JUDGMENT NO. 55

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree no. 115 of 30 May 2002, titled "Consolidated Act of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Justice Expenses (Text A)”, initiated by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting in monocratic composition, in the criminal proceedings against K. S., by way of the referral order of 2 July 2025, registered as no. 166 in the 2025 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, no. 38, first special series, of the year 2025.

Having regard to the intervention statement submitted by the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in the chambers on 12 January 2026 the Reporting Judge Massimo Luciani;

deliberated in the chambers on 12 January 2026.

Statement of Facts

1.– By order of 2 July 2025, registered as no. 166 in the 2025 register of orders, the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting in monocratic composition, raised ex officio, with reference to Articles 3 and 24, paragraphs two and three, of the Constitution, questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree no. 115 of 30 May 2002, titled "Consolidated Act of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Justice Expenses (Text A)”, as introduced by Art. 12-ter, paragraph 1, letter a), of Decree-Law no. 92 of 23 May 2008 (Urgent measures concerning public security), converted, with amendments, into Law no. 125 of 24 July 2008, in the part where it includes among those presumed to possess an income exceeding legal thresholds, persons convicted by final judgment for the offenses provided for by Art. 73 of Presidential Decree no. 309 of 9 October 1990 (Consolidated Act of the laws governing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of related drug addiction states), other than the cases under paragraph 5, where aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1.

1.1.– Regarding the relevance of the issue, the referring court states that it is tasked with ruling on the application for admission to State-funded legal aid filed by K. S., a non-EU citizen, in the context of criminal proceedings against him that concluded with a conviction for attempted simple theft; the court noted from the defendant’s criminal record "a potential impediment to admission,” consisting of a judgment of the same Court dated 19 May 2000 (which became irrevocable on 3 October of the same year), by which the penalty was applied upon request pursuant to Art. 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to certain offenses, unified by the nexus of continuing crime, as provided for and punished by Art. 73, paragraph 4, of Presidential Decree no. 309 of 1990, aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b).

Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses provides, in fact, that "[f]or subjects already convicted by final judgment for the offenses referred to in Articles 416-bis of the Criminal Code, 291-quater of the consolidated act referred to in Presidential Decree no. 43 of 23 January 1973, 73, limited to the hypotheses aggravated pursuant to article 80, and 74, paragraph 1, of the consolidated act referred to in Presidential Decree no. 309 of 9 October 1990, as well as for offenses committed by availing oneself of the conditions provided for by the aforementioned article 416-bis or in order to facilitate the activity of the associations provided for by the same article, and for offenses committed in violation of the rules for the repression of tax evasion regarding income and value added taxes, for the sole purposes of this decree, income is considered to exceed the established limits.”

1.2.– Given this premise, the referring court recalls that, by judgment no. 139 of 2010, this Court, while declaring the constitutional illegitimacy of the presumption established by the cited provision insofar as it did not admit contrary proof, affirmed that "[t]he introduction, which is constitutionally required, of contrary proof does not eliminate from the legal order the presumption provided by the legislator, which therefore continues to imply a reversal of the burden to document the existence of the income requirements for access to legal aid,” and that it is the duty of "the applicant to demonstrate, with adequate supporting documentation, his state of ‘indigence’ and [...] of the judge to verify the reliability of such documentation, making use of every necessary investigative tool.”

Having to exclude that the extinction of the penal effects of the judgment of application of the penalty upon request may exempt the judge from taking it into account for the purpose of admission to State-funded legal aid (citing, in particular, the judgment of the Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, 15 January-6 February 2025, no. 4816), the referring court notes that, following the judgment of this Court no. 223 of 2022 (which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, in the part where it included among the impeding offenses also the crime referred to in paragraph 5 of Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics), convictions for one of the cases referred to in the cited Art. 73 other than the hypothesis provided for in paragraph 5 remain an impediment to ordinary admission to the benefit if any of the aggravating circumstances provided for by the subsequent Art. 80 are present, "as the aforementioned presumption of exceeding income limits must operate in such a case.”

In the present case, the referring court continues, the defendant attached to the application for admission to State-funded legal aid a self-declaration from which it appears that he: 1) possesses a personal income resulting from income tax returns for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024 not exceeding the limit provided by law; 2) does not cohabit with anyone and, therefore, there is no family income to be calculated; 3) is not the owner of real estate nor registered movable property, either in Italy or abroad; 4) is homeless and has spent long periods in detention; 5) has submitted a request to the consular authority for the prescribed certification concerning the receipt of any income abroad.

Having stated this, the referring court believes that the applicant failed to provide the contrary proof that would have been necessary to overcome the presumption of exceeding the income limits, having produced only the described self-declaration and attached "only a single certification and two pay slips from 2022.”

1.3.– Regarding the manifest lack of groundlessness, the referring court believes that the iuris tantum presumption of exceeding income limits for access to State-funded legal aid placed upon persons convicted of crimes under Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, other than the case of paragraph 5, where aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, violates Articles 3 and 24, paragraphs two and three, of the Constitution.

The referring court recalls that the ratio of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses has been identified by constitutional jurisprudence in the need to prevent persons in possession of wealth acquired through the illicit activities indicated therein from accessing State-funded legal aid by taking advantage of the objective difficulty in ascertaining income derived from criminal activity (citing judgments no. 223 of 2022 and no. 139 of 2010) and that the right of the indigent to State-funded legal aid has the nature of an inviolable right, as a fundamental instrument to ensure the effectiveness of the right of action and defense in court (again citing judgment no. 223 of 2022, with the precedents cited therein).

The referring court therefore believes that any provision of law that limits access to the benefit of State-funded legal aid or makes its recognition more burdensome must be scrutinized with particular rigor in terms of intrinsic rationality and the proportionality of the balancing, and that the extension of the presumption of exceeding the income limit to those who have been convicted of crimes under Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics other than paragraph 5, where aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, does not pass the reasonableness test, as these are aggravating circumstances that, "although they bestow greater offensiveness upon the act, deserving of a harsher sanction, do not in any way affect the profitability coefficient.”

More specifically, given that jurisprudence considers the offense described by paragraph 4 of Art. 73, instead of that described by paragraph 5, to be integrated even in the case of possession of "a few hundred grams of marijuana” and that of paragraph 1 "even in the face of quantities of cocaine well below 100 grams” (recalling the judgment of the Court of Cassation, Sixth Criminal Section, 3-25 November 2022, no. 45061), i.e., in cases of dealing "well distant from large-scale drug trafficking,” the aggravating circumstances provided for by Art. 80, paragraph 1, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics would add nothing, according to the referring court, in terms of a presumption of criminal profitability: not having committed the act by availing oneself of minors or selling the substance to minors (Art. 80, paragraph 1, letter a); not having committed the act by availing oneself of a person addicted to drugs or in the vicinity of a school or barracks (Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters c and g); not having the offer or sale aimed at obtaining sexual services from a drug-addicted person (Art. 80, paragraph 1, letter f); not having the act committed by an armed or disguised person (Art. 80, paragraph 1, letter d).

In this way, according to the referring court, such cases would end up being illogically and irrationally equated to drug-dealing offenses aggravated by the large quantity, ex Art. 80, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, where only for such an aggravated offense could the presumption of greater profitability of the crime (subject to contrary proof) be justified, along with the different regime for admission to State-funded legal aid. Furthermore, the referring court notes that the regulatory provision would discriminate, by subjecting them to the burdensome burden of proof, those convicted for individual acts of dealing (albeit aggravated ex Art. 80, paragraph 1, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics) compared to participants in a criminal association aimed at non-minor drug dealing (Art. 74, paragraph 2, of the same consolidated act), who could access the benefit of State-funded legal aid according to the ordinary procedure, despite the fact that the stable nature of the association "suggests a more pronounced capacity to produce significant criminal wealth.”

1.4.– Subordinately, the referring court raises the question of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, in the part where it includes among the subjects for whom income exceeding the limit provided for admission to State-funded legal aid is presumed, those who have been convicted by final judgment for the offenses referred to in Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics other than the hypothesis of paragraph 5, where the aggravated hypotheses referred to in the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b) recur, and – by way of further subordination – in the part where it includes subjects convicted by final judgment for the offense referred to in Art. 73, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, where the aggravated hypotheses referred to in the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b) recur.

2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney’s Office, requesting that the questions of constitutional legitimacy be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

2.1.– Regarding the relevance, the State Attorney’s Office, after recalling that Art. 23, second paragraph, of Law no. 87 of 11 March 1953 (Rules on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), makes incidental access to the Constitutional Court conditional on the requirement that the main proceedings "cannot be resolved independently of the resolution of the question of constitutional legitimacy” and that constant constitutional jurisprudence deems this requirement not met when the question has a merely hypothetical or virtual character (citing judgments no. 134 of 2016, no. 281 of 2013, and no. 45 of 1972, as well as orders no. 26 of 2012, no. 176 of 2011, and no. 363 of 2010), noted that the a quo judge did not in any way address the issue of the contrary proof that the defendant should have offered to overcome the presumption deriving from the previous conviction against him, nor did he explain the reasons why the documentation attached to the application was not sufficient.

2.2.– On the merits, the defense of the President of the Council of Ministers concluded for the lack of grounds for the questions raised both primarily and subordinately, reiterating that – as already recognized by this Court’s judgment no. 139 of 2010 – the purpose of avoiding that those who are in possession of hidden wealth acquired through criminal activities benefit from the legal aid provided for the indigent may well justify the use of presumptions, provided that these are rebuttable by contrary proof.

Considerations of Law

3.– The Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting in monocratic composition, raised, with reference to Articles 3 and 24, paragraphs two and three, of the Constitution, the question of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, in the part where it includes among the subjects for whom income exceeding the limits provided for access to State-funded legal aid is presumed, those convicted by final judgment for the offenses referred to in Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, other than the hypotheses referred to in paragraph 5, where the aggravating circumstances referred to in the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, recur.

Subordinately, it raised the question of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses in the part where it includes – among the subjects for whom income exceeding the limits provided for access to State-funded legal aid is presumed – subjects convicted by final judgment for the offenses referred to in Art. 73 of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, other than the hypotheses referred to in paragraph 5, where the aggravating circumstances referred to in the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b), recur.

Further subordinately, it raised the question of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses in the part where it includes among the subjects for whom income exceeding the limits provided for access to State-funded legal aid is presumed, those convicted by final judgment for the offenses referred to in Art. 73, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics where the aggravating circumstances referred to in the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b), recur.

Said questions of constitutional legitimacy were raised in the context of criminal proceedings in which the defendant, a non-EU citizen, was convicted for the crime of attempted simple theft. The referring judge, in fact, reports that, during said proceedings, the defendant requested to be admitted to the benefit of State-funded legal aid and that his criminal record showed a judgment of application of the penalty upon request for certain offenses in continuation, provided for and sanctioned by Art. 73, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b), in relation to which Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses contemplates the presumption of exceeding the income limit for the purposes of admission to the benefit in question.

3.1.– Regarding the relevance, the referring judge recalls that, with judgment no. 139 of 2010, this Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses in the part where it did not provide for the possibility that those finally convicted for any of the impeding offenses provided therein could offer contrary proof regarding the legal presumption. It also signals that the jurisprudence of legitimacy is constant in believing that the presumption of exceeding the income limit does not lapse in the event of the extinction of the penal effects of the judgment of application of the penalty upon request.

On the basis of the judgment of application of the penalty upon request of the parties, pronounced on 19 May 2000 and having become irrevocable on the following 3 October, the referring judge notes that the application of the penalty for the crime referred to in Art. 73, paragraph 4, of the Consolidated Act on narcotics, aggravated pursuant to the subsequent Art. 80, paragraph 1, letters a) and b), is potentially an impediment to admission to State-funded legal aid, that is, for the crime of drug possession and dealing aggravated by having committed the act by availing oneself of minors and for having sold the drugs also to minors. This is, in fact, a criminal hypothesis for which the presumption of exceeding the income limit for admission to State-funded legal aid applies.

The a quo judge reports that the defendant attached to the application for admission to State-funded legal aid a self-declaration from which it appears that he: 1) possesses a personal income resulting from income tax returns for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024 not exceeding the limit provided by law; 2) does not cohabit with anyone and, therefore, there is no family income to be calculated; 3) is not the owner of real estate nor registered movable property, either in Italy or abroad; 4) is homeless and has spent long periods in detention; 5) has submitted a request to the consular authority for the prescribed certification concerning any income abroad.

Having stated this, the referring judge notes that "the applicant [...] failed to provide the contrary proof that would have been necessary [...], limiting himself to presenting the usual self-certification and attaching only a single certification and two pay slips from 2022,” and that, on the basis of the provision of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, the request for admission to State-funded legal aid should be rejected.

3.2.– The State Attorney’s Office objected to the inadmissibility of the question because the referring judge did not provide any argument to justify the unsuitability of the described documentary production to overcome the legal presumption.

3.3.– The objection is well-founded.

Constitutional jurisprudence is firm in stating that: 1) the incidental question of constitutional legitimacy is admissible when the referral order is argued in a way that allows external control of relevance through a not implausible reasoning of the logical path followed and the reasons for which the referring judge states he must apply the challenged provision in the main proceedings (ex plurimis, judgments no. 179 of 2024, no. 94 of 2023, no. 237 of 2022, and no. 259 of 2021); 2) it is not up to this Court to provide "a different framing of the evidentiary data” acquired in the a quo process and evaluated by the referring judge to consider the factual prerequisites that determine the applicability of the rule suspected of constitutional illegitimacy as proven (judgment no. 122 of 2024).

However, the orientation that requires the a quo judge to provide a "sufficiently clear” reasoning (judgment no. 110 of 2024) regarding relevance, i.e., a reasoning that is "not manifestly erroneous or contradictory” as to the "evaluation, reserved to him, of the supporting and evidentiary material” (judgment no. 164 of 2023), is equally consolidated. This is because the requirement of relevance "necessarily implies that the raised question of constitutional legitimacy has an actual and not merely eventual incidence in the a quo proceedings,” i.e., that "the doubt of conflict with the Constitution involves a provision from whose application, for the purposes of defining the judgment pending before him, the a quo judge demonstrates he cannot prescind” (judgment no. 269 of 2022).

Precisely for this reason, this Court has emphasized the necessity that the arguments spent by the referring judge are not "deficient and contradictory”: in such cases, in fact, one "ends [...] by evading the need for adequate reasoning relating to the central profile that conditions the relevance in the matter subject to the a quo judgment” (judgment no. 249 of 2021).

3.4.– The described motivational requirements are particularly significant in cases like the one at hand. With judgment no. 139 of 2010, in fact, this Court, in declaring the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses in the part where it did not admit contrary proof regarding the presumption of exceeding the income limit borne by those who had been finally convicted for the crimes contemplated therein, did indeed affirm that the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy "does not eliminate from the legal order the presumption provided by the legislator, which therefore continues to imply a reversal of the burden to document the occurrence of the income requirements for access to legal aid” (with the consequence that "[i]t will be up to the applicant to demonstrate, with adequate supporting documentation, his state of ‘indigence’,” indicating and documenting "concrete factual elements from which the actual economic-patrimonial situation can be deduced in a clear and unequivocal way”), transforming the presumption from absolute to relative (judgment no. 223 of 2022), but it added that "[w]ith respect to such evidentiary elements, the judge will have the obligation to conduct a rigorous evaluation and for this purpose will certainly be able to make use of the verification tools that the law places at his disposal, including those, particularly penetrating, indicated in Art. 96, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree no. 115 of 2002,” i.e., the request to the police commissioner (questore) for information regarding the lifestyle, personal and family conditions, and economic activities eventually carried out by the applicant, to be acquired also through investigations by the Financial Police (Guardia di Finanza).

In the same vein, the jurisprudence of legitimacy intervened after judgment no. 139 of 2010 stated that the necessity for the judge to conduct investigations regarding the economic-patrimonial conditions of the applicant, also pursuant to Art. 96, paragraph 3, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, is excluded only if the applicant, who is in the condition provided for by Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the same consolidated act, has not alleged any concrete factual element suitable to allow the overcoming of the presumption (Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, judgment 17 June-10 July 2014, no. 30499; more recently, Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, judgment 22 March-11 April 2022, no. 13742). The logical procedure that, by the rule dictated by Art. 2729 of the Civil Code, the judge is required to follow has been interpreted in the sense that it is up to the applicant to demonstrate, with adequate allegations, his state of indigence and for the judge to verify the reliability of such allegations, making use of every necessary investigative tool (Court of Cassation, Fourth Criminal Section, judgment 22 November-15 December 2016, no. 53387). This, moreover, is consistent with the consolidated orientations of civil jurisprudence on the matter of proof of a negative fact: since it is impossible to materially demonstrate a fact that did not happen, proof of the same can be given through demonstration of a specific contrary positive fact or even through presumptions from which the negative fact can be deduced (among many, Court of Cassation, Labor Section, judgment 24 September 2019, no. 23789). A presumption, moreover, is nothing other than the consequence that the law (and then the judge) draws from a known fact to trace back to an unknown fact (Art. 2727 of the Civil Code).

3.5.– Given this, it has already been recalled that the a quo judge, in motivating on the relevance, simply stated that the applicant had "omitted to provide the contrary proof that would have been necessary [...], limiting himself to presenting the usual self-certification and attaching only a single certification and two pay slips from 2022.” However, the judge said nothing regarding the results of the produced documentation or the applicant’s allegations regarding the absence of income derived from cohabiting family members and of real rights over real estate and registered movable property, as well as with respect to the allegation of being homeless and having spent long periods in detention or not having income from abroad. Regardless of the fact that these are allegations that – consistent with what was stated by this Court’s judgment no. 139 of 2010 and consolidated jurisprudence of legitimacy – could have led him to perform the investigations referred to in Art. 96 of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, which however do not appear to have been performed, it cannot fail to be noted in this case that, with the judgment of application of the penalty upon request dating back to 19 May 2000, i.e., over twenty-five years ago, the evaluation of such allegations should have been particularly significant, in order to avoid the unlimited duration of the presumption over time turning into an improper sanction, consisting of the perpetual limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right such as the right of defense.

In other words: if it is true that the aforementioned judgment no. 139 of 2010, in declaring the constitutional illegitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, identified an element of irrationality in the "unlimited duration over time of the preclusion to the verification of the actual economic situation of subjects who request admission to State-funded legal aid,” it must be believed that the burden of allegation and proof necessary to overcome the current iuris tantum presumption must logically be modulated not only in relation to the fact ascertained in the conviction for the potentially impeding offense, but also to the date of the judgment itself, in the sense that the further back in time it is, the less invincible the presumption concerning the possession of illicit income must be considered, and the more attenuated the evidentiary burden required to overcome it must be considered. This is equivalent to saying that the a quo judge should have not only explained why he did not deem it necessary to perform the investigations referred to in Art. 96, paragraph 3, of the Consolidated Act on justice expenses, but also why the offered documentary proof and the allegations concerning the absence of other income, being homeless, and having spent long periods in detention could not be considered relevant, in the face of such a remote conviction in time, for the purpose of considering the legal burden of proof satisfied.

3.6.– Given this, it must therefore be held that the referring judge provided deficient reasoning regarding the evaluation of the allegations and proofs collected in the main proceedings, thus preventing even that external control of the reasons for which he states he must apply the challenged provision in the main proceedings. This Court – it is worth repeating – cannot replace the a quo judge in the evaluation of the evidentiary material and the allegations made by the parties, but can and must verify that he raises the question only after having scrutinized – with all the tools abstractly at his disposal – the allegations and proofs offered to him, in order to avert the risk that, depending on a lacunose verification of the facts, the question of constitutional legitimacy has a purely hypothetical and eventual character.

The statements that precede certainly do not serve to revoke in doubt the constant jurisprudence of this Court which, "[e]ven in the perspective of a more widespread access to the control of constitutionality,” deems it sufficient that "the provision suspected of constitutional illegitimacy affects the argumentative path that the referring judge is called upon to perform, even if the tenor of the decision does not change” (judgment no. 122 of 2024 and precedents cited therein). An orientation, the one now recalled, which is aimed at connecting the relevance of the question of constitutional legitimacy to the objective interest that the judge does not apply constitutionally illegitimate norms and not to the subjective interest of the parties of the main proceedings to obtain a favorable decision. The particular "openness” of said jurisprudential direction, however, does not exempt the a quo judge from reconstructing the nexus of relevance. Consequently, in this case, the referring judge was required to formulate (and to motivate congruously) a prognosis regarding the applicability of the legal presumption subject to contestation.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Art. 76, paragraph 4-bis, of Presidential Decree no. 115 of 30 May 2002, titled "Consolidated Act of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Justice Expenses (Text A)”, raised, with reference to Articles 3 and 24, paragraphs two and three, of the Constitution, by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Section, sitting in monocratic composition, with the order indicated in the epigraph.

Thus decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 12 January 2026.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Massimo LUCIANI, Reporting Judge

Valeria EMMA, Chancellor

Deposited in the Registry on 17 April 2026

The anonymized version is consistent, in the text, with the original.