JUDGMENT NO. 7

YEAR 2026

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of: President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review proceedings concerning Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code and Article 1, paragraph 18, of Law of May 20, 2016, No. 76 (Regulation of Civil Unions between Persons of the Same Sex and Regulation of Cohabitations), initiated by the Ordinary Court of Florence, Third Civil Section, in the proceedings between Elisabetta Santi and Marco Giallombardo, by order of May 8, 2025, registered as Ordinance No. 117 of the 2025 registry and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 25, Special Series One, of the year 2025.

Having noted the appearance of Elisabetta Santi out of time;

having heard in the chamber session of December 1, 2025, the Rapporteur Judge Emanuela Navarretta;

deliberated in the chamber session of December 1, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– By order of May 8, 2025, registered as Ordinance No. 117 of the 2025 registry, the Ordinary Court of Florence, Third Civil Section, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, and, "if necessary," Article 1, paragraph 18, of Law of May 20, 2016, No. 76 (Regulation of Civil Unions between Persons of the Same Sex and Regulation of Cohabitations), "insofar as they do not provide for the suspension of the prescription of rights also between stable cohabitants linked by a bond of familial affection," for violation of Articles 2, 3, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Articles 9 and 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

2.– The referring judge premises that it must decide a civil dispute in which the plaintiff, Elisabetta Santi, sued the former de facto cohabitant, Marco Giallombardo, to obtain the restitution of various movable assets and personal effects, as well as several sums of money totaling Euro 91,063.00, plus interest and monetary revaluation.

Specifically, the Court of Florence reports that the plaintiff had lent the defendant the sum of Euro 63,713.00, which the latter used to carry out improvement works on a property of his exclusive ownership. On March 16, 2006, the defendant acknowledged this debt, declaring that he had received said sum as a loan and undertook to repay it, including indexation. The private writing expressly excluded that the transfer of money was made in fulfillment of a natural obligation under Article 2034 of the Civil Code.

According to the referring judge, the couple, after sharing over a decade of common life, experienced a crisis in 2015, and on November 3, 2016, the defendant terminated the cohabitation. From that moment on, the plaintiff began to demand the restitution of the amount loaned and, given the persistent non-performance, sent the defendant several registered letters—on June 30, 2017, July 12, 2018, and November 15, 2018—asserting her creditor claim. The debtor's further inaction induced the former cohabitant to bring the matter before the Court.

The referring judge finally reports that the defendant, having appeared in court, admitted to having received the sum of Euro 63,713.00 from the plaintiff, confirmed having acknowledged the existence of the debt, arising from a loan agreement, on March 16, 2006, but nevertheless pleaded the intervening prescription of the credit right.

3.– In light of this objection, the Court of Florence raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, insofar as it does not suspend the running of the limitation period between de facto cohabitants.

3.1.– Regarding the relevance of the challenges, the referring judge highlights that the disbursement of the sum by the plaintiff in favor of the defendant must be attributed to the framework of a loan agreement. In particular, the qualified nature of the acknowledgment of debt and the defendant's commitment to repay the sum of money, moreover indexing the quantum subject to the repayment obligation, would preclude a different qualification.

The referring judge further notes that the title, the acknowledgment deed, and the parties' allegations do not allow for the derivation of a deadline for the performance of the repayment obligation. However, it specifies that, even applying Article 1817 of the Civil Code, which allows the lender to request the judge to set a term for performance, this would not affect the dies a quo (starting date) of the prescription, which runs from the moment the contract is concluded, or from the subsequent interrupting act.

Ultimately, according to the Court of Florence, the restitution credit should be deemed extinguished by the prescription pleaded by the defendant debtor, once ten years have passed since the debt acknowledgment act. As for further abstractly interrupting acts, undertaken by the creditor between 2017 and 2020, they would be time-barred, as they occurred after the prescription period expired on March 16, 2016.

The application of the current legal provisions would, therefore, according to the referring judge, lead to the acceptance of the prescription objection raised by the defendant and, consequently, the dismissal of the restitution claims filed by the plaintiff.

Conversely, if the discipline set forth in Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code were extended—by virtue of the invoked declaration of unconstitutionality—to the present case, the running of the prescription would be suspended from when the credit arose, during the cohabitation, until November 3, 2016, when the relationship ceased. This would render the prescription-interrupting acts undertaken by the plaintiff after the end of the cohabitation timely.

3.2.– The Court of Florence adds that a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the challenged provision would not be usefully employed, given its literal wording which prevents the cohabitant from being considered included in the notion of "spouse."

4.– Concerning the non-manifest lack of foundation, the referring judge first addresses Judgment No. 2 of 1998, with which this Court declared unfounded, in relation to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, raised insofar as it excludes the suspension of prescription during stable cohabitation. According to the referring judge, "the change in the social and value context," as well as the evolution of the legal system, brings to light further and more compelling elements that the Court deems must be subjected to the current review of constitutional legitimacy.

4.1.– In the opinion of the referring judge, "[a]pproaching the issue of the constitutional protection standard for the family always requires the interpreter to confront concepts of clear social and sociological origin, such as social custom, culture, and social consciousness (concepts widely invoked by constitutional jurisprudence; cf. Constitutional Court Judgments No. 1 of 2022, No. 221 of 2019, and No. 174 of 2016)." This comparison would reveal a downsizing of the differences between spouses and stable cohabitants. The institution of marriage, subject to primary protection under Article 29 of the Constitution, would no longer represent the only means through which citizens can give legal significance to a family union, nor the only way to establish a family possessing the character of stability.

Concurrently, civil and criminal jurisprudence, both lower and higher courts, have initiated a process of hermeneutic re-examination of several institutions, aimed at overcoming, through extensive interpretations or analogical applications (where permitted), unreasonable disparities in treatment between spouses and de facto cohabitants, incompatible with the Constitutional Charter.

The Court of Florence cites, in this regard, first, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation (Sixth Criminal Section, Judgment of January 29-May 22, 2008, No. 20647), which equated more uxorio cohabitants with members of the family founded on marriage for the purposes of applying Article 572 of the Penal Code (prior to the textual amendment broadening its scope by Article 4 of Law No. 172 of October 1, 2012, concerning "Ratification and implementation of the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of children against sexual exploitation and abuse, done at Lanzarote on October 25, 2007, as well as rules for the adaptation of domestic law").

Secondly, the referring judge cites the jurisprudence of the United Criminal Sections, which analogously applied to stable cohabitants the ground for non-prosecution that Article 384 of the Penal Code reserves for "close relatives," even in the presence of a defining rule, established by Article 307, fourth paragraph, of the Penal Code, which excludes such cohabitants from the concept of close relative (Court of Cassation, United Criminal Sections, Judgment of November 26, 2020-March 17, 2021, No. 10381).

Finally, the Court of Florence refers to established case law both regarding admission to free legal aid, where the cohabitant's income is included among family incomes (Court of Cassation, Fourth Civil Section, Order of October 26, 2005, No. 109), and regarding compensation for secondary victims of harm to the parental relationship, to which the de facto cohabitant is also included.

4.2.– The referring judge adds that the capacity of the notion of family to also encompass the de facto family can also be inferred from supranational sources, starting with Article 8 ECHR, as interpreted by conventional jurisprudence (the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of June 13, 1979, Marckx v. Belgium; May 26, 1994, Keegan v. Ireland; January 5, 2010, Jaremowicz v. Poland; April 27, 2010, Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy; June 24, 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria; July 21, 2015, Oliari and Others v. Italy are cited in this regard).

A similar conclusion should also be drawn from Article 9 of the CFRUE itself, which separately recognizes the right to found a family and the right to marry, thus decoupling the EU notion of family from the institution of marriage.

4.3.– Essentially, in the opinion of the Court of Florence, all forms of stable cohabitation, characterized by significant affective bonds and the sharing of a common life project, enjoy equal dignity, save for the more precise and specific regulation of marriage, both as an act and as a relationship.

The referring judge infers from this the unreasonable disparity of treatment between spouses and de facto cohabitants concerning the suspension of prescription, given that the same substantial reasons that lead to deeming the performance of acts interrupting the term inexcusable between spouses are found with reference to both affective relationships.

Consequently, the different discipline applicable to spouses and de facto cohabitants, although justified by prior constitutional jurisprudence (Judgment No. 2 of 1998 is cited) due to the greater stability assured by the marital bond, would no longer appear current, given the changed regulatory context.

Firstly, "the stability of the relationship, with the dissolution of the indissolubility of marriage, no longer constitutes an absolute and unchangeable characteristic [of the latter] and, indeed, often characterizes non-marital unions more" (Court of Cassation, Second Criminal Section, Judgment of April 30-August 4, 2015, No. 34147, is cited).

Secondly, the characteristic of stability would not be foreign to other family models and, in any case, could not constitute a decisive argument in itself to deny an equivalence between spouses and de facto cohabitants regarding the suspension of prescription. To this end, the referring court notes that, unlike more distant jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation (Civil Section I, Judgment of June 19, 1971, No. 1883), more recent jurisprudence does not apply the aforementioned ground for prescription suspension to the case of legally separated spouses, as it considers the substantial aspect of the relationship and not the formal aspect related to marital status (Court of Cassation, Civil Section I, Order of December 14, 2018, No. 32524, citing Court of Cassation, Civil Section I, Judgment of April 4, 2014, No. 7981; Judgment of August 20, 2014, No. 18078; Civil Section VI, Order of May 5, 2016, No. 8987).

4.4.– Therefore, in the opinion of the Court of Florence, given the profound social and regulatory change that has affected the phenomenon of the family, the reasons that justified the suspension of prescription only with regard to marital relationships no longer exist. The ratio legis of the challenged provision would be to "give relevance to the substantial inapplicability of acts interrupting the prescription that would be necessary to protect the fullness of the rights that one spouse holds against the other; the interruption of the term, in fact, save for the case of debt acknowledgment, would only occur through acts of a contentious nature (Article 2943 C.C.) which, as such, are certainly in conflict with the normal unfolding of family cohabitation relationships."

Ultimately, the ratio of the challenged discipline would not be connected to the formal fact of the marital bond, but rather to the substantial aspect of the affective-family relationship that links the holder of the credit right to the obligated party. The judge therefore finds homogeneity between the compared factual situations and the applicability of the ratio legis of the challenged provision also to de facto cohabitation. The exclusion of stable cohabitants from the scope of application of the challenged provision would therefore appear to lack reasonable justification and be prejudicial to the principle of equality.

5.– In the alternative, the referring judge also complains of an infringement of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the latter under the aspect of intrinsic unreasonableness, as well as Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 8 ECHR and Articles 9 and 33 of the CFRUE.

Article 2 of the Constitution, by guaranteeing family social formations and the rights of individuals within them, would require the legislator to respect, at the same time, family harmony and the subjective legal situations held by the members.

The failure to suspend prescription between cohabitants would place the creditor partner under the burden of performing prescription-interrupting acts that could jeopardize family relationships, contrary to Article 2 of the Constitution.

In the opinion of the Court of Florence, if it is true that the ratio of Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code is to enhance the "individual positions of family members over the preservation of family unity" (Court of Cassation, Civil Section I, Order of December 14, 2018, No. 32524, is cited) and if it is also true that the requirement to preserve the family community has constitutional relevance regardless of the marital bond (Articles 2 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 8 ECHR, as well as Articles 9 and 33 of the CFRUE), the omission to provide for an instrument capable of safeguarding these same values in the presence of de facto cohabitation would appear unreasonable. In this type of relationship too, it should be presumed—according to id quod plerumque accidit—that acts aimed at compelling the cohabitant-debtor to comply are capable of compromising the stability, serenity, and unity of the family nucleus.

6.– The referring judge further specifies that the beginning and end of family cohabitation are characterized by elements that, despite lacking formalism (except in the case of registered cohabitations), still have objective relevance. In particular, the referring judge notes that formalism is not a prerequisite for applying the grounds for prescription suspension, given that the legislator itself has provided for certain grounds that do not require a formal act capable of attesting ex ante to the running of the suspension period (referring in this regard to the hypotheses under numbers 7 and 8 of Article 2941, first paragraph, of the Civil Code).

The Court of Florence also emphasizes that the legal discipline peacefully contemplates interrupting acts requiring proof of the occurrence of factual prerequisites, with the effect of even resetting the prescription term. Therefore, "if the acts that [...] lead to the start of a new prescription period can be [...] devoid of a formal character capable of ensuring certainty ex ante in the calculation of the prescription term, a fortiori this should apply to the institution of prescription suspension, given that it involves a mere freezing of the term."

The extension of the discipline of Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code to de facto cohabitants would, therefore, require nothing more than a judicial assessment of the beginning and end of the stable cohabitation.

7.– On October 31, 2025, Elisabetta Santi appeared out of time.

Considered in Law

8.– With the order indicated in the heading (reg. ord. No. 117 of 2025), the Court of Florence, Third Civil Section, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code and, "if necessary," Article 1, paragraph 18, of Law No. 76 of 2016, "insofar as they do not provide for the suspension of the prescription of rights also between stable cohabitants linked by a bond of familial affection," for violation of Articles 2, 3, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 8 ECHR and Articles 9 and 33 of the CFRUE.

9.– The referring judge finds an unreasonable disparity of treatment between spouses and de facto cohabitants regarding the suspension of prescription, given that the same substantial reasons that lead to deeming the performance of acts interrupting the term in the case of spouses to be inexcusable are found, identically, in the case of stable cohabitants.

In the alternative, the referring judge considers Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the latter under the aspect of intrinsic unreasonableness, to be violated, given that the failure to suspend prescription between de facto cohabitants would place the creditor partner under the burden of performing prescription-interrupting acts capable of compromising the stability, serenity, and unity of the family nucleus.

Finally, the referring judge deems Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution to be violated, in relation to Article 8 ECHR and Articles 9 and 33 of the CFRUE.

10.– On procedural grounds, the latter challenge must be declared inadmissible due to contradiction and lack of reasoning.

With regard to Article 8 ECHR, the referring judge himself acknowledges that the provision cannot be invoked as an authentic interposed parameter, pursuant to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, due to the margin of appreciation recognized by the case law of the ECtHR to Member States in regulating family formations. Nevertheless, the referring judge does not limit himself to mentioning this provision as an interpretative support to sustain the legal recognition acquired by the de facto family, but invokes it as an autonomous interposed norm in relation to the constitutional parameter of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

As for Articles 9 and 33 of the CFRUE, the reference is entirely fleeting and lacks reasoning, as the demonstration that the challenged provisions fall within the scope of application of European Union law is missing—the latter condition being the one on which, pursuant to Article 51 of the CFRUE, "the very applicability of the provisions of the Charter, including their suitability to constitute interposed parameters in the constitutional legitimacy review judgment, is subordinated" (Judgments No. 137 of 2025 and No. 85 of 2024; in the same sense, Judgments No. 69, No. 31, and No. 7 of 2025).

11.– On the merits, the questions raised concerning Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the latter under the dual aspect of unequal treatment and intrinsic unreasonableness, are well-founded.

12.– Preliminarily, it is necessary to recall that the challenged Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, insofar as it limits the suspension of prescription to the relationship "between spouses," without also considering the relationship between stable cohabitants, has already been the subject of challenges similar to those raised in the present proceedings in the past; challenges that Judgment No. 2 of 1998 declared unfounded, based on two arguments.

On the one hand, this Court held that the discipline applicable to the spouse was unsuitable to serve as a tertium comparationis (third point of comparison) with respect to the de facto cohabitant, due both to the stability and certainty derived solely from marriage, and to the reciprocity and correspondence of rights and duties stemming uniquely from the marital bond.

On the other hand, de facto cohabitation was deemed incompatible with the prerequisites required for the suspension of prescription, identified in "precise formal and temporal elements." According to Judgment No. 2 of 1998, "the very nature of prescription—an institution aimed at conferring stability on proprietary relationships—requires the adoption of certain and incontestable reference parameters for the running of the terms," which can only be found in the existence and cessation of "a legal bond such as marriage."

13.– More than a quarter of a century after that ruling, the evolution, first jurisprudential and then legislative, allows for the recognition of the prerequisites that make possible—according to the jurisprudence of this Court—the reconsideration of its previous orientation (cf. Judgments No. 24 of 2025 and No. 203 of 2024).

In particular, the recognition of de facto cohabitation as a family formation protected by Article 2 of the Constitution has progressively consolidated, in the context of which affectio and solidarity among members deserve the broadest protection (infra, point 14). Furthermore, constitutional jurisprudence has clarified, over time, the meaning and limits within which the discipline applicable to the spouse can be taken as a tertium comparationis with respect to the de facto cohabitant (infra, points 15, 16, and 16.1.). Finally, even in light of regulatory and jurisprudential developments, the compatibility between the suspension of the prescription term and the characteristics inherent in de facto cohabitation has become apparent (infra, point 16.2.).

14.– Regarding the first aspect, it is first worth examining the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence.

14.1.– Even before Judgment No. 2 of 1998, this Court, with Judgment No. 237 of 1986, had already affirmed that "a consolidated relationship, even if de facto, does not appear [...] constitutionally irrelevant when considering the relevance afforded to the recognition of social formations and the consequent intrinsic manifestations of solidarity (Article 2 of the Constitution). Even more so [in] the presence of offspring."

This view has consolidated and refined over time.

Judgment No. 404 of 1988—in declaring the unconstitutionality of Article 6, first paragraph, of Law No. 392 of July 27, 1978 (Regulation of Leases of Urban Properties), insofar as it did not include the more uxorio cohabitant among those entitled to the lease contract in the event of the tenant's death—reaffirmed that even a de facto union, as a social formation protected by Article 2 of the Constitution, deserves protection when characterized by stability and bonds of solidarity. Subsequently, Judgment No. 8 of 1996, textually reiterated by Judgment No. 140 of 2009, emphasized that de facto cohabitation must not be "configured [...] as a lesser form of marital relationship, disapproved of or merely tolerated," but rather both must be recognized their "own specific dignity."

From then on, this Court began to use the term "family" with reference to stable de facto cohabitation (Judgment No. 140 of 2009), highlighting how it generates "an affective relationship, typical of the 'family relationship' within the scope of the values of solidarity postulated by the 'aggregations' referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution" (Judgment No. 213 of 2016). On this basis, the latter ruling declared the unconstitutionality of Article 33, paragraph 3, of Law No. 104 of February 5, 1992 (Framework Law for assistance, social integration and rights of disabled persons), as amended by Article 24, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law No. 183 of November 4, 2010 (Delegations to the Government on strenuous work, reorganization of bodies, leave, secondments and permissions, social safety nets, employment services, incentives for employment, apprenticeship, female employment, as well as measures against undeclared work and provisions on public employment and labor disputes), insofar as it did not include the cohabitant among the subjects entitled to paid monthly leave for the assistance of a disabled person.

Judgment No. 10 of 2024 followed the same line, which, in protection of affection in prison, recognized the unconstitutionality of Article 18 of Law No. 354 of July 26, 1975 (Provisions on the penitentiary order and the execution of custodial and restrictive measures of liberty), insofar as it did not provide that a person detained could be admitted to conduct interviews, without visual monitoring by custody personnel, not only with their spouse or civil union partner, but also with the permanently cohabiting person.

Moreover, this Court, after noting that de facto cohabitations now "outnumber families founded on marriage," observed, with Judgment No. 148 of 2024, the affirmation of "a pluralistic conception of the family, first in society and then in jurisprudence, thanks also to the impetus given by the European Court of Human Rights (Judgment of July 21, 2015, Oliari and Others v. Italy)," reiterating the "full dignity" of the "family composed of de facto cohabitants."

On these assumptions, it declared the unconstitutionality of Articles 230-bis, third paragraph, and 230-ter of the Civil Code, insofar as these provisions did not include the "de facto cohabitant" among the family members and did not qualify the family business as one to which the latter contributes.

Finally, with Judgment No. 197 of 2025, the Court extended the extraordinary leave for the assistance of a family member with serious disability, provided for by Article 42, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree No. 151 of March 26, 2001 (Consolidated Text of legislative provisions on the protection and support of maternity and paternity, pursuant to Article 15 of Law No. 53 of March 8, 2000), in the text prior to the regulatory amendment introduced by Article 2, paragraph 1, letter n), of Legislative Decree No. 105 of June 30, 2022, concerning "Implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20, 2019, on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU," to the de facto cohabitant.

14.2.– Parallel to the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence, that of the Court of Cassation has also granted the broadest recognition to the de facto family, reiterating its constitutional framing within Article 2 of the Constitution.

To protect the cohabitant, standing in one's own right (iure proprio) has been admitted for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages resulting from the very serious injury or death of the partner (Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, Order of April 13, 2018, No. 9178; Judgments of March 21, 2013, No. 7128, and March 28, 1994, No. 2988) or of the unilateral child of the cohabitant who lives within the context of the de facto family (Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, Judgment of April 21, 2016, No. 8037). The stable cohabitant has also been recognized a qualified right of detention regarding the dwelling used as a common home (Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, Judgment of April 27, 2017, No. 10377; Civil Section I, Judgment of September 11, 2015, No. 17971; Civil Section II, Judgments of January 2, 2014, No. 7, and March 21, 2013, No. 7214).

In the event of the dissolution of the bond, lower courts have developed protection mechanisms for the de facto cohabitant, resorting to general remedies in contract law, ranging from the non-repetitiveness of performance of natural obligations under Article 2034 of the Civil Code (Court of Cassation, Civil Section I, Order of January 2, 2025, No. 28, and Judgment of June 13, 2023, No. 16864) to the emergence of claims for unjust enrichment under Article 2041 of the Civil Code (Court of Cassation, Third Civil Section, Order of June 7, 2018, No. 14732, and Judgment of May 15, 2009, No. 11330).

Moreover, after the entry into force of Law No. 76 of 2016, the United Civil Sections affirmed that the "establishment of a new stable cohabitation [...] gives the right to claim, as long as the cohabitation persists, [...] economic contributions that are no longer relevant for the legal system solely as fulfillment of a natural obligation but also constitute [...] the fulfillment of a reciprocal and guaranteed duty of moral and material assistance [...], although not devoid of precariousness in its unfolding, as it is linked to the continuation of the factual situation" (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgment of November 5, 2021, No. 32198).

The tendency—in the event of dissolution of marriage or civil union—to take into account any period of pre-marital cohabitation or cohabitation preceding the civil union, for the purpose of determining the divorce settlement or the allowance due to the civil union partner, is also connected to the aforementioned orientations (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgments of December 27, 2023, No. 35969, and December 18, 2023, No. 35385).

These and other forms of recognition of the legal relevance of de facto cohabitation in the civil field are supplemented by several interventions in criminal jurisprudence. Among the various rulings, it is necessary to point out, in particular, the analogical application of the ground for non-prosecution under Article 384, first paragraph, of the Penal Code, referring to those who committed the act because they were compelled by the necessity of saving a close relative from serious and unavoidable harm to their liberty or honor (Cass., United Criminal Sections, Judgment No. 10381 of 2021). Although the latter notion was referred to by the legislator only to "ascendants, descendants, spouse, partner of a civil union between persons of the same sex, siblings, relatives in the same degree, uncles and nieces" (Article 307, fourth paragraph, Penal Code), the higher courts applied it also to the de facto cohabitant. Specifically, they held that, since the excuse is aimed at avoiding the alternative "between the fulfillment of a criminally sanctioned duty and the protection of one's affections, it is entirely 'incoherent' to deny that the same subjective condition exists, whether the persons are married or cohabiting. In both cases, the inner conflict is identical. In both cases, Article 384 cited considers the conduct subject to the violated norm inexcusable, due to the lack of 'culpability' of the agent.'"

14.3.– Finally, as this Court has already noted (Judgment No. 148 of 2024), the hermeneutic relevance—in connection with Article 2 of the Constitution—of both Article 8 ECHR, to which the ECtHR has also linked relationships "that constitute a 'family' in the social sense, provided that there is an effective close and proven affectionate bond" (Judgment No. 148 of 2024, cited above), and Article 9 CFRUE, which contemplates the "right to found a family" alongside the "right to marry," cannot be ignored.

14.4.– Moving from jurisprudential evolution to regulatory evolution, it must be noted that the legislative source—after abandoning the reference to the notion of concubinage, dating back to the Penal Code of 1930 (Article 560, declared unconstitutional with Judgment No. 147 of 1969)—has, over time, recognized de facto cohabitation as a family formation.

In particular, the legislator intervened first with sector-specific regulations, inspired by the need to: i) grant rights to de facto cohabitants (Article 3, paragraph 2, of Law No. 91 of April 1, 1999, concerning "Provisions regarding the procurement and transplantation of organs and tissues"; Article 4, paragraph 2, of Law No. 302 of October 20, 1990, concerning "Provisions in favor of victims of terrorism and organized crime"; Article 2, paragraph 1, letter n), Legislative Decree No. 105 of 2022); ii) give recognition and relevance to stable affective cohabitation (Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Article 6, paragraph 4, of Law No. 184 of May 4, 1983, concerning "The right of the minor to a family," as amended by Article 6 of Law No. 149 of March 28, 2001, concerning "Amendments to Law No. 184 of May 4, 1983, concerning 'Regulation of the adoption and placement of minors,' as well as to Title VIII of Book One of the Civil Code"; Article 3 of Law No. 6 of January 9, 2004, concerning "Introduction into Book One, Title XII, of the Civil Code of Chapter I, relating to the establishment of the administration of support and amendment of Articles 388, 414, 417, 418, 424, 426, 427 and 429 of the Civil Code regarding interdictions and incapacitation, as well as related implementation, coordination, and final provisions"; Article 5 of Law No. 40 of February 19, 2004, concerning "Provisions regarding medically assisted procreation"); iii) protect minors in the context of de facto cohabitations (Articles 330 and 333 of the Civil Code, as supplemented by Article 37, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Law No. 149 of 2001).

Subsequently, with Law No. 76 of 2016, the legislator introduced a discipline aiming for a systematic approach (Article 1, paragraphs 36 to 65), in the context of an intervention that, in general, has interpreted a "pluralistic conception of the family" (Judgment No. 148 of 2024), invoking, in Article 1, paragraph 1, the social formations "pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution."

Following the path traced by jurisprudential and doctrinal evolution, the legislator identified the notion of de facto cohabitants, referring to "two adults stably linked by affective bonds of a couple and mutual moral and material assistance," as well as "not bound by ties of kinship, affinity, or adoption, by marriage or by a civil union" (Article 1, paragraph 36, of Law No. 76 of 2016).

Furthermore, for purely evidentiary purposes, it established that the proof of stable cohabitation may refer to the demographic registration referred to in Articles 4 and 13, paragraph 1, letter b), of Presidential Decree No. 223 of May 30, 1989 (Approval of the new demographic registry regulation for the resident population).

Finally, the legislator prepared a set of protections for members of the de facto family, often incorporating those from jurisprudential developments, and enhanced, in accordance with the nature of this institution, the possible recourse to private autonomy, regulating cohabitation contracts.

15.– Having invoked the main elements of legislative and jurisprudential evolution, which have conferred full dignity upon the family formation under consideration and have made its identifying features clearer and more defined, it is necessary to specify the approach adopted by this Court in extending norms provided for spouses to the de facto cohabitant.

Constitutional jurisprudence, on the one hand, has excluded a general equivalence between the discipline concerning the marital bond and that relating to de facto cohabitation, if only one considers that the latter bond tends to escape the set of effects stemming from marriage (Judgments No. 148 and No. 66 of 2024, No. 170 of 2014, and No. 138 of 2010).

On the other hand, however, in the comparison between de facto cohabitation and the marital relationship, it has admitted the "comparability of the disciplines concerning particular aspects of one and the other that may present analogies for the purposes of the reasonableness review under Article 3 of the Constitution" (Judgment No. 8 of 1996; Order No. 121 of 2004)" (Judgment No. 140 of 2009).

Essentially, with reference to specific norms—especially those external to the peculiar family law discipline—it is entirely possible to "ascertain [between the two institutions] characteristics so common as to require identical discipline, which this Court can ensure through the reasonableness review imposed by Article 3 of the Constitution" (Judgment No. 140 of 2009)" (Judgment No. 148 of 2024).

16.– That being established, it must be noted that the challenged provision, on the one hand, relates to the general discipline of "[p]rotection of rights" and concerns the institution of prescription, which the jurisprudence of this Court itself associates with judicial protection under Article 24 of the Constitution (Judgment No. 86 of 2025). On the other hand, and above all, it highlights a ratio capable of operating in the same terms with reference to spouses and de facto cohabitants.

16.1.– By providing that "[p]rescription remains suspended [...] between spouses," Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code intends to preserve affectio and family unity.

Through the institution of suspension, the legal system recognizes that, in the presence of a stable affective bond between a couple, the exercise of acts interrupting prescription, which foreshadow possible litigation and are perceived as injurious to mutual trust, is not required.

Such a purpose, therefore, centers on the protection of the affective bond that the Constitution protects whether it originates from an act, such as marriage, as provided for in Article 29 of the Constitution, or stems from the stability of the cohabitation relationship, giving rise to a family social formation, which finds its foundation in Article 2 of the Constitution.

Therefore, no differently from what can be observed with respect to the spouse, the de facto cohabitant, who holds a credit against the other, cannot be required to bear the burden of exercising the claim, and, more generally, of asserting the right subject to prescription, thereby compromising the stability, harmony, and unity of the affective relationship.

The de facto cohabitant, just like the spouse, cannot be faced with the alternative between sacrificing the bond of affection and mutual trust that binds the family unit and the compression of the possibility of asserting one's right. Without acts interrupting prescription, in fact, the right is all the more destined for sacrifice the longer and more lasting the affective bond proves to be.

Such an alternative, besides unreasonably differentiating the de facto cohabitant from the spouse, is destined to negatively impact interests traceable to Article 2 of the Constitution.

16.2.– In addition, the idea that the characteristics inherent in the institution of prescription suspension would justify the different treatment of the spouse compared to the de facto cohabitant cannot be shared.

In fact, the thesis that the suspension of prescription must be rooted in prerequisites constituted by "precise formal and temporal elements found in marriage and not in free cohabitation" (Judgment No. 2 of 1998) must be re-examined.

16.2.1.– First, it should be noted that, precisely in the interpretation of Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation has progressively abandoned a formally rigid reading of the ground for suspension referring to the status of spouse, favoring, instead, a reading focused on protecting the substantial dimension of the relationship. Starting from a 2014 judgment (Cass. No. 7981 of 2014), the prevailing view has been that, with legal separation between spouses, the applicability of prescription suspension ceases, even if the marital bond is not yet dissolved. This principle has also been confirmed by a recent intervention (Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, Order of February 16, 2025, No. 3979), which reiterated that the suspension operates only as long as affectio persists, which is the sole ratio capable of justifying the application of the challenged provision.

It is thus confirmed that the relevant factor for the suspension of prescription is not the existence of the marital bond, but the existence of an affective bond between the couple and a community of life, which are also clearly present in de facto cohabitation, rendering interrupting acts of prescription morally inexcusable.

16.2.2.– The non-formal approach adopted by jurisprudence in identifying the prerequisites for prescription suspension is also confirmed in various legal provisions, in which the period of suspension or the moment of interruption is linked to events whose verification necessarily occurs subsequently. It is sufficient, in this regard, to recall: i) Article 2941, first paragraph, number 8), of the Civil Code, which suspends prescription until the debtor's deceit in concealing the existence of the debt is discovered, a situation whose existence and duration can only be ascertained ex post in judicial proceedings, requiring proof of a subjective element; ii) Article 2942, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, which suspends prescription against unemancipated minors and legally incapacitated persons not only in cases where they do not have a legal representative but also if the latter is in a conflict of interest with the minor or the incapacitated person, a circumstance whose existence and duration must necessarily be proven subsequently (Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, Judgment of December 6, 2024, No. 31310; Second Civil Section, Judgment of July 19, 2012, No. 12490; First Civil Section, Judgment of February 1, 2007, No. 2211); iii) finally, Article 2944 of the Civil Code, which indicates as a ground for interrupting prescription the acknowledgment of the right "by the person against whom the right itself can be asserted," without requiring specific forms for this purpose.

Moreover, the institution of prescription aims to guarantee the certainty of law between the parties to a relationship and not towards third parties, given that it is not subject to judicial notice (Article 2938 Civil Code), must be pleaded, and may be subject to waiver once matured (Article 2939 Civil Code).

There is, therefore, no systematic need that requires the existence of formal prerequisites, certain a priori, in order to define the period of prescription suspension, which confirms that merely invoking the lack of such requirements in the case of de facto cohabitation is not sufficient to justify its different treatment compared to the spousal relationship.

16.2.3.– For the applicability of the suspension of prescription, it is sufficient to be able to verify with certainty, even only subsequently, the period during which the institution operates.

Indeed, both the legislator and constitutional and higher court jurisprudence presuppose the possibility of proving the existence of de facto cohabitation concerning a specific time frame. This can also be inferred from provisions and hermeneutic reconstructions preceding Law No. 76 of 2016 itself, which offered an facilitated means of proving de facto cohabitation through demographic registration.

Law No. 149 of 2001, which reformed the discipline of adoption, provides for the possibility of adding the pre-marital cohabitation period to the post-marital cohabitation period, to allow access to the institution of adoptio plena (supra, point 14.3.). Similarly, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation deems that, in the event of dissolution of marriage or civil union, the period of de facto cohabitation preceding the marriage or civil union must be added to the period following these acts, for the purpose of determining the amount of the divorce settlement or the allowance due to the civil union partner (supra, point 14.2.). Finally, this Court itself established that, for the entire period of cohabitation, the monthly assistance leave and the extraordinary leave are due to the de facto cohabitant of a person with a serious disability (Judgments No. 213 of 2016 and No. 197 of 2025); similarly, always with reference to the period of cohabitation, it held that the same protections enjoyed by the spouse within the framework of the family business should apply to the partner in a de facto union (Judgment No. 148 of 2024 and supra, point 14.1.).

Precisely in this latter judgment, the evidentiary function of the demographic registration of de facto cohabitation was highlighted, and therefore it was excluded that such registration could constitute a condicio sine qua non for the application of the related discipline (in the same sense, Judgment No. 197 of 2025). Likewise, in the present context, it must be reaffirmed that the introduction, with Article 1, paragraph 37, of Law No. 76 of 2016, of the possibility of registering de facto cohabitation offers a facilitated evidentiary tool, but does not preclude proving its existence and duration by other means—by any means of evidence.

17.– Since the idea of a supposed incompatibility between the institution of prescription suspension and the inherent characteristics of de facto cohabitation is therefore unsubstantiated, the unreasonable disparity of treatment that Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code determines between the spouse and the de facto cohabitant, along with the infringement of interests protected by Article 2 of the Constitution, must be reaffirmed.

As already highlighted (point 16.1.), whether the affective bond stems from marriage or a stable cohabitation, an act interrupting prescription capable of undermining that very bond which forms the basis of family unity is not required. In both cases, it is not permissible to impose a burden that results in the alternative between the sacrifice of the affective relationship, on the one hand, and the risk of compromising the protection of one's right, on the other; a fork in the road that, in either direction, leads to a conflict with Article 2 of the Constitution.

Such an alternative thus reveals not only an unreasonable disparity of treatment between the spouse and the de facto cohabitant and an infringement of Article 2 of the Constitution, but also an intrinsic unreasonableness.

This latter unreasonableness is all the more evident when considering that, while in the phase of dissolution of the cohabitation bond, jurisprudence gives rise to claims for unjust enrichment in favor of the cohabitant who has contributed to the formation of the common assets (supra, point 14.2.), conversely, the challenged provision tends to cause the loss of entitlement to credits, which may arise from financial contributions made to the other cohabitant to support assets or activities of which the latter is the exclusive owner.

18.– In light of the considerations set forth, Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code must be declared constitutionally illegitimate, insofar as it does not provide that prescription remains suspended between de facto cohabitants.

The use of the latter term is such as to include—in light of the definition in Article 1, paragraph 36, of Law No. 76 of 2016—both the cohabitant of a heterosexual couple and that of a same-sex couple. This excludes the necessity of intervening—as hypothetically suggested by the referring judge—on Article 1, paragraph 18, of the aforementioned Law No. 76 of 2016.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 2941, first paragraph, number 1), of the Civil Code, insofar as it does not provide that prescription remains suspended between de facto cohabitants.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on December 1, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Rapporteur Judge

Igor DI BERNARDINI, Chancellor

Filed with the Chancellery on January 23, 2026