Sentenza n. 170 del 2025

Judgment No. 170 of 2025 - AI translated

JUDGMENT NO. 170

YEAR 2025

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of: President: Giovanni AMOROSO;

Judges: Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, Massimo LUCIANI, Maria Alessandra SANDULLI, Roberto Nicola CASSINELLI, Francesco Saverio MARINI,

has pronounced the following

JUDGMENT

in the constitutional legitimacy review of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, initiated by the Ordinary Court of Verona, Criminal Section, in a single-judge panel, in the criminal proceedings against F. Z., with an order dated March 28, 2025, registered under no. 82 of the register of orders for 2025 and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 20, Special First Series, of 2025.

Having examined the intervention brief of the President of the Council of Ministers;

having heard in the public deliberation of October 20, 2025, the Reporting Judge Francesco Saverio Marini;

deliberated in the public deliberation of October 20, 2025.

Facts Considered

1.– By order dated March 28, 2025 (reg. ord. no. 82 of 2025), the Ordinary Court of Verona, Criminal Section, in a single-judge panel, raised, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, a question of constitutional legitimacy regarding Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, "insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 1, of Law no. 24 of March 8, 2017 (Provisions on the safety of care and the assisted person, as well as on the professional liability of healthcare practitioners),” the insurer of the healthcare or socio-healthcare facility may be summoned in the criminal proceedings at the request of the accused.”

2.– The referring court states that it is seized, during the trial phase, of the criminal proceedings against a "so-called ‘employed’ physician,” as a permanent employee of a Local Socio-Healthcare Authority, accused of the crime of negligent homicide committed in the exercise of the healthcare profession, pursuant to Articles 589 and 590-sexies of the Penal Code.

According to the indictment hypothesis, the accused, in his capacity as a medical director serving in the surgery unit of a Verona healthcare facility, allegedly caused, "due to fault consisting of imprudence, negligence, and lack of skill, as well as specific fault for not observing the guidelines,” the death of a patient due to septic shock on October 25, 2020.

At the preliminary hearing, on October 10, 2024, the next of kin of the deceased patient constituted themselves as civil parties, and at the first trial hearing, on January 29, 2025, the defense counsel for the accused requested "the summoning, as civilly liable party, of the insurance of the (public) healthcare facility of which the accused [himself] is (and was also at the time of the facts) an employee.”

3.– In the opinion of the referring court, the question is relevant because Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "does not allow the accused to request and obtain the summoning of subjects as civilly liable parties, except in the cases introduced by the judgments of the Constitutional Court no. 112 of 1998 and no. 159 of 2022,” to which the present case does not pertain.”

Therefore, the request of the accused must be rejected in light of the current wording of the challenged provision.

4.– Regarding the non-manifestly unfounded nature, the referring judge – citing constitutional jurisprudence on the summoning of the civilly liable party by the accused in criminal proceedings – observes that the case under examination exhibits the same requirements that "led to the declarations of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [with the] judgments of the Constitutional Court no. 112 of 1998 and 159 of 2022,” relating to compulsory insurance for third-party liability arising, respectively, from the circulation of motor vehicles, pursuant to Law no. 990 of December 24, 1969 (Compulsory insurance for third-party liability arising from the circulation of motor vehicles and watercraft) and from the use of weapons or implements useful for hunting, pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 8, of Law no. 157 of February 11, 1992 (Provisions for the protection of warm-blooded wild fauna and for hunting activities).

The insurance for third-party civil liability of the healthcare facility, public or private, "for damages caused by personnel ‘operating in any capacity at’” the facility is also compulsory pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, of Law no. 24 of 2017. Furthermore, the referring court notes that the injured party’s direct action against the insurer is provided for (Article 12, paragraph 1) – an action that "became fully operational [...] only from March 16, 2024, with the entry into force of Interministerial Decree 232/2023” – and that there exists "an internal guarantee relationship between the liable party-accused and the insurer-third party, which allows for recognizing a ‘plural’ function of the guarantee, thus safeguarding both the injured party-civil party and the liable party-accused.”

In the case of the "so-called ‘employed’ physician,” an employee of the healthcare facility, it could well be argued that the healthcare facility’s insurer is legally required to be liable for the act of the accused pursuant to Article 185, second paragraph, of the Penal Code.

In the referring court’s opinion, there exists, therefore, "an unjustified disparity of treatment – with a consequent violation of the principle of equality, under Article 3 of the Constitution – between the accused subjected to the compensation claim in the criminal proceedings (who is precluded, by virtue of the current provision of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from obtaining the summoning of the facility’s insurer as a civilly liable party) and the defendant in the same action in civil proceedings (who, instead, can summon the same insurer for guarantee, pursuant to Articles 1917, 4th paragraph, of the Civil Code and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure),” which was already noted in the Constitutional Court's judgments no. 112 of 1998 and no. 159 of 2022.

The fact that, in the present case, the summoning of the facility’s insurer, as a civilly liable party, was requested by the employed physician, namely a subject who is a party to a contract concluded with a different (legal) person, cannot be deemed "an obstacle to the existence of the aforementioned disparity of treatment.” This is because – the referring court specifies – this is a case of "insurance on behalf of another, according to the structure provided for in Article 1891 of the Civil Code, under which the healthcare facility assumes the role of contracting party and the healthcare practitioner that of the insured.” Even in this case, therefore, "the insurer, despite having stipulated the insurance contract with the healthcare facility (contracting party), must be liable – even directly towards the injured party – for the act of the accused-liable party (insured),” with the consequent configuration of a "civil liability ex lege, regardless of the fact that the accused is not a party to the contractual relationship between the insurer and the healthcare facility.”

5.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, with a brief filed on June 3, 2025, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, who requested that the question be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

In the opinion of the State defense, the question would be "lacking the requirement of relevance,” because the healthcare facility’s insurer "has already been summoned to the proceedings as a civilly liable party, by the civil parties, for the act of the accused.” It is, therefore, "not admissible even in abstracto [...] a further summoning [...] of the same insurer, for the same illicit act and under the same insurance title,” given the evident "lack of interest of the accused himself, who would already be guaranteed, in the event of a conviction.”

The question would also be inadmissible due to "the erroneous reconstruction of the regulatory framework,” as the referring court has "entirely overlooked the ‘decisive circumstance’ that the criminal act dates back to October 25, 2020 (date of the victim’s death)” and therefore "precedes the time of the effective validity of the Law [no. 24 of 2017], which became fully operational (as regards the direct action by the injured party provided for in Article 12) only from March 16, 2024, with the entry into force of the Interministerial Decree [December 15, 2023, no. 232] (Regulation determining the minimum requirements for insurance policies for public and private healthcare and socio-healthcare facilities and for healthcare practitioners, the minimum guarantee requirements and the general operating conditions for other similar measures, including direct risk assumption and the rules for risk transfer in case of contractual substitution by an insurance company, as well as the provision in the facilities' balance sheet of a risk fund and a fund constituted by the accrual reservation for compensation related to reported claims).”

The summoning of the healthcare facility’s insurer, as a civilly liable party, by the employed physician would therefore not be possible, because said liability would concern "prior facts for which the [Law of 2017] is not applicable.”

On the merits, however, the question would be unfounded, because Article 12 of Law no. 24 of 2017 subordinates, under penalty of inadmissibility, the direct civil action of the injured party against the healthcare facility’s insurer to the commencement of the preventive technical consultation or the mandatory conciliation attempt, which cannot be initiated in criminal proceedings.

Article 5, paragraph 6, letter g), of Legislative Decree no. 28 of March 4, 2010 (Implementation of Article 60 of Law no. 69 of June 18, 2009, on mediation aimed at conciliation of civil and commercial disputes), moreover, exempts the "civil action exercised in criminal proceedings” from the conciliation attempt, but not from the preventive technical assessment, which "remains necessary under penalty of inadmissibility of the claim.”

Considered in Law

1.– With the order indicated in the preamble (reg. ord. no. 82 of 2025), the Court of Verona, Criminal Section, in a single-judge panel, questions, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, the constitutional legitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, "insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 1, of Law no. 24 of March 8, 2017 […], the insurer of the healthcare or socio-healthcare facility may be summoned in the criminal proceedings at the request of the accused.”

1.1.– The referring court states that the judgment concerns a medical director serving in the surgery unit of a Verona healthcare facility, accused of negligent homicide for having caused, "due to fault consisting of imprudence, negligence, and lack of skill, as well as specific fault for not observing the guidelines,” the death of a patient due to septic shock on October 25, 2020.

At the preliminary hearing, on October 10, 2024, the next of kin of the deceased patient constituted themselves as civil parties, and at the first trial hearing, on January 29, 2025, "the defense counsel for the accused requested the summoning, as civilly liable party, of the insurance of the (public) healthcare facility of which the accused [himself] is (and was also at the time of the facts) an employee.”

The request should, however, be rejected in light of the current wording of the challenged provision, which "does not allow the accused to request and obtain the summoning of subjects as civilly liable parties, except in the cases introduced by the judgments of the Constitutional Court no. 112 of 1998 and no. 159 of 2022,” to which the present case does not pertain.”

Hence the relevance of the question.

1.2.– The referring court holds that the challenged provision violates Article 3 of the Constitution, as it results in "an unjustified disparity of treatment [...] between the accused subjected to the compensation claim in the criminal proceedings (who is precluded, by virtue of the current provision of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from obtaining the summoning of the facility’s insurer as a civilly liable party) and the defendant in the same action in civil proceedings (who, instead, can summon the same insurer for guarantee, pursuant to Articles 1917, 4th paragraph, of the Civil Code and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure),” which was already noted in the recalled judgments of the Constitutional Court no. 112 of 1998 and no. 159 of 2022.

In the case under its review, in fact, the same requirements are met that "led to the [prior] declarations of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

Firstly, the insurance for third-party civil liability of the healthcare facility "for damages caused by personnel ‘operating in any capacity at’” the facility is compulsory, pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, of Law no. 24 of 2017. Furthermore, the injured party’s direct action against the insurance company is provided for (Article 12, paragraph 1), and finally, there exists "an internal guarantee relationship between the liable party-accused and the insurer-third party, which allows for recognizing a ‘plural’ function of the guarantee, thus safeguarding both the injured party-civil party and the liable party-accused.”

2.– The State Attorney General’s Office raised an objection to the admissibility of the question on two different grounds.

2.1.– Firstly, the question would be "lacking the requirement of relevance,” because the healthcare facility’s insurance company "has already been summoned to the proceedings as a civilly liable party, by the civil parties, for the act of the accused.”

The objection is unfounded, as it does not appear that the constituted civil parties requested, nor that the judge ordered, the summoning of the insurer of the hospital facility of which the accused is an employee, as a civilly liable party.

2.2.– Secondly, the question would be inadmissible because "the criminal act dates back to October 25, 2020 (date of the victim’s death)” and therefore "precedes the time of the effective validity of the Law [no. 24 of 2017], which became fully operational (as regards the direct action by the injured party provided for in Article 12) only from March 16, 2024, with the entry into force of the Interministerial Decree” no. 232 of December 15, 2023 (Regulation determining the minimum requirements for insurance policies for public and private healthcare and socio-healthcare facilities and for healthcare practitioners, the minimum guarantee requirements and the general operating conditions for other similar measures, including direct risk assumption and the rules for risk transfer in case of contractual substitution by an insurance company, as well as the provision in the facilities' balance sheet of a risk fund and a fund constituted by the accrual reservation for compensation related to reported claims)).

Considered in Law

At the preliminary hearing, on October 10, 2024, the next of kin of the deceased patient constituted themselves as civil parties, and at the first trial hearing, on January 29, 2025, "the defense counsel for the accused requested the summoning, as civilly liable party, of the insurance of the (public) healthcare facility of which the accused [himself] is (and was also at the time of the facts) an employee.”

Hence the relevance of the question.

In the case under its review, in fact, the same requirements are met that "led to the [prior] declarations of constitutional illegitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

2.– The State Attorney General’s Office raised an objection to the admissibility of the question on two different grounds.

The objection is unfounded.

Pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 6, of Law no. 24 of 2017, "[t]he operationality of the provisions on the direct action of the injured party is [...] subordinated to the entry into force of the Ministerial Decree referred to in Article 10, paragraph 6, which is to establish the minimum requirements for insurance policies for healthcare and socio-healthcare facilities and for healthcare practitioners” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023). Said decree was adopted on December 15, 2023, and entered into force on March 16, 2024, prior to the exercise of the action for compensation for damages, in the present case on October 10, 2024, with the constitution of a civil party in the criminal proceedings.

In the referring court’s view, given the procedural nature of the cited Article 12, paragraph 6, the direct action against the healthcare facility’s insurer, as civilly liable party for the act of the employed physician, would be exercisable from the entry into force of the Ministerial Decree it provides for, irrespective of the time the act was committed. This is by virtue of the principle tempus regit actum.

The reasoning of the order of reference on this point and, therefore, on the relevance of the question is sufficient and not implausible; this is enough to pass the admissibility review, which, according to the constant constitutional jurisprudence, "is merely external and instrumental to the verification of adequate reasoning on the relevance of the question of constitutional legitimacy” (ex multis, Judgments no. 108 and no. 62 of 2025 and no. 49 of 2024).

3.– On the merits, the question is well-founded.

3.1.– This Court has thoroughly reconstructed, in Judgment no. 182 of 2023, the regulation of the "insurance obligations provided for by Article 10 of Law no. 24 of 2017,” which concern "distinctly three categories of subjects: a) healthcare facilities; b) self-employed physicians; c) ‘employed’ physicians.”

Regarding the insurance obligation of the former, which is relevant here, "public and private healthcare facilities [must] procure insurance policies, or [...] adopt ‘other similar measures,’ to cover two classes of risk.

They must first insure for third-party and service provider civil liability, also for damages caused by personnel: in other words, for civil liability arising both from their own act (e.g., organizational shortcomings) and from the act of others for which they are liable (conduct of service providers) (Article 10, paragraph 1, first and second sentences).

However, healthcare facilities also have the obligation to cover with insurance policies the civil liability of the medical personnel employed by them, in the event that this personnel is called upon to answer for the damage in their own right, as tortious liability (Article 10, paragraph 1, third sentence, in relation to Article 7, paragraph 3)” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023).

As clarified by this Court, "the first type of risk is the subject of insurance on its own behalf”; the second, however, "is the subject of insurance on behalf of another, according to the structure of Article 1891 of the Civil Code, in which the healthcare facility assumes the role of contracting party and the physician that of the insured” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023).

"Employed” physicians, therefore, "have no obligation to insure their own civil liability towards patients: that liability must, in fact, be covered – as seen – by the insurance (or similar measure) required of the healthcare facility for which they work” (further, Judgment no. 182 of 2023).

Regarding physicians practicing as self-employed professionals, however, the law leaves the insurance obligation in place, for the protection of the client, already established by pre-existing provisions (Article 10, paragraph 2 of Law no. 24 of 2017); they must therefore insure themselves independently.

3.2.– The question of constitutional legitimacy raised by the present referring court concerns the insurance that the healthcare facility must procure to cover the personal extracontractual liability of healthcare practitioners operating within the facility (the so-called "employed” physicians), pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, third sentence, in relation to Article 7, paragraph 3, of Law no. 24 of 2017.

With reference to this insurance, there would be, in the opinion of the referring court, a disparity of treatment, in terms of defensive opportunities, between the accused against whom the civil compensation action is exercised in criminal proceedings, who cannot summon the insurance company as a civilly liable party, and the defendant in the same action in civil proceedings, who is instead granted the right to summon his insurer for guarantee (Articles 1917, last paragraph, of the Civil Code and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

3.3.– As is known, pursuant to Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now challenged, the civilly liable party – that is, the person who, according to civil laws, must be liable for the act of the accused (Article 185, second paragraph, Penal Code) – may be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the civil party or, in the case provided for by Article 77, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the public prosecutor (when, that is, the latter, in a situation of "absolute urgency,” has exercised the civil action in the interest of an incapacitated injured party due to mental infirmity or minority).

With Judgment no. 112 of 1998, this Court held Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be constitutionally illegitimate, insofar as it did not also allow the accused to summon the insurer in criminal proceedings in the specific case of compulsory insurance for civil liability arising from the circulation of motor vehicles and watercraft provided for by Law no. 990 of 1969 (hereinafter: r.c.a.).

In particular, the decision highlighted two aspects: firstly, the circumstance that the injured party had a direct action for compensation against the insurer and that, in the proceedings brought by the injured party against the insurer, the liable party must also be summoned, thus constituting a necessary joinder of parties between these subjects; secondly, the connection between the possibility of summoning the insurer – offered to the defendant in civil proceedings – and the right of the insured party to be indemnified against compensation claims, with a correlative right of recourse, which is excluded for the insurer.

This Court, in fact, pointed out that such a "plural function” of the guarantee relationship – as it is intended to directly safeguard both the victim and the liable party – must necessarily correspond to the alignment, even in criminal proceedings, of the procedural powers of "summoning” recognized in civil proceedings, in order to prevent the effectiveness of the aforementioned function from being prejudiced by the injured party’s choice to assert their compensation claim by constituting themselves a civil party in the criminal proceedings, rather than in the natural forum. Hence the identified violation of the principle of equality, under the aspect of the disparity of treatment of the accused subjected to a compensation claim within the criminal proceedings compared to the defendant in the same action in civil proceedings.

These principles were duly reiterated in the subsequent Judgment no. 159 of 2022, which again declared Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutionally illegitimate, insofar as it did not provide that the insurer could be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the accused, this time in the case of civil liability arising from compulsory insurance for civil liability resulting from hunting activities, provided for by Article 12, paragraph 8, of Law no. 157 of 1992.

In that hypothesis as well, in fact, not only was there a compulsory insurance ex lege with a "plural guarantee function” (of both the insured hunter and the victims of hunting accidents), but the injured party’s direct action against the insurance company was also provided for (Article 12, paragraph 10, of Law no. 157 of 1992). However, since, unlike the compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, the compulsory insurance in the field of hunting did not expressly provide for the necessary joinder of parties between the insurer and the liable party in the proceedings brought against the former, this Court highlighted that "the only truly indispensable element for the liable party’s insurer to be qualified as civilly liable is the regulatory provision [...] for the injured party’s direct action: a provision in the face of which, in the event that the insured party’s illicit act constitutes an offense, the insurer must be considered obliged towards the victim, by virtue of a provision of civil law, to compensate for the damages caused by the crime jointly with the accused, in accordance with the scheme outlined by the Penal Code” (Judgment no. 159 of 2022).

3.4.– This Court considers that, in the case under examination, the same unjustified disparity of treatment must be recognized between the accused subjected to a compensation claim in criminal proceedings and the defendant in the same action in civil proceedings, which was already noted in the recalled judgments no. 112 of 1998 and no. 159 of 2022.

Indeed, the insurance of healthcare facilities for the civil liability of the medical personnel they employ, for the hypothesis in which this personnel is called upon to answer for the damage in their own right as tortious liability, is compulsory insurance ex lege.

The insurance obligation – provided for by Article 10, paragraph 1, third sentence, of Law no. 24 of 2017 – rests on the healthcare facility, rather than on the "employed” physician, because "it is intended that the costs of insurance – including as regards the extracontractual liability of the [physician] towards the patient – remain borne by the healthcare facility” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023). As already noted, this is a case of "insurance on behalf of another, according to the structure of Article 1891 of the Civil Code, in which the healthcare facility assumes the role of contracting party and the physician that of the insured” (further, Judgment no. 182 of 2023).

The object of the regulatory insurance obligation is, therefore, still the civil liability of the "employed” physician towards the patient, irrespective of the subject on whom that obligation rests.

Moreover, it is undeniable that the compulsory insurance for the physician’s civil liability towards the patient fulfills that "plural guarantee function” to which Judgment no. 159 of 2022 referred, most recently.

The compulsory insurance protects, first of all, the patients damaged by medical activity, guaranteeing them, within the limits of the insurance coverage ceiling, compensation for the damages suffered. This conclusion is supported by the circumstance, already highlighted by this Court, that, "[s]imilarly to the regulation on compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, Law no. 24 of 2017 allows [...] the injured party to act directly against the insurer (providing, moreover, that the liable party is a necessary co-party in the related proceedings), [...] when it concerns the company that insures the healthcare facility” to cover the personal extracontractual liability of the "employed” physicians operating within the facility (Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 4) (Judgment no. 182 of 2023). In this regard, the objection raised by the State Attorney General’s Office, based on the fact that Article 8 of Law no. 24 of 2017 subordinates, under penalty of inadmissibility, the direct civil action of the injured party against the healthcare facility’s insurer to the commencement of preventive technical consultation, which would not be possible in criminal proceedings, is not valid. It is, in fact, decisive that the cited Article 8 configures, as a "condition of admissibility” (paragraph 2), the "resort pursuant to Article 696-bis of the Code of Civil Procedure” for the action brought "before the civil judge relating to a dispute for compensation for damages resulting from healthcare liability” (paragraph 1), and not also for the same action exercised by constituting oneself a civil party in the criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, like every form of insurance, the insurance in question also protects the insured party, who has the right to be indemnified against the injured party’s compensation claims, with a correlative right of recourse against the insurer if they have satisfied them. Since, in the present case, it is an insurance on behalf of another, as already pointed out, it is the physician who assumes the role of the insured, "entitled, as such, to assert the rights arising from the contract pursuant to Article 1891, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, including that of indemnity against the claims of the civil party” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023). Moreover, it cannot be ignored that one of the purposes that Law no. 24 of 2017 pursues, through the provision of compulsory insurance and its regulation, is to ensure a more serene exercise of the activity of medical personnel, characterized by intrinsic and ineliminable margins of risk and by an increasing exposure to compensation claims by patients, by transferring, among other things, the costs of the insurance coverage for the related civil liability to the healthcare facility for which the personnel work, as previously noted. This objective would risk being frustrated if the physician subjected to a compensation claim in criminal proceedings could assert the right to indemnity from the insurer only "downstream” of their conviction, with the risk of having to satisfy the injured party's claims with personal resources in the meantime. These are, therefore, measures that also aim to counteract the harmful dynamics of defensive medicine.

In conclusion, even the "employed” physician, against whom a compensation claim is exercised by constituting oneself a civil party in criminal proceedings, must be granted the faculty to request the summoning of the insurance company providing coverage to the belonging healthcare facility, as a civilly liable party. Otherwise, "the effectiveness of the dual guarantee function of the insurance relationship,” established pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 1, of Law no. 24 of 2017, would remain "compromised, according to the injured party’s choice regarding the procedural venue in which to assert their claims,” with a consequent violation of Article 3 of the Constitution (Judgment no. 159 of 2022).

4.– For the reasons set forth above, the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is declared, insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 1, third sentence, of Law no. 24 of March 8, 2017, the insurer may be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the accused.

5.– This Court observes that, as already highlighted, the obligation to insure for civil liability towards the patient also rests on physicians practicing as self-employed professionals (Article 10, paragraph 2, of Law no. 24 of 2017, which leaves in place, for the protection of the client, the obligation already established by pre-existing provisions).

Moreover, Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the same law, "allows [...] the injured party to act directly against the insurer (providing, moreover, that the liable party is a necessary co-party in the related proceedings), [...] when it concerns the company that insures [...] the self-employed physician” (Judgment no. 182 of 2023).

With respect to this risk as well, therefore, the insurance for the physician’s civil liability towards the patient, on the one hand, is compulsory ex lege, and on the other hand, fulfills a "plural guarantee function,” protecting both the insured physician, who has the right to be indemnified against the injured party’s compensation claims, with a correlative right of recourse against the insurer if they have satisfied them, and the patients damaged by medical activity, guaranteeing them, within the limits of the insurance coverage ceiling, compensation for the damages suffered.

This Court therefore holds that – also in order to avoid creating disharmonies in the system, or unjustified disparities of treatment between "employed” physicians and self-employed physicians – the constitutional illegitimacy of the same Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is declared consequentially, pursuant to Article 27 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Provisions on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 2, of Law no. 24 of 2017, the insurer may be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the accused. The provision, in fact, expresses the same logic as that challenged by the referring order and affected by the same vice of constitutional illegitimacy.

for these reasons

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

1) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 1, third sentence, of Law no. 24 of March 8, 2017 (Provisions on the safety of care and the assisted person, as well as on the professional liability of healthcare practitioners), the insurer may be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the accused;

2) declares the consequential constitutional illegitimacy, pursuant to Article 27 of Law no. 87 of March 11, 1953 (Provisions on the constitution and functioning of the Constitutional Court), of the same Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it does not provide that, in the case of civil liability arising from the compulsory insurance established by Article 10, paragraph 2, of Law no. 24 of 2017, the insurer may be summoned in criminal proceedings at the request of the accused.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on October 20, 2025.

Signed:

Giovanni AMOROSO, President

Francesco Saverio MARINI, Rapporteur

Roberto MILANA, Chancery Director

Filed with the Chancery on November 25, 2025

The anonymized version conforms, in text, to the original