflicts with the principle of proportionality, causing "a particularly intense and definitive compression of the legal sphere of the addressees, in the face of objectives that could have been pursued by means of less invasive instruments.”

Furthermore, Article 3-bis would infringe Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which confer Union citizenship upon anyone holding the citizenship of a Member State.

Additionally, the challenged provision would infringe Article 22 of the Constitution, which excludes any form of deprivation of the *status civitatis*, if deriving from "discretionary choices of a political nature, including those justified with reference to general public interests”; Article 72, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution, inasmuch as the requirement of assembly-reserved legislation implies a formal statutory reserve, thereby precluding acts having the force of law in the indicated matters; Article 77 of the Constitution, due to the lack of the prerequisites justifying recourse to emergency legislation.

Regarding the question referred to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU, the referring judge observes that Article 3-bis entails the "automatic and generalized loss” of European citizenship as well, thus falling within the scope of application of European law. In such cases, Member States must respect the principle of proportionality. The referring judge recalls the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (in particular, Grand Chamber, judgment of September 5, 2023, Case C-689/21, Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet), according to which national rules must allow for an individual examination of the consequences that the loss of citizenship produces for the persons concerned, and guarantee the possibility of retaining or recovering European citizenship.

In conclusion, according to the Court of Campobasso, Article 3-bis, insofar as it retroactively establishes new conditions for the acquisition of Italian citizenship, entails an *"ex tunc* revocation of an acquired right,” "without the provision of a reasonable time limit for requesting the recognition of the *status civitatis*.”

2.– The minor party to the *a quo* proceedings, represented by his parents, entered an appearance in the proceedings registered under No. 4 ord. reg. of 2026 by a brief filed on February 2, 2026. It argues, in particular, the merits of the questions concerning Articles 3, 22, 72, fourth paragraph, and 77 of the Constitution.

The applicants in the *a quo* proceedings entered an appearance in the proceedings registered under No. 40 ord. reg. of 2026 by a brief filed on April 6, 2026. They argue, in particular, the merits of the questions concerning Articles 22, 72, fourth paragraph, and 77 of the Constitution.

One of the two applicants in the *a quo* proceedings entered an appearance in the proceedings registered under No. 41 ord. reg. of 2026 by a brief filed on April 7, 2026.

She sets forth arguments in support of the merits of all the questions raised. With reference to the one concerning Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU, she observes that the Italian State has failed "in that relationship of solidarity which binds it to dual-national Italians born and resident abroad.” In the alternative, the party requests this Court to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice concerning the meaning of the aforementioned European parameters.

3.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, intervened in the proceedings brought by the Court of Mantua by a brief filed on February 3, 2026, and in both proceedings brought by the Court of Campobasso by briefs filed on April 7, 2026.

State defense reviews the regulatory and jurisprudential framework prior to Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, characterized by an expansive trend in citizenship, and highlights the "exponential increase in applications for the recognition of Italian citizenship *iure sanguinis* by foreign citizens.” Article 3-bis does not entail any loss of already acquired rights, but intervenes exclusively on the mechanisms for the transmission of Italian citizenship, introducing a bar to acquisition.

The State Attorney General argues the groundlessness of the questions raised. With reference to the one concerning Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, raised by the Court of Campobasso, it observes that the rulings of the Court of Justice concerning the obligations that States must respect when revoking citizenship concern different factual scenarios, as they relate to cases where the persons concerned had been identified as citizens of the Member State, had enjoyed rights and fulfilled obligations connected with citizenship status, and had subsequently been the subject of individual decisions withdrawing or revoking citizenship. Conversely, Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, limits the transmission of citizenship to those who, "throughout their lives, have behaved like foreigners.”

According to State defense, the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, April 29, 2025, Case C-181/23, European Commission v. Republic of Malta, indicates not only that the challenged rules are in line with European law, but also that they have "provided the necessary corrections to a regulatory system that, otherwise, might have been in conflict with EU law itself.” The previous regulatory framework, in fact, allowed the enjoyment of rights provided for by the European legal order to subjects boasting no genuine connection with the European Union, "potentially introducing millions of people into the European Union area, without any form of control, with repercussions also on public safety, not only national,” and on the provision of social benefits.

4.– The Patrimonio Italiano association, the Confederation of Italians in the World, and the Natitaliani association filed briefs of intervention, respectively on January 28, 2026, February 2, 2026, and February 3, 2026, in the proceedings brought by the Court of Mantua. By Order No. 69 of 2026, this Court declared all interventions inadmissible.

By a brief filed on April 2, 2026, L.G. S.D.S. and C.T. S.D.S. intervened in the proceedings registered under No. 41 ord. reg. of 2026.

By briefs filed on April 3, 2026, the Confederation of Italians in the World intervened in the proceedings brought by the Court of Campobasso.

By a brief filed on June 8, 2026, W. F. intervened in the proceedings registered under No. 40 ord. reg. of 2026.

All such interventions were declared inadmissible by this Court by Order No. 102 of 2026.

4.1.– In the proceedings brought by the Court of Mantua, the Euro-American Research Center on Constitutional Policies of the University of Salento (Cedeuam), the Argentinos nelle Marche APS association, the Union of Descendants of Italians in the World, Intercomites Brasil, and the Trentini nel Mondo ETS association filed *amendments/amicus curiae* briefs, respectively on January 26, 2026, January 30, 2026, February 1, 2026, February 2, 2026, and February 3, 2026. Such briefs were admitted by Presidential Decree of March 31, 2026.

On April 3, 2026, the brief of the Argentinos nelle Marche APS association was filed in the proceedings registered under No. 41 ord. reg. of 2026. Such brief was admitted by Presidential Decree of April 29, 2026.

4.2.– On May 19, 2026, A.V. D.L. filed a supplementary brief.

On the same date, supplementary briefs were filed in both proceedings brought by the Court of Campobasso by the applicants in the *a quibus* proceedings.

A. L.A. and J. L.A. reply to the arguments contained in judgment No. 63 of 2026 of this Court, also recalling the order of the Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, May 12, 2026, No. 13818. In the alternative to the grounds of constitutional illegitimacy, the parties request that the case file be returned to the *a quo* judge so that he may reconsider the issues in light of the aforementioned Order No. 13818 of 2026, and, in any event, that a preliminary reference be made to the CJEU regarding the profiles of incompatibility with Article 20 TFEU, freedom of movement, and Articles 7 and 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

In the proceedings registered under No. 41 ord. reg. of 2026, the party replies to the arguments contained in judgment No. 63 of 2026, also recalling the aforementioned order of the Court of Cassation No. 13818 of 2026. Furthermore, it takes the view that the question left unprejudiced by judgment No. 63 of 2026 (point 9.1.: "Moreover, the question concerning the differentiation between those who received the appointment and those who initiated the procedure for the recognition of citizenship but did not receive the appointment by 23:59 on March 27, 2025 remains unprejudiced [as it falls outside the *a quo* proceedings and was thus not raised by the referring judge]”) is not extraneous to the order of the Court of Campobasso: consequently, it requests, in the alternative, that the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letters a), a-bis), and b) of Law No. 91 of 1992 be declared, to the extent that it does not allow the recognition of the *status civitatis*, in compliance with the legislation applicable as of March 27, 2025, following an expression of intent aimed at obtaining recognition which did not materialize "due to objective impediments not attributable to the interested party.” In a further alternative, it requests that a preliminary reference be made to the CJEU concerning the compatibility of the challenged rules with Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU, "under the profiles of proportionality, the effectiveness of protection, and the prohibition of unreasonable restrictions on access to the status of European citizen.”

4.3.– During the public hearing, counsel for F. C.D.S.C. reiterated the request for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Considering in Law

5.– The Ordinary Court of Mantua, civil section, by an order registered under No. 4 ord. reg. of 2026, and the Ordinary Court of Campobasso, specialized section for immigration, international protection, and free movement of European Union citizens, by two orders registered under numbers 40 and 41 ord. reg. of 2026, having identical content, have raised questions concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis – limited to the words "even prior to the date of entry into force of this article” and to the conditions set forth in letters a), a-bis), and b) – of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted.

The first referring judge alleges the infringement of Articles 1, second paragraph, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, 58, 72, fourth paragraph, 77, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation "to compliance with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR, and in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”

The Court of Campobasso alleges the infringement of Articles 2, 3, 22, 72, fourth paragraph, 77, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU.

The referring orders indicated in the heading concern the same provisions and raise partly overlapping questions; therefore, the joinder of the proceedings for joint examination must be ordered.

6.− Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 establishes as follows: "[b]y way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14, and 20 of this law, Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983, Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, anyone born abroad even prior to the date of entry into force of this article and who holds another citizenship shall be deemed never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions is met: a) the status of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the legislation applicable as of March 27, 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, submitted to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 23:59, Rome time, on the same date; a-bis) the status of citizen of the interested party is recognized, in compliance with the legislation applicable as of March 27, 2025, following an application, accompanied by the necessary documentation, submitted to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the interested party by the competent office by 23:59, Rome time, on the same date of March 27, 2025; b) the status of citizen of the interested party is judicially ascertained, in compliance with the legislation applicable as of March 27, 2025, following judicial proceedings instituted no later than 23:59, Rome time, on the same date; c) a first- or second-degree ascendant holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; d) a parent or adoptive parent has been resident in Italy for at least two consecutive years following the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the date of birth or adoption of the child.”

This Court must rule, inter alia, on the question of whether the aforementioned Article 3-bis infringes Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. The former provision establishes that "[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.” The latter provision establishes, in paragraph 1, that "[c]itizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”

According to the Court of Campobasso, Article 3-bis would entail the "automatic and generalized loss” of European citizenship as well, thus falling within the scope of application of European law. In such cases, Member States must respect the principle of proportionality. The referring judge recalls the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (in particular, Grand Chamber, judgment of September 5, 2023, Case C-689/21, Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet), according to which national rules should allow for an individual examination of the consequences that the loss of citizenship produces for the persons concerned, and guarantee the possibility of retaining or recovering European citizenship.

7.− In judgment No. 63 of 2026, this Court clarified (point 8.3.) that Article 3-bis configures "an original bar to the acquisition of Italian citizenship” by its addressees, "and not a revocation.” It also noted that the failure to use the institution of revocation "is consistent with the content of the rules under examination, which produce effects to which revocation is conceptually extraneous. In fact, [...] revocation is an institution that operates *ex nunc*, in connection with subsequent circumstances, whereas Article 3-bis produces *ex tunc* effects, in order to address a very longstanding situation (albeit aggravated over the decades).” Furthermore, this Court observed that "revocation (as well as the loss of citizenship regulated by Article 12 of Law No. 91 of 1992 and the official annulment of the measure granting citizenship) affects a status already officially acquired by an individual, whereas the rules under examination impact the unofficially recognized status of a multitude of people,” and that "[t]his is presumably why the particular phrasing used by the legislator was adopted ("shall be deemed never to have acquired Italian citizenship”): the use of the presumptive formula is appropriate to the fact that for none of the addressees of the rules was the status of Italian citizen legally certain.”

7.1.− In the same ruling, this Court also provided a historical framework for the rules governing the transmission of Italian citizenship, examining the impact of the entry into force of the Constitution and the progressive divergence therefrom of the legislative rules on citizenship. The observations made in the aforementioned decision are summarized below.

In Italy, the basic criterion for the acquisition of citizenship is the filiation relationship, pursuant to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Law No. 91 of 1992. Prior to Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, transmission to descendants occurred without temporal limits.

In the fifty years from 1876 to 1925, over 16.5 million Italian citizens emigrated to various destinations worldwide, the majority (approximately 8.9 million people) heading towards the American continent, to countries where *ius soli* was in force. Thus, an enormous mass of people was formed who held foreign citizenship while also retaining Italian citizenship, almost always unverified.

Over the years, the scale of the dual citizenship phenomenon has increased considerably, also by virtue of legal factors. On the one hand, this Court, by judgments No. 87 of 1975 and No. 30 of 1983, declared unconstitutional the rules providing for the loss of citizenship by an Italian woman who acquired her foreign husband’s citizenship through marriage (Article 10, third paragraph, of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, entitled "On Italian citizenship”), and those which did not attribute citizenship by birth to the child of an Italian mother (Article 1, number 1°, of Law No. 555 of 1912); on the other hand, the Court of Cassation held that the rules declared unconstitutional were inapplicable even to factual scenarios prior to the entry into force of the Republican Constitution (see the aforementioned judgment No. 4466 of 2009).

The provision according to which sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it in the forms and within the limits of the Constitution (Article 1, second paragraph, of the Constitution), materializes in the provisions granting citizens rights of democratic participation, in particular active and passive electorate (Articles 48 and 51 of the Constitution), participation in determining national policy through political parties (Article 49 of the Constitution), and the right to vote in referendums (Articles 75 and 138 of the Constitution). Citizens are substantially bound to the life of the democratic State, which they constitute and sustain, giving rise to a community of political destinies. Through democratic cooperation in decisions affecting the community, they share responsibility for what happens to it and bear, at least to a certain extent, its consequences, both advantageous ones and those involving burdens and sacrifices.

The democratic participation that gives life to a community of political destinies is rooted in an effective bond between citizens and the national community. The necessity of this bond clearly emerges from Articles 1 and 4, second paragraph, of the Constitution and from other constitutional principles, as set forth in judgment No. 63 of 2026. The fabric of these principles converges in configuring the people as a community bound by effective ties among its members, consisting of solidarity, reciprocity of rights and duties, commitment to the progress of society, and sharing of common destinies. Already in judgment No. 142 of 2025, this Court had emphasized that "constitutional rules evoke a correlation between citizenship and the territory of the State, as a place reflecting a common cultural *humus* and the sharing of constitutional principles” (point 11.2.).

Therefore, legislation such as that preceding the decree-law under examination, based on an ethno-nationalistic vision of the people, upon closer inspection departed significantly from the model of citizenship outlined above. In fact, it allowed individuals who had not contributed to its progress, did not participate in common destinies, and could easily evade the sacrifices and obligations deriving from such decisions to participate in political decisions concerning the community.

Furthermore, the fact that persons substantially extraneous to the national community, through the recognition of citizenship, could be decisive for the formation of a political majority (or for the outcome of a referendum) weakened the legitimacy of the majority principle. Indeed, other citizens, who had not contributed to the formation of such a majority but shared an effective bond among themselves, would have perceived the political decisions adopted by it as imposed from the "outside.”

7.2.− In judgment No. 63 of 2026, this Court also illustrated the meaning of the nexus between Member State citizenship and European citizenship. The fact that a matter – such as citizenship – falls within the competence of Member States does not prevent national rules from having to respect European law in situations falling within the scope of application of Union law (CJEU, Fourth Chamber, judgment of April 25, 2024, Joined Cases C-684/22 to C-686/22, Stadt Duisburg, point 34). Therefore, on the one hand, the rules governing the conditions for acquiring national citizenship must take into account the effect of conferring European citizenship and, consequently, cannot prejudice the constitutional-legal meaning of the latter; on the other hand, the revocation of national citizenship has an immediate impact on the ownership of European citizenship and the enjoyment of the rights deriving therefrom, with the consequence that it must respect certain EU law principles, such as proportionality.

Therefore, a relationship of coherence must exist between the constitutional framework of national citizenship and the regime of European citizenship. The reconstruction of citizenship within the democratic legal order carried out in the preceding paragraph appears to harmonize with the requirements of European citizenship. Indeed, consistently with what was affirmed by the Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, judgment of April 29, 2025, Case C-181/23, European Commission v. Republic of Malta, an effective relationship of solidarity and loyalty between the State and its citizens and the reciprocity of rights and duties are required. Furthermore, the aforementioned reconstruction ensures the connection between national citizenship and European citizenship based on the sharing of certain civic values, which underlie both the Republic and the European Union. The constitutional principles that contribute to creating an effective bond between the citizen and the national community are largely overlapping and in any event always consistent with the values enumerated in Article 2 TEU, which form the basis of "European society.”

7.3.− Judgment No. 63 of 2026 declared unfounded the question – raised by the Ordinary Court of Turin – concerning the infringement of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU.

This Court noted that the aforementioned CJEU ruling on the 2025 Maltese case "represents a coherent development of previous judgments, which have considered justified – albeit reviewable from the standpoint of proportionality – national rules providing for the loss of citizenship, insofar as they are aimed at ‘protecting the particular relationship of solidarity and loyalty between [the Member State] and its nationals, as well as the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the foundation of the bond of nationality’ (Grand Chamber, judgment of March 2, 2010, Case C-135/08, Rottmann, point 51; to the same effect, the aforementioned judgments Stadt Duisburg, point 37, and Tjebbes, point 31; Grand Chamber, judgment of January 18, 2022, Case C-118/20, Wiener Landesregierung, point 52), and at ensuring the persistence of an effective link with the Member State: ‘it is legitimate for a Member State to consider that citizenship is the expression of a genuine link between it and its nationals and to attach to the absence or cessation of such a genuine link the loss of its citizenship’ (thus, again, the aforementioned Tjebbes judgment, point 35). However, ‘having regard to the importance which primary EU law attaches to the status of citizen of the Union, which, as is apparent from point 29 of the present judgment, constitutes the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, it is for the competent national authorities and national courts to verify whether the loss of the nationality of the Member State concerned, where it entails the loss of the status of citizen of the Union and the rights conferred thereby, complies with the principle of proportionality so far as concerns its consequences for the situation of the person concerned and, where appropriate, that of his family members, having regard to European Union law’ (see the aforementioned judgment of the Court of Justice, Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 38)” (point 10).

This Court deemed the case law of the Court of Justice, which – in the face of national rules impacting concretely on rights correlated with European citizenship – requires an individual examination of the consequences produced on the lives of the interested parties in implementation of the principle of proportionality, to be non-pertinent with respect to the challenged Article 3-bis. Judgment No. 63 of 2026 noted that "[t]he judgments of the Court of Justice cited above all concern cases in which a Member State has deprived an individual of an ascertained status (of national and, therefore, European citizen), thus impacting on rights concretely exercisable by that same individual. According to the Court of Justice, rules depriving individuals of citizenship fall within the scope of application of Union law when they entail the loss of a recognized status and of the correlated rights (judgments Rottmann, point 49; Stadt Duisburg, point 36; Tjebbes, point 32; Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 30; Wiener Landesregierung, points 39-41 and 48; see also Grand Chamber, judgment of March 8, 2011, Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano, point 42: ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’). The Court of Justice emphasizes that the consequences produced by rules depriving individuals of citizenship ‘cannot be hypothetical or eventual’: Tjebbes judgment, point 40 (to the same effect, judgments Stadt Duisburg, point 50; Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet, point 54; Wiener Landesregierung, point 59)” (point 10).

Precisely "because national rules concretely impact rights correlated with European citizenship, an individual examination of the consequences produced on the lives of the persons concerned is necessary, according to the Court of Justice, in implementation of the principle of proportionality. Such an examination would not even be conceivable if the status of European citizen is not ascertained and, therefore, no right is concretely exercisable by the subjects concerned. The *ratio* of European case law is to safeguard Union citizenship understood as the fundamental status of nationals of Member States: this *ratio* fails in the present case, because for none of the addressees of the challenged Article 3-bis was the status of European citizen legally certain. Ultimately, the rulings of the Court of Justice invoked by the referring judge are not pertinent because the challenged rules, as specified in point 8.3., do not provide for a loss of Italian citizenship” (again, point 10).

This Court therefore rejected, in judgment No. 63 of 2026, the request made by the parties to make a preliminary reference concerning the compatibility between the challenged Article 3-bis and Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, finding that the prerequisites which, according to the case law of the Court of Justice, exempt from the duty to make a preliminary reference were met (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, judgments of March 24, 2026, Case C-767/23, Remling, and of October 6, 2021, Case C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi; judgment of October 6, 1982, Case C-283/81, Cilfit and Others).

8.− In the proceedings registered under No. 40 ord. reg. of 2026, the parties requested in their supplementary brief, in the alternative, that the case file be returned to the *a quo* judge in order to take into account Order No. 13818 of 2026 of the Court of Cassation.

Such a request cannot be granted. The aforementioned Order No. 13818 of 2026 merely confirms previous case law concerning the matter of citizenship, specifying that, as maintained by this Court, in the absence of ascertainment, anyone who has acquired Italian citizenship by filiation "cannot enjoy that status and the rights and prerogatives connected therewith in relations with others and with the legal order itself” (point 2.7.). Furthermore, the Court of Cassation clarified that even the failure to communicate the appointment (which translates into an obstacle to submitting the application) creates an interest in bringing judicial proceedings for ascertainment, thereby disproving the absence of suitable remedies to overcome administrative dysfunctions.

In the same proceedings, the parties submitted a motion for adjournment (reiterated during the public hearing), stating that the applicability of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, to persons born prior to the decree itself would be the subject of a question referred to the Joint Civil Sections of the Court of Cassation following the order of the same Court, First Civil Section, July 18, 2025, No. 20122, and that the decision of the Joint Sections was imminent for publication.

Such a motion cannot be granted. A question regarding the applicability of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, to persons born prior to the entry into force of the decree-law was not referred to the Joint Sections; rather, a question concerning "the interpretation and application of Articles 7, 8, 9, and 12 of Law No. 555 of 1912” was referred (thus the measure of the First President of September 25, 2025).

9.− In these joined proceedings, the parties have once again requested – both in their written defenses and during the public hearing – that a preliminary reference be made to the Court of Justice, in order to obtain clarification on the meaning of Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU and the compatibility of Article 3-bis with them.

In particular: a) in the proceedings registered under No. 41 ord. reg. of 2026, the applicant party in the *a quo* proceedings entered an appearance, requesting, inter alia, that this Court submit a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on the meaning of the aforementioned European parameters; b) in the same proceedings, in the supplementary brief, the party requested, in the alternative, that a preliminary reference be made to the CJEU concerning the compatibility of the challenged rules with Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU, "under the profiles of proportionality, the effectiveness of protection, and the prohibition of unreasonable restrictions on access to the status of European citizen”; c) in the proceedings registered under No. 40 ord. reg. of 2026, the parties requested in their supplementary brief to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU, in relation to the profiles of incompatibility with Article 20 TFEU, freedom of movement, and Articles 7 and 9 of the CFREU; d) during the public hearing, counsel for F. C.D.S.C. reiterated the request for a preliminary reference described under a).

9.1.− Request b) must be dismissed because the question is not relevant to the decision of the case. The party formulated the request in relation to the question left unprejudiced by this Court in judgment No. 63 of 2026 (point 9.1.: "Moreover, the question concerning the differentiation between those who received the appointment and those who initiated the procedure for the recognition of citizenship but did not receive the appointment by 23:59 on March 27, 2025 remains unprejudiced [as it falls outside the *a quo* proceedings and was thus not raised by the referring judge]”), which it considers included among those raised by the Court of Campobasso.

In reality, the referring judge makes a generic reference to "bureaucratic factors” that may delay the submission of the administrative or judicial application, without ever specifically mentioning the case of those who initiated the administrative procedure prior to March 28, 2025, but never received the communication of the appointment. Moreover, the order of the Court of Campobasso never states that the applicants had requested an appointment through administrative channels: on the contrary, it expressly specifies that no "application was submitted via administrative channels,” "nor, moreover, was it [...] proposable,” given that in the line of descent a woman had given birth to a child prior to 1948. It thus appears that the interested parties chose not to pursue the path of judicial ascertainment, taking into account the different practice followed by the public administration and the courts in giving effect to judgment No. 30 of 1983 of this Court, which declared unconstitutional the rules not attributing citizenship by birth to the child of a female citizen (according to the Court of Cassation, the rules declared unconstitutional are inapplicable even to factual scenarios prior to the entry into force of the Republican Constitution – judgment No. 4466 of 2009 – whereas the public administration continued to follow Ministry of the Interior Circular K.28.1 of April 8, 1991, entitled "Recognition of the possession of the *status civitatis* of Italy by foreign citizens of Italian stock,” according to which "descendants of our female emigrants are to be deemed Italian citizens *iure sanguinis* by maternal derivation provided they were born after January 1, 1948, the date of entry into force of the Republican Constitution”).

Therefore, the question left unprejudiced by judgment No. 63 of 2026 was not raised by the Court of Campobasso and was moreover not relevant to its proceedings (as highlighted by State defense at the public hearing).

9.2.− Request c) as well – in the part concerning freedom of movement and Articles 7 and 9 of the CFREU – cannot be granted because the question is not relevant to the decision of the case. Indeed, the party requests clarification on these European rules insofar as it challenges the condition provided for by Article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letter c) ("a first- or second-degree ascendant holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship”), but such provision is not contested by the Court of Campobasso.

9.3.− Conversely, requests a) (reiterated during the public hearing) and c), in the part concerning Article 20 TFEU, are relevant for the decision of the case under examination.

The Court of Campobasso challenges Article 3-bis, in the part indicated above (point 5), also for infringement of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU, which confer Union citizenship upon anyone holding the citizenship of a Member State. Therefore, clarification by the CJEU concerning the scope of these provisions and the case law of the Court itself regarding citizenship is relevant for resolving the question having the aforementioned Treaty provisions as interposed benchmarks.

This Court already declared this question unfounded in judgment No. 63 of 2026, widely recalled above (point 7.3.). It still considers that it conformed, in that ruling, to the indications stemming from the CJEU’s rulings, given that the challenged Article 3-bis had no impact on rights connected with the status of European citizen, because for none of the addressees of Article 3-bis was that status legally certain, so that no right inherent thereto was concretely exercisable. In the present case, an individual examination of the consequences produced by Article 3-bis on the "private life” of the interested parties (Article 7 of the CFREU, invoked by the aforementioned Udlændinge-og Integrationsministeriet judgment) in implementation of the principle of proportionality cannot be configured, because for none of the addressees of Article 3-bis did private life take place concretely within the scope of Union law.

Article 3-bis, in implementing the principle of the genuine link, is in reality consistent with the vision of citizenship (of the Member State and European) outlined by the CJEU in the aforementioned 2025 decision on the Maltese case (point 96: "the foundation of the bond of nationality of a Member State rests on the particular relationship of solidarity and loyalty between that State and its nationals, as well as on the reciprocity of rights and duties”). It prevents persons born abroad, holding another citizenship and lacking a meaningful link with Italy, from requesting the recognition of Italian citizenship, thereby acquiring the right to travel within the countries of the European Union. The need for an effective link does not only mean reciprocal solidarity between the State and the citizen, but also implies the sharing of principles, which are the expression of values, and "[c]itizenship of the Union is founded [...] on the common values set out in Article 2 TEU” (point 95 of the aforementioned decision on the Maltese case).

As seen, however, in the present proceedings the parties have reiterated the request for a preliminary reference to the CJEU in order to decide the question concerning the infringement of Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.

In compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation set forth in Article 4, paragraph 3, TEU (most recently, Order No. 161 of 2024) and the exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide the definitive interpretation of European law (Court of Justice, Third Chamber, judgment of February 12, 2026, Case C-56/25, Petlichev, point 56; Grand Chamber, judgment of December 18, 2025, Case C-448/23, European Commission, points 206 and 213; Grand Chamber, judgment of February 22, 2022, Case C-430/21, RS, point 72), this Court intends to follow up on such requests.

10.− The proceedings herein must therefore be stayed and the following question submitted to the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 267 TFEU:

– whether Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU preclude the adoption of rules such as those provided for by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, insofar as they configure an original bar to the acquisition of Italian citizenship incumbent upon those born abroad even prior to the date of entry into force of Article 3-bis itself and who hold another citizenship, unless one of the conditions indicated in the remainder of the same provision is met.

on these grounds

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the proceedings,

1) orders that the following preliminary question be submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

– whether Articles 9 of the Treaty on European Union and 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union preclude the adoption of rules such as those provided for by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions regarding citizenship), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, insofar as they configure an original bar to the acquisition of Italian citizenship incumbent upon those born abroad even prior to the date of entry into force of Article 3-bis itself and who hold another citizenship, unless one of the conditions indicated in the remainder of the same provision is met;

2) stays these proceedings until the aforementioned preliminary question is determined;

3) orders the transmission of a copy of this order, together with the case file, to the Registry of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on June 9, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Draftsman

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed at the Registry on July 23, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms in its text to the original