JUDGMENT NO. 61

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Arts. 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 36 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of August 20, 2025 (Simplifications in building regulations. Alignment with reference state legislation. Amendments to Regional Law no. 65/2014), initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers with a petition notified on October 24, 2025, filed with the registry on the same date, entered as no. 38 in the 2025 register of petitions, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, no. 45, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having regard to the act of appearance of the Tuscany Region;

having heard the reporting Judge Francesco Saverio Marini at the public hearing of March 24, 2026;

having heard State Attorney Adele Berti Suman for the President of the Council of Ministers, and Attorney Marcello Cecchetti for the Tuscany Region;

having deliberated in the chambers on March 24, 2026.

Legal Findings

1.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, by means of a petition notified and filed on October 24, 2025 (Reg. Pet. no. 38 of 2025), has challenged Arts. 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 36 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of August 20, 2025 (Simplifications in building regulations. Alignment with reference state legislation. Amendments to Regional Law no. 65/2014), with reference to Art. 117, second paragraph, letter m), regarding the matter of «determination of the essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights», and third paragraph, regarding the matter of «territorial governance», of the Constitution; the latter in relation to the interposed provision under Art. 23-ter of Presidential Decree no. 380 of June 6, 2001, titled «Consolidated Act of legislative and regulatory provisions regarding building regulations. (Text A)», as amended by Law Decree no. 69 of May 29, 2024 (Urgent provisions regarding building and urban planning simplification), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 105 of July 24, 2024 (so-called "Salva Casa” decree).

In the petitioner's view, while Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations introduced simplification measures of both a procedural and economic nature for changes in the intended use of properties, the challenged Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, and specifically Arts. 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 36, has, on the one hand, disregarded the rationale of the new state legislation and, on the other hand, infringed the specific provisions contained in said Art. 23-ter, thereby exceeding the limits of regional competence and encroaching upon the state’s competence regarding the determination of essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights, as well as fundamental principles relating to territorial governance.

2.– In the first ground of appeal, the petitioner alleges that the Tuscany Region, despite declaring in the preamble of said regional law an intent to align its legislation with the new provisions of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, has in fact evaded its rationale through the challenged Art. 3, paragraph 2. This rationale consists of simplifying procedures for changes in intended use, both of the "horizontal” type—i.e., within the same functional category under the aforementioned Art. 23-ter, paragraph 1, indicated in letters a) residential, a-bis) tourist-accommodation, b) productive and executive, c) commercial, and d) rural—and of the "vertical” type—i.e., between different functional categories, provided they fall within zones A), B), and C) of Art. 2 of the Decree of the Minister of Public Works, in agreement with the Minister of the Interior, no. 1444 of April 2, 1968 (Mandatory limits on building density, height, distance between buildings, and maximum ratios between spaces for residential/productive settlements and public spaces or areas reserved for collective activities, public green spaces, or parking, to be observed for the purposes of drafting new urban planning instruments or revising existing ones, pursuant to Art. 17 of Law no. 765 of August 6, 1967).

Under Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, "horizontal” changes are always permitted, without prejudice to the possibility for municipalities to provide specific conditions in their urban planning instruments, while "vertical” changes are always permitted without the obligation to secure additional areas for services of general interest or complying with the mandatory minimum parking supply under Interministerial Decree no. 1444 of 1968. The only condition required is the payment of secondary urbanization charges, excluding primary urbanization charges.

In the view of the State Attorney’s Office, the state legislature intended to preclude the requirement for primary urbanization charges for "vertical” changes of intended use, as such changes concern areas already urbanized and thus characterized by the presence of primary urbanization works; therefore, imposing such charges on the applicant would result in an unjustified duplication. A different conclusion applies to secondary urbanization charges which, corresponding to the social impact of the new urban destination, could never give rise to a duplication of charges.

This interpretation of Art. 23-ter is confirmed, according to the petitioner, by the "Guidelines and interpretative criteria on the implementation of Law Decree no. 69 of May 29, 2024, converted, with amendments, into Law no. 105 of July 24, 2024 (DL Salva Casa),” published on the institutional website of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport on January 30, 2025, according to which, precisely, the payment of primary urbanization charges is not due for vertical changes of intended use (point 2.1.).

Compared to the state legislation, whose defining points are the simplification of the procedure and the reduction of charges for the applicant, the regional legislature has, on one hand, excluded the obligation to secure areas for services of general interest and parking in compliance with state provisions, but, on the other hand, in introducing—inter alia—paragraph 2-bis to Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, it has maintained the application of the provisions under Title VII, Chapter I, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of November 10, 2014 (Norms for territorial governance), and thus the obligation for the applicant to pay both primary and secondary urbanization charges.

Therefore, by considering the previous regulation regarding urbanization charges to remain unchanged, the Tuscany Region’s legislation does not conform to the state legislation, but expressly betrays its rationale of simplification and facilitation of changes in intended use throughout the national territory, thereby interfering with both the exclusive state competence regarding essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights and the concurrent competence relating to territorial governance.

3.– In a second ground of appeal, the President of the Council of Ministers highlights a further conflict between Art. 3, paragraph 2, of the challenged regional law and Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations. The latter intended to limit the power of municipalities, regarding changes in intended use, to the imposition of mere conditions within their urban planning instruments, such as measures to cap requests, aimed at preserving the structure, harmonious development of the territory, and a balanced distribution of settlement loads. Such conditions could never translate into discriminatory limitations, lest the rationale of the new Art. 23-ter be distorted.

In light of these considerations, the provision of the challenged Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025 which, by introducing paragraph 2-ter of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, grants municipalities the possibility to impose not only specific conditions but also limitations on changes of intended use, would violate the amended Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations. This rule repeatedly uses formulations such as "[a]re […] always permitted” or "is always allowed” regarding changes of intended use, emphasizing the state legislature’s intent to set common standards across the national territory regarding the balance between the individual’s needs, relating to property rights, and the public interests connected to territorial governance.

Therefore, the challenged regional provision would violate both Art. 117, second paragraph, letter m), of the Constitution, regarding the determination of essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights, and Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, regarding the matter of territorial governance.

4.– Finally, in a third censure, the petitioner complains that the regional legislature, in the challenged Arts. 3, paragraph 1, and 36, has also affected the transitional regime. Art. 36, in particular, inserts Art. 252-septies into Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, providing, on one hand, that to ensure the sustainability of changes in intended use in relation to territorial specificities, the new discipline shall apply only following the approval, by municipalities, of a specific variation to adapt their urban planning instruments and, on the other hand, that said variation must be approved within two years from the entry into force of the challenged Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025. The challenge regarding constitutional illegitimacy is extended by the petitioner to Art. 3, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, in the part where, in replacing the introductory sentence of paragraph 2 of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, it provides that "the provisions of Art. 252-septies shall remain in force”, in order to reaffirm the postponement of the application of simplifications regarding "vertical” changes of intended use until the relevant municipal regulation is issued.

In the petitioner's view, this would conflict with Art. 23-ter, paragraph 3, of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, according to which "[t]he regions shall adapt their legislation to the principles of this article, which in any case have direct application, without prejudice to the possibility for the regions themselves to provide for further levels of simplification.”

The conflict appears evident when comparing the state provision concerning the immediate effectiveness of the new discipline, having direct application, with the postponement of its effectiveness for a time not exceeding two years, provided by the regional legislation, so as to allow Municipalities to assess, from an urban planning perspective, the requested changes in intended use, consequently adapting their territorial planning instruments. This would result in a further breach of the constitutional limits of regional competences and the need to restore the correct order of state competences, both in the matter of essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights and with reference to territorial governance.

5.– The Tuscany Region has appeared in the proceedings, contesting all the claims.

Regarding the highlighted divergence on urbanization charges, the respondent Region stated that Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations merely confirms the obligation to pay secondary urbanization charges and says nothing about primary urbanization charges, expressly excluding only some, such as the finding of areas to be allocated to services of general interest and the provision of parking. Therefore, had it been the state's intention to exempt "vertical” changes of intended use from the obligation to pay primary urbanization charges, the legislature would have made this explicit, just as it did for areas intended for services of general interest and for parking; nothing can be deduced to the contrary from the sole reference to secondary urbanization charges.

Furthermore, in the respondent's view, urbanization charges should not be confused with the works themselves, as, by constituting a consideration that the concessionaire must pay regardless of the actual expenses incurred for the realization of the works, it could also be used for maintenance, adaptation, and enhancement of already existing works.

Moreover, although the state legislature has stated that the subject of the regulation is changes of intended use "without works,” therefore without an increase in the urban load, it cannot be completely ruled out that some increases may occur, also in light of the agreement reached by the Unified Conference in the session of October 20, 2016, which expressly provides for them even in the case of changes in the intended use of properties (Annex A, item 5, "Urban load”). In such cases, albeit residual, it would be illogical and unjustified to deprive municipalities of the revenue derived from the payment of primary urbanization charges.

In a second line of argument, the Tuscany Region assumes that Art. 3, paragraph 2, of the challenged regional law, by providing for the possibility for local authorities to attach conditions and limitations to changes in the intended use of properties, would not conflict with Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, which would only apparently limit the possibility of imposing mere "conditions,” intending instead to include "limitations” within that term.

This would be evident from the aforementioned Guidelines and interpretative criteria on the implementation of Law Decree no. 69 of 2024 of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, where it is highlighted that "conditions” can have a threefold purpose, among which is precisely that of limiting, in relation to specific and motivated needs, the operation of state law. The same Guidelines provide that the planning powers of local authorities regarding territorial destinations can be expressed in the imposition of "conditions, limitations, or prohibitions,” with the exclusion of only arbitrary limitations or restrictions. From this, the respondent deduces a full conformity of the challenged regional law with what was provided by the state legislature in Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations.

The Tuscany Region, in fact, intended only to better clarify the powers of local authorities regarding changes of intended use and not to compress the simplification measures introduced by the state legislature.

The Tuscany Region also contests the validity of the third complaint.

According to the respondent, the spirit of liberalization that underlies the new discipline for changes in intended use must be combined with compliance with the conditions set by municipal urban planning instruments, as, if it were instead believed that state provisions are of immediate application, even in derogation of the provisions contained in municipal urban planning instruments and without the mediation of a transitional discipline, this would end up causing a serious imbalance in the structure of urban centers.

Moreover—the Region observes—the provision for the possibility, for local authorities, to impose limitations and conditions on the discipline of changes in intended use can only require an adequate time so that municipalities, the only entities capable of appreciating the sustainability of interventions in the territory, can provide for the implementation of said limitations.

The rationale of the transitional regime would thus appear essential to protect municipal autonomy in urban planning activity, and the maximum term of two years could only be considered reasonable to allow municipalities to implement the adaptation variations.

Consequently, also with reference to Art. 3, paragraph 1, and Art. 36 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, the Region has legislated in accordance with Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations and, therefore, has not violated Art. 117, second paragraph, letter m), and third paragraph, of the Constitution.

6.– Both parties have filed illustrative briefs, in which they summarized their defenses and insisted on their conclusions.

During the public hearing, the defense counsel for the Tuscany Region noted that, in the event that this Court deems the third complaint presented by the petitioner regarding the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 36 of the challenged regional law, containing the transitional discipline, to be well-founded, it could only suspend the judgment and refer to itself the question of constitutional legitimacy of the provision under Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, in the part where it provides for the direct applicability of new state provisions on the change of intended use, for violation of Art. 3 of the Constitution. In the respondent's view, the state rule, interpreted in this way, would be constitutionally illegitimate for disparity of treatment and unreasonableness.

Considered in law

7.– With the petition indicated in the heading (Reg. Pet. no. 38 of 2025), the President of the Council of Ministers has challenged Arts. 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 36 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, with reference to Art. 117, second paragraph, letter m), and third paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to the fundamental principles in the matter of "territorial governance,” dictated by the interposed provision under Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations.

8.– With a first censure, the petitioner complains of the divergence between Art. 3, paragraph 2, of the challenged regional law and the interposed state rule under Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, regarding the urbanization charges due in the event of a "vertical” change of intended use, operating between different functional categories. The state rule, in fact, for such changes in intended use, establishes that there is no obligation to secure areas for services of general interest and for parking and limits itself to placing the payment of secondary urbanization charges on the applicant. In the petitioner's view, state law has implicitly excluded primary urbanization charges, while the regional provision has maintained the application of the provisions under Title VII, Chapter I, of the previous Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014 and, with it, the obligation, for the applicant for a change of intended use, to pay both primary and secondary urbanization charges.

The challenged regional rule does not therefore conform to the state one and, indeed, betrays its rationale of simplification and facilitation of changes in intended use throughout the national territory, thereby interfering both with the exclusive state competence in the matter of "determination of the essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights” and with the concurrent legislative power in the matter of "territorial governance.”

According to the Tuscany Region, there would, instead, be no appreciable divergence between the two provisions. Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations would in fact limit itself to confirming the obligation to pay secondary urbanization charges without providing anything on primary urbanization charges, expressly excluding only some, such as the procurement of areas to be allocated to services of general interest and the provision of parking.

In the respondent's view, had it been the state legislature's intention to exempt "vertical” changes of intended use from the obligation to pay primary urbanization charges, the legislature would have expressly provided for it.

9.– The question, with reference to Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, is well-founded.

It must be premised, on this point, that the regulation of urbanization charges falls within the matter of building, which has merged, together with urban planning, into the matter of "territorial governance,” under Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution.

This Court has already ascribed the regulation relating to building permits to the fundamental principles of the aforementioned matter (judgments no. 90 of 2023 and no. 24 of 2022). Accessing it, sharing its nature, is that relating to urbanization charges connected to the issuance or formation of such permits.

It must be recalled that—according to constitutional jurisprudence—urbanization charges are public law considerations aimed at compensating the community for the new urban load, as a greater provision of services that the authorized work will generate (judgment no. 247 of 2020). The principle of the onerous nature of the authorization title was introduced by Law no. 765 of August 6, 1967 (Amendments and additions to the urban planning law no. 1150 of August 17, 1942) and was more extensively regulated by Law no. 10 of January 28, 1977 (Norms for land buildability). A construction cost was imposed on those requesting the building permit, and, indeed, urbanization charges, distinguished into primary urbanization charges (roads, sewers, electricity and gas distribution network, etc.) and secondary urbanization charges (services for the community, kindergartens and nursery schools, markets, churches, sports facilities, health facilities, etc.).

The former are due by reason of an increase in the urban load that derives from the building of a new construction or from a modification of the intended use of a pre-existing property and can also correspond to a greater intensity of the urban load brought by the new building on existing services. The latter constitute, instead, the "social” cost of the new settlement in the territory, corresponding to the increase in secondary services made indispensable by the new building and by the presumable increase in the demand for those services in the relevant territory.

The determination of charges, also insofar as it is related to the measure of standards, can only be regulated by a criterion of uniformity throughout the national territory, just as the derogation or reduction of the expected amount can only be regulated in a uniform way, also in force of a principle rule that imposes itself on the detail regional legislation (judgments no. 247 of 2020, no. 231 of 2016, and no. 13 of 1980) or with the provision for the realization of urbanization works in place of the payment of the relevant charges.

The grievance of the President of the Council of Ministers relates to the charges due for the "vertical” change of intended use, which the state legislature exempts from the obligation to secure areas for general services and for parking, safeguarding only the obligation to pay secondary urbanization charges. It is evident that the challenged rule, in regulating only secondary urbanization charges, implicitly excludes primary ones. This interpretation finds confirmation also in the frequently recalled Guidelines of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and finds its rationale in the circumstance that the changes of intended use, to which the legislature refers, occur in urbanized areas and in which primary urbanization works have, therefore, already been realized.

The challenged Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, in introducing—inter alia—paragraph 2-bis to Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, has, instead, established that "[t]he application of the provisions under title VII, chapter I of this law remains in force.” This provision, in contrast with the mentioned state regulation, allows municipalities to impose, for the purposes of a "vertical” change of intended use, the liability also for primary urbanization charges. For this profile, and limited to the provision of said provision, the challenged regional rule violates state competence in the matter of "territorial governance” and is, therefore, constitutionally illegitimate.

10.– The second censure of the President of the Council of Ministers concerns paragraph 2-ter of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, also introduced by Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, which provides for the possibility for municipalities to establish, in their urban planning instruments, specific "conditions and limitations” to "vertical” changes of intended use.

According to the petitioner, the provision would conflict with Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations which refers only to "conditions” and not also to "limitations.”

This question, in relation to Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, is also well-founded.

The reference, by the regional legislature, to "limitations,” in addition to "conditions,” does not give rise—as argued by the regional defense—to a mere hendiadys, devoid of regulatory value, but must be understood as the recognition of a more intense and incisive planning power of municipalities.

It must be considered that—as still indicated by the cited Guidelines of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport—the planning power of municipalities is divided between "conditions, limitations, or prohibitions” (point 2.1.), alluding to a different intensity of the municipal administration's power to affect the right of enjoyment of private property. Although these are partially overlapping concepts, "conditions” refer to measures of a specific and non-obstructive nature, which objectively concern the entire municipal territory and constitute "a flexibility mechanism that allows the local authority to take into account the concrete needs of an orderly arrangement of the territory.” For example, a condition is one that allows the "vertical” change of intended use of a single real estate unit only in compliance with the prevalent form of use of the property. "Limitations” constitute a conceptually wider and more invasive concept by the planning activity of municipalities and have a more intense impact on the right of property. For example, a limitation is one that prevents the change of intended use of entire properties in relation to fractions of territory, or that recognizes broader discretion to the administration.

Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, which introduced paragraph 2-ter of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, is therefore constitutionally illegitimate limited to the words "and limitations,” for violation of the fundamental principles in the matter of "territorial governance.”

11.– The third and final censure concerns Arts. 3, paragraph 1, and 36 of the challenged Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025. Art. 36, in inserting paragraph 252-septies into Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, introduced a transitional discipline, deferring and conditioning the application of Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations to the approval, to be carried out within two years by the municipalities, of a specific adaptation variation of their urban planning instruments, or of a specific discipline that establishes the specific conditions and limitations to the power to order the change of intended use of properties. The grievance is extended by the petitioner to Art. 3, paragraph 1, of the same regional law, in the part where, in replacing the introductory sentence of paragraph 2 of Art. 99 of Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, it provides that "the provisions of Art. 252-septies shall remain in force,” with the same purpose of deferring the application of simplifications in the matter of changes of intended use until the relevant municipal regulation has been issued.

In the petitioner's view, the mentioned regional provisions would conflict both with Art. 117, second paragraph, letter m), in relation to the matter of "determination of the essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights,” and with Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution in reference to the matter of "territorial governance,” for violation of the interposed rule under Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, in the part where it establishes, in paragraph 3, that "the regions shall adapt their legislation to the principles of this article, which in any case have direct application, without prejudice to the possibility for the regions themselves to provide for further levels of simplification.”

12.– This question, in reference to Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, is well-founded.

According to the Tuscany Region, the state rule, in providing that "the possibility for municipal urban planning instruments to set specific conditions” remains in force (a formula that appears in the new paragraphs 1-bis, 1-ter, 1-quater of Art. 9-bis of Presidential Decree no. 380 of 2001, introduced by Art. 1, paragraph 1, letter c, number 1, of Law Decree no. 69 of 2024, as converted), would have implicitly considered the possibility of a transitional period to allow municipalities to carry out a preliminary assessment of the territory's situation, aimed at evaluating the urban planning impact of changes in intended use.

If this were not the case, the interposed state rule would be constitutionally illegitimate for disparity of treatment, as it would treat those who requested the modification of the intended use before the Municipality’s resolution setting the conditions differently from those who request it subsequently. The state rule would also be devoid of reasonableness because, on one hand, it would safeguard the planning power of municipalities, but, on the other hand, it would provide for the direct applicability of the rule itself, before that planning power can be exercised.

This Court observes that the conflict between the state regulation, which certainly has the rank of a fundamental principle, and the regional one is quite evident. Direct application, without the need for a transitional discipline, is expressly provided by state law and responds to the logic of simplification that characterizes the regulatory amendment.

Direct application, unlike the activity of mere execution, is addressed, in fact, to all subjects of the legal system and not only to the municipal public administration. The provision is, therefore, directly and immediately operating also towards private individuals (judgment no. 72 of 2025), without the need for a postponement to allow municipalities to modify their planning power.

Moreover, the interposed state regulation cannot be considered unreasonable or a cause for disparity of treatment, given that the legislature was concerned, at the same time, to impose its immediate applicability and to allow, in any case, a subsequent intervention of the municipalities for the future, in accordance with general principles.

Therefore, Arts. 3, paragraph 1, limited to the words "by article 252-septies and,” and 36 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, are constitutionally illegitimate for violation of Art. 23-ter of the Consolidated Act on Building Regulations, as an interposed rule pursuant to Art. 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, which reserves to the State the determination of fundamental principles in the matter of "territorial governance.”

13.– The censures relating to the violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter m), of the Constitution, which reserves to the State the matter of "determination of the essential levels of benefits concerning civil and social rights,” are absorbed for all the rules challenged in these proceedings.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of August 20, 2025 (Simplifications in building regulations. Alignment with reference state legislation. Amendments to Regional Law no. 65/2014), in the part in which it introduced paragraph 2-bis to Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of November 10, 2014 (Norms for territorial governance), limited to the words "The application of the provisions under title VII, chapter I of this law remains in force.”;

2) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 3, paragraph 2, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025, in the part in which it introduced paragraph 2-ter of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, limited to the words "and limitations”;

3) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Arts. 3, paragraph 1, which replaced paragraph 2 of Art. 99 of Tuscany Regional Law no. 65 of 2014, limited to the words "by article 252-septies and,” and 36, of Tuscany Regional Law no. 51 of 2025.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on March 24, 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco Saverio MARINI, Reporting Judge

Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry

Filed in the Registry on April 30, 2026