JUDGMENT NO. 2
YEAR 2026
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, initiated by two orders of December 13, 2024, from the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, registered under numbers 63 and 64 of the register of orders for the year 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 16, first special series, of the year 2025.
Having reviewed the memorandum of appearance of S. B. and the memorandum of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;
having heard Judge Rapporteur Stefano Petitti in the public hearing of November 19, 2025;
having heard counsel Ladislao Massari for S. B. and State counsel Antonio Trimboli for the President of the Council of Ministers;
deliberated in the council chamber on November 19, 2025.
Facts Considered
1.– By two orders dated December 13, 2024, registered under numbers 63 and 64 of the register of orders for 2025, the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, raised:
a) as a primary matter, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in connection with Article 6, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as for conflict with Articles 117, first paragraph, and 11 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 3 and 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 9, 2016, on strengthening certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at criminal proceedings, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and further for conflict with Articles 3 and 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution, "insofar as it establishes that, when the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, the appellate court (or the Court of Cassation), in declaring the crime extinguished by prescription, rules on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning the civil effects, and does not instead provide that, analogously to the provision in paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the appeal is not inadmissible, the appellate court (or the Court of Cassation) shall refer the continuation of the proceedings to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the civil issues using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings";
b) as a subsidiary matter, questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for conflict with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the ECHR, as well as for conflict with Articles 117, first paragraph, and 11 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, "as interpreted by the 'living law' represented by the judgments of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation no. 35490/09, Tettamanti case, and no. 36208/2024, Calpitano v. Moscuzza, in that it is held that 'in the appeal proceedings against a judgment convicting the accused also for damages, the judge, following the extinction of the crime due to prescription in the interim, cannot merely acknowledge the cause of extinction, adopting the resulting civil determinations based on the criteria set out in Constitutional Court Judgment no. 182 of 2021, but is nevertheless required, given the presence of the civil party, to assess, even in the face of insufficient or contradictory evidence, the existence of the prerequisites for acquittal on the merits'."
2.– In the order registered under no. 63 of the register of orders for 2025, the Court of Appeal of Lecce reports that it must rule on the appeal brought by an accused person found liable in the first instance for the crime under Articles 81 and 595, first and third paragraphs, of the Penal Code, and also sentenced to compensate the damages to the constituted civil parties, the quantification of which was referred to the civil judge, following the imposition of provisional awards in their favour. The appeal asserts the non-existence of the charged crime and requests acquittal. However, the referring court notes that the crime is deemed extinguished by prescription as of August 26, 2023.
In the order registered under no. 64 of the register of orders for 2025, the Court of Appeal of Lecce reports that it must rule on the appeal brought by an accused person found liable in the first instance for the crime under Articles 646 and 61, first paragraph, number 11, of the Penal Code, and also sentenced to compensate the damage to the constituted civil party, quantified at EUR 4,520.34, plus interest and costs. The appeal asserts, with a first ground, the non-existence of the charged crime and, with a second ground, the prescription of the same. However, the referring court notes that the crime is deemed extinguished by prescription as of December 15, 2021, or June 30, 2022.
2.1.– Both referral orders specify that, pursuant to Article 574, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, appeals against a criminal conviction also extend their effects to the orders for compensation of damages, so that Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies, according to which "[w]hen the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, the appellate court and the Court of Cassation, in declaring the crime extinguished by amnesty or prescription, shall rule on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning the civil interests."
2.2.– The referring courts first recall that this Court, with Judgment no. 182 of 2021, declared unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning the same Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which were also raised on that occasion by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, in relation to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in connection with Article 6, paragraph 2, of the ECHR, as well as in relation to the same Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Judgment no. 182 of 2021 held that Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure aims to satisfy the need to protect the civil party, in the sense that, when the criminal proceedings have passed the first instance and are in the appeal stage, a judicial response to the compensatory or restitutory claims of that party must nonetheless be ensured in that same venue, even when a finding of the accused's criminal liability is no longer possible, without thereby violating the principle of the presumption of innocence as defined in the conventional system by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and as recognized in European Union law; a principle according to which the person accused of committing a crime and subjected to criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal (regardless of whether procedural or on the merits) cannot subsequently be treated by the public authorities as if they were guilty of the crime charged.
This Court held that in the procedural situation where the crime is extinguished by prescription and the accused is therefore acquitted of the charge, the judge is in no way called upon to form, even incidentally, a judgment of criminal guilt as a prerequisite for the decision, whether to uphold or reform, on the parts of the appealed judgment concerning civil interests. Such a judgment of criminal liability is not required by the textual content of the challenged provision, nor by the living law resulting from the jurisprudence of legitimacy.
According to Judgment no. 182 of 2021, the interpretation consistent with the aforementioned interposed parameters must be chosen, according to which the judge in the criminal appeal, when ruling on the compensation claim, instead of verifying whether the typical criminal offense contemplated by the criminal norm is met, must ascertain whether the civil tort of Article 2043 of the Civil Code is met. The absence of an incidental finding of criminal liability concerning the crime extinguished by prescription would not preclude, in this sense, the possibility for the damaged party to obtain a judicial finding of their right to compensation for damages, including non-pecuniary damage, whose protection must be ensured, in the systemic and balanced assessment of constitutionally relevant values, on par with that due to the accused with regard to the presumption of innocence. Thus, upon the supervening cause of extinction of the crime, the accused has the right that their criminal liability shall no longer be called into question, while the civil party has the right to a full finding of the compensatory obligation. In this sense, the legislator, even within the framework of the autonomy and separation relations between civil and criminal proceedings characterizing the Code of Criminal Procedure in force since 1989, has balanced the needs underlying the operation of the general principle of the accessory nature of the civil action to the criminal action (which excludes a decision on the civil head in the event of acquittal) and the needs to protect the interest of the damaged party who has constituted themselves a civil party.
2.3.– The Court of Appeal of Lecce then recalls the judgments of the ECHR, first section, of June 15, 2023, Roccella v. Italy, and of November 18, 2021, Marinoni v. Italy, which held that the Italian system concerning the relationship between civil and criminal proceedings is based on the principle of the autonomy of the civil liability action before the civil jurisdiction and that of the accessory nature of the civil action in criminal proceedings, as outlined in this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021.
2.4.– The same balance in the relationship between civil and criminal proceedings established by the case law of this Court is considered by the referring courts to have influenced the reform process that led to the introduction of paragraph 1-bis in Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, through Article 2, paragraph 2, letter b), number 2), of Law September 27, 2021, no. 134 (Delegation to the Government for the efficiency of criminal proceedings and on matters of restorative justice and provisions for the swift conclusion of judicial proceedings), concurrently with the introduction of Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Non-prosecution for exceeding the maximum time limits for appeal proceedings), applicable only to appeal proceedings concerning crimes committed on or after January 1, 2020.
Paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was then replaced by Article 33, paragraph 1, letter b), number 1), of Legislative Decree October 10, 2022, no. 150 (Implementation of Law September 27, 2021, no. 134, delegating the Government for the efficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as on matters of restorative justice and provisions for the swift conclusion of judicial proceedings) and in its current wording, paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "[w]hen the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, and in any case of appeal of the judgment even for civil interests, the appellate court and the Court of Cassation, if the appeal is not inadmissible, in declaring the criminal action non-prosecutable due to the exceeding of the time limits referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 344-bis, shall refer the continuation of the proceedings to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the civil issues using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings."
The referral orders cite an extensive excerpt from the explanatory report accompanying Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022, deducing therefrom that the reform legislator drew the necessary consequences from the principles set out in the aforementioned Judgment no. 182 of 2021, attributing to the civil judge the continuation of the appeal proceedings whenever the criminal matter has ceased to exist, because the criminal action has been declared non-prosecutable pursuant to Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or because the appeal was brought only for civil interests, thus relieving the criminal judge from ruling on the appeal and safeguarding the presumption of innocence of the accused.
2.5.– In this normative and jurisprudential framework, the referral orders report the intervening judgment of the Court of Cassation, united criminal sections, of March 28-September 27, 2024, no. 36208, which enunciated the following principle of law: "[i]n the appeal proceedings against a judgment convicting the accused also for damages, the judge, following the extinction of the crime due to prescription in the interim, cannot merely acknowledge the cause of extinction, adopting the resulting civil determinations based on the criteria set out in Constitutional Court Judgment no. 182 of 2021, but is nevertheless required, given the presence of the civil party, to assess, even in the face of insufficient or contradictory evidence, the existence of the prerequisites for acquittal on the merits."
The Court of Appeal of Lecce observes that this ruling affirmed in its reasoning that the interpretative constraint derived from this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021 implies that Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be interpreted to mean that the finding of civil liability by the criminal appellate judge, after the criminal matter has concluded with the declaration of prescription of the crime, is equivalent to an affirmation, even incidental, of criminal liability.
It further notes that the united criminal sections considered that the situation addressed in the 2021 constitutional precedent is that of the judge in criminal appeal proceedings who has already relinquished jurisdiction over the criminal liability of the accused following the declaration of extinction of the crime due to supervening prescription (or amnesty) and must rule, pursuant to Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions concerning civil interests. This situation is deemed different from that addressed by the same united criminal sections in Judgment of May 28-September 15, 2009, no. 35490, as the principle expressed therein must stand, namely that an acquittal on the merits, in case of contradictory or insufficient evidence, does not prevail over the immediate declaration of a cause for non-prosecutability, unless, at the appeal stage, following the supervening extinction of the crime, the judge is required to assess, due to the presence of the civil party, the evidentiary material for the purpose of civil determinations, a principle which applies, therefore, in the distinct case where the jurisdiction over the criminal liability of the accused has not ceased for the judge in the criminal appeal proceedings.
This principle, according to the same united criminal sections, is entirely compatible with the interpretation of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure offered by this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021, providing protection that allows the accused to even reach a full acquittal, without thereby questioning the presumption of innocence and in line with the case law of the ECHR.
2.6.– The Court of Appeal of Lecce, however, argues that the interpretative solution proposed in the cited judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024 fails to recognize that "the two moments that would constitute the overall judgment required by Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not formally distinct and carried out in two autonomous [appeal] proceedings, before two different judges, which also conclude with two distinct orders."
For the referring courts, following this "living law," the judgment concluding the appeal proceedings under Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the moment it declares the extinction of the crime due to prescription, upholding the civil determinations, would necessarily contain within itself a judgment, at least incidental, of the guilt of the accused. This would contravene the reconstruction of the operation of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure carried out in this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021, according to which the appellate judge, having noted the extinction of the crime due to prescription or amnesty (a finding that should not be preceded by any verification of the accused's criminal liability), must perform a single judgment, full and integral in character, regarding the appeal brought, but concerning no longer the criminal liability of the accused, but rather the civil liability and carried out according to the rules of civil proceedings.
2.7.– The Court of Appeal of Lecce therefore believes that, although the charged crimes are extinguished by prescription, in the presence of the constituted civil parties and considering the grounds of appeal focused on the absence of criminal liability, in light of the living law emerging from the judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024, it is called upon to fully re-evaluate the "criminal liability" of the accused regarding the same facts and based on the same evidentiary material examined in the first instance, in order to confirm or not the civil determinations made at that stage, should the prerequisites for their acquittal not be found to exist.
2.8.– With this reconstruction of the scope of application of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court of Appeal of Lecce considers that the principle of the presumption of innocence operating within the conventional system (Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR), in the aspects already examined by the aforementioned Judgment no. 182 of 2021, is violated, as an interposed parameter with respect to the first paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitution, putting forward the unconstitutionality of the "living law" most recently reaffirmed by the united criminal sections of the Court of Cassation.
This is because the interpretation now rooted in the jurisprudence of legitimacy, by opposing the conventionally oriented interpretation championed by this Court, would require the judge in appeal proceedings, pursuant to Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to carry out, before declaring the extinction of the crime due to prescription, an exhaustive assessment of the accused's liability, in light of the appeal brought, in a way that either acquits them, pursuant to Article 530, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or declares the crime extinguished, but implicitly affirming their culpability.
2.9.– The referring Court makes analogous considerations with regard to the further interposed parameters of European scope: Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU.
2.10.– The referral orders, moreover, state that the unconstitutionality of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the highlighted living law, is hypothesized only as a subsidiary matter, given that priority must be given to the legislative evolution resulting from Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022 concerning the relationship between the criminal action and the civil action within the criminal proceedings.
Reference is made to the provisions, already mentioned, of paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by virtue of which the appellate court and the Court of Cassation, which declare the criminal action non-prosecutable due to exceeding the maximum time limits for appeal proceedings, in the event of a first-instance conviction for compensation of damages in favour of the civil party, or in the case of an appeal also for civil interests, must refer the continuation of the proceedings to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the compensation claims using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings.
This solution is indicated by the referring court as compliant with the case law of this Court on the presumption of innocence of the accused, attributing the task of deciding to the civil judge, in a situation where the prerequisites for civil liability must be verified, without even incidentally ascertaining criminal liability.
The Court of Appeal of Lecce therefore asserts that paragraph 1 and paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursue the same objective of protecting the accused's right to the presumption of innocence, so that a disparity of treatment between the two scenarios would be entirely unreasonable: that of paragraph 1-bis, resulting from the declaration of non-prosecutability of the criminal action due to exceeding the time limits referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applicable, however, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 3, of Law no. 134 of 2021, only to appeal proceedings concerning crimes committed on or after January 1, 2020, and that of paragraph 1, which presupposes extinction by prescription, applicable instead only to appeals concerning crimes committed previously.
In the view of the referring judges, the option followed by the legislator with the provision in paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is preferable due to the balance achieved between the opposing interests (protection of the presumption of innocence and the reasonable duration of the civil liability judgment), to which the provision of the challenged paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be adapted.
The alignment of the two scenarios of paragraph 1 and paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the referring court asserts, would not frustrate the expectations of the accused and the civil party that the appeal judgment, with reference to the remaining civil issues, should take place on the merits before the criminal judge, since the outcome of the referral to the competent civil appellate judge already occurs pursuant to Article 622 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., when the Court of Cassation quashes the judgment solely for civil effects.
Therefore, the "corrective" intervention requested by the Court of Appeal of Lecce as a primary matter, to render Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure consistent with the Constitution, is the assimilation of its precept to that of paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (with possible extension to the provision of paragraph 1-ter, concerning the effects of the precautionary attachment ordered to secure the civil obligations arising from the crime). In this way, the "unreasonable disparities in treatment between accused persons, in the face of entirely analogous situations, determined simply by the date of the committed crime," would be eliminated, preventing the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution.
2.11.– In the subsidiary proceedings related to order registered under no. 64 of the register of orders for 2025, S. B., the appealing accused, appeared, adhering to the legal arguments set out in the referral order and requesting the acceptance of only the question raised as a primary matter.
As for the question raised as a subsidiary matter, the defense considers it unfounded, as there is no doubt that "the in-depth examination of the procedural events, including the possibility of an acquittal pursuant to Article 530, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the presence of compensation claims and following the prescription of the crime, falls within the broader scope of guarantees for the accused in the appeal proceedings."
2.12.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in both proceedings, represented and defended by the Attorney General's Office, requesting that the questions be declared inadmissible or, in any case, unfounded.
2.12.1.– The inadmissibility of the questions is raised first of all because the referral orders do not offer a plausible justification regarding their relevance. For the purpose of the asserted applicability of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the proceedings a quo, it is noted that the Court of Appeal of Lecce allegedly did not put forward any argument to exclude that the case file shows it is evident that the fact did not occur, or that the accused did not commit it, or that the fact does not constitute a crime, so as not to require an immediate acquittal on the merits pursuant to Article 129, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This aspect, according to the Attorney General's Office, does not even emerge from the description of the facts.
Furthermore, the violation of Article 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution is merely indicated by the referring courts, but not substantiated.
2.12.2.– The questions would in any case be unfounded, since the interpretation of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicated by this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021 has already been deemed compatible with the living law expressed in the judgment of the united criminal sections no. 35490 of 2009, later confirmed by the latter in the more recent judgment no. 36208 of 2024. This interpretation admits the coexistence of two distinct moments in the judgment required by the challenged provision, as these are differentiated assessments, both in terms of the parts, and in terms of the rules for decision regarding criminal liability and civil liability.
Regarding the conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, concerning the different regulation introduced by paragraph 1 and the subsequent paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defense of the President of the Council of Ministers first of all invokes the broad discretion enjoyed by the legislator in shaping procedural institutions, limited only by manifest unreasonableness. Such unreasonableness would not arise from the mere fact of maintaining the original Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is explained by the misalignment that may characterize, chronologically, the operation of a substantive criminal law provision compared to a procedural criminal law provision. This is because, in the new framework defined by Law no. 134 of 2021 and as a result of the introduction of Article 161-bis of the Penal Code, for crimes committed after January 1, 2020, the course of prescription of the crime ceases definitively upon the judgment of first instance, so that the extinction of the crime due to prescription can no longer occur with respect to the civil determinations made in the appealed judgment, finding instead application the hypothesis of non-prosecutability of the criminal action due to exceeding the maximum time limits for appeal proceedings, under Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It follows that the challenged paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is destined to have a limited operational scope for prescription cases.
The Attorney General's Office therefore argues that paragraph 1 and the more recent paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not comparable, referring to institutions, such as prescription and non-prosecutability, which are heterogeneous: the former operates on a substantive level, extinguishing the crime, while the latter is intended to operate on a procedural level, extinguishing the criminal action. The non-prosecutability of the action due to exceeding the maximum duration limits for appeal proceedings determines a definitive consumption of the decision-making power of the criminal judge, so that—as observed in the explanatory report accompanying Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022—a continuation of the appeal proceedings solely for civil effects would lead to a contradiction in the system due to the impeding nature of the declaration of non-prosecutability under Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Finally, the State defense observes that not even Article 622 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can serve as a significant tertium comparationis, as in the scenario described therein, the referral to the civil appellate judge finds its justification in the peculiarities of the referral proceedings following the quashing of the judgment ordered by the Court of Cassation solely for civil effects, and therefore does not support the conclusion of a general attribution to the civil judge of jurisdiction over the restitutory or compensatory claims of the civil party who has, from the outset, submitted their claims to the criminal judge.
2.12.3.– In the proceedings concerning order registered under no. 64 of the register of orders for 2025, the party filed a memorandum of elaboration on October 31, 2025, thus failing to observe the deadline under Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Supplementary Provisions for Proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
Legal Considerations
3.– With the orders indicated in the heading (no. 63 and no. 64 of the register of orders for 2025), the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, as a primary matter, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in connection with Article 6, paragraph 2, of the ECHR, Articles 117, first paragraph, and 11 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as in relation to Articles 3 and 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution, "insofar as it establishes that, when the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, the appellate court (or the Court of Cassation), in declaring the crime extinguished by prescription, rules on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning the civil effects, and does not instead provide that, analogously to the provision in paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the appeal is not inadmissible, the appellate court (or the Court of Cassation) shall refer the continuation of the proceedings to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the civil issues using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings."
As a subsidiary matter, the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning the same Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to the conventional and EU parameters mentioned above, in relation to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, "as interpreted by the 'living law' represented by the judgments of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation no. 35490/09, Tettamanti case, and no. 36208/2024, Calpitano v. Moscuzza, in that it is held that 'in the appeal proceedings against a judgment convicting the accused also for damages, the judge, following the extinction of the crime due to prescription in the interim, cannot merely acknowledge the cause of extinction, adopting the resulting civil determinations based on the criteria set out in Constitutional Court Judgment no. 182 of 2021, but is nevertheless required, given the presence of the civil party, to assess, even in the face of insufficient or contradictory evidence, the existence of the prerequisites for acquittal on the merits'."
4.– The referring Court states that it is called upon to rule on the appeals respectively brought by the accused, found liable in the first instance for the crimes charged and also sentenced to compensate the damages to the constituted civil parties, and reports that the same crimes are extinguished by prescription.
Consequently, to rule on the appeals, Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be applied, according to which "[w]hen the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, the appellate court and the Court of Cassation, in declaring the crime extinguished by amnesty or prescription, shall rule on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning the civil interests."
In both referral orders, the Court of Appeal of Lecce recalls that this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021 declared unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised precisely on Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenged, in relation to the first paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitution, in connection with the same conventional and EU parameters invoked in the present proceedings. It notes, moreover, that the united criminal sections of the Court of Cassation, with Judgment no. 36208 of 2024, enunciated the following principle of law: "[i]n the appeal proceedings against a judgment convicting the accused also for damages, the judge, following the extinction of the crime due to prescription in the interim, cannot merely acknowledge the cause of extinction, adopting the resulting civil determinations based on the criteria set out in Constitutional Court Judgment no. 182 of 2021, but is nevertheless required, given the presence of the civil party, to assess, even in the face of insufficient or contradictory evidence, the existence of the prerequisites for acquittal on the merits."
The referring Court considers then that, by following this living law, the conclusive judgment of the appeal proceedings under Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the moment it declares the extinction of the crime due to prescription, upholding the civil determinations, would necessarily contain within itself a judgment, at least incidental, of the guilt of the accused. And this would contravene the reconstruction of the functioning of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Judgment no. 182 of 2021.
The referring Court, in fact, argues that, although the charged crimes are extinguished by prescription, in the presence of the constituted civil parties and given the grounds of appeal focused on the absence of criminal liability, the interpretation proposed by the judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024, following the previous judgment of the same united sections no. 35490 of 2009, would imply that in appeal proceedings a full re-evaluation of the "criminal liability" of the accused regarding the same facts and based on the same evidentiary material examined in the first instance should proceed, in order, if the prerequisites for their acquittal are not found to exist, to confirm or not the civil determinations made at that stage.
4.1.– A violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, as an interposed parameter with respect to the first paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitution, or of the principle of the presumption of innocence operating within the conventional system, would thus be appreciable, which, in light of the interpretation given by the Court of Strasbourg, forbids that the person accused of committing a crime and subjected to criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal (regardless of whether procedural or on the merits) may subsequently be treated by public authorities as if they were guilty of the crime charged.
Even with regard to the further interposed parameters of European scope, such as Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU, the Court of Appeal of Lecce recalls the aspects of the issues already examined by Judgment no. 182 of 2021, questioning the conformity with these parameters of the interpretation that the living law offers of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4.2.– The referral orders, moreover, specify that the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the highlighted living law, is hypothesized only as a subsidiary matter, given that priority must be given to the legislative evolution resulting from Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022 concerning the relationship between the criminal action and the civil action within the criminal proceedings, with specific regard to paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The aforementioned paragraph 1-bis establishes that "[w]hen the accused has been sentenced, even generically, to restitution or compensation for damages caused by the crime, in favour of the civil party, and in any case of appeal of the judgment even for civil interests, the appellate court and the Court of Cassation, if the appeal is not inadmissible, in declaring the criminal action non-prosecutable due to the exceeding of the time limits referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 344-bis, shall refer the continuation of the proceedings to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the civil issues using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings."
The framework outlined by this provision, in the view of the referring Court, would be consistent with the constitutional case law on the presumption of innocence of the accused, attributing the task of deciding to the civil judge, in a situation where the prerequisites for civil liability must be verified, without even incidentally ascertaining criminal liability.
Based on the observation that paragraph 1 and paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursue the same objective of protecting the accused's right to the presumption of innocence, the referring Court therefore considers that the disparity of treatment between the two scenarios would be unreasonable, despite the explicit temporal divergence of the scope of application of the two provisions. The solution adopted by the legislator with the provision in paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure realizes the correct balance between the opposing interests of protecting the presumption of innocence and guaranteeing the reasonable duration of the civil liability judgment, so that the provision of the challenged paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should now be adapted to it.
Therefore, the "corrective" intervention requested by the Court of Appeal of Lecce as a primary matter, to render Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure consistent with the Constitution, is to bring the scenario governed by paragraph 1 of the same Article under the rule of paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
5.– The two referral orders concern the same provision and raise identical issues, so their joinder for a joint decision appears appropriate.
6.– The Attorney General's Office objected, in the first place, to the inadmissibility of the questions on the grounds that the referral orders do not offer a plausible justification regarding their relevance.
In particular, for the purpose of the asserted applicability of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the proceedings a quo, the Court of Appeal of Lecce, in describing the facts to be judged, allegedly failed to provide reasoning as to whether the case file does not show it is evident that the fact did not occur or that the accused did not commit it or that the fact does not constitute a crime, for the purpose of ruling under Article 129, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
6.1.– The objection is unfounded.
Both referral orders report that the prerequisites for the application of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met in the proceedings a quo: a conviction for compensation of damages caused by the crimes in favour of the civil parties has been pronounced against the accused; the appellate judges must declare the crimes extinguished by prescription and rule on the appeals for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the appealed judgments concerning the civil interests.
One of the aspects involved in the raised questions is precisely the scope of the assessment to which the appellate judge is called, where a cause of extinction of the crime has supervened, with reference to the assessment of the accused's liability and the evidentiary material for the purpose of civil determinations, according to the special regime provided precisely by the challenged provision.
Therefore, the point raised by the Attorney General's Office as the basis for the objection of lack of reasoning on relevance rather concerns the merits of the raised issues.
6.2.– The Attorney General's Office also objected to the inadmissibility of the question raised with reference to Article 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution, because it was not reasoned.
6.2.1.– This objection is well-founded.
The referral orders do not, in fact, contain a specific and adequate reasoning on the reasons why Article 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution—according to which "[t]he accused is not deemed guilty until final conviction"—would be violated by the challenged provision. The referring Court does not put forward any specific argument to relate to the presumption of innocence set out in the constitutional parameter the conventional principle that protects those who have been acquitted in the criminal case from assertions that nevertheless surreptitiously attribute responsibility for the same crime.
7.– Moving on to the examination of the merits of the other questions, the textual classification of these as "primary" and "subsidiary" clearly shows their presentation in sequentially graduated terms.
The question concerning the diversity of decisional outcomes on the related civil effects must therefore be addressed first: in one case, the declaration of extinction of the crime due to prescription, based on Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in the other, the declaration of non-prosecutability of the criminal action due to exceeding the maximum time limits for appeal proceedings, based on Article 578, paragraph 1-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8.– For reasons of systematic framing, it is appropriate to highlight that paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was added by Article 2, paragraph 2, letter b), number 2), of Law no. 134 of 2021, effective from October 19, 2021. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same Article 2, "[t]he provisions referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall apply only to appeal proceedings concerning crimes committed on or after January 1, 2020." It was subsequently replaced, in the terms set out above, by Article 33, paragraph 1, letter b), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022.
8.1.– In the explanatory report accompanying this legislative decree, the choices made to implement the directive referred to in Article 1, paragraph 13, letter d), of the delegation law, regarding the relationship between the criminal action and the civil action brought in criminal proceedings, are supported by the finding that the declaration of non-prosecutability due to exceeding the time limits referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure has "a procedural character and, as such, prevents the examination of the merits and reaching a final conviction, rendering the preceding judgment null and void."
The regime applicable in the event of extinction of the crime due to amnesty or prescription, already regulated by Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the sense of attributing to the criminal judge the task of ruling on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning civil interests, was therefore not considered "transferable" to regulate the relationship between the civil action and non-prosecutability pursuant to Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The scenario of exceeding the maximum time limits established for appeal proceedings is thus configured as "a procedural barrier that prevents any continuation of the proceedings, even merely aimed at ascertaining liability from a substantive point of view," unlike what happens with the judgment declaring the extinction of the crime, especially due to prescription, which does not present any logical or legal incompatibility with a full ascertainment of the accused's liability.
This also explains, in the explanatory report, the solution adopted in paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of providing, as a consequence of the declaration of non-prosecutability of the criminal action, for the referral of the continuation to the competent civil judge or section at the same level, who shall rule on the civil issues using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings.
The task of verifying "the prerequisites for civil liability, without even incidentally ascertaining criminal liability" and ruling only on the "civil issues" relating to the damaged party's right to compensation, without therefore being able to affect the presumption of innocence, would thus remain attributed to the civil judge of the "continuation."
In particular, the report further notes that the continuation of the proceedings before the civil judge ordered by paragraph 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the presence of the impediment to the continuation of the criminal proceedings and, moreover, "in any case of appeal of the judgment even for civil interests" (and, therefore, even where there has been no conviction for restitution or compensation for damages), saves the civil party from the burden of reintroducing the claim and does not result in a modification of the claim.
The transition from criminal proceedings to civil proceedings in the event of non-prosecutability due to exceeding the maximum duration limits for appeal proceedings, pursuant to Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore becomes one of the elements that the damaged party must take into account in the framework of the comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages resulting from the option for the exercise of the civil action in criminal proceedings. The report thus states that, "reasonably, the eventuality must be foreseen by the party damaged by the crime from the moment of constitution as a civil party, an act which must therefore contain the statement of the reasons justifying 'the claim for civil purposes,' according to the amended wording of Article 78, letter d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
8.2.– This Court has already pointed out that Article 578, paragraph 1-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlines a further hypothesis of continuity between criminal and civil findings, investing the civil appellate judge with the "continuation" of the proceedings (rather than a "new" judgment), at the conclusion of which the conviction of the accused for compensation of damages in favour of the civil party may be upheld or revoked.
Just like the scenarios that derogate from the principle of symmetry between the accused's conviction and the ruling of the criminal judge on the claim for restitution and compensation for damage (such as those in Articles 578, paragraph 1, 576, paragraph 1, and 622 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), Article 578, paragraph 1-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned with offering a judicial response to the claim of the civil party and saving the proceeding in which the latter has pursued the compensatory or restitutory claim, even in the absence of a finding, by the criminal judge, with res judicata effect, as to "[t]he existence of the fact, its criminal unlawfulness, and the affirmation that the accused committed it" (Judgment no. 173 of 2022).
9.– The questions raised as a primary matter, concerning the unreasonableness of the provision in Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure compared to the subsequent Article 578, paragraph 1-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to the need to protect the accused's right to the presumption of innocence, as defined in the conventional system by the case law of the ECHR and recognized in European Union law, are unfounded.
The issue concerning the compatibility of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the second aspect of the presumption of innocence has already been examined by this Court and declared unfounded with the aforementioned Judgment no. 182 of 2021.
It is obviously entirely possible for this Court to reconsider its orientations and, if necessary, modify them when there are "reasons of particular cogency that render the previously adopted solutions no longer sustainable: for example, the irreconcilability of the precedents with the subsequent development of the case law of this Court or of the European Courts; the changed social or regulatory context in which the new decision is placed or—in any case—the supervening of factual or normative circumstances not previously considered; the matured awareness of the undesirable consequences produced by past jurisprudence" (Judgment no. 203 of 2024, point 4.5. of the Legal Considerations; the same for Judgment no. 24 of 2025, point 3 of the Legal Considerations).
In the present case, however, there are no reasons for a change in direction.
9.1.– First, no supervening unreasonableness of paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is found, which could be inferred from the fact that the legislator, in introducing paragraph 1-bis of the same Article 578, differentiated the legal treatment of analogous situations, compared from the perspective, relevant here, of the so-called second aspect of the presumption of innocence, according to which the person accused of committing a crime and subjected to criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal (regardless of whether procedural or on the merits) cannot subsequently be treated by public authorities as if they were guilty of the crime charged.
It must first be specified that, at least as far as prescription is concerned, the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 1-bis of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply in relation to facts that are distinct on a temporal level.
Pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 3, of Law no. 134 of 2021, non-prosecutability due to exceeding the maximum time limits for appeal proceedings applies, as already indicated above, to the (only) proceedings concerning crimes committed on or after January 1, 2020. For these crimes, on the other hand, it will no longer be possible for prescription to mature during the appeal proceedings, since, pursuant to the new Article 161-bis of the Penal Code, the course of prescription ceases definitively upon the judgment of first instance.
From this perspective, therefore, paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an "exhausting norm," which will cease to apply with the conclusion of appeal proceedings concerning crimes prior to 2020.
With reference to this temporal distinction, the well-known and constant orientation of this Court applies, according to which the passage of time constitutes an element capable of justifying the different treatment of analogous situations (ex plurimis, among the latest, judgments no. 7 and no. 6 of 2024, no. 92 of 2021).
The limits that the case law of this Court recognizes with regard to the scope of constitutional legitimacy review of the legislator's discretion in making the most appropriate choices to regulate the succession of procedural laws over time are also well known (as most recently reaffirmed in Judgment no. 36 of 2025).
However, in the present case, the decisive element is the observation that the institutions of prescription and non-prosecutability are not homogeneous in terms of nature and effects on the decision-making power of the criminal judge, as observed further in the text.
9.2.– The referring Court, in fact, compares two situations—that of the judge in criminal appeal proceedings who declares the crime extinguished by prescription committed prior to January 1, 2020, and that of the judge who declares the criminal action non-prosecutable due to exceeding the maximum duration limits for appeal proceedings with reference to a crime committed, instead, from that date—which are not homogeneous.
The situation still regulated by the challenged provision is characterized by the prescription of the crime, which constitutes an institution of a substantive nature "that affects the punishability of the person, connecting to the passage of time the effect of preventing the application of the penalty" (Judgment no. 115 of 2018), whereas non-prosecutability under Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure affects the procedural aspect of the criminal action, due to a delay attributable to the individual appeal proceeding, precluding the examination of the merits, or limiting any further investigation that may influence it.
9.3.– The different treatment regarding jurisdiction over the ruling on the appeal solely for the purposes of the provisions and parts of the judgment concerning civil interests, which in the case of the prescribed crime remains with the criminal judge by virtue of the challenged provision, does not even result in an imbalance in the position of the acquitted accused compared to the position that the same person assumes before the civil judge in the case of a declaration of non-prosecutability: both the criminal judge in the appeal, where paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure still applies, and the civil judge of the continuation, where paragraph 1-bis applies, are exclusively called upon to verify the prerequisites for civil liability and to rule on the issues relating to the damaged party's right to compensation, without having to carry out any finding on criminal liability. Therefore, there is no violation of the right to the presumption of innocence as defined in the conventional and EU system by Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
9.4.– If we consider the position of the civil party, moreover, the provision that the judgment "continues" before the competent civil judge, who will decide "using the evidence acquired in the criminal proceedings and any evidence acquired in the civil proceedings," contained in Article 578, paragraph 1-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is explained precisely by reason of a ruling of the criminal appellate judge of an exclusively procedural nature, which prevents the examination of the merits, followed by a *translatio iudicii*. The uniqueness of the judgment that continues on civil issues after the declaration of non-prosecutability of the criminal action leaves the effects of the civil action for restitution and compensation for damages from the crime brought in the criminal proceedings unaffected, the *petitum* and the *causa petendi* of the claim remaining identical.
The possible outcome of the non-prosecutability of the criminal action due to exceeding the maximum duration limits under Article 344-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the continuation of the compensation proceedings in the civil sphere, with regard to crimes committed on or after January 1, 2020, must therefore be considered by the civil party from the moment of their constitution as a civil party, which must therefore contain, under penalty of inadmissibility, "the statement of the reasons justifying the claim for civil purposes," as stipulated by Article 78, paragraph 1, letter d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the wording introduced by Article 5, paragraph 1, letter b), number 1), of Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2022 and in force since December 30, 2022.
9.5.– With reference, then, to the interposed parameters of conventional origin (Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR) and EU origin (Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2016/343/EU, Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), it is useful to recall that in the judgment of the ECHR, Grand Chamber, of June 11, 2024, Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom, the ECHR specified that, for the purpose of guaranteeing the so-called second aspect of the right to the presumption of innocence, under Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, it is irrelevant, neither for the judgment on compensation for damages from a crime nor for other non-criminal proceedings, to distinguish between acquittal judgments and judgments of no case to answer, and that the violation of the conventional rule occurs when such proceedings result in attributing criminal liability to the person already acquitted.
The ECHR held that attributing criminal liability to a person means expressing the opinion that they are guilty based on the norm governing the finding of guilt, which suggests that the outcome of the criminal proceedings should have been different. Whoever has benefited from an acquittal or a judgment of no case to answer must remain subject to the ordinary application of domestic law rules governing the regime of evidence outside of criminal proceedings.
From this perspective, therefore, the provision that the finding of the existence of the conditions for compensation for damages in favour of the civil party occurs, in the event of prescription of the crime, by the same criminal judge or by the civil judge, is devoid of any injurious effect on the right of the accused to the presumption of innocence, as defined in the conventional system by the case law of the ECHR and recognized in European Union law. Instead, it is essential that even in the former case that finding does not generate doubt regarding the guilt of the accused itself.
10.– The questions raised as a primary matter are, therefore, unfounded.
11.– We must now proceed to examine the subsidiary ones.
These essentially assume that the aforementioned judgment of the united criminal sections of the Court of Cassation no. 36208 of 2024, constituting living law regarding Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, disregarded the interpretative constraint established by this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021.
According to the Court of Appeal of Lecce, the united criminal sections, with the 2024 ruling, would instead have provided an interpretation of the provision subject to doubt of constitutional legitimacy that had already been rejected by this Court, so that the living law thus formed would conflict with the invoked conventional and EU parameters.
11.1.– The questions are unfounded for the following reasons.
11.2.– The repeatedly mentioned judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024 did not affect the salient terms of the objections examined in the precedent of this Court concerning the interposed, conventional, and EU parameters.
12.– Judgment no. 182 of 2021 (points 11, 12, and 13 of the Legal Considerations) stated in its preamble that in the procedural situation of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the crime is extinguished by prescription and the accused is acquitted of the charge, the appellate judge must not form, even incidentally, a judgment of criminal guilt as a prerequisite for the decision, whether to uphold or reform, on the parts of the appealed judgment concerning civil interests.
According to the same Judgment no. 182 of 2021, this interpretation "finds no obstacle in the jurisprudence of legitimacy" (point 13 of the Legal Considerations) and, in particular, in the principle of law enunciated in the cited judgment of the united criminal sections no. 35490 of 2009, according to which an acquittal on the merits, in case of contradictory or insufficient evidence, prevails over the immediate declaration of extinction of the crime due to prescription or amnesty when the judge in criminal appeal proceedings is called to assess, due to the presence of the civil party, the evidentiary material with full and integral jurisdiction for the purposes of civil determinations.
The absolute congruity of this interpretation of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the reconstruction carried out in the just-cited Judgment no. 35490 of 2009—as noted by the aforementioned Judgment no. 182 of 2021—is confirmed by the finding that this precedent of the united criminal sections does not presuppose, nor does it allow, that the judge in criminal appeal proceedings, when dealing with the civil claim after having declared the crime extinguished, must also form, explicitly or otherwise, a (renewed) judgment on the criminal culpability of the accused, being entrusted only with an assessment confined within the boundaries of civil liability.
13.– The judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024 continued the orientation marked by its previous judgment no. 35490 of 2009, moreover drawing from the reasoning of this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021 the recognition that the living law formed on Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not conflict with Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, as understood by the ECHR.
The united criminal sections, in the most recent ruling, in fact, differentiated the scopes of operation of the principles affirmed by their previous judgment and by this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021. The former concern the case where the jurisdiction of the criminal appellate judge over the criminal liability of the accused has not ceased, it being necessary in this stage to privilege acquittal on the merits of the charge over the declaration of extinction of the crime due to prescription, with the consequent revocation of civil determinations.
Conversely, the decision of this Court related to the stage where the judge in criminal appeal proceedings has already relinquished jurisdiction over the criminal liability of the accused, having ascertained the supervening extinction of the crime due to prescription, and must examine the fact to rule solely for civil effects, keeping the necessity to avoid affirming, for this purpose, criminal liability, otherwise violating the principle of the presumption of innocence.
Nonetheless, the judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024 highlighted that Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be interpreted to mean that the criminal appellate judge, in the name of the second aspect of the presumption of innocence, must incoherently confine themselves to acknowledging the extinction of the crime, but is instead required to always assess, even in the face of insufficient or contradictory evidence, the prerequisites for the acquittal on the merits of the accused. The judgment of the united criminal sections, therefore, concerns the priority relationship between acquittal and extinction of the crime due to supervening prescription, justified precisely by the presumption of innocence, and indeed by its primary aspect.
As the defense of the constituted party also notes, in deeming the questions raised as a subsidiary matter unfounded, the interpretation of the challenged provision proposed by the united sections allows for an adequate balance between the constitutional relevance requirements related both to the protection of the interest of the damaged party, constituted as a civil party, and the judicial finding of their right to compensation for damages, and to the protection of the accused's right to the procedural effects of the presumption of innocence. Among the guarantees of the accused is, in fact, the adoption of the rule of judgment under Article 530, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even in hypotheses of ruling on compensatory claims in the event of prescription of the crime.
13.1.– Having, therefore, the judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024 confirmed the orientation marked by its previous judgment, itself the basis for the judgment of conformity with the Constitution of the living law concerning Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressed in Judgment no. 182 of 2021, it must be excluded that the living law constituted by the 2024 ruling conflicts with the same conventional and EU parameters, in relation to which this Court has already held the question concerning Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be unfounded.
14.– Nor can it be considered that elements capable of orienting towards the existence of the alleged violation of the so-called second aspect of the right to the presumption of innocence and therefore of Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, can be deduced from the case law of the Court of Strasbourg subsequent to this Court's Judgment of 2021.
Indeed, in both referral orders, this case law is merely invoked in points 2.3 through reference to two ECHR rulings (Judgments Marinoni v. Italy and Roccella v. Italy), which the referring Court of Appeal itself states have "appreciated the balance of the system," outlined by this Court's Judgment no. 182 of 2021, "between the principle of the accessory nature of the civil action and the need to protect the interest of the damaged party, constituted as a civil party, highlighting its full compatibility with the ECHR."
15.– Precisely the analysis of the most recent decisions of the ECHR on the scope of the second aspect of the right to the presumption of innocence, under Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, therefore confirms the judgment of non-fondness of the questions raised as a subsidiary matter by the Court of Appeal of Lecce.
The same decisions of the ECHR cited by the referring Court, as well as the subsequent judgment of the ECHR, Grand Chamber, of June 11, 2024, Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom, allow us to affirm that the ECHR does not prevent a judicial authority—if necessary, according to domestic law, the same criminal judge—from ruling on the compensation action after the accused has been acquitted.
Therefore, the procedural solution adopted by the challenged Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be directly and immediately attributed the alleged violation of the accused's right to the presumption of innocence, as defined in the conventional system by the case law of the ECHR and recognized in European Union law.
The inconveniences represented by the referring Court, moreover, can also be found in hypotheses where the action for restitution and compensation for damages from the crime is brought anew or continued before the civil judge, since, according to the ECHR, the presumption of innocence also operates outside the *matière pénale*, protecting the reputation of those who have been acquitted, even in non-criminal proceedings connected to the crime, such as that for compensation for damages, from public authorities.
Thus, the presumption of innocence does not limit its operational capacity within the single criminal proceeding concerning the possible liability of the accused for the crime, but prohibits considering that person, in any other judicial proceeding, guilty of the crime charged against them, and this, on the one hand, until the moment when such guilt has been definitively ascertained through proceedings, and, on the other hand, after it has been definitively excluded.
16.– This Court has always found in Article 538 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the "fulcrum" of the system of relationships between criminal proceedings and the civil action brought therein, in the sense that the criminal judge decides on the claim for restitution and compensation for damages only if they pronounce a judgment of conviction of the accused, the debtor party as to the civil obligations (in this sense, Judgment no. 176 of 2019).
With respect to this rule, paragraph 1 of Article 578 of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlines, as already stated, an exception, given that the conviction for compensation for damages can be joined with the acquittal from the criminal charge due to prescription or amnesty.
In the same recent judgment of the united criminal sections no. 36208 of 2024, it was reiterated that the criminal appellate judge, even in the presence of a cause for the extinction of the crime, can acquit on the merits, even in case of doubt under Article 530, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore revoke the civil determinations, the general rule of Article 538 of the Code of Criminal Procedure re-expanding in that event. Otherwise, the appellate judge, pursuant to Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, declares the crime extinguished due to prescription (or amnesty), thereby also ruling on the existence of the criminal act and the absence of justifying circumstances related to it.
In upholding or reforming the parts of the appealed judgment concerning civil interests, the criminal judge must therefore no longer rule on the criminal liability of the perpetrator, nor re-evaluate the now established criminal act, but must decide solely on the existence and concrete extent of a compensable prejudice, that is, ascertain the damaged party's right to compensation for damages, including non-pecuniary damage, respecting the principles of civil liability law regarding the assessment of the causal link and the subjective element.
In this sense, no violation of the right guaranteed by Article 6, paragraph 2, ECHR, can be imputed to Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the living law, as the double object of the issues relating, respectively, to the assessment of the existence of the fact, its commission by the accused, and its criminal relevance, and to the decision solely for the further effects of the right to compensation for damages arising from the same fact, remain distinct and non-confusable within it.
17.– The questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure raised as a subsidiary matter by the Court of Appeal of Lecce must therefore also be declared unfounded.
for these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
joins the proceedings,
1) declares inadmissible the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, raised, in relation to Article 27, second paragraph, of the Constitution, by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, with the orders indicated in the heading;
2) declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 578, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, raised, in relation to Articles 3 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in connection with Article 6, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as in relation to Articles 117, first paragraph, and 11 of the Constitution, in connection with Articles 3 and 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 9, 2016, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by the Court of Appeal of Lecce, sole criminal section, with the orders indicated in the heading.
Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on November 19, 2025.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Stefano PETITTI, Rapporteur
Igor DI BERNARDINI, Chancellor
Filed in the Registry on January 16, 2026
The anonymized version is textually consistent with the original