JUDGMENT NO. 92

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has issued the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, referred by the Ordinary Court of Piacenza, Civil Section, sitting in a single-judge capacity, in the proceedings between S. and A. spa, V. A. spa, and G. D.G., by order dated March 17, 2025, registered under no. 186 of the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, no. 41, special series, of the year 2025.

Having seen the act of intervention by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in the chambers on March 12, 2026, the Reporting Judge Maria Rosaria San Giorgio;

having deliberated in the chambers on March 12, 2026.

Legal Reasoning

1.– By order dated March 17, 2025, registered under no. 186 of the 2025 register of orders, the Ordinary Court of Piacenza, Civil Section, sitting in a single-judge capacity, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in reference to Articles 3, 25, 97, and 111 of the Constitution, under the interpretation provided by the "living law" (*diritto vivente*) resulting from the judgment of the Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, January 18, 2018, no. 1202. According to said judgment, by explicit and unchallengeable legislative choice of merit, the judge before whom a case is resumed following a declinatory ruling on competence by the originally seised judge may raise a conflict of competence and request an *ex officio* regulation of competence only if they deem themselves incompetent by subject matter or mandatory territorial jurisdiction, and not when they believe competence is governed *ratione valoris* (by value).

1.1.– Regarding the facts, the *a quo* court reports that it is called upon to decide on a claim for payment for street cleaning services provided following a traffic accident, filed by S. and A. spa, as the concessionaire of said service under a public concession, in proceedings resumed following a ruling by the Justice of the Peace of Piacenza declaring themselves incompetent by value.

The initial judge had held that the dispute, involving the assessment of liability for a road accident and seeking a conviction for the payment "of a sum as compensation for damages, or such lesser or greater amount as may be ascertained during the proceedings through an expert witness (CTU)," was of indeterminate value.

According to the referring judge, the Justice of the Peace's ruling manifestly contradicts the rules on competence and the case files, from which it would emerge that the value of the dispute was "correctly fixed at Euro 1,862.62," an amount corresponding to the compensation requested by the plaintiff company, as none of the parties had filed a claim for damages nor requested a court-appointed expert witness "or further assessments."

In support of this assumption, the *a quo* court invokes the jurisprudence of legitimacy, according to which, for the purpose of identifying the court competent by value, a claim seeking payment of a determined sum or, alternatively, of that "greater or lesser amount as shall be deemed just," results in the failure to specify the sum itself, and must consequently be presumed to fall within the competence of the seised judge, pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure (citing orders of the Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, February 2, 2023, no. 3142, and Second Civil Section, August 25, 2021, no. 23434).

The referring judge, therefore, believes they lack competence, as in the dispute at hand, which concerns the assessment of the existence and enforceability of a pecuniary claim asserted by a public service concessionaire based on an agreement and "against the subject identified by that agreement as the obligor" – and not the road accident which serves only as a "factual antecedent" – competence would be determined "solely by value."

However, the *a quo* court observes that the abnormal declinatory ruling of the Justice of the Peace of Piacenza "appears, at this stage, irremediable," since, according to consolidated jurisprudence of legitimacy, which has risen to the status of living law, the regulation of competence, which the judge before whom the case is resumed may request *ex officio* pursuant to Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is limited only to cases of conflict of competence by subject matter or mandatory territorial jurisdiction (citing, among others, Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 1202 of 2018).

According to the referring judge, this strictly literal interpretation provided by the living law allows the natural judge to affirm their own incompetence by value, either willfully or through gross negligence (*ignorantia legis*), and to definitively anchor competence before another judge without the necessary prerequisites being met.

1.2.– Having premised this, regarding relevance, the referral order highlights that the doubts regarding constitutional legitimacy concern a provision which, due to its "ictu oculi prejudicial" nature, must necessarily be applied in the *a quo* proceedings.

1.3.– Regarding non-manifest groundlessness, the referring judge believes that Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under the interpretation provided by the jurisprudence of legitimacy, "in the part where, in case of a manifestly erroneous declaration of incompetence by value, by precluding the *ad quem* judge from raising the regulation of competence *ex officio*, it allows the natural judge to divest themselves of the competence to decide unwanted cases, in violation of the rules of vertical distribution of competence," conflicts first of all with Article 25 of the Constitution, "both in isolation and in combination with Article 111 of the Constitution."

The provision subject to scrutiny would, in fact, allow the seised judge to divert the parties from their natural judge, who has arbitrarily and illegitimately divested themselves of the dispute, assigned without remedy to another judge, even if superior.

Furthermore, Article 3 of the Constitution would be violated, as the challenged provision, by offering no remedy against an abnormal ruling declining competence, would determine a disparity of treatment between identical cases, which "would have different judges – and different proceedings, due to the structural diversity between ordinary first-instance proceedings and proceedings before the Justice of the Peace – due to the casual ethical or psychological inclination of the individual Justice of the Peace."

The referring judge also perceives a violation of the reservation of law (*riserva di legge*) under Article 111 of the Constitution, since, by virtue of the provision under scrutiny, the process – regarding competence and applicable procedure – would not be regulated by law, but would be left to the "changeable, erratic, and unpredictable" will of the individual magistrate.

Lastly, the challenged discipline would be incompatible, under various aspects, with Article 97 of the Constitution.

First of all, the administration of justice would not comply with the canons of good governance, efficiency, and impartiality, as the rules of jurisdiction cannot be left to chance but must be established by law.

Furthermore, the illegitimate transfer of the proceedings (in this case, from the Justice of the Peace to the Court) would result in an undue burden on the workload of the judicial office to which the case is referred and of the individual magistrates, "especially where – as in the present case – the non-episodic or occasional nature, but rather the intentionally serial nature, of such 'dispossession' by the *a quo* judge emerges."

In addition, the parties to the proceedings themselves could only "suffer disorientation and distress" when faced with the *ex officio* assignment of petty and serial disputes to a different judge without the possibility of "returning before the natural judge," which would undermine the legitimate reliance on good faith, correctness, efficiency, effectiveness, and effectiveness of administrative activity "also relevant under the different profile of the predictability of judicial decisions."

Finally, the interpretation of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided by the jurisprudence of legitimacy, by allowing the "requalification of the claim as being of indeterminate value to be considered crystallized," would endorse the imposition of an undue tax liability, such as that deriving from the increase of the unified contribution without the legal prerequisites existing.

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, requesting that the questions of constitutional legitimacy be declared unfounded.

2.1.– In the first place, the violation of Article 25 of the Constitution should be excluded.

The principle enshrined by this constitutional parameter – observes the intervenor – ensures the pre-establishment by law of the criteria and the procedure for identifying the judge.

However, for this guarantee to be considered implemented, the possibility that every error regarding the distribution of competence can be corrected *ex officio* is not required, but rather the predictability of the criteria, the typification of remedies, and the stability ensured by preclusions.

In the opinion of the state defense, only the criteria of subject matter and mandatory territorial jurisdiction are necessary criteria, for which Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for "the official corrective in case of negative conflict."

On the contrary, competence *ratione valoris* operates "on a merely distributive plane between offices that are in some way equal, and in any case suitable by subject matter and territory," with the consequence that any erroneousness of the ruling on the related issue does not affect the quality of the adjudicating body. And it is for this reason that the control of such an error would reasonably be left to the initiative of the parties within the terms fixed by Article 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Regarding proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, the remedy for the erroneousness of the ruling on competence is constituted by the appeal to the Court and, where said jurisdictional body pronounces only on competence, the decision is challengeable by necessary regulation.

According to the intervenor, therefore, no gap in protection is discernible, as the legislature has prepared a typified remedial path, which is not exceptional and, therefore, complies with the principle of the pre-established natural judge under Article 25 of the Constitution.

Nor could the presence of "non-virtuous practices" of some judges be sufficient to "convert individual pathological episodes into a structural defect of the discipline."

2.2.– The state defense also excludes the violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 of the Constitution, observing that the rules on competence by subject matter, by mandatory territory, and by value, responding to different functions, are not comparable.

The first two criteria justify, it is observed in the brief, the "official corrective" in case of negative conflict.

The parameter of value, however, as already emphasized, has the function of distributing disputes between judicial offices that are in any case suitable by subject matter.

According to the state defense, the limitation of the conflict of competence to cases of incompetence by subject matter would be reasonable, given that only the violation of such a criterion could attribute the decision to an office lacking the specialization adequate to the dispute.

The legislative choice to strengthen protection regarding errors of mandatory territorial competence would be "[e]qually rational," given that in such a case the link with the territory is functional to the efficient and effective practicability of judicial activities.

2.3.– The President of the Council of Ministers also considers the challenge formulated in reference to Article 111 of the Constitution to be unfounded.

The discipline under scrutiny would, in fact, respect the reservation of law established by this constitutional precept, predetermining both the criteria of competence and the timing and methods for raising incompetence, as well as the scope of the *ex officio* regulation of competence and the remedies of the parties.

The intervenor believes that the *a quo* judge confuses the applicative pathology of procedural rules with the inadequacy of the regulatory design itself.

They add that the principle of due process regulated by law does not require that every procedural error be remediable. The error on value, unlike that relating to competence by subject matter and mandatory territory, would not affect the functional suitability of the judicial office. This would be the reason why the legislature has excluded the *ex officio* regulation from operating in this last case.

Such a choice would, moreover, respond to the need to guarantee the reasonable duration of the process and would avoid multiplying *ex officio* regulations for disputes that "remain in any case before judges competent by subject matter and territory."

2.4.– Lastly, the State Attorney General’s Office considers the reasons put forward by the referring judge in support of the challenges under Article 97 of the Constitution to be unpersuasive.

The intervenor reiterates that the discipline of competence is typified by law through the provision of connecting criteria, terms for performing procedural activities, preclusions, the scope of operation of the *ex officio* regulation, and party remedies.

Consequently, any pathological episodes such as those stigmatized by the referring judge "find a remedy within the process."

The argument of the scheduling burden for the *ad quem* judicial office would also miss the mark.

In the opinion of the state defense, the parameter under Article 97 of the Constitution would, in fact, be relevant at the level of the overall organizational structure of the jurisdiction and not in relation to the individual judicial office or the individual magistrate.

The rules on competence would be intended to achieve the pre-establishment of the judge and the identification, in the abstract, of the judicial office considered most adequate under the profile of specialization with respect to certain matters.

The purpose of equitable distribution of workloads between magistrates, guaranteed through organizational measures, would instead be secondary and consequential.

Furthermore, any violations of law determined by ignorance or inexcusable negligence would be sanctioned in disciplinary proceedings.

Finally, the argument that relies on the increase of the unified contribution that may result from the "requalification" of the value of the case by the judge who erroneously declines competence *ratione valoris* would not be shareable.

The alleged imposition of an undue tax would not in any case be attributable to Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the taxation of the process is subject to specific rules.

2.5.– On February 19, 2026, the President of the Council of Ministers filed an illustrative brief in which they reiterated the arguments made in support of the conclusions resigned in the act of intervention, adding that the questions raised tend, ultimately, to obtain the introduction of a "different remedial model in matters of competence by value." However, such a choice would not be "constitutionally imposed," but reserved to the discretion of the legislature.

Considerations in Law

3.– The Court of Piacenza, Civil Section, sitting in a single-judge capacity, doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the interpretation provided by the jurisprudence of legitimacy, which constitutes living law, according to which, by explicit and unchallengeable discretionary choice of the legislature, the *ex officio* regulation of competence can be requested only in cases of negative conflict of competence by subject matter or mandatory territory and not also by value.

3.1.– The challenged provision, "in the part where, in case of a manifestly erroneous declaration of incompetence by value, by precluding the *ad quem* judge from raising the regulation of competence *ex officio*, it allows the natural judge to divest themselves of the competence to decide unwanted cases, in violation of the rules of vertical distribution of competence," would conflict, first of all, with Article 25 of the Constitution, "both in isolation and in combination with Article 111 of the Constitution," as it would allow the seised judge to arbitrarily devolve the cognizance of the dispute to a judge "not natural, that is, not pre-established by law," through an unchallengeable ruling.

3.2.– Article 3 of the Constitution would also be violated, as the norm under scrutiny, by offering no remedy against a ruling declining competence that results in being abnormal, would allow identical cases to be handled by the natural judge or by the judge erroneously seised of the dispute, not based on a legal criterion, but on the correctness and good faith "of the natural person designated as the natural judge."

3.3.– The referring judge also perceives a violation of Article 111 of the Constitution, as, according to the challenged provision, the process – with reference to competence and the applicable procedure – would not be regulated by law, but left to the "changeable, erratic, and unpredictable" will of the individual magistrate.

3.4.– Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by living law, would finally conflict with Article 97 of the Constitution, as, for the administration of justice to be compliant with the canons of good governance, efficiency, and impartiality, "the rules of jurisdiction cannot be left to chance, but must be established by law." Furthermore, the challenged provision, by making illegitimate transfer possible, on the one hand, would determine an undue burden on the workload of the *ad quem* judicial office and of the individual magistrates, with "disorientation and distress" to the parties themselves; on the other hand, it would endorse the imposition of an undue tax liability, such as that deriving from the increase of the unified contribution, without the legal prerequisites existing.

4.– Preliminary to the examination of the merits of the questions is the reconstruction of the *ratio* of the challenged provision, as well as the essential features of the regulatory system in which it is inserted.

4.1.– Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, titled "Conflict of competence," provides that "[w]hen, following the order declaring the incompetence of the seised judge by reason of subject matter or territory in the cases referred to in Article 28, the case is resumed within the terms referred to in Article 50 before another judge, the latter, if they believe they are in turn incompetent, requests the regulation of competence *ex officio*."

In order to prevent the risk of a double declaration of incompetence – that is, by both the *a quo* judge and the *ad quem* judge – the provision in question allows the judge whose competence has been affirmed by the magistrate first seised, but who disagrees with the indication made in their favor, to raise the conflict, without, however, being able to provide themselves with a new ruling of incompetence – which could be followed by others by the judges indicated as competent in turn –, but by requesting a final re-examination from the Court of Cassation.

4.2.– The institution in question is situated in the same regulatory context as the regulation of competence upon a party's request pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, like this, fulfills the typical function of immediately devolving the issue of competence to the Court of Cassation, which – as the regulator of jurisdiction and competence pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 1, of Royal Decree no. 12 of January 30, 1941 (Judicial System) – rules with pan-procedural effectiveness (Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 30200 of December 15, 2017), that is, binding on any other judge and unlimited in time (Article 310, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure).

Unlike the *ex officio* regulation, the voluntary one constitutes, however, a means of impugnation and can affect both the order that pronounces solely on competence – as well as on *litispendence* and on connection (Article 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure) – and the judgment or order that also decides on the merits.

In the first case, the necessary regulation governed by Article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure finds application, while in the second, where only the ruling on competence is challenged, the optional regulation provided for by Article 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be employed.

If, instead, the merits are also challenged, the means of impugnation must be identified in the appeal.

The regulation pursuant to Article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure is called "necessary" as it constitutes the only remedy through which it is possible to challenge the ruling on competence alone and possibly obtain its annulment.

The *ratio* of the uniqueness and necessity of the instrument is to be found in the need to avoid the prolongation of the state of uncertainty on the issue of competence and to induce the interested party to propose a request for regulation without delay, in order to immediately obtain a definitively binding assessment on competence that puts an end to the conflict arising as a consequence of the party's exception or the *ex officio* finding and the subsequent provision.

The *ex officio* regulation of competence does not, however, have an impugnative nature, amounting to a provision having the form of an order with which the judge before whom the case is timely resumed refers the decision of the issue to the Regulating Court (Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, Order no. 30761 of November 22, 2025).

4.2.1.– As expressly sanctioned by Article 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the regulation upon a party's request cannot be employed against rulings on competence adopted by the Justice of the Peace (*ex multis*, Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 711 of January 18, 2021).

This does not mean, however, that the aforementioned decisions are unchallengeable, since, as confirmed by the jurisprudence of legitimacy, they can be challenged by appeal (*ex aliis*, Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 12010 of May 28, 2014), which, precisely because the regulation of competence is precluded, constitutes a "necessary [...] impugnation" (Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 33456 of December 17, 2019).

It remains, in any case, firm, for the Justice of the Peace, the possibility, where the conditions indicated by Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure are met, to raise the conflict of competence and to request the regulation *ex officio* (*ex aliis*, Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 15382 of September 13, 2012).

4.3.– Closely correlated to the provision subject to scrutiny is then Article 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which "[t]he order that, also pursuant to Articles 39 and 40, declares the incompetence of the judge who pronounced it, if it is not challenged with the request for regulation, makes the declared incompetence and the competence of the judge indicated in it incontestable if the case is resumed within the terms referred to in Article 50, unless it is a matter of incompetence by subject matter or incompetence by territory in the cases provided for in Article 28."

The failure to employ the regulation against the ruling declaring incompetence by reason of the so-called weak criteria (value and simple territory) therefore triggers the mechanism inherent in the necessity of the means: the declinatory decision becomes incontestable and, at the same time, the competence of the judge designated by it remains definitively firm.

4.3.1.– Like the provision subject to challenge, Article 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure tends to avoid that, in the event that the seised judge considers themselves incompetent and, thus, also the one designated by the latter, the exercise of judicial protection is hindered by the passage of the case from one judge to another, pending a final ruling on the issue of competence.

The Code of Civil Procedure of 1865 had intended to prevent such a risk through a discipline of rulings on competence – contained in Article 115 – inspired by the principle, of Germanic descent, of *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*, according to which every judge is the judge of their own competence, so that, with respect to the dispute of which they are seised, they are sovereign in determining the perimeter of their *potestas iudicandi*, without other judges being able to interfere with such assessment.

Among the compilers of the 1940 code, however, a contrast had been recorded between an orientation inclined to eliminate the rule mentioned above and a trend favorable to its conservation. A compromise solution has derived from it, by virtue of which, for the "weak" titles of competence (value and simple territory), the path of incontestability of the declinatory ruling not challenged by regulation was chosen, while, for the "strong" criteria (subject matter and mandatory territory), it was provided that the *ad quem* judge, if they do not intend to submit to the designation made by the first judge, may disagree, but not by deciding the issue themselves, but by directly investing the Court of Cassation.

The option for such a model was justified as follows: "[t]o avoid exceptions of incompetence proposed for purely dilatory purposes, and the re-proposal of the same issue of competence before different judges, the scope of the traditional principle, dating back to a patrimonial conception, which has faded today, of jurisdiction, according to which every judge should be reserved in an exclusive manner the competence to decide on their own competence, has been considerably restricted; and the principle has been adopted [...] welcomed in other legislations and better responding to the modern idea of the unity of jurisdiction, according to which the decision that has passed into *res judicata* with which the first seised judge declares themselves incompetent and designates another judge as competent, is, in certain cases, binding on the judge before whom the parties are referred for the continuation of the process" (Report of the Minister Keeper of the Seals Grandi presented at the hearing of October 28, 1940 for the approval of the text of the Code of Civil Procedure, no. 26).

4.4.– The legislature has thus outlined a dual regime of rulings on competence valid, respectively, for "weak" and "strong" competence titles.

Where the judge first seised declines competence by value or simple territory, if the parties do not promote the regulation (or, in proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, the appeal), the *ad quem* judge cannot in any way challenge the designation in their favor, as on it, as well as on the pronouncement of incompetence, the *res judicata* is formed, even if only formal and endo-procedural (Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Order no. 19472 of July 18, 2019), and the issue of competence can no longer be called into question, neither by the parties nor by the proceeding judge, in the subsequent degrees of the proceedings (Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, Judgments no. 25245 of September 15, 2025 and no. 2973 of February 27, 2012).

Conversely, in the hypothesis in which the seised judge declares themselves incompetent by subject matter or mandatory territory, if the parties do not propose the regulation of competence (or, in proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, the appeal), the judge before whom the case is timely resumed is not bound by the indication made by the first judge, but exceptionally can disagree with it. However, they cannot decide on their own incompetence, but must raise the negative conflict by requesting its regulation, *ex officio*, by the Court of Cassation.

4.5.– Such a regulation, due to its structural peculiarities, constitutes an institution of a special nature (Court of Cassation, Sixth Civil Section, Order no. 7596 of April 1, 2011).

Its purpose is to prevent at the root the emergence of the negative conflict by forbidding the same *ad quem* judge who considers themselves, in turn, incompetent (by subject matter or mandatory territory) from rendering a declinatory ruling of competence and imposing on them to initiate a new procedural phase aimed at resolving the issue of competence in advance through a ruling of the Court of Cassation.

The jurisprudence of legitimacy has identified the foundation of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the system's need to guarantee respect for the irreducible minimum of the rules of distribution of competence that concern the quality of the claim, accepting, conversely, also in the perspective of the reasonable duration of the process, that a given dispute can be decided by a judge tasked with knowing others of different value (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 1202 of 2018).

The cited judgment has, moreover, highlighted that, for a non-casual choice of legislative merit, "as such not subject to review before the Constitutional Court," the norm under scrutiny has limited the *ex officio* regulation of competence to pronouncements of incompetence by subject matter and mandatory territory.

The failure to extend the institution also to issues of competence by value and simple territory reveals the legislature's concern to ensure a complete control of the preliminary issue only when the competence titles are at stake which, concerning the quality of the dispute, involve the judge's aptitude to render a more correct decision.

The purpose of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, in fact, only that "to avoid that a judge knows about a dispute of which the law perceives a quality such as to deserve to be reserved exclusively for another judge" (again, Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 1202 of 2018).

5.– Given these premises, the questions of constitutional legitimacy must be declared unfounded.

5.1.– In the first place, Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by living law, in the part where it does not admit the *ex officio* regulation of competence also for pronouncements of incompetence *ratione valoris*, does not conflict with the principle of the natural judge pre-established by law.

5.1.1.– According to the jurisprudence of this Court, the expression "natural judge pre-established by law" contained in Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Constitution indicates the judge established based on general criteria fixed in advance and not in view of specific disputes (most recently, Judgment no. 205 of 2025).

The invoked constitutional principle guarantees the citizen's right to prior non-doubtful knowledge of the judge competent to decide or, even more clearly, the right to certainty that the latter is not a judge created *a posteriori* in relation to a fact that has already occurred (Judgment no. 88 of 1962).

It aims "not only to protect the citizen against the prospect of a judge who is not impartial, but also to ensure the independence of the judge invested with the cognizance of a case, placing them safe from the possibility that the legislature or other judges arbitrarily deprive them of proceedings already anchored before them" (Judgment no. 38 of 2025).

The guarantee under Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Constitution can, therefore, be considered respected when the adjudicating body has been established by law and its competence is defined based on general criteria fixed in advance, in compliance with the reservation of law (again, Judgment no. 205 of 2025).

On the other hand, an illegitimate subtraction of the case from the natural judge occurs whenever the same judge is designated *a posteriori* in relation to a given dispute or directly by the legislature, by way of singular exception to the general rules, or through acts of other subjects, to whom the law attributes such power beyond the limits that the reservation under Article 25 of the Constitution imposes.

5.1.2.– Having premised this, differently from what the referring judge believes, the failure to extend the *ex officio* regulation of competence also to the hypothesis, here under examination, in which competence *ratione valoris* is declined, does not resolve itself into the attribution to the judge first seised of the possibility of deciding arbitrarily, in defiance of the rules on competence aimed at ensuring respect for the guarantee of the natural judge pre-established by law, without their assessment being able to be subjected to control.

Conversely, as this Court has already observed in declaring the manifest groundlessness of a question analogous to that now under scrutiny, the system outlined by Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure "responds to an organizational choice of the legislature, which, in compliance with reasonable criteria of procedural economy, has deemed it appropriate to limit the possibility of conflict of competence only to cases in which the contrast concerns competence by subject matter or mandatory territorial competence, without this implying a violation of the principle of the 'natural judge' as the preclusion to *ex officio* re-examination by the judge of the resumption follows in any case from a judgment on competence rendered by the first judge in application [...] of specific rules of law and subject to impugnation for any violation of the same" (Order no. 361 of 1989).

No reasons are perceived to rethink the solution adopted in the precedent just mentioned, having, on the contrary, the arguments supporting it received confirmation from the subsequent development of the jurisprudence of legitimacy.

As remembered, the judgment of the United Civil Sections no. 1202 of 2018 has, in fact, clarified that the provision under scrutiny lends itself to a "minimalist" reading, as it reveals the legislature's concern not to guarantee, through the instrument of the conflict of competence, the exact respect "always and in any case" of the rules governing the distribution of *potestas iudicandi*, but to ensure the observance of the "irreducible minimum" of only the specific precepts concerning the "quality" of the claim, accepting, conversely, also in the name of the reasonable duration of the process, that a given dispute can be decided by a judge tasked with knowing others of different value.

This does not mean, moreover, that in the hypotheses not "covered" by Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure the declinatory ruling of competence cannot be challenged and, therefore – as supposed by the *a quo* judge –, is "unchallengeable" and "irremediable," nor that by means of it the seised judge, declining competence, can, at their own discretion, divert the parties from the natural judge pre-established by law.

On the contrary, as remembered, the system guarantees that even the ruling of incompetence by value and simple territory is subjected to revision through the regulation of competence upon a party's request or, in proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, by appeal.

Therefore, when, as in the dispute subject to the *a quo* proceedings, the criterion of distribution by value operates, taking into consideration not the quality of the claim, but a merely quantitative profile – such as the extent of the economic value of the good or the relationship deduced in court –, without the qualitative characteristics of the case requiring a particular aptitude of the jurisdictional body called to know it, it is not essential that the dispute be decided "always and in any case" (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 1202 of 2018) by the judge identified according to the correct application of the criteria indicated by the law.

In the aforementioned hypothesis, the legislature deems the regulation upon a party's request – or, for proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, the appeal – a sufficient remedy to ensure minimum control on competence, without its failure to be employed, and the consequent crystallization of the even erroneous designation of the *ad quem* judge, resolving itself into a prejudice for the effectiveness of judicial protection.

Once, by effect of the mechanism outlined by Article 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the failure to challenge renders the ruling of incompetence by value (or by simple territory) incontestable, for the system the competent judge is to be identified in the one, indicated in the declinatory provision, before whom the case has been timely resumed.

This is because, where the interested party acquiesces to the erroneous declination of competence, the interest in the correct application of the criteria of distribution of *potestas iudicandi* recedes with respect to the need for a reasonable duration of the process.

However, even in such an eventuality, competence is determined according to a, albeit subsidiary, rule of legal source – deducible from Article 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure –, which does not remit the identification of the competent judicial office to the discretion of the seised judge, but outlines, in a general and abstract way, a procedure for its relative determination alternative to the system of distribution of disputes governed by Article 6 and following of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Such a regulatory arrangement is compatible with the guarantee under Article 25 of the Constitution since, as this Court has, even recently, emphasized, the principle of the natural judge does not crystallize in the legislative determination of general competence, but also consists of all those provisions that derogate from such competence based on criteria that, rationally, evaluate the disparate interests placed in play by the process (again, Judgment no. 205 of 2025).

On the other hand, the pre-establishment of the natural judge "cannot be exasperated to the point of implying a sort of hibernation of the criteria dictated for competence and jurisdiction; it is essential only that the possible mutation does not remain entrusted to the mere discretion of the judge" (Judgment no. 268 of 1987).

This is because, as this Court has had the opportunity to highlight "[t]o the principle by which procedural provisions are not ends in themselves, but functional to the best quality of the decision on the merits, the current Code of Civil Procedure is inspired almost constantly – in regulating issues of procedure –, and in particular the discipline that to the identification of the competent judge – aimed at ensuring, on the one hand, respect for the constitutional guarantee of the natural judge and, on the other hand, the suitability (in the legislature's evaluation) to render the best decision on the merits – does not sacrifice the right of the parties to obtain an answer, affirmative or negative, regarding the 'good of life' object of their dispute" (Judgment no. 77 of 2007).

In light of the preceding considerations, the possibility that the provision on competence becomes incontestable also in the case in which it results in being seriously unobservant of the rules on competence or, even, intentionally aimed at moving an "unwanted" dispute to a different judicial office, constitutes a mere factual element – irrelevant for the purposes of the scrutiny of constitutional legitimacy of the challenged norm.

Applicative abuses, even if abstractly proposed in the referral order, find a remedy within the same procedural discipline, being able, as already said, to be challenged through the regulation of competence upon a party's request or, in proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, by appeal.

Even if the parties omit to activate the means of impugnation recognized to them, the instrumentalizations feared do not affect the constitutional legitimacy of the discipline in question, being able, in that case, to be sanctioned in accordance with the rules on the responsibility, including disciplinary, of the magistrate.

5.2.– Neither is the disparity of treatment discernible which, according to the referring judge, would derive from the possibility that identical cases are handled by the natural judge or by the judge erroneously seised, not based on a legal criterion, but depending on the "correctness and good faith of the natural person designated as the natural judge."

This challenge is also based on the erroneous hermeneutical premise of the unchallengeability of the provision declaring incompetence *ratione valoris*.

As noted by this Court in the remembered Order no. 361 of 1989, in case of declination of competence by value, the impossibility, for the judge of the resumption, to request the *ex officio* regulation follows in any case from a ruling on the competence of the first judge, which can be subjected to revision through the regulation of competence upon a party's request or, in proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, by appeal.

In the case in which the parties do not intend to react to the first judge's ruling, a competence crystallizes which, while being able to diverge from the criteria of distribution of disputes *ratione valoris*, finds in any case foundation in a rule on competence – such as the one dictated by Article 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure – having the characteristics of predetermination and abstractness.

The violation of the principle of equality proposed by the referring judge is, therefore, to be excluded because in the situations put to comparison the system deems the judges invested with the dispute equally equipped with *potestas iudicandi*.

5.3.– The provision object of challenge does not conflict, then, with the reservation of law under Article 111, paragraph 1, of the Constitution since, differently from what the *a quo* judge believes, in the case under scrutiny the consolidation of competence *ratione valoris* in the judge indicated as competent is not the fruit of the unchallengeable will of the judge declaring themselves incompetent, but the effect of the failure to challenge the relative ruling through the remedies under Articles 44 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure; an effect which, as already highlighted, is contemplated – and tolerated – by the system, despite it springing from an erroneous application of the static criteria of determination of competence.

5.4.– Finally, the challenges of violation of Article 97 of the Constitution do not deserve to be accepted.

In the jurisprudence of this Court, it is, in fact, constant the affirmation according to which the principle of good governance, "while being referable also to the bodies of the administration of justice, concerns exclusively laws concerning the organization of judicial offices and their functioning under the administrative aspect; while such a principle is extraneous to the exercise of the jurisdictional function" (Judgments no. 14 of 2019 and no. 174 of 2005; in the same sense Judgments no. 172 of 2021, no. 80 and no. 34 of 2020), a function which comes into view in the questions raised by the *a quo* judge.

It is incidentally noted, moreover, how none of the applicative repercussions indicated by the referring judge affects the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged provision.

The denounced increase of the workload for the magistrates of the judicial office before which the case migrates by effect of an erroneous declination of competence *ratione valoris* constitutes, in fact, a consequence of the application of a different discipline of competence provided for and accepted by the system also "in the name of the reasonable duration of the process" (again, Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, no. 1202 of 2018).

Similar considerations apply to the "distress" and "disorientation" which, according to the referring judge's perspective, the parties would suffer by effect of the erroneous declination of competence by value.

It cannot, in fact, be overlooked that, in the hypothesis under scrutiny, the consolidation of competence in the *ad quem* judge and the subsequent resumption of the case spring from the acquiescence of the same parties to the declination of the judge first seised.

Even the denounced increase of the unified contribution is a consequence of the incontestability of the determination of the value of the dispute by the judge who declined competence and of the *translatio iudicii* before the judge declared competent (Court of Cassation, Fifth Civil Section, Judgment no. 8912 of April 11, 2018).

6.– The questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure must, therefore, be declared unfounded.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure unfounded, raised in reference to Articles 3, 25, 97, and 111 of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Piacenza, Civil Section, sitting in a single-judge capacity, with the order indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, March 12, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Reporter

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Chancellor

Filed in the Registry on May 28, 2026

 

The anonymized version is consistent, in the text, with the original.