JUDGMENT NO. 179
YEAR 2025
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
is composed of:
President: Giovanni AMOROSO;
Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,
has delivered the following
JUDGMENT
in the constitutional legitimacy review proceeding concerning Article 130 of the Presidential Decree of May 30, 2002, no. 115, containing the "Consolidated Text of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Judicial Costs (Text A),” initiated by the Ordinary Court of Turin, Specialized Section for Business Matters, in the proceedings between A. R. and L. D.L., with an order dated February 4, 2025, registered under no. 42 of the ordinary register of 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 12, special first series, of the year 2025.
Having reviewed the statement of appearance of A. R. and L. D.L.;
having heard the report by Judge Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI at the public hearing of October 8, 2025;
having heard Advocate Marco Ciurcina for A. R. and L. D.L.;
having deliberated in the council chamber of October 8, 2025.
Facts Considered
1.– By order of February 4, 2025, registered as ord. no. 42 of 2025, the Ordinary Court of Turin, Specialized Section for Business Matters, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 130 of the Presidential Decree of May 30, 2002, no. 115, containing the "Consolidated Text of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Judicial Costs (Text A),” alleging its conflict with Articles 3 and 24 of the Constitution.
The challenged provision establishes that, where a party to civil proceedings is admitted to legal aid at the State's expense, the amounts due to the counsel, the magistrate's assistant, and the party's technical consultant shall be reduced by half.
1.1.– The referring court reports that, in the appeal proceedings against a precautionary measure issued to the detriment of L. D.L., the latter had filed a request for the liquidation of the fee for engineer A. R., a technical consultant appointed by him.
Since the activity performed by the latter, concerning the extraction of data from an information system, was not included in any provision of the consolidated text on judicial costs that determines fees based on the subject matter, the relevant liquidation had to be carried out based on the unit rate for hearings (vacazioni), as per Article 1 of the Decree of the Minister of Justice of May 30, 2002 (Adjustment of fees due to experts, technical consultants, interpreters, and translators for operations performed upon order of the judicial authority in civil and criminal matters).
Furthermore, since the assisted party had been admitted to legal aid at the State's expense, the reduction of half provided by Article 130 of the consolidated text on judicial costs was to be applied to the amount.
On this basis, the referring court observes that the halving of the indicated values would be "incongruous considering the quality and type of activity performed" by the consultant, because the fees provided for by Article 1 of the Ministerial Decree of May 30, 2002, are "now outdated in time and never updated," even though Article 54 of the consolidated text on judicial costs provides that "[t]he measure of fixed, variable, and time-based fees shall be adjusted every three years in relation to the variation, ascertained by ISTAT, of the consumer price index for blue-collar and white-collar families, recorded in the preceding three-year period, by a directorial decree of the Ministry of Justice, in agreement with the Ministry of Economy and Finance."
1.2.– Regarding the relevance of the questions, the Court notes that Article 130 cited must necessarily apply in the present case, as the party's consultant, admitted to legal aid, challenged the liquidation ordered in compliance with the challenged provision after requesting the liquidation of their fee.
It further emphasizes that the activity performed by the consultant can only be remunerated by resorting to the unit rate for hearings, and that the latter has never been subject to adjustment.
1.3.– Regarding the non-manifest groundlessness, the Court of Turin refers to this Court's Judgment no. 166 of 2022, which declared the challenged provision constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it does not exclude the reduction of amounts due to the magistrate's assistant, where such amounts result from the application of tariff provisions not updated pursuant to Article 54, and with which principles applicable to the present case were affirmed.
The referral order also cites excerpts from previous judgments of this Court, no. 192 of 2015 and no. 178 of 2017, by which Article 106-bis of the consolidated text on judicial costs, which contains analogous provisions for the case of legal aid in criminal proceedings, was declared constitutionally illegitimate in the part concerning, respectively, the magistrate's assistant and the party's consultant.
In line with these decisions, the referring court observes that the prescribed halving of the fee for the party's consultant intervenes on an already disproportionate base tariff due to deficiency, as a result of the lack of adjustment; hence the alleged conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the principle of reasonableness.
In particular, the legislature allegedly failed to verify that the sums on which the reduction operates are "consistent with the underlying principles" of the consolidated text, which require—albeit with due limitations connected to the public nature of the service—proportionality to private practice tariffs, and "preserved in their essential consistency in relation to the changes in the cost of living."
Moreover, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 130 of the consolidated text on judicial costs concerning the magistrate's assistants—who, consequently, now have their fees recognized without any reduction—would give rise to a further aspect of conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, concerning the principle of equality.
Finally, since the role of party's consultants constitutes "an essential aspect of the right to defense," the provision of incongruous fees would also conflict with Article 24 of the Constitution, "given the risk of greater difficulty in finding an expert consultant willing to perform their activity for the party admitted precisely because of the lower fee that they would, in any case, be destined to receive."
2.– L. D.L., the claimant in the main proceedings, and A. R., the party's technical consultant, appeared in the proceedings, assisted by the same counsel and with a single "statement of appearance," and declared that they adhered to the referring court's submissions, extensively citing the aforementioned precedents of this Court.
In Law Considered
1.– By order of February 4, 2025 (reg. ord. no. 42 of 2025), the Court of Turin, Specialized Section for Business Matters, raised, with reference to Articles 3 and 24 of the Constitution, questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 130 of the consolidated text on judicial costs, insofar as it provides that, where a party to civil proceedings is admitted to legal aid at the State's expense, the fees of the party's technical consultant are reduced by half.
1.1.– According to the referring court, the challenged provision, by not excluding the application of the reduction where tariff provisions not updated pursuant to Article 54 of the consolidated text on judicial costs are applied, would lead to a significant decrease in fees that are already disproportionate due to deficiency, as they are calculated on the basis of parameters never updated since the approval of the Schedules annexed to the Ministerial Decree of May 30, 2002.
Such disproportion would lead to the unreasonableness of the provision, which has, moreover, already been deemed so by this Court, with Judgment no. 166 of 2022, for the part concerning the magistrate's assistant.
1.2.– Pursuant to the latter decision, moreover, Article 3 of the Constitution would also be violated concerning the principle of equality, as it determines the possibility that, in the context of the same procedural discipline, the fee reduction applies to the party's consultant and not to the magistrate's assistant.
1.3.– Finally, Article 24 of the Constitution would also be violated, as the fee reduction would result in prejudice to the right of defense of the parties, consisting of the difficulty in finding a consultant willing to perform their activity, given the significant reduction in already inadequate fees.
2.– The questions are well-founded.
2.1.– The regulation of judicial costs, established by Presidential Decree no. 115 of 2002, places the magistrate's assistant and the party's technical consultant on an equal footing regarding the liquidation of their respective fees.
As this Court has already observed in Judgment no. 166 of 2022, repeatedly cited by the referring court, "[t]he rationale of this body of legislation—which, being expressly referenced, as indicated in Title VII, to '[m]agistrate's assistants in criminal, civil, administrative, accounting, and tax proceedings,' sets forth common discipline for all procedural systems—is aimed at balancing the public nature of the function of assisting judicial activity with the need not to undermine the commitment guaranteed by the designated professional."
Hence the provision of Article 50, paragraph 2, of the consolidated text on judicial costs, which ensures the adequate remuneration of professionals appointed in the proceedings by providing a "relationship of proportionality between the schedule values of the fees and the corresponding private practice tariffs, albeit with a reduction, taking into account the public nature of the institution" (Judgment no. 166 of 2022; similarly, judgments no. 89 of 2020 and no. 192 of 2015).
The fixing of liquidation criteria aimed at correlating the fee to the extent, complexity, and urgency of the work performed (Articles 51, 52, and 53 of the consolidated text on judicial costs) also responds to this balancing objective, "without creating any duplication and without undermining the commitment ensured by the assistant" (Judgment no. 90 of 2019).
But, above all, the provision for a triennial adjustment of fees contained in Article 54 of the consolidated text on judicial costs is relevant in this regard, the purpose of which, as this Court has affirmed, is to allow the applicable tariffs to be "preserved in their essential consistency in relation to the changes in the cost of living" (Judgment no. 192 of 2015).
2.2.– The same balancing objective takes on a particular connotation in proceedings where a party has been admitted to legal aid at the State's expense, in which "the identification of a balance point between the guarantee of the right to defense for the indigent and the necessity of containing public expenditure in judicial matters is crucial" (Judgments no. 166 of 2022 and no. 47 of 2020).
It is in this sense that the reduction of fees provided for by the challenged provision, with regard to party technical consultants in civil proceedings, is justified.
On this point—and albeit with reference to the reduction provided for the fees of the counsel—this Court has affirmed that this provision does not per se violate the principle of reasonableness, as the safeguards for the constitutional guarantee of the right to defense are left to the legislature's discretion, especially considering that legal aid at the State's expense is an institute of procedural law. However, it is necessary that the criterion for determining the fee does not impose such a sacrifice on the professional as to break the reasonable link between the fee due to them and their market value (Orders no. 122 of 2016 and no. 350 of 2005).
2.3.– Furthermore, it must be emphasized that, even where the party has been admitted to legal aid at the State's expense, the fees of the appointed professionals must be liquidated in accordance with the criteria mentioned above, and, in particular, in an amount adequate to the variation in the cost of living.
Moreover, in the review of Article 106-bis of the consolidated text on judicial costs—which, similarly to the provision challenged herein, provides for a reduction of fees liquidated to consultants appointed in criminal proceedings—this Court affirmed that, by so providing, the legislature could not ignore that these were fees which, pursuant to Article 54 of the consolidated text on judicial costs, should have been periodically revalued (Judgments no. 178 of 2017 and no. 192 of 2015).
The provision of Article 54 of the aforementioned consolidated text, in other words, constitutes a safeguard clause, the non-observance of which results in an alteration of the system designed by the legislature; so much so that, according to the latest decisions cited, the failure to adjust tariffs has led to the calculation basis for fees already being seriously disproportionate due to deficiency, even considering the balance imposed by the public nature of the service (also in this sense, Judgment no. 16 of 2025).
3.– In light of these considerations, continuity must be given to the principles affirmed by this Court with Judgment no. 166 of 2022.
3.1.– It must be reiterated, in particular, that the failure to observe the adjustment clause has severed the necessary correlation between the professional's fee and market values, "thereby nullifying that relationship of rational connection and proportionality between the means provided by the legislature and the purpose it intended to pursue, which is the basis of the reasonableness of the legislative choice" (point 4 of the Legal Considerations).
The challenged provision is therefore in conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution under the aspect of the principle of reasonableness.
3.2.– The same Article 3 is also violated in relation to the principle of equality.
Since the figure of the party's technical consultant must be fully equated, as regards the fee regime, to that of the magistrate's assistant (Judgment no. 178 of 2017), the provision of a different fee for the services rendered in the proceedings by the two professionals, even though the latter is always determinable based on the same tables, constitutes an unjustifiable disparity of treatment.
3.3.– Finally, there is also an infringement of the right to defense, resulting in a violation of Article 24 of the Constitution.
As this Court has already affirmed in relation to the technical consultant appointed in criminal proceedings, "among the system repercussions produced by the unreasonable reduction challenged, there could be that of the withdrawal of subjects possessing the best professional skills" (Judgment no. 178 of 2017); this is particularly true considering that, whereas the magistrate's assistant has the obligation to perform their office in civil proceedings (Article 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure), this obligation does not rest upon the party's technical consultant.
4.– In conclusion, Article 130 of the consolidated text on judicial costs must be declared constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it does not exclude that the reduction by half of the amounts due to the party's technical consultant is applied in the event of the application of tariff provisions not updated pursuant to Article 54 of the same consolidated text.
for these reasons
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 130 of the Presidential Decree of May 30, 2002, no. 115, containing the "Consolidated Text of Legislative and Regulatory Provisions on Judicial Costs (Text A),” insofar as it does not exclude that the reduction by half of the amounts due to the party's technical consultant is applied in the event of the application of tariff provisions not updated pursuant to Article 54 of the same Presidential Decree no. 115 of 2002.
Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 8, 2025.
Signed:
Giovanni AMOROSO, President
Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Rapporteur
Roberto MILANA, Director of the Registry
Filed in the Registry on December 2, 2025
The anonymized version conforms, in text, to the original