JUDGMENT NO. 119

YEAR 2024

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of: President:

Augusto Antonio BARBERA;

Judges: Franco MODUGNO, Giulio PROSPERETTI, Giovanni AMOROSO, Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3, paragraph 2; 5; 7; 8, paragraphs 1, 6, and 9; 10; 11; 13, paragraph 6; 14, paragraphs 3 and 5; 16; 18, paragraph 3; 19, paragraph 1; 20; 21, paragraphs 1 and 3; 34, paragraph 1; 36; 40; 41; 42; 47, paragraphs 2 and 4, and 48 of the Law of the Piedmont Region No. 7 of May 31, 2022 (Rules for simplification in urban planning and construction), initiated by the President of the Council of Ministers with a claim notified on August 1, 2022, filed in the registry on August 5, 2022, registered as No. 54 in the register of claims for 2022, and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 40, first special series, of the year 2022.

Having examined the instrument of constitution of the Piedmont Region, as well as the instrument of intervention, out of time, of Fabrizio Taricco Costruzioni srl;

Having heard at the public hearing of April 9, 2024, the reporting Judges Franco Modugno, Stefano Petitti, Emanuela Navarretta, and Marco D’Alberti;

Having heard the lawyer Daniele Granara for Fabrizio Taricco Costruzioni srl, the State Attorneys Gianna Galluzzo and Giancarlo Caselli for the President of the Council of Ministers, and the lawyer Marcello Cecchetti for the Piedmont Region;

Deliberated in the council chamber of May 7, 2024.

Considered in fact

1.– With a claim registered as No. 54 in the register of claims for 2022, filed on August 5, 2022, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General’s Office, initiated proceedings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 3, paragraph 2; 5; 7; 8, paragraphs 1, 6, and 9; 10; 11; 13, paragraph 6; 14, paragraphs 3 and 5; 16; 18, paragraph 3; 19, paragraph 1; 20; 21, paragraphs 1 and 3; 34, paragraph 1; 36; 40; 41; 42; 47, paragraphs 2 and 4, and 48 of the Law of the Piedmont Region No. 7 of May 31, 2022 (Rules for simplification in urban planning and construction).

The claimant complains, overall, of the violation of Articles 3, 5, 9, 32, 97, 117, second paragraph, letters m), p) and s), and 118, first and second paragraphs, of the Constitution, in relation, with regard to the alleged violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, to Articles 135, 143, and 145 of Legislative Decree No. 42 of January 22, 2004 (Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape, pursuant to Article 10 of Law No. 137 of July 6, 2002) and to Article 5, paragraph 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of May 13, 2011 (European Semester – First urgent provisions for the economy), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 106 of July 12, 2011; the violation of Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the fundamental principles of the matter of “governance of the territory”, set out in Articles 2-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, 9-bis, paragraph 1-bis, 10, paragraph 1, letter c), 14, 16, paragraph 4, letter d-ter), 23, paragraph 01, letter a), 31, 32, paragraph 1, letters a), b), c) and d), and 34-bis of Presidential Decree No. 380 of June 6, 2001, containing the “Consolidated Text of the legislative and regulatory provisions on construction. (Text A)”, from Article 5, paragraphs 10 and 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted, and from Article 41-quinquies of Law No. 1150 of August 17, 1942 (Urban Planning Law), as implemented by the decree of the Minister for Public Works, in agreement with the Minister for the Interior, No. 1444 of April 2, 1968 (Non-derogable limits of building density, height, distance between buildings, and maximum ratios between spaces intended for residential and productive settlements and public spaces or those reserved for collective activities, public green spaces, or parking lots, to be observed for the formation of new urban planning instruments or the revision of existing ones, pursuant to Article 17 of Law No. 765 of 1967); of the same parameter under Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, with regard to the matter of “health protection”, in relation to the decree of the Minister of Health of July 5, 1975 (Amendments to the ministerial instructions of June 20, 1896, regarding the minimum height and main health and hygiene requirements of residential premises); and, finally, the violation of the principle of loyal cooperation, under Articles 5 and 120 of the Constitution.

2.– Regarding Article 3, paragraph 2, of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, the claimant denounces the violation of Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, with regard to the matter of “governance of the territory”, in relation to the fundamental principles expressed by Article 9-bis, paragraph 1-bis, of the Consolidated Building Code.

The challenged provision, in modifying Article 2 of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of October 4, 2018 (Measures for the reuse, requalification of buildings, and urban regeneration), added letter d-bis) to paragraph 1, which defines as lawful buildings or parts of buildings those “built lawfully or for which a building permit in regularization has been issued pursuant to Articles 36 and 37 of Presidential Decree No. 380 of June 6, 2001 (Consolidated Text of the legislative and regulatory provisions on construction), Law No. 47 of February 28, 1985 (Rules on the control of urban planning and construction activity, penalties, recovery, and regularization of illegal works), Law No. 724 of December 23, 1994 (Measures for the rationalization of public finance), Decree-Law No. 269 of September 30, 2003 (Urgent provisions to promote development and to correct the trend of public accounts), converted, with amendments, by Law No. 326 of November 24, 2003. For properties built in an era in which the law did not require, for building activity in the portion of territory concerned, the acquisition of a building permit, even in the presence of different local provisions, the lawful status can be inferred from the initial cadastral information or other evidentiary documents, such as photographs, cartographic extracts, archive documents, or other public or private acts whose provenance is demonstrated, and from the building permit of the last building intervention that affected the property or real estate unit, integrated with any subsequent permits authorizing partial interventions.”

In particular, in the claimant’s view, the definition of the "lawful status” of the property introduced by the regional legislator would deviate from that contained in Article 9-bis, paragraph 1-bis, of the Consolidated Building Code, in the part where it provides that, for “properties built in an era in which it was not mandatory to acquire the building permit”, the lawful status must be inferred from the initial cadastral information or other evidentiary documents and from the permits described therein.

According to the State Attorney General’s Office, the interposed state provision, with a different discipline from that contained in the challenged regional legislation, would establish that the lawful status of the property must be inferred from the aforementioned evidentiary elements.

In addition, the state defense refers to Article 31, first paragraph, of Law No. 1150 of 1942 and Article 10 of Law No. 765 of August 6, 1967 (Amendments and additions to Urban Planning Law No. 1150 of August 17, 1942), from which it deduces that, for constructions built before the entry into force of the aforementioned law of 1967, the building license was already required if the work fell within the built-up area or in areas of expansion and, outside of these cases, if the municipal building regulations had established the obligation to obtain a building license, for the purposes of assessing the lawful status (in this regard, the remitting party refers to the judgments of the Council of State, sixth section, No. 3899 of August 7, 2015; fourth section, No. 5141 of October 21, 2008; fifth section, No. 287 of March 14, 1980, and the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court for Lombardy, second section, No. 37 of January 9, 2017).

Therefore, in the view of the state defense, the challenged regional provision, by including in the definition of "lawful properties” constructions without a building permit built before 1967 outside of built-up areas and expansion areas, would produce, by also including cases in which the license was required by municipal building regulations, a violation of the aforementioned state principles, with a consequent undue extension of the notion of lawfully built properties.

Having recognized, therefore, in the aforementioned Article 9-bis, paragraph 1-bis, of the Consolidated Building Code, the nature of a fundamental principle in the matter of “governance of the territory”, the State Attorney’s Office affirms that “the state legislation is responsible for ‘the choices of principle, in particular those relating to the if, when, and how much, i.e., the decision on whether to provide for an extraordinary building permit’, exclusively in compliance with which the regional legislation is competent for the articulation and specification of the provisions dictated by the state legislator.”

3.– Also with regard to Article 3, paragraph 2, of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, the claimant complains of the violation of Article 117, second paragraph, letter m), of the Constitution, with regard to the matter of determining the “essential levels of services [concerning civil and social rights] that must be ensured uniformly throughout the national territory.”

In particular, on the assumption that it is up to the state legislator to issue provisions concerning possible regularizations, while "the regional legislator can intervene only with regard to the articulation and specification of these provisions,” the regions could not "circumvent the demolition obligation imposed by state law,” and it would not be conceivable in any way to remit to a regional legislative discipline the notion of lawfully built property, "it being evident the need for uniform application of this notion, which - due to its repercussions, also in terms of the lawfulness of urban regeneration interventions - can only pertain to the essential levels of services that must be ensured throughout the entire national territory.”

4.– The President of the Council of Ministers then challenges Article 5 of the same Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, which replaced Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018.

Following the amendment, the aforementioned Article 3 provides in paragraph 1 that: "[t]he provisions of this section apply to properties lawfully built and to their relevant appurtenances existing on the date of approval of this law, without prejudice to the limitations referred to in Article 11 and lawful, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter d-bis), at the time of submission of the application for reuse and requalification intervention.”

Then, in paragraph 2, it establishes that "[f]or the purposes of reuse and requalification of the properties referred to in paragraph 1, reference is made to what is provided for: a) by the PPR, by territorial plans and general regulatory plans, as well as by their implementing instruments; b) by Article 5 of Decree-Law No. 70 of May 13, 2011 (European Semester - First urgent provisions for the economy), converted into law, with amendments, by Law No. 106 of July 12, 2011; c) by Article 14, paragraph 1-bis, of Presidential Decree 380/2001 for building renovation interventions; d) by the provisions of this section, as provided for in paragraph 5.”

The claimant notes that, before the amendment, the interventions provided for by the so-called second housing plan would have been allowed "only on buildings lawfully built or for which it turned out that a building permit in regularization had been issued (the issuing of which, as is known, requires that the work carried out be in accordance with, as well as the urban planning and construction regulations in force at the time of submission of the application, those in force at the time of its implementation – the so-called double conformity) on the date of submission of the intervention request.” Conversely, by virtue of the reference made to Article 2, paragraph 1, letter d-bis), of Law No. 16 of 2018 (as in turn amended), the same interventions would be allowed, "in addition to the aforementioned buildings, also on those subject to building regularization (i.e., on properties not compliant with urban planning and construction regulations according to the parameter of double conformity).”

4.1.– In the view of the Attorney General’s Office, the extension to properties subject to building regularization of the building benefits, provided for by Article 5 of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted - to whose discipline the aforementioned Article 3, paragraph 2, letter b), of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018 refers - would be in clear contrast with Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the state principle of the matter of “governance of the territory”, set out in the same Article 5, paragraph 10, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted. This, in fact, establishes that "[t]he interventions referred to in paragraph 9 cannot relate to illegal buildings or sites in historic centers or in areas of absolute non-building, with the exclusion of buildings for which a building permit in regularization has been issued.”

In particular, according to the President of the Council of Ministers, this Court, with judgment No. 24 of 2022, would have clarified that, with regard to the aforementioned state provision, "[t]he permit in regularization, which is relevant for the purposes of the granting of volumetric incentives, differs from the building regularization enhanced by the regional legislator.”

5.– The claimant then challenges, again, Article 5 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, in the part where it amended Article 3, paragraph 3, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, recognizing in the current discipline a violation of Articles 9 and 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 135, 143 and 145 of the Code of Cultural Heritage and to Article 5, paragraph 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted, as well as Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution.

5.1.– The rule resulting from the reform introduced in 2022 would give “the Municipalities the power to grant, for the interventions of the so-called second housing plan, premium volumes, as well as to allow the relocation of surfaces and volumes, autonomously establishing the methods for the correct insertion of these interventions – of significant impact – in the territorial context.”

By virtue of the phrase present in the challenged provision, which makes "without prejudice to the provisions of the municipal council resolution,” this provision could dictate measures that conflict with the current general regulatory plan (PRG), "and this regardless of whether the same PRG is adapted or not to the PPR.”

Moreover, according to the claimant, the municipality would be invested with real powers of landscape planning, being able to autonomously establish “the interventions eventually necessary to achieve architectural and landscape harmonization with respect to the built context, with the power to grant, after motivation, even greater bonuses than those referred to in letter c).”

The President of the Council of Ministers contests that, in this way, "there would be, albeit indirectly, a violation of the PPR adopted by the Region in agreement with the Ministry of Culture, the state administration responsible for the protection of landscape values.” And this despite the general clause provided for in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the same Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, according to which "[i]n order to limit soil consumption and requalify the existing city, increase the static safety of artifacts, the energy performance of the same, promote the improvement of environmental, landscape, and architectural quality of the built fabric, the Region promotes interventions for the reuse and requalification of existing buildings, urban regeneration interventions, and the recovery of attics and rustic buildings, in compliance with the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 42 of January 22, 2004 (Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape, pursuant to Article 10 of Law No. 137 of July 6, 2002) and the regional landscape plan (PPR).”

The claimant recalls that the Ministry for Cultural Heritage and Activities (now: Ministry of Culture) signed with the Piedmont Region the agreement on the Landscape Plan of March 14, 2017, stipulated pursuant to Article 143, paragraph 2, of the Code of Cultural Heritage, for the purposes of approval of the landscape plan in agreement between the parties. The PPR of the Piedmont Region was then approved, at the end of the co-planning process initiated with the State, with a resolution of the Regional Council of October 3, 2017, No. 233-35836. With a decree of the President of the Regional Council of March 22, 2019, No. 4/R, the regional regulation containing the “Implementation of the Landscape Plan of the Piedmont Region (Ppr), pursuant to Article 8bis, paragraph 7, of Regional Law No. 56 of December 5, 1977 (Protection and Use of Land) and Article 46, paragraph 10, of the implementing rules of the Ppr,” in force since April 12, 2019, was subsequently adopted, which regulates, among other things, the adaptation of planning instruments to the PPR, in implementation of what is provided for by Article 145 of the Code of Cultural Heritage. According to what the claimant also reports, at the moment there would be few municipalities that have adapted their PRGs to the PPR, while for the others, the transitional discipline referred to in the aforementioned regulation remains applicable, according to which, until the adaptation, the provisions of the PRGs in force on the date of entry into force of the PPR are implemented with the methods, direct or indirect, provided for by the PRG itself, provided that they are not in conflict with the binding and immediately prevailing provisions of the PPR.

The President of the Council of Ministers, therefore, refers to Article 143, paragraph 9, of the Code of Cultural Heritage, in the part in which it expressly provides that “[a]s from the date of approval of the plan, the relative forecasts and prescriptions are immediately binding and prevailing over the provisions of territorial and urban plans.” In particular, according to the State Attorney’s Office, the municipal urban planning instruments should “be conformed or adapted, not only to the provisions for use contained in the landscape plan (immediately conforming the uses of the territory), but also to the guidelines and directives contained in the same plan (which it is up to urban planning to decline in concrete terms and implement).”

Given the above, the state defense believes that, by derogating from urban planning, "the implementation of the directives contained in the landscape plan, to which the urban planning instruments must be conformed, would be undermined,” thus realizing, from this point of view, "an indirect derogation from landscape planning,” while "the modification of the landscape plan is to be considered admissible exclusively through new planning, which takes into account the specific territorial contexts.”

5.2.– The claimant then notes that the provision of regional rules, which would contemplate, in a general and abstract way, indiscriminate interventions with a significant impact on the territory, without allowing an assessment in concrete terms, would be in radical contrast with the principles mentioned. Immediately after, however, it states that "[l]andscape protection is […] being seriously undermined, because it is limited to the individual decisions that, on a case-by-case basis, the administrative bodies in charge will have to make within the framework of the landscape authorization procedure referred to in Article 146 of the Code.”

Therefore, the provisions of Articles 135, 143 and 145 of the Code of Cultural Heritage would be violated, which would find further support in the reference that Article 5, paragraph 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted, makes to the limits of the so-called second housing plan, which expressly saves the “provisions contained in the Code of Cultural Heritage and Landscape.”

5.3.– The alleged derogation from landscape planning would also violate Articles 3 and 97 of the Constitution, as it would be contradictory in itself, and therefore unreasonable, as well as contrary to the principle of the proper functioning of the administration.

In support of such an assumption, the claimant emphasizes that "[o]n the one hand […] the Region has approved the landscape plan and on the other hand reiterates, and indeed expands, the scope of exceptional provisions derogating from the plan itself, outside of the necessary planning framework that is non-derogable and binding for urban planning instruments.”

5.4.– Finally, the State Attorney General’s Office found, again with respect to the amendment made by Article 5 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022 to Article 3, paragraph 3, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, a violation of the principle of loyal cooperation.

In the view of the claimant, the provision would constitute the result of a choice made unilaterally by the Region, outside of the long shared path with the State that led to the approval of the PPR. Such a method of regulation would, therefore, be unconstitutional, by virtue of the fact that the principle of loyal cooperation presides over all relations that exist between the State and the regions, as it is suitable to regulate them dynamically, attenuating dualisms and avoiding excessive rigidities.

6.– Another provision challenged by the President of the Council of Ministers is Article 7 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, which amended Article 5 of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018.

6.1.– From a first point of view, the violation of Articles 3, 9, 97, and 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 135, 143 and 145 of the Code of Cultural Heritage, is contested.

6.1.1.– The claimant, focusing in particular on the amendments to Article 5, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, believes that they allow interventions also implemented "in derogation from the Regional Landscape Plan.”

In the aforementioned paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, in fact, the reference to compliance with the rules of the PPR is missing, and the provision that "such interventions must be consistent with any requirements of the urban planning instruments for the conservation and safeguarding of the settlement, architectural, historical-artistic, landscape, or documentary characters” would be insufficient.

According to the claimant, if the municipal urban plan has not yet conformed to the landscape plan, the latter instrument would in fact be derogated from, since the assessments inherent to protection would be entrusted exclusively to the assessment of the municipalities, which would replace the PPR. Where, on the other hand, the urban plan was conformed, only those prescriptions for which a direct finalization to protection needs is provided by the municipalities (and not by the State or by the Region, which contributed to landscape planning) would be saved.

6.1.2.– Again, according to the State Attorney General’s Office, the alleged derogation from landscape planning would be contradictory in itself, and therefore unreasonable, as well as contrary to the principle of proper administration, since the Region would have, on the one hand, approved the landscape plan and, on the other hand, reiterated - even expanding its scope - the exceptional provisions derogating from the same instrument, outside of the necessary non-derogable planning framework.

6.2.– From another perspective, the President of the Council of Ministers also challenges Article 7 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, for having introduced an amendment to Article 5 of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, which would be in open contrast with Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the fundamental principles of the matter of "governance of the territory,” set out in Article 41-quinquies of Law No. 1150 of 1942, as implemented by Ministerial Decree No. 1444 of 1968, as well as by Article 5, paragraph 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted.

6.2.1.– Paragraph 9 of the aforementioned Article 5 of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, as amended, in fact, provides that "[t]he interventions referred to in the preceding paragraphs may exceed the building and urban planning parameters provided for by the urban planning instruments and may: a) entail an increase or decrease in the number of real estate units undergoing building renovation; b) exceed the land densities established by Article 7 of [Ministerial Decree No. 1444 of 1968]; c) exceed the maximum height allowed by the urban planning instruments up to the quantity necessary to raise the building by one floor.”

According to the claimant, this provision would undermine the fundamental state principle, according to which interventions of building and urban transformation are allowed only within the framework of urban planning, within which a function of regulation of land uses is exercised, necessary and irreplaceable, as it is suitable to synthesize the multiple interests, also of constitutional importance, that pertain to each territorial area.

Unlike what is provided for by the regional legislator, the state regulator would therefore have provided for the possibility of assenting interventions in derogation from urban planning only by virtue of a decision taken, on a case-by-case basis, at the local level, based on a weighing of interests that takes into account the territorial context (Article 14 of the Consolidated Building Code). This would determine that the Region would not be allowed to "introduce generalized ex lege derogations from urban planning”, all the more so if such "generalized derogations take on a stable character over time.”

In support of the denounced censures, the claimant also refers to the constitutional jurisprudence, which has "emphasized how the power of urban planning ‘is not only functional to the interest in the orderly building development of the territory […], but is also aimed at the balanced implementation of a plurality of different public interests, which find their foundation in constitutionally guaranteed values’” (Judgment No. 219 of 2021 is cited).

In further support of this outcome, the claimant recalls how the same legislation on the housing plan "exclude[s] the possibility of derogating from Ministerial Decree No. 1444 of 1968” (in this regard, the remitting party refers to lengthy excerpts from judgment No. 217 of 2020). Therefore, in the opinion of the state defense, if so much has been provided for with reference to the legislation on the housing plan, which qualifies itself for its extraordinary and derogating character, it should be "considered valid with reference to regional provisions, such as the one in question, which introduce generalized derogations from urban planning, in the absence of coverage by a state law.”

6.2.2.– Furthermore, with regard to the same Article 7 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, the state defense denounces the violation of the principle of loyal cooperation, since the challenged provision would be the result of a choice made unilaterally by the Region, outside of the long shared path with the State that led to the approval of the PPR.

7.– The President of the Council of Ministers also challenges Article 8, paragraphs 1, 6, and 9, of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022.

The claimant states that Article 8 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022 makes amendments and additions to Article 6 of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018.

According to the claimant, paragraph 1 of Article 8 of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, by also allowing "the recovery of attics not yet existing at the time of submission of the intervention application, once three years have passed since their construction,” would unreasonably expand, in violation of Articles 3, 9, and 97 of the Constitution, the number of cases in which an attic susceptible to residential recovery can be configured.

As for Article 8, paragraph 6, of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022, which in turn replaces Article 6, paragraph 7, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, the claimant points out that the provision allows the recovery of existing attics "regardless of the indices or urban planning and building parameters provided for by the PRGs and the implementing instruments in force or adopted.” The provision would conflict with Article 117, third paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to the matter of the governance of the territory, due to a conflict with Article 5, paragraph 11, of Decree-Law No. 70 of 2011, as converted, according to which, within the framework of the interventions of the "housing plan,” until the entry into force of regional regulations, the issuance of a building permit in derogation from urban planning instruments is allowed pursuant to Article 14 of the Consolidated Building Code. The latter, establishing a fundamental principle in the concurrent legislative matter of governance of the territory, states, in paragraph 3, that "[t]he derogation, in compliance with the hygienic, health, and safety rules, may exclusively concern the limits of building density, height, and distance between buildings referred to in the implementing regulations of general and executive urban planning instruments, as well as the permissible uses, without prejudice in any case to compliance with the provisions of Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Ministerial Decree No. 1444 of April 2, 1968.” It would also be "violated the fundamental principle in the matter of ‘governance of the territory’ contained in Article 2-bis, paragraphs 1 and 1-bis, of Presidential Decree No. 380 of 2001.”

In addition, with reference to attics falling in areas protected from a landscape point of view, the Piedmontese regional law, providing that the recovery of attics can take place substantially in derogation from the indices and urban planning and building parameters provided for by the PRG and implementing instruments, would remove the discipline of interventions from the proper seat of the landscape plan.

The systematic and generalized derogation from urban planning instruments would also entail a violation of the principles concerning the general need for land planning and compliance with urban planning standards.

Therefore, the derogation from urban planning, resulting in an indirect derogation from the provisions of the landscape plan, would violate Article 117, second paragraph, letter s), of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 135, 143, and 145 of the Code of Cultural Heritage, as well as Articles 3 and 9 of the Constitution. The principle of loyal cooperation would also be violated, since the Piedmont Region would have taken "unilateral and repeated initiatives, outside of the collaboration path already profitably concluded with the State through the approval of the 2017 Landscape Plan.”

Article 8, paragraph 9, of Piedmont Region Law No. 7 of 2022 is also challenged, in the part where, by amending Article 6, paragraph 10, of Piedmont Region Law No. 16 of 2018, it