JUDGMENT NO. 110

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of September 22, 1988 (Approval of provisions on criminal proceedings against juvenile defendants), as added by Art. 6, paragraph 1, letter c-bis), of Law-Decree No. 123 of September 15, 2023 (Urgent measures to combat youth social hardship, educational poverty, and juvenile delinquency, as well as to ensure the safety of minors in the digital sphere), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 159 of November 13, 2023, initiated by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin in the criminal proceedings against N. A., by order dated June 5, 2025, registered under no. 147 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, No. 35, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having examined the act of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard the Judge Rapporteur Stefano Petitti in the chambers on May 4, 2026;

having deliberated in the chambers on May 4, 2026.

Statement of Facts

1.– By order dated June 5, 2025, registered under no. 147 of the 2025 register of orders, the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin raised, with reference to Articles 3, first paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of September 22, 1988 (Approval of provisions on criminal proceedings against juvenile defendants), as added by Art. 6, paragraph 1, letter c-bis), of Law-Decree No. 123 of September 15, 2023 (Urgent measures to combat youth social hardship, educational poverty, and juvenile delinquency, as well as to ensure the safety of minors in the digital sphere), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 159 of November 13, 2023, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28, concerning the suspension of proceedings with probation (messa alla prova), do not apply to the crime referred to in Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code (sexual violence), limited to instances aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, without allowing for any exceptions.

In the alternative, the court a quo requests the issuance of "substitutive or manipulative judgments, aimed at introducing exceptions to said general prohibition, in relation to the nature, manner, or circumstances of the action and subsequent observation of personality having a favorable assessment; and, in any case, if said crime is linked by the bond of continuous offense with other crimes against the person charged in the same proceedings to the detriment of the same [offended party] for which the benefit is permitted, particularly with that referred to in Art. 612-bis of the Criminal Code."

2.– The referring judge notes that they must adjudicate via summary proceedings a person who was a minor at the time of the facts, charged with the crimes referred to in Arts. 612-bis, paragraphs one, two, and three, 609-bis and 609-ter, numbers 5) and 5-quater), 61, number 1), and 635, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code.

2.1.– For the purposes of the relevance of the questions, the GUP (Preliminary Hearing Judge) of the Juvenile Court of Turin highlights that the challenged provision precludes them from verifying the feasibility of the suspension of proceedings with probation, given the charged crime under Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code (sexual violence), in the identified instances aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, in connection, by way of continuous offense, with the crimes of stalking and criminal damage, the latter committed shortly before the violence to the detriment of the same minor victim, one year younger than the defendant, for retaliatory and intimidating purposes.

The referring judge reports that the finding of liability regarding the crime of sexual violence "is certain based on the overall evidentiary framework" and that "[t]here do not emerge at this stage unequivocal elements to conclude that the minor defendant lacked the capacity to understand and intend and/or maturity," especially given the report from the juvenile services, which diagnosed an "emerging personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic characteristics (PDM-2), in which narcissistic fragilities may help understand aggressive behavior in intimate relationships."

The court a quo specifies that it has ordered a psychiatric evaluation to investigate aspects of imputability and social danger, or partial mental infirmity, although "the existence of causes for non-punishability appears unlikely" at this stage.

The referral order observes, therefore, that the procedural findings contain multiple elements tending to exclude that the defendant's personality is already structured in a deviant sense, making the admission to probation highly appropriate in the instant case, in order to defer the evaluation of personality evolution to the outcome of a re-educational – which has already begun – and reparative path, utilizing the specific tools that only the institution in question allows to be activated effectively, "all the more so since it is still a minor in the full developmental age."

The referring judge then illustrates the favorable prognostic elements acquired and notes that the received reports "attest to a certain start of critical re-elaboration of the crime, a certain introspective capacity, the trust placed in the operators, and the active search for both support and the professional figures accompanying them."

Nevertheless, the court a quo excludes the possibility of settling the judgment with any other pronouncement typical of juvenile proceedings, "due to the gravity of the crime, not so much regarding the execution methods, but for its integration within preceding and concomitant stalking conduct, initiated as early as the age of fourteen to the detriment of the same victim, continued after the first complaint and characterized by forms of extreme psychological and physical violence, supported by the intimate conviction of her inferiority and aimed at annulling all her decision-making autonomy (cf. indictment), finally culminating in delusional serial threats of death/suicide emerging from chats in the days immediately preceding the young woman's complaint, who only then began to mentalize the gravity of the risks run."

2.2.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring judge assumes that Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 introduced an exclusionary automatism, which prevents, without exceptions, the assessment of the concrete case of the crime by the juvenile judge in relation to the age characteristics of the defendant, otherwise permitted by the suspension of proceedings with probation.

The court a quo complains that, regarding the scale and manner of implementation, the prohibition operates indiscriminately even for conduct of lesser gravity, which appear as such only ex post, and also regarding psychological implications, as would be established in the instant case.

A further profile of unreasonableness of the challenged regulation would consist in the mandatory and non-derogable formulation, which excludes access to probation for the crime of aggravated sexual violence even where it is connected to others that would instead allow it, such as, in the specific case, that of stalking. It is argued that the absolute exclusionary nature established for the crime referred to in Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code, in instances aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, would also prevent giving importance to its possible psychological connection with other crimes that, as in the case at hand, reveal an identical deviant drive, not focused on sexual subjugation, but aimed at an absolute general and systematic overwhelming of the offended party, fueled by a personality disorder in turn resulting from educational models inspired by over-protection and justification.

The constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 would be found in the consideration of the mere title of the crime, regarding which the legislature has dictated an absolute presumption of ineffectiveness of re-educational paths, with force always prevailing over the function of recovery of the minor who committed it, untethered from a verification of gravity in the concrete, even when connected by a bond of continuous offense with a crime (in the specific case, the conduct of stalking) for which the suspension of proceedings with probation would be possible, despite revealing an identical desire for domination and reification of the partner.

The court a quo further observes that the challenged provision does not allow any type of evaluation linked to the concrete fact and the personal, family, and socio-environmental situation of the minor, which could allow access to probation, even if particularly monitored and in a highly restrictive context. On the other hand, since the juvenile criminal process system does not provide for mediation with the victim, admission to probation would constitute the only way to seek a possible consideration of the position of the offended party by the minor defendant.

Finally, the referring judge complains of the unjustified disparity of treatment that the challenged provision reveals compared to more serious criminal types and, nevertheless, compatible with probation (such as, by way of example, the crimes of organized crime, massacre, and kidnapping for extortion purposes).

2.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, which requested that the questions be declared manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.

2.3.1.– The State Attorney's Office first raised the inadmissibility of the questions due to the failure to identify the constitutional parameters to be referred to, the omission of motivation regarding their relevance, and the erroneous reconstruction of the regulatory framework, upon which the violation of Art. 3 of the Constitution is deduced.

It is noted that the court a quo merely raised the question regarding the violation of Art. 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution without making proper reference to Arts. 27, third paragraph, and 24 of the Constitution.

The referral order would also lack adequate motivation on the existence of all indicators necessary for probation, inherent to both the crime committed and the personality of the perpetrator (given the indictment of previous stalking conduct to the detriment of the same victim), also with regard to the period following the incriminated act, with reflections on the relevance of the questions raised.

The reconstruction of the regulatory framework supporting the alleged unreasonableness of the catalog of crimes made "exclusionary" to probation indicated by paragraph 5-bis of Art. 28 of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 would also be incorrect.

2.3.2.– On the merits, according to the President of the Council of Ministers, the questions would, in any case, be manifestly unfounded.

The State defense objects that the radicality of the thesis supported by the referring judge, according to which the juvenile process should always and in any case be based, in addition to the purposes of recovering the person, on the mitigation of the offensiveness of the process and on the rapid exit of the minor from the penal circuit, would be based on an outdated conception of the figure of the minor which, from a criminological point of view, is no longer reflected in reality, as the statistical data reported in the act of intervention would document.

The indisputable guidelines of the juvenile criminal process should, instead, be reconciled, in compliance with other primary constitutional values (life, integrity, and health of citizens), with the needs, both special preventive and general preventive, in the face of very serious crimes, such as those contemplated by the challenged provision.

In the opinion of the State Attorney's Office, the manifest groundlessness of the questions raised would be appreciated based on the consideration that the referring judge censures, with reference to Art. 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, the preclusion of the absolute prohibition of access to probation in cases of aggravated sexual violence, without even limiting it to instances of minor gravity, which would amount to theorizing a "tyrannical right" to probation compared to the other constitutional values at stake. In any case, it would be in the presence of a form of non-reviewable exercise of legislative discretion regarding the "qualification" of the absolute gravity of the crime for the purposes of the inapplicability of the provisions regarding the suspension of proceedings with probation.

Finally, regarding the hypothesized violation of Art. 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the State Attorney's Office highlights the lack of homogeneity of the observations contained in the referral order, in terms of the operation of the tertium comparationis criterion in the face of the exclusionary cases listed by paragraph 5-bis of Art. 28 of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988.

Considerations of Law

3.– With the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. no. 147 of 2025), the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin raised, with reference to Articles 3, first paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, added by Art. 6, paragraph 1, letter c-bis), of Law-Decree No. 123 of 2023, as converted, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28, concerning the suspension of proceedings with probation, do not apply to the crime referred to in Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code (sexual violence), limited to instances aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, without even allowing for any exceptions. Subordinately, the court a quo requests the issuance of a substitutive or manipulative judgment, aimed at introducing exceptions to said general prohibition, in relation to the nature, manner, or circumstances of the action and subsequent observation of personality having a favorable assessment; and, in any case, if said crime is linked by the bond of continuous offense with other crimes against the person charged in the same proceedings to the detriment of the same offended party for which the benefit is permitted, particularly with that referred to in Art. 612-bis of the Criminal Code.

3.1.– The court a quo is called to decide following the request for immediate judgment against a person, a minor at the time of the facts, charged with the crimes referred to in Arts. 612-bis, paragraphs one, two, and three, 609-bis and 609-ter, numbers 5) and 5-quater), 61, number 1), and 635, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code, and the subsequent admission to summary proceedings.

Regarding relevance, the referring judge, after having excluded the possibility of settling the judgment with a pronouncement other than conviction or with any other pronouncement typical of juvenile proceedings "due to the gravity of the crime, not so much regarding the execution methods, but for its integration within preceding and concomitant stalking conduct," highlights that, even if the procedural findings contain multiple elements suitable for excluding that the personality of the defendant is already structured in a deviant sense, making the admission to probation in the instant case highly appropriate, this possibility is precluded by the challenged provision.

3.2.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring GUP believes that Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 introduced an automatism, by virtue of which, without exceptions, the very possibility of evaluating the concrete case of the crime by the juvenile judge in relation to the age characteristics of the defendant, otherwise permitted by the institution of probation, is excluded.

This prohibition, furthermore, would operate indiscriminately even for conduct of lesser gravity, which appear as such only ex post, and regardless of psychological implications, as would be established in the instant case.

A further profile of unreasonableness of the newly introduced regulation would consist in the mandatory and non-derogable formulation of the challenged provision, which excludes access to probation for the crime of aggravated sexual violence even where it is connected to others that would instead allow it, such as, in the specific case, that of stalking.

Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 would therefore be constitutionally illegitimate as the preclusion to probation stems from the mere consideration of the title of the crime, regarding which the legislature has dictated an absolute presumption of ineffectiveness of re-educational paths, with force always prevailing over the function of recovery of the minor who committed it, untethered from a verification of gravity in the concrete, even when connected by a bond of continuous offense with a crime (in the specific case, the conduct of stalking) which is still in itself admitted to probation and which reveals an identical desire for domination and reification of the partner.

The referral order further challenges that the provision does not allow any type of evaluation linked to the concrete fact and the personal, family, and socio-environmental situation of the minor, which could allow access to probation, even if particularly monitored and in a highly restrictive context.

Finally, the referring judge complains of the unjustified disparity of treatment that the challenged provision reveals compared to criminal types even more serious than those excluded from juvenile probation.

4.– The State Attorney's Office, in its act of intervention, excepted the manifest inadmissibility of the questions for several profiles.

The exceptions are not well-founded.

4.1.– Regarding the claim that the court a quo merely raised the question regarding the violation of Art. 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution without making proper reference to Arts. 27, third paragraph, and 24 of the Constitution, "it is a constant affirmation that the question of constitutional legitimacy must be scrutinized also having regard to the constitutional parameters not formally evoked, but deducible in an unequivocal way from the referral order, should such an act make clear, albeit implicit, reference to them by means of the reference to the principles enunciated by them" (lastly, Judgment No. 203 of 2025).

Now, the overall tenor of the referral order allows it to be considered that the explicit reference to the individualization of the treatment, procedural and substantive, to be applied to the minor defendant confronts the principles referred to in Art. 27, third paragraph, of the Constitution (individualization and re-educational purpose of the penalty), which therefore must be considered evoked by the referring judge; while the failure to evoke Art. 24 of the Constitution is a profile which, abstractly, could affect the merits of the question, but not condition its admissibility.

4.2.– The exception that the referral order would lack adequate motivation on the existence of all indicators necessary for probation, inherent to both the crime committed and the personality of the perpetrator, with regard also to the period following the incriminated act, is also not well-founded.

The referral order accounts for the preliminary scrutiny carried out regarding the possibility of re-education and integration of the defendant into social life, proposing a prognostic judgment conducted on the basis of multiple indicators, inherent to both the crime committed and the personality of the perpetrator, manifested also in the period following the incriminated facts.

In this sense, the same order passes the "external" control in terms of the relevance of the questions through a not implausible motivation of the logical path carried out and the reasons for which the referring judge states they must apply the challenged provision in the main judgment (thus, regarding similar exceptions, Judgment No. 203 of 2025).

4.3.– Finally, the exception with which the State Attorney's Office generically denounced the omitted reconstruction of the regulatory framework by the referring judge is not well-founded.

The latter, indeed, supported the censures with an exhaustive illustration of the reference norms and the pertinent constitutional jurisprudence.

5.– Before proceeding to the examination of the merits of the questions, it is necessary to note that Judgment No. 203 of 2025 of this Court (filed on December 29, 2025, and published in the Official Gazette on December 31, 2025, therefore on a date subsequent to the referral order under scrutiny) declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, insofar as it provided that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28 did not apply to the crimes provided for by Arts. 609-bis and 609-octies of the Criminal Code, aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, even when the mitigating circumstance of "cases of minor gravity" was deemed to exist.

The same judgment also declared the questions of constitutional legitimacy of the same Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28, concerning the suspension of proceedings with probation, do not apply to the crimes provided for by Arts. 609-bis, paragraphs one and two, and 609-octies of the Criminal Code, aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the same code, raised, with reference, overall, to Arts. 3, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Courts of Rome and Bari, to be unfounded.

Said judgment (point 13 of the Considerations of Law) remarked that, even in the changed regulatory framework resulting from the introduction of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, there remains "a teleological heterogeneity between the probation of the adult and that of the minor, since the latter is rooted and finds its reason for being in the purposes of Art. 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, expressing an eminently re-educational function, while the former has an undeniable sanctionatory component."

At point 14 of the Considerations of Law, the same judgment nevertheless highlighted that even in the matter of juvenile criminal law – in which the re-educational function of the penalty acquires a role of special prominence, in light of Art. 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution – one cannot "deny a margin of discretion to the legislature in the identification of the requirements for access to instruments of procedural diversion, also as a function of the particular relevance of the protected legal good; this provided that the sanctionatory reaction to the crime committed, and even before that the criminal proceeding itself, retains in any case that special vocation to favor the re-education of the minor that characterizes the 'constitutional face' of juvenile criminal law."

Therefore, in the face of crimes, such as those contemplated in Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, gravely harmful to the rights of the offended parties, all the more so when they are also minors, it did not appear "unreasonable for the legislature's choice to provide in any case for the conduct of a trial, according to rules specifically calibrated on the needs of the minor defendant, in the general preventive perspective of preparing a dissuasive response regarding certain forms of juvenile delinquency."

The choice to exclude the suspension of proceedings with probation for the minor for the crimes referred to in Arts. 609-bis and 609-octies of the Criminal Code, where aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, made with Art. 6, paragraph 1, letter c-bis), of Law-Decree No. 123 of 2023, as converted, was therefore not considered censurable by this Court, as it was limited, with mandatory formulation, to certainly serious crimes, often committed by minors to the detriment of minors, and therefore rationally justified and proportionate in relation to the pursued purposes.

Likewise, the questions with which the unreasonableness of the challenged provision was denounced, for having precluded juvenile probation even regarding crimes less serious than others that still permit it, were declared unfounded. Such censures – it was observed – rely, in fact, on a comparative judgment that evokes as terms of comparison the statutory frames of the crime cases, allegedly more serious, which remained outside Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, while the choice of the legislature was in this case inspired "by the assessment of the specific needs to combat some more frequent conduct of juvenile delinquency, harmful, for what is relevant here, to the sexual freedom of the victims" (point 14.1. of the Considerations of Law).

Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 was, instead, judged manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate insofar as it placed among the crimes "exclusionary" to probation aggravated sexual violence, even when it is a matter of the "cases of minor gravity" referred to in Art. 609-bis, third paragraph, of the Criminal Code. The challenged provision sets an iuris et de iure presumption of gravity of the conduct constituting the crimes listed therein, such that a lack of reasonableness appeared to this Court to be the preclusion operating "when the special-effect mitigating circumstance of the fact of minor gravity ex Art. 609-bis, third paragraph, of the Criminal Code is configured, abstractly referable also to the circumstantial instances provided for by Art. 609-ter of the same code in relation to the degree of compromise of the protected legal good, to the execution methods, and to the global consideration of the fact." Therefore, having noted that such a mitigating circumstance constitutes a "tempering of the effects of the concentration in a single crime of behaviors, which are very different from each other, which in any case affect the sexual freedom of the offended party, and of the consequent different intensity of the injury of the legal objectivity of the crime" (point 15 of the Considerations of Law), this Court held that the abstract negative legislative prognosis regarding the effective possibilities of recovery and social reintegration of the minor through the path of suspension of proceedings with probation, underlying Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, was held to be contradictory with respect to the ratio of the same Art. 609-bis, third paragraph, of the Criminal Code, which allows the penalty to be reduced by up to two thirds.

6.– Having said that, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, raised with reference to Arts. 3, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28, concerning the suspension of proceedings with probation, do not apply to the crime provided for by Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code, aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the same code, must be declared manifestly unfounded because they have already been declared unfounded by the aforementioned Judgment No. 203 of 2025, without there being presented today arguments further and different from those already examined in said decision.

7.– Regarding the questions raised in the alternative, those with which the referring GUP censures the same Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, insofar as it does not allow the suspension of proceedings with juvenile probation for "exclusionary" crimes linked by the bond of continuous offense with others for which the preclusion does not operate, and which are charged in the same proceedings to the detriment of the same offended party, are not well-founded.

What remains, indeed, decisive is the consideration that the choice made by the legislature in introducing paragraph 5-bis into Art. 28 of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 was inspired by the assessment of the specific needs to combat some more frequent conduct of juvenile delinquency, harmful to the sexual freedom of the victims, and this ratio is not eroded – if anything confirmed – by the presence of so-called satellite crimes.

The petitum formulated in the alternative, as the referring judge themselves declares, translates, on the other hand, into the request for a strongly manipulative pronouncement, which would interfere with the discretion of the legislature in relation to a regulation of an evidently exceptional nature.

8.– Finally, regarding the questions with which the referring judge censures, in the alternative and with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988 as it does not know exceptions to the prohibition of admission to probation "in relation to the nature, manner, or circumstances of the action," it is necessary to recall the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy – by the Judgment No. 203 of 2025 – of the cited provision, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28 do not apply to the crimes provided for by Arts. 609-bis and 609-octies of the Criminal Code, aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the Criminal Code, even when the mitigating circumstance of "cases of minor gravity" occurs.

From such a ruling follows the necessity of the restitution of the documents to the referring judge, so that, in light of the consequent change in the regulatory framework, they may proceed to a new evaluation regarding the relevance and the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions raised (thus, for example, orders no. 183 and no. 49 of 2020, no. 182 of 2019, no. 154 of 2018 and no. 146 of 2011).

9.– In conclusion, the restitution of the documents to the referring judge must be ordered for a new examination of the relevance and the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, raised, with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as the challenged provision, relative to the crime referred to in Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code (sexual violence), aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the same code, does not know exceptions to the prohibition of admission to probation "in relation to the nature, manner, or circumstances of the action," while the remaining questions must be declared manifestly unfounded and not well-founded.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) orders the restitution of the documents to the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin relative to the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of September 22, 1988 (Approval of provisions on criminal proceedings against juvenile defendants), added by Art. 6, paragraph 1, letter c-bis), of Law-Decree No. 123 of September 15, 2023 (Urgent measures to combat youth social hardship, educational poverty, and juvenile delinquency, as well as to ensure the safety of minors in the digital sphere), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 159 of November 13, 2023, raised insofar as the challenged provision, relative to the crime referred to in Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code (sexual violence), aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the same code, does not know exceptions to the prohibition of admission to probation "in relation to the nature, manner, or circumstances of the action";

2) declares the manifest groundlessness of the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, insofar as it provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Art. 28, concerning the suspension of proceedings with probation, do not apply to the crime provided for by Art. 609-bis of the Criminal Code, aggravated pursuant to Art. 609-ter of the same code, raised, with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin, with the order indicated in the heading;

3) declares not well-founded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 28, paragraph 5-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 448 of 1988, insofar as it does not allow the suspension of proceedings with probation for "exclusionary" crimes linked by the bond of continuous offense with others for which the preclusion does not operate, and which are charged in the same proceedings to the detriment of the same offended party, raised, with reference to Arts. 3, first paragraph, 27, third paragraph, and 31, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of the Juvenile Court of Turin, with the order indicated in the heading.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on May 4, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Stefano PETITTI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Chancery

Filed in the Chancery on June 18, 2026

 

The anonymized version conforms, in its text, to the original