JUDGMENT NO. 70

YEAR 2024

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Augusto Antonio BARBERA;

Justices: Franco MODUGNO, Giulio PROSPERETTI, Giovanni AMOROSO, Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D'ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 257, second sentence, of Law No. 296 of 27 December 2006, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-annual State budget (Financial Law 2007)”, initiated by the Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, in the case between G. S. and Roma Capitale and the State Property Agency, by order of 13 October 2023, registered under no. 155 of the 2023 register of orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 49, first special series, of the year 2023.

Having examined the act of constitution of G. S. and the act of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having heard at the public hearing of 6 March 2024 the Reporting Judge Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi;

Having heard the lawyer Carmine Alessandro Arieta for G. S. and the State Attorney Francesco Meloncelli for the President of the Council of Ministers;

Deliberated in the Chamber of Council on 7 March 2024.

Facts of the Case

1.– By order of 13 October 2023 (reg. ord. no. 155 of 2023), the Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 257, second sentence, of Law No. 296 of 27 December 2006, containing "Provisions for the formation of the annual and multi-annual State budget (Financial Law 2007)”, insofar as it "provides for the retroactive application of the new criteria for determining the compensation for the unlawful, or non-compliant, construction of immovable works on the maritime state property, which are based on market values and not on the legislative criteria expressed in the previous Legislative Decree no. 400 of 1993”, with reference to Articles 3, 23, 24, first paragraph, 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

2.– The referring court sets out the events of the proceedings a quo and reports that G. S., in resuming the proceedings previously initiated before the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, which had then declared itself lacking jurisdiction, challenged before the Ordinary Court of Rome, by act notified on 13 February 2009, the provision of 23 November 2007 with which the Municipality of Rome ordered him to pay EUR 64,628.13 as compensation determined pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 257, of Law no. 296 of 2006, in reference to the period 1 January 2002-31 December 2007, for a maritime state property concession that expired on 31 December 2001, relating to the maintenance of a beach cabin for summer residence on a maritime state property area located in Ostia Lido.

With this administrative provision, the Municipality of Rome contested not only the unlawful occupation of the area, but also the construction on it of immovable works in the total absence of an enabling title.

The plaintiff in the main proceedings reconstructed the complex administrative affair concerning the original concession granted to his predecessor in title until 31 December 2001, reporting his unsuccessful attempts to obtain its extension or renewal. He also stated that he had asked the Court of Rome to annul the challenged provision and, in the alternative, to reduce the amount of compensation, "due to the principle of non-retroactivity applicable to Law No. 296/2006”, which was the basis of the quantification carried out by the Municipality of Rome, as it came into force after the period of unlawful occupation identified by the municipal administration.

From the reconstruction of the facts carried out by the referral order, it appears that the Court and the Court of Appeal of Rome rejected the claim, having ascertained the unlawfulness of the occupation and the unlawfulness, incapable of being remedied, of the construction carried out, which irreversibly affected the building and urban planning layout of the area.

The referring court points out that the judges of both levels of judgment have addressed the issue of the effectiveness in time of Article 1, paragraph 257, of Law No. 296 of 2006, insofar as it provides that the compensation due is commensurate with the market rent in the event of unlawful occupation of state property, when it results – as in the present case – in the construction of immovable works in the total absence of an enabling title, or in the presence of an enabling title that, due to its content, is incompatible with the destination and regulation of the state property. In this regard, it appears that the Court and the Court of Appeal of Rome considered the retroactive application of the aforementioned provision to be lawful, considering it to be of an interpretative nature.

G. S. filed an appeal to the Court of Cassation against the second instance judgment, contesting, first of all, with the first three grounds of appeal, the conclusions of the Territorial Court regarding the unrectifiable abusiveness of the works carried out on the state property area and reintroducing, with another independent ground of appeal, the issue of the non-retroactive applicability of the aforementioned regulatory provision. According to the appellant, the aforementioned provision would not have a real interpretative scope, but rather an innovative character that would be in conflict with the prohibition of retroactivity provided for by Article 3 of Law No. 212 of 27 July 2000 (Provisions on the statute of taxpayers' rights) or by Article 1 of Law No. 689 of 24 November 1981 (Amendments to the penal system), depending on whether the compensation is recognised as having a tax or punitive nature.

From the appellant's perspective, it would instead be necessary to apply, instead of those introduced by Article 1, paragraph 257, of Law No. 296 of 2006, the calculation criteria previously dictated by Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 400 of 5 October 1993 (Provisions for the determination of fees relating to maritime state property concessions), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 494 of 4 December 1993.

3.– Having premised this, the referring court, precisely with reference to the ground of appeal last illustrated, expresses doubts about the constitutional legitimacy of the provision referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of Law No. 296 of 2006, if it is considered applicable also to events that occurred before its entry into force.

To justify the impact on the main proceedings of the suspicions of constitutional illegitimacy put forward, which presuppose that the other grounds of appeal to the Court of Cassation are unfounded, the a quo panel declares that it shares the appealed judgment, insofar as it has qualified as unlawful the construction object of the case, as it was built in the total absence of an enabling title and on state property land. Indeed, it would be established in the case law (of which several rulings are cited) the principle according to which constructions on state property land are not susceptible of regularization.

From the consequent existence of the prerequisite for the application of the provision under examination would therefore derive the relevance of the questions raised: if these were accepted, in fact, the judgment should be decided without applying the challenged regulatory provision.

4.– As for non-manifest unfoundedness, in the opinion of the referring panel, it is first necessary to establish whether the second sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of Law No. 296 of 2006, in force since 1 January 2007, should be considered an innovative rule, as such applicable only from that latter date.

Such a qualification, observes the referring court, would find "insurmountable obstacles in the literal and overall formulation of the rule”.

In this regard, the interpretative nature of the first sentence of the provision would have already been affirmed by the case law itself (of which some rulings are cited).

It would now be necessary to establish whether a similar character should also be recognized for the second sentence, as held by the appealed judgment in the proceedings a quo, which in fact retroactively applied the new and more burdensome criteria for determining the compensation to an occupation of state property area prior to the entry into force of the provision.

4.1.– Before deciding on the point, the referring panel dwells on the nature of the compensation in question, clearly excluding that it is a tax or administrative penalty and classifying it, instead, as a patrimonial income attributable to a private-law-type performance, ancillary and linked to obtaining an occupation fee, as such involving subjective rights with patrimonial content. In this sense, numerous rulings of legitimacy would support this, cited in the referral order and rendered in the jurisdiction settlement proceedings, from which the principle would be derived that, in the case in question, a dispute relating to the enforcement phase of the relationship would arise, subsequent to the award of the concession of public property. Therefore, the sums claimed by the municipal administration should be recognised as having a purely compensatory nature "under a private law regime”. In this sense, the final phrase of the challenged provision would also support this, which, by referring to them, saves "the application of the current penalty measures, including the restoration of the state of places”.

4.2.– Having excluded the nature of tax or administrative penalty of the compensation under discussion, the referring panel also discards the possibility of attributing effectiveness only for the future to the challenged provision, which provides for new methods of calculation: "[t]he literal meaning of the words used, their connection and the intention of the legislator” would argue "in the sense of the interpretative tenor of all the provisions” referred to in Article 1, paragraph 257, of Law No. 296 of 2006.

The self-qualification contained in the first sentence would "unequivocally state the interpretative purpose of the rule”: on the one hand, in fact, the latter would clarify that the uses contemplated in Article 8 of Legislative Decree no. 400 of 1993, as converted, include "also the mere occupation of maritime state property and related appurtenances”; on the other hand, "the declared interpretative urgency would go so far as to clarify” that, instead, the construction of immovable works on maritime state property – in the total absence of an enabling title or in the presence of a non-compliant enabling title – "will be subject to requests for compensation commensurate with market values”.

In other words, within the framework of a plan aimed at bringing the values of use of state property closer to those of the market, avoiding "abstract” tabular evaluations, the entire paragraph 257 cited would express the intention of the legislator to enhance public property, with a view to "greater profitability for the State […], proportionally reducing the advantages of private parties who assume the role of concessionaires” (according to what was affirmed by this Court in judgment no. 302 of 2010).

Ultimately, the initial doubt should be resolved in the sense of recognizing the challenged provision a clear interpretative function, with consequent retroactive effectiveness of the new criteria for calculating the compensation, commensurate with market values.

5.– This being stated, according to the referring panel the formulation of the provision would not have created "any doubt of legitimacy”, if its application had been foreseen only "from the moment of its entry into force”, since the merit of the legislative choices regarding the "appropriateness of the compensatory patrimonial determinations” could not be challenged.

The retroactive effect depending on the interpretative nature of the rule, however, leads the judge a quo to doubt its compatibility with the constitutional parameters evoked.

5.1.– Firstly, a violation of Articles 3 and 23 of the Constitution is denounced, especially with respect to the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations.

The referring court points out that the challenged provision would not have intervened to resolve case-law disputes concerning the application of the previous method of quantifying concession fees and related compensation, as provided for by Legislative Decree No. 400 of 1993, as converted.

It also excludes "the need to make up for previous inequities through the retroactive intervention of the new criteria for determining the compensation”.

The "mere opportunity” to adapt "rapidly and even retroactively” the management of maritime state property "to the new trends of a dynamic and market economy”, also in the pursuit of the aim of containing the public spending of local authorities and protecting the assets of the State, would not be sufficient to prevent the violation of Article 3 of the Constitution.

The judge a quo admits that the legislator can attribute retroactive effect to a law – with the only limit posed by Article 25, second paragraph, of the Constitution in criminal matters – and that such effect must be recognized to laws that are authentically interpretative; he also cites the jurisprudence of this Court regarding the cases in which this technique can legitimately be used.

However, it recalls that when a provision, despite its self-qualification, does not in fact have an interpretative nature, this may be a symptom of the improper use of the legislative function of authentic interpretation, imposing an expansion of this Court's review of the correctness of the balancing carried out by the legislator.

To this end, it also reconstructs the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on retroactive laws, citing numerous rulings that recall the limits constituted by the necessary existence of "imperative reasons of general interest” and by the prohibition of interference by the legislative power in the administration of justice in order to influence the judicial outcome of a dispute.

Having stated this, the referring court considers that the challenged provision does not pass the constitutional legitimacy test carried out according to the principles illustrated, as the legislator has not carried out a fair balance "between the surprise to which the exclusive users of public property are subjected (albeit users of abusive or non-compliant constructions with respect to the original concession) and the opportunity for the community to derive – also retroactively – from maritime state property the dynamic profitability of the market”. All the more so since the retroactive intervention would operate within a relationship that has as its object a patrimonial benefit with respect to which there would be "the legitimate expectation of the recipients of the original regulation, ex Article 23 of the Constitution”.

5.2.– From another perspective, the violation of Articles 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution is put forward, also through the reference to the case law of the ECHR, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, given that the financial reasons indicated alone would not be sufficient reason to justify a legislative intervention "destined to have repercussions on ongoing proceedings”. In particular, the retroactive effect of the law, "aimed at preserving the economic interest of the State that is a party to ongoing proceedings”, would be "in clear and open conflict” with the principles of fair trial, the equality of arms in the proceedings and with the attributions constitutionally reserved to the judicial authority.

Furthermore, the admittedly "undoubted need to contain the public spending of local authorities” and to "protect the assets of the State” would not have been adequately balanced with the sacrifice imposed on the inviolable right, guaranteed by Article 24, first paragraph, of the Constitution, to take legal action to defend one's rights and legitimate interests, which is violated by a regulatory intervention that occurred "during proceedings in which the State is a party”.

6.– G. S., party in the proceedings a quo, has appeared in the proceedings, and has retraced both the procedural events, already summarised in the referral order, and the arguments made by the latter regarding the interpretative nature of the challenged provision.

With regard to this last point, in particular, it stated that, if no doubt can be raised regarding the purpose of authentic interpretation pursued by the first sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of the financial law for 2007, the second sentence should instead be recognized a clear innovative value, insofar as it establishes that, for occupations consisting of the construction of immovable works, the compensation should no longer be calculated with reference to the concession fee, but rather by basing it on market values.

In any case, the defense of the private party has adhered to the conclusions reached by the referral order, regarding the constitutional illegitimacy of the challenged provision, due to conflict with the parameters evoked by the Court of Cassation.

7.– The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the State Attorney General's Office, has intervened in the proceedings.

The intervening party, having reconstructed the argumentative parabola of the referring court and illustrated the regulatory context of reference, asked to declare inadmissible or unfounded all the questions raised.

7.1.– Firstly, the Attorney General's Office has raised the objection of inadmissibility, "due to irrelevance and lack of pertinence”, of the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Articles 24, first paragraph, 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, with regard to the alleged violation of the sphere reserved to the jurisdiction as a result of the retroactivity of the challenged provision.

According to the intervening party, the questions raised, from this perspective, would be abstract, because it would already be evident from the referral order itself that the first instance proceedings were initiated in 2009, that is, after the entry into force of the provision suspected of constitutional illegitimacy.

7.2.– As for the merits, the State Attorney General's Office highlights the lack of foundation of the questions raised with reference to Articles 3 and 23 of the Constitution.

In the introduction, the intervening party reiterates the reasonableness of a rule that provides for the reference to market values for the quantification of the compensation for damage suffered by the State as a consequence of the violation of ownership of state property, observing how the criterion of reference to pre-established values – used before the advent of the challenged provision – makes, over time, conduct carried out in violation of the law advantageous, and thus constitutes an incentive to violate it.

This being stated, the Attorney General's Office proceeds from the factual assumption, also ascertained by the referring Court of Cassation, that the subject to whom the administration has requested compensation for unlawful occupation of state property "is a transgressor, […], having built and used on maritime state property land an immovable construction in the total absence of an enabling title and in the absence of a concession title”.

The expectation that the referring court considers violated would be in itself illegitimate and therefore "the principle of consistency and certainty of the law cannot be invoked in favor of a transgressor”, in the face of the construction of unlawful works on a state property area, thus irreversibly transformed.

The permanent nature of the unlawful act itself would prevent the transgressor from invoking "the stability of the legal order on which he may have relied to decide on his conduct”.

In support of this assumption, the Attorney General's Office refers to the case law of this Court on long-term relationships, to argue that the legislator could well change the rules during the course of the relationship, also with retroactive effects, to regulate the compensation for "damage from the violation of the (public state) ownership right”, in order to protect State assets through equivalent reinstatement according to the general principles of civil liability.

In this last regard, it adds that "the constitutional relevance of the protection of state assets and property, especially maritime state property” should not be underestimated, which is closely linked to the "protection of the landscape, the marine environment, with its biodiversity and related ecosystems”, to be placed on at least an equal level with the protection of private property.

Moreover, according to the Attorney General's Office, the assumption from which the referring court proceeds would also be erroneous from a different perspective.

In particular, it observes that the legislator has not expressly qualified as an authentic interpretation the rule contained in the second sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of Law No. 296 of 2006. In the opinion of the intervening party, this provision would instead dictate an innovative rule, albeit with retroactive effects. As such, it would not be unconstitutional per se, given that the legislator, outside the penal sphere, may well dictate provisions with retroactive effect, provided that the latter finds adequate justification in the need to protect principles, rights and assets of constitutional importance.

In this case, the legislative choice would not be manifestly arbitrary, in the face of the need to protect interests – illustrated previously – "of such importance as to prevail over the needs related to the protection of the expectation, moreover not legitimate, of the recipients of the original regulation”, who could well have foreseen a regulatory change aimed at operating a new and more balanced balance between the rights of the individual and the interest in the enhancement and protection of public assets.

8.– The private party and the President of the Council of Ministers, near the hearing, have filed written briefs, in which they have confirmed and further illustrated their defenses.

8.1.– The intervening party, in particular, has pointed out that the authentic interpretation carried out by the legislator with the first sentence of the challenged provision would have limited itself to restricting the field of application of Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 400 of 1993, as converted, excluding from its scope unlawful occupations characterised by the construction of unpermitted removable works on the state property area concerned. The second sentence, consequently, would have limited itself to confirming that, for the cases not included in the aforementioned Article 8, "the ordinary civil regime” of compensation for damage from unlawful occupation of a real estate property, normally calculated "based on the income that can be obtained from the concession of use of the property”, should apply, without prejudice to the possibility of compensation in kind consisting of the restoration of the places, as well as the applicability of the other penalties provided for by public law.

8.2.– The private party, instead, adhered to the arguments of the referring court, in particular with regard to the questions raised with reference to Articles 24, first paragraph, 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, observing how the challenged provision is destined "to have repercussions on ongoing proceedings”, without it being possible to identify "an imperative reason of general interest […] such as to adequately balance the sacrifice of the individual with the inviolable right, guaranteed by Article 24 of the Constitution, to take legal action to defend their rights and legitimate interests”.

Reasons for the Decision

1.– The Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, raises questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1, paragraph 257, second sentence, of Law No. 296 of 2006 (Financial Law 2007), insofar as it "provides for the retroactive application of the new criteria for determining the compensation for the unlawful, or non-compliant, construction of immovable works on the maritime state property, which are based on market values and not on the legislative criteria expressed in the previous Legislative Decree no. 400 of 1993”, with reference to Articles 3, 23, 24, first paragraph, 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR.

The aforementioned paragraph 257, in the first sentence (not challenged), offers the authentic interpretation of Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 400 of 1993, as converted, which sets out the criteria for quantifying – starting from the year 1990 – the compensation due for the "uses contemplated therein” of state property. In particular, the aforementioned Article 8 determines the compensation in an amount equal to that due as a concession fee, "increased respectively by two hundred percent and one hundred percent”, depending on whether there is a total lack of concession or only a non-compliance with it. These uses, as a result of the exegesis imposed by the legislator himself in the first sentence of paragraph 257, must be considered as referring "to the mere occupation of maritime state property and related appurtenances”.

The second sentence of the same paragraph 257 – which is the provision suspected of constitutional illegitimacy – provides that "[i]f, instead, the occupation consists of the construction on maritime state property of immovable works in the total absence of an enabling title or in the presence of an enabling title which, due to its content, is incompatible with the destination and regulation of the state property, the compensation due is commensurate with market values, without prejudice to the application of the current penalty measures, including the restoration of the state of places”.

2.– The judgment challenged in the main proceedings considered lawful the application of the new criteria for calculating the compensation also to a period of unlawful occupation prior to the entry into force of Law No. 296 of 2006. The grievances of the appellant in the proceedings a quo, which led the Court of Cassation to raise the questions of constitutional legitimacy that are the subject of today's scrutiny, are focused precisely on this ruling.

3.– The referring court observes that, if the suspicions of constitutional illegitimacy were declared well-founded, the case should be decided without applying the challenged provision, but resorting to the "previous rule of judgment”.

This is sufficient to overcome the external review that belongs to this Court with regard to the relevance of the questions raised.

4.– As for non-manifest unfoundedness, in the opinion of the a quo panel, the wording of the entire paragraph 257 of Article 1 of the 2007 financial law would prevent the challenged provision from being considered in terms of an innovative rule, as such applicable only from 1 January 2007, it being rather necessary to recognize it as having a clear interpretative nature.

The consequent retroactive effect of the legal provision leads the judge a quo to doubt its compatibility with the constitutional parameters evoked.

Firstly, in violation of Articles 3 and 23 of the Constitution, with regard to the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations, the legislator would not have made a fair balance between the conflicting interests, also in light of the case law of the ECHR on retroactive laws.

From another angle, and also in this case with the support of the case law of the ECHR, the violation of Articles 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution is put forward, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR. In particular, a legislative intervention would be involved that, as it is "destined to have repercussions on ongoing proceedings” in order to influence the outcome, would violate the principles of fair trial and equality of arms between the parties, as well as the right to defense and, at the same time, the attributions constitutionally reserved to the judicial authority.

5.– The Attorney General's Office has raised the objection of inadmissibility, "due to irrelevance and lack of pertinence”, of the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Articles 24, 102, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR, with regard to the alleged violation of the sphere reserved to the jurisdiction as a result of the retroactivity of the challenged provision.

According to the intervening party, the question raised, from this perspective, would be abstract, because it would already be evident from the referral order itself that the first instance proceedings before the Court of Rome were initiated in 2009, that is, after the entry into force of the provision suspected of constitutional illegitimacy.

6.– As a preliminary matter - with regard to the questions raised by the referring court with reference to Articles 24, first paragraph, 102, first paragraph, 111, first and second paragraphs, and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 6 ECHR - the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Attorney General's Office must be accepted, albeit for reasons different from those put forward by the latter.

Although, in fact, the main proceedings were introduced only after the date of entry into force of the challenged provision (1 January 2007), the referring court has not excluded the possible pendency, at the time when the legislator decided to intervene, of other proceedings concerning the determination of the amount of compensation in question.

However, this aspect is only mentioned, while the argument should have been illustrated more extensively, in light of the constant constitutional case law (which, for this part, converges with that developed by the ECHR, widely cited in the referral order), according to which the assessment in terms of misuse of legislative power presupposes that "the State or the public administration” are "parties to already established proceedings”, the outcome of which may be influenced (judgments no. 4 of 2024 and no. 174 of 2019; in the same sense, judgments no. 145 of 2022, no. 260 of 2015 and no. 303 of 2011).

7.– Moving on to the examination, on the merits, of the remaining questions raised with reference to Articles 3 and 23 of the Constitution, the Court of Cassation has limited the object of the doubt of constitutional illegitimacy to only the second sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of the 2007 financial law, to which it has extended the qualification in terms of authentic interpretation provided by the legislator himself at the beginning of the previous first sentence. From this, it has deduced the retroactive effect also of the challenged provision, for this reason exposed to doubts of compatibility with the constitutional parameters evoked.

This Court does not share this hermeneutical presupposition, the erroneousness of which, however, does not exclude the admissibility of the questions raised, since a retroactive effect can still be attributed to the provision under examination, albeit according to a different exegetical itinerary.

7.1.– The provision interpreted by the legislator – Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 400 of 1993, as converted – was limited to distinguishing between uses that did not comply with the concession and uses that were totally devoid of a title and, for the calculation of the related compensation, used as a parameter only the concession fee, differentiating the percentage increases in the two cases.

The original regulation did not, instead, make any explicit distinction between "mere occupations” of maritime state property and more serious abuses, consisting of the construction of unlawful immovable works on the areas already unlawfully occupied.

In this context, precisely, the first sentence of paragraph 257 of Article 1 of Law No. 296 of 2006 intervened, which wanted to clarify the scope of the provision, providing that the aforementioned Article 8 is interpreted "in the sense that the uses contemplated therein refer to the mere occupation of maritime state property and related appurtenances”.

The authentically interpretative, and therefore retroactive, character of the first sentence of the aforementioned paragraph 257 is peacefully recognized by the case law, in terms shared by this Court: in this sense, among the latest, the Court of Cassation, Second Civil Section, order no. 12154 of 8 May 2023 and Third